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2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – DA – Deterrence › 1NC – Russia

Russia’s continuing its operations in Africa despite the coup.

Calcutt & Kayali ’23 [Clea; Senior Correspondent, France for POLITICO. Laura; technology correspondent for POLITICO. June 26, 2023; “Wagner and Russia are here to stay in Africa, says Kremlin’s top diplomat”; POLITICO; https://www.politico.eu/article/wagner-africa-mali-operations-will-continue-russia-sergey-lavrov-vows/] TDI

PARIS — Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has vowed Wagner Group’s operations in Mali and the Central African Republic “will continue” despite the failed rebellion led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the mercenaries, against Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The paramilitary group has expanded its reach across Latin America, the Middle East and Africa in recent years and is seen by Western governments as Russia’s armed foreign policy apparatus. Prigozhin’s mutiny raised questions about the future of its overseas operations.

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – DA – Deterrence › 1NC – Russia

Only deterrence via military intelligence prevents regional instability and global implications of Russian military presence in Africa.

Banco & Carrier ’23 [Erin; national security reporter for POLITICO. Anastasiia; Freelance Journalist, Master’s in Journalism from Columbia University. May 7, 2023; “To counter Russia in Africa, Biden deploys a favored strategy”; POLITICO; https://www.politico.com/news/2023/05/07/wagner-russia-africa-00095572] TDI

As Russia’s paramilitary organization, the Wagner Group, expands its presence in African countries, the Biden administration is pushing back with one of its prized tactics: sharing sensitive intelligence with allies in Africa in an attempt to dissuade countries from partnering with the group.

The administration has used this tactic with increasing frequency, including in the months leading up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It serves the dual function of alerting allies to looming threats and placing adversaries on notice that the U.S. knows what they’re doing.

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – DA – Deterrence › 1NC – China

Turns case. China’s worse.

Hung ’20 [Ho Fung; Henry M. and Elizabeth P. Wiesenfeld Professor in Political Economy at the Sociology Department and the Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. They received their bachelor degree from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, MA degree from SUNY-Binghamton, and PhD degree in Sociology from Johns Hopkins. June 5, 2020; “As U.S. Injustices Rage, China’s Condemnation Reeks of Cynicism”; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/05/us-injustice-protests-china-condemnation-cynical/] TDI

Beijing’s criticism of the United States, however, differs from that seen around the globe. China’s critique does not stem from a genuine concern for universal human rights and the well-being of African Americans. The Chinese people have not been given any opportunity to protest in solidarity with Americans — or against the abuses of black residents in China itself. Anti-black racism remains rampant on the Chinese internet, untouched by censors who seek to crush opinions the government dislikes. Its motivation is simply to tell the United States, and everybody else, to stop criticizing China over its own human rights abuses. Underneath Beijing’s commentary on the U.S. unrest is a deeply cynical voice that asks: If the U.S. authorities can do it, why shouldn’t we?

Last Friday afternoon, Trump held a press conference to denounce China’s plan to devise a national security law to crack down on Hong Kong’s dissents. He threatened to end U.S. recognition of Hong Kong’s special trading status and to sanction Chinese officials hurting Hong Kong’s freedom. It is going to bring real damage to Chinese companies and wealthy elites who have been using Hong Kong as a back door to gain access to foreign capital, sensitive technology, and channels to relocate their wealth overseas.

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – DA – Deterrence › 1NC – China

Lack of US military competition with China spills over globally. Diplomacy fails.

Coté ’23 [Mike; writer and historian focusing on great-power rivalry and geopolitics. April 10, 2023; “Africa Shows How Biden Is Losing the World to China”; National Review; https://www.nationalreview.com/2023/04/africa-shows-how-biden-is-losing-the-world-to-china/] TDI

On the other hand, Chinese diplomacy under Xi Jinping has been aggressive, even coercive. But it has also been successful. Since 2012, China has relentlessly promoted its interests abroad, gaining greater economic and military influence. This is especially clear in Africa, where China is the continent’s biggest trade partner and has its first overseas naval base. It has also gotten far more involved in mediating internal African issues, working to limit the civil war in Ethiopia and promoting China’s form of one-party governance as a shortcut to success. Another Chinese geopolitical goal is to raise its influence on international organizations. This was most notable in its co-opting of the World Health Organization to stifle any investigation of Covid’s origins. That process ran directly through Africa, where Beijing leveraged its ties to promote Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus as its favored candidate for the directorship of the World Health Organization in 2017. Tedros won that contentious election with strong Chinese support, and returned the favor with his complicity in China’s Covid deception.

