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2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › 2NC – UQ – US-China Relations

Trade still balances on a tightrope between the US and China

He 7/7 – (Laura He is a reporter and digital producer for CNN Business, based in Hong Kong. She covers news about Asian business and markets, with a focus on China. Before joining CNN, Laura He was a senior financial correspondent for South China Morning Post based in Hong Kong. Prior to that she worked for Dow Jones in both Hong Kong as well as San Francisco. In the U.S. she also worked for Forbes and wrote about Chinese entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in Silicon Valley. She started her career with Xinhua News Agency working in both Hong Kong as the chief financial correspondent and on-air reporter, as well as in Beijing as an editor. Laura He holds a Master’s in journalism from Stanford University and speaks English, Mandarin, and Cantonese); 7-7-2023; "4 things making it harder for Janet Yellen to repair the US-China relationship," CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/06/economy/us-china-janet-yellen-visit-intl-hnk/index.html //sp

As US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen gears up Friday for two days of meetings with officials and economists in Beijing, she has a tough job: to stabilize a fractious relationship that worsened this week when China retaliated in a tech war with the United States. On Monday, China announced restrictions on exports of two strategic materials needed to make semiconductors, which are crucial for the normal functioning of daily life and a growing source of tension between the world’s top two economies. “This is just the beginning,” Wei Jianguo, a former Chinese vice-minister of commerce, told the official China Daily. “China’s tool box has many more types of measures available.” The issues that need to be worked out between the superpowers are thorny and complex, even as their economies seem to defy talk of decoupling to become ever more intertwined. Yellen’s visit comes at a moment when the global economy faces much uncertainty, as China’s post-Covid recovery loses momentum, Europe tries to pull out of a recession and the United States is still at risk of one. The global economy stands to gain if Washington and Beijing can mend fences, but analysts say this appears unlikely. “The two countries have misaligned and competing strategic interests. The relationship is at its lowest point in decades, marked by palpable and mutual distrust,” said Anna Ashton, director of China corporate affairs and US-China relations at Eurasia Group. Here are four things likely to make it harder for Yellen to repair US-China ties, and one thing keeping the relationship going. 1. Chip war The tussle over the future of semiconductors has escalated in recent months, drawing in Japan and Europe. Beijing played a trump card earlier this week when it imposed export controls on two raw materials, gallium and germanium, that are critical to the global chipmaking industry. This was perceived as China’s second counter measure to a US ban on advanced chip sales to China, which was announced by the Biden administration last year. Sanctioning one of America’s biggest memory chipmakers, Micron Technology (MU), in May was Beijing’s first. Wei was quoted by China Daily as saying the decision to announce curbs was made after “thoughtful consideration” and was designed to “not only cause panic in certain countries, but also exert heavy pain in them.” Analysts believe limits on the export of rare earths, a group of 17 elements for which China controls more than half of the global supply, could be the next way for China to hit back. In October, the US government unveiled a set of export controls banning Chinese companies from buying advanced chips and chip-making equipment without a license. According to multiple media reports, the curbs will be expanded to restrict the sale of some artificial intelligence chips. The sanctions strike at the heart of Beijing’s tech ambitions, as chips are vital for everything from smartphones, self-driving cars, and advanced computing to weapons manufacturing. China has strongly criticized such restrictions on tech exports and will do all it can to ensure they don’t hold back its own development. 2. Raids on US businesses Beijing’s crackdown against Western consulting and due diligence firms has also unnerved US businesses. In April, Beijing updated its counter-espionage law, which expanded the list of activities that could be considered spying. Over the past few months, officials have launched a spate of raids on consultancies, including Capvision, Bain & Company and the Mintz Group. The authorities accused Capvision, which is based in Shanghai and New York, of helping to leak sensitive military information to foreign forces. Skyscrapers stand at the Lujiazui Financial District at sunset on May 8, 2023 in Shanghai, China. China's economy is growing again. So why are investors getting out? Analysts said Chinese President Xi Jinping’s enhanced focus on national security is creating political risks that are making it harder for foreign firms to do business in China. Some funds and research firms have shut their China offices following the crackdown, including Forrester Research and the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan. 3. Possible restrictions on investment in China Since earlier this year, the Biden administration has been mulling new rules that could limit investment in key parts of China’s economy by American businesses, according to multiple media reports. In April, a group of congressional Republicans called on the administration to “use all available tools” to sanction cloud computing firms with links to China. The US government has long scrutinized foreign investment into the country. But rules regulating US investment abroad would be a new step, part of a broader effort to make it harder for China to develop key technologies that could support its military. Rising geopolitical tensions have put many companies in a tough position. Last month, venture capital titan Sequoia split off its China business after its expansive investments in China, often in tech startups, drew attention from US lawmakers. Signage with logo at headquarters of venture capital investment firm Sequoia Capital, on Sand Hill Road in the Silicon Valley town of Menlo Park, California, August 25, 2016. (Photo via Smith Collection/Gado/Getty Images). US venture capital titan Sequoia to split off China business amid tension with Beijing Sequoia’s executives said in a statement that it has become “increasingly complex” to run a decentralized global investment business. TikTok is also fighting to save its operations in the United States as a growing number of lawmakers raise national security concerns about the company’s ties to China. 4. De-risking Hawks have been calling for the US to decouple from China, an unrealistic proposition given the extent of the bilateral trade and investment ties. Still, US President Joe Biden and his European allies have repeatedly stressed the desire to “de-risk” their relationships with the Chinese economy, not least because of lessons learned since Moscow ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year about relying on Russia for energy and other commodities. The war in Ukraine has fueled worries over Taiwan, which China has threatened to invade. The concerns have led to coordinated efforts to remove China from technology supply chains that can be used to advance its military strength. That has been met with strong opposition from Beijing. “Some people in the West are hyping up so-called concepts of reducing dependency [on China] and de-risking. I would say these concepts are false propositions,” Chinese Premier Li Qiang said last month at a World Economics Form in the northern Chinese city of Tianjin. Chinese Premier Li Qiang delivers his speech on the opening ceremony of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Tianjin on June 27, 2023. China's premier strikes bullish tone on economic growth despite widespread concerns He called for “de-risking” decisions to be made by companies rather than governments. Economic globalization remains unchanged, and there should be more cooperation and communication, he added. President Xi said Tuesday that Beijing opposes “decoupling.” China wants to work with nations to “reject the moves of setting up barriers, decoupling and breaking links,” he told leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, according to a text of his speech carried by the official Xinhua news agency. But trade is going strong Despite the tension, consumers and businesses in the two economies remain deeply connected. China is among the top two holders of US debt, and the US is still China’s single largest trading partner. Last year, trade in goods between the two economies climbed to nearly $691 billion, breaking the previous record set in 2018, according to US Commerce Department data. America’s deficit in goods traded with China increased 8% to $382.9 billion, also the biggest on record. “Trade between the two superpowers is bifurcating and it’s a paradox. Even as strategic supply chains decouple, in other areas multinational enterprises are doubling down on their in-China-for-China operations,” said Alex Capri, senior lecturer at the National University of Singapore Business School. On Wednesday, US pharmaceutical firm Moderna (MRNA)signed a deal to make its first major investment in China. Tesla (TSLA) has announced plans to open a second factory in Shanghai to produce large batteries used to store huge amounts of electricity. A Chinese bank clerk counts US dollar banknotes next to RMB (renminbi) yuan banknotes at a bank in Huaibei city, east Chinas Anhui province, 20 May 2010. Why China and Japan are praying the US won't default “The China market remains critically important to many US companies’ global competitiveness. The sheer size of the market is unmatched,” Ashton said. But she warned that businesses and consumers have yet to to see the full effects of sanctions that have been promulgated by both sides, and more such measures are certainly coming. “Both sides are ramping up commercial restrictions in the name of national security and national interests,” she said. “If [the trend] continues to build, it could indeed threaten the two countries’ ability to maintain robust economic engagement even where the goods and services in question are seemingly mundane and benign.”

