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2023 DDI Negative
Heg Bad › Heg Bad

US hegemony is gone for good now.

Cooley and Nexon 20 — Alexander Cooley, Claire Tow Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and Director of Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, Daniel H. Nexon, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2020 ("How Hegemony Ends," Foreign Affairs, June 9th, Available Online at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends, Accessed 07-24-2023)

But this time really is different. The very forces that made U.S. hegemony so durable before are today driving its dissolution. Three developments enabled the post–Cold War U.S.-led order. First, with the defeat of communism, the United States faced no major global ideological project that could rival its own. Second, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its accompanying infrastructure of institutions and partnerships, weaker states lacked significant alternatives to the United States and its Western allies when it came to securing military, economic, and political support. And third, transnational activists and movements were spreading liberal values and norms that bolstered the liberal order.

Today, those same dynamics have turned against the United States: a vicious cycle that erodes U.S. power has replaced the virtuous cycles that once reinforced it. With the rise of great powers such as China and Russia, autocratic and illiberal projects rival the U.S.-led liberal international system. Developing countries—and even many developed ones—can seek alternative patrons rather than remain dependent on Western largess and support. And illiberal, often right-wing transnational networks are pressing against the norms and pieties of the liberal international order that once seemed so implacable. In short, U.S. global leadership is not simply in retreat; it is unraveling. And the decline is not cyclical but permanent.

2023 DDI Negative
Heg Bad › Hegemony (from Growth file)

Retrenchment is inevitable and will be gradual now, but recommitting makes it violent and forced.

Charles A. Kupchan 20, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, "America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President", Foreign Policy, 10-21-2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/21/election-2020-smart-retrenchment/

As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner.

Much of the debate surrounding the next administration’s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world. And it’s true: Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement. What’s been largely missing from this debate, however, are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation’s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes.

2023 DDI Negative
Heg Bad › Hegemony (from Growth file)

Accelerated economic growth increases US hegemony and destroys resources

Ahern 2/21/23 [MA in Philosophy at Memorial University of Newfoundland, Program and Outreach Specialist Brattleboro Office of Sustainability, community organizer and activist “How Degrowth Can Help Reduce Global Conflict”, SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE, https://magazine.scienceforthepeople.org/online/how-degrowth-can-help-reduce-global-conflict/] RVP

As the ecological emergency accelerates, so do proposals to address it. Over the last few years, the concept of degrowth has grown in popularity with features in major publications, growing political support, and best selling books like Kohei Saito’s Capital in the Anthropocene: Towards the Idea of Degrowth Communism in Japan.1 Defined as an equitable and democratic reduction of energy and material throughput targeted at rich nations and the globally wealthy, degrowth is based on three first principles: strong ecological sustainability, designing economies and social systems that are not predicated on the economic growth imperative, and global social justice. As Rahila Gupta describes, “degrowth emphasizes a time-rich society of solidarity, equality and mutual care, redistribution of resources and proper democracy based on extended political participation—all ways of living proven to enhance well-being rather than anxiety-producing materialism.”2

While degrowth predominantly targets the Global North’s unsustainable use of fossil-fuels or contributions to biodiversity loss, in a highly interconnected global system, growth in the North necessarily impacts the South in terms of their development, their ecosystems, and the kind of vulnerability these countries are subject to. At the most basic level, increased economic growth means more demand for energy and materials. In a period of an energy transition where those materials are largely found in the Global South—Latin America, Asia, and Africa predominantly—conflicts, injustice, and greenwashing would be inevitable without some kind of just transition that reduces the relative demand for these materials.3 This is where degrowth’s commitment to global justice and ecological sustainability set it apart from other green transition narratives.

2023 DDI Negative
Heg Bad › Hegemony (from Growth file)

Current US hegemony is on the decline

Engelhardt 22 [8/15/22, Tom created and runs Tomdispatch.com, a project of The Nation Institute where he is a Fellow. His next book, A Nation Unmade by War (Dispatch Books), will be published later this month. “The Twilight Years of American Hegemony”, THE NATION, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/aging-american-power-election/] RVP

I find nothing strange in Joe Biden, at 79 (going on 80), being the oldest president in our history and possibly planning to run again in 2024. After all, who wouldn’t want to end up in the record books? Were he to be nominated and then beat the also-aging Donald Trump, or Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, or even Fox News’s eternally popular Tucker Carlson, he would occupy the White House until he was 86.

Honestly, wouldn’t that be perfect in its own way? I mean, what could better fit an America in decline than a president in decline, the more radically so the better?

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Case › Case turn — antichina posture bad (also stuff in heg bad)

Perception of china helps no one

New York Times 23 — The Editorial Board, a group of opinion journalists whose views are informed by expertise, research, debate and certain longstanding values, 2023 ("Who Benefits From Confrontation With China?," New York Times, March 11th, Available Online at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/11/opinion/china-us-relationship.html, Accessed 07-29-2023) AJH

America’s increasingly confrontational posture toward China is a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy that warrants greater scrutiny and debate.

For most of the past half-century, the United States sought to reshape China through economic and diplomatic engagement — or, in the case of the Trump administration, through economic and diplomatic disengagement. The Biden administration, by contrast, has shelved the idea that China can be changed in favor of the hope that it can be checked.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Case › Case turn — antichina posture bad (also stuff in heg bad)

US-China rivalry creates more problems, its better to work together — Cold War policies prove.

Brazinsky 23 — Gregg A. Brazinsky, Gregg A. Brazinsky, 2023 ("U.S.-China Rivalry: The Dangers of Compelling Countries to Take Sides," United States Institute of Peace, March 30th, Available Online at https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/us-china-rivalry-dangers-compelling-countries-take-sides, Accessed 07-29-2023) AJH

As the U.S.-China rivalry intensifies — with some speculating a new Cold War is in the offing — many Asian countries are looking on with concern. If Washington seeks to maintain its role as a global leader, it should be judicious in how it contests Chinese influence in Asia, which seems likely to be the key battleground of the new Sino-American rivalry. The United States must understand that Asian countries do not want to be forced to constantly manage competing pressures from superpowers. Cold War-era Sino-American competition demonstrates that forcing Asian countries to choose sides can ultimately be counterproductive and undermines one of the United States’ chief attributes in this global competition.

As the White House hosts its second Summit for Democracy this week, it should recall a vital lesson from the Cold War that ultimately helped Washington prevail: one of the United States’ key advantages over China — then and now — is the allure of the democratic model it shares with its allies in the free world.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Case › Leaders

China will not invade Taiwan — they want to be perceived as peacemakers and Taiwan is economically valuable to them.

