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2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Politics DA › 1NC---Link---GOP Opposition

A robotax causes a political disruption.

Irwin 18 [Neil Irwin is a senior economics correspondent for The New York Times, where he writes for The Upshot. He is the author of “How to Win in a Winner-Take-All World” and was previously a columnist and reporter at The Washington Post. He has an M.B.A. from Columbia University, where he was a Knight-Bagehot Fellow in Economics and Business Journalism, “If the Robots Come for Our Jobs, What Should the Government Do? (Published 2018),” The Upshot, 6-12-2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/upshot/if-the-robots-come-for-our-jobs-what-should-the-government-do.html, accessed 7-24-2023, HKR-SWY]

To the degree that many of these ideas imply a more activist government role, conservatives tend to be more leery. But Michael Strain, a scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, says the risks of disruption are high enough that some flexibility may be needed.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Politics DA › 1NC---Link---GOP Opposition

Democrats support a robotax – means GOP would oppose it.

Kovacev 20 [Robert J. Kovacev , “A Taxing Dilemma: Robot Taxing Dilemma: Robot Taxes and the Challenges of Effective Taxation of AI, Automation and Robotics in the Fourth Industrial Revolution,” Contemporary Tax Journal, 7-13-2020 https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1157&context=sjsumstjournal, accessed 7-24-2023, HKR-SWY]

The most recent high-profile endorsement of the concept of a robot tax came from U.S. Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.44 Rep. Ocasio-Cortez suggested in a speech at SXSW that a tax rate of 90% on businesses using robots may be necessary, referencing Mr. Gates’ robot tax proposal.45 At least two U.S. presidential candidates in the 2020 Democratic primary have explicitly adopted a robot tax proposal.46

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Politics DA › 1NC---Link---GOP Opposition

The GOP hates a robotax and would refuse to budge.

Drum 17 [Kevin Drum is an American journalist, who created a blog called Calpundit. He holds a writing and blogging position at Mother Jones magazine. He graduated from California State University, Long Beach, where he received his bachelor's degree in journalism., “You will lose your job to a robot—and sooner than you think,” Mother Jones, 10-xx-2017, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/10/you-will-lose-your-job-to-a-robot-and-sooner-than-you-think/, accessed 7-24-2023, HKR-SWY]

So how do we get these ideas into the political mainstream? One thing is certain: The monumental task of dealing with the AI Revolution will be almost entirely up to the political left. After all, when the automation of human labor begins in earnest, the big winners are initially going to be corporations and the rich. Because of this, conservatives will be motivated to see every labor displacement as a one-off event, just as they currently view every drought, every wildfire, and every hurricane as a one-off event. They refuse to see that global warming is behind changing weather patterns because dealing with climate change requires environmental regulations that are bad for business and bad for the rich. Likewise, dealing with an AI Revolution will require new ways of distributing wealth. In the long run this will be good even for the rich, but in the short term it’s a pretty scary prospect for those with money—and one they’ll fight zealously. Until they have no choice left, conservatives are simply not going to admit this is happening, let alone think about how to address it. It’s not in their DNA.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Politics DA › 1NC---Link---Lobbying

Manufacturers would lobby against and find loopholes in a robotax.

Walker 19 [Jon Walker covers broad trends at the intersection of AI and industry for Emerj. He has reported on politics and policy issues for news organizations including National Memo, Massroots, and NBC. He has a Master of Public Policy from Portland State University and a BA in Chemistry and a BA in Science in Society from Wesleyan University. He has worked as a Senior Policy Analyst., “Robot Tax – A Summary of Arguments “For” and “Against”,” Emerj Artificial Intelligence Research, 2-2-2019, https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/robot-tax-summary-arguments/, accessed 7-24-2023, HKR-SWY]

If a country did try to place a fee on actual robots, it is likely it would be difficult for some companies to avoid the tax. Manufacturing robots, self-driving cars, delivery drones, and anything that looks like a classic “robot” or clearly replaces a specific category of job would likely be hit.

But there are a lot of marginally robot-like tools that manufacturers would aggressive lobby policy makers to exclude from the tax. Alternatively, manufacturers could modify the tools just enough to exploit some loophole in the definition of a robot.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Politics DA › 1NC---Link---Lobbying

A robotax causes lobbying from industry trade groups – perpetuates inequality and turns case

Seamans 21 [Robert Seamans (PhD, UC Berkeley) is an Associate Professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business where he teaches courses in game theory and strategy. His research has been published in leading academic journals and been cited in numerous outlets including The Atlantic, Forbes, Harvard Business Review, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and others. In 2015, Professor Seamans was appointed as the Senior Economist for technology and innovation on President Obama's Council of Economic Advisers, “Tax not the robots,” Brookings, 8-25-2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/tax-not-the-robots/, accessed 7-24-2023, HKR-SWY]

This example points to a big danger with a robot tax: depending on how a “robot” is defined, it may create disproportionate burdens on some industries and not others. In this example, if “driverless forklifts” were excluded from the definition of robot, then manufacturers investing in robotic arms would bear more of a tax burden than warehouse owners investing in driverless forklifts. Manufacturing comprises about 9% of the U.S. economy on average, but up to 15% of employment in some states. Taxing investment in automating technology such as a robotic arm in a handful of states based on an arbitrary definition of what does or does not comprise a “robot” does not seem equitable. One can only imagine the amount of political strategy efforts by various industry trade groups to shape what is or is not included in the definition of robot.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Politics DA › 1NC---Link---Lobbying

Robo-Taxes Link - Politically contentious/subject to absolutely massive lobbying, as businesses slug it out over the definition and details of the tax that will shape the future of the economy

Christie 21 [Rebecca Christie is a fellow at Bruegel and the Brussels columnist for Reuters Breakingviews. She was lead author on the European Stability Mechanism’s official history book and has reported from Brussels, Washington and around the world for Bloomberg News, Dow Jones Newswires/The Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times. She has also served as an expert adviser to a European Economic and Social Committee panel on taxation, is a regular conference speaker and moderator, and has provided editing and policy analysis to the European Commission, members of the European Parliament, and the African Development Bank. She holds degrees from Duke University and from the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin., “Do robots dream of paying taxes?,” 10-xx-2021, https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/wp_attachments/PC-20-041021.pdf, accessed 7-24-2023, HKR-SWY]

To the extent the concept of a robot tax is retained, it needs to be reframed as a rallying point rather than a literal strategy. Proposals for any new tax quickly degenerate into political slugfests accompanied by extensive lobbying from prospective winners and losers.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Advantage CP › 2NC---Net Benefit

AI reduces the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent—nuclear war

Kallenborn 19[Zachary Kallenborn, Policy Fellow at the Center for Security Policy Studies, "What if the U.S. Military Neglects AI? AI Futures and U.S. Incapacity",9-3-2019, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/what-if-the-u-s-military-neglects-ai-ai-futures-and-u-s-incapacity/, 1LEE]

The year is 2040: AI and robotics threaten nuclear deterrence and dominate the battlefield. Swarms of drones guard national borders with a mixture of advanced air and missile defenses, while massive undersea swarms rove the sea in search of nuclear submarines. Cheap drone-mounted sensors virtually eliminated costly advantages in stealth, made the ocean vastly more transparent, and created significant uncertainty in submarines as reliable second-strike platforms. Other AI capabilities help manage the system, optimize processes to keep costs low, and reduce false positives and negatives. A series of short but bloody conflicts between the United States, China and Russia in the late 2030s raised specters of new great power conflict unconstrained by nuclear weapons.

