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2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Impact › Racial Impacts

Semiocapitalism is rooted in racial exploitation

Lenehan 19 (Lenehan, Rose Ph. D. in Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2019, MIT, ‘Reparations, racial exploition, and racial capitalism,2019 /LM)

Mills begins his list of examples with slavery and Native American expropriation. An argument for the illegitimacy of most currently held property claims could be made on the basis of those alone, since they can be thought of as large-scale instances of theft thoroughly integrated into the development of the US economy. Notice, however, that though Mills characterizes these 'transactions'-centuries-long processes, which worked very differently in different times and places-as instances of racial exploitation, his broader argumentative strategy does not require it. Fortunes built on expropriation and slavery were very plainly not earned through processes wherein the rights to life, liberty, and property of all parties to the transactions were respected. Whatever justice in acquisition and justice in transfer require, claims to wealth produced by seizing land through the doctrine of discovery, owning and selling the products of their enslaved labor violate them. If we are seeking to describe and explain these practices, then theorizing about race and changing racial norms is 5 Mills, "Reply to Critics," 261. Emphasis mine. 34 crucial, but no such theorizing is necessary in order to consider whether the property claims slavery and land expropriation produced were legitimate by contemporary liberal norms; it can be argued that redress is owed for these practices, or that the wealth holdings that followed them were illegitimate, regardless of how the broader theory of racial exploitation fares. But a theory of racial exploitation ought to treat these cases as paradigmatic. These practices played an enormous role in producing what Mills calls "illicit white advantage"-the elimination of which is his primary goal in theorizing racial exploitation in the first place. To determine whether Mills's theory fits these cases, I'll turn to some of the historical work about the racial ideas that were prevalent early on in these practices.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Impact › Racial Impacts

Semiocapitalism feeds into antiblackness and anti-Asian practices of racialized social isolation

McMaster 19’ (McMaster, James, is Assistant Professor of Gender and Women’s Studies and Asian American Studies, Journal of Asian American Studies, " But You Have to Do Something”: The Racialized Holding Environment of Julia Cho’s Office Hour, June 2019," https://muse.jhu.edu/article/728872/pdf/ LM)

It is my contention that this exchange expresses a certain struggle and structure of feelings found by the playwright in Gina, in Dennis, and, by extension, in Seung-Hui Cho: namely, the struggle and structure of Asian American loneliness. If Genevieve, in her insistence that Gina in particular must do something for Dennis, doubles down on the displacement of gendered and racialized caring and pedagogical labor she effected earlier in the narrative, then Gina’s rebuff and redirection of Genevieve asserts that this student’s needs must be met by everyone, at all levels, at all times. The exchange, in other words, resurfaces the complicated interracial relations with which the play began. The pernicious power of Asian American loneliness is given in the sense that nearly no area of Asian American life seems to escape its affective saturation. Drawing on work from Jasbir Puar, I position Asian American loneliness as a racialized condition of “debility” that indexes both a structural reality of racialized social isolation under semiocapitalism and a psychic and affective condition comorbid with other (deracinated) conditions more legible within the logic of medical diagnosis. Recontextualizing and compounding Bifo’s claims, Asian American loneliness might be given in and as the isolation that characterizes the Asian immigrant experience, as well as its often concomitant linguistic and performatic otherness. Or else and in other contexts, Asian American loneliness might be the mood of the model minority—the subject whose supposed success seems to [End Page 147] delegitimize claims to suffering and solidarity that might be made to the dominant culture or its other dominated others. When experienced in this latter mode especially, the unbearability of Asian American loneliness for the (assimilative) Asian American subject often leads to the splintering of interracial coalition insofar as this particular structure of ugly feelings frequently yields antiblack performances of what Jared Sexton has called “people of color blindness,” performances such as the one that Julia Cho depicts in this interaction between Gina and Genevieve. Indeed, while I read Gina’s (somewhat suppressed) anger as an expressive eruption of Asian American loneliness generated by a situation of profound burden and isolation, I would also suggest that it is misdirected at Genevieve. Gina forgets that Genevieve is also and, as a black woman, especially overwhelmed by the twinned burdens of care and representation. In other words, in seeking assistance from Genevieve, Gina forgets that Genevieve’s burden came prior (indeed, in a world structurally constituted by and against antiblackness, is prior) to her own. The exchange demonstrates that Asian American loneliness functions not only as a drain on Asian American life, but as a mechanism potentially productive of antiblack burden, as well.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Impact › Racial Impacts

Semiocapitalism is rooted in racial exploitation

Lenehan, 19,( Lenehan, Rose Ph. D. in Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2019, MIT, ‘Reparations, racial exploition, and racial capitalism,2019 /LM)

Here, very briefly, are two sketches of alternative accounts of racial exploitation. First, sometimes people use the term "racial exploitation" just to refer to exploitation of 'the subordinate races' by 'the dominant race.' In fact, this is what Mills seems to mean by "racial exploitation" in earlier work. In The Racial Contract, he writes, "The whole point of establishing a moral hierarchy and juridically partitioning the polity according to race is to secure and legitimate the privileging of those individuals designated as white/persons and the exploitation of those individuals designated as nonwhite/subpersons." 8 ' The white/non-white bifurcation corresponds to the division between the exploiters and the exploited. This is a global bifurcation, since Europe grew wealthy through slavery and colonization, and a national bifurcation, since white settlers grew wealthy through land expropriation and slavery. Here, Mills does not distinguish between standard capitalist exploitation and racial exploitation. Instead, he is arguing that standard capitalist exploitation is racial exploitation. Yet another account of racial exploitation might refer to something much more specific. It could begin, for example, with an account of racial formation, explaining how racial categories are reproduced and transformed, how they structure social space, and how people inhabit them. Within such a framework, one could develop a theory of racial power and powerlessness. Formal legal restrictions have largely been replaced by social rules about who belongs where, who is entitled to what, and what behavior is proper or acceptable for whom. Relative to particular contexts, and the norms that dominate in those contexts, people wield a particular kind of power or are particularly vulnerable because of their racial designations.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Impact › Generic

The creation of a violent necro-economy fragments labor from capital – turns case

Bifo 2011 (Franco Berardi, Italian critic and media activist, 08-23-2011, “After the Future”, AK Press, Accessed 7-19-2023, pg 108-110)//sfs

The global recession started officially in September 2008 and lasted officially until the summer of 2009. Since the summer of 2009 the official truth in the media, in political statements, in economic talk was: recovery. The stock exchange began to rise again and the banks started again paying huge bonuses to their managers and so on. Meanwhile, unemployment was exploding everywhere, salaries were falling, welfare was curtailed, 90 million more are expected to join the army of poverty in the next year. Is this recovery? Our conditional reflex (influenced by the Keynesian knowledge that recovery is the recovery of the “real economy”) answered: no, this is not recovery, capitalism cannot recover only by financial means. But we should reframe our vision. Finance is no longer a mere tool of capitalist growth. The financialization of capitalism has made finance the very ground of accumulation, as Christian Marazzi (2010) has explained in recent works such as The Violence of Financial Capitalism. In the sphere of semiocapitalism, financial signs are not only signifiers pointing to some referents. The distinction between sign and referent is over. The sign is the thing, the product, the process. The “real” economy and financial expectations are no longer distinct spheres. In the past, when riches were created in the sphere of industrial production, when finance was only a tool for the mobilization of capital to invest in the field of material production, recovery could not be limited to the financial sphere. It took also employment and demand. Industrial capitalism could not grow if society did not grow. Nowadays we must accept the idea that financial capitalism can recover and thrive without social recovery. Social life has become residual, redundant, irrelevant. The financial cycle is bleeding the social environment dry: sucking energies, resources, and the future. And giving nothing back. Recovery of the financial process of valorization of capital is totally separated from the cycle of material production and social demand. Financial capitalism has obtained autonomy from social life. Let’s consider the political side of the same problem: once upon a time when society was suffering the blows of recession, workers reacted with strikes, struggle and political organization, and forced state intervention in order to increase demand. Industrial growth needed mass consumption and social stability. What is impressive in the ongoing crisis, on the contrary, is the widespread passivity of the workers, their inability to unionize. The political trend in Europe is the meltdown of leftist parties and the labor movement. In the US, Obama is daily attacked by racist and populist mobs, but no progressive social movement is emerging. 1.2 million people have had their mortgages foreclosed upon and lost their houses following the sub-prime swindle, but no organized reaction has surfaced. People suffer and cry alone. In the old time of industrial capitalism, the working class could fight against a target that was precisely identified: the boss, the entrepreneur who was the owner of material things like the factory, and of the product of his laborers. Nowadays the boss has vanished. He is fragmented into billions of financial segments, and disseminated into millions of financial agents scattered all around the world. The workers themselves are part of recombinant financial capital. They are expecting future revenues from their pension fund investments. They own stock options in the enterprise exploiting their labor. They are hooked up, like a fly in a spider web, and if they move, they get strangled, but if they don’t move, the spider will suck their life from them. Society may rot, fall apart, agonize. It is not going to affect the political and economic stability of capitalism. What is called economic recovery is a new round of social devastation. So the recession is over, capitalism is recovering. Nonetheless, unemployment is rising and misery is spreading. This means that financial capitalism is autonomous from society. Capitalism doesn’t need workers: it just needs cellular fractals of labor, underpaid, precarious, de-personalised. Fragments of impersonal nervous energy, recombined by the network. The crisis is going to push forward technological change, and the substitution of human labor with machines. The employment rate is not going to rise in the future, and productivity will increase. A shrinking number of workers will be forced to produce more and more, and to work overtime. The real bubble is the work bubble. We have been working too much; we are still working too much. The human race does not need more goods, it needs a redistribution of existing goods, an intelligent application of technology and a worldwide cut in the lifetime dedicated to labor. Social energies have to be freed from labor dependence, and returned to the field of social affection, education, and therapy. We should take seriously the concept of autonomy. In the present condition autonomy means exodus from the domain of economic law: Out-onomy, abandonment of the field of economic exchange, self-organization of knowledge and of production in a sphere of social life which is no longer dependent on economic culture and expectations – barter, free exchange of time and of competence, food self reliance, occupation of territories in the cities, organization of self-defense. The fantastic collapse that has shaken the global economy since September 2008 has opened a new phase in the history of the world. After some months of amazement and confusion, media, political institutions and economists have started to repeat the self-reassuring mantra: recovery is coming soon. I do not know what will happen next, but I think that the word recovery means very little in the current situation. What is sure, in my opinion, is that the workers will not recover if neoliberal ideology is not abandoned, and if the myth of growth is not substituted with a new kind of narration. Unemployment is rising everywhere and salaries are falling. And the huge debt accumulated for the rescue of the banks is weighing upon the future of society.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Link › Social Security

The distribution of social security perpetuates MRWaSP’s hegemonic system—healthcare is just a form of MRWaSP reproduction—the impact is queer lives

Robin James 15— former Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, editor for Philosophy, Literary Theory, Music & Sound Studies at Palgrave MacMillan, Resilience & Melancholy: Pop Music, Feminism, Neoliberalism, Zero Books , pages 47-48, February 27th, 2015 //kd

In the last chapter, I discussed various ways resilience discourse impacts contemporary pop music aesthetics. Here, I consider how it shapes MRWaSP. As a biopolitical strategy, resilience recycles “death” into “life,” and treats death or as a means or opportunity for life. Resilience invests in life, but those investments are routed through death. Sometimes, that means overcoming your own failures, transforming past losses into future gains; other times, that means maintaining some portions of the population at or near death in order to maximize elites’ quality and quantity of “life.” In the same way that capitalism redistributes wealth, resilience is a way of distributing life and death. It invests in the viability of lives who contribute to the overall health and success of hegemonic society by allowing elite groups to receive the benefits from minority groups’ struggles to survive. This means that resilience doesn’t just produce “life” in general, but specific types or styles of life and specific types or styles of death. For example, MRWaSP makes some queer lives more viable than others.52 In the US, where employment and marriage are the main means of access to health insurance, laws that permit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, in conjunction with anti-gay-marriage laws, make it more difficult for homosexuals and non-cisgendered people to access employment and marriage, and, by extension, affordable health care. Moreover, in a society where (a) unemployment rates are significantly higher for blacks, Latinos, and other non-white groups, and (b) marriage is increasingly a privilege reserved for the bourgeoisie, it is very difficult for non-bourgeoisie queers of color to access affordable health care, making them much more vulnerable to illness and death than any other group.53 This method of distributing health care invests in sexually normal lives and divests from queer ones. It maintains the overall balance of power—MRWaSP hegemony—by pushing certain types of queer people to die at specific rates (more than average) and in specific ways (e.g., not of old age).