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › 1NC – Shell (Long)

China-Taiwan conflict goes nuclear – wargame simulations and real-world doctrines prove

Wasser & Pettyjohn 22 – (Stacie Pettyjohn is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at CNAS. Her areas of expertise include defense strategy, posture, force planning, the defense budget, and wargaming; Becca Wasser is a Senior Fellow for the Defense Program and lead of The Gaming Lab at CNAS. Her research areas include defense strategy, force design, strategic and operational planning, force posture and employment, and wargaming. She is also an adjunct instructor at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where she teaches an undergraduate course on wargaming. Wasser holds an MS in foreign service, with distinction, from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, and a BA in international and global studies from Brandeis University); "A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear //sp

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. A fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › 1NC – Shell (Long)

China yearns for an economically weak Taiwan to exploit – Ukraine proves economy is the key factor and China will pull the trigger on a weak Taiwan

Braw 22 – (Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she focuses on defense against emerging national security challenges, such as hybrid and gray-zone threats. Braw attended the University of Hagen in Germany, graduating with an MA in political science and German literature. She has a BA from Friedrich Schiller University Jena in Germany); "Elisabeth Braw," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/author/elisabeth-braw/ //sp

China is making no secret of its desire to harm Taiwan by putting the screws to its economy. Beijing could cause enormous harm for relatively little direct cost and without dispatching a single soldier to the island: Companies always worry about disruption and reduce their operations or leave altogether if chaos seems likely. But that doesn’t mean the Taiwanese economy is doomed. Western companies can partner with Taiwanese ones and agree take on key parts of their operations in case of a crisis. Even just striking such deals would signal to Beijing that Taiwan is resilient—and that it has many friends. When Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen met with U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California in April, Beijing responded with a military exercise featuring a simulated attack on the island—and, for good measure, dispatched an “inspection flotilla” to the Taiwan Strait, where its inspections would have wreaked havoc on the crucial but narrow shipping lane, through which 240 cargo ships sail on an average day. The message to global shipping companies was clear: Sailing near Taiwan is risky, and Beijing can cause chaos in the strait whenever it chooses. A little saber-rattling is enough to unsettle many companies. Britain’s iconic Brompton Bicycle firm is, for example, reducing its use of Taiwanese suppliers out of fear of a Chinese invasion. Other companies with operations in Taiwan are adding conflict clauses to contracts. “Companies are increasingly concerned that in the event of a takeover of the island by force, the U.S. government could sanction assets in Taiwan if Washington deems them to be under China’s control,” Nikkei Asia reports. In the weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the presence of Russian soldiers at the border so spooked Western investors that many left the country. Ukraine’s currency lost value, its sovereign dollar bonds plummeted, and insurance against a Ukrainian default became more expensive. Yet, with the soldiers remaining on the Russian side, the Kremlin was not yet violating any international laws or rules. Taiwan’s economy is far sturdier and larger than Ukraine’s, and it doesn’t suffer from the pervasive corruption that made Ukraine a risky bet for businesses in the first place. But its economy is indisputably vulnerable to Chin[a]ese gray-zone aggression and invasion threats. That doesn’t mean, though, that companies on the island are doomed. Rather than panicking, many are beefing up their resilience. A survey released in February by the American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan showed that 47 percent of its member companies said the new geopolitical climate had forced them to revise business continuity plans. An October 2022 survey by Nikkei Asia, in turn, showed that 46 percent of foreign multinationals with operations in Taiwan had made plans to evacuate staff in case of a serious crisis. But the American Chamber of Commerce survey also showed that 88 percent of companies planned to maintain or expand investments in Taiwan in 2023. Industry accounts for nearly 38 percent of Taiwan’s economy, while services account for nearly 61 percent. Agriculture makes up a mere 1.4 percent of the Taiwanese economy, compared with nearly 11 percent of Ukraine’s economy. That distribution is worrisome from a self-sufficiency perspective in case of war. It is, however, excellent news when it comes to Taiwan’s economic resilience because a heavy focus on industry and services means that companies can more easily rely on international partners in a crisis. If, for example, Beijing were to dispatch its “inspection flotilla” again, thwarting deliveries to Taiwanese manufacturers, such disruption could cause Taiwanese manufacturers’ international customers, to look for alternative suppliers. Chinese use of military force against Taiwan would naturally scare Taiwanese companies’ customers away. While Taiwan has a new All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency, it only includes mobilization of defense-related industries, and its responsibilities don’t include the continuity of the economy. But if Taiwanese businesses had international crisis partners, those partners could take over production and