AI could threaten the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Although constant, real-time tracking of all nuclear submarines is difficult to imagine due to the massive size of the oceans, technology improvements and some luck could allow an adversary to know the locations of second-strike platforms for long enough to eliminate them in a first strike. Swarms of undersea drones and big data analysis offer great potential for new and improved anti-submarine platforms, weapons, and sensor networks. Already, some missile defenses use simple automation that could be improved with AI. Drones can also help track missiles, serve as platforms to defeat them, or simply collide with incoming missiles and aircraft. AI improvements generally enable more advanced robotic weapons, more sophisticated swarms, and better insights into data. Of course, the long history of failed attempts and huge costs of missile defense suggest elimination of nuclear deterrence is highly unlikely, but all of these developments could add up to serious risks to the reliability of nuclear deterrence.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Advantage CP › 2NC---Net Benefit

Offshoring AI crushes DoD procurement—nature of AI facilitates company mobility due to economic restrictions

Shields 18[Justin Shields, JD from the University of San Diego School of Law, Senior Global Trade Advisor at EY, MA in International Relations from Stellenbosch University, BA in Political Science from Arizona State University, “Smart Machines and Smarter Policy: Foreign Investment Regulation, National Security, and Technology Transfer in the Age of Artificial Intelligence”, Winter, John Marshall Law School, 51 J. Marshall L. Rev. 279, Volume 51, Issue 2, , 1LEE]

The potential relocation of U.S. AI research and development centers to other countries is another negative drawback to increases in investment restrictions. The very nature of AI technology makes it relatively easy to relocate these projects when favorable economic conditions are available elsewhere. Participants in AI projects may be located in multiple countries and have no formal contractual relationship with one another.141 The low cost of infrastructure and small physical footprint associated with AI projects means that firms can simply move development work offshore if regulations prove too onerous.142 In addition, attempts by any one country to regulate participation in such projects may not impact the development of such projects.

At the moment, investment in AI research and development currently remains concentrated in a few technology hubs in the U.S. and China, with Europe lagging far behind.143 However, China is also helping to establish and fund new research and development centers in Europe.144 If the U.S. enacts more restrictions on Chinese investment, China may simply redirect that investment to Europe. Indeed, it appears that Europe would be ready to step into any void created by an American abdication of leadership in innovation.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Advantage CP › 2NC---Net Benefit

What’s losing us the tech race is China’s access to powerful companies and its ability to absorb them into national strategy—offshoring resulting from a robo tax gives them even more AI companies—magnifies loss of heg

1AC Schmidt 22 Eric Schmidt and Yll Bajraktari ERIC SCHMIDT is Chair of the Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP), YLL BAJRAKTARI is Chief Executive Officer of SCSP. Foreign Affairs, 09-08-22, [“America Could Lose the Tech Competition with China”, , accessed 7-17-23 angelina]

But that was only after a supply-chain crisis had roiled the U.S. economy for two years as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and after the Pentagon had warned that it had become dependent on East Asian suppliers for 98 percent of the commercial chips it uses. In 2019, the United States ramped up a diplomatic campaign to thwart China’s bid to dominate the world’s 5G infrastructure. But that was only after the massively state-subsidized Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE undercut major Western competitors, seemingly cemented positions in the communications networks of U.S. allies, and flooded the zone in standard-setting bodies. And last year, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (on which both of us served) delivered its final report, calling for a comprehensive approach to sustaining U.S. leadership in education, research, and applications in AI that would mean an infusion of millions in new federal investment and a sustained government focus. But that report came out four years after China had already launched its national strategy on artificial intelligence, which generated billions in new funding, identified national-champion companies, and integrated AI into Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy. This reactive approach is hardly a recipe for future success. The United States needs to win on these tech battlegrounds and make sure it is not caught by surprise again. Even taking into account the important steps Washington has taken in the past three years, it is hard to say with any confidence that the United States is now better positioned or organized for the long-term contest. Washington cannot sit by and allow Beijing to gain an advantage on the next round of emerging technologies, which will extend beyond the digital domain to include biotechnology, smart manufacturing, and new methods for producing and storing energy. Technology is at the heart of the U.S.-Chinese competition to build a thriving society, a growing economy, and sharper instruments of power. At stake is the future of political freedom, open markets, democratic government, and a world order rooted in democratic values and cooperation rather than authoritarianism and coercion. Washington needs a national plan that brings together commercial, academic, and government sectors to carry out a techno-industrial strategy. And the federal government needs to make a serious commitment to revamp the instruments of U.S. statecraft, including the military, to weather a prolonged period of danger. LOSING IS AN OPTION As Washington fiddled, Beijing’s centralized system for high-tech research and development churned, investing billions of dollars, training students, and subsidizing tech companies.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Advantage CP › 2NC---Net Benefit

Keeping artificial intelligence within the US is key—only way to maintain competition-we read green

1AC Singer 21 [Scott Singer, Ph.D. candidate in international relations at the University of Oxford "How Universal Basic Income Can Advance the United States’ China Strategy", 11/29/21, The diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/how-universal-basic-income-can-advance-the-united-states-china-strategy/, Accessed 4-20-2023, roshan]

However, UBI would operate as more than an inward-facing policy. Rather, it would strengthen American competitiveness on the world stage by unlocking support for technological progress and AI development. As such, it would help the United States maintain its hegemonic advantage over China. UBI reframes the story of automation. Instead of replacing us, robots would now be working for us, and their progress would deliver us financial freedom. As their productivity grows in the coming decades, so could monthly checks – aka the dividends we are paid for being stakeholders in the United States. In this context, rapid technological progress that allows America to stay nationally competitive is not only digestible, but beneficial.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Advantage CP › 2NC---AT: Wealth Tax Bad

A billionaire’s tax does not slow economic growth—their studies are rooted in the flawed claim that growth is constrained by the supply-side of the economy.

Bivens ’19. [ Josh Bivens is the chief economist at the Economic Policy Institute (EPI). He has a Ph.D. in economics from the New School for Social Research and a bachelor’s degree from the University of Maryland at College Park.] “Analyses claiming that taxes on millionaires and billionaires will slow economic growth are fundamentally flawed.” November 21, 2019. https://www.epi.org/blog/analyses-claiming-that-taxes-on-millionaires-and-billionaires-will-slow-economic-growth-are-fundamentally-flawed/