Bremmer 23 — Ian Bremmer, q president of Eurasia Group, a political-risk consultancy, and GZERO Media, a company dedicated to providing intelligent and engaging coverage of international affairs and teaches at Columbia, 2023 ("Why China Won't Invade Taiwan Anytime Soon," Time, April 12th, Available Online at https://time.com/6270599/china-invade-taiwan/, Accessed 07-29-2023) AJH

All that said, the actual risk of imminent Chinese military action against Taiwan remains low. Beijing always flexes military muscle when highest-level U.S. and Taiwanese officials meet face to face. Yet, though Speaker McCarthy’s visit with Taiwan’s president marks the highest-level U.S.-Taiwan meeting on US soil since 1979, China’s latest response was less militarily threatening than its reaction to last summer’s visit to Taiwan by then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi – and Beijing is well aware that Washington will notice that.

More importantly, Xi is spending considerable energy these days on playing a larger role on the global stage, particularly as a peacemaker. He has offered a 12-point peace plan for Ukraine he hopes will encourage others to see China as a global mediator, even if this particular plan has no chance of success. This past weekend, Xi welcomed French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission Chairman Ursula Von der Leyen to Beijing for discussion of the Ukraine war and the future of China’s relations with Europe more broadly. Though Xi didn’t promise his European guests to lean harder on Russia, the Chinese and French governments issued a joint statement pledging they would work together to bring Russian and Ukrainian negotiators to the bargaining table.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Case › Leaders

Risks of cyber war are overblown. Cyber war won’t lead to larger conflict.

Jensen and Banks 18 — Benjamin Jensen, holds a dual appointment as a scholar-in-residence at American University, School of International Service and as an associate professor at the Marine Corps University, the co-author of “Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion,” with David Banks, a professorial lecturer at the American University, School of International Service, 2018 (“Cyber warfare may be less dangerous than we think,” The Washington Post, April 26th, Available Online at , Accessed 01-24-2019) AJH

We agree. However, our research suggests that, although states like Russia will continue to engage in cyberattacks against the foundations of democracy (a serious threat indeed), states are less likely to engage in destructive “doomsday” attacks against each other in cyberspace. Using a series of war games and survey experiments, we found that cyber operations may in fact produce a moderating influence on international crises.

Here’s why: Cyberspace offers states a way to manage escalation in the shadows. Thus, cyber operations are more akin to the Cold War-era political warfare than a military revolution.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Case › Leaders

No Japan prolif — relationship is good now.

Terence Roehrig 17. Professor of National Security Affairs and the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group @ the U.S. Naval War College. 2017. “Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella; Deterrence After the Cold War.” Columbia University Press.

WOULD JAPAN EVER DEVELOP ITS OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS? The short answer to this question is “not likely,” though scholars disagree over the reasons.99 For years, analysts have spoken of a “nuclear allergy” in Japan resulting from World War II that prevented Japanese leaders from discussing nuclear weapons, much less consider acquiring them. Though constrained from discussing the issue publicly, Japan’s conservative leaders often discussed the issue privately, believing Japan must keep the option open.100 Yet for Japan to make the decision to go nuclear would require a drastic deterioration of its security environment accompanied by a collapse of the Japan-U.S. alliance. In many respects, a Japanese decision to head in this direction is what Campbell and Sunohara call “the ultimate contradiction.” Japan’s “standing as a non-nuclear nation is a virtual bedrock of the nonproliferation regime” yet “at the same time, suspicion and speculation have persisted that, given the right set (really the wrong set) of international and domestic conditions, Japan might seriously consider the nuclear option.”101 Japan clearly possesses the technology and infrastructure for a breakout through its extensive civil nuclear energy program should it desire to do so.102 Estimates of Japan’s necessary breakout time range from a few months to a year or two. The disaster that followed the March 2011 tsunami and nuclear catastrophe at Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant raised the possibility that Japan might permanently shut down its nuclear reactors and scrap its nuclear energy industry entirely, removing its breakout capability. Yet in the end, Japan remains committed to its nuclear energy program and in August 2015 restarted its first nuclear power plant since shutting them all down in 2011. A few months after the disaster, former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba stated, “I don’t think Japan needs to possess nuclear weapons, but it’s important to maintain our commercial reactors because it would allow us to produce a nuclear warhead in a short amount of time. It’s a tacit nuclear deterrent.”103 Maintaining a civilian nuclear program even after the tragedy at Fukushima has a clear connection to maintaining some level of nuclear breakout capability and nuclear deterrent. Referring to the LDP’s determination to maintain a nuclear energy program, Narushige Michishita argued, “What they are saying in a tacit manner is that 98 percent of our program is peaceful, but we have the potential for something else.”104 Japan would face some serious operational and political obstacles should it seek nuclear weapons. Japan’s people are concentrated in several densely populated urban areas that makes them very vulnerable to a nuclear exchange. To have an effective deterrent, Japan would need many weapons, and given Japan’s lack of geographical depth, there are few places to deploy these systems, making them vulnerable to a first strike. Acquisition of the necessary weapons systems, especially strategic bombers and ballistic missiles, would violate the constitution and the EDOP.105 Some disagree that nuclear weapons are acceptable as a defensive system used only for retaliation, and there would likely be a highly divisive debate in Japan should any government head in this direction under any but the most dire circumstances. Even in the wake of what many would argue is an increasingly aggressive China, Prime Minister Abe had a difficult time obtaining public support for a constitutional reinterpretation of collective self-defense. Finally, “going nuclear” would also entail leaving the NPT and damaging Tokyo’s reputation as a nonproliferation stalwart. Economic sanctions would likely follow, as well as restrictions on Japan’s nuclear industry.106 For all these reasons, Japan would incur a heavy cost, domestically and internationally, should it move to acquire nuclear weapons. Every time Japanese leaders have examined this possibility, they have acknowledged this reality and chosen instead to rely on the U.S. defense commitment. As one study notes, “In the context of the gulf between Japanese public opinion, which is largely ill-disposed toward nuclear weapons and security hawks at the elite level eager to push back against this ‘nuclear allergy,’ the END [extended nuclear deterrent] offered and continues to offer a neat and practical solution.”107 Thus, Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. alliance and the nuclear umbrella while also slowly increasing its own conventional capabilities and leaving the door open for nuclear acquisition. In the end, Samuels and Schoff provide the most pointed analysis: “Although Japan’s nuclear hedging strategy is likely to continue in the near future, U.S. policy makers (and those throughout the region) should not be sanguine about this strategy continuing indefinitely. Japan’s choices will be determined ultimately by how well potential threats can be managed and by the strength of the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence.”108

