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2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › K---Taiwo

Calls to repair fit within a political project of methodological cosmopolitanism. To be a nation-state means to be an international political body suggesting it is appropriate to discuss global issues contextually, ie. Understanding the legacy of slavery in America means understanding America’s role in the global system of racial capitalism.

Magali Bessone, 02-22-2017, Bessone is Professor of political philosophy at Panthéon-Sorbonne University, member of the ISJPS (Institut des Sciences Juridique et Philosophique de la Sorbonne, UMR 8103) and associate researcher at Centre International de Recherche sur l’Esclavage et les Post-esclavages focusing on theories of justice and critical theories of race and racism, “From Reparations for Slavery to International Racial Justice: A Critical Republican Perspective”, GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC, https://doi.org/10.21248/gjn.9.2.117 // VDR

However, listening to the agents’ normative claims does not imply that we should necessarily endorse these claims. Moreover, marginalised agents may have competing claims: dominated groups are not univocal. Therefore, from a methodological perspective, critical republicanism’s diagnosis and formulation of such injustices requires close collaboration between normative theory on one hand and sociological, juridical and historical empirical analyses on the other. Sociological, legal and historical examination is necessary to explore and expose the reality of the domination actually experienced by actors in different spheres as well as the specific dimension of idealisation in all our normative ideals.18 In Cécile Laborde’s terms,19 critical republicanism, if it indicates sustaining the priority of injustice and working toward non-domination, has to test ‘official’ republican norms or ideals against empirical facts to demonstrate how these ideals were genealogically constructed and how they sometimes sociologically as factors in oppression or exclusion. Moreover, I suggest that such a critical republican theory leads us to a specific understanding of some global issues that are distinctively ‘international.’ This is different from current dominant paradigms — in particular, from the ‘methodological nationalism’ adopted by the tenants of what Laborde labels ‘official republicanism,’20 as well as from what David Miller refers to as ‘strong cosmopolitanism.’21 Following Isabelle Delpla, I propose to name this form of non-individualistic methodological cosmopolitanism ‘methodological internationalism.’22 It implies both that states remain primary agents of international justice (they matter for historical reasons) and that they should prima facie be understood as international entities operating within the framework of international law. This view retains from methodological nationalism the idea that nation-states are fundamental agents of global justice. However, it agrees with methodological cosmopolitanism as it recognises that states are inherently embedded in an international system of norms. Nation-states are part of an international order that has foreign policy implications: other states, or international institutions and organisations, inevitably influence their internal decisions. More significantly, however, methodological internationalism highlights that international circumstances are an essential part of the domestic ‘circumstances of politics’ where we assess which principles of justice should structure our social settings and institutions. Principles of justice always have both national and international implications — there is nothing like a strictly domestic principle of justice. The significance of nation-states in matters of justice can thus be both acknowledged and deeply revised: to be a nation-state means to be an international political body. Such methodological internationalism has two important epistemic consequences. First, it becomes not only possible but also appropriate to discuss global issues contextually. The meaning and significance of global political problems vary according to the perspective adopted, the public culture and the social norms of the political entity in which they are framed. This suggests that no political issue can simply be envisaged as a domestic issue and injustices in redistribution, recognition or representation always have an international dimension.23 Second, such an approach pleads for a dynamic — transitional — self-understanding of political entities. It recognises that even those republican polities, such as France, that view themselves as essentially close-bounded and homogenous communities, have created this representation of themselves in an actively promoted domestic political myth, which involved denying their inherently international character. In official republicanism, our core national identity is supposed to have emerged ‘from within’ the nation rather than primarily from (a constant interaction with) international norms and procedures. Hence, identifying the nation-state as a constitutively international entity could lead us to support the view of the French republic as a more open and pluralist body: it promotes the possibility of an effective change in the self-representation of French national identity. This endeavour is, in contrast to official republicanism, an important challenge for critical republicanism. For these methodological reasons, I suggest that the effort to prioritise injustices, coupled with a focus on their meaning in specific contexts whose national character is already international, can prove to be a heuristically useful manner of grasping global justice issues. Such contextualised theorisation allows us to develop a better understanding and more precise account of how new forms of injustice emerge from certain socio-historical relations within and across polities and how these are framed in situated languages or grammars that reveal the tension between their supposedly national, and really international, character. The ‘Official Republican’ Perspective on ReparationsReparations for colonial slavery have recently been prominent in the French public sphere. The demand for reparations appeared both as part of an international trend, precipitated by the UNESCO World Conference Against Racism in Durban in 2001, where African and Caribbean delegations set the agenda on reparations, and in the national context of the (first) ‘Taubira law’ (2001)24 which recognised slavery and the slave trade as ‘crimes against humanity.’ The activist group Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires (CRAN) called for a national debate on reparations in 2012 and 2013. Although this was rejected by the French state,25 it was largely publicised in the media; however, it aroused both misunderstanding and opposition.26 Reparations are perceived as an expression of the ‘memory war’27 that has been raging in France since the late 1990s and was particularly virulent in 2005–2006 after the so-called ‘riots’ in the suburbs of Paris. This war is all the more acute because it affects the national identity narrative, in which unity and coherency is perceived to be threatened due to colonial fracture and the possible recognition of a criminal past.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › K---Unpayable Debt › AT: White Benevolence Link

We can recognize unplayability but give repayment anyway--- Delaying reparations upholds white supremacy---Their ev.

Gearin ‘22 [Gearin, L. R. M., was published in the Department of Peace and Global Studies, Earlham College 2022, July 5. (UN)settling unpayable debt: Theorizing and disrupting the production of white “benevolence” during giving to reparations funds. Journal of Critical Race Inquiry. https://jcri.ca/index.php/CRI/article/view/15010]//MMS

If white people feel at ease about holding onto structural power by taking credit for the beneficial effects of their reparative actions, perhaps a different orientation could begin from a stance of radical humility. This premise of radical humility does not mean that white people should do nothing. It does mean, however, that white people cannot assume that their actions give rise to consequential effects that they can take ownership (and thus credit) over. In contrast to calls for white epistemic humility, where white people are encouraged to act as if they cannot “truly” know (Medina, 2012), here I suggest humility in relation to moral agency. In this, I am inspired by Riggs’s (2004) argument that white claims to moral agency always reify hierarchical orderings of agency and allow white people to manage their stake in white supremacy. When white people operate under the assumption that their actions actually cannot bring about significant consequences, they cannot arrive at a place where they imagine that giving reparations adequately compensates for the violence of whiteness. I am not arguing that reparative giving does not bring about meaningful consequences, but instead seeking to explore the ways that a stance that disavows consequential agency can make white benevolence inoperable. In effect, white people who are denied consequential agency lose the capacity to use giving to “balance the score” and are instead positioned to give reparations continuously, without expecting that each payment lessens their implication or responsibility. It is not that actions do not matter in the stance of radical humility, but that white people are re-oriented away from remembering, tallying, and accumulating credit for the impact of their actions. As Harney and Moten argue, justice can begin when we recognize that “there is no payment possible” but give repayment anyways (2013, 61). The stance of radical humility is a tool for orienting white people toward an ethic of giving reparations that is suffused with forgetfulness rather than accounting. The stance of radical humility is useful insofar as it has the potential to scramble the frameworks of white benevolence. As Rigby Jr. and Ziyad (2016) argue, There is nothing redeeming or redeemable about whiteness—by definition. Only the radical negation of it is helpful or freeing … Therefore, white people should move comfortably in neither Black spaces nor white spaces. Even those who are well-meaning should drive themselves into the ground trying to figure out how to occupy a positive whiteness—because it is impossible. Only in this frenzy, when the sense of order that is critical to whiteness turns to chaos in every place, can the motivation to destroy it overcome the compulsion to reform it (para. 7). Ribgy Jr. and Ziyad argue that the internal sensibilities of whiteness must become uninhabitable chaos for white people to forego the hope of ixnhabiting a non-harmful whiteness. The internal sensibilities of benevolent whiteness are informed by frameworks of consequential agency, individuality, and transactional responsibility. A stance of radical humility denies white people consequential agency, insists that they do not have individual ownership over their actions, and presents a vision of an ongoing, never finished responsibility to redress racial injustice. As such, the stance of radical humility scrambles the frameworks that make white benevolence into an operable and inhabitable position. By locating white people firmly within whiteness and then inviting them to give in ways that make white benevolence nonsensical, a stance of radical humility might productively turn the internal order of whiteness into uninhabitable chaos. The stance of radical humility is useful for the reorientation it can provide, not necessarily for its truthfulness or falseness. However, it is worth noting that the premise is not as far from truth as it might first appear. As Rigby Jr. and Ziyad (2016) argue, [white people have] been the conduits for necessary Black liberation work. White people surely played integral roles … But those roles were meticulously crafted by the toils, lives, death and suffering of Black people. The energy forced through those conduits was painstakingly produced by Black folks” (para. 16). The orienting premise that white people cannot, in fact, achieve anything through their actions does not mean that they should do nothing. It simply means that white people must recognize that their actions are profoundly contingent upon the work of others. Consequently, the stance of radical humility is also useful because it denies white entitlement to autonomous moral agency in the work of racial justice. For Sullivan (2008), however, granting moral agency to white people is essential if they are to avoid becoming paralyzed by guilt and are instead going to be able to enact anti-racist decisions and actions, even if imperfect. Similarly, Martín Alcoff (1988) argues that white people need to feel that they can act to repair racist harm and be good to others, even as they recognize that the weight of their racial history is against them, in order to feel connected to others and act against racial injustice. Sullivan and Martín Alcoff are correct in raising concerns about the tendency for white people to sink into defeatist attitudes when faced with the weight of white supremacy; at the same time, it seems that denying white people their entitlement to moral agency might actually allow them to feel more connected to others and the work of reparations. In denying consequential agency, the stance of radical humility pushes white people to understand their relationships and responsibility to others in sustained, rather than transactional, ways. Sullivan is concerned that denying white people moral agency “tends to make [B]lack and other non-white people solely responsible for white redemption and deliverance from racism” (2008, 252-3), yet the stance of radical humility operates to make white responsibility to give reparations into an unfinished and never-ending commitment. As such, the stance of radical humility can productively deepen white people’s sense of responsibility to act on racial injustice, rather than allowing them to sink into complacency. To be clear, the stance of radical humility is useful as an orienting principle for white organizing around reparative action, not as a call for white people to individually act out reparations with humility. Unlike Ignatiev and Garvey’s (1996) framework of race traitorship, I do not assume that individual disobedience toward whiteness presents a challenge to the structure of white supremacy. Individualizing and interiorizing the work to disfigure whiteness is not necessarily useful because whiteness is a structuring force, not an aggregation of individual white identities. The stance of radical humility has the potential to disfigure whiteness only insofar as it cultivates the conditions for white people to organize collective redistributive politics in ways that scramble the internal sensibilities of whiteness. 1. Sara Ahmed (2007) critiques the tendency to end academic work on racism with hopeful suggestions about what white people might do better. She argues that this move shifts attention away from the incommensurable “stuckness” of white anti-racism and centers the agency of the white subject. Instead of offering helpful suggestions, she argues that we must remain grounded in the stubborn persistence of whiteness, writing, In not being promising, in refusing to promise anything, such an approach to whiteness can allow us to keep open the force of the critique. It is by showing how we are stuck, by attending to what is habitual and routine in ‘the what’ of the world, that we can keep open the possibility of habit changes, without using that possibility to displace our attention to the present, and without simply wishing for new tricks (2007, pp. 164-165). This project has been oriented by a commitment to thinking carefully about the incommensurabilities of white anti-racist practice. Taking up Ahmed’s call, I showed how white reparations organizing is deeply stuck in reproducing whiteness and upholding white supremacy. At the same time, however, I also began with a commitment to theorize a more disruptive way for white people to give reparations in this current moment. Given that the time for reparations is now and to delay further is to continue to uphold white supremacy, we must theorize how a different kind of redistributive politics might be possible within the conditions of this moment without indulging in hopefulness about the potential for white anti-racism to transform itself. It is my hope that the idea of a stance of radical humility can help disrupt white benevolence by orienting us toward a different reparative politics without obscuring the incommensurable stuckness of white anti-racism.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › K---Unpayable Debt › AT: White Benevolence Link

