2023
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2NC – Cap K › 2NC stuff › Collapse Now - UQ
Maund 5/8 Maund, Clive. Clive Maund has been president of www.clivemaund.com, a successful resource sector website, since its inception in 2003. He has 30 years' experience in technical analysis and has worked for banks, commodity brokers and stockbrokers in the City of London. He holds a Diploma in Technical Analysis from the UK Society of Technical Analysts."Gold In Major World Currencies". Streetwisereports.Com, 5/8/2023, https://www.streetwisereports.com/article/2023/05/08/gold-in-major-world-currencies.html. Accessed 25 May 2023. ut-ac
With the gargantuan debt bubble built up over many decades now collapsing and imploding, the world is headed for a hyperinflationary depression, and the highest priority for investors and citizens at large is simply wealth preservation with so many destructive forces converging at once that will render many assets and investments worthless.
Gold's greatest attribute is that it always holds its intrinsic value, no matter what, and in an environment where other assets, especially paper assets, are losing value at an increasingly rapid rate, it really comes into its own, appreciating against currencies to offset their decline in purchasing power and even gaining in real value as investors eventually stampede into it as a safe haven.
2023
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2NC – Cap K › 2NC stuff › Collapse Now - UQ
Desai 23 Desai, R. Radhika Desai is Professor in the Department of Political Studies and Director of the Geopolitical Economy Research Group at the University of Manitoba, Canada, and Convenor of the International Manifesto Group. (2023). Capitalism, Coronavirus and War: A Geopolitical Economy (p. 266). Taylor & Francis. ut-ac
This pattern of expansion has not only cleft the world into capitalist and socialist economies but ensured that the capitalist world is no seamless or uniform entity but a congeries of national capitalisms, each marked by its distinctive history and struggle to avoid subordination and achieve its own domination. Britain’s original industrial and imperial dominance, based on empire and ‘free trade’, was challenged by contenders pursuing nationally distinct state-directed industrialisation behind protectionist walls, giving each capitalism distinct national and quite statist economic structures. As these struggles intensified in the late nineteenth century, they produced what Karl Polanyi called ‘crustacean’ nations (Polanyi 1944, 202), national economies with hard statist shells.
These capitalisms were also productively more powerful, emerging just when capitalism was entering its monopoly phase which, as Marx and anticipated, and Hilferding had argued (Marx 1894/1981, 567–73; Hilferding 1910/1981, 367–8), ripened and readied capitalism for socialist transition. However, with Britain remaining committed to free trade and the United States seeking to take over its role of imposing economic openness on the world as Britain’s abilities were manifestly declining, capitalism’s life was prolonged, albeit through resort to ‘socialistic’ measures. For a time, they made even the comparatively far more liberal United States and the United Kingdom resemble the statist economies though, as the United States and the United Kingdom led the way in rolling these measures back from the 1980s onwards, the diversity of capitalisms reemerged to be studied by a veritable cottage industry of its models (Coates 2000) and varieties (Hall and Soskice 2001).
2023
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2NC – Cap K › 2NC stuff › AT Cap Good
Barsamian and Chomsky 4/6 Barsamian, David. founder and host of the radio program Alternative Radio and has published books with Noam Chomsky, Arundhati Roy, Edward Said, and Howard Zinn, among others. Alternative Radio, established in 1986, is a weekly one-hour public-affairs program offered free to all public radio stations in the United States, Canada, Europe, and beyond. Chomsky, Noam. institute professor (emeritus) in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and laureate professor of linguistics and Agnese Nelms Haury chair in the program in environment and social justice at the University of Arizona. This article was an interview excerpted from AlternativeRadio with Noam Chomsky. “Savage Capitalism From Climate Change to Bank Failures to War”. TomDispatch. 6 Apr 2023. https://tomdispatch.com/savage-capitalism/. ut-ac
David Barsamian: On March 20th, the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change issued its latest report. The new IPCC assessment from senior scientists warned that there's little time to lose in tackling the climate crisis. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said, "The rate of temperature rise in the last half-century is the highest in 2,000 years. Concentrations of carbon dioxide are at their highest in at least 2 million years. The climate time bomb is ticking." At COP 27 he said, "We are on a highway to climate hell with our foot still on the accelerator. It is the defining issue of our age. It is the central challenge of our century." My question to you is: You'd think survival would be a galvanizing issue, but why isn't there a greater sense of urgency in addressing it in a substantial way?
Noam Chomsky: It was a very strong statement by Guterres. I think it could be stronger still. It's not just the defining issue of this century, but of human history. We are now, as he says, at a point where we'll decide whether the human experiment on Earth will continue in any recognizable form. The report was stark and clear. We're reaching a point where irreversible processes will be set into motion. It doesn't mean that everybody's going to die tomorrow, but we'll pass tipping points where nothing more can be done, where it's just decline to disaster.
2023
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2NC – Cap K › 2NC stuff › AT L/T – Degrowth
Liu 22 Liu, J. C. (2022). John C. Liu was a Masters Candidate for Integrated Design & Management Program @ MIT. Rethinking Consumption & Production: Systems Design for Sustainable Lifestyles in the Global North (Doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). pp. 6-7. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/145159. ut-ac
Climate change & sustainable development are two of the greatest challenges of the 21st century. The mandate is clear. According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2018), our world must achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 in order to prevent global temperatures from rising 1.5°C above pre-industrial level by the end of this century. At that point, the negative impacts on our environment & society will be irreversible. The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) (2021) states that the world will need to halve annual GHG emissions in the next 8 years - an enormous undertaking for society at all levels. In response, governments, industries, communities, and individuals around the world are taking action at varying speeds.
