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2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Tricks › FWK---Fiat K

Symbolic Code DA: Fiat is illusory as scenario-planning attempts to impose meaning onto the unknown by programming our environment to feel predictable: a violent process that voraciously consumes information to objectify our lived experiences into endless data.

Schwartz 12 Scott W. Schwartz,  Ph.D. candidate in the Anthropology Department at the CUNY Graduate Center, as well as an adjunct lecturer at the Borough of Manhattan Community College. His research focuses on the methodologies and materials employed in the collection of environmental data, examining the epistemological history of climate modeling and algorithmic governance more broadly. He served as a Quantitative Reasoning Fellow at Baruch College from 2014 to 2016. He has conducted archaeological fieldwork centered on historical ecology and conservation in Scotland, Iceland, and Italy. He has had various projects featured in art galleries in New York and Los Angeles over the past decade, including a recent collaboration appearing at the Queens Museum as part of their Chance Ecologies exhibit. In the summer of 2017 he was awarded an Art-Science residency grant from the National Science Foundation and Pratt Institute. “Programming the landscape—the objectification of space” 2012 | Signs-International Journal of Semiotics Works, 49-66 | |JDiang

Human energy is coated in a symbolic residue. It is the nature of these symbols that allows populations to program their environments for the maximal level of anticipatory efficiency. The foremost concern of this article is to prove the basic premise that, in general, the behavior of populations and individuals is inclined toward the enhancement of perceived predictability in human landscapes. This behavior is ultimately a product of the unique human capacity for symbolic reasoning. Symbols, either mental or tactile, are shared cultural constructs that demand conventionalization and consolidation of meaning to be most effective. In this sense symbols are programmed with meaning by the populations that employ them. As this paper hopes to illustrate, the conventionalization of semantic reactions engendered by symbol programming detaches the individual from the sovereignty of their subjectivity, and leads to the objectification of the human landscape. This investigation posits a fundamental appreciation for how humans navigate our environments. It is the hypothesis of this paper that humans engage in an objectification of the environments we inhabit, consciously or unconsciously, in order to render the future more predictable. In a more dramatic conception, human landscape usage decisions are driven by a biologically embedded imperative to annihilate the unknown. This imperative may be parsed down to gems of folk wisdom regarding the human abhorrence of vacuums, but more essentially asserts the preeminence of anticipatory prowess in human decision-making. The survival benefit of accurately anticipating the future properties of one’s environment should be evident, but a few of the advantages of high predictability and low uncertainty are listed below: • It increases the amount and reliability of subsistence that can be extracted from an environment (knowing where a fruit tree will be or when to harvest) • It decreases the risk of predation or natural catastrophe • It minimizes the amount of energy-calories necessary for the brain to confront and process novel situations. This paper will assume that the benefit of the motivations listed above is inherent. Each is of varying importance, and varying relevance today, but it is clear to see where each motivator could be construed as advantageous, if not essential, to survival. Assuming that these terms are agreeable, the task is now to prove that the attainment of these goals is accomplished through a process of objectification of the human environment. As an opening caveat, it is crucial to assert that the behaviors to be addressed within are designed to enhance the perceived predictability of the environment. There are indisputably numerous, countless failures in this effort, but what is important is that the behaving agent feels as though they can accurately anticipate future scenarios. It is this confidence that allows the agent to conserve energy on the anxiety of the unknown -- even if they are dead wrong. It is the supposition of this paper that human populations have been capable of thriving in environments ill-suited to our original physical adaptations -- the African savannah -- precisely because we have programmed the environments we inhabit to conform to cultural algorithms, which may be relatively accurately forecasted and projected into the future, thus deriving the above list of beneficial effects. If we allow that the primary goal of social behavior is to render our environments more conducive to predictability, which I hope to prove in the following sections, we can trace this imperative to the pursuit of environmental objectification, which in turn, leads to the introduction of symbolic thought, and eventually to the deferment of subjective experience, which is ultimately what makes us exceptionally gifted hypothetical modelers, which includes projections the future. More cogently, this sequence may be visualized with the help of the following diagram (fig. 1): 52 [Fig 1 Omitted] Objectivity, Objectification & Objects The words objectivity, objectification and object overflow with meaning for many English-speakers. There are several competing definitions and concepts for each. In the parlance of this paper, it is hoped that these numerous connotations can be bridged and inclusive of all. The primary understanding of objectivity is often as an opposition to subjectivity. Whereas subjectiveness is the first-hand experience of an individual, objectiveness is an alleged unbiased interpretation of the environment that is detached from personal experience, and based solely upon exteriorly verifiable data. Subjectiveness is a personal impression based on information accrued through the five individual senses, objectiveness is supported by information from trusted sources, e.g., the theoretical objectivity of the newspaper. There has been much debate on whether total objectivity can ever be attained (Halbwachs 1925). It does appear that human agents, with our contingent life histories, are incapable of complete objectivity, however, the ideal of perfect objectivity is a standard against which newspapers, jurors, judges and politicians are often held. This debate is largely inconsequential to the present paper. The term objectification has come to represent the dehumanization of people, places or things, often towards ill-intentioned ends. When we speak of objectifying women, we are stripping them of their individuality, their personality, and basically disconnecting them from their subjective experiences of life -- transforming them into predictable and programmable objects. It is the contention of this paper that this process is fundamentally undertaken in order to reduce the anxieties of the unknown, and imbue the objectifier with the (false) confidence inherent in control. This process can be applied to individuals, groups and even environments. While it may seem quizzical to speak of dehumanizing something that is not human (i.e. can we really dehumanize a landscape?), what is truly meant by this, is to desubjectify, that is, to attribute desired programmable properties. And it is certainly possible to attribute desired properties to a landscape, or in other words to objectify the landscape. The term object(s), on its own, is also considered in a very precise sense herein. Of primary concern is that objects exhibit properties which may be mapped, described, projected and fully understood. The woman as an object has properties which can be controlled and projected, whereas the woman (or any gender) as an individual is unpredictable, thus a source of anxiety -- negatively taxing on our energy allocation. Another operative distinction for the term object is that, while objects may not intrinsically be man-made, “objectified things” are intrinsically products of human endeavor. For example a tree -- not a man-made creation -- may still be considered an object. In classifying a tree as an object we, again, are ascribing properties and behaviors to the tree which may be predicted and projected. Whether or not our predictions and projections are accurate is ultimately rather irrelevant. What is significant is that we have confidence in our predictions and projections, and may thus limit our anxieties. In short, what defines an object for purposes of this paper is something that can be programmed to behave according to human laws and conceptions of the future. In this case, “objective” is not meant to convey any claims to absoluteness or correctness, only the common reality that a majority of a population indulges. For example, we willingly defer our own subjective experiences of the flatness of the Earth to peers who have cultivated much more in-depth knowledge of this subject, such as Pythagorus, Eratosthenes, or Magellan -- we can objectively say that the Earth is spherical. Similarly millions of Germans deferred their subjective experiences of reality to the objective reality of Hitler during World War II. Just because reality has been consolidated does not mean it is any more or less accurate.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › AT: Perms

The aff’s perms fail, any attempt to combine the alt with the aff causes it to get coopted

Berardi 09 – [Franco Berardi, "Precarious Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism and the Pathologies of the Post-Alpha Generation", 1/1/2009, Minor Compositions, https://monoskop.org/images/d/d5/Berardi_Franco_Bifo_Precarious_Rhapsody_Semocapitalism_and_the_Pathologies_of_Post-Alpha_Generation.pdf]//英生

On the basis of these premises Krahl critiques the political planning of the twentieth century labor movement:

The absence of reflection on the professional constitution (Verfassung) of class-consciousness as a non-empirical category has introduced into the socialist movement a tacit reduction of class consciousness in a Leninist sense that is inadequate to the metropolis (1969: 367).

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › AT: Perms

Affirm the secretive nature of the archive- it’s key to avoid cooption and make liberation possible

Childs 16 (Greg L. Childs- Assistant Professor of History @ Brandeis, Secret and Spectral: Torture and Secrecy in the Archives of Slave Conspiracies, DOI 10.1215/01642472-3315886, © 2016 Duke University Press, Social Text, December, 2015 Volume 33, Number 4 125: p. 51-52)//TR

The phenomenon of secrets in the archive that can never be revealed, then, points to a multifarious multiplication of the unknowable. The court often made these multiplications, but they were also made against the power of the judiciary. White ignorance about black political strivings was thus not just born of the manipulations of interrogations through tortures, redactions, or dismissals of testimonies. It was just as surely achieved through the conscious attempts on the part of black and nonwhite subjects to avoid what Derrida refers to as the “violence of the archive,” the drive or perceived necessity to archive the past as a way of keeping at bay the always present, heterogeneous, and unpredictable threat of irretrievable loss.48 The horizon of what philosopher Charles Mills has labeled “white ignorance” is thus not necessarily reducible to deliberate inversions of knowledge into not knowing; though deliberate or not, the result is still a scene of disavowal.49 The issue seems to turn on who disavows what, and what those disavowals tell us about the limits or excesses of power. When João de Deus refused to answer questions, for example, and effectively bought time for the gunman Luís Pires to escape, he disavowed the notion that his arrest necessarily had to mean the end of the movement. The effect of this process, then, was that judges remained ignorant of the whereabouts of one of the principal organizers of the movement, so they could never capture or know the full extent of the conspiracy and its supporters. On the other hand, when judges assigned a death sentence to Luís Pires in absentia and condemned all of his progeny and lineage to eternal infamy, they disavowed that his physical absence could hamper their performance.50 With one eye on promotions and another eye on punishing subordinates of African descent, colonial magistrates were both willing to record their frustrations with the secrets kept by rebels and happy to advance their careers on the basis of these same secrets. Thus, a contradiction appears to emerge in this moment: the secrets of a movement led by men of African descent are never recovered or fully disclosed but are nevertheless punished publicly. However, the secret methods and interrogations that the magistrates used to conclude that Luís Pires and others were guilty were also never fully disclosed to the public. Thus, the secrets of conspirators and judges ultimately return us to the issue of the public and to how control over public opinion by both elites and subalterns depended on secrecy. There is much at stake in pushing beyond the fascination with trying to uncover the contents of the innumerable secrets that live in archives of colonial slavery and resistance. Perhaps, instead of reading every silence or silenced black rebel for clues or details regarding his true intentions and purposes, we should rather focus on how those secrets aided future subaltern political formations or future governing practices in the case of judges and officials. Disassociating secrecy from recovery may thus be a way toward opening up further space for research on black publics and politics under colonialism that understands the multiplication and maintenance of secrecy as an integral component of protecting and furthering the project of writing histories of black intellectual production and critical thought.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › F/W › 2NC---FWK---AT: Predictability/Clash

1---Capitalist Realism DA: Capitalism’s become central to all economic theses. Predictability’s attempt to confine politics to what we expect to hear recreates serial policy failure with the exhaustion of the cultural and political future that fails to imagine any alternative.

Fisher 09 Mark Fisher, also known under his blogging alias k-punk, was an English writer, music critic, political and cultural theorist, philosopher, and teacher based in the Department of Visual Cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London. “Capitalist Realism” November 27, 2009 |Ch. 1 Pages 3-10 | JDiang