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Case › Leaders

High level dialogue and mutual interests deter miscalculation

Yang 11—Minister of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China (Jiechi, 6 January 2011, A Conversation with Yang Jiechi, )

We have good reason to believe that with the efforts of both sides, President Hu's state visit this time will forcefully move forward the positive, cooperative and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship in the new era. It will take our practical cooperation to a new high and enhance the mutual understanding and friendship between the two peoples. And it will demonstrate the will of China and the United States to act together for world peace, stability and development. Ladies and gentlemen, President Hu's upcoming visit to the United States will take place when the Obama administration concludes its second year in office. We commend the good progress the China-U.S. relations have made over the past two years. The China-U.S. relationship is an extremely important bilateral relationship in today's world. We believe that though China-U.S. relationship has seen some difficulties in the past two years, it has made important overall progress, particularly in the following areas. First, the exchanges and communication between the two countries at the high level and various other levels have never been closer. China-U.S. relations achieved a smooth transition shortly after President Obama took office. In the past 24 months, the two presidents have had seven successful meetings. I had the good fortune to be present at all the seven meetings. And I always came away with a deep impression of the sincerity of the leaders in their discussion about how to move forward the relationship, how to face the challenges and how to work for the common good of our two peoples and the people of the world. President Obama paid a state visit to China, and now President Hu will come to the United States for a state visit. Officials of the two countries at various levels have had frequent contacts in diverse forms. The two sides have established the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogues and the high-level consultation on people-to-people exchange. This time in Washington, we discussed when to have the third round of SED, Strategic and Economic Dialogues. I think it will happen sometime in mid-2011. Setting up unique and effective -- I mean,these exchanges are setting up unique and effective platforms to enhance mutual trust and cooperation between China and the United States. Second, the desire and resolve of the two countries to strengthen their cooperation have never been stronger. In April 2009, President Hu and President Obama reached an important agreement when they met in London that the two sides should work together to build a positive, cooperative and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship for the 21st century. This has charted the course for the growth of China-U.S. relations in the new era. President Hu emphasizes on many occasions that a sound China-U.S. relationship is in the fundamental interests of the two countries and serves peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. He stressed that the Chinese government places high importance on its relations with the United States it and will work to promote cooperation with the United States. Likewise, President Obama attaches a great deal of importance to China-U.S. relations. The U.S. government has stressed its commitment to stronger cooperation between the two countries. Third, the Chinese and American interests have converged as never before. Today, we have tackled the international financial crisis, pushed forward the reform of global economic governance and played an important role in spurring world economic recovery. The China-U.S. business ties have been taken to a new level. Two-way trade is expected to top $380 billion U.S. dollars in 2010. China has been the fastest-growing major export market of the United States for nine consecutive years. Investment by Chinese enterprises in the United States has rapidly increased. By the end of November 2010, Chinese businesses had made over 4.4 billion U.S. dollars of non-financial direct investment in the United States. All this has contributed to the economic recovery and the protection of jobs in the United States. Our bilateral exchanges and cooperation in a wide range of areas, including energy and the environment, have been growing in breadth and depth. Fourth, the two peoples have never been engaged in China-U.S. relations in such a broad and in-depth manner. Today, around 120,000 Chinese students are studying in the United States and more than 20,000 American students are studying in China. According to Chinese statistics, over 3 million tourists visit each others' countries every year and 110 plus passenger flights fly between the two countries every week. China and the United States have forged 36 pairs of friendship, province-state and 161 sister-city relationships. Such close interactions have built countless bridges of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. Fifth, the communication and coordination between China and the United States on major regional and international issues have never been better. The two countries have maintained effective coordination on regional hotspot issues, such as the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the Iranian nuclear issue and South Asia. And now during this visit of mine, we discussed these issues. We also discussed the situation in Sudan, which figures prominently in the coming weeks. Also, on global issues, including climate change, G-20, the U.N. reform and fighting transnational crimes, working together the two countries have played an important and positive role in upholding world peace and security and promoting global sustainable development. The China-U.S. cooperation has become more strategic in terms of substance and more important in terms of global impact. What is it that has brought China and the United States closer to each other in the course of cooperation in the past two years? I believe that it is our growing common interests. It is the growing sense of any important reality that China-U.S. relations in the 21st century should be anchored in joint efforts to seize common opportunities and address common challenges for the welfare of our two peoples and the people of the world. With regard to issues in China-U.S. relations, whatever the differences, there is a basic consensus between China and the United States: namely, the China-U.S. relationship is far too important. The two countries have far more common interests than disagreements and cooperation is always the defining feature of this relationship.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Case › Leaders

The US would resort to diplomacy before retialiation

Dobbins et al ’11 – James Dobbins is the director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, David C. Gompert is a Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation. He is also former Senior Advisor for National Security and Defense for the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq, David A Shlapak is a Senior International Policy Analyst with Rand Corporation, and Andrew Scobell is Senior Political Scientist at RAND's Washington, DC, office and former Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (“Conflict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence,” RAND Corporation, )

If U.S. localized direct defense is endangered by Chinese anti-access capabilities in the near term, and U.S. escalation is constrained by growing risks and growing Chinese military reach in the mid to long term, the United States may be increasingly left without good military operational alternatives in regional contingencies involving Chinese forces. As several of these cases suggest, this may weigh against U.S. involvement in contingencies where important U.S. interests are not at stake. Unless China commits naked and large-scale aggression—which, to be clear, is not indicated by its current pattern of use of force—this may involve greater reliance on U.S. diplomacy and attempts to head off conflict by accommodating Chinese interests, especially if they have merits. Of course, the declining efficacy of direct defense and increasing riskiness of escalation (and thus of deterrence) would deplete U.S. influence over the outcome of disputes, from maritime and territorial questions up to and including the fate of North Korea and Taiwan.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Case › Leaders

Relations are resilient and war will never happen

Wu, China Foundation for International Studies Center for American Studies executive director, 2013 (Zurong, “China and America’s Innate Goal: Avoiding War Forever”, 7-30, )