At the COP26 climate summit, 151 countries have submitted climate plans but commitments to deep emission cuts remain weak and ambiguous (Mountford et al., 2021). The UNEP (2021) estimates that these NDCs place the world on track to reach 2.7°C in temperature rise by the end of the century. Tensions exist between countries in the Global South that require funding to leapfrog fossil fuel technologies and countries in the Global North who are largest historical emitters.
2023
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2NC – Cap K › 2NC stuff › AT FW
Moufawad-Paul 22 Moufawad-Paul, J. Joshua Moufawad-Paul is a Canadian academic and writer from Toronto, Canada. He is a professor of philosophy at York University. A Maoist philosopher, Moufawad-Paul has written several works on the topic and regularly posts on his blog M-L-M Mayhem which focuses on his conception of the philosophy of Maoism. (2022). Politics in command. https://foreignlanguages.press/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/N15-Politics-in-Command_A-Taxonomy-of-Economism-1st-Printing-FINAL.pdf. pp 53-60. **footnotes omitted. ut-ac
Thus, there is a second definition of politics and that is “politics as defined as a division between populations with differing views as to its objective,”39 because within every society to date there are populations who cannot agree on the meaning of a good society—a political community, a polis—and this tension of disagreement is what we mean by politics. This division and differentiation demand that we take a side on the meaning of the political, and that this taking a side is the essence of politics. This is why Lenin’s conception of politics—and placing politics in command—means that “the aim of all political action must be to transform the organization of society in its entirety.”40 That is, politics means the commitment to a class position and practice, since society is divided by classes. There is always an a priori decision of what class position one adopts and this decision is the essence of politics.
For Badiou, politics is one of the conditions of philosophy. That is, it is a theoretical terrain that generates its own “truth-procedure”41 due to the history of social struggle. A given politics, then, “is a singularity in situation, dependent on an event affecting the collective, of which, in sequential fashion, it presents the truth.”42 Take, for example, the event of the Russian Revolution: the singularity of the Bolsheviks’ ideological line emerged in the situation of all the chaos leading up to the event of 1917, and that event presented a truth—more accurately, truths—that demanded militant fidelity: the partisan vanguard, the revolutionary state. These truths were dependent on previous truth claims (for instance, the claim that class struggle is the momentum of history), and they also remained dynamic and open to the historical development of future politics. At the same time, they did not go, and still do not go, unchallenged. There are emancipatory politics and there are counter-emancipatory politics. Politics is class struggle, the “division between populations who cannot agree on the meaning of a good society.”
2023
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1NC – Cap K › Alt › Alt – Communist Organizing
Thomas 13 Thomas, P. D. (2013). Peter D. Thomas lectures in the History of Political Thought at Brunel University, London. He serves on the Editorial Board of Historical Materialism—Research in Critical Marxist Theory. The communist hypothesis and the question of organization. Theory & Event, 16(4). https://muse.jhu.edu/article/530491. rc ut-ac
The Communist Hypothesis The debate on the ‘Idea of Communism’ that emerged in 2008 following Alain Badiou’s analysis of the electoral victory of Sarkozy, drawing upon a longer history of vindications of communism over the last 30 years, was quickly greeted with enthusiasm by prominent theorists from a wide range of leftist political traditions. This discussion also seems to have stimulated a renewal of the energy and engagement that had marked the most creative dimensions of the alternative globalization and anti-war movements straddling the millennium. After the impasses those movements confronted in what was sometimes seen as an ‘interregnum’ at the beginning of the global economic crisis, the affirmation of the ‘Idea of Communism’ – or perhaps even more so, the more precise notion of a ‘Communist Hypothesis’ – offered the possibility of a renewed collective research project into the viable forms of contemporary political struggle. Unexpectedly and audaciously, the positive programme of communism, and not simply negative resistance to capitalist crisis, became the horizon within which we could comprehend and meet the challenges of the present. As an ideological intervention, the merits of this discussion are remarkable: it has given rise to a wide ranging international discussion of the notion of communism that did not occur even at the height of the alternative globalization and anti-war movements, still struggling against the overdeteminations of the new world order rhetoric of the 1990s. What still remains more difficult to ascertain, however, is the nature of these discussions’ relationship to the organizational debates that have emerged in the wake of Occupy, international anti-austerity protests and the ‘actually existing’ revolutionary movements of our times. Some important contemporary theorists have argued that the discussion of the idea of communism should keep a distance from immediate organizational questions. In particular, Badiou has strongly resisted the notion that the affirmation of communism should necessarily be accompanied by a renewed consideration of the role of the political party, as decisive agent of that idea’s realization, which he instead regards as an historically superseded instantiation of ‘communist invariants’ that are today searching for a new mode of historical existence. By far the most widespread response, however, has been the proposal that a coherent investigation of the meaning of communism today necessarily requires a reconsideration of the nature of political power, of political organization, and, above all, of the party-form. Žižek, for instance, has long argued that a politics without the party is nothing more than a form of ‘politics without politics.’ More recently, Jodi Dean has emphasized that the reproposition of the party-form is the horizon within which the debate on communism can become intelligible to itself. Far from the caricature of homogenous or ‘totalitarian’ unity, Dean argues that the party – and the Leninist party in particular – should be understood as constituting a ‘vehicle for maintaining a specific gap of desire, the collective desire for collectivity’ (Dean 2012, 207). She further argues that such a dynamic has already been evident in the achievements of Occupy, whatever the ‘anti-verticalist’ claims sometimes made on its behalf. In a related vein, Jan Rehmann (2013) has argued that the nascent counter-hegemonic dimensions of Occupy, alongside regroupment processes on the European left, have prepared the ground for a serious reproposal of the question of the mass political party. In particular, Rehmann argues that a renewal of the party will involve experimentation in new party forms, including notions such as those of a ‘mosaic left’ (Urban 2009) or a ‘connective party’ (Porcaro 2012). These are positions close to those advocated by one of the original proponents of the debate on communism, the sadly departed Daniel Bensaïd, who repeatedly argued over many years that the concept of the party remains central to any coherent reflection on the nature and form of politics in the contemporary world, whether or not the word ‘party’ itself is used to describe those processes of unification, coordination and decision. For Bensaïd, it is the specificity of the overdetermined field of political relations and its irreducibility to the social that continually reproposes the question of the party-form – not as a solution, but as a problem that each upsurge of social and political struggle involving diverging and sometimes conflicting component elements inevitably confronts. This constitutive tension generates the need for continuous interpretative and analytical labor, in the attempt to discover the party-form adequate to the specificity of the social movements to which it gives expression, at the same time as it transforms them by translating their demands into the distinctive register of politics (Bensaïd 2002, 112 et sq). Above all, however, it has been practical experience of the contradictory processes of left regroupment on an international scale – from reconfigurations over the last decade on the Latin American left, to the varying success of coalition parties in Europe such as Die Linke in Germany, Izquierda Unida in Spain, Syriza in Greece and the Front de Gauche in France, to the tentative emergence of new political formations across North Africa and the Arab world – that has firmly placed the question of the party back on the contemporary agenda. The communist horizon thus now confronts its own horizon of intelligibility not simply in a discussion of the party-form, but in the dialectical relation between such theoretical debates and the organizational innovations of the real movements of today, to paraphrase the now oft-quoted words of the German Ideology, that aim to abolish the present state of affairs (MECW 5, 49). The Horizon of the Party-Form In this text, I want to explore some of the consequences of the notion of a communist hypothesis in relation to these organizational debates, and in particular, to the emerging debate regarding the adequate party-form for radical politics today. First, I will argue that the sometimes obscure organizational implications of the generic affirmation of communism become clearer when we situate this discussion historically, as a transposition and continuation ‘by philosophical means’ of some of the central debates of the alternative globalization movement. For despite the exaggerated claims to novelty of both friend and foe alike, the debate on communism did not emerge from nowhere. Rather, I argue that it should be understood as representing the displacement into a theoretical register of central themes of the previous sequences of struggles against the ‘new world order’ in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In the same way, the new movements that have fortuitously coincided with the debate on communism – student movements across North America and Europe from 2009 onwards, the global wave of Occupy, the ongoing Arab revolutions and growing anti-austerity movements around the world throughout 2012 – represent not a return or rebirth of history, but its revenge. They should be understood as expressions of the accumulation, displacement and transformation of tendencies from the previous cycle of mass struggles that that have been surreptitiously burrowing away, like Marx’s old mole, under the surface of what we can now see was only an apparent and decidedly temporary pacification of the ‘interregnum’ of the middle years of the last decade. The ‘spontaneous rediscovery’ by the moment of Occupy of the aporiai that plagued the alternative globalization and anti-war movements, however, indicate a substantial continuity of unresolved problems across the different conjunctures of the ebbs and floods of the social and political movements of the last 15 years. As a formalized response and proposed resolution to some of these themes, the discussion of communism can help to clarify both the strengths and limits of these debates, particularly those that are still strongly operative in the post-Occupy conjuncture. Second, I then aim to explore some significant models of organization that emerged in previous periods in which the renewal of communist politics was closely linked to attempts to rethink the party-form. For from the Manifesto of the Communist Party onwards, communism, as word, idea and hypothesis, has always been inseparably tied to the forms of political organization necessary for its realization: in the terms of the classical Marxist debates, the ‘question of organization’ [die Organisationsfrage]. The models that I will consider are, first, the notion of the ‘compositional party’ derived from the experience of Italian operaismo, recently – and perhaps surprisingly – reproposed in Hardt and Negri’s Commonwealth; second, the conceptualization of the party as a ‘laboratory’ in which a unitary ‘political subject’ could be forged, theorized most coherently in the work of the early Lukács; and third, Gramsci’s call for the formation of a ‘modern Prince’ as a harnessing of the inherent conflictuality of political modernity in a constituent party-form. Each of these models can be regarded as a mirror in which we can see reflected some of the challenges of the organizational questions that have marked both the alternative globalization movement and the rebellions and revolts of today. Hardt and Negri’s notion of a compositional party composed of ‘insurrectional intersections’ of irreducible singularities responds to the problem of thinking the party-form in a period of the proliferation of demands and movements grounded in diverse experiences of capitalist exploitation and oppression. Lukács’s proposal of the party as a laboratory for the forging of a totalizing political subject poses the question of the party-form as one of the unification and coordination of political initiatives. Both of these models, I will argue, ultimately confront the limitations of a political formalism, which runs the risk of invoking a political party-form as the resolution of the contradictions of the social practices that are thereby interpellated as its subaltern content. Gramsci’s modern Prince, on the other hand, integrates both compositional and totalizing dimensions, while avoiding the temptation of a formalistic resolution of the contradictions that are the necessary preconditions – and enduring challenge – of political organization. Rather than the elimination of difference, the assertion of identity or the dominance of political form over social content, the modern Prince represents the outlines of a party-form that would be capable of valorizing contradiction and conflict, harnessing them as the motor of its totalizing development. In these sense, the modern Prince can be understood as a proposal for a type of ‘expansive’ party-form that might be able to respond productively to the challenges of contemporary movements.