Children of Men connects with the suspicion that the end has already come, the thought that it could well be the case that the future harbors only reiteration and re-permutation. Could it be that there are no breaks, no 'shocks of the new' to come? Such anxieties tend to result in a bi-polar oscillation: the 'weak messianic' hope that there must be something new on the way lapses into the morose conviction that nothing new can ever happen. The focus shifts from the Next Big Thing to the last big thing - how long ago did it happen and just how big was it? T.S. Eliot looms in the background of Children of Men, which, after all, inherits the theme of sterility from The Waste Land. The film's closing epigraph 'shantih shantih shantih' has more to do with Eliot's fragmentary pieces than the Upanishads' peace. Perhaps it is possible to see the concerns of another Eliot - the Eliot of 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' - ciphered in Children of Men. It was in this essay that Eliot, in anticipation of Harold Bloom, described the reciprocal relationship between the canonical and the new. The new defines itself in response to what is already established; at the same time, the established has to reconfigure itself in response to the new. Eliot's claim was that the exhaustion of the future does not even leave us with the past. Tradition counts for nothing when it is no longer contested and modified. A culture that is merely preserved is no culture at all. The fate of Picasso's Guernica in the film - once a howl of anguish and outrage against Fascist atrocities, now a wall-hanging - is exemplary. Like its Battersea hanging space in the film, the painting is accorded 'iconic' status only when it is deprived of any possible function or context. No cultural object can retain its power when there are no longer new eyes to see it. We do not need to wait for Children of Men's near-future to arrive to see this transformation of culture into museum pieces. The power of capitalist realism derives in part from the way that capitalism subsumes and consumes all of previous history: one effect of its 'system of equivalence' which can assign all cultural objects, whether they are religious iconography, pornography, or Das Kapital, a monetary value. Walk around the British Museum, where you see objects torn from their lifeworlds and assembled as if on the deck of some Predator spacecraft, and you have a powerful image of this process at work. In the conversion of practices and rituals into merely aesthetic objects, the beliefs of previous cultures are objectively ironized, transformed into artifacts. Capitalist realism is therefore not a particular type of realism; it is more like realism in itself. As Marx and Engels themselves observed in The Communist Manifesto, [Capital] has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom — Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation. Capitalism is what is left when beliefs have collapsed at the level of ritual or symbolic elaboration, and all that is left is the consumer-spectator, trudging through the ruins and the relics. Yet this turn from belief to aesthetics, from engagement to spectatorship, is held to be one of the virtues of capitalist realism. In claiming, as Badiou puts it, to have 'delivered us from the "fatal abstractions" inspired by the "ideologies of the past'", capitalist realism presents itself as a shield protecting us from the perils posed by belief itself. The attitude of ironic distance proper to postmodern capitalism is supposed to immunize us against the seductions of fanaticism. Lowering our expectations, we are told, is a small price to pay for being protected from terror and totalitarianism. 'We live in a contradiction,' Badiou has observed: a brutal state of affairs, profoundly inegalitarian - where all existence is evaluated in terms of money alone - is presented to us as ideal. To justify their conservatism, the partisans of the established order cannot really call it ideal or wonderful. So instead, they have decided to say that all the rest is horrible. Sure, they say, we may not live in a condition of perfect Goodness. But we're lucky that we don't live in a condition of Evil. Our democracy is not perfect. But it's better than the bloody dictatorships. Capitalism is unjust. But it's not criminal like Stalinism. We let millions of Africans die of AIDS, but we don't make racist nationalist declarations like Milosevic. We kill Iraqis with our airplanes, but we don't cut their throats with machetes like they do in Rwanda, etc. The 'realism' here is analogous to the deflationary perspective of a depressive who believes that any positive state, any hope, is a dangerous illusion. In their account of capitalism, surely the most impressive since Marx's, Deleuze and Guattari describe capitalism as a kind of dark potentiality which haunted all previous social systems. Capital, they argue, is the 'unnamable Thing', the abomination, which primitive and feudal societies 'warded off in advance'. When it actually arrives, capitalism brings with it a massive desacralization of culture. It is a system which is no longer governed by any transcendent Law; on the contrary, it dismantles all such codes, only to re-install them on an ad hoc basis. The limits of capitalism are not fixed by fiat, but defined (and redefined) pragmatically and improvisationally. This makes capitalism very much like the Thing in John Carpenter's film of the same name: a monstrous, infinitely plastic entity, capable of metabolizing and absorbing anything with which it comes into contact. Capital, Deleuze and Guattari says, is a 'motley painting of everything that ever was'; a strange hybrid of the ultra-modern and the archaic. In the years since Deleuze and Guattari wrote the two volumes of their Capitalism And Schizophrenia, it has seemed as if the deterritorializing impulses of capitalism have been confined to finance, leaving culture presided over by the forces of reterritorialization. This malaise, the feeling that there is nothing new, is itself nothing new of course. We find ourselves at the notorious 'end of history' trumpeted by Francis Fukuyama after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Fukuyama's thesis that history has climaxed with liberal capitalism may have been widely derided, but it is accepted, even assumed, at the level of the cultural unconscious. It should be remembered, though, that even when Fukuyama advanced it, the idea that history had reached a 'terminal beach' was not merely triumphalist. Fukuyama warned that his radiant city would be haunted, but he thought its specters would be Nietzschean rather than Marxian. Some of Nietzsche's most prescient pages are those in which he describes the 'oversaturation of an age with history'. 'It leads an age into a dangerous mood of irony in regard to itself', he wrote in Untimely Meditations, 'and subsequently into the even more dangerous mood of cynicism', in which 'cosmopolitan fingering', a detached spectatorialism, replaces engagement and involvement. This is the condition of Nietzsche's Last Man, who has seen everything, but is decadently enfeebled precisely by this excess of (self) awareness. Fukuyama's position is in some ways a mirror image of Fredric Jameson's. Jameson famously claimed that postmodernism is the 'cultural logic of late capitalism'. He argued that the failure of the future was constitutive of a postmodern cultural scene which, as he correctly prophesied, would become dominated by pastiche and revivalism. Given that Jameson has made a convincing case for the relationship between postmodern culture and certain tendencies in consumer (or post-Fordist) capitalism, it could appear that there is no need for the concept of capitalist realism at all. In some ways, this is true. What I'm calling capitalist realism can be subsumed under the rubric of postmodernism as theorized by Jameson. Yet, despite Jameson's heroic work of clarification, postmodernism remains a hugely contested term, its meanings, appropriately but unhelpfully, unsettled and multiple. More importantly, I would want to argue that some of the processes which Jameson described and analyzed have now become so aggravated and chronic that they have gone through a change in kind. Ultimately, there are three reasons that I prefer the term capitalist realism to postmodernism. In the 1980s, when Jameson first advanced his thesis about postmodernism, there were still, in name at least, political alternatives to capitalism. What we are dealing with now, however, is a deeper, far more pervasive, sense of exhaustion, of cultural and political sterility. In the 80s, 'Really Existing Socialism' still persisted, albeit in its final phase of collapse. In Britain, the fault lines of class antagonism were fully exposed in an event like the Miners' Strike of 1984-1985, and the defeat of the miners was an important moment in the development of capitalist realism, at least as significant in its symbolic dimension as in its practical effects. The closure of pits Was defended precisely on the grounds that keeping them open was not 'economically realistic', and the miners were cast in the role of the last actors in a doomed proletarian romance. The 80s were the period when capitalist realism was fought for and established, when Margaret Thatcher's doctrine that 'there is no alternative' - as succinct a slogan of capitalist realism as you could hope for - became a brutally self-fulfilling prophecy. Secondly, postmodernism involved some relationship to modernism. Jameson's work on postmodernism began with an interrogation of the idea, cherished by the likes of Adorno, that modernism possessed revolutionary potentials by virtue of its formal innovations alone. What Jameson saw happening instead was the incorporation of modernist motifs into popular culture (suddenly, for example, Surrealist techniques would appear in advertising). At the same time as particular modernist forms were absorbed and commodified, modernism's credos - its supposed belief in elitism and its monological, top-down model of culture - were challenged and rejected in the name of 'difference', 'diversity' and 'multiplicity'. Capitalist realism no longer stages this kind of confrontation with modernism. On the contrary, it takes the vanquishing of modernism for granted: modernism is now something that can periodically return, but only as a frozen aesthetic style, never as an ideal for living. Thirdly, a whole generation has passed since the collapse of the Berlin Wall. In the 1960s and 1970s, capitalism had to face the problem of how to contain and absorb energies from outside. It now, in fact, has the opposite problem; having ail-too successfully incorporated externality, how can it function without an outside it can colonize and appropriate? For most people under twenty in Europe and North America, the lack of alternatives to capitalism is no longer even an issue. Capitalism seamlessly occupies the horizons of the thinkable. Jameson used to report in horror about the ways that capitalism had seeped into the very unconscious; now, the fact that capitalism has colonized the dreaming life of the population is so taken for granted that it is no longer worthy of comment. It would be dangerous and misleading to imagine that the near past was some prelapsarian state rife with political potentials, so it's as well to remember the role that commodification played in the production of culture throughout the twentieth century. Yet the old struggle between detournement and recuperation, between subversion and incorporation, seems to have been played out. What we are dealing with now is not the incorporation of materials that previously seemed to possess subversive potentials, but instead, their precorporation: the pre-emptive formatting and shaping of desires, aspirations and hopes by capitalist culture. Witness, for instance, the establishment of settled 'alternative' or 'independent' cultural zones, which endlessly repeat older gestures of rebellion and contestation as if for the first time. 'Alternative' and 'independent' don't designate something outside mainstream culture; rather, they are styles, in fact the dominant styles, within the mainstream. No-one embodied (and struggled with) this deadlock more than Kurt Cobain and Nirvana. In his dreadful lassitude and objectless rage, Cobain seemed to give wearied voice to the despondency of the generation that had come after history, whose every move was anticipated, tracked, bought and sold before it had even happened. Cobain knew that he was just another piece of spectacle, that nothing runs better on MTV than a protest against MTV; knew that his every move was a cliche scripted in advance, knew that even realizing it is a cliche. The impasse that paralyzed Cobain is precisely the one that Jameson described: like postmodern culture in general, Cobain found himself in 'a world in which stylistic innovation is no longer possible, [where] all that is left is to imitate dead styles, to speak through the masks and with the voices of the styles in the imaginary museum'. Here, even success meant failure, since to succeed would only mean that you were the new meat on which the system could feed. But the high existential angst of Nirvana and Cobain belongs to an older moment; what succeeded them was a pastiche-rock which reproduced the forms of the past without anxiety.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › F/W › 2NC---FWK---Financial Memory DA

(3)---Financial Memory DA---Capitalism simulates communication through the algorithmic commodification of all existence. An information economy recycles and resells to us our moral and ethical foundations which is apriori to a “fair” constitution of knowledge. The impact’s information overload: unlimited arrangements with capital that extracts all existential value.

Ibrahim 18 Yasmin Ibrahim is a Professor of Digital Economy and Culture. She has written and published extensively on new media technologies and migration. She has been involved in numerous editorial boards and presently serves on the Editorial board for Sociology. She has reviewed for EU funding bodies and has served as reviewer for the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF) for a number of years. Her work has been published in a number leading journals including Ethnicities, Gender, Work and Organization, New Technology, Work and Employment, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Continuum, The British Journal of Psychiatry, Transcultural Psychiatry, Journal of Marketing Management, etc. She is the convenor for Borderlines, an interdisciplinary research cluster in the school. She has contributed extensively to Equality and Inclusion work both in the School and College. “Transacting Memory in the Digital Age: Modernity, Fluidity, and Immateriality” April 2, 2018| Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences . | JDiang