China and the U.S. are currently constructing a new kind of relationship between major powers, with several aims. One intrinsic aim is especially worthy of attention, namely that China and the U.S. will not go to war today, nor in the future, and will forever maintain a peaceful association. The Chinese and American governments and people are striving toward this goal unceasingly because it is in the best interests of the people of China, America and the whole world. To avoid conflict, to keep from fighting, to be mutually respectful and to embark upon a path of mutual cooperation — acting in these ways would benefit everyone. First of all, the globalization of the economy, information and other essential factors have created a global village, and the U.S. and China live and work together within this community; their interests are intertwined and neither can break the inseparable bond each has with the other. The global financial crisis of 2007 once again made clear the great extent to which the Chinese and American economies are linked and mixed, for when one sinks into a recession or depression, it is almost impossible for the other to recover and flourish alone. When it comes to international security, climate change, energy, counterterrorism, oceans and all sorts of other unprecedented areas, China and the U.S. share more common interests every day, and cooperative negotiations are unceasingly strengthened. Within this sort of atmosphere, discussing whether the U.S. and China want to go to war seems a little bit untimely and excessive. Second, the current period is fundamentally different than the era of the Cold War, for the development of peace is the theme of the present. People from countries around the world are all concentrating their energy on revitalizing the economy and improving quality of life. After the end of the Cold War, America launched several localized wars in smaller countries under the banner of the fight against terrorism, in the process bringing upon itself a heavy financial and economic burden. Perhaps it was upon consideration of the fact that large-scale conflicts could yield a level of suffering and destruction that would be difficult to endure that America has not launched any wars against the great powers that are in possession of nuclear arms. Even in the Cold War, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, America and the Soviet Union did not go to war. The experience of history tells us that the inherent goal of this new form of Sino-U.S. relations will have the support of the strength of the entire ranks of the world’s great powers; thus as long as both China and the U.S. have unflagging perseverance, it can be achieved. Third, for over 40 years, China and the U.S. have promoted a strategy of mutual trust, of the expansion of cooperation, of controlling differences of opinion. These lessons from experience are the U.S. and China’s most valuable treasure. Since Nixon visited the Chinese, Sino-American relations have gone through wind and rain but have always developed onward; moreover, the speed, breadth and depth of the development have far exceeded everyone’s expectations. Indeed, Sino-U.S. relations enjoy a great vitality. And since the foundations were laid fairly recently, Sino-U.S. relations continually make significant progress. The highest leaders communicate freely and military leaders exchange visits often. The two militaries are in the process of issuing plans for Chinese troops to participate in the 2014 Pacific Rim joint military exercises. Both sides have decided to actively investigate significant military activities, report mechanisms to each other and continue to research matters of security and issues regarding standards of conduct, which are relevant to the Chinese and American navies and air forces. These collaborations will give rise to a significant and far-reaching influence on world peace and international security and will vigorously promote the actualization of the inherent goal of the new form of Sino-U.S. great power relations.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Case › Leaders

No China war

Thucydides trap has exceptions – US and UK

MAD – both countries know it would go nuclear instantly, and international orgs would do everything possible to prevent escalation

Proxy wars more likely

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Case › Vacancies

Pentagon abotion policy already passed, theres no reason for Tuberville to keep the nominee block

Demirjian 23 — Karoun Demirjian, multimedia international journalist and freelance reporter at the Washington Post, 2023 ("House Votes to Limit Abortion Access in the Military, Bowing to the Right," The New York Times, July 13th, Available Online at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/13/us/politics/house-republicans-defense-bill.html, Accessed 07-29-2023) AJH

A divided House voted on Thursday to restrict abortion access, bar transgender health services and limit diversity training for military personnel, potentially imperiling passage of the annual defense bill as Republicans, goaded by their right flank, loaded the measure with conservative policy dictates.

The House voted 221 to 213 to overturn a Pentagon policy guaranteeing abortion access to service members regardless of where they are stationed, with Republicans propelling it to passage over near-unanimous Democratic opposition.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Case › Vacancies

NoKo nuke war unlikely

Robert E. Kelly 17. Associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University. 7-26-2017. "The Surprisingly Simple Reason North Korea Has Nuclear Weapons." National Interest.

Since the launch of a North Korean medium- to long-range intercontinental missile this month, there has been much anxiety about Pyongyang’s ability to strike U.S. cities. It seems likely that North Korea can at least strike Alaska’s largest city, Anchorage. Some analysts have suggested Pyongyang already has the capability to strike the east coast of the United States. Skepticism may be warranted. North Korea may have trouble with missile reentry, guidance, warhead miniaturization and other technical issues. But nonetheless, it appears quite likely that if Pyongyang does not yet have the ability to strike the lower forty-eight American states, it will soon. Last month, I suggested the United States is on countdown of sorts. North Korea is rushing toward a nuclear ICBM, and Americans will soon be forced to adapt to it, or fight. It seems that decision fork is coming sooner than many expected. Striking North Korea would be incredibly risky , and the United States has learned to live with other states’ nuclear missilization. Russia, China and Pakistan are powers whom Washington would almost certainly prefer were not nuclear. Yet the United States has adjusted. Each of those three, including Pakistan, has treated its weapons reasonably carefully. There has not been the much-feared accidental launch or hand-off to terrorist groups. All appear to think of their nuclear weapons as defensive and for deterrence purposes. Indeed, the offensive potential of nuclear weapons is curiously constrained. They would so devastate an enemy that conquest of said enemy would be pointless—who wants to take-over an irradiated wasteland? Plus, nuclear use would likely bring nuclear retaliation on the attacker, in which case any benefit of a war would be lost to the huge costs of nuclear destruction in the homeland. This logic seems to apply to North Korea as well. In the most extreme possible scenario, where Pyongyang used nuclear weapons against Seoul to facilitate a successful invasion, the devastation in the South would be so awful, that one wonders why North Korea would want to invade at all. Due to the peninsula’s mountainous terrain, only a few areas of South Korea are easily habitable for large numbers of people. Nearly 75 percent of the population lives on 30 percent of the landmass. Those small areas—basically the South biggest cities—would be targets of Northern nuclear weapons in any such war. If North Korea were to win that conflict, it would then inherit those irradiated, blasted population zones, in addition to scarcely usable mountains. What would be the point of winning then? Of fighting at all? Similarly, North Korean nuclear use against the South—or Japan or the United States—would lead to devastating American nuclear retaliation. South Korea and Japan have been treaty allies of the United States for decades. These relationships are about as robust as any in the U.S. alliance network. Countless secretaries of state and defense have pledged to protect Seoul and Tokyo. So American nuclear retaliation would almost certainly follow any Northern offensive nuclear strike. North Korea would inherit an apocalyptic wasteland in the South, while absorbing punishing nuclear retaliation at home—so punishing in fact, that the regime itself might collapse under the weight of the social chaos unleashed by American nuclear strikes. And if that were not bad enough, one could easily imagine China attacking North Korea if Pyongyang offensively used nuclear weapons. China may tolerate North Korea’s nuclearization, but it is hard to imagine Beijing tolerating North Korea using such weapons to start a war. Beijing knows that China may well could be the next target. It is easy to foresee the United States and China working together to destroy North Korea if it aggressively used nuclear weapons. Some fear North Korea might ‘ hand off ’ a weapon to rogue groups, but no states have done this yet. Others suggest nuclear weapons might be a method to bully South Korea into subservience or permanent subsidization. But so long as South Korea remains allied to the United States, it is not clear why North Korean nuclear blackmail would succeed. Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons level the playing field in the peninsula rather than shift it against South Korea. In short, North Korea’s possible use of its nuclear arsenal is highly constrained. It fits the profile of other state’s nuclear weapons—great as an ultimate guarantee of national defense and sovereignty, great for national prestige , but hugely risky for the offense. It is not clear that North Korea can escape the issue of practical use which so many other nuclear powers have tried to solve. There is simply no way to use these weapons for gain that would not immediately provoke massive counter-costs. Yet we seem to have a hard time transferring this logic to North Korea. Americans are deeply worried about war with North Korea, and our pop culture routinely portrays Pyongyang as aggressive toward the United States. Even if it could win a war, North Korea’s decrepit, neofeudal, gangster state probably could not absorb the South Korean population—which is twice the size of the North and long accustomed to democracy and freedom. So yes, North Korea’s nuclear weapons are unsettling, even frightening. But nuclear weapons have not been used for offense to date (barring WWII), and there is little to suggest that North Korea can escape the same ‘unusability’ trap other nuclear powers find themselves in. These weapons are almost certainly for defense and deterrence, so we should respond in kind with missile defense. That, not airstrikes and a consequent huge risk of Asian regional war, is the way forward.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Case › Vacancies