In recent weeks, several policy analyses of progressive economic policies—a surtax on high-incomes, a wealth tax, and Social Security expansion—have claimed these policies would damage economic growth. Policymakers should give these analyses very little weight in debates about these issues, for a number of reasons. First, and most important, is the fact that all of these analyses are grounded in an economic view of the world that sees growth as constrained by the economy’s productive capacity (or the supply side of the economy) and not by the spending of households, businesses and government (the economy’s demand side). These estimates have other problems too—they are not even particularly convincing supply-side estimates and even if the economy’s growth really was constrained by supply, these estimates would still be misleading about the effects of these policies on welfare. But the biggest reason why policymakers should give these analyses zero weight is because they assume that growth is almost never demand-constrained. Before the Great Recession, the assumption that growth was nearly always supply constrained was almost universally held by economists and macroeconomic policymakers. It was recognized that demand (or aggregate spending) could occasionally be too weak to fully employ the economy’s productive capacity and hence cause rising unemployment, but it was generally thought that such periods were rare and would end quickly after the Federal Reserve sensibly cut interest rates. Because shortfalls of demand relative to supply were rare and short and easy to fix, the reasoning went, any real constraint on the economy’s growth over the long-run must be the pace of growth of supply. Growth in supply is generally driven by growth in the quality of the workforce, the productive stock of plants, equipment and research, and growth in technological progress, which together lead to growing productivity—or the amount of income or output generated in an average hour of work. The assumption that supply constraints are much more likely to bind overall growth than demand constraints drove almost all macroeconomic policymaking in the decades before the Great Recession. For example, the Federal Reserve for decades feared lower unemployment far more than lower inflation. Lower unemployment was a signal that demand was rising relative to supply, and if one thinks growth was generally supply-constrained, this meant that demand growth would quickly outstrip supply growth and lead to rising inflation. Lower inflation, conversely, meant that supply growth was outpacing demand growth—but that was always a temporary and easy-to-fix condition. The decades-long bipartisan overreaction to rising federal budget deficits is also a byproduct of assuming the economy’s growth is supply constrained. Deficits boost demand growth. If one assumes that demand is generally marching in lock-step with supply, then larger deficits that boost demand imply that supply constraints will soon bind and cause inflation (or interest rate increases). Smaller deficits, conversely, reduce demand growth. But if the danger of demand growth slowing too much is low and easy-to-fix, then that’s not a problem. The experience of the last decade has done much to shake this belief that demand-constrained growth is nothing to worry about and that supply-constrained growth should be the default presumption for policy analysis. For example, the Federal Reserve has cut interest rates to spur demand growth three times in the past six months with unemployment below 3.8 percent. They certainly seem to be acting (correctly) as if demand-constrained growth is a real problem. Prominent macroeconomists and former policymakers like Olivier Blanchard, Jason Furman, and Lawrence Summers have all written in recent months that efforts to close budget deficits should not be a high policy priority, largely because there is no evidence that supply constraints are binding. These reversals of policy presumption are evidence-based and admirable. Yet the decades-long inertia of policy evaluation done in a framework of supply-constrained growth is hard to stop—and so we have the recent parade of analyses claiming that a number of progressive initiatives will slow the economy by dragging on supply side growth. The Tax Foundation, for example, has estimated that a ten-percentage point surcharge on incomes over $2 million—a change that would only affect the highest-income 0.1 percent of households—will slow growth enough to cost 118,000 jobs by the end of the decade. A still-preliminary analysis of presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren’s wealth tax—a change that would affect only the wealthiest 0.1 percent of households—was estimated by the Penn-Wharton Budget Model team to slow growth by more than 0.2 percentage points each year over the next decade. The Penn-Wharton Budget Model project’s assessment of a plan by Representative John Larson (D-Conn. ) to expand Social Security benefits was analyzed by my colleague Monique Morrissey previously, so I will largely leave that aside in this post. Each of these results is driven entirely by the assumption that growth is supply-constrained. In the case of both the high-income surcharge and the wealth tax, the taxes are assumed to reduce labor supply and savings (which raises the “user cost of capital” and hence leads to reduced investment). But over the past decade, there is no evidence that labor supply has been a constraint on growth. Unemployment rates fell steadily in the years between 2010 and 2018. Even as the decline in unemployment moderated over the past year, labor force participation rose smartly. Additionally, the share of prime-age adults with jobs remains below its 2000 level—and there’s no particular reason to be sure that 2000 level is a hard upper bound. The clearest sign that availability of labor has become a supply-side constraint would be rapid wage growth— and that has certainly not happened. There is even less evidence that insufficient savings or a high user cost of capital have been constraints on growth of the capital stock or will become constraints anytime soon. Interest rates—the simplest proxy for the scarcity of savings and high user costs of capital – have been severely depressed for years, and interest rate projections have overestimated their growth since the late 1990s. Corporate profitability has been extraordinarily high over the 2000s, even as investment has been weak. One rebuttal to the argument that we should severely discount policy analyses based on supply-constrained assumptions is that we can’t bank on too-low demand being the primary constraint on growth forever. This is true—but hardly dispositive. The norm of conducting long-run policy analysis premised on the assumption that supply is the primary constraint on growth was never grounded in thinking that demand never constrained growth. Instead, it was assumed that while demand could bind, it would only do so for very limited times so could be largely ignored in the long-run. But, we just emerged from a period where demand unambiguously constrained growth for a decade—an entire budget forecasting window! Worse, we know some of the primary reasons why demand has become a tighter and tighter constraint on growth over time. One of the most important is the that has characterized recent decades. All else equal, a redistribution of income from low and moderate-income households to richer households will drag on demand growth, as richer households spend a smaller share of their income. There are potential policy offsets to this demand drag stemming from redistribution—most notably lower interest rates. But interest rates have been extraordinarily low over the last decade even as demand sagged. For a host of reasons, the strategy of fighting the demand drag of the enormous upward redistribution of income with lower interest rates seems to have lost any juice it may have ever had. Until there has been a reversal of this upward redistribution, it seems odd to think we should simply re-adopt the assumption that demand will stop being the primary constraint on growth. Another rebuttal to the argument that it is demand and not supply that will be the more likely constraint on growth in coming years is that productivity growth in the U.S. economy has been extremely slow of late. With slow productivity growth, even historically sluggish demand growth can exceed growth in the economy’s productive capacity and cause the supply-side to bind much more often. But the productivity slowdown is itself likely a function of slack demand over the past decade. Workers and capital have been so cheap and so plentiful for businesses to hire over the past decade that incentives to squeeze more from each unit of labor or capital have been severely blunted. Tellingly, as labor became scarcer in recent years, productivity growth has begun to firm up. Granted, productivity won’t rise without bound if demand accelerates, but the larger point is that one cannot infer from the past decade of data that low productivity growth is a permanent condition that guarantees supply constraints will bind going forward. Ironically, the three proposals recently dinged by supply-side analyses as slowing growth are all aimed at pushing back against the trend of rising inequality. As such, if adopted they would actually make it more likely that such supply-side analyses could be useful sometime in the future. To be very clear about this, a world in which it is supply constraints that bind is better in many ways. Involuntary unemployment would no longer be a problem and both productivity and wages would be pushed up. But even in a supply-constrained world, the recent analyses of the high-income surcharge and the wealth tax would be deeply misleading in terms of their effect on Americans’ welfare. Take the simplest case of this: the decline in GDP and jobs allegedly caused by the high-income surcharge. The first thing to note is how completely trivial even the Tax Foundation’s estimated effects are: growth that is slower by 0.01 percent for the next decade, with cumulative losses reaching 0.1 percent by the end of that time. One way to think about this is to compare how long it would take us with the surtax to reach the level of GDP projected for December 31, 2029 without the surtax. The answer is that we’d hit this same no-surtax level of GDP a week or two later. Would anybody notice this? In the second quarter of 2019, estimates of GDP growth were revised down by 0.1 percent—a one-quarter revision as large as the 10-year impact estimated by the Tax Foundation for the surcharge. Did anybody notice this 2nd quarter GDP revision in their lived economic experience or actually feel poorer? In regards to the job impacts, they are roughly equivalent to 900 fewer jobs per month created over the next decade. But the statistical standard error on the estimate of the number of jobs created each month by the Bureau of Labor Statistics is just under 70,000. Again, this is not a change anybody would notice. Even more importantly for assessing the welfare impact of these estimates, none of this job loss (assuming it happened and was noticed) would be involuntary—that is, willing potential workers who were unable to find a job because of the tax. Instead, the job loss would occur because a miniscule decline in productivity growth caused by reduced capital investment would reduce wages (by something on the order of 0.01 percent each year on average). Due to these lower wages (lower relative to a forecast baseline, mind you, not lower wages than today), potential workers would voluntarily decide to not work. Think of how little we should worry about these welfare effects: a worker who chooses to work when wages are $20 an hour but chooses not to work when wages are $19.99 an hour was clearly on the knife-edge of this decision anyhow, with work providing very little extra utility relative to not working. Or take the case of the wealth tax. The GDP losses chalked up to its effects come about because a decline in the after-tax return to holding wealth reduces the incentive of households to save and hence pushes up the “user cost of capital”, which in turn reduces investment and productivity growth. But households’ after-tax return to holding wealth is but one in a long list of inputs into the user cost of capital, and even the overall user cost of capital has been shown in empirical studies to have only weak effects on investment. To get a sense of how unconvincing model-based estimates of the effect of tax-based changes in the user cost of capital on investment are, note that the Penn Wharton Business Model (PWBM) actually predicted pro-growth effects from the 2017 tax cut—even though it was deficit-financed, which suppresses growth in their supply-side driven model (all else equal). The logic for how the 2017 tax law spurred growth in their model (even as it boosted deficits) was again through the channel of lowering the user cost of capital and spurring investment. And yet in the real world, capital investment collapsed shortly after the law’s passage. Outside of highly stylized and opaque models, efforts to empirically estimate the effect of taxes on capital income on investment come to mixed results. Finally, as many have pointed out, the effect of tax increases on growth depends on what you do with the money collected. If the worry is that tax increases might reduce private-sector investment, one can allay that by using the revenue to finance public investments. Research suggests that because U.S. governments (both federal and sub-national) have been so stingy with public investments in the recent past that the rates of return to boosting these could be potentially higher than for private investments. This seems especially true in regard to investments that reduce the growth of greenhouse gas emissions or provide high-quality early education for kids. Tax increases that help finance a larger public role in providing health insurance which then bends the long-run cost curve of health care by squeezing out inefficiencies and rents from the American health system would also have strong effects in boosting American living standards—yet this is obviously not any part of the PWBM estimates. Is any of this a call for economic nihilism—simply rejecting any finding that progressive policies may have effects we’d want to consider when debating them? Not at all. For example, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a very popular policy among progressive policymakers. Yet high-quality research indicates that some of its benefits may leak away from low-wage workers and to their employers. Knowing this, pairing the EITC increase with a minimum wage increase can help ensure that more of its gains are captured by workers. Analogously, it is conceivable (but by no means assured) that the wealth tax could indeed reduce savings by the very wealthy. If direct empirical estimates confirmed that, this would be valuable information. If further research indicated that reduced national savings overall were a binding supply-side constraint on growth (unlikely in the near-term or medium-term) then researchers could next look at whether or not the wealth tax boosted savings by the non-wealthy (it might). If the net effect of the wealth tax showed that it reduced national savings and caused supply-side constraints to bind, then complementary policies could be considered. For example, some have put forward plans for universal Guaranteed Retirement Accounts, financed by a combination of broad-based tax increases and mandatory contributions from employers and employees. Such plans would increase national savings. Genuine information about economic policies is good and useful. But the highly stylized output of models that assume supply-constraints on growth are the norm, and which are presented as effects on “growth” and “jobs” with no further context are notably unusual, and often actively misleading in today’s policy debates.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Advantage CP › 2NC---AT: Billionaires Avoid the Tax