Hamilton 19 is literally the bootstraps mythology, which is Black Capitalist---the rest of the article just says that black people should start businesses, get real estate, or “get educated”

Ford 10 [Glen Ford, American journalist, Co-founder of Black Agenda Report, Sep 15, 2010, Black Folks Ain't Got No Money For Bootstraps: The Black Capitalist Dead End, https://www.blackagendareport.com/content/black-folks-aint-got-no-money-bootstraps-black-capitalist-dead-end, accessed July 13 2023]

The two devastating recessions of the last decade have had catastrophic effects on Black economic prospects. Yet, despite the monstrous setbacks of recent years and the general failure to bridge the racial wage and wealth gap over the last three decades, there still exists a strong current of Black political thought that insists African Americans can pull themselves and the rest of the race up by their financial bootstraps, through hard work and pooling of collective resources. Some of these arguments are unashamedly Black capitalist; others preach a brand of communal partnerships among Black entrepreneurs and consumers that attempts to make the entire Black community a kind of capitalist engine of self-help. What binds the variations on the "bootstrap" theme together, is an essential refusal to challenge the capitalist system. The belief is that Black "buying power" or race-based investment schemes will allow Black folks to rise from the bottom of the American economic barrel. Implicit in this line of thinking is the notion that Blacks are at the bottom because they have not been trying hard enough to move up - which is also the assumption of white racists, whether they call themselves conservatives or liberals. The most fatal flaw in the Black capitalist world view is the assumption that Black people actually have the wealth and discretionary income to build an internal economy that could insulate them from the general capitalist crisis. We know different, because all the data tell us that Black household income is stuck at the same level relative to whites as back in 1979, and Black comparative wealth was steadily eroding even before the last decade's recessions. And we know that Black wealth has been further diminished relative to whites in the ongoing housing meltdown, in which Blacks are twice as likely to face foreclosure. And we know that Blacks, a majority of whom are renters, bear the brunt of the dislocations caused by rampant gentrification, which in some urban areas forces families to spend more than half their income on rent. "The most fatal flaw in the Black capitalist world view is the assumption that Black people actually have the wealth and discretionary income to build an internal economy that could insulate them from the general capitalist crisis." Simply put, there ain't no damn money for these bootstrap capitalism dreams, and there never was. There was never the possibility of building a Black General Motors - and now General Motors requires billions of dollars in federal infusions to survive. What a great distraction this nonsense about bootstrap racial upward mobility has been - so much wasted time and misdirected dreams over the generations. Worse than that, the bootstraps mythology - sometimes under the shorthand, "Do for Self" - implicitly or explicitly urges Black people to forego making demands of government, as if that amounts to "begging the white man" for something. This attitude surrenders all Black claims to any of the society's resources except those we currently hold in our own pockets - which is the equivalent of social death. President Obama also warns Blacks to expect no redress from their government. At a recent press conference, he once again urged Blacks to be patient, that when the economy grows, everybody will be "swept up into that virtuous circle." It never happened before, and it never will. Blacks need to "Do for Self," but not as aspiring capitalists. We have always made our greatest progress in political struggle. That's the Promised Land that we make, together.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › K---Unpayable Debt › 2AC

Black Americans have faced material harms that require material solutions – symbolic actions curtail the possibility of any pragmatic solutions. The 1AC acknowledges that repair is not primarily about money, but rather about centering political strategy around social justice to improve collective needs.

Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò, 11-2022, Táíwò’s theoretical work draws liberally from the Black radical tradition, anti-colonial thought, German transcendental philosophy, contemporary philosophy of language, contemporary social science, and histories of activism and activist thinkers, “Reconsidering Reparations”, Oxford University Press

Here, Coates, or I myself, might have been surprised. At least some of those things are precisely what we want from reparations. Hughes exploits a haze of ambiguity around reparations: what are they about? Adolph Reed, Jr. describes the call for reparations for African Americans as a blend of “material, symbolic, and psychological components.”4 Reed explains that the United States’s long history of slavery and racial economic apartheid has cost African Americans in direct and indirect “material” ways, which include racially discriminatory lending practices, as well as the violent exclusion of Blacks from voting and other aspects of public political life. Reparations projects that involve financial payment of some kind might go some distance toward remedying this. But also important are means of addressing impersonal material considerations such as political representation, as well as attempts to counter symbolic injustices, such as monuments and memorials that continue to propagate the ideology of global racism. Finally, some proponents of reparations believe that they will raise collective racial consciousness and provide tools to address social pathologies that are related to the painful history of slavery and racial domination

Reed thinks the ambiguity caused by these separate categories of goals is a liability, since elites can then exploit it by choosing the version of reparations that is cheapest for them: the symbolic. We have already seen this tendency at work: in Washington, D.C., the capital of the United States, the mayor decided to paint “Black Lives Matter” on the plaza in front of the White House, in response to the 2020 summer of protests against racist police violence. There, mere days later, law enforcement continued to brutalize protestors while the mayor supported a multimillion dollar budget increase to their budget.5 More important, overinvestment from any level of society into such symbolic reparations could detract energy and resources from an alternative, preferable political project: “building broad solidarity across race, gender, and other identities around shared concerns of daily life” like “access to quality health care, the right to a decent and dignified livelihood, affordable housing, quality education for all.” Here, Reed sounds the alarm later raised by Hughes—that the call for reparations for some distracts from a more worthy political project that would provide justice for all.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › K---Unpayable Debt › 2AC

We can recognize unpayability but give repayment anyway--- Delaying reparations upholds white supremacy---Their ev.

Gearin ‘22 [Gearin, L. R. M., was published in the Department of Peace and Global Studies, Earlham College 2022, July 5. (UN)settling unpayable debt: Theorizing and disrupting the production of white “benevolence” during giving to reparations funds. Journal of Critical Race Inquiry. https://jcri.ca/index.php/CRI/article/view/15010]//MMS