services in case Taiwanese firms became incapacitated. Should Taiwan proper become disconnected from the internet (and thus from most modern functions), as Taiwan’s Matsu Islands were this February after their cables were severed by two Chinese vessels, international corporate partners could similarly cover Taiwanese companies’ core obligations to customers. While Taiwan faces more devastating risks than most countries, there are models that it can build on to secure the continuity of its economy during a severe crisis. Sweden and Finland, for example, have continuity-of-the-economy plans that date back to the Cold War, though the plans are largely nationally based. “Even short of an attack of Taiwan, COVID and the war in Ukraine have demonstrated that that the world’s long supply chains are incredibly vulnerable,” said retired Maj. Gen. Pekka Toveri, a former chief of military intelligence in the Finnish defense forces and newly elected member of the Finnish Parliament. “That includes ammunition for Ukraine. The world is discovering that the ammunition we want to send the Ukrainians includes parts from authoritarian countries that are not exactly our friends.” That makes it even more important for Western companies—and countries—to help companies in an indisputably friendly country such as Taiwan. To be sure, there are logistical challenges in taking over a modicum of another company’s operations, especially in manufacturing. The parts have to be available, and the logistics of getting the product to the customer have to be arranged. And, yes, companies in other countries often have full order books. Inherently local operations, like supermarkets and pharmacies, can’t be conducted from afar. But like most of today’s corporate giants, most Taiwan-based companies—led by TSMC, Foxconn, MediaTek, Chunghwa Telecom, Formosa Petrochemical, and Delta Electronics—already have operations in other countries. (TSMC has invested $40 billion in building two chip factories in Arizona, the first of which will become operational next year.) These satellite operations, aided by local partners, would be well-placed to increase their operations if China were to start tightening the clamps on Taiwan. The home bases of foreign companies active in Taiwan could naturally take over some of the Taiwanese branches’ operations in case of a crisis. The rise of remote work, and the fact that Taiwan is a fully integrated member of the modern global economy, is to Taiwan’s advantage. What’s more, the Czech Republic already runs pioneering national security exercises for the private sector led by its defense ministry. Prague could lend this expertise to Taiwan. So is the fact that Taiwan has a rapidly growing number of friends. It may enjoy diplomatic recognition from only 13 countries, but many more—including Lithuania and the Czech Republic—have demonstrated great fondness toward the island in recent months. In a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in March, 66 percent of Americans viewed Taiwan favorably. By contrast, a Pew poll in September 2022 found that 82 percent of Americans had a negative view of China, up from 35 percent in 2002. So did 83 percent of Swedes, up from 40 percent; 74 percent of Germans, up from 37 percent; 75 percent of Dutch citizens, up from 34 percent; 63 percent of Spaniards, up from 21 percent; 74 percent of Canadians, up from 27 percent; and 69 percent of U.K. citizens, up from 16 percent; 87 percent of Japanese citizens, up from 42 percent; and 80 percent of South Koreans, up from 31 percent. In Germany, an astonishing 87 percent of respondents said in a poll last November that the government should make the country less dependent on nondemocratic countries. Only 22 percent were in favor of stronger relations with China at the expense of human rights. Such popular support for Taiwan across the Western world opens massive opportunities for Western companies, even ones fearful of Chinese retaliation. Since they face risks in China anyway—not least because of China’s newly amended, and now even broader, espionage legislation—and are often trying to leave as a result, why not make lemonade out of geopolitical lemons and volunteer to become Taiwanese companies’ crisis partners? By supporting Taiwan and communicating this to the world (under the hashtag #FreedomFirm, perhaps?), they would engender a great deal of affection among Western consumers. “From a reputational perspective, there would be upsides, especially for consumer-product companies, since so many companies are already caught between Western consumers and Chinese ones,” said Alison Taylor, a clinical associate professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business who focuses on business ethics. “But if you make pharmaceuticals, for example, you might want to stay under the radar. It would depend a lot on the sector.” Western governments could offset potential reluctance by offering tax breaks and other support to companies that team up with Taiwanese counterparts. That would send a strong signal of allied support for Taiwan—and be an entirely peaceful measure. Beyond the potential reputational win, companies would help Taiwan demonstrate that Chinese attacks on its economy won’t have the desired effect. That’s the point: By demonstrating resilience in case of aggression by China, Taiwan and its friends can make such aggression less likely. A Taiwan economic defense alliance formed by Western corporations assisted by their governments would be as symbolically important as a military one.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › 1NC – Shell (Long)

US-China trade war weakens Taiwan’s economy

Lee 18 – (Yen Nee Lee has an a MSc in Economics at the Singapore Management University (SMU) and a senior correspondent for CNBC); “Asian economies have a lot to lose in a US-China trade war,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/20/us-china-trade-war-to-hurt-asian-exporters-like-taiwan-south-korea.html //sp