A billionaire’s tax would not cause a migration—studies prove.

Young ’17. [ Cristobal Young is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Stanford University. He studies how sociological dynamics shape the effects of public policies--especially policies meant to reduce inequality. His research has been featured in The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and USA Today, and he has contributed pieces to The New York Times Sunday Review and the New York Daily News, among others.] “If you tax the rich, they won’t leave: U.S. data contradicts millionaires threats.” November 20, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/nov/20/if-you-tax-the-rich-they-wont-leave-us-data-contradicts-millionaires-threats

Does raising taxes on the rich really trigger their migration to more obliging states or countries? This study of every million-dollar earner in the US shows otherwise. In the classic Ayn Rand novel Atlas Shrugged, the rich go “on strike” – withdrawing their services and disappearing from society in protest against taxes and regulation. Weary of carrying an ungrateful world on their shoulders, business leaders and other top income earners finally shrug, and leave the world without them. The book’s metaphor inspires political rhetoric to this day: if you tax the rich, they will leave. Variations on the threat are issued by well-off individuals all over the world – not least in the United States, where each state sets its own tax policies, and periodic warnings are issued that taxes on the rich will lead to millionaire migration to more obliging US states. When Oregon voters passed a millionaire tax at the start of this decade, for example, the state’s richest resident, Nike CEO Phil Knight, warned the tax would set off a “death spiral … in which thousands of our most successful residents will leave”. As California considered similar taxes, policymakers cautioned “nothing is more mobile than a millionaire and his money”. In New Jersey, governor Chris Christie simply stated: “Ladies and Gentlemen, if you tax them, they will leave.” But does this rhetoric stand up to statistical scrutiny? To better understand elite migration across state lines, I analyzed tax return data from every million-dollar income-earner in the United States. The dataset includes 3.7 million top-earning individuals, who collectively filed more than 45 million tax returns over more than a dozen years – showing where millionaires live and where they move to. And it turns out that place still matters for the rich – much more so than we might think. Only about 2.4% of US-based millionaires change their state of residence in a given year. Interstate migration is actually more common among the US middle class, and almost twice as common among its poorest residents, who have an annual interstate migration rate of 4.5%. While travel may be a classic “luxury good”, migration is not. Moving one’s home, life and family to a different place is mostly about people who have a poor economic fit with where they live, earn below-market incomes, and are struggling to find a livelihood. Higher income earners show low migration levels because they are not searching for economic success – they’ve already found it. When millionaires do move, they admittedly tend to favour lower-tax states over higher-tax ones – but only marginally so. Around 15% of interstate millionaire migrations bring a net tax advantage. The other 85% have no net tax impact for the movers. Furthermore, almost all of the tax-migration moves are to just one low-tax state: Florida – where low-income taxes come with sun, sand and palm trees. Other low-tax states such as Texas, Tennessee and Nevada do not pick up any net tax-migration. So while some millionaires have moved to lower tax states over the years 1999-2011, the flows have been too small to change the geography of the economic elite in America. The world view The Forbes list of the world’s billionaires offers an international look at elite migration, and takes us higher up the food chain to the greatest corners of wealth. Analysis of this list shows most of the world’s billionaires – about 84% – still live in their country of birth. And among those who do live abroad, most moved to their current country of residence long before they became wealthy – either as children with their parents, or as students going abroad to study (and then staying). Only about 5% of world billionaires moved abroad after they became successful. These individuals readily fit the stereotype of a “transnational capitalist class” – unplugged from their nation state, travelling the world for some combination of tax avoidance and cosmopolitan lifestyle. Many of them can be found in London claiming “non-dom” status to avoid the tax laws of both their homeland and those that apply to British citizens. Others are located in tropical tax havens – such as Sir Richard Branson, who moved to the British Virgin Islands after becoming a billionaire. These jet-setting billionaires generate a lot of headlines and cynicism about tax flight. But they are anecdotal exceptions. The world’s billionaires largely live where they were born or where they began their careers. The British elite live in Britain, the Chinese elite live in China, and the American elite live in America. After making it on to the Forbes billionaire list, elites are actually more likely to die than to move to a different country. Why do the rich have such low migration rates? And why is common intuition about elite migration so wrong? It turns out that education is a big part of the remaining puzzle. People with high levels of education have very high mobility – but only for a short period after finishing their education. If you know people who have been geographically mobile, the chances are they have a higher-level education. However, once they have made a solid start to their career, the chances are also that they will not move again. Migration is a young person’s game, and moving overwhelmingly occurs when people are starting their careers. By the time people hit their early forties, PhDs, college grads and high school drop-outs all show the same low rate of migration. Typically, millionaires are society’s highly educated at an advanced career stage. They are typically the late-career working rich: established professionals in management, finance, consulting, medicine, law and similar fields. And they have low migration because they are both socially and economically embedded in place. In the US tax data, while most of the millionaires’ incomes come from wages and salaries, a quarter of them also own a business. Almost all of them are married, and most have children at home. For all these reasons, places are sticky – it is hard to move after making a career and family in a place. If millionaires were mostly college-going twentysomethings not yet tied to place by career or family responsibilities, place-based income tax systems would face serious challenges. We would be trying to tax the rich exactly when they are most mobile. But this is not the case. Typically, people make decisions about where to live almost two decades before they hit their peak earnings. This shows a kind of unexpected genius behind taxes on the very highest incomes. A tax on million-dollar income serves as an intergenerational transfer, since those who pay it are the late-career working rich: socially and economically embedded in the place. In contrast, most of the people who are mobile – early career professionals – do not really care about the “millionaire tax”, because if they ever pay it, it will be decades in the future, and only if they are wildly successful. Millionaire tax revenues could be used to invest in things that matter to young people starting out: education, infrastructure, public services, urban amenities, quality of life. And this would help to attract and retain a pipeline of future top-earners, creating a virtuous tax circle. This is why places with highly progressive income taxes – such as New York and California – still thrive as centres for talent and elite economic success. Their policies focus on the pipeline of future top earners. They invest in what attracts mobile young professionals – quality of life – and only send them the bill if and when they achieve their highest aspirations.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Advantage CP › 2NC---AT: Can’t Afford Without a Tax