No war – Noko knows its outmatched technologically and economically, and deterrence solves

David C. Kang & Victor Cha 18. Kang is Maria Crutcher Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California; Cha is Director for Asian Affairs in the White House's National Security Council, with responsibility for Japan, North and South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. 2018. “THREATENING, BUT DETERRENCE WORKS.” Nuclear North Korea, Columbia University Press, pp. 41–69. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/cha-18922.8.

This raises another question: does North Korea have legitimate security fears? In a nutshell, the problem is this: the United States refuses to give security guarantees to North Korea until it proves it has dismantled its weapons program. The North refuses to disarm until it has security guarantees from the United States. Hence, stalemate. The key issue is whether North Korea has legitimate security concerns. If it does—and I will argue that this is the case—we can explain the pattern of North Korean behavior and also point to a solution. North Korea’s nuclear weapons, missile programs, and massive conventional military deployments are aimed at deterrence and defense. If North Korea really wanted to develop nuclear weapons for offensive purposes, it would have done so long ago. Even if the North develops nuclear weapons, it will not use them because of a devastating U.S. response. The North wants a guarantee of security from the U.S., and a policy of pressure will only make North Korea feel even more insecure. Even isolation is at best a holding measure, while economic sanctions—or even economic engagement alone—will be unlikely to get North Korea to abandon its weapons program. Without movement toward resolving the security fears of the North, progress in resolving the nuclear weapons issue will be limited. The United States and North Korea are still technically at war—the 1953 armistice was never replaced with a peace treaty. The U.S. has been unwilling to discuss even a nonaggression pact, much less a peace treaty or normalization of ties. With the U.S. calling North Korea a terrorist nation and Donald Rumsfeld discussing the possibility of war, it is no surprise that North Korea feels threatened. Upon closer examination, North Korea never had the material capabilities to be a serious contender to the U.S.- ROK alliance, and it quickly fell further behind. So the real question has not been whether North Korea would prevent or preempt as South Korea caught up, but instead why North Korea might fight as it fell farther and farther behind. To paraphrase William Wohlforth, “theorists tended to concentrate on dynamic challengers and moribund defenders. But in Korea the North was the moribund challenger, and the South was the rising defender.”7 If North Korea was so weak, why did so many people conclude that North Korea was the likely instigator of war? Since North Korea was not powerful, scholars and policymakers hypothesized extreme psychological tendencies to North Korean leaders. That is, if the material conditions such as military or economic power did not lead logically to a conclusion of North Korean threat, then the leadership’s psychology was what must matter. These ancillary and ad hoc psychological assumptions range from an irrational North Korean leadership to an extremely strong preference for invasion. Most theories of war focus on material conditions such as relative power, but in the case of North Korea, the real analytic lifting has been done by psychological assumptions about intent. As I will show, none of these assumptions are tenable.8 The explanation for a half-century of stability and peace on the Korean peninsula is actually quite simple: deterrence works. Since 1953 North Korea has faced both a determined South Korean military, and more importantly, U.S. military deployments that at their height comprised 100,000 troops and more than 100 nuclear-tipped Lance missiles aimed at North Korea. Even today the United States maintains bases in South Korea that include 38,000 troops, nuclear-capable airbases, and naval facilities that guarantee U.S. involvement in any conflict on the peninsula. While in 1950 there might have been reason for confidence in the North, the war was disastrous for the Communists, and without massive Chinese involvement North Korea would have ceased to exist. Even during the cold war, North Korea’s leadership never challenged this deterrence on the peninsula. As I will show, the attempted assassinations of South Korea’s authoritarian leaders during the 1970s and 1980s have stopped because they would be clearly counterproductive in a democratic South Korea, and will not begin again. Given the tension on the peninsula, small skirmishes have had the potential to spiral out of control, yet these incidents on the peninsula have been managed with care on both sides. The peninsula has been stable for fifty years because deterrence has been clear and unambiguous. The end of the cold war marked a major change in North Korea’s security position. The past fifteen years have seen the balance of power turn sharply against the North. What was stable deterrence during the cold war by both sides has swung quickly in favor of the West and South Korea.19 In the 1990s North Korea lost its two cold war patrons, experienced economic and environmental crises, and fell far behind the South. Although during the cold war the North was the aggressor, this shift in power put it on the defensive. It was only when the balance began to turn against the North that it began to pursue a nuclear weapons program. Both the weapons program and the bellicose nature of its rhetoric are an attempt to continue to deter the U.S. from taking any preemptive moves against it. North Korea has the worst public relations in the world. The North’s anachronistic cold war rhetoric and seeming inability to present itself reasonably make it difficult for even impartial people in the West to make sense of its actions. This chapter is aimed at providing an explanation. As history has shown, pressure only exacerbates North Korean security fears. Since North Korea does not pose the threat many analysts think it does, the United States may be wasting resources aimed at the North, and may also be unnecessarily raising tensions throughout the region. I want to emphasize that I am neither defending nor justifying North Korean behavior. Much of the regime’s actions are abhorrent and morally indefensible. However, sound foreign policy is built upon clear and objective analysis of the conditions at hand. Emotion and ideology have often interfered with the reasoned study of North Korea, and this has led scholars and policymakers to consistently overestimate the North Korean threat and