2023
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Kritik
1NC – Cap K › Shells › 1NC – Cap K – Generic
Thomas 13 Thomas, P. D. (2013). Peter D. Thomas lectures in the History of Political Thought at Brunel University, London. He serves on the Editorial Board of Historical Materialism—Research in Critical Marxist Theory. The communist hypothesis and the question of organization. Theory & Event, 16(4). https://muse.jhu.edu/article/530491. ut-ac
The Communist Hypothesis The debate on the ‘Idea of Communism’ that emerged in 2008 following Alain Badiou’s analysis of the electoral victory of Sarkozy, drawing upon a longer history of vindications of communism over the last 30 years, was quickly greeted with enthusiasm by prominent theorists from a wide range of leftist political traditions. This discussion also seems to have stimulated a renewal of the energy and engagement that had marked the most creative dimensions of the alternative globalization and anti-war movements straddling the millennium. After the impasses those movements confronted in what was sometimes seen as an ‘interregnum’ at the beginning of the global economic crisis, the affirmation of the ‘Idea of Communism’ – or perhaps even more so, the more precise notion of a ‘Communist Hypothesis’ – offered the possibility of a renewed collective research project into the viable forms of contemporary political struggle. Unexpectedly and audaciously, the positive programme of communism, and not simply negative resistance to capitalist crisis, became the horizon within which we could comprehend and meet the challenges of the present. As an ideological intervention, the merits of this discussion are remarkable: it has given rise to a wide ranging international discussion of the notion of communism that did not occur even at the height of the alternative globalization and anti-war movements, still struggling against the overdeteminations of the new world order rhetoric of the 1990s. What still remains more difficult to ascertain, however, is the nature of these discussions’ relationship to the organizational debates that have emerged in the wake of Occupy, international anti-austerity protests and the ‘actually existing’ revolutionary movements of our times. Some important contemporary theorists have argued that the discussion of the idea of communism should keep a distance from immediate organizational questions. In particular, Badiou has strongly resisted the notion that the affirmation of communism should necessarily be accompanied by a renewed consideration of the role of the political party, as decisive agent of that idea’s realization, which he instead regards as an historically superseded instantiation of ‘communist invariants’ that are today searching for a new mode of historical existence. By far the most widespread response, however, has been the proposal that a coherent investigation of the meaning of communism today necessarily requires a reconsideration of the nature of political power, of political organization, and, above all, of the party-form. Žižek, for instance, has long argued that a politics without the party is nothing more than a form of ‘politics without politics.’ More recently, Jodi Dean has emphasized that the reproposition of the party-form is the horizon within which the debate on communism can become intelligible to itself. Far from the caricature of homogenous or ‘totalitarian’ unity, Dean argues that the party – and the Leninist party in particular – should be understood as constituting a ‘vehicle for maintaining a specific gap of desire, the collective desire for collectivity’ (Dean 2012, 207). She further argues that such a dynamic has already been evident in the achievements of Occupy, whatever the ‘anti-verticalist’ claims sometimes made on its behalf. In a related vein, Jan Rehmann (2013) has argued that the nascent counter-hegemonic dimensions of Occupy, alongside regroupment processes on the European left, have prepared the ground for a serious reproposal of the question of the mass political party. In particular, Rehmann argues that a renewal of the party will involve experimentation in new party forms, including notions such as those of a ‘mosaic left’ (Urban 2009) or a ‘connective party’ (Porcaro 2012). These are positions close to those advocated by one of the original proponents of the debate on communism, the sadly departed Daniel Bensaïd, who repeatedly argued over many years that the concept of the party remains central to any coherent reflection on the nature and form of politics in the contemporary world, whether or not the word ‘party’ itself is used to describe those processes of unification, coordination and decision. For Bensaïd, it is the specificity of the overdetermined field of political relations and its irreducibility to the social that continually reproposes the question of the party-form – not as a solution, but as a problem that each upsurge of social and political struggle involving diverging and sometimes conflicting component elements inevitably confronts. This constitutive tension generates the need for continuous interpretative and analytical labor, in the attempt to discover the party-form adequate to the specificity of the social movements to which it gives expression, at the same time as it transforms them by translating their demands into the distinctive register of politics (Bensaïd 2002, 112 et sq). Above all, however, it has been practical experience of the contradictory processes of left regroupment on an international scale – from reconfigurations over the last decade on the Latin American left, to the varying success of coalition parties in Europe such as Die Linke in Germany, Izquierda Unida in Spain, Syriza in Greece and the Front de Gauche in France, to the tentative emergence of new political formations across North Africa and the Arab world – that has firmly placed the question of the party back on the contemporary agenda. The communist horizon thus now confronts its own horizon of intelligibility not simply in a discussion of the party-form, but in the dialectical relation between such theoretical debates and the organizational innovations of the real movements of today, to paraphrase the now oft-quoted words of the German Ideology, that aim to abolish the present state of affairs (MECW 5, 49). The Horizon of the Party-Form In this text, I want to explore some of the consequences of the notion of a communist hypothesis in relation to these organizational debates, and in particular, to the emerging debate regarding the adequate party-form for radical politics today. First, I will argue that the sometimes obscure organizational implications of the generic affirmation of communism become clearer when we situate this discussion historically, as a transposition and continuation ‘by philosophical means’ of some of the central debates of the alternative globalization movement. For despite the exaggerated claims to novelty of both friend and foe alike, the