Asian economies such as Taiwan, South Korea and Southeast Asia could be badly hit if trade tensions between the U.S. and China heat up further, experts have warned. Those economies are among the largest exporters of “intermediate goods” to China, which then assembles those pieces into finished products to ship to final destinations such as the U.S., noted Gareth Leather, senior Asia economist at Capital Economics. Examples of “intermediate goods” include semiconductor chips and screens. Those components are typically manufactured in different locations across Asia before they’re sent to China for assembly into products such as mobile phones and computers. Both China and the U.S. have traded increasing threats to impose tariffs on each other’s products. While the final list of affected goods is not yet known, J.P. Morgan analysts wrote in a note that electronic products would likely be included. That means that if the various tariffs suggested by U.S. President Donald Trump come into effect and result in a fall in Chinese exports to the U.S., there will be knock-on effects for the rest of Asia. “By its very nature, such products are highly reliant on tightly integrated supply chains. To that extent, this would propagate any trade shock into the region,” the J.P. Morgan analysts said. Such threats are coming at a time when emerging markets, including those in Asia, have been battered by capital outflows and have seen their currencies weaken in the process. By the end of Tuesday, the Taiwanese dollar was down by around 1.7 percent since the start of the year to 30.172 per U.S. dollar, while the weakened 4.2 percent to 1,110.89 per U.S. dollar in the same period. In Southeast Asia, was down 1.5 percent year-to-date on Tuesday to 1.3567 per U.S. dollar, while the saw a smaller dip of 0.6 percent to 32.73 per U.S. dollar during the same time frame. All those currencies on Tuesday hit their weakest levels in seven months against the greenback — after tensions between the world’s two largest economies escalated. But until the targeted goods are known, it’s difficult to quantify the actual impact that Asian economies could see, experts said. In fact, the damage could also be smaller than expected since China is the dominant supplier of many goods that it sells to the U.S., Leather said. “U.S. consumers would struggle to find sufficient substitutes to replace the goods that they currently buy from China, at least in the short-term. What’s more, to the degree that other countries can step in, Asian exporters are well-placed to benefit from any shift in U.S. demand,” he said. “Until we know exactly which goods are targeted, it will be impossible to calculate the impact on the rest of Asia,” he added.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › 1NC – Shell (Long)

BCA pushes over the edge – leads to increased tensions and trade war with China

Clausing & Wolfram 23 – (Kimberly Clausing holds a B.A. Carleton College, 1991, M.A. Harvard University, 1993, Ph.D. Harvard University, 1996, and UCLA faculty since January 2021, holds the Eric M. Zolt Chair in Tax Law and Policy; Catherine Wolfram is a Professor of Economics at the MIT Sloan School of Management. She previously served as the Cora Jane Flood Professor of Business Administration at the Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley. She received a PhD in Economics from MIT in 1996 and an B.A from Harvard in 1989.); “CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENTS, CLIMATE CLUBS, AND SUBSIDY RACES WHEN CLIMATE POLICIES VARY”NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w31310/w31310.pdf //sp

However, the foreign policy responses to a carbon border adjustment mechanism need not be accommodating. Not all governments abroad will be sanguine about the threat of foreign tariffs; 16 for example, China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand have suggested that they will oppose carbon border adjustment mechanisms on the grounds that they are protectionist and discriminatory (Böhringer et al. 2022). If some countries launch retaliatory actions in response, this risks a trade war of escalating tariffs, reducing the gains from trade on both sides and harming international cooperative efforts on both climate and other areas of joint concern. Given the many agenda items requiring international cooperation (including security, public health, and tax competition), the downsides of additional trade frictions are substantial, especially at a time when the international trading system is already under strain.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › 1NC – Shell (Long)

US-China trade relations solid, but contentious

Armstrong 7/9 – (Kathryn Armstrong has a BA in Broadcasting from Christchurch Polytechnic Institute of Technology and an experienced Television News Producer for BBC); “US-China talks a 'step forward' in relations, says Janet Yellen," 7/9/23, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-66146458 //sp

US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has said her visit to Beijing has marked a "step forward" in efforts to stabilise relations between the two countries. Ms Yellen spoke at the end of a four-day trip, during which talks were held over issues including climate change. She described the talks as "direct, substantive and productive" and said both sides had learned more about each other. However, she admitted the US and China still had "significant disagreements". "No one visit will solve our challenges overnight," she said. "But this trip will help build a resilient and productive channel of communication with China's new economic team." The US-China relationship has deteriorated in recent years. Issues dividing the countries include human rights in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, territorial claims to Taiwan and the South China Sea and Beijing's growing domination of a host of industries. Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng, who was among those to meet with Ms Yellen, said on Saturday he regretted "unexpected incidents" - such as the row over a spy balloon - had hurt ties with the United States. Ms Yellen stressed the need for better communication in order to try and overcome these issues, adding that US President Joe Biden did "not see the relationship between the US and China through the frame of great power conflict. "We believe that the world is big enough for both of our countries to thrive." On the issue of economic competition, Ms Yellen said the US sought a "dynamic and healthy global economy that is open, free and fair, not one that is fragmented or forces countries to take sides". She said any future curbs to business with China would be implemented "in a transparent way" and focus on sectors where the US had "specific national security concerns". Earlier in the visit, Ms Yellen criticised Beijing's curbs against US firms, including the tightening of controls over exports of two materials crucial to producing computer chips. The move follows Washington's efforts in the past year to curb Chinese access to some advanced computer chips. Ms Yellen said the US would fight back against China's "unfair economic practices". In response, China's finance ministry said "the nature of China-US economic and trade relations is mutually beneficial and win-win" and that there was no winner in a trade war. On climate change, Ms Yellen urged Beijing to work with the US and support institutions like the Green Climate Fund, which was set up to help developing nations adapt to climate change and lessen its effects. The Treasury Secretary was the second senior Washington official to visit Beijing in the last two months. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Beijing in June - the highest-ranking Washington official to visit the Chinese capital in almost half a decade. His sentiments at the end of his trip echoed Ms Yellen's. He said that while there were still major issues between the two countries, he hoped they would have "better communications, better engagement going forward." However, the next day President Joe Biden referred to Mr Xi as a "dictator" - triggering outrage from Beijing. Despite the political tensions, trade between the two countries grew in 2022 for the third year in a row. According to official figures, China exported more than $536bn (£422.3bn) worth of goods to the US last year, while $154bn of goods went in the other direction.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › 1NC – Shell (Short)

US-China trade war causes World War III

Kapustina 20 – (Larisa Kapustina works at the Ural State University of Economics, Marketing and International Management Department, University of Economics in Bratislava, International Economic Relations and Economic Diplomacy Department); “US-China Trade War: Causes and Outcomes,” SHS Web of Conferences, https://www.shs-conferences.org/articles/shsconf/pdf/2020/01/shsconf_ies_2019_01012.pdf //sp