Net benefit turns and outweighs: the productivity increases thanks to automation will offset potential losses in revenue about 17x over within the next decade

Atkinson 19 – Atkinson holds a Ph.D. in city and regional planning from the University of North Carolina, Chapel. He earned his master’s degree in urban and regional planning from the University of Oregon. Has worked for the White House in economic task forces since the Clinton administration. Robert Atkinson, April 8 2019, “The Case Against Taxing Robots,” Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, https://itif.org/publications/2019/04/08/case-against-taxing-robots/

Robots are already driving productivity.4 Investment in robots contributed to 10 percent of GDP growth per capita in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries from 1993 to 2016. There is also a 0.42 percent correlation between a country’s wage-adjusted manufacturing robot adoption and growth in productivity between 2010 and 2017.6 Graetz and Michaels found that robot densification increased annual growth of GDP and labor productivity between 1993 and 2007 by about 0.37 and 0.36 percentage points respectively across 17 countries studied, representing 10 percent of total GDP growth—this compared with the 0.35 percentage point estimated total contribution of steam technology to British annual labor productivity growth between 1850 and 1910.7 Their subsequent study found that investment in robots contributed 10 percent of growth in GDP per capita in OECD countries from 1993 to 2016.8 The same study found that a one-unit increase in robotics density (which the study defines as the number of robots per million hours worked) is associated with a 0.04 percent increase in labor productivity. A study by the Institute for Employment Research in Germany found that robot adoption led to a GDP increase of 0.5 percent per person per robot over the 10 years from 2004 to 2014.9 To date, most robot adoption has occurred in manufacturing, where they perform a wide variety of manual tasks more efficiently and consistently than humans. With continued innovation, robot use is spreading to other sectors, from agriculture to logistics to hospitality. Robots are also getting cheaper, more flexible, and more autonomous—in part because of the addition of artificial intelligence. Some robots will substitute for workers; others, “cobots” (“collaborative robots” that work alongside workers), will complement workers. As this trend continues, robot adoption will likely become a key determinant of productivity growth and potentially reshape global supply chains.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Advantage CP › 2NC---AT:Mil Recruitment Add-on

It’s the worst recruiting crisis in history

Carol Stoker 23[Carol Stoker, a retired US Navy officer and has helped conduct a number military manpower and retention studies , "How to solve the military recruitment crisis",6-7-2023, Spectator World, https://thespectator.com/topic/fix-military-recruitment-crisis-dei-army/, 1LEE]

Our military is facing the worst recruiting crisis in the history of our fifty-year-old All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Contrary to what you may have read elsewhere, there is no single explanation for this urgent problem. Rather, this crisis is the product of a number of factors: a strong civilian labor market, the effects of COVID, a shrinking pool of American youth eligible to serve in the military, and — of greatest concern — a reduced interest in joining the military, fed by a lack of knowledge, a declining sense of service, false and negative messaging about the forces, and the activist politicization of the force.

Today, there are about 1.3 million active-duty military members; they are its greatest asset. The services aim annually to match their respective personnel numbers with their congressionally authorized “end-strength” headcount. As the largest branch (about 35 percent of the military), the US Army has a substantially higher recruiting goal than the other services. Since the start of the AVF, the services have generally acquired enough qualified recruits. But the 2022 fiscal year was the worst for military recruiting in the AVF’s history. The Army missed its recruiting goal by an astounding 25 percent. It received 44,901 soldiers, 15,099 (75 percent) less than its goal of 60,000. The Navy gained 33,442; the Marine Corps 28,608; the Air Force 26,196; and the new Space Force 532. While the other services met their fiscal 2022 goals, it was a tough year for recruiting. All bolstered retention efforts to meet their end-strength.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Advantage CP › 2NC---AT:Mil Recruitment Add-on

Everyone missed the recruiting goal

Thomas Spoehr 23[Thomas Spoehr, conducts and supervises research on national defense matters, "The Military Recruiting Crisis Is Getting Worse",6-26-2023, Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-military-recruiting-crisis-getting-worse, 1LEE]

At a recent House Armed Services Committee hearing, leaders from the Army, Navy, and Air Force all dutifully reported that they expected to miss their annual recruiting goal this year by thousands. This is just the latest sign that the military recruiting crisis—the worst since the institution of the all-volunteer force in 1973—is not abating.