debate on communism did not emerge from nowhere. Rather, I argue that it should be understood as representing the displacement into a theoretical register of central themes of the previous sequences of struggles against the ‘new world order’ in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In the same way, the new movements that have fortuitously coincided with the debate on communism – student movements across North America and Europe from 2009 onwards, the global wave of Occupy, the ongoing Arab revolutions and growing anti-austerity movements around the world throughout 2012 – represent not a return or rebirth of history, but its revenge. They should be understood as expressions of the accumulation, displacement and transformation of tendencies from the previous cycle of mass struggles that that have been surreptitiously burrowing away, like Marx’s old mole, under the surface of what we can now see was only an apparent and decidedly temporary pacification of the ‘interregnum’ of the middle years of the last decade. The ‘spontaneous rediscovery’ by the moment of Occupy of the aporiai that plagued the alternative globalization and anti-war movements, however, indicate a substantial continuity of unresolved problems across the different conjunctures of the ebbs and floods of the social and political movements of the last 15 years. As a formalized response and proposed resolution to some of these themes, the discussion of communism can help to clarify both the strengths and limits of these debates, particularly those that are still strongly operative in the post-Occupy conjuncture. Second, I then aim to explore some significant models of organization that emerged in previous periods in which the renewal of communist politics was closely linked to attempts to rethink the party-form. For from the Manifesto of the Communist Party onwards, communism, as word, idea and hypothesis, has always been inseparably tied to the forms of political organization necessary for its realization: in the terms of the classical Marxist debates, the ‘question of organization’ [die Organisationsfrage]. The models that I will consider are, first, the notion of the ‘compositional party’ derived from the experience of Italian operaismo, recently – and perhaps surprisingly – reproposed in Hardt and Negri’s Commonwealth; second, the conceptualization of the party as a ‘laboratory’ in which a unitary ‘political subject’ could be forged, theorized most coherently in the work of the early Lukács; and third, Gramsci’s call for the formation of a ‘modern Prince’ as a harnessing of the inherent conflictuality of political modernity in a constituent party-form. Each of these models can be regarded as a mirror in which we can see reflected some of the challenges of the organizational questions that have marked both the alternative globalization movement and the rebellions and revolts of today. Hardt and Negri’s notion of a compositional party composed of ‘insurrectional intersections’ of irreducible singularities responds to the problem of thinking the party-form in a period of the proliferation of demands and movements grounded in diverse experiences of capitalist exploitation and oppression. Lukács’s proposal of the party as a laboratory for the forging of a totalizing political subject poses the question of the party-form as one of the unification and coordination of political initiatives. Both of these models, I will argue, ultimately confront the limitations of a political formalism, which runs the risk of invoking a political party-form as the resolution of the contradictions of the social practices that are thereby interpellated as its subaltern content. Gramsci’s modern Prince, on the other hand, integrates both compositional and totalizing dimensions, while avoiding the temptation of a formalistic resolution of the contradictions that are the necessary preconditions – and enduring challenge – of political organization. Rather than the elimination of difference, the assertion of identity or the dominance of political form over social content, the modern Prince represents the outlines of a party-form that would be capable of valorizing contradiction and conflict, harnessing them as the motor of its totalizing development. In these sense, the modern Prince can be understood as a proposal for a type of ‘expansive’ party-form that might be able to respond productively to the challenges of contemporary movements.
2023
UTNIF
Kritik
1NC – Cap K › Shells › 1NC – Cap K – Generic
Trainer 22 Trainer, T. Ted Trainer is a conjoint Lecturer, part of the Social Sciences program at the University of New South Wales. (2022). CAPITALISM: WHY WE SHOULD SCRAP IT. pg. 101-110. https://thesimplerway.info/CAPITALISMBOOK.pdf **language edited rc ut-ac
Let us step back and consider again the global situation sketched in Chapter 3. It was explained that the increasingly serious range of problems, including environmental destruction, resource depletion, deprivation of the Third World, conflict over access to resources and markets, and the deterioration of social cohesion, are direct consequences of the fact that there is far too much producing and consuming going on. The main argument in this chapter is that this society is not capable of dealing with this situation, and that it will inevitably culminate in the more or less catastrophic breakdown of society on a global scale.
Before detailing that argument some aspects of the trajectory should be considered further.
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McCollum 22 McCollum, J. (2022). John McCollum is an assistant professor of sociology at Minot State University. Avoiding the pitfalls of capitalism in the Green New Deal. In Routledge Handbook on the Green New Deal (pp. 78-83). Routledge. ut-ac
State capitalism and the problem of entrenched political power
Our next important area for critiquing the GND in Marxist perspective is the state. The question of whether the working class can advance its interests through the state remains a heated debate in Marxist political thought. Marxist political theorist Ralph Miliband held that the state could be turned toward working-class interests through parliamentary means. The state reflected capital’s interests because of the capitalist class’s occupation of decision-making power and influence over the parliamentary process. Miliband believed that the working class could capture some degree of political power in national politics and affect change in that manner. A case in point was the rise to power of the Labour Party after World War II in Miliband’s native United Kingdom. The social-democratic nature of the GND highlights the hopes of its supporters to advance the GND through national parliaments and congresses, rather than, say, through revolutionary means. Given that the state will remain intact, we should look further into what this means for the class nature of the GND and the problems this may create, socially and environmentally.