Trade war will escalate into Hot World War III. A trade war can escalate from Cold to Hot stage, which is especially unwanted scenario considering that the US allows limited use of nuclear weapon. According to Terence TaiLeung Chong & Xiaoyang Li, the trade conflict between China and the US is of fundamental nature and it cannot be easily resolved [29]. The conflict is associated with the race for global economic domination. The US has a serious advantage in cyberspace and it seeks to “digitally colonize” the global economy. According to Ashmanov, almost all neural platforms in the world are US-based, including first of all those belonging to Google and Facebook [35]. “The US shows with its actions, that they are ready to easily throw any inconvenient contracts and obligations away into the trash can, and also to ignore the UN and other international organizations, granting itself the right for unilateral military actions, the US is moving towards the role associated with the British Empire after the World War I” [6]. This scenario seems unlikely now, but it is not excluded. Trump has made matters worse by acting unilaterally against China in a way that would appear to breach World Trade Organization rules. Indeed, potential allies find Trump’s “America First” rhetoric repulsive. All this has given China the political high ground – “China doesn’t want a trade war, but we’re not afraid to fight a trade war” has become Beijing’s official line [22].

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › 1NC – Shell (Short)

BCA pushes over the edge – leads to increased tensions and trade war with China

Clausing & Wolfram 23 – (Kimberly Clausing holds a B.A. Carleton College, 1991, M.A. Harvard University, 1993, Ph.D. Harvard University, 1996, and UCLA faculty since January 2021, holds the Eric M. Zolt Chair in Tax Law and Policy; Catherine Wolfram is a Professor of Economics at the MIT Sloan School of Management. She previously served as the Cora Jane Flood Professor of Business Administration at the Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley. She received a PhD in Economics from MIT in 1996 and an B.A from Harvard in 1989.); “CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENTS, CLIMATE CLUBS, AND SUBSIDY RACES WHEN CLIMATE POLICIES VARY”NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w31310/w31310.pdf //sp

However, the foreign policy responses to a carbon border adjustment mechanism need not be accommodating. Not all governments abroad will be sanguine about the threat of foreign tariffs; 16 for example, China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand have suggested that they will oppose carbon border adjustment mechanisms on the grounds that they are protectionist and discriminatory (Böhringer et al. 2022). If some countries launch retaliatory actions in response, this risks a trade war of escalating tariffs, reducing the gains from trade on both sides and harming international cooperative efforts on both climate and other areas of joint concern. Given the many agenda items requiring international cooperation (including security, public health, and tax competition), the downsides of additional trade frictions are substantial, especially at a time when the international trading system is already under strain.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › 1NC – Shell (Short)

US-China trade relations solid, but contentious

Armstrong 7/9 – (Kathryn Armstrong has a BA in Broadcasting from Christchurch Polytechnic Institute of Technology and an experienced Television News Producer for BBC); “US-China talks a 'step forward' in relations, says Janet Yellen," 7/9/23, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-66146458 //sp

US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has said her visit to Beijing has marked a "step forward" in efforts to stabilise relations between the two countries. Ms Yellen spoke at the end of a four-day trip, during which talks were held over issues including climate change. She described the talks as "direct, substantive and productive" and said both sides had learned more about each other. However, she admitted the US and China still had "significant disagreements". "No one visit will solve our challenges overnight," she said. "But this trip will help build a resilient and productive channel of communication with China's new economic team." The US-China relationship has deteriorated in recent years. Issues dividing the countries include human rights in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, territorial claims to Taiwan and the South China Sea and Beijing's growing domination of a host of industries. Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng, who was among those to meet with Ms Yellen, said on Saturday he regretted "unexpected incidents" - such as the row over a spy balloon - had hurt ties with the United States. Ms Yellen stressed the need for better communication in order to try and overcome these issues, adding that US President Joe Biden did "not see the relationship between the US and China through the frame of great power conflict. "We believe that the world is big enough for both of our countries to thrive." On the issue of economic competition, Ms Yellen said the US sought a "dynamic and healthy global economy that is open, free and fair, not one that is fragmented or forces countries to take sides". She said any future curbs to business with China would be implemented "in a transparent way" and focus on sectors where the US had "specific national security concerns". Earlier in the visit, Ms Yellen criticised Beijing's curbs against US firms, including the tightening of controls over exports of two materials crucial to producing computer chips. The move follows Washington's efforts in the past year to curb Chinese access to some advanced computer chips. Ms Yellen said the US would fight back against China's "unfair economic practices". In response, China's finance ministry said "the nature of China-US economic and trade relations is mutually beneficial and win-win" and that there was no winner in a trade war. On climate change, Ms Yellen urged Beijing to work with the US and support institutions like the Green Climate Fund, which was set up to help developing nations adapt to climate change and lessen its effects. The Treasury Secretary was the second senior Washington official to visit Beijing in the last two months. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Beijing in June - the highest-ranking Washington official to visit the Chinese capital in almost half a decade. His sentiments at the end of his trip echoed Ms Yellen's. He said that while there were still major issues between the two countries, he hoped they would have "better communications, better engagement going forward." However, the next day President Joe Biden referred to Mr Xi as a "dictator" - triggering outrage from Beijing. Despite the political tensions, trade between the two countries grew in 2022 for the third year in a row. According to official figures, China exported more than $536bn (£422.3bn) worth of goods to the US last year, while $154bn of goods went in the other direction.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › T – Basic Income › 2NC

It needs to fulfil basic needs

GBI 10 — [Global Basic Income Foundation is a research organization that advocates for a , “Global Basic Income: Definition and Arguments,” Global Basic Income, 2010, http://www.globalincome.org/English/Global-Basic-Income.html, accessed 7-16-2023] - PG