The ubiquitous imaging of our everyday lives through mobile devices in the age of convergence has created a fluidity between our visuality and our modes of production online. As we capture and upload images pervasively through mobile technologies, we are forming new intimacies with immateriality in modernity through digital platforms. This fluidity and the binding of immateriality are also entwined with the production of social memory through people’s repositories which sit alongside media memory and the institutionalised memory of the archives or official projects of memory. Institutionalised memory, which has a purposive strand in projects of commemoration, and remembering and forgetting have all come under renewed scrutiny in the digital age as these become disrupted through the ‘‘fluidity’’ of the digital world. Fluidity is defined through both form and meaning in what we identify as a post-human world where algorithms and technologies simulate and anticipate human behaviour while re-calibrating our projects of remembering and forgetting as redemptive acts in human history. The accumulation of image repositories through people’s transactions of the immaterial on digital platforms is consequential in the digital age. Unlike material tangible artefacts like photographs, our relationship with the immaterial online world is about a fluid world where uploads, downloads, storage of memory through mobile devices and cloud systems and the ability to curate images disembedded from its context or origins creates a close intimacy with the immateriality of the digital world. This immateriality is bound with a ‘‘virality’’ where the circulation economy can make new connections between hitherto unrelated objects and subjects through the architecture of the internet where the re-labelling through tags and key words of search terms can enforce new associations between and with the immaterial. As such our human cognitive memory coexists with a mnemonic memory through cloud storage systems and mobile devices. If industrialisation centred a world of materiality, mobility and acceleration, the digital and virtual world presses immateriality as a dominant form where virtuality and invisible labour and consumption can accrue, displacing the material mode as a central aspect of the social reality of production, consumption and asset formation online. The virtual world induces our bind with the fluid and immaterial, where new images can be morphed, curated and relentlessly transacted through a viral economy inviting new forms of gaze and immaterial objects of desire. This fluidity and the emphasis on the immaterial have implications for collective memory and projects of forgetting and remembering, and equally for our constitution of sacred and profane in the virtual world. 2 Fluidity, Immateriality and Mortality Fluidity has been explored within the changing social structures of modernity. Zygmunt Bauman employed the metaphor of ‘‘liquidity’’ to describe a world that has transformed in comparison with its earlier solid state. For Bauman ‘‘liquid modernity’’ defies a particular form morphing into a liquid environment where one cannot rely on any form of fixity, this means individuals cannot rely on past experiences to navigate their futures. This ‘‘liquid life is a precarious life, lived under conditions of constant uncertainty’’ (Bauman 2000: 2). This liquidity then encapsulates the profound transformations taking place in modernity brought through our interconnectivity and processes of globalisation, including the technological transformation brought forth by information and communication technologies (ICTs). We have moved from the stability, permanence and heaviness Y. Ibrahim 123 of the ‘‘solid’’ modern era, to the unstable, fleeting era of ‘‘liquid’’ modernity, where maximum impact, instant obsolescence and constant mobility are all important— and from which we cannot escape (Jacobsen and Marshman 2008: 804). Constant disruptions and lack of reliability of the past are encoded in this liquidity where history does not completely work for humanity as a reference point but conjoins to a trajectory of instability. This liquid modernity stands in contrast to an earlier solid modernity organised through categories and definitions where there is a sense of order or stability. Bauman extends the metaphor of liquidity originally explored by Jean Paul Sartre and Mary Douglas, contrasting the liberating ‘‘fluidity’’ of today with the cloying ‘‘viscosity’’ of life in the past (Jacobsen and Marshman 2008: 805). This liquidity is both liberating and unsettling at the same time, providing new tools and platforms for self-expression and identity formation. This liquidity coalesces with virtuality where information and communications technologies produce new realms to transact and enact sociability through immaterial modes. Capitalism is now linked to the virtual world of information economies and is no longer imagined through heavy industries and factory production, acquiring new forms of fluidity and invisibility in extracting labour and value. The information revolution has implications for the way in which we work and form interpersonal relationships, but more importantly it seeps into other realms of society threatening our existing relationships with social and collective memory. If liquid modernity is the erosion and blurring of categories such as work and leisure, then the breakdown of distinctions between production, consumption and the production of commodities become reconfigured. What one experiences and consumes ‘‘outside’’ of labour time can become part of the production of commodities (Brouillette 2009: 144–145). The virtual world then stands for a new social world where there is interface between the user and its immateriality. The seamless relationship between production and consumption and the emergence of ‘‘prosumer’’ economies means that the consumer is integrated into the production and marketing modes in invisible and intangible ways. The process of immaterial production is thus cyclical and all-pervasive, incorporating everyone and entails ‘‘the whole of the social relation’’ in the author-work-audience relationship (Brouillette 2009: 144–145). The binding of the social with the co-production of labour and consumption and equally the embedding of these into relations of sociality is a vital aspect of this virtuality. The conjoining of social relations with modes of production is emblematic of the flow of data and content between personal and professional spheres and equally between private and public realms where fluidity is inscribed in the modes of exchange and the different spheres of life. The virtual space reiterates both the fluidity of liquid modernity, being a space filled with ‘‘described’’ and ‘‘made’’ images. According to Lee et al. (2003: 216) images, represented by the computer, are regenerated by programmatic manipulation after transforming their existence into digital information rather than representing the real like a picture or movie. Hence, the virtual world is a world of simulation (Lee et al. 2003: 216). The virtual space defined through its immateriality is a space of imagery containing the power of transformation in both terms of form and contextual relations between subject and object. Transacting Memory in the Digital Age: Modernity,… 123 Derrick de Kerckhove (cf. Mercader 1990: 171–173) proposes four criteria for distinguishing virtual technology, the first being that of immateriality. Secondly, the virtual can be defined as the interval between the limits and options of what is possible. The virtual realm requires the technical establishment of limits and options between what is certain and uncertain. The third attribute refers to cybernetics or the possibility of a system reacting or self-organising itself with the aid of clearly defined protocols and parameters in reference to given tasks. The last aspect is interactivity or the set of options for the parallel and coordinated treatment of data that enables the double intervention of the operator and the device (cf. Mercader 1990: 171–173). Hence, the virtual has modes of manipulation and options within it while binding the certain and uncertain, creating an interface between user, device and the technological platform. While materiality is understood as the presence of objects, structures and others that comprise one’s immediate surroundings, immateriality through its intangibility invites possibilities through its lack of form and structure. In tandem with this, Derrida associates the virtual with a variety of contemporary developments, including ‘‘spectral effects, the new speed of apparition (we understand this word in its ghostly sense) of the simulacrum, the synthetic or prosthetic image, and the virtual event, cyberspace and surveillance, the control, appropriations and speculations that today deploy unheard-of powers’’ (Derrida 1994: xviii). In associating the virtual with ghosts, Derrida positions those immaterial beings as those that haunt the living yet are excluded from them. As ghosts have the ability to upset the natural order of things because of their possession of knowledge that surpasses the living, the virtual, when acknowledged as integral to the constitution of knowledge about the real, similarly has the potential to destabilize what we understand about it (Kim 2013: 3). In destabilizing the assumption that the real is the locus of activity and meaning, Derrida emphasises that the vitality of the immaterial forces of new media is increasingly central to the formation of the real. He implicates the virtual to our experience and conception of the real and how the virtual constitutes our understanding of the real, but is overlooked in our perceptions of it (see Kim 2013: 3). The nature of electronic information and its immateriality is becoming central to contemporary social, economic and cultural developments in the West. The notion of ‘‘virtual reality’’ than alludes to the nuances in the positioning of the virtual in modernity where it is not only with relevance to technological devices which allow us to enter immersive worlds but also the inextricable bind between virtual and the real in contemporary society. As such reality can be recomposed by virtual processes such that the virtual comes to govern our sense of social reality and relationships. The virtual is a supplement to the real in that the virtual is integral to it, but has been excluded from consideration (Kim 2013: 3–4). Similarly, Baudrillard’s conceptualisation of virtual reality as a metaphor for our cultural condition extends his earlier idea on simulation where electronic media encompassing commodity culture and consumer capitalism foreground other traditional sources of value that once grounded truth and meaning. As such virtual reality is constructed out of virtual, immaterial processes, including the flow of electronic images, commodity culture and financial capitalism. For Baudrillard (2008: 35), Y. Ibrahim 123 virtual reality and our absorption into it represents our ‘‘passing over into the extreme of technology, into technology as an extreme phenomenon’’. This passing over means that there is no reversibility to an earlier world and neither is there any nostalgia for it. In virtual reality, simulation becomes reality, re-crafting the ‘‘immaterial’’ as flesh (Kim 2013: 4). Beyond the immateriality and fluidity of the virtual sphere which, Derrida asserts, unleashes a spectral dimension, cyber space is also defined through its ineradicable qualities. This sits in stark contrast with the fluidity of the virtual sphere where content can be manipulated or morphed. The virtual as ineradicable and viral, circulating yet stripped of meaning, portends a new ethereal world where mortality can be re-imagined and morality can be reconfigured through the workings of a host of processes such as algorithms, community standards, lack of editorial oversight and remediation of the moral through new standards of taste and decency. What is unleashed on the internet can circulate forever and this in contradiction with the mortality of human life. The fascination with the virtual is that it defies the mortal time where content can be ineradicable and float forever. While human life is entangled with the project of memento mori, the virtual is about the possibilities of extending the temporality beyond human mortality. Our profiles and expressions on the internet can stay forever, prompting new ways to forget and erase on the internet such as the ‘‘right to forget’’. In May 2014, the European Union found that people can request search engines to remove specific results for queries that include their name, where the interests in those results are outweighed by the person’s privacy rights. The right to be forgotten is also known as the right to erasure. It gives individuals the power to request the removal of their personal data when there is no compelling justification for its continued processing by a company. The Data Protection Bill in the UK will enshrine the European Union’s General Data Protection Rule (GDPR)1 and is intended to give the public more control over what happens with their personal data—including the ‘‘right to be forgotten’’. The bill reveals how machine memory and relentless circulation and ordering of data on the internet have profound implications for societies and individuals. The projects of memory and forgetting online become a complex interplay of machine logic, architecture of the internet and memory as a form of circulation and storage where it is amenable to new forms of governance, control and gaze, and also human vulnerabilities. 3 The Politics of Virality Within the apparitional world of virality, new forms of imagination and reality can be pledged. New worlds and ontologies co-mingle with the inauthentic and simulated versions of the ‘‘real’’. A world where people try to be configured as ‘‘real’’ and ‘‘authentic’’ while being judged by strangers and others who they will never meet in their offline lives. The information revolution unleashed by ICTs is a virtual world where matter swims in immaterial mode vying for attention, matter which can recalibrated into new data assemblages which can be resold and commodified in the market economy. With an avalanche of content swimming in the sea of virtuality, what grabs human attention and creates a spurt in the exchanges between people and peers is evidenced in the notion of the viral. A content that is exchanged, shared widely and rapidly on the intent has been termed viral to capture the spread of its popularity. Viral signifies some form of contagion, analogous to the spread of a biological virus (Anderson and May 1991). What can go viral can defy prediction and lead into the uncertain. With virality being an intrinsic quality of the internet, the phenomenon of seeking to recreate the ‘‘viral’’ is now a big part of marketing. While the viral remains an elusive and unpredictable phenomenon of the virtual sphere, it conjoins with our networked sociality where we are constantly locked into exchanging content where these substitute ‘‘small talk’’ and provide a form of ‘‘phatic communion’’ (Malinowski 1936) where these exchanges become a form of everyday ritual in maintaining social ties. This exchange-based phatic sociality in the online environment as such can turn projects of memory into the ‘‘viral’’ and ‘‘popular’’ where endless exchanges may be less about the content but the creation of resonance through social sharing. The viral celebrates the popular as part of the social imaginary within a given time. The viral is also about ephemeral until the next viral content claims our attention. The pledging of memory through the viral is also about its reframing through the popular and the ephemeral where new content and exchanges are constantly vying for our attention. The transaction of memory online then binds our projects of memory into new attention economies where the temporal becomes besieged through our ability to hold our attention on material that invokes popular appeal while highlighting that the viral is orchestrated through an elusive logic where what gains popularity is both uncertain and unbound. With the viral becoming newsy—the traditional notion of news becomes reconfigured through rituals of frenetic exchange where the viral is bound up with the phatic, with new forms of sociality and networks which can redirect popular gaze. The fervent exchanges of content online in different platforms can be seen as a ‘‘re-entextualization’’ (see Bauman and Briggs 1990). This refers to a process by which a piece of ‘‘text’’ is extracted from its original context-of-use and reinserted into an entirely different one, involving different participation frameworks, a different kind of textuality producing different meaning outcomes (Blommaert and Varis 2015). As such what is marginal to the original source of the text can become reconfigured as significant and vice versa. This intense sharing produced through the characteristics of virtuality, particularly immateriality and fluidity, where forms and content remediate our transaction of memory online, locates it as an open-ended phenomenon amenable to manipulation and mutilation by both man and machine. Y. Ibrahim 123 4 Memory and Digital Amnesia If the characteristics of the internet such as immateriality, invisibility, virtuality and virality perform as ghosts in a machine, one can imbue the internet with various forms of magic. It is a machine which can offer endless possibilities to re-imagine and resurrect human agency and communion. The saturation of immaterial matter and fluidity, and also the conjoining of these flows of content through human actors who pass this onto others, produces a moment of unlimited arrangements with capital. Our awe with the ghosts in the machine and their ability to transcend time and space is also about capital forging new enterprises with online platforms and its technical architecture. The speed and flow of the internet is also about the complex interplay of capital with human connectivity and our co-optation into the commercial while reconstituting us as data that can be sold and resold. Within this arrangement of endless awe with virtuality and capital’s quest to capitalise on human activities and relationships as well as their free labour, projects of memory and historicity enter into a turbulent realm on the internet. New forms of violence, game play and rituals will engage with these projects of memory, creating new forms of memory and counter-memory. While the internet has enabled people to remember and archive the personal and national, instability and the ghosts in the machine can equally thwart our projects of collection, memorialisation and collective redemption. I want to interrogate the notion of fluidity of digital immateriality and the implications for social memory through Facebook’s treatment of the Napalm Girl image as a pornographic image (see Ibrahim 2017). The iconic image of Napalm Girl went viral again online but for an entirely different reason in 2016. The Pulitzer prize-winning image shot by Associated Press Photographer Nick Ut had been uploaded by Norwegian newspaper editor who had posted the photo as part of a series on war photography and subsequently found his account suspended by Facebook (Ingram 2016). Facebook had coded the iconic war image as a pornographic image through its ‘‘technological gaze’’. Though Facebook had subsequently apologised and restored the image after a public outcry, the act of coding the image as pornographic laid siege to the redemptive power of war photography and the perversity of warfare which targets the flesh of an innocent child. Facebook has over time defended its transgressions and aberrations by proclaiming that it is a technology company rather than a media organisation, saying that it puts the emphasis on sharing and transacting content rather than on the content’s veracity. Recently, Facebook has also been under renewed criticism for fake news in its news feeds. Fluidity and immateriality form an inextricable bind in the Facebook economy as it functions as a platform for sharing, intimacy and maintaining connections with friends and strangers. To sustain these networks through such transactions huge amounts of data and content pass through these sites. As such, friendships, sociality, phatic communion and the sense of self became renegotiated with new rules online while merging with offline norms. These social formations become abstracted by capital where social exchanges of information are monetised through the sharing of private data on public platforms. The accumulation and circulation of content provide the means to create huge volumes of traffic where data can be mined and resold to advertisers. Facebook’s shifting modes of identity between a technology company and a platform which handles large amounts of news content inevitably places it in a contested terrain where the practices of sharing in networks coalesce with news dissemination. It becomes intimately implicated in the processes of re-entextualization where context can be stripped out and yet where content can be endlessly circulated, inviting new meanings and readings into historic projects of memory, particularly of images. Facebook’s re-readings of iconic images through its ‘‘community standards’’ as such can be irreverent of public sentiments or social and historic contexts and, in the case of the ‘‘Napalm girl’’ incident, iconoclastic. Facebook as a social networking site becomes part of the neoliberal economy’s extraction of free labour to boost the agenda of capital, and its algorithms are part of ‘‘fixed capital’’ which intensifies capital accumulation and the monetization of exchange (see Terranova 2014; Davies 2013; Fisher 2009). As such algorithms can extract not just use value but also aesthetic, existential, social and ethical values (Terranova 2014: 382). Terranova contends users themselves are cast as quasi-automatic relays of a ceaseless information flow (2014: 381) entering a realm of exploitation where free labour is abstracted from leisure pursuits and aesthetic consumption. The Marxist critique of capital’s exploitation of free labour on the internet acknowledges the accumulation of content in social networking sites and equally the management of information through algorithms which become an extension of capital’s logic to intensify the extraction of value in monetizing networked exchanges. Hence, the algorithm as a form of premeditated logic and formula of capital projects the values of organisations in coding and cataloguing information. Algorithms as non-neutral entities bear the teeth marks of capital. While discourses of the internet celebrate discourses of empowerment and hold power to account, the intense quest to monetise the internet is also closely related to clandestine algorithms which order information on an industrial scale. Our utopian notions of the internet as open and democratic were in tandem subsumed through the secrecy of algorithms performing to the logic of capital as a form of trade secret which could be protected by commercial regulations. Algorithms as a hidden code behind platforms such as Facebook perform by extracting certain attributes which will drive traffic and maximise a networked attention economy. In view of this, algorithms are complex, hidden, closely guarded, non-static and iterative in moving with the logic of capital (see Diakopoulos 2015; Lievrouw 2012). Social networking sites as conduits for vast amounts of content without the attendant editorial oversight remain an intrinsic challenge for societies in the digital age. Posing new forms of vulnerability while laying siege to our projects of remembering, forgetting, as well as moments of collective redemption. Facebook has been accused of manipulating trending topics. The company reportedly fired some 18 contractors responsible for curating topics for the list after accusations of bias and replaced them with algorithm (Hovland and Seetharaman 2016). This in turn has facilitated a string of errors including the sharing of hoax stories. Y. Ibrahim 123 Facebook’s use of algorithms has also been criticised for being amenable to partisan news feeds which spin the news into shareable stories which are inaccurate (Vincent 2016). In response, Facebook has defended itself as a ‘‘tech company and not a media company’’ (Baral 2016). According to Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook: When you think about a media company, you know, people are producing content, people are editing content, and that’s not us. We’re a technology company. We build tools. We do not produce the content. We exist to give you the tools to curate and have the experience that you want, to connect with the people and businesses and institutions in the world that you want. (cf. Baral 2016). The emphasis on sharing and curation rather than the quality and accuracy of content along with its notion of making content available that is of ‘‘public interest’’ has entrapped Facebook into a long history of social and ethical controversies, particularly with relevance to the image economy on its networking platform. Equally, it is remediated through the technological gaze of social networking sites which can impose their morality and sensibilities through their ‘‘user agreements’’ which act as modes of censorship. The flow of content onto digital platforms will inevitably remediate our notions of the historic and iconic and will equally be a constant threat to our collective constructions of the ‘‘sacred’’. Facebook’s moral governance of images through its community standards has entailed a mix of strategies from employing outsourced censors in the Third World to the use of identification software to recognise known child pornography images to the use of algorithms and the recently discharged human curators of content. The other basis on which it primarily governs images is through its user community standards and its communal gaze as a form of informal policing where people can report objectionable images which will then be assessed against its own internal acceptability standards. With millions of images swimming in its platform and where images attract traffic and the monetisation of data, having a heavy hand or editorial oversight with images is not the desired option for Facebook. Where the algorithm performs as an ahistorical and amoral tracking tool, the community of users are co-opted in policing its platform. This enmeshing of community standards and technological gaze works to organizational rules and the logic of capital where it exploits sharing and exchange networks without value content, not for the content’s sake but its ability to be transacted at frenetic pace. Speed of exchange and volume then dictate the logic of capital in exploiting these social networks. In effect, Facebook extracts aesthetic and moral labour from its users, assessing affect and morality through their reactions while appropriating a paternalistic stance of requesting them to ‘‘share and consume responsibly’’ while commodifying moving and static images as a means to drive traffic and interaction. Hence, its technological gaze is based on constantly testing the boundaries of the sacred and profane, and in the process its technological gaze premises a community standard which is blind to historicity and morality and increasingly a community it may seek to represent. The constant testing of boundaries where the sacred is desecrated or the profane prevails in the guise of its community standards or ‘‘public interest’’ will entail a Transacting Memory in the Digital Age: Modernity,… 123 constant incursion on our collective memory and morality, impressing Facebook’s tendency to destroy myths and sacred sites through the cultural violence of flattening content where networks share without knowing or understanding the context or origin of content. Facebook’s banning of the Napalm Girl is a representation of this mechanised technological gaze and its attendant morality where the sacred will swim alongside the puerile and pornographic until it is rescued through public outrage and outcry against its cultural iconoclasm. 5 Ghosts in the Machine Patricia Clough (2000: 383) points out that in the age of teletechnology, comprising computer technology and television, these globalised networks of information and communication where layers of images, texts and sounds flow in real time or constitute a reality rather than represent one. In the digital age, the transaction of memory through social networking sites and personalised platforms created for new forms of ‘‘sociality’’ will present new challenges for humanity, particularly in terms of the image and its visuality. In these platforms, the visuality of iconic imagery pressed through the hidden (i.e. algorithms) and explicit modes of sharing will remain in an unstable and turbulent form. As the iconic becomes reconfigured through a technological gaze it will continuously reposition our morality, shifting the historical into new modes of contestation, undoing our collective modes of redemption against acts of human depravity as was evident with the case of the Napalm Girl image. Given the distinct elements of the virtual environment and our pervasive awe with a new world where technologies can power new forms of fantasy and simulated reality, the real and the virtual as well as the morphed and the sacred will recombine with ferocious speed to thwart and invert our projects of memory. Here, it will be possible to consign new powers to the digital and its magic infused through the ‘‘ghosts in the machines’’ where new types of reality and ‘‘worlds’’ propel us into activities transcending time and space and forming binding relationships with the immaterial. This will call us to invest further into the economies and workings of a system where labour is invisible and tangled through technical data, pledging yet more of our sense and sensibilities to the ghosts that work these machines. These ghosts are the very spirits that work algorithms, the apparitions which enshrine the logic of capital and equally the phantoms which invoke our invisible labour and aesthetics. Through wearable technologies they steer our senses and embed their agenda on human networks and work to relay content and data building up a frenetic pace in which we become part of the machinery, seduced into parting with our labour yet not fully conscious of how our labour is extracted to work this machine. The embedding of pneumonic memory through storage systems such as clouds and search engines which return semantic searches and build associations with hitherto unrelated events and phenomena, and the flow of the iconic and sacred as envisioned through an image on digital platforms will confront a multitude of ghosts in the machine orchestrated through a co-mingling of capital and technology and equally the insatiable spirit of human animal awed by the invisible and visible Y. Ibrahim 123 apparitions of the digital technology. Here in the immaterial world, new instabilities are introduced along with a democratic promise that all users will have access to produce an immaterial world to counter a real world that slots them into class and demographics through material possessions. Antonio Negri, in drawing on Derrida’s theory of deconstruction, asserts that capitalism as a system of change collapses the virtual and material world into an undecidable binary while undoing all binaries (see Wilkie 2011: 167–172). Similarly, Clough (2000:385) drawing on Antony Elliot (1996), asserts that ‘‘the human subject’s awareness of agencies other than human agency blurs the opposition of human and machine, nature and technology, the virtual and the real, thereby also blurring the opposition of reality and fantasy’’. As such teletechnology brings about a change for the human subject in the relationship with time and space, and by the extension of that a change in historicity and memory (Clough 2000: 385). This creates a complicit duality where we relay and exchange information which is capitalised by machine algorithms which then reconfigure the sacred. In the process of doing so, we remain equally vulnerable to these arrangements thwarting our projects of memory and history. 6 Conclusion The fluidity and immateriality of the virtual sphere with its ability to reconfigure the human projects of redemption through remembering and forgetting will be disrupted through the ghosts and the invisible processes of the internet. As organizations impose new forms of morality to govern content and to justify it through their protocols and algorithms, the immaterial and fluid web will pose new vulnerabilities where the sacred and profane can be re-coded and re-ordered disrupting continuities with our historicity and collective memorialising. The incursions into the sacred and the constant need to reify and protect the sacred will mean the pervasive testing of our limits and moral boundaries. The ghosts which Derrida alludes to in virtuality are not just about the unlimited knowledge they can potentially hold but the potential to thwart the morality while transacting memory through a sphere which is ineradicable. In the process, it inserts the potential to dislodge the sacred, celebrate the profane and disrupt the moral. The virtual performs to iconoclasm, driven by ghosts which take immaterial forms, while powering these disruptions through social relations and the acts of sharing and communion.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › F/W › 2NC---FWK---AT: Fairness/Plan Focus