MRWaSP reproduces itself by divesting and diminishing queer lives; what happens when we invest and intensify them instead? If resilience is dependent on precarity, could “dying” in the wrong way, at the wrong time, at the wrong rate be a way for people to fight back against the resilience discourses that render them precarious in the first place? Here, “dying” means more than just physical death; “dying” means living a supposedly unviable life, a life that isn’t profitable for MRWaSP, a life whose support diminishes the resilience of other, more elite groups. What happens when we invest in unviable, unprofitable lives? Can going into the death corrupt resilience discourse? If so, how?

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Link › UBI

The Neoliberal emancipatory ideal underpinning their basic income backfires into an “In-Group” and “Out- Group” based upon the organizational “exit” and “voice” dynamics

Herzog 16 [LIs Herzog, "Basic Income and the Ideal of Epistemic Equality", 6/4/16, Basic Income Studies, //JO]

If one acknowledges that epistemic equality is an important normative ideal for organizations, whether for moral, instrumental, or instrumentally moral reasons, it suggests itself to ask about institutional levers that would promote it. Hence, one might suggest that an unconditional basic income could be a suitable candidate. One central argument in its favor is, after all, that it might help counterbalance the fundamental asymmetry between those who have to sell their labor in order to earn an income, and those who have an independent source of income (See e. g. Berry 2005, 212). By facilitating exit, an unconditional minimum income might also support epistemic equality in organizations: employees who know that they have a safety net in case they get fired might be more willing to speak up. They know that they will not end up without an income during the time it takes to find a new job or to start a self-employed business or a democratically run company (cf. similarly Blanc 2014, 484). At second glance, however, one can raise a number of critical questions about whether an unconditional minimum income would really have these positive effects. Arguably, the dynamics of “exit” and “voice” can be more complex than this line of argument suggests. With regard to feasibility, supporters of an unconditional minimum income – and especially those who draw on the argument from epistemic equality – run into a dilemma: if an unconditional minimum income is low, it may be more feasible, but it may not have the desired effects. Individuals usually adapt their standard of living upwards to their current income, which is composed of the unconditional minimum income and their wage (and other forms of income or transfers they might receive). If, in the case of exit from their job, they fall back on the unconditional minimum income alone, they have to immediately cut back their spending, which can be so difficult that they do not perceive exit as an option they would take voluntarily. Thus, to serve the purpose of strengthening epistemic equality, an unconditional minimum income would probably have to be quite high. This, however, makes questions of feasibility more urgent, and it also raises questions about ways in which this strategy might backfire. For example, it might make exit too easy, so that individuals lose any incentive to stay and speak up if they disagree with what is going on in an organization – and organizations could tell them to leave, instead of listening to what they have to say. Organizational life might become a very fleeting affair, with people coming and going in unpredictable ways. This might have certain normative advantages from an individual perspective, but it is hard to tell whether this is more likely to have a positive effect on epistemic equality in organizations, or whether it would turn their epistemic practices in a kind of “commons” that no-one feels responsible for. Organizations might react to such tendencies by offering those employees whom they do not want to leave yet higher wages (cf. also Gintis & Bowles 1993, 85). This, however, could exacerbate inequalities within organizations, creating an “in group” whose members are allowed to speak whenever they like, and an “out group” who are told to leave whenever they try to raise their voice. Some developments, for example the outsourcing of “non-essential” jobs into service companies, already go into the direction of creating different classes of employees with unequal rights. These developments are problematic not only from the perspective of epistemic equality, but, obviously, also from many other perspectives. One of the motives for promoting an unconditional minimum income is in fact to create stronger safety nets for those in precarious working conditions, but it is not clear what effects it would have for life within organizations. The overall case for an unconditional minimum income may be a strong one, but it seems too far-fetched to make an argument from epistemic equality, at least not before we do not have more empirical evidence of how an unconditional minimum income would change labour market dynamics.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Link › FJG

Their use of the FJG turns workers into prisoners of the workfare----forces neoliberal blame download perpetuating pauper cultural radiation

David Jordan 13 [John David Jordan, "The Anathattractive s/State: A Marxist-Semiotic Analysis of the Discourse, Ideology and Practice of Neoliberal Workfare", 2013, Public Journal of Semiotics, https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/617367/1/anathattractive.pdf//JO]

This study draws on three broad streams: Marxism, semiotics and symbolic interactionism – particularly the work of Erving Goffman. While at first these may seem disparate analytic threads, praxis begs to differ (see also Goldberg, 2001). Like workfare, neoliberal globalisation (workfare’s economic parent system) is too often viewed primarily in terms of gross and abstract international forces and flows. While these latter are undoubtedly immensely significant, immensity itself can sometimes obscure the micro-fabric of neoliberal reality – i.e. the other business end of neoliberalism, where real individuals experience “the virtue of selfishness” (Rand, 1964) – as its victims. This study is concerned with the semiotic echoes that occur at micro-social levels subsequent to the movement of vast, global, economic eddies; and more particularly, how one key neoliberal apparatus – a workfare centre – acts as an amplification chamber for these reverberations. A workfare centre can have multiple purposes, depending on local political, geographical, economic and labour market imperatives. However, it always has the purpose of symbolically reprocessing its inmates into the cruelly and unjustifiably individualised destination of neoliberal blame-download. Blame-download – i.e. making the victims of poverty appear to be to blame for their plight – is accomplished via aggressive semiotic regimes. These regimes, cannot, however, be separated from the immensity of the world-market. They exist solely as defamatory semio-disciplinary appliances in its service. Hence, to facilitate analysis, an innovative and creative schema is required that is capable of detecting the echoes of the financial big-bang (neoliberalism) in the cultural radiation (class-racism (Balibar, 1992)) leaked by workfare centres. Marx’s work remains the primary and most profoundly incisive guide to the operation of the world-market and poor law operation today. Workfare, in many ways, takes every dire warning Marx made as to the oppression of the unemployed, and of the exploitation of low paid workers, and treats them not as a warning of what to avoid, but as a blueprint for what to do. There is nothing, furthermore, in the profound analytic over-view bequeathed by Marx which forbids linking macroforces to semio-disciplinary regimes. Quite the reverse: Marx himself details extensively the micro-discipline and discursive defamations prosecuted historically against paupers (1887, 1975a [1865]). Nor is the work of Erving Goffman somehow incompatible with macro-structural views. Goffman was acutely aware of the impact of wider economic processes upon individual ‘treatments’ (see especially Stigma) – and particularly the double-meaning of this word (see Asylums), which takes on a further level of significance in a neoliberal world where not only structurally engendered life-distress, but also poverty, is seen as a treatable, quasi-medical personal dysfunction (see, signally, Mead, 1986).

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Link › GEN/MISC

They rely on economic thinking that excludes symbolic and cultural exchange which infinitely scarifies the very makings of life itself and makes their impacts inevitable.

Bifo 2011 (Franco Berardi, Italian critic and media activist, 08-23-2011, “After the Future”, AK Press, Accessed 7-19-2023, pg 110-113)//sfs

More than ever, economic rationality is at odds with social rationality. Economic science is not part of the solution to the crisis: it is the source of the problem. On July 18th 2009 the headline of The Economist read: “What went wrong with economics?” The text is an attempt to downplay the crisis of the Economics profession, and of economic knowledge. For neoliberal economists the central dogma of growth, profit and competition cannot be questioned, because it is identified with the perfect mathematical rationality of the market. And belief in the intrinsic rationality of the market is crucial in the economic theology of neoliberalism. But the reduction of social life to the rational exchange of economic values is an obsession that has nothing to do with science. It’s a political strategy aimed to identify humans as calculating machines, aimed to shape behavior and perception in such a way that money becomes the only motivation of social action. But it is not accurate as a description of social dynamics, and the conflicts, pathologies, and irrationality of human relationships. Rather, it is an attempt at creating the anthropological brand of homo calculans that Foucault (2008) has described in his seminar of 1979/80, published with the title The Birth of Biopolitics. This attempt to identify human beings with calculating devices has produced cultural devastation, and has finally been showed to have been based upon flawed assumptions. Human beings do calculate, but their calculation is not perfectly rational, because the value of goods is not determined by objective reasons, and because decisions are influenced by what Keynes named animal spirits. “We will never really understand important economic events unless we confront the fact that their causes are largely mental in nature,” say Akerlof and Shiller (2009: 1) in their book Animal Spirits, echoing Keynes’s assumption that the rationality of the market is not perfect in itself. Akerlof and Shiller are avowing the crisis of neoliberal thought, but their critique is not radical enough, and does not touch the legitimacy of the economic episteme. Animal Spirits is the title of an other book, by Matteo Pasquinelli (2008). Pasquinelli’s book deals with bodies and digits, and parasites, and goes much deeper in its understanding of the roots of the crisis than its eponymous publication: “Cognitive capitalism emerges in the form of a parasite: it subjects social knowledge and inhibits its emancipatory potential” (Pasquinelli 2008: 93). “Beyond the computer screen, precarious workers and freelancers experience how Free Labor and competition are increasingly devouring their everyday life” (Pasquinelli 2008: 15). Pasquinelli goes to the core of the problem: the virtualization of social production has acted as the proliferation of a parasite, destroying the prerequisites of living relationships, absorbing and neutralizing the living energies of cognitive workers. The economic recession is not only the effect of financial craziness, but also the effect of the de-vitalization of the social field. This is why the collapse of the economic system is also the collapse of economic epistemology that has guided the direction of politics in the last two centuries. Economics cannot understand the depth of the crisis, because below the crisis of financial exchange there is the crisis of symbolic exchange. I mean the psychotic boom of panic, depression, and suicide, the general decline of desire and social empathy. The question that rises from the collapse is so radical that the answer cannot be found in the economic conceptual framework. Furthermore, one must ask if economics really is a science? If the word “science” means the creation of concepts for the understanding and description of an object, economics is not a science. Its object does not exist. The economic object (scarcity, salaried labor, and profit) is not an object that exists before and outside the performative action of the economic episteme. Production, consumption, and daily life become part of the economic discourse when labor is detached and opposed to human activity, when it falls under the domination of capitalist rule. The economic object does not pre-exist conceptual activity, and economic description is in fact a normative action. In this sense Economics is a technique, a process of semiotization of the world, and also a mythology, a narration. Economics is a suggestion and a categorical imperative: Money makes things happen. It is the source of action in the world and perhaps the only power we invest in. Life seems to depend on it. Everything within us would like to say that it does not, that this cannot be. But the Almighty Dollar has taken command. The more it is denied the more it shows itself as Almighty. Perhaps in every other respect, in every other value, bankruptcy has been declared, giving money the power of some sacred deity, demanding to be recognized. Economics no longer persuades money to behave. Numbers cannot make the beast lie down and be quiet or sit up and do tricks. At best, economics is a neurosis of money, a symptom contrived to hold the beast in abeyance…. Thus economics shares the language of psychopathology – inflation, depression, lows and highs, slumps and peaks, investments and losses. (Sordello 1983) From the age of the enclosures in England the economic process has been a process of production of scarcity (scarcification). The enclosures were intended to scarcify the land, and the basic means of survival, so that people who so far had been able to cultivate food for their family were forced to become proletarians, then salaried industrial workers. Capitalism is based on the artificial creation of need, and economic science is essentially a technique of scarcification of time, life and food. Inside the condition of scarcity human beings are subjected to exploitation and to the domain of profit-oriented activity. After scarcifying the land (enclosures) capitalism has scarcified time itself, forcing people who don’t have property other than their own life and body, to lend their life-time to capital. Now the capitalist obsession for growth is making scarce both water and air. Economic science is not the science of prediction: it is the technique of producing, implementing, and pushing scarcity and need. This is why Marx did not speak of economy, but of political economy. The technique of economic scarcification is based on a mythology, a narration that identifies richness as property and acquisition, and subjugates the possibility of living to the lending of time and to the transformation of human activity into salaried work. In recent decades, technological change has slowly eroded the very foundations of economic science. Shifting from the sphere of production of material objects to the semiocapitalist production of immaterial goods, the Economic concepts are losing their foundation and legitimacy. The basic categories of Economics are becoming totally artificial. The theoretical justification of private property, as you read in the writings of John Locke, is based on the need of exclusive consumption. An apple must be privatized, if you want to avoid the danger that someone else eats your apple. But what happens when goods are immaterial, infinitely replicable without cost? Thanks to digitalization and immaterialization of the production process, the economic nomos of private property loses its ground, its raison d’etre, and it can be imposed only by force. Furthermore, the very foundation of salary, the relationship between time needed for production and value of the product, is vanishing. The immaterialization and cognitivization of production makes it almost impossible to quantify the average time needed to produce value. Time and value become incommensurable, and violence becomes the only law able to determine price and salary. The neoliberal school, which has opened the way to the worldwide deregulation of social production, has fostered the mythology of rational expectations in economic exchange, and has touted the idea of a selfregulation of the market, first of all the labor-market. But self-regulation is a lie. In order to increase exploitation, and to destroy social welfare, global capitalism has used political institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, not to mention the military enforcement of the political decisions of these institutions. Far from being self-regulated, the market is militarily regulated. The mythology of free individuals loyally competing on the base of perfect knowledge of the market is a lie, too. Real human beings are not perfect rational calculating machines. And the myth of rational expectations has finally crashed after the explosion of the real estate mortgage bubble. The theory of rational expectation is crucial in neoliberal thought: the economic agents are supposed to be free to choose in a perfectly rational way the best deal in selling and buying. The fraud perpetrated by the investment agencies has destroyed the lives of millions of Americans, and has exposed the theoretical swindle. Economic exchange cannot be described as a rational game, because irrational factors play a crucial role in social life in general. Trickery, misleading information, and psychic manipulation are not exceptions, but the professional tools of advertisers, financial agents, and economic consultants.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Link › GEN/MISC