Despite significant efforts by the military services, such as offering hefty enlistment bonuses of up to $50,000 and the ability to choose your first duty station, recruiting numbers have not improved. The effects on the armed forces are sobering: Navy ships are undermanned, and the Army is considering cutting the number of its Brigade Combat Teams.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Advantage CP › 2NC---AT: Federal JG Fails

A JG is better in every way—satisfies human dignity, creates economic stability, distributes income better, and doesn’t produce inflation

BIG stands for basic income guarantee

Tcherneva 12[Pavlina Tcherneva, Ph.D and an Associate Professor of Economics at Bard College, the Director of OSUN’s Economic Democracy Initiative, and a Research Scholar at the Levy Economics Institute, NY while specializing in monetary and fiscal policy coordination and employment policy, "The Job Guarantee: Delivering the Benefits That Basic Income Only Promises – A Response to Guy Standing",12-31-2012, De Gruyter, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/bis-2013-0010/html, 1LEE]

In the modern monetized world, however, the poor and the unemployed want paid work. The Argentinean experience shows that paid work matters to the poor (poor mothers in particular), and that visions of a post-work society are not their visions. The poor and the unemployed want to participate in mainstream society, by receiving wages and contributing to private market or community production. At the same time, those individuals feel the pressing need for mainstream society to recognize their care and community work as useful. The experience of poor women in Argentina demonstrates that the poor understand that income alone does not empower. Social mores dictate that genuine empowerment comes from earned income, not charitable contributions. Although non-wage income entitlements to women attempt to recognize household work as socially useful, which deserves financial support in a monetized society, they do not carry the same benefits women report from engaging in paid employment, nor do they help break the gender stereotypes of division of responsibilities within the household.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Advantage CP › 2NC---AT: Federal JG Fails

A federal job guarantee resolves automation induced unemployment while facilitating its development

Kavanagh 18[Darrell Kavanagh, ex-labor party member with 8 years of experience writing for socialism, "Gis a Job",11-6-2018, Medium, https://medium.com/@DarrellChaloner/gis-a-job-f030042e9501, 1LEE]

But though people on the left recognise this, and are already campaigning for a living wage and secure jobs with trade union rights, there is also a fear in our movement of approaching automation, which might provide a few well-paid jobs, but would leave even more people on the scrapheap of underemployment or unemployment.

Employers, too, are wary of investment, which has never really recovered from the crash of 2007/2008. Partly this is due to a lack of demand in the economy, leaving them unsure they could realise the profits from such investment, and partly it is due to the weakening of workers’ rights over the last 40 years, which allows bosses to throw cheap, insecure labour at the problem, rather than invest in productive capacity.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Advantage CP › 1NC---Solvency

A JG raises the minimum wage, combats structural inequality, and provides social benefits in ways a UBI can’t.

Paul, Darity, & Hamilton ’17. [ Mark Paul is an assistant professor of economics at the Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy at Rutgers University. William Darity Jr is the Samuel DuBois Cook professor of public policy, African and African American Studies, and economics and the director of the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University. Darrick Hamilton is associate professor of economics and urban policy at the Milano School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy and the Department of Economics, New School for Social Research.] “Why We Need a Federal Job Guarantee.” February 4, 2017. https://jacobin.com/2017/02/federal-job-guarantee-universal-basic-income-investment-jobs-unemployment/#:~:text=A%20job%20guarantee%20would%20reduce,to%20a%20mean%20of%20%2432%2C500.