2023
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Negative
Off-Case Positions › Cap and Trade CP › 2NC – Solvency
Stavins 14 – Robert Stavins, Professor of Energy and Economics at Harvard (“Cap and Trade Is the Only Feasible Way of Cutting Emissions,” The New York Times, June 2nd, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/06/01/can-the-market-stave-off-global-warming/cap-and-trade-is-the-only-feasible-way-of-cutting-emissions)
A national carbon-pricing regime is the only feasible way for the United States to reach its goal of reducing emissions to 83 percent below their 2005 level by 2050. With 30 years of success, even if uneven at times, pricing regimes have provided incentives to achieve goals in the least expensive manner. Because emission control costs vary drastically among the millions of diverse emissions sources, conventional regulations are unfeasible. Only a pricing regime provides incentives for the overall target to be achieved in the least expensive manner. In the long term it is economical because of incentives to adopt lower-cost, cleaner technologies. The initial distribution of allowances in a cap-and-trade system offers a direct means of compensating for the inevitably unequal burdens imposed by a climate policy. It resists degradation by political forces, because its environmental and economic performance is unaffected by the initial distribution of allowances. Internationally, it provides a straightforward means to link with other countries’ climate policies, which is exceptionally important for addressing this global problem. Finally, experience favors cap and trade because it has a history of successful adoption and implementation over three decades. In 1982, the Environmental Protection Agency put in place a trading program to phase out leaded gasoline. It produced a more rapid elimination of leaded gasoline from the marketplace than had been anticipated, and at a savings of some $250 million per year. Later, Congress enacted a law proposed by President George H. W. Bush to use cap and trade to cut sulfur dioxide emissions (and consequently acid rain) by half, at a savings of $1 billion per year. As climate change has become an increasing concern, cap and trade has most often been the instrument of choice. The first and largest example is the European Union Emissions Trading System, which has covered electricity generation and large manufacturing, and is now being expanded. But external factors in Europe have suppressed allowance prices, lowering incentives to cut emissions. The economic downturn has curtailed energy and allowance demand. “Complementary policies,” like Europe’s aggressive renewable power initiatives, have relocated emissions from electricity generation to other sectors with no net reduction. In the process, abatement costs have been driven up and allowance prices suppressed. Also, the anticipated termination of the Clean Development Mechanism created a temporary flood of offsets on the market. The European Commission is about to lower the program’s cap, bringing higher future allowance prices. In the United States, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, begun in 2009, brought together nine Northeastern states in a cap-and-trade regime controlling electricity sector emissions. The combination of the recession, low natural gas prices and mild weather lowered emissions below the cap, but the states have now increased the program’s stringency. California’s ambitious cap-and-trade system will soon cover 85 percent of the state’s economy and reduce carbon dioxide emissions to their 1990 levels by 2020. Add to these seven pilot carbon dioxide cap-and-trade systems in China, plus others up and running in Quebec and Switzerland, and still others planned in South Korea, India, Chile, Brazil and Mexico, and it becomes clear that cap and trade has emerged as the preferred approach for meaningful action to address climate change.
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Off-Case Positions › Cap and Trade CP › 1NC – Shell
Richard Schmalensee and Robert Stavins 19 Professor of Management and Economics at MIT and former Dean of MIT Sloan; and Professor of Energy and Economic Development at Harvard (“Learning from Thirty Years of Cap and Trade”, Resources (May 16, 2019), https://www.resources.org/archives/learning-thirty-years-cap-trade/)
Implications for Climate Change Policy: Two highly relevant lessons from thirty years of experience with cap-and-trade systems stand out. First, cap and trade has proven itself to be environmentally effective and economically cost-effective relative to traditional command-and-control approaches. Moreover, less flexible systems would not have led to the technological change and innovation that appear to have been induced by market-based instruments. Second, and equally important, the performance of cap-and-trade systems depends on how well they are designed. In particular, it is important to reduce unnecessary price volatility to avoid excessive costs. Hybrid designs offer an attractive option to do this if some variability of emissions can be tolerated. All of this suggests that cap and trade merits serious consideration when countries, states, provinces, or regions around the world develop policies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. And, indeed, this has happened. However, as mentioned above, proposals for such policies have often triggered significant opposition. In the United States, the failure of Congress to pass cap-and-trade climate legislation in 2010 was essentially collateral damage from a much larger political war that decimated the ranks of both moderate Republicans and moderate Democrats. Nevertheless, political support for using cap-and-trade systems to reduce GHG emissions has emerged in many other parts of the world. In fact, in the negotiations leading up to the 2015 UN Climate Conference in Paris, many parties endorsed key roles for carbon markets and broadly agreed on the value of linking those markets. It is certainly possible that three decades of high receptivity to cap and trade in the United States, Europe, and other parts of the world will turn out to have been only a relatively brief departure from long-term reliance on command-and-control environmental regulation. However, considering the generally positive experience with cap and trade, we are cautiously optimistic that the denigration of cap and trade in US political debates may turn out to be a temporary departure from the long-term trend of increasing reliance on market-based environmental policy instruments. We are hopeful, but only time will tell.
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Solvency › 2NC – No Training
Tymoigne ’13 [Eric. *Associate Professor of Economics at Lewis & Clark College, Portland, Oregon; and Research Associate at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. "Job guarantee and its critiques: Insights from the New Deal experience." International Journal of Political Economy 42, no. 2 (2013): 63-87.]perth
Two straightforward means to improve labor productivity are to train individuals and to make sure that existing skills are used properly. No skills were used well in the work programs. In fact, it was not infrequent for enrollees to lose skills since they could not apply what they knew and were assigned to activities that were be-low their skill levels. Data for the WPA show that there was a major discrepancy between skills and tasks available (Table 1). Unskilled individuals represented only a quarter of the WPA enrollees, while almost half of enrollees had been previously employed in skilled or semiskilled activities. However, a significant majority of WPA enrollees (63.4 percent) were involved in unskilled tasks.