Fiscal redistribution perpetuates the need for resilience and neolibrealism—contributing to the hegemonic society by allowing elite groups to profit-- the impact is minorities

Robin James 15— former Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, editor for Philosophy, Literary Theory, Music & Sound Studies at Palgrave MacMillan, Resilience & Melancholy: Pop Music, Feminism, Neoliberalism, Zero Books , pages 47-48, February 27th, 2015 //kd

In the last chapter, I discussed various ways resilience discourse impacts contemporary pop music aesthetics. Here, I consider how it shapes MRWaSP. As a biopolitical strategy, resilience recycles “death” into “life,” and treats death or as a means or opportunity for life. Resilience invests in life, but those investments are routed through death. Sometimes, that means overcoming your own failures, transforming past losses into future gains; other times, that means maintaining some portions of the population at or near death in order to maximize elites’ quality and quantity of “life.” In the same way that capitalism redistributes wealth, resilience is a way of distributing life and death. It invests in the viability of lives who contribute to the overall health and success of hegemonic society by allowing elite groups to receive the benefits from minority groups’ struggles to survive. This means that resilience doesn’t just produce “life” in general, but specific types or styles of life and specific types or styles of death. For example, MRWaSP makes some queer lives more viable than others.52 In the US, where employment and marriage are the main means of access to health insurance, laws that permit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, in conjunction with anti-gay-marriage laws, make it more difficult for homosexuals and non-cisgendered people to access employment and marriage, and, by extension, affordable health care. Moreover, in a society where (a) unemployment rates are significantly higher for blacks, Latinos, and other non-white groups, and (b) marriage is increasingly a privilege reserved for the bourgeoisie, it is very difficult for non-bourgeoisie queers of color to access affordable health care, making them much more vulnerable to illness and death than any other group.53 This method of distributing health care invests in sexually normal lives and divests from queer ones. It maintains the overall balance of power—MRWaSP hegemony—by pushing certain types of queer people to die at specific rates (more than average) and in specific ways (e.g., not of old age).

MRWaSP reproduces itself by divesting and diminishing queer lives; what happens when we invest and intensify them instead? If resilience is dependent on precarity, could “dying” in the wrong way, at the wrong time, at the wrong rate be a way for people to fight back against the resilience discourses that render them precarious in the first place? Here, “dying” means more than just physical death; “dying” means living a supposedly unviable life, a life that isn’t profitable for MRWaSP, a life whose support diminishes the resilience of other, more elite groups. What happens when we invest in unviable, unprofitable lives? Can going into the death corrupt resilience discourse? If so, how?

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Link › GEN/MISC

The AFF uses a neoliberal politics of exclusion that creates the illusion of a post-identity world where alternative movements are impossible. The plan serves to render radical thinking as obsolete by appearing as a “leveling” of the playing field – turning economic inequality into a resource by putting everyone on the same spectrum of normality which makes equal opportunity seem plausible.

James 2018 (Robin James, philosopher of popular music and professor at UNC Charlotte with a PhD in Philosophy from DePaul University, December 2019, “The Sonic Episteme: Acoustic Resonance, Neoliberalism, and Biopolitics”, Duke University Press, accessed 7-17-2023, https://www.dukeupress.edu/the-sonic-episteme)//sfs

What makes statistical normalization suited to the way neoliberalism and biopolitics manage social inequity? Neoliberalism manages identity-based difference differently than classical, contractarian liberalism does. Classical liberalism asserts that we’re all equal because we’re universally human, abstract individuals without relevant differences (because differences are only relevant in the private sphere). Neoliberalism asserts that we’re all equal because all (formerly private) differences are included and valued. Instead of strictly regulating purity (which takes a lot of resources), laws and institutions include deregulated differences, often under the banner of “diversity.” I call this move the domestication of noise because it turns what was formerly a problem (in the Du Boisian “how does it feel to be a problem?” sense) into a resource. Just as statistical distributions can reveal predictable patterns in what otherwise appear like chance occurrences, the domestication of noise finds order in what traditionally seems like irrational or unruly behavior. By including formerly excluded unruliness, neoliberalism purports to be post-identity. Post-identity is an umbrella term that describes views like “postfeminism” or “postracial.” These views assert that classically liberal identitybased social exclusion (sexism, racism) no longer exist: such exclusion certainly happened in the past, but we have overcome it today. For example, as Angela McRobbie explains, “post-feminism positively draws on and invokes feminism as that which can be taken into account, to suggest that equality is achieved, in order to install a whole repertoire of new meanings which emphasise that it is no longer needed, it is a spent force.” This isn’t the “backlash” of the 1990s, but the idea that people and institutions already value and practice diversity so that white women and people of color really can and do have equal access to political participation and economic success. The ontology of statistical measurement lets the claim that we’ve over come sexism and racism and everyone is equal now seem plausible. Unlike the classical social contract, which posits an ontological divide between “humans” and “sub-” or “nonhumans,” biopolitical normalization posits a flat social ontology, in particular, the flat ontology of mathematics in which everything is a number and thus commutable. As Mader argues, “it is the continuity of number itself that renders both the individuals counted and the ratio of group to group comparable objects to which basic and sophisticated mathematical operations can be applied. . . . Social discontinuities are homogenized in the continuity of quantum.” For example, the discontinuities produced by patriarchy as a political system are re-aggregated as gender becomes one variable in a multifactor statistical model. As variables, gender and race are disarticulated from the power relationships (patriarchy and white supremacy) that produce social discontinuities. As Mader puts it, “a gradational ontology replaces one of opposition.” The continuity among statistical variables or groups is what lets postidentity thinking happen: there are no different social orders for humans and subhumans; we’re all on the same human spectrum. This continuum from normal to abnormal does in fact put everyone on the same playing field. It’s the neoliberal version of classically liberal notions of formal equality before the law or “political emancipation”: treating everyone as though they’re on the same continuum obscures the fact that we still recognize a difference between good abnormal—“disruptors,” geniuses—and bad abnormal—terrorists, thugs. Structural barriers haven’t gone away; they’ve just been remade with different tools and layered on top of the old ones. These new structural barriers are what I call a politics of exception. The politics of exception is the outcome of neoliberal/biopolitical applications of the ontology of statistical normalization to worlds deeply shaped by centuries of material inequality and domination. This ontology reworks modernity’s inclusion/exclusion binary into a spectrum of flexibility and dynamism. In the former case, domination contracts create social identities (races, genders) as tools to disaggregate and purify society by excluding white women and nonwhites from political, moral, and legal personhood. This model excludes by creating discontinuities, such as the discontinuity between noise and signal. However, over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, it’s not just audio engineers that domesticate noise, “using and manipulating noise (rather than eliminating it).” Neoliberalism and biopolitics domesticate noise, excluding people from personhood by using and manipulating them via statistical and ideological continuities that incorporate their noise into the big social spectrum. When everyone is on the same statistical continuum or spectrum, everyone seems to have the chance to be or become normal; so, if you’re deficiently normal, it must be due to your lack of effort or inherent pathology. This is where the hidden structural barriers factor in: individuals’ placement on the normal curve isn’t the outcome of just their choices and behaviors but also of the way structural barriers foreclose or facilitate the kinds of choices available to them and the opportunity costs of those choices. Neoliberalism and biopolitics cook the books (the background conditions) so that foreground equity always produces differential levels of success. This process of production is what I call, following Lester Spence’s use of the term, the politics of exception. According to Spence, “neoliberalism relies on three populations, institutions, and spaces: those perfectly formed according to market logic, those able to be re-formed according to that logic, and the exceptions unable to be re-formed.” These populations are all situated on the same spectrum—the market—but ongoing structural barriers (like, say, rape culture and the criminalization of blackness) make it more difficult and costly for oppressed people to successfully adapt to neoliberal market logic and inhabit “normal” parts of that spectrum. (And even when they do adapt to these norms, biases prevent them from being seen as successful.) Some traditionally oppressed groups can, with adequate investment, be brought into a relatively normal range of conformity to neoliberal market logics; this is the idea behind campaigns like “black girls code” or Sheryl Sandberg’s infamous “Lean In” feminism. Other groups, however, don’t bring adequate returns on that investment; they cannot efficiently be reformed to neoliberal market logics. They thus appear static, recalcitrant, and inflexible. These are the exception. The early twenty-first-century U.S. education program No Child Left Behind is another example of the politics of exception. Instead of segregating public schools explicitly on the basis of race and policing the purity of white schools, nclb uses nominally inclusive performance-based measures like test scores to dole out both resources and penalties on what are effectively racial lines. Including everyone on the same quantitative, statistically measured spectrum kills two birds with one stone: (1) it serves as evidence that identitybased social exclusion is over, obsolete, a thing we “neo-”s are “post-” because we’re all on the same playing field, and (2) it provides the mechanism for producing white supremacist patriarchy without relying explicitly on identitybased social exclusion. Similarly, the editorial choices in the Hollaback! Project’s 2014 video “10 Hours of Walking in nyc as a Woman” render black and Latino men exceptions to postfeminist society. The video claims to document the extensive but mundane nature of misogynist street harassment that (white) women face. However, as many critics noted, the video does not depict any white men as perpetrators. Building on the increasingly prominent trope where “black identity appears as an antiquated state of confinement from which the ‘multiracial imagined community’ must be delivered,” the video presents men of color as solely responsible for (white) women’s street harassment, as embodying a “backwards” masculinity that is out of sync with postfeminist society. The same logic informs the production on Usher featuring Juicy J’s 2014 single “I Don’t Mind.” Playing up Juicy J’s association with strip club anthems like his 2012 hit “Bandz a Make Her Dance,” the song contrasts r&b-singing Usher’s respectable, nominally feminist black masculinity with rapping Juicy J’s seemingly pre-feminist objectification of sex workers. Like a good woke boyfriend, Usher sings that he “doesn’t mind” that his girlfriend is a stripper because she remains monogamous with him and, perhaps more importantly, makes a lot of money. Juicy J, on the other hand, likes the fact that other men look at, admire, and objectify his stripper girlfriend and has no qualms about being in it for the sex, not the love or long-term relationship. Though the lyrics give space to both styles of black masculinity, the production endorses Usher’s performance over Juicy J’s. The “booty clap” synth is common in hip-hop of that time; it is a handclap synth sound that mimics the “booty clap” move in hiphop dance. Like many other trap songs of this era, Juicy J’s “Bandz” features this synth on every beat (i.e., quarter notes at 4/4). “I Don’t Mind,” however, puts these synths only on 2 and 4, transforming trap ratchetness into a more traditional and respectable r&b sound. In this way, the song’s sounds exhibit the nominally feminist reform expected of neoliberal subjects and present Juicy J, both in his vocal performance on this track and in his other songs, as an exception incapable of such reform. Unlike the Hollaback! video, which holds men of color in general responsible for all ongoing sexism, the sounds on “I Don’t Mind” mark a break in the spectrum of black masculinities between Usher (who, like the booty clap rhythms, is reformed) and unreformed, incorrigibly sexist Juicy J. This break redraws old class- and sexuality-based hierarchies among African Americans in terms that aren’t, at least on the surface, about class or sexuality.66 Confirming Spence’s claim that “African Americans constitute the exception,” these examples illustrate how the politics of exception mobilizes the claim that identity-based exclusion has been or should be overcome to mark the same status differences that identities did. Creating exceptional cases and classes is one component of the politics of exception. Quarantining exceptions is the other key component. From a biopolitical perspective, signals or voices that don’t resonate harmoniously that don’t embody the predictable, probabilistic ratios of the neoliberal market (i.e., as I discuss in chapter 4, that don’t exhibit sophrosyne), may be legitimately muted, masked, or silenced. The politics of exception don’t purify the social body so much as compress it in order to manage away frequency ratios that reduce society’s overall efficiency. Compression helps signals circulate efficiently and profitably by “discard[ing] the parts of the audio signal that are unlikely to be audible.” Neoliberalism and biopolitics help white supremacist patriarchy operate most efficiently by discarding parts of the population that are least likely to register a positive impact on dominant metrics of social and economic value, like profitability or health. In this way, it resembles Sterne’s perceptual coding; I discuss this comparison in chapters 2–5. In sum, the kinds of neoliberalism and biopolitics I study in this book rewrite social relations as specific kinds of mathematical relations: frequency ratios and normalized statistical distributions. This ontological shift from people to numbers also restructures systematic relations of domination and subordination, remaking formal equality before the law into statistical continuities and the politics of exception. Because acoustic resonance is a qualitative version of the same basic mathematical principles behind this type of neoliberal biopolitics (i.e., frequency ratios), taking it as a normative model (a model for how things ought to be) for the economy, ontology, society, personhood, or anything else brings whatever you are modeling in accord with the tools and techniques neoliberalism and biopolitics use to maintain structures of domination and subordination. Each of this book’s chapters shows how different constituents of the sonic episteme use acoustic resonance to do just that.