2---Commodified Ideas DA: Semiotic Capital dictates knowledge production that subsumes neoliberal scholarship. It’s the center of how knowledge is organized in the debate economy.

Berardi 09 Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Italian Marxist Philosopher | “Precarious Rhapsody” 2009, Minor Compositions| Page 59-61 |JDiang

Capital reacted, following the dictates of liberalist ideology, with the coercive privatization of the products of collective knowledge and the submission of experimentation to economic competition. The privatization of collective knowledge has encountered resistance and opposition everywhere, and cognitive laborers have started to realize that their potential is superior to the power of the merchant. Since intellectual labor is at the center of the productive scene, the merchant no longer possesses the juridical or material instruments to impose the principle of private property. Given that the most precious goods in social production have an immaterial and reproducible character, we have discovered that the private appropriation of goods makes no sense, while the reasons sustaining the privatization of material goods in industrial society have weakened. In the sphere of semiotic-capital and cognitive labor, when a product is consumed, instead of disappearing it remains available, while its value increases the more its use is shared. This is how the network economy works, and this contradicts the very principle of private 59 // Merchant, Warrior & Sage property on which capitalism was founded until now. Since this perspective has started to spread, the warrior has come back on the scene, with the old economy of petrol magnates and arms producers. The amount of sadness, fear and anxiety accumulated in the folds of social labor during the 1990s has now been turned into fanaticism, aggressiveness and obsession with identity. The merchant has resorted to the warrior to submit the sage again. Bill Gates allied himself with George Bush. The merchant who robbed collective intelligence allied himself with the idiot warrior and together they try to suffocate any inch of wisdom, to subsume once and for all knowledge to profit and power. Thanks to the opening of the stock market to the masses carried out in the 1990s, a mass participation with the profit of capital was possible and this resulted in the dotcom economy. This also opened the possibility for a vast process of self-organization of cognitive laborers. Cognitive laborers invested their competence, knowledge and creativity and found the means to create an enterprise in the stock market. For several years the form of enterprise was the point of encounter for financial capital and cognitive labor at a high productivity rate. A new form of self-enterprise glorified at once the autonomy of labor and the dependency on the market. After a decade of uninterrupted growth and social alliance between cognitive labor and recombining capital, this alliance was broken. The fall of the stock market that began in April 2000 was the beginning of a political crisis of the relation of capital and cognitive labor. Many different factors provoked this rupture. First of all, the collapse of the psychic and social energies of cognitive labor: overexploitation, the acceleration of life rhythms, the twenty four hour long working day of mobile phone workers, depression, the excessive use of stimulant drugs to sustain the pace of hyper-labor have lead the cognitive laborer into a depressive phase. The collapse came from inside. At the same time, the monopolistic attack against the army of dotcom, the front of cognitive laborers and the free market occurred. The imposition of limits on experimentation, the imposition of monopolistic standards, the alliance between monopolies and political power, took the breath away from the diffuse economy. Then the monopolistic counterrevolution began and the conditions for a shift from the network economy to the war economy were created. The new economy had witnessed the flourishing of a process of self organization of cognitive labor in the form of the enterprise, but in the same years a predatory lumpen bourgeoisie emerged to take advantage of the crisis of traditional capitalist rule in order to appropriate for itself enormous shares of social capital, as all the post-Enron collapse cases demonstrated. Neoliberalism in the long run has not favored the free market but monopoly. At this stage, almost miraculously, while the crisis precipitated and was taking away all credibility and power of the groups linked to the Bush administration, those airplanes fell from the sky and gave birth to an era of unlimited violence, an era when power, having lost all legitimacy, legitimates itself through war. But in war, perspectives are redefined. Nazi-liberal aggressive capitalism evoked the specter of the war to defend its vacillating power, but in the course of this war, which is unacceptable for the conscience and lifestyle of the great majority of the western population, anything could happen. The problem Weizsaecker talks about is urgent today: is it possible to have a self-organization of scientists that is founded on the autonomy of science from power? This is no longer a concern for a small group of nuclear physicists, but for millions and millions of workers in science and technology, in administration, in education and therapy. The pacific army of the cognitariat holds the key to a deconstruction of the chain of automatisms through which capitalism fortifies itself.

2023 Michigan Kritik
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Symbolic Code DA: Fiat is illusory as scenario-planning attempts to impose meaning onto the unknown by programming our environment to feel predictable: a violent process that voraciously consumes information to objectify our lived experiences into endless data.