Perhaps the most serious example of China’s diplomatic expansionism relates to a traditional staple of American foreign policy: development aid. Under Xi, Chinese outflows of foreign direct investment have more than doubled, rising from $65 billion in 2012 to a peak of $216 billion in 2016. In 2020, as other nations retrenched during the pandemic, China became the largest global investor for the first time. China has been the largest source of foreign direct investment to Africa since 2013, displacing the U.S. as the continent’s primary development partner. The massive Belt and Road infrastructure project, Xi’s diplomatic baby, has attracted the bulk of those funds, making inroads into many African countries, funding bridges, dams, railways, and more.

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – DA – Deterrence › 1NC – China

The past century proves.

French ’23 [Howard; columnist at Foreign Policy, a professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, and a longtime foreign correspondent. May 22, 2023; “U.S. Apathy Paved the Way for China in Africa”; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/22/congo-mining-batteries-china-biden-climate-change-us-africa-policy/] TDI

A lot can happen in a quarter of a century, though — especially when you’re not paying attention, as has largely been the case with the United States regarding Africa. Back then, there was so much talk about the enormous profits that lay ahead for Western companies in the business of extraction, once the corruption and chaos of the Mobutu era was put in the past, that many people in Zaire (now renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and throughout Central Africa thought the United States had sponsored Kabila’s takeover of the country in order to dominate its mineral wealth into the indefinite future.

Just how utterly differently reality has played out was brought home to me in recent days by an article in the New York Times asking whether the United States could ever compete with China in the economically strategic area of battery production, which will unavoidably serve as the foundation for a transition to electric vehicles and is key to any hope of meeting the Biden administration’s ambitious goals for limiting climate change.

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – DA – Deterrence › 1NC – China

The US is countering China in Africa now.

Kenyette ’22 [Patrick; author for Military Africa. August 31, 2022; “US determined to stop China’s new base in Africa”; Military Africa; https://www.military.africa/2022/08/us-determined-to-stop-chinas-new-base-in-africa/] TDI

“As a first priority, we need to prevent or deter a Chinese space on the Atlantic coast of Africa,” Townsend stated. The U.S. has recently sent an interagency delegation to that country to discuss U.S. security concerns, he added.

“Modest investments today can yield a continent of partners tomorrow. We are most effective when we synchronize diplomacy, development, and defense.” Townsend stated referring to the 0.3% of the DOD operating budget and manpower being spent on United States Africa Command.

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – DA – Deterrence › 1NC – North Africa

African instability causes and exacerbates numerous existential threats.

Ray ’22 [Charles; US Army (ret.), chair of the Africa Program of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Former US Foreign Service officer who served as ambassador to Cambodia and Zimbabwe and was deputy assistant secretary of defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs. May 2022; “America, You Better Believe That Africa Matters”; American Diplomacy; https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2022/05/america-you-better-believe-that-africa-matters/] TDI

In the minds of most Americans and Europeans, the continent of Africa has long been seen as peripheral to world affairs, looked at either as a source of natural resources ripe for extraction or a place of poverty and violence requiring massive amounts of aid. This is a shortsighted and distorted view of a diverse continent and is long overdue for a reset.

The truth is that Africa is home to some of the planet’s most strategic minerals and other resources, and that natural and manmade disasters plague the continent. It is far more diverse and dynamic than popular culture, mainstream media, and even many foreign policy makers portray it. For a lot of reasons, some of them existential, it is far from peripheral; it matters.

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – DA – Deterrence › 1NC – North Africa

Empirics prove. Link turns are wrong.