2023 Michigan Kritik
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Economic resilience isn’t a positive tool – they reinforce standards that celebrate overcoming dangers to separate resilient communities from precarious ones while feeding off suffering to reproduce it. This independently turns the AFF - by providing the illusion of choice to trap subjects as human capital in the bloodthirsty cycle of neoliberalism and shock capitalism they create cycles of overcoming to be celebrated.

James 2015 (Robin James, philosopher of popular music and professor at UNC Charlotte with a PhD in Philosophy from DePaul University, 2-27-2015, “Resilience & Melancholy: Pop Music, Feminism, Neoliberalism”, Zero Books, Accessed 7-15-2023, https://philpapers.org/rec/JAMRAM)//sfs

Neoliberalism upgrades regulatory systems into deregulated ones. In economics, this means controlling the market’s background conditions, rather than market activities themselves; market activities thus appear to operate “free” of direction. For example, instead of instituting a single-payer health care system, one that ostensibly gives individuals no “choice,” the Affordable Care Act (aka “Obamacare”) allows people to “choose” among a highly circumscribed range of options (huge corporation A versus huge corporation B)—superficially this appears as ‘free choice,’ when in effect background constraints are basically a mode of soft coercion. In the same way that it restructures political economy, neoliberalism revamps the basic organizing principles of art. Regulatory, cinematic practices of objectification, fragmentation, and disavowal have been upgraded into deregulatory, post-cinematic resilience. Section (a) addresses the difference between the male gaze/controlling images and deregulated MRWaSP visualization. Objectification and fragmentation are techniques with which the male gaze and controlling images regulate and exclude femininity in order to control the negative effects of damage. Compositional processes, on the other hand, are deregulatory techniques for producing feminized damage as a resource. Section (b) addresses the difference between the kinds of aesthetic pleasure produced by gazing/controlling, on the one hand, and visualization, on the other. Whereas the “visual pleasure” (a.k.a. “scopophilia”) in the title of Mulvey’s article on the male gaze comes from conquering feminized damage, the pleasure in post-cinematic media comes from resiliently overcoming damage—that is, from making oneself into something like Tiqqun’s “Young Girl” (the ideal form of neoliberal human capital). i. Compositional Processes: “Post-cinematic” media upgrades the logic and methods of classical narrative (tonality, the novel, Hollywood cinema) and modernist counter-narrative (like New Wave cinema or hip hop), reworking them into deregulatory practices like open works or generative processes. Regulatory techniques (like narrative, cinematic suturing, the male gaze, and controlling images) damage women for the purpose of excluding them from the undamaged work of art. Radical modernist and post-modernist works recuperate feminized damage as a means of deconstructing regulations (i.e., as a means of anti-art practice). In both modernist and post-modernist aesthetics, there is a preestablished formal logic, and femininity is instrumentalized in both constructing and deconstructing that logic. Deregulatory techniques, on the other hand, liberate feminized damage so it can be directly put to work. Deregulatory works are organized so they don’t seem organized. Instead of following a pre-given formula, like narrative or tonality, visualization reveals the emergent order in an otherwise an-archic swarm. Structure “can only be apprehended bit by bit…and from moment to moment, through the constructive action of ‘linking’ one space to another” (Shaviro PCA 37). I call this technique “compositional process,” because it shares aspects of Bruno Latour’s concept of “compositionism” and composer Steve Reich’s notion of “gradual process.” “Musical processes,” Reich explains, “determine all the note-to-note (sound-tosound) details and the overall form simultaneously. (Think of a round or infinite canon.)” (Reich, 34). Or, as Latour puts it the “micro-and macrocosm are now literally and not simply symbolically connected (BL 381). Unlike improvisation, which happens on top of a strictly regular formal architecture (e.g., a soloist improvising over fixed chord changes and phrase-lengths), this “‘just-in-time’ production” (Shaviro PCA 53) is a method of generating emergent order: the moment-to-moment details unfold simultaneously with and as the overarching structure. Compositional processes are flexible and irregular. “Looseness or arbitrariness…is in fact the very point” (Shaviro PCA 74) of structures designed to generate visual (or sonic) damage. “Engineered so as to maximize shock” (Shaviro PCA 80), compositional processes are designed to cultivate aesthetic damage, which manifests, for example, as fragmentation, disjunction, lack of narrative/tonal center or goal, and lack of regular meter or temporality. As I discussed in chapter one, deregulated works can be “entirely incoherent, yet immediately legible to anyone” (Shaviro PC 80) because the superficial chaos is intentionally produced and controlled for by the work’s immanent structure. If regulation limits and prohibits irrationality and incoherence, deregulated visualization leverages and exploits it. “Things don’t need to harmonize, or fit together” (PCA 53) because deregulatory MRWaSP visualization explicitly affirms the damage that harmonization or integration is designed to obscure. In this way, MRWaSP visualization naturalizes feminized fragmentation, objectification, and incoherence. MRWaSP visualization “controls” feminized damage by amplifying it and putting it to work generating resilient aesthetic/human capital. So, following Shaviro’s analysis, if the cinematic gaze controls by organizing its visual field into active/passive, motion/stillness, subject/object hierarchies, MRWaSP visualization uses compositional processes, “modulation,” and “feedback” to do its work (PCA 16). Sonic and visual “events,” like a sample or a post-production effect, “interpenetrate and feed back upon one another” (Shaviro PCA 52) so that a “film’s sheer density of incidents and references baffles our efforts to ‘translate’ what we see and hear into something more abstract, more metaphorically palatable and easily manageable” (Shaviro 78; emphasis mine). It’s like a DDOS for our eyes, ears, nerves, and brains. We’re given more sensory data than we’re capable of processing, so we have difficulty separating the signal from the noise. As Shaviro puts it, “the headlong rush…is all” (80). Dissonance, then, is the effect of overwhelming “noise”—either literal noise, or biopolitical/statistical “noise.” Being overwhelmed by something too big and/or strong to resist is a feature of conventional femininity and feminine sexuality (especially in rape culture); for example, there’s the fantasy of being swept off one’s feet. Traditional European aesthetics strive to contain and domesticate overwhelming affects and sensations. For example, Kant’s feeling of sublimity is, as Christine Battersby and other feminist aestheticians have argued, a masculine conquest of potentially overwhelming, and thus feminizing, feelings. MRWaSP visualization, on the other hand, treats the experience of overwhelming sensory-affective experience as a net gain, not as a loss of control (because, in a deregulatory scheme, there’s no ‘control’ to lose). Feminized damage is now a resource, not a deficiency, a form of subjectivity and value-production, not a type of objectification and aesthetic/economic devaluation. Or rather, feminized damage is a resource and not a type of devaluation and desubjectification for otherwise privileged women, like professional white women who can “Lean In.” Damage that isn’t explicitly situated in a LIO narrative is treated as evidence of pathology. Persistent, unproblematized objectification are attributes of supposedly “voiceless” or “invisible” women who need to be saved and spoken for. MRWaSP visualization separates out resilient populations who can bounce back from sensory overload from precarious ones who can’t. MRWaSP visualization banks on sensory overload. This overload is the aesthetic equivalent of the “shock” in what Naomi Klein calls “shock capitalism”. “A variation on Machiavelli’s advice that injuries should be inflicted ‘all at once’” (7; emphasis mine), Klein explains, this idea of crisis or shock is the foundation for contemporary practices of (re)development, privatization, and investment. In post-cinematic media, shockdoctrine methods generate a surplus of pleasure. Postcinematic media are designed to generate, amplify, and transmit damage so that we can hear, see and feel the damage we (or the characters we watch and identify with) ought to overcome. All that damage “makes sense” to audiences as fodder for a spectacular therapeutic narrative: Look, it must be overcome! Whereas the male gaze and controlling images create the effect of coherence by blurring ‘damaged’ (feminized, blackened) elements out of focus, deregulated MRWaSP visualization puts damage at the center of our attention. The damage doesn’t just make sense, it feels good. ii. Pleasure: Without the security of universal structures, one must resiliently craft functional resources out of any and everything. Performing or viewing compositional processes, you never know what you’re going to get, what material you’ll have to work with, or what output performers will present you with. Thus, performers and audiences need to be flexible—they must turn damage (incoherence, accidents, chance occurrences) into a performative resource and/or listening pleasure. Resilient subjects take pleasure in “feeling the burn,” as the saying goes. For example, Taio Cruz’s 2012 single “Hangover” treats a hangover as something to gleefuly celebrate, evidence of one’s “work hard/play hard” cred. Don’t get me wrong—hangovers hurt. But resilient subjects savor and crave that damage like vampires do human blood, because it’s their fuel. It feels good to avow damage as what can be or has been overcome. Resilience discourse habituates us to affirm and avow our damage. In the same way that Pavlov’s dog is just following his programming when he or she drools upon hearing the sound of a bell (because he or she has been trained to associate that sound with the pleasure of eating), we’re just following our programming when we find aesthetic pleasure in being overwhelmed by dissonance—we’ve learned to associate that feeling of overwhelming damage with the pleasure of, feeding our human capital, our “selves,” if you will. This is a very different model of pleasure than the pleasure in gazing or controlling, which comes from avoiding damage. “Visual pleasure” as Mulvey argues, is generated by the narrative devices that resolve or obscure challenges to the subject’s autonomy. Failing to acknowledge the work done by the camera allows the protagonist/gazer to feel more powerful and autonomous than he is. Subject/object binaries have the same effect, allowing the gazing subject to feel like he isn’t also the fragmented object of someone else’s gaze. The gaze is the means by which a classically liberal, modernist subject identifies and abjects objects from himself, as subject, and from society. Because the exclusion of the object is what constitutes the subject as such, this exclusion—in, for example, the form of resolution or closure—is invested as the site of traditional aesthetic pleasure. Modernist avant-gardes, on the other hand, produce “damaged goods,” works or subjects whose imperfec-tions critique and oppose dominant aesthetic and ethical norms. In post-or critical-modernity, transgression of exclusionary boundaries is the site of aesthetic pleasure. Examples of this include Dada artists’ exquisite corpses, Afro-modernist antiphony, and feminist art’s use of ugliness and disgust (e.g., in Orlan’s work). Such practices transgress norms of coherence, homophony, and beauty as a means to critique them. This is why Mulvey argues that feminist film and film criticism ought to “make way for a total negation of the ease and plenitude of the narrative fiction film” (835). MRWaSP visualization avows and normalizes visual, compositional, and affective damage, recycling modernist transgression into raw materials for the neoliberal culture industry. Damage isn’t something subjects avoid, or which subjects do to objects—damage is the means and medium of subjectification. Postcinematic looking is a feedback loop in which we make visible, for others, our own self-objectification. To be recognized as a resilient subject, one must be seen by others as actively monitoring oneself (e.g., through quantified self practices like diet or exercise tracking). Because these practices collapse “image” and “bearer of the look” into the same role, conventional subject/object distinctions don’t make much sense. So, instead of producing conventionally gendered male gazers and feminine objects, post-cinematic visualization produces both resilient MRWaSP visualizers and pathological, toxic black holes (i.e., vampiric drains of light, energy, momentum, and so on). The next section focuses on this toxicity and the role of non-resilient women of color in MRWaSP visualization.