In addition, training and education were considered an afterthought in most programs. This was the case for the WPA until 1940, when war preparation required an improvement in the skills of available individuals. At the CCC, academic education was purely voluntary. Vocational training was conditioned on the availability of equipment and supervisors, and on the willingness of the camp administrator to devote time to this activity. Beyond the organization of the programs, political pressures from labor unions also contributed to the lack of a training component. Unions were afraid that trained enrollees would compete with workers in the private sector and press down wages (Salmond 1967; Schwartz 1984)
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Solvency › 1NC – Jobs Turn Climate
Paterson ’19 [Matthew. *Professor of International Politics, University of Manchester. “The Green New Deal’s Contradiction – New Infrastructure and Redistribution May Boost Carbon Emissions.” The Conversation. March 6, 2019. https://theconversation.com/the-green-new-deals-contradiction-new-infrastructure-and-redistribution-may-boost-carbon-emissions-112078.]perth
The Green New Deal therefore contains a basic contradiction that anyone pursuing it will have to wrestle with as it develops. Many of the measures proposed – such as investing in infrastructure and spreading wealth more evenly – will intrinsically work in tension with efforts to decarbonise the economy.
They create dynamics that increase energy use at the same time as other parts of the Green New Deal are trying to reduce it. For example, building infrastructure such as new road networks will both create demand for carbon-intensive cement manufacture and opportunities for more people to travel by car.
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Solvency › 1NC – No Infrastructure
Smith ’19 [Noah. *assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University. “A Federal Job Guarantee Is Asking for Trouble.” Bloomberg. March 11, 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-11/u-s-economy-federal-job-guarantee-would-hurt-private-employers.]perth
First, there’s the question of whether people could be fired from the new program. It’s easy to imagine good reasons to fire someone from a government job -- starting fights, for example, engaging in criminal activities or simply refusing to work. Even if a job guarantee allowed workers to be fired for egregious offenses, there would doubtless be intense public scrutiny of firing decisions, especially on social media. That would put immense pressure on the administrators of the federal jobs program to avoid firing even those who deserved to be fired.
The likely results would be a drop in productivity as some people realized they didn’t have to work to collect paychecks, increased resentment among those who felt morally obligated to put in a hard day’s labor, and disruption of the workplace due to toleration of disruptive or criminal behavior that would never be permitted at private companies.
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Solvency › 1NC – No Infrastructure
Chait ’18 [Jonathan. *columnist for New York Magazine. “Democrats Are Rushing into a Job Guarantee. It Could Be a Huge Mistake.” New York Magazine. April 25, 2018. https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/04/democrats-are-rushing-a-jobs-guarantee-its-a-huge-mistake.html.]perth
The Center for American Progress cites large, unmet needs that could be filled with unemployed workers: “There are not nearly enough home care workers to aid the aged and disabled. Many working families with children under the age of 5 need access to affordable child care. Schools need teachers’ aides, and cities need EMTs.” It’s true that some temporary needs could be handled with the temporary workers who would be hired by the government for this purpose. But the program by design would fluctuate in size along with the business cycle, swelling during a recession, and contracting during a recovery. You can’t just have your teachers and child-care workers come and go. The jobs in the job guarantee would have to be for work that is either temporary, or optional. That constricts the kinds of work that can be done.
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Solvency › 1NC – No Infrastructure
Lowrey ’18 [Annie. *staff writer for The Atlantic. “A Promise So Big, Democrats Aren’t Sure How to Keep It.” The Atlantic. May 11, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/05/the-democratic-party-wants-to-end-unemployment/560153/.]perth
Still, none of these early Democratic efforts come close to figuring out how to provide a job to every American—instead hand-waving about where the jobs would come from, instructing states and cities to do the technocratic heavy lifting, and gesturing to the economic benefits. “It seems to me that these proposals as a general point are enthusiastic about how this might work,” said LaDonna Pavetti of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. “But are perhaps underestimating how much work and how many services would have to scale up to provide those kinds of jobs.”
Consider, for instance, the simple question of what kind of jobs should be on offer. Kelton and Hamilton, along with their co-authors, have pushed for direct public employment, rather than providing wage-subsidized private jobs. “You don’t want this to be workfare,” Hamilton told me. “You want to create a true alternative.” His proposal suggests that such jobs “the repair, maintenance, and expansion of the nation’s infrastructure, housing stock, and public buildings; energy-efficiency upgrades to public and private buildings; assistance with ecological restoration and services to reduce the country’s carbon footprint; engagement in community-development projects; provision of high-quality preschool and after-school services; provision of teachers’ aids; provision of high-quality elder care and companionship; rejuvenation of the nation’s defunded postal service; support for the arts; and other activities that shall support the public good.”
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Solvency › 2NC – Jobs Hurt Employment
Gulker 2018 – Former Senior Research Fellow at the American Institute for Economic Research and PhD in economics from Stanford University (Max, “The Job Guarantee: A Critical Analysis,” 2018, Accessed Online at )
We must approach any discussion of the impact of a federal job guarantee on the wider economy with an abundance of caution. Our sample size for evaluating a program that the Levy report’s authors term a “radical transformation of the labor market” is zero. Even countries with much larger public sectors do not operate under the mandated system of a job guarantee.