Hicks et al. ’21 [Marcus; retired Air Force Major General who served as Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa, from 2017 to 2019. He previously was Chief of Staff at the U.S. Special Operations Command and a career AC-130 pilot. Kyle; active-duty U.S. Army Officer, a Ph.D. student at the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, and a cohost of the Irregular Warfare Podcast. Dan; active-duty U.S. Army Officer and a Joint Chiefs of Staff Fellow. March 4, 2021; ”Great-Power Competition Is Coming to Africa”; Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2021-03-04/great-power-competition-coming-africa] TDI

Under President Donald Trump, the United States withdrew troops and resources from Africa as part of a broader national security shift from counterterrorism to great-power competition. The Trump administration used the euphemism “optimization” to describe the pivot away from Africa that began around 2018, but a more accurate term would be disengagement. It pared back efforts to fight jihadis in Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria, downsizing the U.S. military footprint in some of the continent’s most volatile regions. And in the final months of Trump’s presidency, his administration withdrew nearly all U.S. troops from Somalia.

The shift in U.S. strategy toward Africa reflects an assumption — shared by many in Washington — that counterterrorism and other long-standing U.S. priorities in Africa will diminish in importance as competition between the United States, China, and other significant powers intensifies. But that assumption is wrong. In fact, far from being a distraction from great-power competition, Africa promises to become one of its important theaters. And if anything, great-power competition will increase the need for the United States to battle terrorists and safeguard democracy, trade, and free enterprise in Africa — but to do so with particular attention to limiting the malign influence of Russia and China.

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – DA – Deterrence › 1NC – North Africa

Russia and China fill in in the absence of American military leadership.

Bruhl ’22 [Joe; colonel in the U.S. Army with seven years’ experience living and working in Africa, Chief of Future Plans for the U.S. Army’s Southern European Task Force — AFRICA., Master’s degree from Harvard. June 14, 2022; “AMERICA IGNORES AFRICA AT ITS OWN PERIL”; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/america-ignores-africa-at-its-own-peril/] TDI

America’s ambivalence toward Africa puts it at a dangerous disadvantage there — and impacts U.S. leadership around the globe. While Washington focuses on the Russian military threat in Eastern Europe and Chinese expansionism in the Pacific, Russia and China are outcompeting the United States in Africa in ways that could fundamentally alter the global balance of power.

To restore momentum to its work in Africa, Washington should develop an integrated strategy that does three things: establishes continent-wide objectives with tailored regional strategies, dramatically expands mutually beneficial economic investment, and leverages areas in which the United States holds comparative advantage over its competitors.

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – DA – Deterrence › 1NC – North Africa

Biden’s stepping up military presence in Africa now to deter adversaries. Perception & influence are key.

Gardner ’23 [Akayla; White House Correspondent at Bloomberg News. B.A. in Public Affairs Journalism from Ohio State University. March 24, 2023; “US Fights for Influence in Africa Where China, Russia Loom Large”; Bloomberg; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-24/us-fights-for-influence-in-africa-where-china-russia-loom-large] TDI

President Joe Biden’s administration is stepping up a campaign to build American influence in Africa, where the US has lost ground to its main rivals in what’s starting to look like a new Cold War.

Vice President Kamala Harris next week becomes the latest top official to visit, with stops scheduled in Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia. She’s following Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who’ve both been in the region recently. At a December summit with the continent’s leaders, Biden pledged a $55 billion support package for Africa.

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – K – LibMil › 1NC – L – Speed Elitism

The aff’s attempt to bring movements into the university as objects of study falls prey to speed elitism – that redeploys the 1AC as a development narrative which is coopted by militarism to intervene on colonial Others.

Hoofd ’15 [(Ingrid, communication at National University of Singapore. Promise she’s not a cop.) “The Financialization of the Communicative Ideal in the Activist Social Sciences”, Global Media Journal, 2015. ] pfox TDI