If white people feel at ease about holding onto structural power by taking credit for the beneficial effects of their reparative actions, perhaps a different orientation could begin from a stance of radical humility. This premise of radical humility does not mean that white people should do nothing. It does mean, however, that white people cannot assume that their actions give rise to consequential effects that they can take ownership (and thus credit) over. In contrast to calls for white epistemic humility, where white people are encouraged to act as if they cannot “truly” know (Medina, 2012), here I suggest humility in relation to moral agency. In this, I am inspired by Riggs’s (2004) argument that white claims to moral agency always reify hierarchical orderings of agency and allow white people to manage their stake in white supremacy. When white people operate under the assumption that their actions actually cannot bring about significant consequences, they cannot arrive at a place where they imagine that giving reparations adequately compensates for the violence of whiteness. I am not arguing that reparative giving does not bring about meaningful consequences, but instead seeking to explore the ways that a stance that disavows consequential agency can make white benevolence inoperable. In effect, white people who are denied consequential agency lose the capacity to use giving to “balance the score” and are instead positioned to give reparations continuously, without expecting that each payment lessens their implication or responsibility. It is not that actions do not matter in the stance of radical humility, but that white people are re-oriented away from remembering, tallying, and accumulating credit for the impact of their actions. As Harney and Moten argue, justice can begin when we recognize that “there is no payment possible” but give repayment anyways (2013, 61). The stance of radical humility is a tool for orienting white people toward an ethic of giving reparations that is suffused with forgetfulness rather than accounting. The stance of radical humility is useful insofar as it has the potential to scramble the frameworks of white benevolence. As Rigby Jr. and Ziyad (2016) argue, There is nothing redeeming or redeemable about whiteness—by definition. Only the radical negation of it is helpful or freeing … Therefore, white people should move comfortably in neither Black spaces nor white spaces. Even those who are well-meaning should drive themselves into the ground trying to figure out how to occupy a positive whiteness—because it is impossible. Only in this frenzy, when the sense of order that is critical to whiteness turns to chaos in every place, can the motivation to destroy it overcome the compulsion to reform it (para. 7). Ribgy Jr. and Ziyad argue that the internal sensibilities of whiteness must become uninhabitable chaos for white people to forego the hope of inhabiting a non-harmful whiteness. The internal sensibilities of benevolent whiteness are informed by frameworks of consequential agency, individuality, and transactional responsibility. A stance of radical humility denies white people consequential agency, insists that they do not have individual ownership over their actions, and presents a vision of an ongoing, never finished responsibility to redress racial injustice. As such, the stance of radical humility scrambles the frameworks that make white benevolence into an operable and inhabitable position. By locating white people firmly within whiteness and then inviting them to give in ways that make white benevolence nonsensical, a stance of radical humility might productively turn the internal order of whiteness into uninhabitable chaos. The stance of radical humility is useful for the reorientation it can provide, not necessarily for its truthfulness or falseness. However, it is worth noting that the premise is not as far from truth as it might first appear. As Rigby Jr. and Ziyad (2016) argue, [white people have] been the conduits for necessary Black liberation work. White people surely played integral roles … But those roles were meticulously crafted by the toils, lives, death and suffering of Black people. The energy forced through those conduits was painstakingly produced by Black folks” (para. 16). The orienting premise that white people cannot, in fact, achieve anything through their actions does not mean that they should do nothing. It simply means that white people must recognize that their actions are profoundly contingent upon the work of others. Consequently, the stance of radical humility is also useful because it denies white entitlement to autonomous moral agency in the work of racial justice. For Sullivan (2008), however, granting moral agency to white people is essential if they are to avoid becoming paralyzed by guilt and are instead going to be able to enact anti-racist decisions and actions, even if imperfect. Similarly, Martín Alcoff (1988) argues that white people need to feel that they can act to repair racist harm and be good to others, even as they recognize that the weight of their racial history is against them, in order to feel connected to others and act against racial injustice. Sullivan and Martín Alcoff are correct in raising concerns about the tendency for white people to sink into defeatist attitudes when faced with the weight of white supremacy; at the same time, it seems that denying white people their entitlement to moral agency might actually allow them to feel more connected to others and the work of reparations. In denying consequential agency, the stance of radical humility pushes white people to understand their relationships and responsibility to others in sustained, rather than transactional, ways. Sullivan is concerned that denying white people moral agency “tends to make [B]lack and other non-white people solely responsible for white redemption and deliverance from racism” (2008, 252-3), yet the stance of radical humility operates to make white responsibility to give reparations into an unfinished and never-ending commitment. As such, the stance of radical humility can productively deepen white people’s sense of responsibility to act on racial injustice, rather than allowing them to sink into complacency. To be clear, the stance of radical humility is useful as an orienting principle for white organizing around reparative action, not as a call for white people to individually act out reparations with humility. Unlike Ignatiev and Garvey’s (1996) framework of race traitorship, I do not assume that individual disobedience toward whiteness presents a challenge to the structure of white supremacy. Individualizing and interiorizing the work to disfigure whiteness is not necessarily useful because whiteness is a structuring force, not an aggregation of individual white identities. The stance of radical humility has the potential to disfigure whiteness only insofar as it cultivates the conditions for white people to organize collective redistributive politics in ways that scramble the internal sensibilities of whiteness. 1. Sara Ahmed (2007) critiques the tendency to end academic work on racism with hopeful suggestions about what white people might do better. She argues that this move shifts attention away from the incommensurable “stuckness” of white anti-racism and centers the agency of the white subject. Instead of offering helpful suggestions, she argues that we must remain grounded in the stubborn persistence of whiteness, writing, In not being promising, in refusing to promise anything, such an approach to whiteness can allow us to keep open the force of the critique. It is by showing how we are stuck, by attending to what is habitual and routine in ‘the what’ of the world, that we can keep open the possibility of habit changes, without using that possibility to displace our attention to the present, and without simply wishing for new tricks (2007, pp. 164-165). This project has been oriented by a commitment to thinking carefully about the incommensurabilities of white anti-racist practice. Taking up Ahmed’s call, I showed how white reparations organizing is deeply stuck in reproducing whiteness and upholding white supremacy. At the same time, however, I also began with a commitment to theorize a more disruptive way for white people to give reparations in this current moment. Given that the time for reparations is now and to delay further is to continue to uphold white supremacy, we must theorize how a different kind of redistributive politics might be possible within the conditions of this moment without indulging in hopefulness about the potential for white anti-racism to transform itself. It is my hope that the idea of a stance of radical humility can help disrupt white benevolence by orienting us toward a different reparative politics without obscuring the incommensurable stuckness of white anti-racism.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC Case › Solvency › 2AC---Solvency---UBI Key---AT: Stigma

UBI solves for welfare stigma

Tedds et al 20’ [Lindsay M. Tedds: Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Calgary; Ph.D. in Economics, McMaster University; MA, Department of Economics, University of Victoria; B.A., Economics, University of Victoria; B.A., Political Science, Carleton University. Daria Crisan: Research Associate at University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy, Gillian Petit: Research associate at the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary University of Calgary. 12-1-20, “Basic Income in Canada: Principles and Design Features,” Tedds, Lindsay M. and Crisan, Daria and Petit, Gillian, Basic Income in Canada: Principles and Design Features (December 1, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3781834 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3781834]

There is a firmly held notion that receiving support through the existing income assistance system is shameful and demeaning. Stigma arises from negative social attitudes of others toward benefit recipients, and negative self-characterizations (i.e., feeling like a failure, shame) which, as a consequence, devalues recipients to a class lower than non-recipients, sometimes referred to as “the undeserving poor.” Stigma affects both the take-up of income assistance benefits and the mental and physical well-being of those who receive them (Friedrichsen et al., 2017; Geiger, 2015; Ribar, 2014). Sources of stigma are also inherent within the system itself in various aspects: individual attributions of responsibility for poverty, how the program is implemented, including wait times, and negative interactions with caseworkers (Stuber & Schlesinger, 2006). For example, a program that singles out low-income persons/households, such as a means-tested cash transfer, is more stigmatizing than a program that provides a cash transfer to nearly everyone (such as the Canada Child Benefit). Addressing stigma is important to achieving the goal of alleviating poverty: the higher the stigma associated with a program, the lower the take-up of benefits and the less effective the program is at achieving its goals, which may include the alleviation of poverty (Celhay et al., 2017; Friedrichsen et al., 2017; Geiger, 2015; Moffitt, 1983; Ribar, 2014). A basic income should reduce, if not eliminate, stigma—feelings of shame and the signalling out of a group that is perceived as “less than”—associated with traditional welfare programs and help bolster dignity by ensuring that people are not only treated with respect by the system but are also worthy of such respect. A key component of fostering respect is to ensure that people have autonomy over how they use the assistance provided. Economic Security Economic security is generally defined as the assurance of an adequate income (Rejda, 2012). Economic security depends on three things: financial security, financial stability, and financial continuity. Mapping this back to the definition of economic security, adequacy is achieved through both financial security and financial stability, while assurance is achieved through financial continuity. Financial security is the ability of a person/household to secure a basic quality of life. Financial stability is the ability of households to weather unexpected income shocks, such as unexpected expenses or declines in income. Financial continuity is a reasonable expectation that a base level of income will continue in both the near term and the future. Economic insecurity thus arises when people face limited financial resources, an inability to cover basic expenses, and/or uncertainty in income. The lack of economic security has significant effects on mental health, including fear, worry, anxiety, frustration, and depression. Dealing with economic instability requires constant juggling, which adversely affects decisionmaking. People who are distressed and distracted by their financial burdens may be more likely to err on the job, increasing their chances of being fired. Investing in human capital itself becomes more difficult: attending training programs requires overcoming the recurring inclination to skip a class as one deals with day-to-day struggles, like finding a babysitter or solving the challenges of long commutes. Even learning becomes more difficult when dealing with economic insecurity (Gennetian & Shafir, 2015). The current social assistance system does not support economic security. Social assistance often does not provide sufficient income to cover basic needs and earning additional income results in either a reduction in or revocation of benefits (or fear of the revocation). Many support programs also require individuals to deplete their assets and financial reserves in order to qualify for income support. Furthermore, few of the existing programs in the assistance system provide assurance of a permanent income. Support under many of these programs is neither guaranteed nor fully continuous. There are, however, programs that are continuous for a year, such as the Canada Child Benefit and the GST/HST tax credit—that is, once you are assessed as qualifying for the benefit, your benefit is guaranteed for the next 12 months. In addition, disability assistance can often be guaranteed for life depending on the nature of the disability. A basic income, instead, enhances economic security. A basic income helps cover basic needs and is generally an assured stream of income. Eligibility for a basic income does not require financial reserves to be depleted, which aids beneficiaries in weathering shocks; at minimum, a basic income does not make these shocks any harder to manage then they already are. This aspect of economic security, which is a key part of a basic income, is also essential to a person achieving autonomy. Autonomy occurs as economic security allows people more choices in how they lead their lives. Social Inclusion As outlined stated in United Nations (2016, p. 17) “social inclusion is the process of improving participation in society, particularly for people who are disadvantaged, through enhancing opportunities, access to resources, voice, and respect of rights.” Participation in society is limited when people lack access to material resources, including income and employment, or to services such as health care (United Nations, 2016). Poignantly, this recognizes that people are not able to fully participate in any given sphere without having autonomy to use these material resources to achieve social involvement. That is, social exclusion occurs when individuals face barriers to participating fully or effectively in society. Income poverty is one factor in social exclusion. The current social assistance system attempts to promote social inclusion mainly through paid work; however, this focus on paid work often does not take into account the wellbeing of the recipient. Beneficiaries are encouraged (and in some cases forced) to apply for and accept paid work as quickly as possible without consideration for the quality, sufficiency, or permanency of that paid work.3 Additionally, paid work is not the only path toward social inclusion and the focus on paid work could actually decrease participation in socially beneficial activities. For example, for recipients of social assistance, job search requirements (such as job training or monthly reporting) may reduce the recipient’s ability to pursue other activities that may be both personally and socially beneficial. These other activities may include volunteering, training, caregiving, and education. Comparatively, a basic income promotes opportunity, inclusion, and full participation in society. It does this by altering the choice set of those for whom participation in the formal labour market may not be optimal. For example, for a person considering whether to stay home and care for their young child or enter the labour force, basic income provides a value for the otherwise unpaid child-care option. This enhances social inclusion by valuing unpaid work and providing a source of income to those who choose to engage in unpaid work such as child care and volunteering, education, training, and entrepreneurship. The idea is not that people are unwilling to work, but rather that participation in the formal labour force may not be the optimal choice for all persons. Some advocates of a basic income argue that it should provide for absolute freedom in choosing how to participate, even if that activity is to stay home and bingewatch Netflix all day. However, which activities should be encouraged over others is a program design feature. For example, earnings supplements and earning exemptions that can be paired with basic income programs ensure that work pays, even the first dollar.