Schwartz 12 Scott W. Schwartz,  Ph.D. candidate in the Anthropology Department at the CUNY Graduate Center, as well as an adjunct lecturer at the Borough of Manhattan Community College. His research focuses on the methodologies and materials employed in the collection of environmental data, examining the epistemological history of climate modeling and algorithmic governance more broadly. He served as a Quantitative Reasoning Fellow at Baruch College from 2014 to 2016. He has conducted archaeological fieldwork centered on historical ecology and conservation in Scotland, Iceland, and Italy. He has had various projects featured in art galleries in New York and Los Angeles over the past decade, including a recent collaboration appearing at the Queens Museum as part of their Chance Ecologies exhibit. In the summer of 2017 he was awarded an Art-Science residency grant from the National Science Foundation and Pratt Institute. “Programming the landscape—the objectification of space” 2012 | Signs-International Journal of Semiotics Works, 49-66 | |JDiang

Human energy is coated in a symbolic residue. It is the nature of these symbols that allows populations to program their environments for the maximal level of anticipatory efficiency. The foremost concern of this article is to prove the basic premise that, in general, the behavior of populations and individuals is inclined toward the enhancement of perceived predictability in human landscapes. This behavior is ultimately a product of the unique human capacity for symbolic reasoning. Symbols, either mental or tactile, are shared cultural constructs that demand conventionalization and consolidation of meaning to be most effective. In this sense symbols are programmed with meaning by the populations that employ them. As this paper hopes to illustrate, the conventionalization of semantic reactions engendered by symbol programming detaches the individual from the sovereignty of their subjectivity, and leads to the objectification of the human landscape. This investigation posits a fundamental appreciation for how humans navigate our environments. It is the hypothesis of this paper that humans engage in an objectification of the environments we inhabit, consciously or unconsciously, in order to render the future more predictable. In a more dramatic conception, human landscape usage decisions are driven by a biologically embedded imperative to annihilate the unknown. This imperative may be parsed down to gems of folk wisdom regarding the human abhorrence of vacuums, but more essentially asserts the preeminence of anticipatory prowess in human decision-making. The survival benefit of accurately anticipating the future properties of one’s environment should be evident, but a few of the advantages of high predictability and low uncertainty are listed below: • It increases the amount and reliability of subsistence that can be extracted from an environment (knowing where a fruit tree will be or when to harvest) • It decreases the risk of predation or natural catastrophe • It minimizes the amount of energy-calories necessary for the brain to confront and process novel situations. This paper will assume that the benefit of the motivations listed above is inherent. Each is of varying importance, and varying relevance today, but it is clear to see where each motivator could be construed as advantageous, if not essential, to survival. Assuming that these terms are agreeable, the task is now to prove that the attainment of these goals is accomplished through a process of objectification of the human environment. As an opening caveat, it is crucial to assert that the behaviors to be addressed within are designed to enhance the perceived predictability of the environment. There are indisputably numerous, countless failures in this effort, but what is important is that the behaving agent feels as though they can accurately anticipate future scenarios. It is this confidence that allows the agent to conserve energy on the anxiety of the unknown -- even if they are dead wrong. It is the supposition of this paper that human populations have been capable of thriving in environments ill-suited to our original physical adaptations -- the African savannah -- precisely because we have programmed the environments we inhabit to conform to cultural algorithms, which may be relatively accurately forecasted and projected into the future, thus deriving the above list of beneficial effects. If we allow that the primary goal of social behavior is to render our environments more conducive to predictability, which I hope to prove in the following sections, we can trace this imperative to the pursuit of environmental objectification, which in turn, leads to the introduction of symbolic thought, and eventually to the deferment of subjective experience, which is ultimately what makes us exceptionally gifted hypothetical modelers, which includes projections the future. More cogently, this sequence may be visualized with the help of the following diagram (fig. 1): 52 [Fig 1 Omitted] Objectivity, Objectification & Objects The words objectivity, objectification and object overflow with meaning for many English-speakers. There are several competing definitions and concepts for each. In the parlance of this paper, it is hoped that these numerous connotations can be bridged and inclusive of all. The primary understanding of objectivity is often as an opposition to subjectivity. Whereas subjectiveness is the first-hand experience of an individual, objectiveness is an alleged unbiased interpretation of the environment that is detached from personal experience, and based solely upon exteriorly verifiable data. Subjectiveness is a personal impression based on information accrued through the five individual senses, objectiveness is supported by information from trusted sources, e.g., the theoretical objectivity of the newspaper. There has been much debate on whether total objectivity can ever be attained (Halbwachs 1925). It does appear that human agents, with our contingent life histories, are incapable of complete objectivity, however, the ideal of perfect objectivity is a standard against which newspapers, jurors, judges and politicians are often held. This debate is largely inconsequential to the present paper. The term objectification has come to represent the dehumanization of people, places or things, often towards ill-intentioned ends. When we speak of objectifying women, we are stripping them of their individuality, their personality, and basically disconnecting them from their subjective experiences of life -- transforming them into predictable and programmable objects. It is the contention of this paper that this process is fundamentally undertaken in order to reduce the anxieties of the unknown, and imbue the objectifier with the (false) confidence inherent in control. This process can be applied to individuals, groups and even environments. While it may seem quizzical to speak of dehumanizing something that is not human (i.e. can we really dehumanize a landscape?), what is truly meant by this, is to desubjectify, that is, to attribute desired programmable properties. And it is certainly possible to attribute desired properties to a landscape, or in other words to objectify the landscape. The term object(s), on its own, is also considered in a very precise sense herein. Of primary concern is that objects exhibit properties which may be mapped, described, projected and fully understood. The woman as an object has properties which can be controlled and projected, whereas the woman (or any gender) as an individual is unpredictable, thus a source of anxiety -- negatively taxing on our energy allocation. Another operative distinction for the term object is that, while objects may not intrinsically be man-made, “objectified things” are intrinsically products of human endeavor. For example a tree -- not a man-made creation -- may still be considered an object. In classifying a tree as an object we, again, are ascribing properties and behaviors to the tree which may be predicted and projected. Whether or not our predictions and projections are accurate is ultimately rather irrelevant. What is significant is that we have confidence in our predictions and projections, and may thus limit our anxieties. In short, what defines an object for purposes of this paper is something that can be programmed to behave according to human laws and conceptions of the future. In this case, “objective” is not meant to convey any claims to absoluteness or correctness, only the common reality that a majority of a population indulges. For example, we willingly defer our own subjective experiences of the flatness of the Earth to peers who have cultivated much more in-depth knowledge of this subject, such as Pythagorus, Eratosthenes, or Magellan -- we can objectively say that the Earth is spherical. Similarly millions of Germans deferred their subjective experiences of reality to the objective reality of Hitler during World War II. Just because reality has been consolidated does not mean it is any more or less accurate.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › F/W › 2NC---FWK---C/I

Counter Interpretation: evaluate competing rhetorical narratives. Their attempt to model the material world extracts meaning from objective reality which doesn’t measure the world but creates it. Epistemic refusal exposes the rhetorical vacuity of hegemonic systems that marginalize non-normative groups while restructuring knowledge of the world.

Schwartz 21 Scott W. Schwartz,  Ph.D. candidate in the Anthropology Department at the CUNY Graduate Center, as well as an adjunct lecturer at the Borough of Manhattan Community College. His research focuses on the methodologies and materials employed in the collection of environmental data, examining the epistemological history of climate modeling and algorithmic governance more broadly. He served as a Quantitative Reasoning Fellow at Baruch College from 2014 to 2016. He has conducted archaeological fieldwork centered on historical ecology and conservation in Scotland, Iceland, and Italy. He has had various projects featured in art galleries in New York and Los Angeles over the past decade, including a recent collaboration appearing at the Queens Museum as part of their Chance Ecologies exhibit. In the summer of 2017 he was awarded an Art-Science residency grant from the National Science Foundation and Pratt Institute. “The Material Culture of Temperature Measurement, Capital, and Semiotics” 2021 | City of University of New York Academic Works, 1.2.5 Theoretical Overview Page 27-31 | |JDiang

This dissertation largely follows the conception of the discipline of archaeology laid out by Gavin Lucas in his 2004 article, “Modern Disturbances: On the Ambiguities of Archaeology.” This conception posits that the purview of archaeology is the material aspect of a reciprocal relationship between material and discursive culture. Lucas suggests that the “pre” in “prehistory” need not be considered in sequential or chronological terms, but rather that the “pre” implies that materiality is a necessary pre-condition for discursive information (meaning). That is, semantic information cannot be conveyed in a material-less void. Discursive concepts, such as love or justice, demand at least the materiality of the vocal chords or the vibrating hairs in our ears. The “origins” implied by the etymology of “archaeology” then, refer to the material origins of any discursive information. While, in agreement with this notion of reciprocity between the material and the discursive, following the work of Karen Barad, I contest the idea that the material is somehow ontologically “before” the discursive. Rather, along with Barad, Graham Harman, and other contemporary scholars (sometimes lumped together as speculative realists, object-oriented ontologists, new materialists, or post-humanists), I pursue a flat ontology in which no phenomenon (be it discursive or material) has hierarchal or sequential eminence. That is, the material is not “ontologically before the discursive” as Lucas suggests (2004, 113). Rather, neither can exist without the other. If something has materiality, it signals discursively. If something signals discursively, it has materiality. The very act of parsing this into a binary is a problematic endeavor that I seek to reconcile within the framework of semiotic stratigraphy. Barad’s work posits that meaning (discursivity) and matter cannot be bifurcated, epitomizing an anti-Cartesian trend among many scholars over the past few decades (Barad 2007; Brassier 2007; Harman 2010). Every thing, object, or phenomenon has a material stratum and sends or receives signals (means something to something else). This holds true for stones, tables, or vampires. Barad asserts that every thing is simultaneously and perpetually both sending and receiving signals, that is, being interpreted. A stone is interpreted by wind in that it encounters the electromagnetic resistance of the stone and must move around its contours (Morton 2012). The Material Culture of Temperature // Schwartz 15 To these ends, Barad’s insights into observation and measurement, along with those of Mary Poovey (1998), Isabelle Stengers (2010), Patricia Clough (2012), and Sally Merry (2016) are critical to this dissertation. These critiques of measurement suggest that measurements (such as those a thermometer makes) do not necessarily observe ontologically pre-existing attributes that exist outside of the measurement process, but rather that the action of observation, interpretation, or measurement carves out (or brings forth) properties. As I will expand within, in a very tangible sense, thermometers do not measure temperature, they create temperature. Or, perhaps more palatably, measurement is a generative act of co-creation. As Sally Merry writes, “Those who create indicators aspire to measure the world but, in practice, create the world they are measuring” (2016, 21). In conjunction with Barad’s work on interpretation, observation, and the conveyance of meaning, I build on the insights of Charles Peirce’s semiosis framework. While Barad and Peirce’s ideas do not perfectly align, I wish to play with what I perceive as a great deal of overlap between the two systems. Specifically, I toy with Pierce’s triadic relationship between Sign > Object > Interpretant to articulate a semiotic stratigraphy that will provide the backbone of my data analysis. Anthropologists have increasingly been drawn to Peirce’s model of semiosis as a productive framework for moving beyond the untethered subjectivity of phenomenological and postmodern scholarship, while at the same time acknowledging the malleability of objective reality. Within archaeology the work of Zoe Crossland and Alexander Bauer (2017) has been highly visible in this endeavor. It is also important to note that this dissertation is not a deconstructionist exercise of the type narrowly associated with Derrida (Ziarek 1996). The point here is not to tear down an existing whole into its constituent elements revealing its rhetorical vacuity. Rather, the aim is to relate precisely how coherent discursive systems, such as temperature or law, are built out of very tangibly designed material interactions. It should also be noted that while the following “archaeology of knowledge production” shares titular affinities with Foucault (1969), my aims are quite apart from his. Rather than using the term “archaeology” (somewhat) metaphorically as an act of revealing the stratigraphy (layers) of concepts, I am more interested in the actual materials used to build concepts, drawing on Deleuze more than Foucault for my notion of “concepts”—“Whenever a new concept is created it cuts up our knowledge of the world in a novel way requiring other concepts to be likewise ‘reactivated or recut’” (Ruthrof 2009, 209), suggesting that concepts are not composed of accreted layers. As his later shift in terminology evinces, “genealogy” may better to describe Foucault’s scholarship than archaeology. This is not to say that the ideas of Derrida and Foucault do not have substantial bearing on this dissertation, just perhaps not in the fashion that may seem most readily accessible. While all of the above theoretical positions and justifications are employed in the interpretive frameworks within, on a larger level this work is inspired by strains of thought developed in queer theory. Specifically, I contest dominant and hegemonic narratives and attempt to expose asymmetrical power relations that marginalize and diminish non-normative groups. As a counter-normative method, queer theory is a useful tool for undermining a status quo that beckons irreversible ecological devastation and continued social stratification. This dissertation is indebted to the work of Judith Butler (1993), Mel Chen (2012), Lee Edelman (2007), Jack Halberstam (2005), Paul Preciado (2013), and Jasbir Puar (2017), among others. In this register, this dissertation could happily be categorized as a work of what Nicole Seymour (2012) calls “irreverent ecocriticism.” That is, some could interpret my argument that temperatures are artifacts comprised of dense semiotic events interwoven with high fashion, luxury real estate, gentrification, or El Chapo as “irreverence not as a refusal of political ideals, but rather as a unique means of committing to a political ideal” (68-69). Seymour further defends irreverent ecocriticism: At a time in which a significant portion of U.S. citizens do not share…environmentalists’ opinions on issues such as global warming and the need for continued environmental regulation…it would seem that a different dispositional and epistemological stance is certainly in order. If we can laugh at ourselves, be less sure of ourselves, we might be able to approach our object differently, and invite others to approach our object differently. We might be able to understand why we can’t make others understand (62). To such ends, this dissertation is somewhat binocular in scope. On one hand it is capable of being read as an interventional critique of the naturalized epistemology of capital. Simultaneously, the excessive analyses (over one-hundred pages) of “temperature artifacts” could be read as an absurdist echo of the irreconcilable premise underlying the performance of capitalism—that wealth can grow forever

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Alt › A2 Baudrillard/Semiotics Incorrect

Baudrillard’s claims about the hyperreal economy are rooted in robust analysis: signs and signifiers plague the economy by simulating value, stocks and investments prove.