to misunderstand the motivations behind North Korea’s actions. This chapter is focused on explaining the pattern of North Korea’s military and security policies. A complete picture of North Korea must also include the dramatic steps taken in the past decade to reform and open up its economy. In chapter 4 I will discuss North Korea’s economy and what it tells us about their foreign policy. In this chapter I perform four tasks. First, I show why North Korea is not a threat. Second, I explain why deterrence has worked for fifty years, and show that the changing balance of power has increased North Korea’s security fears. Third, I show why, even if North Korea develops a nuclear weapons capability, it will not use them, and also why North Korea is unlikely to engage in terrorism. Finally, I examine the “madman hypothesis” to show how questionable assumptions can be smuggled into the analysis of North Korea, and show why assuming irrationality is unproductive. WHY NORTH KOREA IS NOT A MILITARY THREAT In explaining North Korea’s foreign policy, a useful place to begin is by exploring why North Korea has become weaker and what has deterred it from starting a war. North Korea chose not to attack the South during the cold war, even though it was at the height of its power and was supported by the PRC and the Soviet Union. The past fifteen years have led to severe economic and military decline in North Korea, and it is now much weaker than South Korea. Intuitively, it follows that this nation is fearful of the United States. The majority of international relations theories conclude that the source of threats is clear: power is threatening. Kenneth Waltz writes that “balance of power theory leads one to expect that states, if they are free to do so, will flock to the weaker side. The stronger, not the weaker side, threatens them. . . . Even if the powerful state’s intentions are wholly benign, less powerful states will . . . interpret events differently.”10 Because states are concerned primarily with their own survival, and since states are concerned about relative power, there always exists the possibility that a strong nation may decide to begin hostilities with a weaker nation. Viewed differently, “parity preserves peace.”11 Thus a potential aggressor will not initiate a conflict if it cannot win. Threats arise by the mere presence of capabilities. Even if a nation was peaceful when it was weak, changes in power can bring changes in goals. Robert Gilpin writes that “rising power leads to increasing ambition. Rising powers seek to enhance their security by increasing their capabilities and their control over the external environment.”12 In this sense intentions are not fixed, but instead flow from and respond to changes in capabilities. The obverse of Gilpin’s argument is that as a nation’s capabilities fall behind, as it grows relatively weaker, its fears about the external environment will increase. Its ambitions will lessen, and its perception of external threat will rise. A preventive war might occur if the challenger’s economic and military capabilities begin to catch those of the defender. In that case, there exists the possibility that the defender will decide to fight a preventive war to keep the challenger from catching up, or that the challenger will fight after it catches up.13 However, there are two generic problems in applying the theories to the Korean peninsula. First, the theories predict peace if a small challenger falls farther behind the defender.14 If a nation was deterred from attacking when it was 60 percent the size of the defender, why would it attack after it has fallen to 30 percent, or even less, of the defender’s size? There are only two logical ways in which one can end up with the weaker power attacking the stronger. The first argument is well elucidated by Victor Cha in chapter 1, which I will discuss that at length in chapter 4. The [[GRAPH 2.1 OMITTED]] second way is to assume that the leader is irrational.15 I will show below why the madman theory does not make much sense. Before that, however, I will show how absolutely weak the North actually is. The first calculation compares only North and South Korea, while the second calculation includes likely U.S. actions in these assessments. The typical approach has been to take both North and South Korea and compare them along a range of economic and military measures, and I will show that North Korea’s capabilities were never preeminent over the South. More important, however, is an assessment of relative power that includes the U.S. forces that would be involved on the peninsula in event of a conflict. Scholars rarely consider this balance of forces, but this is a mistake, because any war would certainly involve the United States. Both of these measures show clearly that preventive war and power transition theories are not applicable to the Korean case. [[GRAPH 2.2 OMITTED]] South Korea has always had twice the population of the North. In economic terms, North Korea was never as large as the South, and even at its closest was no more than three-quarters the size of the South. Graph 2.1 shows estimates for the gross national product (GNP) of North and South Korea from 1953 to 2000. It is clear that North Korea was never close to the South in absolute size, and indeed after 1960 rapidly began falling farther and farther behind. North Korea’s GNP in 1960 was $1.52 billion, while South Korea’s GNP was $1.95 billion. By 1970 North Korea had grown to $3.98 billion, while in the South GNP was $7.99 billion. On a per capita income basis the North was never much farther ahead of the South, either. The North and South were roughly equivalent until the mid-1970s, when the South began to rapidly leave the North behind (graph 2.2). In 1960 North Korea’s per capita GNP was $137 as compared to $94 in the South, and in 1970 the North’s per capita income was $286 to $248 in the South. [[GRAPH 2.3 OMITTED]] However, by 1980 the North’s income was $758 per capita, while the South’s was $1,589, and by 1990 $1,065 to $5,569. Furthermore, in terms of preventive war, per capita income is not as important as absolute size, because small nations may be rich on a per capita basis (Singapore, Switzerland) but be militarily insignificant. In terms of defense spending, North Korea quickly fell behind the South, spending less on defense by the mid-1970s (graph 2.3). As far back as 1977 the South was spending more than the North on defense in absolute dollar terms, $1.8 billion in the South opposed to $1 billion by the North.16 The only measure by which the North outspent the South was on a per-capita GNP basis, which is an indicator of weakness, not strength.17 Additionally these numbers do not include military transfers from their respective patrons. Between 1965 and 1982 