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Pilots prove a UBI solves and reduces stigma

Redmond et al 22’ [Paul Redmond earned his PhD in Economics from Maynooth University and is a Senior Research Officer at the Economic & Social Research Institute. Seamus McGuinness earned his PhD in Economics from Queens University Belfast and is a Research Professor and the Research Area Co-ordinator for labour market research at the Economic and Social Research Institute. Klavs Ciprikis earned his PhD in Economics from Technological University Dublin and is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Economic Analysis Division of the Economic & Social Research Institute. 12-20-22, ESRI Research Series 146, “A universal basic income for Ireland: Lessons from the international literature,” https://doi.org/10.26504/rs146]

The Finish basic income experiment was carried out from January 2017 to December 2018. A random sample of 7,000 people between 25 and 58 years old were selected from a nationwide group of 173,000 people who were receiving basic unemployment benefits. The sample was separated into a ‘treatment group’ of 2,000 people who received basic income only and a ‘control group’ of 5,000 people who continued to receive basic unemployment benefits only. Participation in the experiment was mandatory. People in the treatment group received a basic monthly income of €560, which was unconditional, tax exempt and not affected by income from work. The net benefit of basic income was similar to the net benefit of basic unemployment benefits (Kangas, 2019). Initially, both groups were identical in terms of sociodemographic characteristics, and any changes in economic status and unemployment at the end of the experiment may be due to the provision of basic income. 5.5.3 Findings and analysis Persons receiving basic income experienced greater life satisfaction and fewer mental health problems than the control group, and felt better about their economic security.34 In general, no significant employment effect was observed in the first year of the experiment; however, for families with children employment rates improved during both years of the experiment.35 Participants were interviewed and surveyed during and after the basic income experiment. The treatment group reported that their trust in other people and social institutions improved compared to the control group, and that they had higher confidence in future possibilities.36 5.6 BARCELONA (SPAIN) 5.6.1 Aims and objectives The aim of Barcelona’s B-MINCOME pilot was to improve incomes and civic engagement, and to mitigate poverty and social exclusion (Colini, 2019). Its objective was to test the effectiveness of a guaranteed minimum income (GMI) in deprived and disadvantaged communities in Barcelona. Therefore, it was not a true UBI experiment. 5.6.2 Scope of the study The B-MINCOME experiment ran from November 2017 to October 2019. A random sample of 1,000 low-income households were selected from potential candidates from ten of Barcelona’s most deprived areas. An additional 383 households participated passively as the control group. Household members had to be registered in Barcelona, at least one household member had to be between 25 and 60 years old, and participants had to avail of municipal social services at the time of the experiment (Riutort et al., 2021). Each household in the treatment group was entitled to GMI between €100 and €1,676 per month. The amount of GMI depended on household maintenance costs and other sources of income. Some of the B-Mincome participants were also required to participate in active policies, such as training and employment, social entrepreneurship programme and community participation. 5.6.3 Findings and analysis The findings of Barcelona’s experiment showed that basic income alleviated the feeling of financial uncertainty and stress, which also contributed to significant improvements in individual wellbeing and life satisfaction when compared to the control group (Riutort et al., 2021). However, B-Mincome’s active policies did not increase willingness for entrepreneurship activities or the need to find quality work. In fact, the project as a whole reduced labour market participation, though those who participated in training and employment programmes and received GMI saw a positive impact on work placements. In terms of financial stability, some households acquired economic independence and were able to plan for the future, while other households did not manage to get out of financial hardship. 5.7 OTHER EXPERIMENTS 5.7.1 The Netherlands A GMI experiment ran from 2018 to 2020 in the city of Utrecht. The aim of the experiment was to restructure social assistance payments to find the best way to guide people on guaranteed basic income towards employment and social participation (Verlaat et al., 2020). A total of 752 participants were divided into four groups: the control group; those receiving the payment but with no obligation to find and accept work; those receiving the payment and extra help and guidance in finding employment; and those receiving the payment while also keeping a large proportion of income from work (Verlaat et al., 2020). Key findings indicate that in all programmes, labour market participation improved, as did recipients’ health and wellbeing and sense of autonomy. 5.7.2 Alaska (US) In 1982, the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend was introduced to redistribute profits from the oil industry to all citizens of Alaska in a form of UBI. Dividend payments are affected by company performance, which means that cash transfers are not consistent over time. The payment started at $331 in 1984, but had increased to $2,072 by 2015 (Marinescu, 2019). Jones and Marinescu (2018) found no effect of the dividend payment on employment but observed an increase in part-time work. 5.7.3 North Carolina (US) Since 1997, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians in North Carolina, the US, have used dividend transfers to redistribute profits from a casino on tribal land to every tribal member without condition (Marinescu, 2019). The basic income guarantee in 2016 was $12,000 per adult (CSJ, 2018). There are approximately 14,000 tribal members entitled to basic income. Over the years, guaranteed basic-income recipients were more likely to be lifted out of poverty than those without basic income, less likely to develop psychological problems, such as depression and anxiety, and children were more likely to stay in school longer (CSJ, 2018). Marinescu (2019) also found that basic-income recipients work the same number of hours as those who do not receive guaranteed income. The level of basic income is linked to business performance and profits, which may not provide a stable and reliable basic income for recipients. 5.7.4 Brazil In Marica, Brazil, approximately one-quarter, or 42,000, of that city’s citizens are enrolled in a GMI programme, which has been operating since 2015 (JFI, 2020). Initially, each recipient received the equivalent of US$58 in mumbuca, Marica’s digital currency, per month. This is approximately 30 per cent of Brazil’s minimum monthly income. Since the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, the payment temporarily increased to US$130 in mumbuca currency. Those who have lived in Marica for at least three years and are part of a household earning less than three times Brazil’s minimum monthly income are entitled to the payment. The main objective of the programme is to alleviate poverty, address economic inequality and improve job security. Although more people receiving the payment are lifted out of poverty, there is little research estimating the long-term effects of Marica’s programme. 5.8 MINIMUM-INCOME SCHEMES IN THE EU AND OECD Immervoll (2009) provides a useful, and comprehensive, overview of general minimum-income schemes in member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In developing a typology of minimumincome benefits, Immervoll (2009) describes them as, ‘cash or in-kind transfers that aim at preventing extreme hardship and employ a low-income criterion as the central entitlement condition’. Examples include payments such as unemployment benefits that are not related to social insurance contributions and means-tested lone parent/family benefits. It is important that such benefits are accompanied by activation measures to allow individuals re-enter employment, where possible. However, Immervoll (2009) notes that the most immediate priority of minimumincome benefits is to prevent individuals from going without minimum safety nets at a time when they are most needed. Within the EU, the right to an adequate minimum income is stated explicitly in Principle 14 of the European Pillar of Social Rights: Everyone lacking sufficient resources has the right to adequate minimum-income benefits ensuring a life in dignity at all stages of life, and effective access to enabling goods and services. For those who can work, minimum-income benefits should be combined with incentives to (re)integrate into the labour market. Konle-Seidl (2021) assesses the adequacy of minimum-income support in the EU, where adequacy is based on the at-risk-of-poverty rate. Konle-Seidl (2021) notes that while levels of minimum income vary considerably across the EU, Ireland is the only country where benefit levels for a single member household are close to the poverty threshold. In other countries, minimum-income supports often fall far below the poverty threshold. This is especially true in Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania and Slovakia.37 Therefore, even in the absence of a UBI, Ireland appears to perform better than other EU countries at providing a minimum income for those that need it most. The estimated cost of a UBI for Ireland This section examines four possible universal basic income (UBI) policies in Ireland. The ‘baseline UBI’, the option that most closely resembles a true UBI, involves a non-means-tested, universal payment to every adult in the State that is equivalent to the 2019 at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which amounts to 60 per cent of median equivalised disposable household income (€1,200 per month). The second example applies a lower UBI, equivalent to 50 per cent of median equivalised disposable household income (€1,000 per month). In the third example, we examine a UBI equivalent to the current social welfare rate of €208 per week. Finally, in the fourth example, we examine the type of UBI that could be paid for a given fixed gross amount, equivalent to €10 billion per year. 6.1 A UNIVERSAL, NON-MEANS-TESTED UBI EQUAL TO 60 PER CENT OF MEDIAN INCOME According to the 2016 Census of Population, there were 3,424,935 individuals aged over 18 years of age in Ireland.38 A true UBI, as defined above, would involve a sufficiently large payment to each individual to allow them to live on. While we discuss different thresholds and payments in greater detail below, a reasonable estimate of the minimum income required to ensure a person is not in poverty is the ‘at risk of poverty’ threshold. This is defined as 60 per cent of median annual equivalised income, which amounted to €14,387 in 2019.39 This indicates that a single person would need to earn in excess of this amount to exceed the poverty threshold, which is equivalent to a monthly payment of €1,200 per person. A UBI set at this level would have a gross cost of just under €50 billion per annum.40 To put this in context, total expenditure on all social welfare programmes in 2019 was €20.9 billion (DEASP, 2019). While we base the rate of UBI on the at risk of poverty threshold, it is important to note that this would not represent a viable basis for calculating a UBI on a continuous basis. The at-risk-of-poverty threshold is 60 per cent of median income. Therefore, implementing a UBI would increase the at-risk-of-poverty threshold by altering the income distribution. As such, the at-risk-of-poverty threshold could not be used to re-calculate the UBI going forward, as it would lead to a scenario where the UBI is constantly increasing in response to increases in the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which itself was caused by a higher UBI. Nonetheless, the 2019 threshold provides a useful starting point for thinking about a UBI rate that would enable individuals to achieve an acceptable standard of living. 6.2 A UNIVERSAL, NON-MEANS-TESTED UBI EQUAL TO 50 PER CENT OF MEDIAN INCOME A UBI equivalent to 50 per cent of 2019 median equivalised annual income amounts to a monthly payment of €1,000 per person, or €12,000 per year. The gross cost of such a UBI would amount to €41 billion.41 This is approximately double the total social welfare expenditure in 2019. 6.3 A UNIVERSAL, NON-MEANS-TESTED UBI EQUAL TO CURRENT SOCIAL WELFARE RATE (€208 PER WEEK) A UBI set at the current social welfare payment rate of €208 per week amounts to a yearly payment of €10,816. The gross cost of such a UBI paid to 3,424,935 individuals would amount to €37 billion. However, a UBI payment equal to the prevailing social welfare rate has received the following recent criticism by Green Party (2019) as being too low: As the aim of a UBI is to lift the greatest proportion of the populace out of poverty it is assumed that current levels of welfare payments are not sufficient to do so or do not represent a fair redistribution of national income to achieve lower levels of poverty within the state. The Green Party believes that the UBI should be benchmarked to the most recent data on poverty rates and minimum disposable incomes with an ongoing review process that resets rates on a five year basis. 6.4 A UBI COSTING A TOTAL OF €10 BILLION PER YEAR (GROSS) The costs associated with implementing a UBI similar to those outlined above (Sections 6.1–6.3) are high in gross terms. A more feasible approach may be to initially designate an appropriate and realistic cost that could be allocated to a UBI, and then calculate what could be achieved given this outlay. For example, what could be achieved for a total gross cost of €10 billion per year? Assuming again a population consisting of 3,424,935 individuals aged over 18 years of age, this would amount to €2,920 per year, or €243 per month, per person. These examples underline the inherent trade-off facing all proposed UBI policies. While a key feature of a true UBI is that it provides an adequate level of income to achieve an acceptable standard of living, the practical costs of implementing such a policy may be large. We stress that we are providing basic calculations of gross cost. Any UBI policy would likely involve significant changes to the tax and benefit system. Earlier work has indicated that financing a UBI through income tax could require a high tax rate, in the order of 50 or 60 per cent (see Callan et al., 1994; Callan et al., 2000; Honohan, 1987). More recently, Green Party (2019) suggests alternative financing through a tax on pension funds, a site-value tax, a speculative transaction tax, an increase in stamp duty for property trades that do not relate to the principal private residence, and the replacement of the 20 per cent tax rate with the higher (40 per cent) rate. A more detailed analysis of the impacts of such funding mechanisms could be explored through microsimulation analysis. One of the core advantages of a UBI is that it could potentially replace some, or all, existing social welfare payments. Having one unconditional payment could greatly reduce administrative costs associated with means tests, while also removing any stigma of benefit receipt among recipients. Ultimately, the decision as to which of the existing benefits that could be replaced is a task for policymakers. To inform this decision, we show the payment amounts associated with specific social welfare payments in appendix Tables B.1 and B.2. For example, in 2019, spending on Jobseeker’s Allowance and Jobseeker’s Benefit was €1.6 billion and €350 million respectively. When weighing up the cost of a UBI, it is important to factor in the savings on any benefits that it may replace.