The enactment of the university’s ideals of justice, community, and equality then exceedingly takes to the new technologies of communication, as these have always been mistakenly perceived as the straightforward embodiment or incarnation of these ideals. Logically then, we can see that many academic and non-academic research centers around social change have taken the Internet by storm. This is also unsurprising because it was the intimate collaboration during the Cold War period between American universities and the United States military that led to the birth of the early Internet (the ArpaNet) in the first place. This means that academia on a fundamental level shares with the military its ideals of transparency, connectivity, and communication, as well as a general tendency to incorporate more and more people and places under its regime. In “Becoming-Media” Joseph Vogl for this reason argues that the new media intensify the fact that any medium, in “the very act of communication simultaneously communicates the specific event-character of the media themselves,” (628) so that these new technologies with their militaristic logic of targeting, as he in turn claims in “On Hesitation,” translate the “global world [into] a world of universal addressability.” (144) Since the prime logic of new media technologies, as I also discussed via the work of Baudrillard earlier, consists therefore of a combination simulation and dissimulation, we can expect to find that the websites of those research centers in important ways obscure the ways in which their use of new media are implicated in an increasingly dire economic and social situation for many globally. One more obvious example of this consists in how the prefix ‘social’ in social media in fact hides its complicity in social fragmentation; the ‘social’ media pretend to be about a sociality that actually erases the possibility of coming into contact with radical otherness (that what or those who do not gel with or abide by the Lyotardian ‘communicationalist ideology.’) Another example is how many websites of those research centers display the domain name suffix ‘.edu’ or ‘.org’ in their online addresses, as if they are unrelated or in opposition to capitalist entities that carry the ‘.com’ or ‘.gov’ suffix. A case in point is for instance the Amherst-based center for Communication for Sustainable Social Change (CSSC, http://csschange.org), the University of Queensland Centre for Communication and Social Change (CfCSC, http://uq.edu.au/ccsc/), or the non-governmental Communication for Social Change Consortium (CFSC, http://www.communicationforsocialchange.org) which has head offices in New Jersey and in London. All the traffic to and from these websites nonetheless flows via ISPs and IXPs that, as I mentioned before, are by and large owned by a handful of mostly North-American companies.

Now I want to stress that no doubt a lot of good work is done under the umbrella of these centers and organizations, and that I by no means wish to dissociate myself from the general left-wing spirit of justice and equality that these entities stand for. But I do think that especially the recourse of these entities to new communication and visualization technologies illustrates how the acceleration and subsequent displacement of these ideals has reached its apex today. This is because the usage of the new media naturalizes for its audiences – who are anyway already foremost the privileged sections of society for whom such techniques work to their advantage – the paradigm of transformation, communication, and innovation, both via the websites’ content and their design. The CSSC website for instance proclaims as one of their key objectives the creation of awareness among policy-makers and administrators of “innovative applied communication and technology processes” for community development in so-called ‘developing’ countries. It also professes to the creation of interdisciplinary and international alliances for the purposes of communication and social change. The CFSC website meanwhile claims that “within marginalized communities, there is tremendous untapped potential to use communication for collective good,” since “communication has been an essential tool for development since early in the 20th century.” Part of their mission is “to help people living in poor communities communicate effectively.” The website also, much in line with the neoliberal obsession with technological change, strongly emphasizes the role of “nurturing innovation, research and scholarship in communication.” It displays many photographs of African peoples and communities going about their daily business, like fishing, preparing food, and dancing, so as to imply a link between the dissemination of communication tools and the supposed ‘improvement’ in efficiency around these daily activities. Once more, there is a distinct sense of condescension present in these developmental narratives that claim to help people help themselves, which shows that these organizations still operate much in line with its colonialist and messianistic heritage of ‘good works’ for the purposes of the ‘enlightenment of the natives.’

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – Case › 1NC – Solvency – Alt Causes

French weapon sales to Libya, the UAE, and Egypt sustain the Libya conflict

Di Santo 1/29 – Daniel; (“France Fuels Conflict in Libya” The Trumpet. January 29, 2020. TFDI