Macintosh et al 00 [Norman, Teri Shearer, Daniel Thornton, Michael Welker, Professor Emeritus at Queen's University Canada, PHD, Accounting as simulacrum and hyperreality: perspectives on income and capital, ] cent

The informational perspective (Beaver, 1996) does not explain why people care about formally recognizing the effects of events and transactions like the granting of stock options in the income statement. The information conveyed by data disclosed in financial statement notes, proxy statements or elsewhere should be the same as that of data reported in the income statement since readers could readily adjust income to reflect the disclosures if they wanted to. But if, in this hyperreal financial economy, accounting signs have indeed lost their association with “real” referents, then the informational perspective's presupposition that investors can “see through” accounting numbers to discern true market value is no longer sustainable. There is nothing to see through to. From Baudrillard's perspective, however, “official earnings” do matter. Fox (1997, p. 77) captured the idea: “[T]he simplest, most visible, most merciless measure of corporate success in the 1990s has become this one: Did you make your earnings last quarter?” The presence of this yardstick [a simulacrum] demands the practice of “managing earnings” in order to report official earnings [another simulacrum] that pretty much match analysts' forecasts, presumably in the hopes of simulating value in the eyes of investors and so bolstering the company's stock price. While the practice of earnings management is certainly not new, the extent and nature of the practice appears to be evolving. As SEC chair Arthur Levitt recently observed “this process [earnings management] has evolved into what can best be characterized as a game among market participants” (Levitt, 1998). He describes the self-referential process surrounding the production and consumption of earnings numbers as follows: This is the pattern earnings management creates: companies try to meet or beat Wall Street earnings projections in order to grow market capitalization and increase the value of stock options. Their ability to do this depends on achieving the earnings expectations of analysts. And analysts seek constant guidance from companies to frame those expectations. Auditors, who want to retain their clients, are under pressure not to stand in the way (Levitt, 1998). Microsoft, for example, recently reported an income figure that met or slightly exceeded analysts' expectations for the 41st time in the 42 quarters since the company went public. One analyst said, “Microsoft does a better job of leveraging accounting—I would say it's almost a competitive weapon—than anybody else in the industry” (Fox, 1997, p. 79). For some time, Boston Chicken's record of meeting or beating forecasts was perfect: Not only is Boston Chicken able to report earnings every quarter, but those earnings have so far never failed to meet or surpass analysts' expectations—even though those analysts all know that the earnings in no significant way reflect how the company is doing [emphasis added]... “It's a very smart strategy,” says Michael Moe, a growth strategist at Montgomerey securities. “It has made enormous amounts of capital available to them at an attractive price that most companies can only dream of” (Fox, 1997, p. 79). Though the company's reported earnings mirrored analysts' forecasts perfectly, the latter were well aware that these signs did not refer to “real” earnings. 4.3.1. The map begets the territory

The case of General Electric Company (GE) is even more striking. Due to its large size, wide spectrum of technologies and its global diversity, GE enjoys “a very large amount of flexibility to... deliver strong, consistent earnings growth in a myriad of global economic conditions” and is thus recognized as one of the world's leading, “aggressive practitioners of earnings management” (Managing Profits, 1994). Indeed, GE often develops a model of how an acquisition, a divestment or the restructuring of a division would affect official earnings before going ahead. So, in effect, unlike the traditional thinking where strategy is implemented and accounting later reports the results, in GE's case the accounting model (the map) precedes the implementation of the strategy (the territory). As Baudrillard describes the hyperreality of the simulation era, “The territory no longer precedes the map...[rather] the map engenders the territory” (Baudrillard, 1983a, p. 167). So instead of accounting reflecting the real outcomes of GE's strategic decisions, the ex-ante accounting model (itself a simulation of analysts' expectations as explained above) precedes and engenders the strategy which in turn recirculates into reported earnings. Similarly, motion picture companies like Walt Disney forecast reported earnings when deciding when to release videocassettes of hits like Snow White. By carefully timing videocassette releases, they can maintain the smooth trend in earnings that analysts can easily forecast. Analysts' earnings forecasts, in turn, sustain value. Fig. 2 depicts the potential simultaneity introduced by the earnings management “game”. Download : Download full-size image Fig. 2. Why earnings matter. In sum, as Fig. 2 and the quotes from SEC chair Levitt suggest, analysts look for clues about a company's future earnings in its current financial statements and investment decisions. But management simultaneously takes analysts' earnings forecasts as yearly targets and selects investments that are likely to produce reported income equal to or exceeding those forecasts. In turn, the market capitalizes analysts' earnings forecasts into stock prices. The company's investment decision model, the analyst's forecasting model and the investor's valuation model circulate simultaneously (to use Baudrillard's syntax). They refer to each other but, for investors, they lack any relation to a real referent such as cash flow or “true” income. Granted, the company's investments would not generate any earnings if they didn't also generate cash flows. But neither analysts nor investors know how earnings relate to cash flows and hence to value. Rather, they produce and consume accounting earnings which, when coupled with a “price/earnings multiple,” can be used to simulate value. So Baudrillard might address Kinney's question, “Why do official earnings matter?” as follows. Extant accounting theories are poorly equipped to address the question since they are based on antiquated presuppositions about the relation between accounting signs and underlying referents. In the order of simulation, the surplus of non-referential signs such as earnings has exploded, especially in the financial economy that McGoun (1997) aptly describes as “hyperreal.” Amid ongoing discussions of “meltdowns” and “irrational exuberance” in financial markets, the SEC chair called accounting “a reality check—in many cases, the only reality check—before important economic and investment decisions are made” (Levitt, 1996). But this is surely not the kind of “reality” the ancient Sumerians knew. Instead, earnings create a simulated reality of their own because investors' valuation models still treat earnings as if they have the underlying referents of bygone eras. This decoupling of income from its underlying referents does not, however, suggest a diminished importance for earnings. Indeed, as the financial economy becomes increasingly volatile, it becomes more important to maintain the predictability of the income calculation.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Alt › A2 Baudrillard/Semiotics Incorrect

Baudrillard correctly analyzes hyperreality, subjects have become reflections of reflections brought upon them by semiocapitalism.

Denzin 91 [Norman, American professor of sociology at the University of Illinois, “Paris, Texas and Baudrillard on America”, ] cent

Of course on one level Baudrillard is correct. Many Americans long for the days when things are really 'real' again, where the old myths work and are true. This is why they look to the astral reflections of themselves that come from the Hollywood stars. But at least some understand that these representations from the stars only indirectly signify the America that is lived at the level of the everyday. This is so because the astral signifiers are only reflections of other reflections (e.g. Jane Fonda playing alcoholic Alex in The Morning After as a take-off on Jane Fonda playing sex kittens like Barbarella, or prostitutes like Bree in Klute, or Gena Rolands playing the 'real' Betty Ford in the Betty Ford Story). These reflections of reflections become distortions of the real, wherever that is, and we remember the names of these stars long after we have forgotten their fictional names (Williamson, 1987:23). An inspection of these reflections from the stars suggests that many Americans may have become reflections of the reflections that have been brought to them by the media-oriented, postmodern cinematic society. Some can only grasp the real when it is contained within an image which has already been captured in a prior image. Denzin, Paris, Texas and Baudrillard 131 To the extent that this occurs, the boundaries between the public and the private have been erased in American life. But underneath this level of the hyper-real lurks the world of the ordinary individual who turns away from these representations, or finds that they don't square with her or his life. Some of these persons dream other kinds of dreams, and find the sources of the images of their dreams in a cinematic world that is only in their head. Many travel other paths and find their metaphors, not in the cinema of the desert, but in the subversive movies that critique the standard Hollywood version of what life is really like out there in the hinterlands of America. These viewers turn away from Baudrillard's film library, and construct their own list of films that do what he says postmodern cinema cannot do.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Alt › Socialism alt (don’t read with fiat K )

The alt is a revolutionary line of socialism to sever capital from its semiotic levels

White 22, (Will White 2022), bachelor of arts in history – UCLA, freelance writer, syndicated columnist, political theorist, (; “,” 

So, how should we approach understanding this relationship between capitalism and semiotics? Linguistics and Economics by Ferruccio Rossi-Landi help us here by exploring the material relationship between semiotics and capitalism. Landi identifies social reproduction as a material process in which the needs and conditions of material life determine just about everything. [6] Under this assumption, even if the exchange of signs is non-material, that exchange can only happen with the production and reproduction of bodies and objects from which the signs are born. For example, the premise “Will is silly” relies on the signifier Will existing. Landi also suggests that the sign value of communication is contingent upon satisfying the demand within the dialectical market that satisfies bourgeois needs and desires. [7] This indicates that capitalism may alter how we consume signs. However, the material conditions under capitalism shape the power dynamic that demands particular types of exchange. We must then conclude that only a revolutionary line of action rooted in materialism and helping the masses can resolve capitalism on both the “semiotic” and material levels. This does not deny semiotic coding onto black and brown bodies. Instead, opponents of capitalism should not precisely sever capital from the material, and remember that the coding of deviancy can only be born from the meaning derived from physical bodies.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Alt › Analyze semiotics

The alternative is to analyze the distinct dimensions of inherent semiotics within capitalism through the lense of the Cultural Political Economy

Jessop 14, (Bob Jessop, 2014), British sociologist and political economist who has made significant contributions to the fields of state theory, governance, and regulation, (bobjessop.wordpress.com; “Critical Semiotic Analysis and Cultural Political Economy,” https://bobjessop.wordpress.com/2014/12/15/critical-semiotic-analysis-and-cultural-political-economy///KENTO

This article argues for sustained theoretical and empirical engagement between a materially-grounded critical semiotic analysis and an evolutionary and institutional political economy informed by the cultural turn. It is based on my earlier work on state theory and political economy and my critical engagement with Marx’s pre-theoretical discourse analysis[16] and Gramsci’s elaborate philological and materialist studies of hegemony. Others have taken different routes to similar conclusions and have used other labels to describe them. What most distinguishes CPE as presented here from apparently similar approaches are the application of evolutionary theory to semiosis as well as political economy and their resulting mutual transformation. I conclude with the following remarks. First, insofar as semiosis is studied apart from its extra-semiotic context, resulting accounts of social causation will be incomplete, leading to semiotic reductionism and/or imperialism. And, second, insofar as material transformation is studied apart from its semiotic dimensions and mediations, explanations of stability and change risk oscillating between objective necessity and sheer contingency. To avoid these twin problems, CPE aims to steer a path between ‘soft cultural economics’ and ‘hard orthodox economics’. While the former subsumes economic activities under broad generalizations about social and cultural life (especially their inevitably semiotic character), the latter reifies formal, market-rational, calculative activities and analyzes them apart from their discursive significance and broader extra-economic context and supports. The former tendency is common in economic sociology or claims about the ‘culturalization’ of economic life in the new economy (e.g., Lash and Urry 1994); it also occurs in more discourse-theoretical work, such as work on cultural materialism (Williams 1980; Milner 2002), the linguistic mediation of economic activities (Gal 1989), or economic antagonisms (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Unfortunately, from my viewpoint, while such currents correctly reject a sharp division between the cultural and material and stress the cultural dimensions of material life, they tend to lose sight of the specificity of different economic forms, contradictions, institutions, contradictions, and so on. The risk here is that one cannot distinguish in material terms between capitalist and non-capitalist economic practices, institutions, and formations – they all become equally discursive and can only be differentiated through their respective semiotic practices, meanings, and contexts and their performative impact. Conversely, ‘hard orthodox economics’ tends to establish a rigiid demarcation between the economic and the cultural, reifying economic objects, naturalizing homo economicus, and proposing rigid economic laws. At its most extreme, this leads to universalizing, transhistorical claims valid for all forms of material provisioning; in other cases, it tends to separate economizing activities from their extra-economic supports, to regard the economy as a self-reproducing, self-expanding system with its own laws, and to provide the theoretical underpinnings for economic reductionism. In offering a ‘third way’, CPE, at least as presented here, emphasizes that capitalism involves a series of specific economic forms (the commodity form, money, wages, prices, property, etc.) associated with generalized commodity production. These forms have their own effects that must be analyzed as such and that therefore shape the selection and retention of competing economic imaginaries. Thus a Marxist CPE would robustly reject the conflation of discourses and material practices and the more general ‘discourse-imperialism’ that has plagued social theory for two decades. It would also provide a powerful means both to critique and to contextualize recent claims about the ‘culturalization’ of economic life in the new economy – seeing these claims as elements within a new economic imaginary with a potentially performative impact as well as a belated (mis)recognition of the semiotic dimensions of all economic activities (for sometimes contrasting views, see Du Gay and Pryke 2002; Ray and Sayer 1999). And, in addition, as many theorists have noted in various contexts (and orthodox Marxists sometimes forget), the reproduction of the basic forms of the capital relation and their particular instantiation in different social formations cannot be secured purely through the objective logic of the market or a domination that operates ‘behind the backs of the producers’. For capital’s laws of motion are doubly tendential and depend on contingent social practices that extend well beyond what is from time to time construed and/or constructed as economic. CPE provides a corrective to these problems too. In part this comes from its emphasis on the constitutive material role of the extra-economic supports of market forces. But it also emphasizes how different economic imaginaries serve to demarcate economic from extra-economic activities, institutions, and orders and, hence, how semiosis is also constitutive in securing the conditions for capital accumulation.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Alt › Anticap

The alt is empirically supported and is part of a broader discussion on challenging capitalism.