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Current means testing programs create a sense of negative dependency for recipients – UBI is key to promote universalism and collectivism and ensure that all social welfare gaps are filled

Lansley 20 [Stewart Lansley is the co-author, with Howard Reed, of Basic Income for All: From Desirability to Feasibility, Compass, 2019, and of Breadline Britain, The Rise of Mass Poverty, Oneworld, 2015, “MEETING THE ECONOMIC AND LIVELIHOOD CRISIS: From a recovery basic income to a permanent income floor,” April 2020, https://www.compassonline.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/BasicIncomeFloor_SL_FINAL.pdf]

A key reason for the new momentum behind BI has been the pandemic’s exposure of the multiple weaknesses of the existing system of social security, which is simply not up to the task of providing vital social protection with mass falls in household incomes.

Despite the promises of the post-war years, Britain has never come close to creating an income floor, and even before Covid-19, millions fell through what is an imperfect, mean and patchy safety net. Across rich nations, Britain has at best a middling social security system, one further weakened by a decade of austerity. Most benefit levels have been falling over recent decades as a ratio of typical earnings. The main adult unemployment payment – at 15 per cent of average earnings – is worth less proportionately than at any time since 1948. In an economy where work is increasingly low paid and precarious there are too many holes for too many people in the ‘safety net’.

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Stigma fuels the cycle of poverty---exacerbates economic inequality and resource disparities.

Inglis et al. 22 [Greig, Lecturer in Psychology at the University of West Scotland, et al., “Poverty stigma, mental health, and well-being: A rapid review and synthesis of quantitative and qualitative research” 14 December 2022, https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2677, Wiley Online Library. Accessed 12 July 2023]

Experiences of stigma are associated with a range of adverse mental health outcomes (Schmitt et al., 2014). Stigma affects health indirectly through several structural, interpersonal, and intrapersonal pathways (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2013). At a structural level, stigma inhibits individuals' access to social and economic resources that support health, including power and social capital (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2013). At an interpersonal level, stigmatised individuals may become socially isolated and withdraw from others to avoid discrimination (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2013; Pachankis, 2007). Intrapersonally, experiences of stigma are associated with negative emotion regulation strategies, which may in turn lead to psychological distress (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2009; Hatzenbuehler et al., 2013). Importantly, it is not only overt forms of discrimination that harm health, as both perceived and anticipated stigma can also affect health through social identity threat processes (Major & Schmader, 2018). For example, anticipated discrimination from others leads to an increase in threat-related cognitions, as well as heightened physiological stress responses (Sawyer et al., 2012).

Poverty stigma can be conceptualised as a broad construct that includes experiences of stigma attributed to living in poverty generally, as well as more specific variants of stigma relating to individuals' use of particular services designed to assist low-income groups (e.g., social security). Several international studies have documented how individuals living on low incomes experience poverty stigma (e.g., Inglis et al., 2019; Reutter et al., 2009), and one study led by individuals who have experience of poverty in the United Kingdom stated that “the impact of stigma and negative judgement is a particularly painful part of poverty” (ATD Fourth World, 2019, p. 39). It is important to note here that these experiences do not occur by chance, and that the underlying processes that generate poverty stigma are instead socially motivated. From a sociological perspective, poverty stigma can be considered a form of social power that allows relatively powerful groups in society to achieve certain aims, including the exploitation and control of disadvantaged groups (Link & Phelan, 2014; Tyler & Slater, 2018). From a social identity perspective, poverty stigma may also be generated by individuals categorising themselves and others according to income, which in turn leads to greater group-based stereotyping (Jetten et al., 2017).

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Welfare programs encourage patriarchal patterns of economic dependency that exacerbate barriers within inequality

Lu 21, (Lynn D. Lu is Associate Professor of Law, teaches first-year Lawyering and is a Co-Director of the Economic Justice Project. She earned her J.D. magna cum laude from NYU School of Law, where she was an Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Fellow and Articles Selection Editor for the NYU Review of Law and Social Change.), “From Stigma t om Stigma to Dignity? T o Dignity? Transforming Wansforming Workfare with Univ e with Universal Basic Income and a Federal Job Guarantee” , Spring 2021, // EE

At the same time, national tax and spending policies have consistently both in intent and impact-favored the breadwinning-white-male-headed household over that of the unmarried, single mother of color. Such incentives encourage patriarchal patterns of economic dependency that exacerbate disparate racial and gender impacts in income inequality, wealth building, and economic mobility.52 Even if not explicitly supporting disparate treatment by race, sociologists suggest that "perceptions of rising minority power, declines in whites' relative socioeconomic status, or other perceived macro-level threats to whites' racial status may provoke adoption of more restrictive welfare regimes."5 3 As a result, cash assistance programs associated with greater uptake by people of color carry the harshest and most punitive or onerous requirements. 4 "As whites attempt to undermine racial progress they see as threatening their group's status, they increase opposition to programs intended to benefit poorer members of all racial groups." 5

Past experiences with welfare and workfare reform since the New Deal era reveal persistent discrimination and disparate impact in both the conception and execution of safety net assistance and job creation programs. First, as historians have described, the design and implementation of New Deal programs, both by intent and in effect, reproduced existing social disparities that excluded Black workers and women of color from program benefits.5 6 Social Security and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) were explicitly and intentionally designed to exclude agricultural and domestic workers-primarily Blacks in states governed by southern democrats-from benefits and protections,5 ? an injustice also effectuated by TANF's predecessor, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and later by the GI Bill, as implemented at the discretion of state agency employees. 58