Universal basic income (UBI), an annual government-sponsored payment to all citizens, has been gaining traction across the American political landscape. Andy Stern, former Service Employees International Union president, believes the program will counteract the “acceleration of technology” that he thinks will likely create “work but not reliable jobs or incomes.” On the Right, the American Enterprise Institute’s Charles Murray argues that we should replace the “entire bureaucratic apparatus of government social workers” with a UBI. Other heavy-hitters agree it’s worth discussing. Robert Reich’s recent video calls on the government to provide a minimum payment for every citizen. President Obama told Wired that the United States will have to debate UBI and similar programs “over the next ten or twenty years.” The renewed attention makes sense: UBI would cover workers who, thanks to technological progress, have lost their jobs. One often-cited report tells us that 47 percent of all jobs are at risk of being automated. Yet existing social insurance programs are insufficient. The current array of programs — such as unemployment insurance, the earned income tax credit, and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program — help many Americans, but over forty-three million people still live below the poverty line. Children are among the most vulnerable, with nearly half living at or near poverty. The UBI represents one way to fight increasing deprivation. But another potential intervention — the federal job guarantee (FJG) — might be a far more promising demand. A job guarantee is not a new idea. It has been part of the American conversation at least since populist governor Huey Long put forth his Share Our Wealth Plan. In 1934, he argued that the United States should use public works to ensure “everybody [is] employed.” These calls were echoed by politicians from Roosevelt in his Economic Bill of Rights to George McGovern during his 1972 presidential bid. Martin Luther King also stumped for a job guarantee, demanding immediate “employment for everyone in need of a job.” He saw “a guaranteed annual income at levels that sustain life and decent circumstances” as the second-best option. Here are five reasons to agree with him. A job guarantee means fewer poor Americans. A job guarantee would reduce poverty more quickly and provide more benefits than a UBI. To ensure a sufficient income, we argue for a FJG that would pay a minimum annual wage of at least $23,000 (the poverty line for a family of four), rising to a mean of $32,500. This would eliminate the “working poor” for full-time working households. In addition to the wage, workers in the FJG program would receive health insurance and pension benefits in line with those that all civil servants and elected federal officials receive. In comparison, many of the UBI proposals promise around $10,000 annually to every citizen (for an example, see Charles Murray’s proposal here). On the one hand, this plan would  between employment and money. But it does so at half the rate that would be available under the FJG, not even considering lifesaving benefits like health insurance. The robots haven’t taken over yet. We still need workers. The dangers of imminent full automation are overstated: there is little evidence that companies are largely replacing human workers with robots. As Dean Baker explains, “If technology were rapidly displacing workers then productivity growth – the rate of increase in the value of goods and services produced in an hour of work – should be very high, because machines are more efficient. In the last decade, however, productivity growth has risen at a sluggish 1.4 percent annual rate. In the last two years it has limped along at a pace of less than 1 percent annually. By comparison, in the post- World War II “Golden Age,” from 1947 to 1973, productivity grew at an annual rate of almost 3 percent.” No doubt, stable and high-paid employment opportunities are dwindling, but we shouldn’t blame the robots. Workers aren’t being replaced by automatons; they are being replaced with other workers — ones lower-paid and more precariously employed. Nevertheless, technology, and globalization, have struck fear into American workers. Not because they are by nature a raw deal, but because the balance of forces over the last few decades has been skewed so dramatically in the favor of capital. Technology, nor globalization, need have negative employment effects on workers — but they certainly can. It’s time to get the rules right, and ensure workers are provided the dignity of a job. A federal job program would solve the real problem, while UBI would simply treat a side effect. A FJG could build an inclusive economy. Conventional wisdom holds that people dislike work. Introductory economics classes will explain the disutility of labor, which is a direct trade-off with leisure. Granted, employment isn’t always fun, and many forms of employment are dangerous and exploitative. But the UBI misses the way in which employment structurally empowers workers at the point of production and has by its own merits positive dimensions. This touches on a heated debate on the Left. But for now, there is no doubt that people want jobs, but they want good jobs that provide flexibility and opportunity. They want to contribute, to have a purpose, to participate in the economy and, most importantly, in society. Nevertheless, the private sector continues to leave millions without work, even during supposed “strong” economic times. The workplace is social, a place where we spend a great deal of our time interacting with others. In addition to the stress associated with limited resources, the loneliness that plagues many unemployed workers can exacerbate mental health problems. Employment — especially employment that provides added social benefits like communal coffee breaks — adds to workers’ well-being and productivity. A federal job guarantee can provide workers with socially beneficial employment — providing the dignity of a job to all that seek it. The FJG would also act as a de facto wage floor — private employers will have to offer wages and benefits at least as enticing as the federal government to attract workers. There has been extensive public support for recent increases in the minimum wage, such as the Fight for $15 campaign, demonstrating that most Americans believe workers deserve a living wage. Fighting for a higher minimum wage is an important step to ensure that workers are compensated a living wage rather than a poverty wage, yet let us not forget that the effective minimum wage in this country without a UBI or a job guarantee is $0. This must change. Finally, some argue that a “skills mismatch” explains why some workers remain unemployed. While we reject that narrative, a well-designed FJG will nevertheless include a training element to build workers’ skills and a jobs ladder to create upward mobility in the workplace. All of these elements will build an inclusive economy that provides good jobs for all. The UBI, in contrast, could subsidize bad jobs — allowing low minimum wages and lack of benefits to persist. Federal jobs could provide socially useful goods and services. During the Great Depression, the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) were public employment programs designed to put Americans back to work after the national unemployment rate reached 25 percent. These programs, implemented under the Roosevelt administration, provided socially beneficial goods and services that benefited all Americans. Some of our national parks — Zion, Glacier, and Shenandoah — received substantial work contributions from employees of the federal jobs programs. The Blue Ridge Parkway was a federally funded and staffed infrastructure program. A new federal job guarantee could undertake similarly bold and much-needed public-works projects. The American Society of Civil Engineers gave the United States a D+ in infrastructure and prices necessary repairs at $3.6 trillion. This lack of investment has lowered employment rates, cost businesses sales, and reduced incomes for American families. Make no mistake, these are government choices. They could choose instead to hire unemployed workers to repair bridges, maintain roadways, and update power grids. Likewise, Bill McKibben just called for us to “declare war” against climate change. With climate change being perhaps the largest threat to our well-being, bold action is needed. The job guarantee program would create the capacity to do just that. Professor Robert Pollin of the Political Economy Research Institute calls for scaling up the transition to a green economy, which would create millions of new jobs along the way. He and his colleagues estimate what a Green New Deal would look like and find that a transition to a green economy would amount to an estimated $200 billion in investment annually, resulting in a drop in “US emission by 40 percent within 20 years, while creating a net increase of 2.7 million jobs.” In part, this is due to the labor-intensive nature of energy efficiency and other “green” investments. Additional services, when combined with a FJG, would save average American households thousands, if not tens of thousands, a year. According to the Economic Policy Institute, for example, tuition-free and universal child care and education — staffed by FJG workers — would trim an average of $22,631 annually from families’ budgets in expensive places such as DC while saving households in places like Arkansas a more modest $5,995 on average. To be sure, a UBI would free up time to volunteer, to care for sick relatives, or to start small businesses. Additionally, the UBI would finally provide greater financial freedom to those that choose to stay at home and engage in care work — disproportionately provided by women. However, the FJG has the ability to provide high quality services, such as childcare and elder care, that would greatly reduce the care burden, providing more choice while building on the current social safety net. It’ll stabilize the economy. FJG would bring us much closer to actual full employment, not the neoclassical full employment that subjectively allows for some optimal frictional unemployment. Most contemporary economists rely on the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) to calculate this less-than-full full employment artificial statistic which functions as a disciplinary tool of the bourgeoisie, but this, according to Roger Farmer is “an idea past its sell-by date.” By full employment, we mean simply that everyone seeking a job gets one. We’d wager that if you asked the average American what full employment means to them, they’d give you a similar answer — a job for all. Indeed, a plurality of Americans will also tell you they support a FJG. The UBI would likely still leave a substantial segment of the population in poverty. As Belgian philosopher Philippe Van Parijs, one of the most prominent UBI advocates, acknowledged, even a large payment through the UBI won’t necessarily secure a comfortable living for all citizens. How about those without jobs, or those who earn below subsistence wages? Of course, a UBI coupled with a non-poverty wage option and strong unionization could seriously combat poverty. The UBI would eliminate the effective minimum wage of $0 currently offered in the United States, though it would fail to provide adequate employment for all that demanded it — a crucial shortfall of such a program. A FJG is a sounder mechanism to combat structural inequalities, for instance through closing the persistent unemployment gap experienced by stigmatized groups who face continued discrimination. (Note, since 1972 unemployment has average double digits for black workers and has never fallen below 7 percent — a level that is only reached during times of economic crisis — for white workers). Further, the FJG will have a strong macroeconomic stabilization effect. During economic downturns, it would expand and hire more people; it would then shrink during economic boom periods as people move from public to better-paying private employment. , a  on the FJG’s macroeconomic effects, argues that policies like the UBI have no counter-cyclical features. Thus, when the economy takes a downturn — say as it did in 2007 — basic incomes provide no automatic stabilizers to right the sinking ship. This is good for the economy as a whole. Rather than expanding the unemployment insurance rolls during economic busts, the FJG would put folks to work and moderate the business cycle. Federal workers’ paychecks will increase demand, which will increase economic growth. Many economists agree that today’s secular stagnation — insufficient demand — is contributing to continued “lackluster” growth after the Great Recession. Only modest upticks in growth for the foreseeable future will come if we continue the status quo. Finally, as a less costly program a FJG might be easier for a future left government to enact. Some estimate that basic income could easily cost more than $3 trillion each year, while others say it will only come to $2.7 trillion. The FJG, on the other hand, will cost orders of magnitude less. Even if we conservatively guess that fifteen million unemployed workers need jobs, funding the FJG would take about $750 billion. We want to build an inclusive economy. The FJG will build an economy that serves the working class more efficiently and effectively than the UBI. The benefits will be immediately and broadly distributed. The FJG will directly target the unemployed — remedying a key predictor of poverty. By providing universal employment, it will also counteract employers’ systematic discrimination against ex-offenders, recent military veterans, and certain racial groups. Furthermore, through providing a guaranteed job, workers will be emboldened to take new actions in the private sector. This could be just the policy to reinvigorate the labor movement, spurring unionization drives to improve working conditions. These benefits will result in the federal jobs raising beneficiaries and their families above the poverty line. The UBI can make no such guarantee. Not only would a federal job guarantee bring justice to the millions who desire work, but it would also address the long-standing unjust barriers that keep large segments of stigmatized populations out of the labor force. Finally, it would reverse the rising tide of inequality for all workers. By strengthening their bargaining power and eliminating the threat of unemployment once and for all, a federal job guarantee would bring power back to the workers where it belongs.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Advantage CP › 1NC---Solvency

A billionaire’s tax is both feasible and solves—disincentivizing hoarding leads to economic growth.

Linden ’19. [ Michael Linden is the executive director of the Groundwork Collaborative and a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.] “What could the US afford if it raised billionaires’ taxes? We do the math.” December 13, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/dec/13/billionaires-taxes-inequality-one-percent