EU Observer warned on January 24 that French weapons sent to the United Arab Emirates and Egypt risk adding fuel to the ongoing Libyan civil war. The ongoing conflict between Army Cmdr. Khalifa Haftar and United Nations-backed Fayez al-Sarraj makes such shipments illegal under UN sanctions. So why is France getting involved? The European Union published data in November 2019 for France’s 2018 arms exports. It found that France has exported nonlethal electronics and weapons systems to Libya directly, while sending other Arab nations lethal weapons, which are filtering into the conflict-ridden country. France is taking advantage of a loophole in the wording of UN sanctions, which only outlaws the delivery of lethal weapons. However, “nonlethal” weapons, such as fire-control systems and radars, provide a technological edge to Haftar’s forces, which would otherwise be much harder to obtain. In 2018, France sent €295 million (us$325 million) worth of this equipment directly to Libya. Meanwhile, lethal weapons are able to flow into Libya via Arab nations that trade with France. This includes everything from small arms to mortar rounds to jet fighters. French Mirage fighter jets were seen conducting air strikes in 2019. In June 2019, three Javelin anti-tank missiles were found at a base formerly used by Haftar’s forces. While they had come from the United Arab Emirates and were assumed to be of American origin, the Pentagon investigated and proved them to be from France.

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – Case › 1NC – Solvency – Lilypads

The US just moves the base to undemocratic regimes and establishes lily pad bases.

Vine ‘19 (David, professor of anthropology at American University, “No Bases? Assessing the Impact of Social Movements Challenging US Foreign Military Bases”, published in Current Anthropology volume 60, supplement 19, in February 2019) // Postman TDI

The clearest indication of the impact of antibase movements is found in the US military’s reaction to antibase opposition. Since early in the post–World War II era, US military and civilian planners have shaped the geography of the global base network because of their fears of the kinds of protest that have led to losing access to bases abroad (Vine 2009). This has resulted in a marked preference for bases in countries ruled by dictators and other undemocratic regimes. From the perspective of US policy makers, Calder explains, dictatorships are preferable to democracies because “base politics operate most smoothly when the mass public is not involved” (2007:116– 117). For decades, the fear of antibase protest has also resulted in a geographic shift: the general movement of bases from populated urban areas to isolated sites insulated from any significant opposition. This shift has come to fruition most visibly in the lily pad basing strategy, which emerged around the turn of the century. Under this strategy, the Pentagon has been creating small, secretive bases far from population centers and potentially antagonistic locals. The military’s aim has been to acquire a collection of dozens of easily expandable lily pad bases in places with little or no US military presence (Vine 2015:299–319). “The presence and activities of our forces grate on local populations and have become an irritant for host governments,” former George W. Bush administration Pentagon Secretary Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged (Brown 2006:28). “Wherever possible,” the administration aimed to move bases and troops to “lessen the real and perceived burdens of such situations” (US Department of Defense 2004:7). In other words, the military is well aware of what officials see as the “problem” of antibase movements and is “taking measures to address it” (Davis 2011:219). In addition to creating lily pads, US officials have responded to antibase organizing by further segregating US forces from locals at a consolidated number of very large, increasingly insular bases to avoid the crimes, accidents, and other tensions that have fueled protest movements. The motivation for these changes is not generally protecting the well-being of locals; instead, it is “the quest for operational unilateralism.” Military leaders want to be able “to strike quickly without any need for consultation with anyone, even the government of the territory from which they are launching the strike” (Davis 2011:220). The military has been particularly focused on overcoming antibase resistance by moving operations to locations where inhabitants possess fewer democratic rights, offering the military “greater freedom to operate” (Davis 2011:216). Major buildups have taken place in two of the remaining US and UK colonies, Guam and Diego Garcia; in Africa and Central and Eastern Europe there are now dozens of “lily pads” (Vine 2015:299–313). Amid a major buildup on Guam, Major General Dennis Larsen told a reporter, “This is not Okinawa,” clearly referencing its antibase opposition. “This is American soil in the midst of the Pacific. Guam is a US territory. We can do what we want here, and make huge investments without fear of being thrown out” (Kaplan 2008:60–61). In the shift of bases and forces to locations like Guam, one sees how the geography of the US military base network has been “shaped not only by global military priorities, but also by an increasingly globalized network of local social movements resisting militarization” (Davis 2011:215).

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – Case › 1NC – AFRICOM Good

AFRICOM assistance is effective – not a colonialist Trojan horse.