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Current welfare programs stigmatize poverty – the result is a fundamental cause theory that binds the welfare state to a violent cycle of health inequities

Lapham and Martinson 22, (Jessica Lapham is a professor and educator for the School of Social Work at University of Washington, and Melissa Martinson has a PHD from Columbia University and currently focuses on inequities in health and wellbeing throughout the life span, both in the United States and internationally), “The intersection of welfare stigma, state contexts and health among mothers receiving public assistance benefits”, 6/18/2022, // EE

Stigma is defined as the characteristics, conditions, identities, statuses or distinctions that are discredited or subject to devaluation (Goffman, 1963; Pescosolido & Martin, 2015). The concept of welfare stigma was put forth to capture the discredited attributes associated with participation in the U.S. welfare system, namely the application for and receipt of public assistance benefits (Moffitt, 1983; Stuber & Schlesinger, 2006). The stigmatizing nature of the U.S. welfare system is of particular importance not only because it has shown to deter eligible applicants from participating in public assistance programs despite facing economic hardship (Moffit, 1987), but also because welfare stigma is linked to several adverse mental health outcomes including depression (Pak, 2020), impaired feelings of self-worth (Petterson & Friel, 2001), diminished well-being (Crocker et al., 1998), low self-esteem, anxiety (Dooley & Prause, 2002; Rodriguez et al., 2001), and suicidality (Bassuk et al., 1997). Furthermore, stigma is an important fundamental cause of health inequities (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2013; Phelan et al., 2010; Link & Phelan, 1995).

Fundamental cause theory (FCT) asserts social conditions including stigma fundamentally cause health inequities that persist over time, despite changes in risk factors and health interventions (Phelan et al., 2010; Link & Phelan, 1995). Similar to other fundamental causes such as socioeconomic status, stigma meets FCT criteria because it's shown to shape health through multiple risk factors and mechanisms, involves access to resources used to protect health, and is linked to health inequities across time and place (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2013; Phelan et al., 2010; Link & Phelan, 1995). Importantly, stigma is a multilevel construct that operates in many forms at individual- and structural-levels (Link & Phelan, 2001). At an individual level, stigma compromises health by eroding access to resources (like money, power, social support, and prestige) that shape one's ability to engage in health enhancing behaviors, disrupts psychological and behavioral processes that influence health behaviors, and increases exposure to stress which is associated with numerous health harming physiological responses (for a review, see Hatzenbuehler et al., 2013). Stigma is shown to impact health through structural mechanisms as well which include social conditions, cultural norms, and policies that potentially restrict opportunities of certain individuals embedded within these contexts (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2013; Phelan et al., 2010; Link & Phelan, 1995). Although studies have shown individual-level and structural forms of stigma operate independently to hinder health (Link & Phelan, 2001), there is also evidence to suggest that individual stigma processes occur within structural stigma contexts that shape conditions that increase individual's exposure to health harming circumstances (Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002) as well as interact with individual stigma processes to exacerbate adverse health and wellbeing outcomes (Pachankis et al., 2014). For instance, Mendoza-Denton et al. (2002) found Black college students who experienced forms of stigma and attended predominantly White universities were more likely to exhibit poor education outcomes. Additionally, in a study by Pachankis et al. (2014), stigma based on sexual identity interacted with structural conditions (i.e. policies and state-level attitudes) to predict tobacco and alcohol use for LGBT individuals.

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3 benefits to UBI – increases freedom, eradicates poverty, reduces inequalities.

Albert, J.-F. (2022).(Juan Francisco Albert has his Ph.D in economics about the distributional effects of monetary policy. He is now a professor at the University of Valencia and researches at the London School of Economics and Political Science) The Redistribution of Freedom: Normative Analysis of the Universal Basic Income. Panoeconomicus, 1–31.  

The UBI has several advantages over other welfare benefits that welfare states currently tend to provide in terms of meeting its three basic objectives: increasing the real freedom of individuals, eradicating poverty, and reducing inequalities. Firstly, as explained at length in the previous section, the UBI aims to maximize the real freedom of citizens by being a universal and unconditional benefit and providing sufficient means to all members of the community. No matter what conception of the good life citizens have or what they want to spend their time on, all citizens will receive the public transfer unconditionally to pursue their ends in a completely free and autonomous manner, whatever these may be. In contrast to the UBI, the guaranteed minimum income benefits or minimum incomes existing today in many European countries require an active search for employment by making the benefit conditional on a conception of the good life and a well-defined activity that can be labelled as "work ethic". Secondly, the unconditionality and universality of the UBI simplifies and reduces administrative and bureaucratic costs. It is a clear, transparent, automatic, and non-conditional public benefit, where all citizens would be involved and would not require monitoring and control by the public authorities as is the case with other current conditional benefits. All the bureaucratic and control costs of other welfare programmes would be automatically reduced. Thirdly, the UBI is an effective tool; the implementation of a sufficient amount of UBI would mean the eradication of extreme poverty and a substantial reduction in relative poverty. Moreover, universality guarantees the immediacy of payments and does not entail the waiting time that many citizens face with other public benefits. In current assistance programmes, there is a time delay in receiving the benefit from when citizens suffer the contingency in their income, apply for the benefit, are granted it, and finally receive the income. The UBI eliminates this whole process and involves immediate and automatic monthly transfers.  

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Universal Basic Income is necessary to prevent discrimination from running rampant in the U.S.

Albert, J.-F. (2022).(Juan Francisco Albert has his Ph.D in economics about the distributional effects of monetary policy. He is now a professor at the University of Valencia and researches at the London School of Economics and Political Science) The Redistribution of Freedom: Normative Analysis of the Universal Basic Income. Panoeconomicus, 1–31.  

In relation to the second part of Rawls' second principle of justice, a fair equality of opportunities, this author establishes that for there to be true equality of opportunities when it comes to accessing public positions and posts, it is not only necessary that these positions are formally open, but that everyone has the same opportunities to reach them. It is evident that in our societies there are different discriminations (gender, racial, social, economic, etc.) that mean that two people with the same talents and abilities do not have the same opportunities to access these positions. For example, people with greater economic or social capital will have greater facilities and opportunities to access the model of life they want and access these positions of public responsibility. Likewise, the simple fact of being born male or white facilitates the achievement of personal objectives, and there is unjustifiable discrimination in our societies. A UBI could reduce these discriminations by offering real freedom to individuals in the pursuit of their life goals. Finally, Rawls' difference principle establishes that social and economic inequalities can exist as long as they benefit the most disadvantaged individuals. In turn, the most disadvantaged individuals are defined by this author as those who have a lower amount of primary goods throughout their lives (Rawls, 1971, p. 440). According to Rawls himself, "perhaps the most important primary good is that of selfrespect" (Rawls, 1971, 440). According to van Dijk, (2016) a UBI would improve the self-esteem and self-respect of those less fortunate in the generation of income by the market. By decoupling the income obtained away from the skills to generate income in the market, those with worse luck or fewer skills would see their own self-esteem reinforced. With the current benefits available in European countries in their welfare state configuration, such as minimum living income, unemployment benefits or minimum insertion income, there is a component of stigmatization towards the recipients. Given the existence of conditionality, the beneficiaries of these programmes are publicly exposed and may feel singled out and stigmatized by society as they are unable to generate their own income in the market and their self-esteem is diminished. The unconditional UBI avoids this public signalling and stigmatization as it is an income that is enjoyed by all, regardless of any socioeconomic circumstance. Stigmatization refers to the negative social and psychological consequences that can arise when individuals receive welfare benefits. Many traditional welfare programmes are means-tested, which means that they are only available to individuals who meet certain income or asset thresholds. This can lead to a stigma being attached to welfare recipients, as they may be perceived as "needy" or "dependent" by society. Public signalling refers to the idea that individuals may alter their behaviour in order to signal to others that they are in need of welfare benefits. For example, an individual may be less likely to take a low-paying job if doing so would make them ineligible for welfare benefits. This can lead to a vicious cycle, as individuals may be discouraged from seeking employment due to the perceived stigma attached to welfare and the potential loss of benefits. UBI could potentially eliminate both stigmatization and public signalling by providing a guaranteed income to all citizens, regardless of their employment status or need. This could help to reduce the stigma associated with receiving welfare and encourage individuals to seek employment without fear of losing benefits. However, it should be noted that UBI would not necessarily increase selfesteem and self-respect in societies or individuals where work is not perceived exclusively as a source of income, but as a source of identity, status and dignity associated with contributing to the common good. This issue of reciprocity will be raised in more detail in the following sections. 

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It's a necessity to have targeted universality for the impacts of systemic racism

Powell, 19 ( John Powell, Professor of Law Professor of African American Studies and Ethnic Studies Robert D. Has Chancellor's Chair in Equity and Inclusion Director, Othering & Belonging Institute, “Equity 2.0? What is Targeted Universalism and How Does It Address Inequality?

VIDEO”, JUNE 8, 2022 , Ree)

john a. powell: What happened in terms of the application of equity: people started focusing on disparities. So, in practice, equity became closing disparities between groups. And so, the benchmark in terms of the goal was to get whatever the favored group has, or to close the gap between the less favored and more favored group. That does a couple of things. First of all, it puts groups in competition. And because oftentimes the assumption is, in order to get there, we have to take from the more favored group and give to the less favored group. In racial terms, that means oftentimes, taking from whites or white men and giving to women and people of color. And, not surprising, the favored group, or whatever is designated as the favored group, oftentimes objects. And part of the objection is they’re still holding onto the first concept of equality. But secondly, oftentimes they’re not doing all that well themselves. Take, for example, the suicide rate. By some recent data, the suicide rate among white men is higher than [among] African Americans. There’s still a gap. The gap is, we need to have more Black men killing themselves in order to close that gap. Of course, no one wants that. That’s not what we want. The goal is not just to get what white men have, or white people have. And in some cases, they may not even be the favored group. The goal is to do what? The goal is to end suicide. So, the goal should be designated without it being necessarily attached to what any particular group has. And that takes us to targeted universalism. So targeted universalism says the goal is universal, is something we all want—what Gary [Cunningham] just laid out beautifully—and the strategy to get us there has to be targeted, because we’re situated differently. So, we’re not all in the same situation, but we are all trying to get to the universal goal. So that’s the difference between targeted universalism and equity. Targeted universalism is Equity 2.0. It’s basically saying, we’re trying to get everybody what they need to thrive and prosper in our country. And yes, whites may be closer to that. And they may be closer to that for a number of reasons, including the history of slavery and Jim Crow.