Every billionaire is a policy failure.” So says a key adviser to Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Ocasio-Cortez herself says that it’s wrong to have a “system that allows billionaires to exist” alongside poverty. And the New York Times columnist Farhad Manjoo recently called for us to “abolish billionaires”. For most of the last four decades, the gains from economic growth have flowed overwhelmingly to the rich. Much of those gains to the rich weren’t “earned” in any traditional sense, but rather extracted, excess profits squeezed out of a system designed to favor those who already have power, position, and wealth. Today, the top 1% of Americans own more wealth than the bottom 90% combined. It’s no wonder “abolishing billionaires” has become a rallying cry. But what does it really mean? Is it setting a cap on the amount of wealth one household can own? Or does it entail something a little more structural: unrigging the system that gave us billionaires and instead creating an economy in which everyday people get the benefits from the growth that they have created. Tax Perhaps the most direct way to begin “abolishing billionaires” is by taxing them much more heavily. America’s overall tax system is only barely progressive – meaning that the richest Americans pay only a bit more in taxes as a share of their income than everyone else. And at the very top, among those taking home hundreds of millions each year, the tax code is actually regressive, meaning the more they make the less they pay. The richest 1% own nearly 40% of all the wealth but pay only 20% of all the taxes. Boosting rich people’s taxes is sound policy. Extreme inequality is like economic pollution. It creates widespread harm that the polluters don’t pay for. Inequality makes bubbles more likely, it undermines the foundations for innovation and productivity, and it weakens and destabilizes consumer demand. Taxing it like pollution helps make the costs clearer and reduces the harm. And of course, taxing the super-rich would generate revenue that could be put to better uses than letting that money sit in a Bahamian bank account of a billionaire. Over the next 10 years, the richest 1% of American households will take home about another $22tn, after federal taxes. Their average annual post-tax income will be about $1.7m. Right now they pay about 30% of their income in taxes. Increasing their overall average tax rate by about 10 percentage points would generate roughly $3tn in revenue over the next 10 years, while still leaving the 1% with an average post-tax annual income of more than $1.4m. (That new tax rate, by the way, would be about the same as the overall rate the richest 1% paid back in the 1940s and 1950s.) Three trillion dollars in new revenue is enough to make college free at all public universities, make a massive new investment in infrastructure along the lines of what Senate Democrats have proposed, and triple the budget for the National Institutes of Health. Needless to say, all of these investments would pay enormous economic dividends. Of course, we could raise even more from the rich. We could raise the top 1%’s effective tax rate by as much as 25 percentage points and still leave them with an average annual after-tax income of over $1m. Doing that would generate about $8tn in revenue, which is enough to send every household in the bottom 75% a check for nearly $8,500 every year for 10 years. Wealth tax We could also tax wealth. Whereas income is new money that comes in each year, wealth is the accumulated money that has built up over time. As of 2016, the wealthiest 1% of American households owned about $27tn in total, an average of about $23m per household. A tax that took about 1% of that wealth each year would yield about $4tn over the next decade. To put that amount in perspective, $4tn is more than the federal government will spend over the next decade on foster care, school lunch, school breakfast, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, food stamps, unemployment compensation, supplemental security income for the elderly, blind people, and those with disabilities, and all the tax credits for working families combined. Income and wealth taxes at those levels would, of course, be a lot higher than we have now, but they wouldn’t be so high as to actually, directly, “abolish billionaires”. The rich would still be richer than everyone else, just slightly less so. Ignore the critics There will be those who claim the sky will fall if we tried to tax the rich like this. They’ll predict widespread economic damage, maybe even collapse. These warnings of doom and gloom rely on the theory that growth and prosperity come from rich people’s ingenuity and know-how. If we tax them, they might take their ball and go home. That’s preposterous, of course. Rich people are neither the source of economic prosperity, nor will they decide to go off and form their own society in Antarctica or 10 miles off the coast of San Diego. In fact, taxing rich people will make our economy work more like it should. If we disincentivize hoarding at the top, money will more easily flow to the workers and families who really drive economic growth. And the tax revenue we generate can be put to good use, investing in working people, in communities across the country, and in our collective future. And before long, instead of a few hundred billionaires taking ever more, we could instead have a thriving middle class, widespread economic security, and real opportunities to give the next generation a better life.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT › Advantage CP › 1NC---Solvency

UBI can’t solve—private-sector retraining is key to raising wages and narrowing the skills gap.

McQuillan & Sklar ’18. [ Lawrence J. McQuillan is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Entrepreneurial Innovation at the Independent Institute. He received his Ph.D. in economics from George Mason University, and he has served as Chief Economist at the Illinois Policy Institute, Director of Business and Economic Studies at the Pacific Research Institute, and Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute. Rebecca Sklar is a policy researcher.] “The solution for ‘robogeddon’ is rapid retraining, not guaranteed income.” https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/403092-the-solution-for-robogeddon-is-rapid-retraining-not-guaranteed-income/

“The biggest challenge to workers in countries like mine today is technology,” former president recently  in South Africa. “We’re going to have to consider new ways of thinking about these problems, like a universal income.” As it happens, there is a better solution for workers when “robots come for your job”: rapid private-sector retraining. {mosads}A universal basic income (UBI) is an unearned cash handout from government—actually from taxpayers—to citizens regardless of employment or health status. Oakland, Calif., tested a UBI program in 2016; Stockton, Calif., will launch a pilot program in 2019; and Chicago officials are considering such a program. UBI gives everyone money with nothing expected in return, encouraging people to disconnect from the workforce and society—diminishing human dignity—while creating unsustainable taxpayer obligations. But warnings of “robogeddon” could be overstated. According to consultancy McKinsey, up to 33 percent of the U.S. workforce may need to change occupations and learn new skills by 2030 due to digitization, automation, and advances in artificial intelligence. In contrast, Oren Cass, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, argues that “all of the economic data suggest that jobs are being destroyed by automation slower than ever.” Regardless of the disruption, retraining is a better response, and the private sector retrains better than government. The U.S. government spends $17 billion a year on more than 40 workforce development programs across 14 agencies. Billions more are spent subsidizing postsecondary education — $75 billion in 2013, according to Pew Charitable Trusts. Yet government retraining has failed dismally. An independent 2016 analysis, Workforce Investment Act Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs Gold Standard Evaluation, found that federal programs do little to raise participant salaries and participants are less likely to obtain employment-based health insurance or retirement benefits. Perhaps most important, government programs fail to offer training in high-demand occupations. Another analyst concluded that federal programs are “largely a waste of time for the majority of job seekers and an enormous squandering of taxpayer dollars.” For most people, returning to college is impractical and expensive: adults often face family obligations and significant forgone wages. Most traditional college programs take at least two years to complete, and debt can pile up: average student-loan debt is $5,170 at community colleges and about $37,000 at four-year colleges. Graduates also report dissatisfaction with their degrees. Only 44 percent think their postsecondary education improved their employment chances. Students often find that technological advancements during their college years make their skills gap even wider when they graduate. Meanwhile, 45 percent of employers report that lack of skills is the main reason for unfilled entry-level jobs. The solution for the persistent and widening skills gap is targeted and rapid retraining by companies with skin in the game. They are best suited to develop skill sets that match employment requirements now and into the future. Of the $1.1 trillion spent in the United States each year on postsecondary workforce education and training, private employers spend the most, $590 billion. Since they bet their own money, they do a better job preparing workers for a rapidly changing tech-focused economy. That is why many companies set up their own training programs. Many businesses, including Amazon, AT&T, and Seattle Genetics, now integrate extensive job-training programs into the standard hiring process, developing desired skills such as leadership, customer relations, and data analytics. And there has been a boom in accelerated learning programs (ALPs) in the tech sector to teach new skills rapidly, often in a “work-study” arrangement. App Academy, Hack reactor, and Product School are just a few private ALPs, both online and brick-and-mortar, that teach high-level software skills in a short time at affordable prices and that practically guarantee students jobs. Scholarships could allow people of all income levels to enroll. The rise of ALPs in tech highlights the potential for vocational/technical education to close the skills gap rapidly as automation disrupts more industries. Contrary to the former president, there is an alternative to universal cash handouts and pouring more money down the federal training rathole. Responsible governments will step aside and let private companies implement cutting-edge retraining to ensure that workers quickly acquire the skills necessary for success.