Erickson ’14 [(Dane and Alice, Lecturer in IR – U Colorado Denver and Friend, PhD candidate – American U “The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit: Security Initiatives Are Critical to Cementing Africa’s Gains,” August 14, 2014, Brookings Institution. ] TDI

But security threats must be dealt with head on for economies and societies to thrive, and weak, disorganized and unprofessional security forces are unable to meet current challenges. As National Security Advisor Susan Rice clearly stated in advance of the summit, the U.S. is “not looking to militarize Africa.” Rather, as President Obama explained in his May speech at West Point, the U.S. is interested in building the capacity of local partners to prevent and resolve conflicts; and in Africa, for example, ministries of defense value the enhanced capacity AFRICOM provides to peacekeeping and counter-terrorism missions.

As last week’s summit highlighted, Africa’s economic rise is becoming more conspicuous in the U.S. and around the world. But without strategic investments in the security sector by Africans and the international community, instability can destroy communities, destabilize nascent institutions, retard growth and discourage potential investors. And given the growing multitude of stakeholders on the continent and the complexity of former colonial relationships, the U.S. remains a trusted broker in Africa. In fact, many African leaders explicitly requested peace and security issues to be included on the summit agenda. With the right approach and increases in resources, the Obama administration’s proposed initiatives can provide the requisite momentum for a renewed agenda to enhance security cooperation and reinforce both American and African goals for peace and mutual prosperity.

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – Case › 1NC – AFRICOM Good

Reducing AFRICOM to solely counterterror is misleading – tons of their humanitarian and security work is massively beneficial.

Devermond and Steadman ’20 [(Judd Devermont is the director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He previously served as the national intelligence officer for Africa, the Central Intelligence Agency’s senior political analyst on sub-Saharan Africa, and the National Security Council director for Somalia, Nigeria, the Sahel, and the African Union. Leanne Erdberg Steadman is the director of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where she manages USIP’s CVE work, including serving as the interim director of the RESOLVE Network, as well as a senior advisor to the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States. Prior to joining the Institute, Leanne spent almost a decade in the U.S. government serving at the National Security Council staff at the White House, the Department of State, and at the Department of Homeland Security. Leanne comes to USIP most recently from Accenture Federal Services; and she began her public service career with positions at the state level and with international organizations. Before her work in foreign and public policy, Leanne co-founded an independent record label. Leanne holds a J.D. with honors in the concentration of international law and a B.S., magna cum laude in mass communication studies, both from Boston University.) “Defending the U.S. Military Presence in Africa for Reasons Beyond Counterterrorism”, Lawfare, 05/18/2020. ] pfox TDI

Since Defense Secretary Mark Esper announced a potential drawdown of U.S. troops in Africa, U.S. congressional leaders, military officers, and various commentators have defended the importance of the military in Africa. But they’ve focused almost exclusively on the fight against terrorism. This is not surprising, since the public has for decades really only heard about the U.S. military in Africa when drone strikes hit terrorists in Somalia, when Navy SEALs raid pirate ships in the Gulf of Aden, and when Army Rangers hunt down genocidaires in the jungle.

But the overwhelming focus on terrorist threats oversells the military’s role and undersells Washington’s comprehensive investments in Africa. If advocates want to dissuade the Pentagon from cutting some of its 6,000 troops stationed in Africa, they need to stop valorizing its counterterrorism missions while disregarding the U.S. military’s more lasting contributions. The real selling point is that, every day, the U.S. military forges closer ties with African governments, promotes U.S. values and interests, and responds to humanitarian and health crises—including the coronavirus pandemic.

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – Case › 1NC – Framing – Extinction

Anticipating nuclear extinction breeds empathy and entangled care. Distancing ourselves from considering extinction reifies detached elitism.

Offord, 17—Faculty of Humanities, School of Humanities Research and Graduate Studies, Bentley Campus (Baden, “BEYOND OUR NUCLEAR ENTANGLEMENT,” Angelaki, 22:3, 17-25) TDI

You are steered towards overwhelming and inexplicable pain when you consider the nuclear entanglement that the species Homo sapiens finds itself in. This is because the fact of living in the nuclear age presents an existential, aesthetic, ethical and psychological challenge that defines human consciousness. Although an immanent threat and ever-present danger to the very existence of the human species, living with the possibility of nuclear war has infiltrated the matrix of modernity so profoundly as to paralyse [shut down] our mind-set to respond adequately. We have chosen to ignore the facts at the heart of the nuclear program with its dangerous algorithm; we have chosen to live with the capacity and possibility of a collective, pervasive and even planetary-scale suicide; and the techno-industrial-national powers that claim there is “no immediate danger” ad infinitum.8