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the aff’s attempts at [social justice reform/climate reform/corporate reform] are a futile example of anti-consumption which conversely entrenches consumers into a state of reflexive impotence and futurelessness, rendering any genuine radical reform impossible and exacerbating the endless insomniac drift in which addictions to technology render life meaningless – instead, affirm an experiential epistemic inquiry of semiocapitalism

Quynh et. Al. 23 (Huang Ngoc, James Cronin, Alexandros Skandalis, Huang Ngoc Quynh is an esteemed Lecturer in Marketing at the University of Leicester, “”, ResearchGate, ) ShNapiro

In the case of ideological progressivism on the political left, anti-consumption practices often appear in demonstrations and protests related to addressing environmental issues, unethical corporate behaviours, and social injustice (Kozinets and Handelman, 2004). In the context of re-emerging social conservatism on the political right, anti-consumption activities such as brand rejection and corporate boycotts are a mainstay of new rightist groups’ efforts to challenge liberal business practices and influence civil debates (Cambefort and Pecot, 2020). Moreover, while anticonsumption has long been impelled by anti-imperialist movements to signal discontent with globalisation and the neoliberal model of global capitalism (Varman and Belk, 2009), socioeconomic populist groups have also made political use of reducing and rejecting consumption to protest unfair domestic market forces (Hershkovitz, 2017). Many of these cases underline that anticonsumption practices can reflect ideological attachments that are oppositional to the perceived structures of power that underpin today’s socio-economic life. However, despite the revitalisation of antagonistic politics across consumer culture, we should not lose sight of those forms of anticonsumption that function apolitically and, in doing so, potentially reproduce and perpetuate the status quo. In this paper, we set out to conceptualise how anti-consumption practices, when lacking discernible political alternatives at their core, are incessantly assimilated into the circuitry of semiocapitalism and its desiring forces (Hietanen et al., 2022). In the absence of any genuinely transformative politics, we identify what we call ‘gestural anti-consumption’, a performance that works to relieve individuals’ personal dissatisfactions with, rather than to collectively transform, the underpinning semiocapitalist hegemony and its futureless vicissitudes (Ahlberg et al., 2021; Fisher, 2014a). When undertaken in a ubiquitous market-society where market fundamentalism1 reigns supreme and all beliefs in some kind of post-capitalist future are slowly being ‘cancelled’, anticonsumption functions as a mere gesture of resistance rather than a genuinely antagonistic force. Consumers and anti-consumers, we argue, become conflated and integrated as the one ‘(anti-) consumer subject’. This singular and amalgamated (anti-)consumer subject position remains deadlocked in its actual effects while only appearing differentiated in superficially experiential and symbolic terms. Without unifying political alternatives underpinning them, this subject’s gestural anti-consumption practices remain tied to self-expression and self-fulfilment which are fully commensurate with market logics and can be safely commodified. By adapting and extending the late cultural theorist Mark Fisher’s (2009: 21) concept of ‘reflexive impotence’, we unpack how gestural anti-consumption unfolds via the intersection of the (anti-)consumer subject’s reflexive awareness of her political inertia, inability or unwillingness to bring about structural change, and perpetual attachment to the desiring forces of capitalism itself. This paper is underpinned by two interrelated research questions: What are the main features of gestural anti-consumption? How is the perceived impossibility of structural change prefigured into practices of gestural anti-consumption? To address these questions, we reflect on netnographic data and in-depth interviews with people who engage in ‘digital detoxing’, that is individuals who limit or temporarily abstain from the consumption of digital technologies. Digital detox, while classifiable as a form of anti-consumption, has become, as Syvertsen (2017: 96) emphasises, a mundane and routine act of consumption itself – a ‘part of everyone’s toolbox’ in coping with digital overload and dissatisfaction – rather than a collective action to address the root causes of consumption-related problems. For many individuals, digital detox practices are not motivated by political solidarity against a shared adversary, whether ‘Big Tech’ firms who ostensibly manipulate their consumption or the liberal capitalist structures of power that make such manipulation possible. Crucially, digital detox does not function according to the typical formula of collective ideological resistance – ‘a clear-cut case of “us” and “them”’ 2 Marketing Theory 0(0) (Syvertsen, 2017: 96) – rather it is often a case of disorganised individuals undertaking ephemeral and practical attempts to make their consumption better work for themselves. Our paper makes two important contributions to the emerging strand of ‘terminal’ (Ahlberg et al., 2022) or ‘de-romanticist’ (Fitchett and Cronin, 2022) writings within critical marketing scholarship. First, in line with this strand’s calls to revisit and de-romanticise the institutionalised concepts of our discipline, we offer an update to the subject position of ‘the reflexively defiant consumer’ (Ozanne and Murray, 1995). Under semiocapitalism, we suggest that resistant consumer subjectivity is better understood as the reflexively impotent (anti-)consumer’. In contrast to the celebratory view of an autonomous, self-determining postmodern rebel who, through critical reflection, ‘choose[s] to defy or resist traditional notions of consumption’ (Ozanne and Murray, 1995: 522), we offer an image of an increasingly helpless subject who, with reflexive awareness of his or her utter embeddedness in commodified desiring flows, is disinclined to genuinely defy dominant market forces. In this regard, we challenge the prevalent idea that ‘anti-consumption must be an act of ideological extravagance – wandering beyond the accepted limits of cultural acceptance’ (Kozinets et al., 2010: 226–227). Second, our analyses provide clarification for how any potentially energising relief from capitalism ultimately capitulates under what has been theorised as a cultural atmosphere of ‘no hope’ or futurelessness (Ahlberg et al., 2021; Fisher, 2014a; Hietanen et al., 2020). By tracing how the reflexively impotent (anti-)consumer is as much aware of the problems of technologicallymediated consumer capitalism as she is of her own powerlessness to confront them, we illustrate how living with the slow cancellation of the future impairs any efforts of resistance. The value of identifying the lived effects of this‘futurelessness’ is not simply in offering a pessimistic perspective on subjects’ potential for resistance, but is in the implication for fellow (anti-)consumer researchers to think more ‘futuristically’ about where our critiques could – or should – land. For the analystactivist to genuinely challenge the futureless vicissitudes of consumer culture, it becomes necessary to locate ongoing epistemic enquiry not just at the level of the structural but also at the level of the experiential. This means taking into account capitalist subjects’ own justifications for pursuing personal interests and pleasures rather than any kind of political praxis when faced with systemic problems. Theoretical underpinnings Anti-consumption and political ideology: A brief background Anti-consumption can be defined as ‘intentionally and meaningfully excluding or cutting goods from one’s consumption routine or reusing once-acquired goods with the goal of avoiding consumption’ (Makri et al., 2020: 178). Anti-consumption practices are expressed through three non-exclusive forms: rejecting (i.e. refusing or avoiding); restricting (i.e. reducing); and reclaiming (i.e. changing or co-opting the meanings of) goods, services or experiences (Lee et al., 2011). Although the drivers and manifestations of rejecting, restricting, or reclaiming consumption are manifold, the motivating role of political ideology has been underwritten by a significant stream of research (Izberk-Bilgin, 2012; Kozinets and Handelman, 2004; Ulver and Laurell, 2020). Political ideology denotes a fantasy framework of beliefs, aspirations and aversions concerning the proper functioning of society and how it might be achieved. At an elementary level, political ideology can be mapped out on a continuum with liberal progressivism on the left and conservativism on the right (Cambefort and Pecot, 2020). Although many cases of anti-consumption detected in consumer research are motivated by leftist ideology – for example, liberals’ ‘anti-unethical’ and ‘anti-colonialist’ Hoang et al. 3 rejection of global brands that offend their moral shibboleths – antagonisms have also been detected between social conservatism and the market. Examples of rightist anti-consumption include boycotts of supermarkets that sell Halal products by nationalist groups in England (Lekakis, 2019) and Christian-conservative groups’ rejection of Disney products following the brand’s corporate decision to better represent gay employees and consumers (MacDonald and McDonald, 2014). Recognising that anti-consumption is neither an exclusively left- nor right-wing activity, Pecot et al. (2021) suggest that political extremism in general should be understood as an important predictor for anti-consumption. Individuals positioned at either extreme of the left-right political spectrum are more likely to be suspicious of consumerism and to engage in anti-consumption compared to those in the centre ground. It is the political centre – or ‘mainstream’ – that is understood to function as ‘a constant adversary’ for politically extreme individuals to fight against (Ulver and Laurell, 2020: 490). Whether extremely leftist or rightist, those who undertake anticonsumption in opposition to this real or imagined mainstream adversary are assumed to have committed to a form of lifestyle activism within a movement of like-minded political subjects ‘pos [ing] a viable alternative’ to the existing system (Izberk-Bilgin, 2012: 678; Kozinets and Handelman, 2004). Nevertheless, a ‘viable alternative’ that can truly supplant the existing system is rarely, if ever, taken seriously or considered achievable by lifestyle activists whose practices are typically undertaken in the individualist pursuits of self-expression, social distinction, therapy or hedonism (Kozinets, 2002). Although lifestyle activists may share political beliefs that deviate from the mainstream, it is rare that these beliefs are mobilised in ways that lead to authentic and durable change. For example, Moraes et al. (2010: 293) argue that individuals and groups who ‘share their own notions of the good life’ engage in oppositional practices that, while potentially aligned with extremist views, are undertaken ‘not with a view to change society at large […] but with the aim to restructure the meanings of their own lived experiences as seductive alternatives’. High-profile antimarket or anti-marketing events such as Burning Man have long provided us with illustrations of an anti-consumption that is largely deskinned of any revolutionary potential; serving to provide weekend-trippers with a short-lived, experiential sense of respite from (rather than reformation of) dominant market structures (Kozinets, 2002). For Kozinets, consumption might fall under scope for extreme criticism at such events and alternative modes of exchange are encouraged, but they are ‘not about major social change’ (Kozinets, 2002: 36); instead, they are more about personal growth and expression, and thus denuded of the political narratives that might motivate enduring and genuinely transformative solidarity in wider cultural life. Similarly, Mikkonen et al. (2011: 99) illustrate how online cadres of lifestyle activists who reject the hyper-consumerised ways of celebrating Christmas engage in mischievous anti-consumption discourses as a way of pursuing a