Rogers 14 (Chris Rogers, author, Capitalism and Its Alternatives: A Critical Introduction, Zed Books, 2014. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=1758713.) AM

However, the events of the late 1960s were significant in at least two senses. First, they showed that people are willing and able to ask important questions about society and to express their discontent by taking action (Watts 2001: 160). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the events occurred during the pinnacle of the expansion of post-war liberal capitalism, and were not the product of a capitalist crisis as such (ibid.: 162; Löwy 2002: 96). This suggests that resistance to capitalism is constantly simmering beneath the surface as an expression of a generalized discontent with the implications of the prevailing form of social and economic organization, and that anti-capitalism is more than a fleeting moment associated with undesirable yet historically specific circumstances such as unemployment or rising inflation.

These notions that the anti-capitalism of 1968 either represented ‘pure nothingness’ or resulted in a compromised and co-opted political left can clearly be challenged by the persistence of anti-capitalist activity throughout the world. There are many such examples, which include action by indigenous movements seeking to protect their land from appropriation by the state. This is typified by the Zapatista resistance to the North American Free Trade Agreement in Mexico (Cuninghame 2008), which has gathered support far beyond the Zapatista communities themselves, as they have been able to use communications technologies in order to ‘get their message out despite governmental spin and censorship’ (Cleaver 2008: 130). Alongside other organized activities, the ability of the Zapatista movement to raise awareness of its struggle has ‘facilitated discussions and debate among concerned observers that led to the organization of protest and support activities in over forty countries around the world’ (ibid.: 130). Despite claims that the anti-capitalism of the 1960s was a failure, such movements show that people are still willing to question the capitalist system and to try to create an alternative. On a smaller scale, organizations like the Starbucks Workers Campaign have shown a similar willingness to question the prevailing form of social and economic organization, by challenging the notion of progressive capitalism (Shukaitis 2008: 104). Some of the anti-capitalist actions featuring prominently in the media have included the Battle of Seattle against the World Trade Organization, and the 2009 protests against the G20 in London, but there have been many more besides (see Tormey 2004: 177– 9 for a timeline). All of these varying forms of ongoing struggle indicate people’s continued willingness to question capitalism, ponder alternatives, and consider how they might be realized.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Alt › Anticap

The alternative is to engage in anticapitalism, an act of radical resistance grounded in grassroots movements. Anticapitalism does not represent an unattainable utopia but challenges common myths about capitalism as a whole.

Rogers 14 (Chris Rogers, author, Capitalism and Its Alternatives: A Critical Introduction, Zed Books, 2014. ProQuest Ebook Central, .) AM

A note on terminology The book will draw on four core concepts. The first of these is capitalism. The term capitalism is used throughout the book to refer to the prevailing form of social organization. While acknowledging that the ways in which capitalism operates and the implications of these operations are contested, this book defines capital ism in terms of one commonly accepted distinguishing feature: that capitalism is a system that organizes the production, distribution and exchange of goods, on the basis of private property, with a view to realizing profit and therefore increasing wealth. The second term is alternative capitalism, which is used to describe a system where the capitalistic relationship between state and market is re-regulated, but not fundamentally reformed, in order to try to produce optimal social and economic outcomes. The aim of an alternative capitalism is to maximize wealth and profit by introducing a different structure of rules to govern capitalism. The third concept is that of an alternative to capitalism. An alternative to capitalism is distinct from capitalism because it places an emphasis on social and civic goals, rather than purely focusing on pecuniary gain. In contrast to capitalism, an alternative to capitalism is founded on collective or community property rights, rather than individual property rights, although the form and extent of collective or community property rights may vary. Where the book is referring to either an alternative capitalism or an alternative to capitalism, it uses the form ‘alternative (to) capitalism’. The final concept the book uses is anti-capitalism. It uses the term anti-capitalism to refer to the act of resisting capitalism, whether this occurs by attempting to influence the state, taking control of the state, or actions taken independently or outside of the state. An individual who pursues or wishes to pursue an alternative to capitalism can therefore be described as an anti-capitalist.

Traditions of Resistance In its consideration of capitalism and its alternatives, this book accepts that it is possible to perceive capitalism and its con sequences in different ways. Furthermore, it acknowledges that the way in which capitalism and its consequences are perceived will have a fundamental impact on whether people deem capitalism to be desirable, whether they would prefer an alternative capitalism or an alternative to capitalism, and therefore whether they believe that it is important and worthwhile engaging in resistance to capitalism through the social act of anti-capitalism. However, the central argument of this book is that capitalism displays intrinsic tendencies towards crisis that make an alternative to capitalism desirable, and so justifies anti-capitalist action. In doing so, it argues that capitalism is a product of social interaction between people, and that it is remade or resisted through our social action. This emphasis on social constitution challenges common assertions about the inevitability of capitalist logic, and in the process shows that the prospect of realizing an alternative to capitalism is more than wishful thinking. In its discussions of alternatives to capitalism, however, this book guards against thinking of alternative forms of social organization as outcomes or utopias. Rather, it shows how various forms of alternative social and economic organization have shown a tendency to degenerate over time, or to reproduce injustices of capitalist social relations. It therefore suggests that alternatives to capitalism should be thought of as processes that need to be continually made and remade if they are not to degenerate or reproduce the injustices of capitalist social relations, and if desirable outcomes are to be realized. Reflecting the book’s emphasis on the social constitution of economy and society, it rejects ‘top-down’ attempts to impose an alternative to capitalism by political means, and argues that anticapitalist action should take a ‘bottom-up’ form, which requires democratic and pluralistic experimentation with different models of social and economic organization to expand the space in which non-capitalist activity takes place.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Alt › Generic

The alt is continuous rejection of semiotics via deconstruction revealing the paradoxical nature of their hypnotic notions of rationalization

Jonathan Culler 1997 (Jonathan, Jonathan Culler is chair of the departments of English, Comparative Literature, as well as Senior Associate Dean of Arts and Sciences at Cornell who won MLA’s Lowell Prize and established his reputation as analyst and expositor of critical theory. Professor Culler has been President of the American Comparative Literature Association, Secretary of the American Council of Learned Societies and Chair of the New York Council for the Humanities. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2001 and to the American Philosophical Society in 2006. “Semiotics and Deconstruction” JSTOR ShNapiro)

The moment when semiotics is becoming well-established in America - a subject of conferences, a topic of university courses, and even a domain to which people in various traditional disciplines are beginning to relate their own work - is also, as is perhaps only appropriate, a moment when semiotics finds itself under attack, criticized as a version of precisely the scientific positivism which is itself very prone to reject semiotics. In many cases, of course, the attack on semiotics comes from a traditional humanism, affronted that a discipline with scientific pretensions should claim to treat products of the human spirit. These arguments can be countered in various ways which I shan't be discussing here. I'm interested in a more radical critique which also focuses on the scientific pretension of semiotics - a critique which compels our attention precisely because it isn't another version of traditional humanism. One could cite various examples of this position. I offer as not untypical, but among the better informed, J. Hillis Miller's argument that among literary critics who have been influenced by European developments a clear distinction can be drawn [...] between what might be called to conflate two terminologies, Socratic, theoretical, or canny critics on the one hand, and ApollonianiDionysian, tragic, or uncanny critics on the other. Socratic critics are those who are lulled by the promise of a rational ordering of literary study on the basis of solid advances in scientific knowledge about language. They are likely to speak of themselves as "scientists" and to group their collective enterprise under some term like "the human sciences." [...] Suich an enterprise is represented by the discipline called semiotics [...]. For the most part these critics share the Socratic penchant, what Nietzsche defined as "the unshakeable faith that thought, using the thread of logic, can Jpenetrate the deepest abysses of being [...]." The inheritors of the Socratic faittl would believe in the possibility of a structuralist-inspired criticism as a rational and rationalizable activity. with agreed ulpon rules of procedures, *This mapepr was delivered at the International Conference on the Semiotics of Art, sponsored by the [iniversitv of Michigan, May' 1978, and will appear in the proceedings of that conference. For a more extensive (development of this discussion, see my "Structuralism and Grammatology, given facts, and measurable results. This would be a discipline bringing literature out into the sunlight in a "happy positivism" (1976: 335). The "uncanny critics," on the other hand, have no such faith in the possibility of general and systematic theories, because they have discovered that a careful working through of individual texts, whether literary or philosophical, leads to unmasterable paradoxes, aporias, which seem constitutive of the domain of signification itself. I cite this argument as an example of the attitude which has come to be called "post-structuralist" or "deconstructionist," but I am less interested in Miller's own account of the situation, which seems primarily based on psychological categories - are the proponents of semiotics "lulled by the promise of rational ordering"? do we have "unshakeable faith" in thought? – t han in the powerful interpretive account of linguistics and semiotics on which statements such as Miller's are ultimately dependent: Jacques Derrida's reading of Saussure in De la grammatologie. I want to focus on this reading partly because I think Derrida is right and that his argument should be better understood among semioticians but also because I am interested in the implications for semiotics of this deconstructive reading. But first a word about Derrida's general project. Derrida's writings, his readings of theoretical texts, are explorations of what he calls the "logocentrism" of Western culture - the "metaphysics of presence" which these texts can be shown simultaneously to affirm and to undermine. The metaphysics of presence - our metaphysics - determines being as presence, granting ontological primacy, for example, to what is deemed to be present to consciousness. The Cartesian cogito, in which the I is deemed to lie beyond doubt because it is present to itself in the act of thinking, is one instance. Another is our notion that there is a present instant which we can truly grasp in that it is self-identical and present to us, and that the reality of everything depends on its relation to this presence of the present: the past a former present and the future an anticipated present. Finally, there is the notion of meaning as something present to the consciousness of the speaker at the moment of utterance: what the speaker "has in mind" as he speaks. Derrida is interested in the way in which this logocentrism is "deconstructed" in texts that affirm it. To deconstruct logocentrism is to show that what was taken to be the truth of the world or the ground of an enquiry is in fact a construct that has been imposed and which is contradicted by certain results of the enquiry it founds. This will become clearer as we follow Derrida's reading of Saussure. The Cours de linguistique generale and semiotics generally provide a striking case for Derrida, for it can be shown to contain a radical critique of logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence on the one hand, yet an affirmation of logocentrism and an inextricable involvement with it on the other. Let us take these movements in turn. The critique of logocentrism. Since Saussure defines language as a system of signs, the central question becomes that of the nature and identity of signs and their constituents. Saussure is led by his investigation to argue that linguistic units do not have essences but are defined solely by relations. His famous claim that "dans la langue il n'y a que des differences, sans termes positifs," is a principle wholly at odds with logocentrism. It maintains, on the one hand, that no terms of the system are ever simply and wholly present, for there are no positive terms and a difference can never be present as such. The reality of linguistic units cannot depend, therefore, on their presence as such. And, on the other hanid, in defining identity in terms of common absences rather than in terms of common presences, the linguistic and semiotic principle puts in question the principle which is the very cornerstone of the metaphysics of presence. 2. The affirmation of logocentrism. Though Saussure has specified that sound itself does not belong to the linguistic system, and though he has used the example of writing to illustrate the nature of linguistic units, he adamantly denies that writing is an object of linguistic enquiry ("spoken forms alone constitute its object") and treats writing as a parasitic form, the representation of a representation. This may seem like a relatively innocent move, but in fact a great deal depends on it. And the energy and moral indignation which Saussure displays in relating how linguists can "fall into the trap" of attending to written forms and how writing can "usurp the role" of speech and even affect pronunciation - this suggests that more is at stake than meets the eye. Ever since Plato condemned writing in the Phaedrus, discussion of language has ascribed some characteristics of language to writing and then relegated it to a position of dependence so as to confront a purified speech. To put it very schematically, if writing is set aside as dependent and derivative, accounts of language can take as the norm the experience of hearing oneself speak, where form and meaning seem given simultaneously and in an event of incarnation, rather than, say, the act of deciphering an anonymous inscription. The repression of writing minimizes the differential or diacritical nature of language in favor of supposed presences. The privileging of speech is not only a weighty matter, it is also very nearly inescapable. Why is this so? Because linguistic analysis, and by extension semiotic analysis, depends upon the possibility of identifying signs. To identify signs one must be able to identify signifieds, since a sequence is a signifier only if it is correlated with a concept or signified. We know bet and pet are different signifiers because each has associated with it a different signified. And if we ask how we know this, at what moment or place this association is given, the answer requires some form of presence and will ultimately refer to the moment of speech: the moment of utterance when signifier seems to deliver the signified which is present in it or which it expresses at that moment. The moment of This content downloaded from utterance seems to present positive terms, given in and of themselves, and thus to provide a point of departure for analysis of a system said to consist only of differences. Since the possibility of grasping or identifying signifieds is necessary to the semiotic project, it is no accident that semiotic theory should find itself implicated in phonocentrism and logocentrism. It is neither an accident nor, I want to insist, an error. Let me quote a passage from the Grammatology: The privilege of the phonb does not depend on a choice that could have been avoided. It responds to a moment of economy (let us say of the "life" of "history" or of "being-as-self-relationship"). The system of s'entendre parler through the phonic substance - which presents itself as the nonexterior, non-mundane. and therefore non-empirical or contingent signifier - has necessarily dominated the history of the world during an entire epoch, and has even produced the idea of the world, the idea of worldorigin, that arises from the difference between the worldly and the nonworldly, the outside and the inside, ideality and non-ideality, universal and non-universal, transcendentalnd empirical, etc. (1976: 7-8). These are large claims They may become more comprehensible if one notes that oppositions such as outside/inside, transcendental/empirical, etc., depend on a point of differentiation, a line of division which distinguishes the two terms and commands the opposition. The claim is that the moment of speech, where signifier and signified seem given together, where inner and outer or physical and mental are for an instant perfectly fused, serves as the point of reference in relation to which all these distinctions are posited Since the privileging of speech is essential to our metaphysics, Derrida does not argue that Saussure was mistaken in asserting the primacy of voice and founding linguistic analysis on the necessarily logocentric notion of the sign. On the contrary, Derrida's analyses of the ubiquity of logocentrism - even Georges Bataille can be shown ultimately to be a Kantian - show that analysis is necessarily logocentric: even the most rigorous critiques of logocentrism cannot escape it since the concepts they must use are part of the system being deconstructed. There are, of course, various ways of playing with or resisting the system that one cannot escape, but it would be an error to suggest that Derrida and deconstruction have provided us with an alternative to semiotics and logocentrism. Grammatology, Derrida has said, is not a new discipline which could replace a logocentric semiology; it is the name of a question (1972: 22). Indeed, Derrida's own writing involves a series of strategic manoeuvres and displacements in which he modifies his terms, producing a chain of related but non-identical operators - diffirance, suppldment, trace, hymen, espacement, greffe, pharmakon, parergon - to prevent any of his terms from becoming "concepts" of a new science. Derrida's reading of Saussure is an exploration of the self deconstruction of semiotics. Indeed, in the interview in Positions entitled "Semiologie et grammatologie" he identified his double science or double reading not with a mode of discourse that would lie outside or beyond semiotics but with a special practice within semiotics. One can say a priori that in every semiotic proposition or system of research metaphysical presuppositions will cohabit with critical motifs by virtue of the fact that up to a certain point they inhabit the same language, or rather the same system of language. Grammatology would doubtless be less another science, a new discipline charged with a new content or a new and welldelimited domain than the vigilant practice or exercise of this textual division (la pratique vigilante de ce partage textuel) (1972: 49-50). Three points by way of conclusion. Deconstruction isn't, at least in the work of Derrida and its other most skillful practitioners, some kind of "new irrationalism," as is occasionally suggested. Though it reveals "irrationalities" in our systems and theories, it is the most rigorous pursuit of the logic of the text, be it a theoretical or a literary text. The aporias deconstruction reveals are contradictions, paradoxes, which semiotics cannot escape: in this case that the theory of the sign leads to theoretical principles which must be repressed if analysis is to take place. Semiotics cannot help supposing positive terms which its theory must disallow. Further discussion would lead us to the unmasterable oppositions between langue and parole, system and event, synchronic and diachronic, which can never be held together in a single self-consistent system. Generally, semiotics is not the self-consistent discourse of a science but a text. What deconstruction advises is not a change of direction - the correction of some error which would make it a "true science" - or a change of purpose - a shift from semiotics to a new discipline of grammatology. There is no escape from textuality; one can only engage it with critical vigilance: "la pratique vigilante de ce partage textuel." REFERENCES DERRIDA, JACQUES, 1976. Of Grammatology, Gayatri Spivak, trans. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins). 1972 Positions (Paris: Minuit). MILLER, J. HILLIS, 1976. "Stevens's Rock and Criticism as Cure," The Georgia Review 30:2, 330-405.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Impact › Reproductive Impacts