This has led to one of the key logics of modernity's insanity. As Harari writes: “Nuclear weapons have turned war between superpowers into a mad act of collective suicide, and therefore forced the most powerful nations on earth to find alternative and peaceful ways to resolve conflicts.”9 This is the nuclear algorithm at work, a methodology of madness. In revisiting Jacques Derrida in “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives),”10 who described nuclear war as a “non-event,” it is clear that the pathology of the “non-event” remains as active as ever even in the time of Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un with their stichomythic nuclear posturing.

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – Case › 1NC – Framing – Extinction

Preventing existential risk and framing it as a “we” claim is good.

Coles and Susen 18—Research Professor at the Institute for Social Justice at Australian Catholic University AND Reader in Sociology at the School of Arts and Social Sciences of City, University of London (Romand and Simon, “The Pragmatic Vision of Visionary Pragmatism: The Challenge of Radical Democracy in a Neoliberal World Order,” Contemporary Political Theory May 2018, Volume 17, Issue 2, pp 250–262) TDI

Visionary pragmatism is driven by a political ethos that accents radical receptivity and a sense that a greater degree of wildness in our efforts is indispensable for transformative democratic movements. While some of my earlier works accented the ethical character of receptive generosity in political life, Visionary Pragmatism argues that receptivity is indispensable for generating democratic power – precisely because receptivity involves vulnerability, relationship formation, capacities to modulate, and learning in unexpected ways amidst difficult differences. Drawing on my engagements with the movement for democratic action research in Northern Arizona, I argue that receptive practices engender remarkable capacities for fostering grassroots critique and alternatives, powerful political assemblages across differences, and transformative dynamics in the face of what otherwise appear to be intractable problems. Our best and most powerful possibilities for co-creating urgent democratic change almost always advance along pathways engendered partly through relationships of careful attentiveness to what we initially took to be oblique, unintelligible – or, perhaps, even odious.

For these reasons, my political, theoretical, and pedagogical engagements move across many different configurations and a wider range of situations, ideologies, modes, and commitments than most. Eschewing a single subject position, in Visionary Pragmatism, I experiment with first-person plurals in which the ‘we’ morphs in relation to the different loci of initiative that animate my reflections. Sometimes ‘we’ refers to proponents of radical and ecological democracy very broadly, sometimes to scholars in higher education, sometimes to political theorists, sometimes to the action research movement that formed among people at Northern Arizona University and its community partners, sometimes to a specific action research team, sometimes to all people facing the possibility of planetary ecological collapse. Among the many things I find compelling about the writing of James Baldwin is how he shifts his pronouns without notice – for example, sometimes using ‘we’ to represent black people, sometimes as an uncanny member of the white-majority United States. This rhetorical shiftiness encroaches upon and pulls his readers – especially white readers – beyond the ‘innocence that constitutes the crime’ of their assumed individual and collective white subjectivities in ways that work in visceral, relational, and conceptual registers (Baldwin, 1992, p. 6). Such uncertainty has significant capacity to erode habits and defences, as one finds oneself unexpectedly drawn into perspectives, locations, energies, and tendencies that unsettle and reorient one’s own subjectivity. Much of my work has theorized ‘moving democracy’, and my rhetorical shifting of the first-person plural is a textual practice that aims to enhance this in ways that facilitate reflection.

2023 TDI Affirmative
1NC › 1NC – Case › 1NC – Framing – IR Debates Good

Critiques don’t make the disad presumptively false. You have to debate our internal links---anything else slides into the politics they’ve criticized.

Azari ’22 [Julia; associate professor of political science at Marquette University. Her research interests include the American presidency, political parties and political rhetoric. She is the author of “Delivering the People’s Message: The Changing Politics of the Presidential Mandate.”; March 10, 2022; “Why It’s Important To Debate Foreign Policy Even In Times Of Conflict”; FiveThirtyEight; https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-its-important-to-debate-foreign-policy-even-in-times-of-conflict/] TDI

The reality is that foreign policy has always been contested — and, more often than not, linked to questions of identity and ideology. But debates about war are so interwoven with our larger culture-war politics now that most questions of how to handle military conflict have been largely reduced to partisan scoring. And that’s a problem — not because we need to get back to some bygone bipartisan era, but because real dissension is vital in a democracy, especially in matters of foreign policy.