cynical and playfully self-aware identity project, ‘the Scrooge’, rather than to genuinely educate and rescue seasonal shoppers from marketers’ manipulation. Even commercial brands sometimes seek to incite consumers’ rejection of – and resistance against – dominant market institutions, not in the pursuit of any kind of post-market politics but simply to achieve legitimacy for their own offerings (Koch and Ulver, 2022). Central to the above anti-consumption projects is the absence of earnest political demands and the subordination of meaningful critique to individual conceits and self-interest, what has been referred to as ‘the hollowing-out of political subjectivity’, resulting in a subject positioning founded on ‘base pragmatism and instrumentalism work[ing] in the service of the dominant ideology’ (Treadwell et al., 2013: 4–8). Moreover, the pluralisation of politically hollow anti-consumption projects works to ossify the status quo by aligning resistant energies with individual-expressive 4 Marketing Theory 0(0) rather than collective-transformative logics, ensuring that no single anti-consumption position is consolidated enough to become a genuine threat. No matter how cynical or dissatisfied anticonsumers are, without social solidarity and popular political dissensus, their behaviour is better understood as an alignment to the unrelenting individualism and diversification of consumptive capitalism, rather than as ‘reflexive defiance’ (Ozanne and Murray, 1995: 516) to it. The result is, we argue, a form of anti-consumption that remains gestural and, for the most part, objectless. However, while it might be devoid of collective political objectives, gestural anti-consumption is not without objects, as it constitutes a series of ‘alternative’ consumption choices rather than the refusal of consumption altogether (Chatzidakis et al., 2012; Cronin and Fitchett, 2021). To help us to better understand the political objectlessness of gestural anti-consumers and what underpins their inability or unwillingness to pursue genuine transformation, we now turn to Fisher’s (2009) onto-affective concept of ‘reflexive impotence’. Reflexive impotence and semiocapitalist horizons A common theme of critical marketing scholarship is that consumption today functions within a culture of disavowal whereby consumers are fully aware of their own complicity in systems of power and domination yet maintain an ironic distance to their actions (Bradshaw and Zwick, 2016; Cronin and Fitchett, 2021). Under these circumstances where consumers can disavow yet nonetheless participate in and reproduce the problematic aspects of dominant systems, an incontestable status quo is maintained through what Fisher (2009: 21) refers to as ‘reflexive impotence’, that is, ‘They know things are bad, but more than that, they know they can’t do anything about it’. Reflexive impotence denotes a state of being fully aware of one’s dissatisfaction with today’s increasingly technologically-saturated consumer-capitalist zeitgeist but acquiescing to it under the belief that it is unrealistic and near impossible to change the system. Even when undertaken on mindless autopilot or without significant meaning, day-to-day consumerist preoccupations such as routinely logging calories on digital self-tracking devices (Kristensen and Ruckenstein, 2018), keeping smartphones charged for idle scrolling on public transport (Robinson and Arnould, 2020), posting photos to social media (Kozinets et al., 2017) or binge-watching the latest ‘trending’ TV series via streaming services (Jones et al., 2018), all remain deeply entrenched regimes that many of us cannot imagine no longer doing. Collectively these vortices of digital artefacts and signs (‘semios’) – and the resigned acceptance that perpetuates their consumption – can be located within the parameters of ‘semiocapitalism’, a technologically-mediated global capitalist formation reliant on identifying, influencing and automatising consumers’ informational and semiotic flows, techno-cultural activities and modes of personal stimulation, expression, and meaning-making for its regime of accumulation (Hietanen et al., 2022; Hoang et al., 2022). Under semiocapitalism, consumers remain plugged into what Fisher calls ‘the drip-feed of digital stimulus’ because of: (1) the pervasive lures of an always-on digital culture that is seductively (and competitively) desirous, indulgent and egotistic; and (2) the naturalisation of ritualistic compliance that works to obviate any opposition to it (Dean and Fisher, 2014: 30). Importantly, semiocapitalism reproduces itself through the mixture of ‘perpetual pleasure’ and ‘an endless insomniac drift’ which always happen simultaneously (ibid.). Although its subjects almost never feel wholly present when consuming under semiocapitalism, its endlessly rotating carousel of pleasures keeps the majority committed. The result is reflexive impotence, a deep sense of inertia that is ontological–affective: what is felt becomes what is lived, and what is felt is that there is no popular impetus for change. Hoang et al. 5 There are three critical aspects to reflexive impotence’s onto-affectivity. First, Fisher’s (2009: 21) concept has an intellectual dimension centred on ‘marketplace metacognition’ – a subject’s social intelligence about his or her positioning as a consumer and marketers’ operations upon them (Wright, 2002: 677). Within a networked, gadget-driven, and computer-literate consumer culture, subjects are often not ignorant to market actors’ attempts to surveil and influence them but are also appreciative of the many indulgences and conveniences on offer (Hietanen et al., 2022). Consumers are painfully aware of the benefits that their digital consumption provides, resulting in a state of ambiguity that is conceived of as vaguely manageable rather than resolvable. This is seen in what Fisher (2009: 25) calls an ‘ahistorical, anti-mnemonic blip culture’ wherein time becomes fragmented into ‘digital slices’ that allow consumers to treat their relationships with technology as discrete encounters with benefits, which compensate for the cumulative costs of semiocapitalist subjugation (e.g. addiction, targeted advertising, algorithmic manipulation, etc.) (Hoang et al., 2022). Second, reflexive impotence has an attitudinal dimension best described in terms of ‘postpessimism’, ‘the understanding that neither an optimistic nor pessimistic attitude is justified due to the lack of alternatives’ (Gonnermann, 2019: 27). Gonnermann describes post-pessimism as an attitude ‘meandering between resignation and stoic acceptance’ (p. 37). Reflexive impotence, for both Fisher and Gonnermann, is not the same as apathy. Instead, it mirrors closely the idea of ‘disaffected consent’ (Gilbert, 2013: 18) whereby subjects feel that they have no choice but to accept that the existing socio-economic world they live in, while deeply problematic, constitutes the only viable form available to them. Experienced as ‘a penumbral burden of suppressed meanings and closed-off social possibilities that cannot be completely eliminated or denied’ (Gibson-Graham, 1995: 25), the post-pessimistic attitude is characterised by recognition that today’s capitalist zeitgeist is here to stay for better or worse; all other possibilities are cancelled (Ahlberg et al., 2022). The result is a cultural atmosphere of futurelessness (Fisher, 2014a) where any conceivable futures that are radically different to the semiocapitalist present have evaporated.

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The aff attempts to perms it will fail, any attempt to combine the alt with the aff causes the alt to get coopted

Berardi 09 – [Franco Berardi, "Precarious Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism and the Pathologies of the Post-Alpha Generation", 1/1/2009, Minor Compositions, https://monoskop.org/images/d/d5/Berardi_Franco_Bifo_Precarious_Rhapsody_Semocapitalism_and_the_Pathologies_of_Post-Alpha_Generation.pdf]//英生

On the basis of these premises Krahl critiques the political planning of the twentieth century labor movement:

The absence of reflection on the professional constitution (Verfassung) of class-consciousness as a non-empirical category has introduced into the socialist movement a tacit reduction of class consciousness in a Leninist sense that is inadequate to the metropolis (1969: 367).

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Vote neg to affirm a radical passivity – this creates a line of flight away from competition and acceleration, forming the basis of a new solidarity and revolution which will destroy semiocapitalism.

Bifo 17 (Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, “Futurability: The Age of Impotence and the Horizon of Possibility”, 2017, pg. 68-69)

In their late work What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari reconsider desire from the point of view of ageing. After a discussion of ageing and of friendship in the conclusion of the book, subtitled ‘From Chaos to the Brain’, they say that at a certain moment one perceives the suffering of the universe, chaos, and the surrounding acceleration that blurs perception, attention and understanding. The universe is too fast for the aged brain to elaborate it. This is the dark side of desire: the technical world that we have created in an age of youthful energy is now too fast and too complex for the human mind to control. In his last book, Chaosmosis, Guattari speaks of the chaosmic spasm: the perception that we are no longer able to follow the rhythm of chaosmotic desire. Physical, affective and historical events are slowing the pace of the brain as mind, and in the dissonance between the speed of the world and the slowness of the mind there is a suffering, which is the dark side of desire. But desire is not only energy and speed. It’s also the ability to find another rhythm. Here I am not only contemplating a problem of ageing, I’m talking about the art of politics, about the art of changing our conceptual frame. We must abandon the point of view of productivity, the expectation of acquisition and of control. We must assume, instead, the point of view of laziness and self-care. We must transform impotence into a line of flight away from the universe of competition. We may discover that being exhausted is not so bad. How do we deal with the problem of exhaustion? Inscribing the reality of death in the political agenda. Transforming decline into a lifestyle of solidarity. The senile generation of Europe may become the subject of a cultural revolution aimed to prepare Western society for a redistribution of wealth and resources. Such a cultural revolution should start with a critique of the cult of energetic youth that permeates modern culture. The ideology of unbounded growth and aggressive competition has underpinned the two pillars of capitalist development; they have nourished the romantic and nationalist ideologies that have aggressively mobilized Western society in late modern times. We need a senile approach to the problem of the future. The cult of competition must be replaced by the cult of solidarity and of sharing. I concede that this prospect seems very unlikely at present. The European population seems determined to defend its privilege with all the means at its disposal. However, this stance cannot bring anything good with it and is already bringing a lot of evil. Young people escaping hard conditions are surrounding Fortress Europe. They bear with them the unconscious memory of centuries of exploitation and humiliation, as well as the conscious expectation of those things that advertising and global ideology have lately promised them. Over the past decades, Europe seemed the continent of peace and social justice. Now it is sinking under a wave of sadness and cynicism. Young people seem unable to alter the social conditions and are wandering in a social labyrinth devoid of solidarity or peace. The senile population could, then, be the bearer of a new hope, if they are able to face the inevitable with an easy soul. They may discover something that humankind has never known: the love of the aged, the sensuous slowness of those who no longer expect any good to come from life except wisdom. This is the wisdom of those who have seen much, forgotten nothing, but still look at everything with innocent curiosity.