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2AC Case › Solvency › 2AC---Genealogy Cards

Education of the aff is a pre-requisite to any policy action. Perm do the aff as a pre-req to X.

Katharyne Mitchell 03-?-2017, "(PDF) Education, race and empire: a genealogy of humanitarian governance in the United States Katharyne Mitchell," ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315855122_Education_race_and_empire_a_genealogy_of_humanitarian_governance_in_the_United_States_Katharyne_Mitchell

Genealogy is a historical perspective and investigative method, which offers an intrinsic critique of the present’ (Crowley 2009, 341). Derived primarily from the works of Nietzsche, but more well known through the writings of Foucault (e.g. 1988), it provides people with the critical skills for analyzing and uncovering the relationship between knowledge, power and the human subject in modern society and the conceptual tools to understand how their being has been shaped by historical forces. (Crowley 2009, 341) Because the end goal is not just a history of the present, but also an attempt to uncover plausible alternatives to triumphant modernist narratives of the present, genealogies involve ‘a selective search for injustice and subjection’ (Kearins and Hooper 2002, 733; see also Koopman 2013). This subversive ‘selective search’ requires a historical and geographical excavation of biographies and institutional archives – such as, in this case, those of public and private foundations, non-profit organisations and actors, humanitarians and those writing about them. As a method, genealogy is useful in examining the connections and processes of humanitarian governance throughout history because it can challenge and disrupt the normative historical accounts traditionally brought to bear on subjects such as philanthropy. Genealogy helps expose the generally positive and uncritical assumptions that underlie common-sense understandings of humanitarianism, charity, protection, and similar terms and processes – enabling the space of radical critique to be inserted through denaturalising these processes and tying them firmly to the specific rationalities and power relations of particular times and places. A second advantage of a genealogical method is the emphasis on actors and webs of belief. Political rationalities are formed in social and economic milieus and actors inherit some of these beliefs and practices through forms of socialisation and through social institutions (Bevir and Philips 2017). Research that is historical in nature, and which is attuned to the diversity, complexity and constant struggle over these beliefs and practices, can highlight both ongoing threads and patterns of thought, but also the contingencies of practices that reflect historical and geographical context. Finally, genealogy as method helps us to draw connections between the processes, practices and relations of power that link the past to the present (Koopman 2013). Assumptions and strategic practices related to human capital development and, albeit more opaquely, a perceived limited intellectual capacity of African Americans, continue to infuse philanthropic programmes for education in the US today (Lipman 2015; Spring 2016). In order to achieve the radical potential of the genealogic method here, it is vital to find those moments of ‘injustice and subjection’ in the historical record of humanitarianism, which can serve to illuminate the practices of the present and display them in a more critical light. In this paper, I conduct a genealogical investigation of the rationalities of humanitarianism in the US, with a specific focus on how deeply racialised and hegemonic beliefs about African Americans that took shape under slavery and conditions of domestic colonialism, became linked with nationalist and imperialist aspirations of the 20th century. These philanthropic ideas and practices can be unearthed through a genealogy of the socialisation of actors and the social institutions of humanitarianism, and their connections to a broader political economy and situated set of power relations. In conducting this genealogy I have examined journals from previous eras that addressed African American education (these include the Journal of Negro Education, Journal of Higher Education and Journal of Educational Psychology), congressional archives and presidential speeches related to African American education,1 the published works of Carnegie and 2 Katharyne Mitchell ISSN 0020-2754 Citation: 2017 doi: 10.1111/tran.12180 © 2017 Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) Rockefeller, the histories of private foundations such as Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller,2 the books and other writings of W. E. B. Du Bois and Booker T. Washington on education, and the key texts of the eras in question relating to African American education. These include, most prominently, Gunnar Myrdal’s (1944) famous manifesto, An American dilemma: the Negro problem and modern democracy. Following the end of slavery, inherited beliefs about a perceived deficiency in the moral and educational capacity of African Americans brought new forms of liberal development into operation, a moral trusteeship involving many public and private actors active in the betterment and improvement of this population. I explore the centrality of racist assumptions in this project of ‘betterment’ through time, and how these webs of belief emerged and were set in motion in a spatially and emotionally divided nation, where the legacies of geography, as well as history and memory, played a central role in how they played out. In order to demonstrate some of the racial continuities in humanitarian beliefs and practices, the historical excavations of the paper are divided into three different moments of national development: Reconstruction and backlash, efficiency and reform, and Pax Americana. In each different context, philanthropic foundations and humanitarians sought to provide education to African Americans, who were disenfranchised and disconnected in different ways in each period. But although the specific moral reasoning and techniques of care employed in the provision of education were particular to time and place, the underlying rationalities of a ‘“progressive” imperial agenda’ (Lambert and Lester 2004, 320) connecting African American enfranchisement and connection to national development and imperial aspirations, was manifest (see also Kish and Leroy 2015). In the conclusion I link these excavations of the past to the present, indicating some of the ways that these interconnected logics continue to affect humanitarianism in the US today

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2AC Case › Solvency › 2AC---Genealogy Cards

Dominant forms of knowledge have manifested in the current layout of civil society. Hence, we cannot talk about policy-action without interrogating this historical relationship first.

Kenzo E. Okazaki, 07-19-2021, Okazaki is a John Lewis Fellow, currently at Middlebury," The Bodies of the Condemned: The Return of the Body as the Object of State Power " Middlebury College, https://works.swarthmore.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=suhj VDR

Genealogical analysis of police practice itself reveals that policing is based on the assumption of the inherent criminality of non-white bodies. To Foucault, genealogy is a method of historical inquiry which is from pure history. Because, in his view, the historian is inclined to reduce events to “the lowest common denominator,” a historian’s history ignores certain knowledges in order to construct a seemingly necessary progression toward truth.20 Genealogical analysis rejects the essential progression toward a necessary end and takes into account “the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things which continue to exist and have value for us.”21 Furthermore, insofar as “humanity instills in each of its violences a system of rules and proceeds from domination to domination,” the value of this analysis “resides in challenging established practices of remembering and forgetting by excavating subjugated bodies of experiences and memories, bringing to the fore the perspectives that culturally hegemonic practices have foreclosed.”22 Genealogy may reveal how dominant forms of knowledge production have sanitized and constructed practices and institutions as necessary despite their unpalatable legacies which continue to define them. Police are one institutional feature of governance often assumed to be a constant feature of civil society and necessary in its development. Foucault challenged this view through a genealogical analysis inn his lectures at the College De France. He contends that the uniformed police we see today has not always been necessary and that they do not find origin in the intent to protect individuals in society. Rather, they descend from the concept of police as “the set of intentions and means that ensure that living, better than just living, coexisting will be effectively useful to the constitution and development of the state’s forces.”23 The police were not intended to protect citizens, but to maximize the forces of the state. This prerogative licensed the criminalization of non-whiteness in the United States. Singh elaborates upon this investigation describing how non-white people in the early United States were considered “constitutively outside and incapable of participating in civil society.”24 As police practice is meant to defend civil society, those outside of it and otherwise seen as unproductive and dangerous to the power of the state would be condemned as criminals as “criminality is the name given to a type of violence that threatens the social and civic order.”25 The very state which is under police protection and has been sanitized as providing liberty and freedom for all also warrants genealogical analysis. In American Slavery, American Freedom, Edmund S. Morgan argued that the birth of the United States as a republic founded on liberty and equality was only possible through the knowledge of freedom’s Manichean opposite: slavery. Indeed, “racism became an essential, if unacknowledged, ingredient of the republican ideology that enabled Virginians to lead the nation.”26 Morgan concludes his genealogical analysis by wondering if America today is still colonial Virginia writ large.27 In a more localized analysis, Robin D.G. Kelley wrote that Blackness is that “against which normality, whiteness, and functionality have been defined.”28 As such, it was foundational to constructing modern urban America.29 Upon reviewing the genealogy of police practice and that of the United States, it is no surprise that the criminalization of Black bodies persists to this day.

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Discussions of the racial history of the political-economy help students develop a critical consciousness that allows them to critique and dismantle those systems in the future

Chandler 15 [Dr. Prentice Chandler is Dean and Professor of the Eriksson College of Education at Austin Peay State University in Clarksville (TN). “Doing Race in Social Studies: Critical Perspectives,” Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing. 2015]

Thinking about the nexus between race, racism, and economics, we cannot over-look the fact that a good portion of the U.S. market economy was based on White supremacy. Major companies such as J.P. Morgan, Brooks Brothers, and New York Life insurance, major universities such as Emory, Brown, and Yale as well as influential and rich families such as the Vanderbilts and Walkers benefited eco-nomically from the racial hierarchy and the institution of slavery. Even consumer goods are influenced by race and racism in economics. Take for instance the types of toiletries in hotels and motels around the United States; flesh-toned bandages and hosiery for women, real estate prices and housing values, and even the adop-tion policies of Black and White children are marked with heavy economic racism and White privilege. The approach to race, racism, and economics can also be applied to economic agency. Throughout history, African American communities’ economic decisions were based on and informed by their racial treatment. We see this through northern migration periods, the “do not buy” campaign against businesses with racist policies, and the creation of independent African American economic centers.