The seeds of war politics’ merging with culture-war politics arguably date back to the late 1960s, when anti-Vietnam War protests overlapped with civil rights protests and other social movements that challenged the existing social order. Over time, conservatives and liberals diverged in their attitudes toward the war, especially as liberal elites began to criticize it. Starting with the 1968 presidential election, being anti-war became more closely associated with being a liberal Democrat. And the accusation that George McGovern, the 1972 Democratic presidential nominee, was all for “acid, amnesty1 and abortion” helped solidify this cultural connection.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – DA – Deterrence › 1AR – A2 Deterrence Generic

Deterrence fails.

Walt ’22 [Stephen; columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. June 2, 2022; "Will Teaching Aggressors a Lesson Deter Future Wars?"; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/02/will-teaching-aggressors-a-lesson-deter-future-wars/] TDI

Arguments of this sort have been a staple of hard-line (and especially neoconservative) discourse for decades. Like the domino theory, which refuses to die no matter how often it is disproved, such claims transform the outcome of a single conflict into a struggle for the fate of the entire planet. The choice we are said to face is stark. Down one path: a revitalized liberal order led by a unified alliance of powerful, peace-loving democracies, and a future where war is rare and prosperity reigns. Down the other path: a world of rising autocracy, eroding human rights, and more war. According to this view, Ukraine must win big, or all is lost.

Framing the issue in this way stacks the deck in favor of always doing more and rejecting any sort of compromise, but is the choice as stark as hard-liners make out? Does defeating an aggressor really teach others to behave better? It would be a more benign world if this were the case, but a quick glance at the past century or so suggests otherwise.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – DA – Deterrence › 1AR – A2 Revisionism Generic

Reject either-or revisionism. Only status-based explanations can account for inconsistencies in state behavior.

Simon ’17 [John Lugo; PhD in Political Sciences from Lingnan University. August 16, 2017; “Status, revisionism, and great power strategy: US-China positional competition and the struggle for leadership in Asia-Pacific”; Lingnan University Digital Commons; https://commons.ln.edu.hk/pol_etd/19/] TDI

Starting with China, previous studies claim that China is either a status quo power13 or a revisionist power,14 and proponents of the different standpoints have their daggers drawn about whose account is the most accurate one.15 Yet we need to escape the trap of the either/or logic and open up to the possibility that China simultaneously can be a status quo power and a revisionist power. This becomes obvious when we consult primary official Chinese sources as well as secondary academic exegesis of Chinese foreign policy. As Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress Fu Ying makes clear, China has indeed “chosen to integrate itself into the international order,” yet at the same time, it seeks to “improve…its representation.”16 Similarly, Yong Deng, in his groundbreaking study on China’s struggle for status, accentuates that “the CCP leaders have sought to engineer China’s great power emergence within the world order,” but in doing so “they have geared their diplomacy toward changing the international hierarchy to facilitate China’s great-power ascent.” 17 Here we notice a tension between integrating and accepting the rules of the game and changing the status order, as evidenced by China’s admission to the WTO and its acceptance of global trade rules, while simultaneously struggling to gain a greater position within the WTO hierarchy. 18

If we turn to the United States, we can observe a comparable puzzle. For sure, logically the United States cannot be a revisionist power in relation to the positional status dimension of the international order. If it desires to maintain its preeminent position, this unequivocally means preservation of the status-quo. Yet whereas Barack Obama stresses the desire to maintain global leadership, he at the same time emphasizes the need to write new regional rules to ensure leadership in the Asia-Pacific.19 In their respective studies on the Bush administration’s “transformational diplomacy,” Robert Jervis and Ian Hurd highlight that the United States, in that it wants to preserve its dominant position in the international order, simultaneously “seeks to change the rules of that order.”20 In this way, the United States is taking active part in a “process of changing and remaking the social foundations of the international system.”21 I hash out this problem at length in the conceptual section of the literature view.