Intersections of reinforced cap labor is sustained by semiotics

Bottini 20 (Bottini, E, Université de Caen Normandie, UFR de droit, Faculty Member, 2020, “Reflections on Semiocapitalism and the Maternal from a Daughter’s Point of View”,  Studies in the Maternal  LM)   

The last ten years, the global economic crisis, austerity measures, and the rising surge of racist and populist movements could be seen as the effect of an era that for Bifo is not based on consent, but on terror. This has certainly pushed communities into losing certain transitional elements (Winnicott, 1971) that have been in place for a long time. Many people are confronted with a world that looks very different from the one when their parents were young, but also from the one when they were, themselves, younger or children. Today, these mothers and children have gone through complex changes within their specific situations, often without the opportunity of having support in transitioning to deal with the new and upgraded versions of semiocapitalism’s products. This raises certain questions. Can the ability to reflect on and use the legacy of the relation with one’s own mother, entangled in her difficulties concerning the work on the child’s alterity and her positioning in her social context, be generative for the discovery and rediscovery of how systemic pressures are failing our own need for autonomous spaces? Can the legacy of such a complex intimate relation be used to think through paths of growth, the risk of stasis, and the search for authenticity within a context of splitterkapitalism? Of course, material, practical and structural constraints are not something that can be washed away. However, my question is whether such thinking can help in navigating a reality that tends to obliterate intimate parts of the self. Also, can some of the countless and unthinkable complexities that maternal subjects face today have to do with some of the losses that communities went through in the last decades

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Impact › LGBTQIA+ Impacts

2. Capitalism reinforces hegemonic privilege through classist markets

Cosenva 13 (Julie Cosenva, Julie Cosenza, Department of Speech Communication, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, December 5, 2013, ‘The Crises of Collage: Disability, Queerness, and Chronormativity’/LM)

Queer time emerges from postmodernism and is a specific mode of temporality that deviates from the hegemonic “temporal frames of bourgeois reproduction and family, longevity, risk/safety, and inheritance” (, p. 6). Queer subcultures, Halberstam suggests, create queer temporalities that deviate from the paradigmatic markers of life experiences—birth, marriage, reproduction, and death. Queer time veers from the “natural” progression of time, and the natural progression is mirrored after bourgeois timelines, expectations, and norms. For example, many queers form families outside of the traditional structure of two parents and offspring, that is, two dads, two moms, and a dad co-parenting, a non-cisgender parent, queer parents, and on and on and on. For the most part, at this point in time, same-sex couples can not biologically reproduce a child in the “traditional” sense. In many U.S. cultures, the normative bloodline and reproduction of family is vital to all the major markers of life experiences. However, class privilege helps reinforce this chrononormativity, for example, paying ridiculous amounts of money for a destination wedding, or buying a daughter a new car on graduating from college, or sending a son to Europe after high school, or inheriting the family business when dad retires. These are all important events in a child’s timeline that are marked/celebrated with monetary gifts, contributing to a classist market that is designed specifically to capitalize on significant temporal life experiences. The power inequalities embedded in capitalism are particularly evident when it comes to inheritance, and by “inheritance,” I mean passing on biological characteristics as well as wealth.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Impact › LGBTQIA+ Impacts

Semiocapitalism takes away basic human rights beyond Queertheory

MacCormack 20’, (, Patricia, Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge, UK, July 14, 2020, ‘Embracing Death, Opening The World’ LM)

Semiocapitalism as coined by FrancoBerardi (2015) has reduced life and death to units of profit, without duration, without con-sistency. This is all because the anthropocene has converted the Earth, its occupants, itshistories and its futures, into a resource defined, manipulated and plundered for humanconsumption. The Earth exists for humans under what Carol Adams (2014) would callthe arrogant eye of anthropocentrism. Adams explicitly connects anthropocentrism withnegation, both of rights and of life. This is why aspirations to humanity have led toracial exclusiory feminism, feminist exclusionary anti-racism, racial and feminine exclusion-ary class warfare and so forth. Aspirations to‘humanity’and‘human rights’is an exclusion-ary and negating framework of liberation from oppression and has at its anthropocentriccore an operation of othering in order for anyfighting party to ascend:It is conventionally said that oppression dehumanizes, that it reduces humans to animal status.But oppression cannot dehumanize animals. Animals exist categorically as that which is nothuman...resistance against oppression for humans involves recognizing their‘humanity’.But it is a humanity born of negating. (Adams1995, 77)Defining rights as human has long associated feminism with the demand to become orperform masculinity, racial minoritarianism to perform whiteness and homosexuality toperform heteronormativity. Adams clearly identifies that this structuration of rights isboth anthropocentric and thus by default hierarchical (1995, 78). Feminism in manyways already aligns with anti-anthropocentrism in its demand for difference and itsrefusal of binaries such as nature and culture, the material and the intelligible. Queertheory takes this even further by defying categorisation itself, and without categoriesthere can be no hierarchy. The very concept of differentiation of rights through speciesis defunct from a queer perspective. Beyond queer as a desiring trajectory, queer perspec-tives encounter each manifestation of life as a unique event-organism of expressivity andthe capacity to be affected. A new approach tototalrights for the Earth and all its occu-pants, that rallies against the mass death of nonhuman others, has already embraced thefeminist demand for difference without equivalence to the dominant, and queer’s repudia-tion of ontological recognition that leads to hierarchical placement. Both are a requiredgiven for a new understanding of relations through a natural anti-anthropocentric seriesof relations.We are always parasite, never host. There is no consent asked of the natural. Contem-porary attempts to end the death of the Earth do not go far enough. They speak of reci-procity, of entanglement, of how we can do better. But as long as humans are humans weremain anthropocentric in our impulses, which result in small deviations in human consu-mer practices for which we congratulate ourselves and which are immediately hijacked bysemiocapitalism to become their own kind of profitable ethics.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Impact › Ableism Impacts

2. Semiotics reinforces ableism structures that exist in society created by capitalism

Monetleone 18, (Monetleone, Rebecca, Currently works at the University of Toledo and runs Disability Study Programs as a Doctor of Philosophy, November 2018, ‘A Privileged Bodymind The Entanglement of Ableism and Capitalism,’ LM)

The key feature of ableism is the privileging of certain arrangements of bodyminds, often labeled “typical” or “average,” and the subsequent discrimination against non-normative bodyminds. In this context ‘bodymind’ refers to what Price (2015) calls the “imbrication (not just the combination) of the entities usually called ‘body’ and ‘mind’…” (p. 270). This phrase not only challenges Cartesian dualism but flags cognitive and mental difference as an important category of analysis. Wolbring (2008), a bioethicist who has written extensively on the subject, describes ableism as a “set of beliefs, processes and practices that produce—based on abilities one exhibits or values—a particular understanding of oneself, one’s body and one’s relationship with others of humanity, other species and the environment, and includes how one is judged by others” (p. 90). Goodley et al. (2014) further describe ableism as “normatively privileg[ing] ablebodiedness…encourag[ing] an institutional bias towards autonomous, independent bodies…lend[ing] support to economic and material dependence on neoliberal and hypercapitalist forms of production” (p. 21, emphasis added). Critical disability studies, which allows disability “to be understood from the perspective of the person who experiences it,” has been a rich academic site to explore the entanglements of knowledge systems which privilege certain bodyminds (Reaume, 2014, p. 1248). It is an explicitly normative interdisciplinary commitment to understanding disability as more than individual 68 impairment, and to interrogating deeply entrenched social and political injustices. Simi Linton (1998) holds that the subject matter of disability studies is “not simply the variations that exist in human behavior, appearance, functioning, sensory acuity, and cognitive processing but, more crucially, the meaning we make of those variations” (p. 2). Ben-Moshe and Magaña (2014) add that such meaning is “socially constructed by people’s thoughts, words, and physical manifestations (such as the built environment) and become ways of defining human experiences that take on cultural and historical meaning, often of a negative tint” (p. 106). Moreover, the production of meaning, whether creative or symbolic, is cultural, and it structures identities, social imaginaries, and opinions (de Lauretis, as cited in Hawkesworth, 2006, p. 25). If as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels observe in The German Ideology (1970) the “ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the ruling ideas,” then it is necessary to question how capitalism and capitalist ideology informs the meanings and constructions that are often the focus of disability studies (p. 64). This work should contribute to disability studies and disability culture, as both “aim at breaking down the perception of disability as personal tragedy, pathology, or deficiency” (Ben-Moshe and Magaña, 2014, p. 106). Nor should capitalism’s critics take for granted how “major advances might be made in eroding aversive and rejecting perceptions of persons with disabilities.” Additionally, questioning the effects that capitalism and capitalist ideology have on meaning and its social construction, especially with regards to the intangible dimensions on which society is predicated, does not suffice for understanding the ableist-capitalist relationship.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Impact › Ableism Impacts

Neoliberal capitalism has internalized communication enabling semiocapitalism and detrimental communications

St. Pierre, 19’ (St. Pierre, Joshua, Joshua St. Pierre is Canada Research Chair (Tier 2) in Critical Disability Studies and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta. He holds a BA in Humanities (Briercrest College), an MA in Philosophy (University of Alberta), and a PhD in Philosophy (University of Alberta), 2019, ‘Fluency Machines: Semiocapitalism, Disability, and Action’ LM)

Yet at the same time, I argue that smooth flows of communication can also close the possibility for political action through the production of seemingly uninterrupted spaces, temporalities, and meanings which close over alternative ways of being and relating. As a mode of “compulsory able-bodiedness” (McRuer 2006), I take fluency to be a regulative ideal that governs how and if speech may enter the common world. The ostensibly seamless flow of signs is a fictive ideal impossible to embody but nevertheless compulsory in its performative demands: offering the appearance of a choice where there is actually none. While semiocapitalism attempts to run semiotic bodies down tractable futures, this effort strains against the dysfluency inherent to the capacity of speech. Since fluency works to close political and social spaces—“covering its tracks,” as it were—a critical disability studies analysis is needed to expose the discontinuities, frictions, and asymmetries in semiocapitalism; to expose these ruptures and counter its smooth operations. The vast array of rhythms, semiotic modes, tempos, dictions, and (racialized or disabled) accents that constitute practices of aural “communication” have become the objective domain of the academic field, professional practice, and locus of treatment protocols called SpeechLanguage Pathology (SLP). This biomedical industry has assumed authority over the truth and technical making of speech.