While these topics can be brought up by teachers in economics classes and re-lated to opportunity cost, supply and demand, personal finance, fiscal policy, and monetary policy, we propose that simply mentioning these topics as racial issues in economics is not sufficient. Racial economic teaching should be more active, meaning that teachers’ attention should focus on the centrality of race in economic thought and practice and provide ways to combat racism in educational spaces. When race is not approached theoretically, the topic is playing a tangential rather than central role in U.S. economic teaching. This approach may end up reproduc-ing liberal notions of racial progress rather than on inequity and agency against racial hegemony (Brown & Brown, 2010; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995). A CRT framework provides the lexicon and a more sophisticated literacy for exploring race and racism in economics.

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2AC Case › Solvency › 2AC---Genealogy Cards

Genealogy Card- repetition of others

Gabrielle Sarpy, 2021, " Narratives of Genealogy: Return, Race, and the Body in the Black Imagination," No Publication, https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/169677/gsarpy_1.pdf?sequence=1

This process is the unthought genealogy of neoliberalism’s biopolitics and its commodification of life. For many scholars writing about neoliberalism, it is precisely neoliberalism’s “financialization of everything”—its intensification of the economic’s hold on daily life—that makes it unique and terrifying.32 As David Harvey writes, “Neoliberalization has unquestionably rolled back the bounds of commodification and greatly extended the reach of legal contracts.”33 Neoliberalism is theorized as multiplying capital’s commodification of life by circumventing legal and epistemological barriers to capital accumulation. As Michel Foucault argues, the market became a model of “social relations and existence itself, a form of relationship of the individual to himself, time, those around him, the group, and the family.”34 Yet, as I am arguing, we can understand chattel slavery as central to the contemporary politics of the market in addition to the politics of life and death in general. Indeed, terror’s constitutive relationship to the production and management of race began on the “floating dungeon” of the slave ship. As a paradigmatic technology of modernity, the slave ship—a machine that was simultaneously a prison, a factory, a market, and an instrument of warfare—and its social relations inaugurated the economic, discursive, and institutional life of transnational capitalism.35 The carceral, the imperial, and the industrial were intertwined in the biopolitical regulation of black life, the expansion of capital, and the production of blackness, whiteness, and white supremacy. The slave trade produced methods for controlling populations; disciplining, torturing, and immobilizing the body; regulating health and hygiene; and extending the market beyond the economic. Additionally, it produced regimes of race and racism wherein blackness was subjected to “open and absolute vulnerability,” making white life dependent upon black (living) death.36 In short, the slave trade inaugurated methods for ranking life and measuring value that have yet to be undone. Radical History Review In this way, we can position slavery and its various technologies of domination (ship, plantation, sexual violence, management of birth) as preceding Giorgio Agamben’s argument that the concentration camp is the paradigmatic figure of modernity.38 In Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Agamben argues that the juridico-political structure of the camp is a “hidden matrix of the politics in which we are still living.”39 For Agamben, the camp is the “new biopolitical nomos of our planet,” and our future resides in our ability to recognize the ways that the camp inhabits and drives the architecture of cities, airports, and the distribution of life and death across the globe. The camp is not a historical anomaly but a temporal and spatial structure that is continually brought back to life. That is, it may change name and shape but its function remains the same. As with Agamben’s call to see space, time, and power in a new way in order to make visible the camp’s possession of our everyday, we must learn to see the spirit of slavery in spectacles of violence and death. In addition, we must also learn to recognize it in the operations that go by the names freedom, humanity, and democracy. Such a project requires an understanding that the biopolitics and necropolitics of slavery are not relegated to an amputated past, nor do they reside in a time that progress will soon leave behind. Rather, the slave trade’s logics and technologies have intensified, expanded, and become more insidious. The past does more than repeat: it envelops, seduces, and multiplies.40

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2AC Case › Impact › 2AC---Moral Obligation Cards

The U.S. Federal Government has a moral obligation to atone for the atrocities committed throughout U.S. history

Brooks 06 [Roy L. Brooks is Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of San Diego. He is the recipient of five book awards and the author of more than twenty books. “Atonement and Forgiveness: a New Model for Black Reparations,” University of California Press; New Ed Edition, 4/3/2006]

When a government commits an atrocity against an innocent people, it has, at the very least, a moral obligation to apologize and to make that apology believable by doing something tangible called a “reparation.” The government of the United States committed atrocities against black Americans for two and one-quarter centuries in the form of chattel slavery and for an additional one hundred years in the form of Jim Crow— what Supreme Court Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer refer to as “a law-enforced racial caste system”1—and it has not even tendered an apology for either. The U.S. government should, in fact, atone— that is, both apologize and provide reparations—for racial slavery and apartheid. Saying “I’m sorry” just isn’t enough.2

Atonement would give our government moral credibility and direction through the fog that often engulfs contemporary racial matters. Black Americans, like any self-respecting people, can never forgive or fully trust our government on racial matters until it signals a clear understanding of the magnitude of the atrocities it committed against an innocent people. The past is the future. Atonement places the matter of forgiveness on the table. Forgiveness is black America’s (the victim’s) side of racial reconciliation. Atonement is served on the victim as a kind of civic subpoena. Acceptance is required to seal the deal, to make racial reconciliation possible.3 Atonement (apology plus reparations) and forgiveness are thus the key ingredients of racial reconciliation.

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1AC

As members of the debate community, we must first become critically conscious of our history and social fabric prior to debating the resolution. This allows us to recognize forgotten struggles.

José Medina, 10-2011, Medina is Walter Hill Scott professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University. He is a member of the American Philosophical Association "View of Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism," Vanderbilt University, https://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/3335/3632 //VDR

As Foucault puts it, ‚it is the coupling together of the buried scholarly knowledge and knowledges that were disqualified by the hierarchy of erudition and sciences‛that gives strength to genealogical critique.34What both of these forms of subjugated knowledges brings to the fore is the ‚historical knowledge of struggles,‛‚the memory of combats, the very memory that had until then been confined to the mar-gins.‛35And this is exactly what the critical and transformative work of genealogical investigations consistsin, according to Foucault: with the ‚coupling together of scholarly erudition and local memories,‛genealogical investigations provide ‚a meticulous rediscovery of struggles and the raw memory of fights‛; ‚this coupling *<+ allows us to constitute a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of that knowledge in contemporary tactics.‛36Genealogical investigations can unearth multiple paths from buried or forgotten past struggles to the present; and thus they can promote a critical awareness that things are as they are because of a history of past struggles that are hidden from view, which can have a great impact on how we confront our struggles in the present. As McWhorter’s genealogical investigations il-lustrate so well, ‚one consequence of that awareness is the recognition that today’s status quo was far from inevitable and need not persist into tomorrow.‛37Genea-logies are insurrectionsagainst hegemonic power/knowledge effectsof discursive practices. Thus, for example, McWhorter’s genealogical account of racism in the US is ‚an intellectual assault on the power-effects of institutionalized, entrenched, and taken-for-granted academic, clinical, moralistic, and religious discourses about ra-cism.‛38And it is important to note that the possibilities of critique that are opened up by unearthing marginalized past struggles benefit not only those whose expe-riences and lives have been kept in the dark, but the entire social body, which can now become critically conscious of the heterogeneity of histories and experiences that are part of the social fabric. This is why McWhorter’s genealogy of racism makes racial oppression relevant in novel and unexpected ways to a wide variety of groups and publics that can now relate to old struggles in new ways.39As Foucault puts it, genealogies can be described as the ‚attempt to de-subjugate historical knowledges, to set them free, or in other words to enable them to oppose and struggle against the coercion of a unitary, formal, and scientific theoretical discourse.But, as he emphasizes, genealogies do not simply ‚reject knowledge, or invoke or celebrate some immediate experience that has yet to be cap-tured by knowledge. This is not what they are about. They are about the insur-rection of knowledges.‛41Genealogical investigations proceed by ‚way of playing lo-cal, discontinuous, disqualified, or nonlegitimized knowledges off against the uni-tary theoretical instance‛ that filters them out or absorbs them by putting them in their properplace within a hierarchy. Genealogies are insurrections of subjugated knowledges. And the plurals here are crucial, for the plurality of insurrections and of subjugated knowledges has to be kept always alive in order to resist new hegemonic unifications and hierarchizations of knowledges. The danger that the critical work of genealogies can be reabsorbed by hegemonic power/knowledges is brilliantly described by Foucault: Once we have excavated our genealogical fragments, once we begin to exploit them and to put in circulation these elements of knowledge that we have been trying to dig out of the sand, isn’t there a danger that they will be recoded, recolonized by these unitary discourses which, having first disqualified them and having then ignored them when they reappeared, may now be ready to reannex them and include them in their own discourses and their own power-knowledge? And if we try to protect the fragments we have dug up, don’t we run the risk of building, with our own hands, a unitary discourse?

Insurrections of (de-)subjugated knowledges and their critical resistance can be co-opted for the production of new forms of subjugation and exclusion (new hege-monies) or for the reinforcement of old ones. The only way to resist this danger is by guaranteeing the constant epistemic frictionof knowledges from below, which—as I have argued elsewhere—means guaranteeing that eccentric voices and perspec-tives are heard and can interact with mainstream ones, that the experiences and concerns of those who live in darkness and silence do not remain lost and un-attended, but are allowed to exert friction. Genealogies have to be always plural, for genealogical investigations can unearth an indefinite number ofpaths from for-gotten past struggles to the struggles of our present. And the insurrections of sub-jugated knowledges they produce also need to remain plural if they are to retain their critical power, that is, the capacity to empower people to resist oppressive power/knowledge effects. In the next section I will put this Foucaultian pluralism in conversation with other epistemological pluralistic approaches to memory and knowledge of the past.