However, economic theory and lessons from history can inform our understanding of the likely impacts of a federal job guarantee. Both reports’ authors are confident that in addition to benefiting program enrollees, a federal job guarantee would be an unequivocal positive for the larger economy, offering macroeconomic stabilizers and perhaps even paying for itself.
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Solvency › 1NC – Jobs Hurt Employment
Gulker 2018 – Former Senior Research Fellow at the American Institute for Economic Research and PhD in economics from Stanford University (Max, “The Job Guarantee: A Critical Analysis,” 2018, Accessed Online at )
Because a federal job guarantee differs so radically from anything ever attempted in an otherwise predominantly market-oriented economy, making accurate projections is very difficult. The authors of the CBPP and Levy reports, however, agree that the program is likely to enroll over ten million people. In fact, there are several reasons why their estimates may be too low. The CBPP report estimates a total of 10.7 million fullor part-time participants, with a “full time equivalent” of 9.7 million jobs. This is the number of workers required to reduce the nation’s U-6 (unemployment and underemployment rate including discouraged workers) from 8.2 percent (as of January 2018) to 1.5 percent, “a reasonable estimate for frictional unemployment in the U.S. economy.” The Levy report estimates initial participation in their program of 12.7 to 17.5 million Americans. Its approach is conceptually similar but more ad hoc and is detailed in section 2 of their report. Any of the estimates presented in the two reports would result in an enterprise of staggering, unprecedented size. As chart 1 shows, the Levy report’s upper-bound estimate of 17.5 million enrollees would exceed employment at the world’s nine largest employers combined. The CBPP’s lower estimate would be just shy of employment at the world’s five largest employers combined. This list of employers contains private firms, state enterprises, militaries, and public utilities, none of which individually have attained even a third of the size of the lowest projected job-guarantee participation rate. Economists have long written about the managerial, informational, and incentiverelated issues that arise as firms get bigger.7 We are aware of no organization of any structure that has prospered or even existed with anywhere near these numbers of employees. As large as these numbers are, they may be underestimated because of conceptual errors in thinking about the minimum wage, and the fact that projections are based on recent relatively low levels of unemployment. The Levy report sees the program wage as a “de facto minimum wage” for the entire economy, forcing private sector employers in most circumstances to match it. The CBPP report notes that forty-one million workers currently earn less than fifteen dollars per hour. Both reports assume no more than a trivial amount of those workers would enroll in a job-guarantee program. This reflects the belief by advocates of a higher minimum wage that it would not cause significant job losses, even with a radical doubling to fifteen dollars per hour.9 A survey of the literature on minimum wage and employment by Neumark and Wascher (2007) reports that a “sizable majority” of studies found negative employment effects from minimum-wage hikes, and that “the studies that focus on the least skilled groups that are likely most directly affected by minimum wage increases provide relatively overwhelming evidence of stronger disemployment effects for these groups.” If even a few percent of the workers currently earning under fifteen dollars per hour either lost their jobs or simply chose to enroll, projected participation would increase by millions.
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Solvency › 1NC – No Employment
Bivens ’18 [Josh. *chief economist at the Economic Policy Institute (EPI). “How Do Our Job Creation Recommendations Stack up against a Job Guarantee?” 2018. Economic Policy Institute. 2018. https://www.epi.org/blog/how-do-our-job-creation-recommendations-stack-up-against-a-job-guarantee/.]perth
In their , Darity and Hamilton estimate that a job guarantee today would absorb about 11 million workers. I don’t think we have the public sector managerial capacity right now to oversee the work of 11 million people—who will be coming from varying backgrounds and labor qualifications—and ensure that they will be perceived as undertaking socially useful tasks. This is essentially three times as many people as there are K-12 public school teachers in this country today. These 11 million workers will not have a shared mission (like school teachers) or overwhelmingly have advanced education (again, like teachers). We will need to slot them into a system of management and oversight that has yet to be created or defined (unlike public education, where at least the goals and population to be served are clear enough).
Further, if the private sector contracts in a recession, this number could swell within 18 months to 22 million. This would require careful management of a workforce more than 10 times as large as Wal-Mart’s global labor force. Building anything like this much public sector management capacity strikes me as a project that will be years, if not decades, in the making. And attempts to do this all at once will lead inevitably, I think, to stories about how these are disorganized make-work programs and the stigma will follow.
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Climate Advantage › 2NC – Bad Models
Voosen ’21 [Paul. *earth and planetary science reporter at Science. “U.N. Climate Panel Confronts Implausibly Hot Forecasts of Future Warming.” Science. 2021. https://www.science.org/content/article/un-climate-panel-confronts-implausibly-hot-forecasts-future-warming.]perth
But as climate scientists face this alarming reality, the climate models that help them project the future have grown a little too alarmist. Many of the world's leading models are now projecting warming rates that most scientists, including the modelmakers themselves, believe are implausibly fast. In advance of the U.N. report, scientists have scrambled to understand what went wrong and how to turn the models, which in other respects are more powerful and trustworthy than their predecessors, into useful guidance for policymakers. "It's become clear over the last year or so that we can't avoid this," says Gavin Schmidt, director of NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies.
Ahead of each major IPCC report, the world's climate modeling centers run a set of scenarios for the future, calculating how different global emissions paths will alter the climate. These raw results, compiled in the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP), then feed directly into the IPCC report. The results live on as other scientists use them to assess the impacts of climate change, insurance companies and financial institutions forecast effects on economies and infrastructure, and economists calculate the true cost of carbon emissions, says Jean-François Lamarque, a lead climate modeler at the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) and CMIP's new director. "This is not an ivory tower type of exercise."