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The alternative is to analyze the distinct dimensions of inherent semiotics within capitalism through the lense of the Cultural Political Economy

Jessop 14, (Bob Jessop, 2014), British sociologist and political economist who has made significant contributions to the fields of state theory, governance, and regulation, (bobjessop.wordpress.com; “Critical Semiotic Analysis and Cultural Political Economy,” https://bobjessop.wordpress.com/2014/12/15/critical-semiotic-analysis-and-cultural-political-economy///KENTO

This article argues for sustained theoretical and empirical engagement between a materially-grounded critical semiotic analysis and an evolutionary and institutional political economy informed by the cultural turn. It is based on my earlier work on state theory and political economy and my critical engagement with Marx’s pre-theoretical discourse analysis and Gramsci’s elaborate philological and materialist studies of hegemony. Others have taken different routes to similar conclusions and have used other labels to describe them. What most distinguishes CPE as presented here from apparently similar approaches are the application of evolutionary theory to semiosis as well as political economy and their resulting mutual transformation. I conclude with the following remarks. First, insofar as semiosis is studied apart from its extra-semiotic context, resulting accounts of social causation will be incomplete, leading to semiotic reductionism and/or imperialism. And, second, insofar as material transformation is studied apart from its semiotic dimensions and mediations, explanations of stability and change risk oscillating between objective necessity and sheer contingency. To avoid these twin problems, CPE aims to steer a path between ‘soft cultural economics’ and ‘hard orthodox economics’. While the former subsumes economic activities under broad generalizations about social and cultural life (especially their inevitably semiotic character), the latter reifies formal, market-rational, calculative activities and analyzes them apart from their discursive significance and broader extra-economic context and supports. The former tendency is common in economic sociology or claims about the ‘culturalization’ of economic life in the new economy (e.g., Lash and Urry 1994); it also occurs in more discourse-theoretical work, such as work on cultural materialism (Williams 1980; Milner 2002), the linguistic mediation of economic activities (Gal 1989), or economic antagonisms (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Unfortunately, from my viewpoint, while such currents correctly reject a sharp division between the cultural and material and stress the cultural dimensions of material life, they tend to lose sight of the specificity of different economic forms, contradictions, institutions, contradictions, and so on. The risk here is that one cannot distinguish in material terms between capitalist and non-capitalist economic practices, institutions, and formations – they all become equally discursive and can only be differentiated through their respective semiotic practices, meanings, and contexts and their performative impact. Conversely, ‘hard orthodox economics’ tends to establish a rigiid demarcation between the economic and the cultural, reifying economic objects, naturalizing homo economicus, and proposing rigid economic laws. At its most extreme, this leads to universalizing, transhistorical claims valid for all forms of material provisioning; in other cases, it tends to separate economizing activities from their extra-economic supports, to regard the economy as a self-reproducing, self-expanding system with its own laws, and to provide the theoretical underpinnings for economic reductionism. In offering a ‘third way’, CPE, at least as presented here, emphasizes that capitalism involves a series of specific economic forms (the commodity form, money, wages, prices, property, etc.) associated with generalized commodity production. These forms have their own effects that must be analyzed as such and that therefore shape the selection and retention of competing economic imaginaries. Thus a Marxist CPE would robustly reject the conflation of discourses and material practices and the more general ‘discourse-imperialism’ that has plagued social theory for two decades. It would also provide a powerful means both to critique and to contextualize recent claims about the ‘culturalization’ of economic life in the new economy – seeing these claims as elements within a new economic imaginary with a potentially performative impact as well as a belated (mis)recognition of the semiotic dimensions of all economic activities (for sometimes contrasting views, see Du Gay and Pryke 2002; Ray and Sayer 1999). And, in addition, as many theorists have noted in various contexts (and orthodox Marxists sometimes forget), the reproduction of the basic forms of the capital relation and their particular instantiation in different social formations cannot be secured purely through the objective logic of the market or a domination that operates ‘behind the backs of the producers’. For capital’s laws of motion are doubly tendential and depend on contingent social practices that extend well beyond what is from time to time construed and/or constructed as economic. CPE provides a corrective to these problems too. In part this comes from its emphasis on the constitutive material role of the extra-economic supports of market forces. But it also emphasizes how different economic imaginaries serve to demarcate economic from extra-economic activities, institutions, and orders and, hence, how semiosis is also constitutive in securing the conditions for capital accumulation.

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Neoliberalism has created a system of proliferated privatization that makes war and violence inevitable – war has extended itself to the individual for economic gain.

Bifo 16 (Franco Berardi, aka "Bifo," founder of the famous "Radio Alice" in Bologna and an important figure of the Italian Autonomia Movement, is a writer, media theorist, and media activist. He currently teaches Social History of the Media at the Accademia di Brera, Milan., “The Coming Global Civil War: Is There Any Way Out?,” )//JosephCD

Are we heading into the Third World War? Yes and no: war has been with us for the past fifteen years, it promises to be with us for a long time, and it threatens to destroy the last remnants of modern civilization. The exacerbation of xenophobia across the West and the rise of nationalism in countries like France are causes and effects of a looming war whose sources lie in the past two hundred years of colonial impoverishment and humiliation of the majority of the world population, not to mention neoliberal competition and the privatization of everything—including war itself. Pacifism is becoming irrelevant as the conditions of war become irreversible. How can we oppose war when killers shoot at a peaceful crowd at a concert? War is becoming normal: the stock exchange no longer reacts to massacres, as its main concern is the looming stagnation of the world economy. After every armed attack, whether by Islamists or white supremacists, by random murderers or by well-trained fundamentalist killers, Americans run to buy more weapons. So weapons are not only increasing in the arsenals of nations, but also in the kitchens and bedrooms of everyday families. A Republican assemblywoman from Nevada named Michele Fiore recently posted a Christmas family portrait on Facebook. At first glance, it’s like any other holiday card, with three generations of a family in red shirts and jeans in front of a Christmas tree. Upon closer inspection, you see that Mrs. Fiore, her adult daughters, their husbands, and even one of her grandchildren are all holding firearms. The privatization of war is an obvious feature of neoliberal deregulation, and the same paradigm has generated Halliburton and the Sinaloa Cartel, Blackwater and Daesh. The business of violence is one of the main branches of the global economy and financial abstraction does not discriminate criminal money from any other kind. The process of externalization and privatization is now provoking a worldwide civil war that is feeding itself. According to Nicholas Kristof, “in the last four years more people have died in the United States from guns (including suicides and accidents) than Americans died in the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq combined.” Are we heading toward a global war? Not exactly: no declarations of war are being issued, but innumerable combat zones are proliferating. No unified fronts are in sight, but fragmented micro-conflicts and uncanny alliances with no general strategic vision abound. “World war” is not the term for this. I would call it fragmentary global civil war. And the fragments are not converging, because war is everywhere. Now, as US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter claims, “destructive power of greater and greater magnitude falls into the hands of smaller and smaller groups of human beings.”2 When war is privatized, no geopolitical order in the world can be imagined, no arrangement among the conflicting religious tribes can be pursued. No beginning and no end—an endless war, as Bin Laden promised. From the Paradise in which he certainly dwells, Mr. bin Laden must be looking upon the rise of the Caliphate of Death with a smile: so far, he can easily claim that the Army of Allah is winning the war. Some American Republicans claim that the killings are related to mental illness. In a way, they are right. But they misunderstand the causes and the extent of what they label mental illness. Mental illness is not the rare malady of an isolated dropout, but the widespread consequence of panic, depression, precariousness, and humiliation: these are the sources of the contemporary global fragmentary war, and they are spreading everywhere, rooted in the legacy of colonialism and in the frenzy of daily competition. Neoliberal deregulation has opened the way to a regime of worldwide necro-economy: the all-encompassing law of competition has canceled out moral prescriptions and legal regulations. Since its earliest phases, Thatcher’s neoliberal philosophy prescribed war among individuals. Hobbes, Darwin, and Hayek have all been summoned to conceptualize the end of social civilization, the end of peace. Forget about the religious or ideological labels of the agents of massive violence, and look at their true nature. Take the Sinaloa Cartel and Daesh and compare them to Blackwater and Exxon Mobil. They have much more in common than you may think. Their common goal is to extract the maximum amount of money from their investments in the most exciting products of the contemporary economy: terror, horror, and death. Necro-capitalism is the emerging economic order of the world. The narco business is a pillar of the Mexican economy, and in fact the head of the Sinaloa Cartel, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, was listed by Fortune magazine as one of the most prominent businessmen of 2012. Why not? After all, he is just a neoliberal entrepreneur who deals in deregulated kidnappings, drug trafficking, and murder. Like neoliberal corporations investing money in the ultimate business, the Iraqi-Syrian caliphate and the Mexican narco army pay salaries to their soldiers, who are necro-proletarians. The narco business recruits unemployed young men from Monterrey, Sinaloa, and Veracruz. The caliphate recruits young men from the suburbs of London, Cairo, Tunis, and Paris, then trains them to kidnap and slaughter people at random. Daesh salaries have been estimated to be as much as one thousand US dollars a month. The group acquires this money from ransom, oil, and taxes imposed on millions of Sunni people. They deliver a postmodern medievalism, but one that is not at all backwards. On the contrary, it is an anticipation of the future. In a video released by Dubiq, the advertising agency of the Islamic State, the rhetoric is the same as any other type of advertising: buy this product and you’ll be happy.3 Multiple camera angles, slick graphics, slow motion, and even artificial wind give the whole thing a more dramatic mood: join the cause and you’ll find friends, warmth, and well-being. Jihad is the best therapy for depression. A message for feeble-minded people, for suffering people craving warmth, virile friendship, belonging. Not so different from the ads that we see every day in our city streets, only more sincere when it comes to the subject of suicide. Suicide is crucial in this video: 6,500 current or former US military soldiers commit suicide each year, according to Dubiq. While Americans die alone in anger and despair, God’s soldiers die eager to meet some seventy virgins waiting in Paradise to fuck the warriors. Do you remember Yugoslavia? For some time, it was a rather healthy federation of twenty-five million people. Different ethnic and religious communities coexisted, factories were managed by workers, everybody had a privately owned house, and nobody suffered from hunger. Then came the International Monetary Fund, the Polish pope pushing Croatians into religious war against the Orthodox Serbs, and Germany delivering weapons to the fascist Ustaša. In 1990, the United States cut off all forms of credit to Yugoslavia unless separate elections were held in each state of the federation within six months. As a consequence, Yugoslavia—no longer able to conduct foreign trade—was condemned to commercial bankruptcy, which reinforced the divisive tendencies of its states. The US then funded the individual states to dissolve the federation, also supporting parties and movements that promoted this process. Meanwhile, Germany shipped arms to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. In March of 1991, fascist organizations in Croatia called for the overthrow of the Socialist government and the expulsion of all Serbs from Croatia. On March 5, 1991, they attacked the federal army base at Gospić, and civil war began. The extreme right-wing Croatian party Democratic Union, which used the flag, emblems, and slogans of the pro-Nazi Ustaša party, seized power. Citizenship, property rights, employment, retirement benefits, and passports were granted only to Croats and to no other ethnic group. Thus, 300,000 Serbs armed themselves and entered the fray with unspeakable brutality. The destruction of Yugoslavia can be seen as a return of Hitler’s ghost to the world scene. Ethnic-religious wars caused around 170,000 casualties, as ethnic cleansing was practiced in every area of the federation. After seven years of violence, a new state order emerged based on a paradigm of ethnic-religious identification, a principle thought to have been extinct after the end of the Second World War and the defeat of Nazism. Twenty years after the Nazi-neoliberal wars of Yugoslavia, in all those small nation-states (except perhaps Slovenia) unemployment is rampant, people are impoverished, schools are privatized, and public infrastructure is in disrepair. Today, the Yugoslavia of the Nineties may well be a blueprint for the European future: German Ordoliberalism has impoverished social life, depleted public services all over the continent, and inflicted humiliation on Syriza which has jeopardized the core of European solidarity. The failure to deal with the new wave of migrants from the East has exposed the political fragility of the European Union, and now fuels a new outburst of fear, racism, shame, and bad conscience. From the Balkans to Greece, from Libya to Morocco, are the ten million people amassing at these borders going to be the perpetrators of the next terrorist wave? Or will they be the victims of the next Holocaust? After the attacks in the center of Paris on Friday, November 13, a nervous French President declared: “The security pact takes precedence over the stability pact. France is at war.” Bin Laden’s dream has been fulfilled. A small group of fanatics has provoked fragmentary global civil war. Can it be stopped? In the present condition of perpetual economic stagnation, emerging markets are crumbling, the European Union is paralyzed [Debilitated], the promised economic recovery is elusive, and it is hard to foresee an awakening from this nightmare. The only imaginable way out of this hell is to end financial capitalism, but this does not seem to be at hand. Nevertheless, this is the only prospect we can pursue in such an obscurantist time: to create solidarity among the bodies of cognitive workers worldwide, and to build a techno-poetic platform for the collaboration of cognitive workers for the liberation of knowledge from both religious and economic dogma. A fragmented front of nationalist parties is gaining the upper hand: they oppose the euro currency and globalization, and they call for the restoration of national sovereignty. This front has assembled in the governing coalition of Hungary (which includes Nazis and authoritarian nationalists), in the Italian right-wing of Matteo Salvini, in the Polish government, in the anti-European British party UKIP, and in the rightist majority of the Bavarian CSU. This anti-euro front of European forces is converging with Russian nationalism under the authoritarian leadership of Putin and the banner of national populism and unrelenting Islamophobia. After the humiliation of Syriza, the future of Europe is held captive by the opposition between financial violence and national violence. In order to grasp the dynamic that drives the global civil war, we first have to see the relation between the icy wind of financial abstraction and the reaction of the aggressive body of society separated from its brain. The icy wind of financial abstraction is instilling in the European soul a sense of desolation that Michel Houellebecq has described in his books. La soumission (Submission) is a novel about the sadness that emerges from the vanishing of collective desire. Submission to the Supreme Entity (be it God or the market) is the source of the present gloom, and the source of the present war. Globalization has brought about the obliteration of modern universalism: capital flows freely everywhere and the labor market is globally unified, but this has not led to the free circulation of women and men, nor to the affirmation of universal reason in the world. Rather, the opposite is happening: as the intellectual energies of society are captured by the network of financial abstraction, as cognitive labor is subjugated to the abstract law of valorization, and as human communication is transformed into abstract interaction among disembodied digital agents, the social body is detached from the general intellect. The subsumption of the general intellect into the corporate kingdom of abstraction is depriving the living community of intelligence, understanding, and emotion. And the brainless body reacts—on one side, a huge wave of mental suffering, and on the other side, the much-advertised cure for depression: fanaticism, fascism, and war. And at the end, suicide.