A full basic income guarantees everyone the means to fulfil basic needs. These include, first of all, the fundamental survival needs: clean water, food, clothing, shelter and primary health care. Most people will agree that education is also a basic necessity. What other needs are basic depends, among other things, on climatic conditions and cultural values.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › T – Basic Income › 2NC

A basic income needs to meet basic need

Rose 16 - [Julie Rose is an Associate professor of Governmental and Policy Analysis and Dartmouth University, “Free Time”, Chapter 4 Page 81-82, ‎The Princeton University Press on Legal and Governmental Analysis, 11-8-2016] - PG

The role of this assumption is most apparent and significant in a work-unconditional theory of distributive justice with a universal basic income. Proponents of a basic income generally acknowledge that the level of the basic income would likely be somewhere below subsistence, but to evaluate the time-money substitutability claim in its strongest form, assume that the basic income is equal to the standard level of financial basic need in the society.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › T – Basic Income › 1NC

To meet basic necessities requires more than $22,050 for a family of four -- the aff only generates $2,000 annually per household

Dinan 09 — [Kinsey Alden Dinan, “Budgeting for Basic Needs: A Struggle for Working Families – NCCP,” No Publication, May 2009, https://www.nccp.org/publication/budgeting-for-basic-needs-a-struggle-for-working-families/, accessed 7-16-2023] - PG

The Basic Needs Budgets developed by the National Center for Children in Poverty (NCCP) show the cost of basic day-to-day necessities for families with children. Using examples from these bare-bones budgets, this brief examines the question of how much families need to get by and provides insight into the struggles that working families face. Examples are drawn from 12 localities and are based on families with two children; budgets for other family types and localities are available through NCCP’s Basic Needs Budget Calculator. Basic Needs Budgets show that it takes an income of about 1.5 to 3.5 times the official poverty level ($22,050 a year for a family of four), depending on locality, to cover the cost of a family’s minimum day-to-day needs. The largest expenses are typically child care and housing, although health care and transportation can cost nearly as much – and in some cases more. While the struggle to make ends meet is particularly difficult for single parents, paying the bills is a tough challenge for two-parent families as well.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › T – Basic Income › 1NC

A basic income is required to fund basic necessities to citizens

Fang 23 — [Nicole Fang is a current Research Student at Harvard, “Universal Basic Income is a basic need,” Montgomery County Youths, 4-21-2023, https://mocostudent.org/2023/04/universal-basic-income-is-a-basic-need/, accessed 7-16-2023] - PG

11.6% of Americans currently live in poverty, according to CNBC News. That is more than 1 in 10 Americans not having enough money to support themselves or their families. That is just the people living below the poverty line, not including those just above or fluctuating in between. America is one the most highly developed, wealthy countries in the world and to have that many people in poverty is embarrassing. So how does the country fix the lack of equal distribution of wealth? The answer is a universal basic income. Each American citizen is granted an amount of money each month to help them provide basic necessities for themselves and their dependents.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › Warming Advantage › Taxes Fail

Carbon emissions would be impossible to estimate – manufactures have strong incentives to report low carbon emissions.

Koester, 21 -- [Stefan Koester was a senior policy analyst with ITIF’s Center for Clean Energy Innovation. He has a background in energy and environmental policy and has worked on carbon pricing, corporate sustainability, energy efficiency, electricity markets, and issues related to the electric power sector and renewable energy at the state, regional, and federal levels, "," 9/20/2021, https://itif.org/publications/2021/09/20/unworkable-solution-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanisms-and-global-climate/, accessed 7-17-2023] // David

Counting Carbon Counting and verifying the carbon content of imported products is extremely difficult, as carbon content varies by method, time, and place. If, for example, the EU wanted to impose a CBAM on imported U.S. steel, it would calculate a tariff that is an average of diverse production processes and regions. While the inputs for steel production are known and largely the same across manufacturers, producers are located in areas that have power grids with different carbon intensities, which change throughout the day and over the year. On-site, producers may also use varied resources such as coal or natural gas with differing carbon intensities. All in, the carbon intensity of steel can range from between 500 kg of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) per ton of steel to up to 2,000 kg of CO2e. Any carbon-counting process that relies on a national average of carbon intensity from the exporting country would thus likely mis-estimate actual emissions, penalize low-carbon producers, and force up their costs. Policymakers would need to determine whether the CBAM applies equally to all plants within a firm or whether it can differentiate between different plants within a single firm. If the CBAM were set at the firm-level, rather than the plant-level, then it would mean that products made at highly polluting plants would face a lower carbon price than would be economically efficient. Those made at cleaner plants would face an unjustly high carbon price. Such a setup could also lessen the incentive for plant managers within a firm to implement inventive ways to reduce emissions. CBAM waivers might be permitted if applicants can prove that their products have fewer embodied emissions than the benchmark average. But such a waiver process would require emissions to be verified, thereby adding even more complexity to the CBAM process. CBAM measurement and verification would likely involve numerous suppliers and vendors, third-party auditors, customs and environmental agencies, and freight and logistics operators, among others. It might be vulnerable to manipulation, with manufacturers having strong incentives to minimize reporting of carbon emissions. It might create the risk of exposing market-sensitive information to untrusted third parties, including in the importing countries. Finally, these processes would have to be updated regularly to account for changes in efficiency and production technologies in order to avoid disincentivizing innovation and diffusion.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › Warming Advantage › Taxes Fail

CBAM gets circumvented and never becomes effective – plan causes developing countries to back out of the Paris Agreement.