North Korea received $1.5 billion in military transfers, mostly from the Soviet Union. Over the same time period South Korea received $5.1 billion from the United States.18 [[GRAPH 2.4 OMITTED]] Thus the most common measures of power in international relations—economic size and defense spending—show quite clearly that North Korea was never larger than South Korea, has been smaller on an absolute and per-capita basis than the South for at least thirty years, and continues to fall farther behind. Those who see North Korea as threatening need to explain why North Korea— having waited fifty years—would finally attack now that it is one-twentieth the size of the South. In military capabilities the North and South Korea were in rough parity for the first two decades following the Korean War (1950–1953), and then the North began to fall behind. Graph 2.4 shows the number of men in the armed forces from 1963 to 1998. Most interesting is that North Korea did not begin its massive expansion of its armed forces until well into the 1970s. This is most probably a response to its falling further behind the South. But for the past thirty years, North Korea’s training, equipment, and overall military quality has steadily deteriorated relative to the South. The South Korean military is better-equipped, better-trained, and more versatile with better logistics and support than the North Korean military, and some assessments suggest that this may double combat effectiveness.19 Although the military has continued to hold pride of place in the North Korean economy, there have been increasing reports of reduced training due to the economic problems. Joong-Ang Ilbo, one of South Korea’s major daily newspapers, quoted an unidentified Defense Ministry official as saying that North Korea’s air force had made one hundred training sorties per day in 1996, down from three hundred to four hundred before the end of 1995, and that the training maneuvers of ground troops had also been reduced to a “minimum level.”20 American military officials have noted that individual North Korean pilots take one training flight per month, compared with the ten flights per month that U.S. pilots take.21 This drastically degrades combat readiness. Table 2.1 shows a comparison of weaponry in North and South Korea in 1997. The bulk of North Korea’s main battle tanks are of 1950s vintage, and most of its combat aircraft were introduced before 1956. Evaluations after the Gulf War concluded that Western weaponry is at least twice, or even four-times, better than older Soviet-vintage systems.22 By the 1990s North Korea’s military was large in absolute numbers but the quality of their forces was severely degraded relative to South Korea’s and the U.S. military. Michael O’Hanlon notes that: “Given the obsolescence of most North Korean equipment, however, actual capabilities of most forces would be notably less than raw numbers suggest. About half of North Korea’s major weapons are of roughly 1960s design; the other half are even older.”23 To view the North as superior in military terms is a mistake. But even more surprising about many of these accounts is that they measure the strength of the North Korean military only against that of the ROK, without including the U.S. forces, either present in Korea or those potential reinforcements. North Korea knows that it would fight the United States as well as the South, and it is wishful thinking to hope that the North Korean military [[TABLE 2.1 OMITTED]] planners are so naïve as to ignore the U.S. military presence in South Korea, expecting the U.S. to pack up and go home if the North invaded. Comparisons between the South and the North that ignore the role of the United States are seriously misleading as to the real balance of power on the peninsula.24 In event of a full-scale conflict, the United States could reinforce the peninsula with overwhelming power. Currently 36,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Korea, including the U.S. Second Infantry Division and 90 combat aircraft including 72 F-16s. In addition, 36,000 troops are stationed in Japan, including the headquarters of the Seventh fleet at Yokosuka naval base, 14,000 Marines, and 90 combat aircraft. This is only the beginning, as more would soon arrive from within the United States.25 This economic and military comparison of North and South Korea shows that North Korea never had a lead over the South, and after the 1960s quickly began falling behind. The end of the cold war marked the beginning of a major change in North Korea’s fortunes, as North Korea continued to have economic difficulties, while its allies deserted it. This situation has only become more grave in the new millennium. North Korea is not a threat to start an unprovoked war. North Korea was never in a preeminent position relative to the South, and the real question for the pessimists is why they continue to believe that a nation that is far behind and falling farther behind might still attack. The weak may attack the strong—but the conditions under which we expect that to happen do not exist on the peninsula. Yet many people still see the situation as tense and threatening. This is true, but it is true because deterrence at its heart requires both sides to know that the other side can severely damage it. DETERRENCE AND THE CHANGING BALANCE OF POWER North Korea has not attacked for fifty years because deterrence works. Despite the tension that has existed on the peninsula, the balance of power has held. For more than fifty years neither side has attempted to mount a major military operation, nor has either side attempted to challenge deterrence on the peninsula.26 Any war on the peninsula would have disastrous consequences for both sides. The tightly constricted geographic situation intensifies an already acute security dilemma between the two sides.27 The capitals of Seoul and Pyongyang are less than 150 miles apart—closer than New York and Baltimore. Seoul is 30 miles from the de-militarized zone that separates the North and the South (DMZ), and easily within reach of North Korea’s artillery tubes. One estimate calculates that a war on the Korean peninsula would cost the United States more than $60 billion and result in 3 million casualties, including 52,000 U.S. military casualties. The North, although it has numerically larger armed forces, faces a much more highly trained and capable U.S.-ROK armed forces. This led to stalemate: there was little room for barter or bargaining. The result has not been surprising: although tension is high, the balance of power has been stable. Far from being a tinderbox, both sides have moved cautiously and avoided major military mobilizations that could spiral out of control.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Case › Vacancies

No grey zone conflict in the SCS — Southeast Asian countries are fighting back now.

Koh 23 — Collin Koh, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2023 ("David vs. Goliath: Southeast Asia Can Resist China’s Gray Zone Aggression in the South China Sea . . . with Help," US Naval Insitute, Available Online at https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/may/david-vs-goliath-southeast-asia-can-resist-chinas-gray-zone, Accessed 07-29-2023) AJH

The stereotypical image of Southeast Asian nation responses to China’s maritime coercion in the South China Sea is one of meekness or, at worst, submission. While sometimes true, this view is based on the fact that Southeast Asian countries are smaller and weaker than China and that their economic dependence must limit their responses to Beijing’s aggression. Compounding this perception, several regional capitals frequently send mixed signals, creating the impression of policy confusion or paralysis. The reality, however, is nuanced. These states exercise agency and assert their interests when possible, including by directly pushing back against China’s coercive behavior. Whether their responses are optimal is debatable, but the image of weak nations not willing to push back is often incorrect or at least incomplete. As the United States seeks to coalesce a regional response to thwart China’s gray zone efforts to dominate the South China Sea, it should tap into and bolster this “David vs. Goliath” spirit and courage.

Gray Zone Situations

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Adv CP

Solves the first advantage – 1AC O’Hanlon and Poling prove

O'Hanlon and Poling 20 [Michael O’Hanlon is a senior fellow and director of research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy. He is the author of The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes. O'Hanlon earned an A.B. in 1982, M.S.E. in 1987, M.A. in 1988, and a Ph.D. in 1991 all from Princeton University. Gregory B. Poling is senior fellow for Southeast Asia and director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS. He is a leading expert on the South China Sea disputes and conducts research on U.S. alliances and partnerships, democratization and governance in Southeast Asia, and maritime security across the Indo-Pacific. He is the author of the recently published On Dangerous Ground: America’s Century in the South China Sea, along with various works on U.S. relations with Southeast Asia at large. His writings have been featured in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the Wall Street Journal, and the Naval War College Review, among others. He received an MA in international affairs from American University and a BA in history and philosophy from St. Mary’s College of Maryland, “Rocks, Reefs, and Nuclear War,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 1-14-2020, https://amti.csis.org/rocks-reefs-and-nuclear-war/, accessed 7-16-2023, HKR-SWY // rc angelina]

As the 2020s begin, the world can breathe a collective sigh of relief that the United States has so far avoided a major military crisis with China. Over the past decade, China challenged the lawful rights of U.S. partners and allies in the western Pacific, built massive artificial island bases in the disputed Spratly Islands, and actively sought control over all the waters, seabed, and airspace of the South China Sea. Yet the United States has maintained its access to those waters, deterred any major Chinese use of force against its neighbors, and helped support the efforts of Japan to maintain administrative control over the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. U.S. strategy has been notably less successful in preventing China from robbing Southeast Asian partners, including U.S. ally the Philippines, of their resources and rights in the South China Sea. But the United States has at least slowed China’s advance while avoiding war.

It would be unwise, however, to assume that the status quo is stable. Deterrence has not failed—yet. China is unlikely to do something as brazen as forcefully denying U.S. Navy or commercial ships access to the South China Sea, attacking American or Japanese bases, or intentionally sinking Filipino sailors in disputed waters. But Beijing continues to probe and test U.S. and allied resolve, provoking low-level crises which could easily escalate. Current U.S. strategic thinking could trigger disproportionate responses that would cause such crises to spiral out of control. That is the way World War I began a century ago—and it could happen again.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Settler Colonialism K

The alternative is a cartography of refusal that spurs direct action towards decolonization.

Day 15 — Iyko Day, Associate Professor of English at Mount Holyoke College, 2015 (“Being or Nothingness: Indigeneity, Antiblackness, and Settler Colonial Critique,” Critical Ethnic Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, Accessible Online via Academia at =, Accessed On 8-27-18) AJH

Beyond this inconsistency, the liberal multiculturalist agenda that Wilderson and Sexton project into Indigenous sovereignty willfully evacuates any Indigenous refusal of a colonial politics of recognition. Among other broad strokes, Sexton states, “as a rule, Native Studies reproduces the dominant liberal political narrative of emancipation and enfranchisement.”46 This provides a basis for Wilderson’s assertion that Indigenous sovereignty engages in a liberal politics of state legitimation through recognition because “treaties are forms of articulation” that buttress “the interlocutory life of America as a coherent (albeit genocidal) idea.”47 But such a depoliticized liberal project is frankly incompatible with Indigenous activism and scholarship that emerges from Native studies in North America. The main argument in Glen Sean Coulthard’s book Red Skin, White Masks is to categorically reject “the liberal recognition-based approach to Indigenous self-determination.”48 This is not a politics of legitimizing Indigenous nations through state recognition but rather one of refusal, a refusal to be recognized and thus interpellated by the settler colonial nation-state. Drawing on Fanon, Coulthard describes the “necessity on the part of the oppressed to ‘turn away’ from their other-oriented master-dependency, and to instead struggle for freedom on their own terms and in accordance with their own values.”49 It is also difficult to reconcile the depoliticized narrative of “resurgence and recovery” that Wilderson and Sexton attribute to Indigenous sovereignty in the face of Idle No More, the anticapitalist Indigenous sovereignty movement in Canada whose national railway and highway blockades have seriously destabilized the expropriation of natural resources for the global market. These are examples that Coulthard describes as “direct action” rather than negotiation—in other words, antagonism, not conflict resolution:

They [blockades] are a crucial act of negation insofar as they seek to impede or block the flow of resources currently being transported to international markets from oil and gas fields, refineries, lumber mills, mining operations, and hydroelectric facilities located on the dispossessed lands of Indigenous nations. These modes of direct action . . . seek to have a negative impact on the economic infrastructure that is core to the colonial accumulation of capital in settler-political economies like Canada’s.50

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Settler Colonialism K

The 1AC engages in affective erasure — historical military actions cause trauma that makes indigenous people feel like occupation never ended.

Weiss 21 — Joseph Weiss, sociocultural and political anthropologist at Wesleyan University, PhD from the University of Chicago, 2021 (“NOT BUILT TO LAST: Military Occupation and Ruination under Settler Colonialism,” Cultural Anthropology, Volume 36, Issue 3, Available Online at , Accessed on 09-25-2021) AJH

The shuttering of the rec center appeared to many in both Masset and Old Massett as an unhappy epilogue to more than fifty years of sustained military presence on the islands of Haida Gwaii, ancestral home and unceded territory of the Haida Nation. The Base, as CFS Masset was popularly known, was gone, and with it all the resources it had brought to the two communities. Other than ruins, all that remained was a radio outpost a few kilometers north of Masset, which, people believed, was remotely operated. Except, as Marlene Liddle and her family discovered, the military had not gone from Haida Gwaii. One day in July, when the Liddle family was out berry picking on their traditional territory, they—to their surprise—discovered a sign on their recently renovated outhouse. The sign, written and placed by a member of Canada’s Department of National Defense (DND), informed the Liddle family that their outhouse had been built on DND land and was thus an “illegal building, … built without the approval of the Minister of National Defense, and violated [sic] the Canadian Environmental Protection Act.” Unless the family took down the offending building, the note informed them, it would be “removed on their behalf.”

And yet, the offending outhouse was not new, even if it had been newly renovated. Indeed, one incarnation of the outhouse or another had stood in this same place for the past fifteen years. The military had been notorious for interfering with Haida resource gathering on land the DND had claimed as its own, and Marlene Liddle and her family had wasted little time in returning to berry picking and other forms of food gathering when the military ostensibly left in 1997. There had been material evidence of that departure, moreover: By 2011 the buildings that had made up the Base had been in gradually decay for more than a decade and most of the remaining facilities had been shut down. Even the “private married quarters,” mid-sized houses built for military officers and their families, had been sold to Masset’s residents as civilian housing. The ruins of the Base provided a material reminder of the military’s absence, their skeletal frames signaling Masset’s post-military present to residents and new arrivals alike. It was community common sense, in short, that the military was gone for good. As, it turned out, however, that absence was an illusion, or perhaps even a deception.