Koester, 21 -- [Stefan Koester was a senior policy analyst with ITIF’s Center for Clean Energy Innovation. He has a background in energy and environmental policy and has worked on carbon pricing, corporate sustainability, energy efficiency, electricity markets, and issues related to the electric power sector and renewable energy at the state, regional, and federal levels, "," 9/20/2021, https://itif.org/publications/2021/09/20/unworkable-solution-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanisms-and-global-climate/, accessed 7-17-2023] // David

Tracing Global Value Chains and the Risk of Indirect Carbon Leakage A CBAM could be targeted to specific EITE sectors rather than applying to all imports. For example, it might apply only to steel, aluminum, cement, and basic chemicals, rather than to finished products such as automobiles or computers that have many constituent parts, due to the difficulty of measuring the carbon content of each part. A typical automobile includes around 30,000 parts, including many made by suppliers spread across many nations, making the carbon content virtually impossible to calculate. As noted, however, such a system opens the door to indirect carbon leakage, as importers of these products gain a competitive advantage by circumventing the CBAM on their raw material inputs. The avoidance risk would be increased if traders shipped goods that should be subject to the CBAM through countries that are exempted from it. Alignment with Global Environmental Agreements A CBAM-heavy global trade regime imposed by the developed countries could end up having a consequential effect of undermining climate cooperation if developing countries decided to back out of the Paris Agreement as a result. CBAMs undermine the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), which was formalized by the United Nations Conference on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 and more recently enshrined in Paris. CBDR emphasizes that, while all nations have a legal obligation to reduce GHG emissions, this responsibility is not shared equally, as developed nations have benefited from the vast majority of past emissions. CBDR undergirds the belief that developing countries should not be penalized for seeking to close the economic gap between their citizens and those of richer countries. A CBAM that does not distinguish between carbon-intensive products based on their source, in this regard, could be viewed as blocking opportunities for development. Already, the governments of India and Brazil have raised concerns about the EU’s CBAM proposal on these grounds.22 Yet, CBAMs that exempt products from developing countries create huge loopholes that limit the policy’s effectiveness and reduce the political willingness to impose carbon prices in developed nations. In addition to expanding production in exempt countries, trans-shipping finished or semi-finished products through them is likely to become common.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › Warming Advantage › BCA Bad

BCA would violate WTO rules. Even if the plan gets passed, it would lead to retaliation from other countries.

Koester, 21 -- [Stefan Koester was a senior policy analyst with ITIF’s Center for Clean Energy Innovation. He has a background in energy and environmental policy and has worked on carbon pricing, corporate sustainability, energy efficiency, electricity markets, and issues related to the electric power sector and renewable energy at the state, regional, and federal levels, "," 9/20/2021, https://itif.org/publications/2021/09/20/unworkable-solution-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanisms-and-global-climate/, accessed 7-17-2023] // David

Compatibility with the WTO A well-designed trading system would clearly allow nations to impose discriminatory tariffs based on global negative externalities such as climate change. Unfortunately, the WTO is not so well designed. Many trade scholars believe that CBAMs are incompatible with key WTO rules—most notably, the principle of nondiscrimination among a country’s trading partners.23 While WTO member states are supposed to be allowed to adopt policies that are inconsistent with standard trade rules for environmental reasons, these policies may not be “a means of arbitrary/unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”24 Many trade scholars believe that CBAMs are incompatible with key WTO rules. This vague clause is already the subject of litigation within the WTO’s dispute settlement process, which may have a bearing on cases brought against CBAMs.25 To date, countries seeking to defend policies that have the effect of discriminating on environmental grounds have lost their cases, so those hoping to defend a CBAM may find themselves in an uphill battle.26 No matter what the final outcome, the legal ambiguity such cases create, and the slow pace with which they are adjudicated (exacerbated by vacancies that paralyze the WTO Appellate Body), would muddy CBAM implementation.27 Even if a CBAM is successfully negotiated and applied, further risks persist. The burden of administrative compliance may reduce overall trade. Solutions that seek to avoid weakening the economies of developing countries by exempting their products or gradually implementing a CBAM for them could prompt a WTO challenge based on this differential treatment.28 Impacted countries could retaliate unilaterally or multilaterally. Such trade wars could spiral far beyond the initial sectoral confines and into non-related products as nations ratchet up tariffs on a wide swath of products.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › Warming Advantage › BCA Bad

Carbon tax inflicts economic woes even with a carbon border adjustment and dividend

Lewis 21 — Marlo Lewis Jr., a senior fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, published in The Washington Times, Investors Business Daily, TechCentralStation, National Review, and Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, holds a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and a B.A. in Political Science from Claremont McKenna College, 2021 (“https://cei.org/studies/why-carbon-taxes-are-anti-growth-anti-consumer-and-politically-dangerous-for-conservatives/,” Competitive Enterprises Institute, December 1st, available online at https://cei.org/studies/why-carbon-taxes-are-anti-growth-anti-consumer-and-politically-dangerous-for-conservatives/, accessed 07-17-2023)

Carbon taxes would inflict substantial losses on GDP, job creation, and household income. . Even the most aggressive CO2 tax would have negligible climate effects, and costs would far exceed benefits A realistic assessment of the potential economic damage must also consider the costs created by adding CO2 taxes to a panoply of other policies targeting the fossil-fuel industry. A CO2 tax would exacerbate rather than replace the costs of other less efficient climate policies.

The broader NetZero agenda, which aims to eliminate all U.S. CO2 emissions beyond those absorbed by U.S. forests and other natural “sinks” by 2050, sets the stage for epic policy failure. The global mining and processing infrastructure needed to replace an energy system chiefly reliant on combustible fuels with one reliant on wind turbines, solar panels, and electric vehicles—which require much larger mineral inputs than conventional power generation and vehicles—do not exist. Moreover, the federal permitting system is too slow and litigious to allow completion of the hundreds of renewable energy projects required to replace all coal and gas power plants within 15 years and support massive vehicle electrification. The so-called clean energy transition could become a transition from abundant and affordable to scarce and unaffordable fossil fuels. A related potential downside is a growing dependence on Russia and OPEC for hydrocarbons and China for energy transition minerals.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › Warming Advantage › BCA Bad

A UBI under a carbon dividend would increase debt and decrease GDP significantly

Smetters et al. 20 — Kent Smetters, a Boettner Chair Professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, Faculty Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research, holds a Ph.D economics from Harvard, Knowledge at Wharton Staff, 2022 (“Can Universal Basic Income Work?,” Knowledge at Wharton University of Pennsylvania, January 17th, available online at https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/podcast/knowledge-at-wharton-podcast/universal-basic-income/#:~:text=Impact%20on%20the%20Economy&text=However%2C%20Wharton%20economics%20and%20public,and%20GDP%20falls%20by%209.3%25., accessed 07-16-2023)

The Roosevelt Institute estimated that a deficit-financed payment of $500 a month to every adult in the U.S. would increase consumption, thereby raising the GDP by up to 6.8% by 2027. However, Wharton economics and public policy professor Kent Smetters and his colleagues used a richer dynamic model to estimate the same UBI plan would increase the federal debt by more than 63.5% by 2027, while GDP would fall by 6.1%. By 2032, the debt grows by 81.1% and GDP falls by 9.3%. The smaller tax base also sharply reduces Social Security revenue by 7.1% by 2027 and 10.4% by 2032.

“A Universal Basic Income program would provide a guaranteed income for each American, but it would substantially lower GDP, regardless of how the program is financed,” the researchers said in their 2018 policy brief, “Options for Universal Basic Income: Dynamic Modeling.”

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › Warming Advantage › BCA Bad

BCA’s Destroy The Economy

Small 17 (Gerald ,” Carbon tax plan would hurt economy ”, centralmaine.com, Febuary 15 2017, , Accessed July 16, 2023) //CD

This is regarding a carbon tax and dividend program. The earth has been changing its temperature all the time it has been here. There are many factors that influence the earth’s temperature (biggest is solar activity) and to assume that you can control the temperature by changing one of hundreds of factors is a bit unrealistic. Taxing carbon emissions will increase the cost of everything you do and everything you buy — everything you buy comes by truck and increased fuel costs will be passed on in higher prices. Does anyone remember what $4 per gallon fuel did for your budget and the economy? What if you tax carbon emissions enough so that it achieves the desired reduction, it destroys the economy, and the global temperature continues to rise? Then what? The idea that a carbon tax and dividend program would be “revenue neutral” and actually create jobs is smoke and mirrors. The only jobs it is likely to create are government jobs to administer the program. Anybody who thinks the government is going to take money out of one of your pockets and put money back in your other pocket and you will end up with the same amount of money has no understanding of how government works. In general, efforts to clean up our environment are a good idea, but a carbon tax is not a good idea unless you like paying $4 a gallon for fuel to heat your home and like being unemployed because the economy is trashed.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › Warming Advantage › BCA Bad

BCA’s put pressure on developing nations; Expands China’s spheres of influence.

Olsen 22 (Henry, Education: Claremont McKenna College, BA in political science; University of Chicago Law School, JD, senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center and the Thomas W. Smith distinguished scholar in residence at Arizona State University, “Why the E.U.’s carbon border tax is a very bad idea ”, The Washington Post, December 14, 2022, , Accessed July 16, 2023) // CD

The European Union’s recent decision to impose tariffs on select carbon-heavy imports such as steel and cement is a long-sought victory for climate activists. But the United States should not follow suit. These measures are likely to both increase global human suffering and strengthen China. Unlike with normal tariffs, the E.U. will not apply equal charges to the same sorts of goods; instead, E.U. member nations will estimate how much carbon was directly or indirectly consumed in the product’s creation. That means firms in nations with more carbon-intensive energy consumption will pay higher rates than those that rely more on renewable energy sources. The intent is simple: Use the market power of wealthy nations to push other parts of the world to invest in cleaner sources of energy. Nations that comply will see their firms rewarded with de facto preferential trade treatment; those that do not will face a price disadvantage. As a result, proponents argue, developing economies will be incentivized to bite the bullet and make the changes European nations want. But this seems to be a matter of hope triumphing over experience. Many developing nations use coal to generate electricity because it is significantly cheaper than other options. And they might not have the money to finance a rapid switch-over to fuels that emit less greenhouse gas, such as natural gas. Many nations might choose to face the economic costs the tariffs will impose rather than expend scarce capital for new — and possibly more expensive — energy plants. It will likely be even harder for them to switch to renewable power sources such as wind or solar, which are capital intensive and often require large public subsidies to remain economically viable. Rich nations can afford that, but places such as Bangladesh probably cannot afford it at the scale needed. That means serious energy transition in the developing world would likely take large quantities of Western capital. That’s not likely to happen, especially if government money or guarantees are needed to spur that investment. Voters are not likely to tax themselves to pay foreigners to compete with them. These considerations likely mean the E.U.’s tariffs will slowly encourage firms to produce energy-intensive goods in the developed world. That on-shoring might help workers in those countries with the return of relatively high-paying jobs. But it also means consumers in those countries will pay more for previously imported goods, as labor and energy costs cause prices to rise. This transfer of wealth from one class to another will be difficult to manage, especially if it happens as rapidly as climate activists hope. Developing countries will feel lots of pain as a result. Jobs that once pulled their citizens out of poverty will disappear. Globalization unsettled the developed world, but it was a boon for poorer nations. In 1990, more than a third of the world lived in extreme poverty. By 2015, that rate had fallen to less than 10 percent. Slowing or even reversing globalization will stop this progress in its tracks. Don’t expect the leaders of these nations to go along quietly. They will look for new markets to sell products — and that’s where geopolitics comes in. China is large and rich enough to step at least somewhat into the breach. Unless China also imposes carbon-adjusted border charges, many nations will start to curry favor with it as essentially the only country that could help them. That is not in the West’s interest. U.S. global strategy must focus on weakening and isolating China as long as it pursues its aggressive policies and remains a tightly controlled authoritarian state. Joining the E.U. in imposing green tariffs would likely have the opposite effect, strengthening China’s appeal to nations that often are not firmly democratic to begin with. It might even lead to worse results for the climate if it creates an economic bloc of countries that does not adhere to Western climate goals. This is why rapid progress on global decarbonization is so difficult to achieve. The E.U.’s approach might be climate-wise, but it’s freedom foolish. President Biden should resist the temptation to follow Europe’s example. Instead, he should focus on the only things that can stave off the worst effects of climate change without robbing our way of life: the rapid spread of Western ideals and climate-friendly technology.