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We have reached endless production: semiocapitalism recycles and resells us as subjects that commodifies all cultural meaning mediating moral pursuits and all genre. The production of production suffocates the world in inevitable ecological and humanitarian crises. The machine subsumes all knowledge and rationality engraining cultural consumption into the psyche that holds us hostage to the system while annihilating any alternative.

Hietanen and Andéhn 17 [Joel and Mikael, Professor at the University of Helsinki and Senior lecturer at Royal Holloway, University of London, “More than meets the eye: videography and production of desire in semiocapitalism”, ] cent

Several seminal works attempt to link cultural production to the future of capitalism in a way that seems to arrive at an incessant cyclicality of repetitious desiring – endless signs of production (Baudrillard, 2007; Deleuze & Guattari, 2013; Guattari, 2014). These dystopian views are also often coupled with greater processes of increasing stratification of wealth and ecological and humanitarian crises in a world suffocating under the pressure of increasingly frantic processes of commodification. For Guattari, these tendencies and their cultural production bring about capitalist refrain, in which semiocapitalism, in its evermore penetrating experimentations of commodification, perpetually seeks to homogenise the possibility of affective experience to its lowest common denominator (let us all watch sitcoms that even laugh in our place, that are equally (not) funny to everyone, let us all experience an authentic holiday that is carefully commodified and regimented to produce an expected experience). Here the desiring production of subjectivation increasingly coincides with the machinic repetition of the orders of capitalism itself – a digitally mediated spectacle of ‘enforced happiness and enjoyment’ (Baudrillard, 1998, 546 J. HIETANEN AND M. ANDÉHN p. 80). It would seem we have a keen desiring tendency to connect and go along with all this, as it is increasingly argued that conventional leftist criticisms seem to forget that in all this injustice and alienating tendencies there is a subversive libidinal enjoyment lurking (Deleuzre & Guattari, 2013; Fisher, 2014b; Lyotard, 2004; TomšIč, 2015). These desiring investments are now encapsulated in subjectivation that increasingly has come to produce the desire of capital itself. This radical claim argues that there is an abundance of potential desire in the affective tendencies of capitalism itself, and even its injustices and repressive orders can be unconsciously ‘enjoyed’ as subjectivity is seduced in a mad dash of consumption and social competition (Baudrillard, 2007; Deleuze & Guattari, 2009; Lyotard, 2004) where there is ‘an anxious anticipation, not that there may not be enough, but that there is too much, and too much for everyone’ (Baudrillard, 1988, p. 30). Following Deleuze and Guattari (2013), desiring is relentless and always in tension, attaching itself to more desiring potential and desiring its own annihilation for ‘desire desires death too’ (p. 19). This desiring readily attaches itself to pain (see Scott, Cayla, & Cova, 2017), but also cruelty, submissiveness, drug addiction and the like in the pursuit ‘negating the ego itself’ in the intense potential of pleasure in apathy (also Deleuze, 1989b, p. 29). In semiocapitalism, this kind of psychoanalytic enjoyment takes the form of something akin to the masochistic pleasure of a commodified Stockholm syndrome, where one sides with the hostage-taker in every act of consumption that the incessant desiring of the machinic unconsciousness prompts. It has been successfully incorporated by consumer subjectivities to the point where no conceivable alternative to Western consumerism can be readily imagined (Genosko, 2012; Schiermer, 2011; Stavrakakis, 2007), but that does not mean that consumption is not enjoyed even when its alienating and unjust ramifications are increasingly understood by consumers themselves (Lyotard, 2004; Žižek, 2002). Indeed, even the engagement with attempts to commodify the resistance to the system itself, as in the case of ‘ethical’ brands, can be observed to be readily enjoyable as a form of mischievous make-believe (Walz, Hingston, & Andéhn, 2014; also Bradshaw & Zwick, 2016). As Deleuze and Guattari (2013) note, capitalism is a process of desire and proliferation, or ‘production for production’s sake […] The capitalist machine does not run the risk of becoming mad, it is mad from one end to the other and from the beginning, and this is the source of its rationality’ (p. 423). These logics are embodied in subjectivities of consumption whose machinic unconsciousness produces desiring engulfed in relentlessly producing signs of consumption, personal branding and individualistic achievement (see Scott et al., 2017). To interject and ask ‘how does videography, including my own works, play into, or oppose this greater tendency?’ may help facilitate more critical, and in our opinion more subversive, works to emerge within our field. Going back to the example of a pop-music, consider what one may observe through a semiotic analysis of a video in the hip-hop genre (for an illustrative example, see ‘THat Part’ 2 ). One may identify a veritable smorgasbord of semiotic categories commonly seen as cultural symptoms of (take your pick): the almost indefinite glorification of masculine hubris, brazen demonstrations of purchasing power, femininity relegated to something akin to machines of male pleasure (but only if they look sexually arousing to the male gaze) that is one, of only a few, in a set array of positions of qualified independence available. All these interpretations common to semiotic analysis would constitute critiques on the level of the semiotic symbols in the video alone. In a manner of speaking, they would stay largely ‘within’ the video itself. What thinking about a-signifying semiotics can potentially add to this is a way to diagnose why such portrayals of lifestyles are appealing as a semiotic whole – even in the face of their obvious superficiality – and what kinds of subjectivations that engaging with this medium produces. The repetitive cyclicality and affective emptiness of these videos lie in stark distinction to some of the intensities of its predecessor scenes. This emancipatory potential now seems eerily absent. The pop music video seems not only to have lost its longing for new imaginations, but has also moved to a point where even its attempts to ironise itself have lost all possibilities of signification beyond its own machinic emergence as a commodity. Even when a hip-hop artist (such as in the example above) makes an ironic spectacle of the music industry, the irony no longer points to any alternatives, but is subsumed by its own cyclical circulation of pop music production with the appropriate video aesthetics. In its formulaic, constantly inwardbackwards referencing to its ironic distance it relentlessly approaches the capitalist refrain. That is a point at which the constant quest for difference becomes predicable and loses its ability to affectively evoke new ways of thinking; the mindless staring into the TV-screen as another iteration of the sitcom formulae is displayed provides a striking example of what millions experience every day. Approaching the capitalist refrain, we encounter a situation in which one can no longer even imagine, or meaningfully discuss alternative or new ways of thinking, as its irony has been inverted to retrospective banality that no longer even recognises the possibility of meaningful engagement. Instead, the possibilities of desiring production (on platforms such as YouTube) is mostly to participate in flows of largely unconnected ‘comments’ or to click on the next suggested video of similar type according to algorithmic statistics that now machinically channel ‘taste’ (also Zwick & Dholakia, 2004). This is your subjectivity now. Click on the next video. Repeat. These affective tendencies are interwoven in technologies that guide possible interaction with the medium. In a Guattarian sense, the subject was ‘never there’, but the desire for producing a subject was always productive, now having formed allencompassing connections to a desiring productive logic in a capitalist sense. This leaves us with a simulacrum of cultural meaning in the form of audiovisual music expression, a retrospective longing in consuming diversities of sameness. ‘Machinic enslavement and a-signifying semiotics work together’ (Bueno, 2017; Genosko, 2009, p. 123) in this simulation of video-mediated musical experience as repetition of the same set of possibilities, and thus only interpreting its semiotic content cannot reveal it as a cultural tendency that produces movement for subjectivities constitutive of capitalist unconscious desire. Endless and relentless production of production. No intensities, nofuture, the end of genres. To what end do we identify these tendencies as informing consumer research videographies? Let us start by asking: how and for what purposes are we producing spectacles of consumption in the form of video? We might start by imagining videographic inquiry based on a critical engagement with the capitalist refrain we have described above. We hope that videography can, in a way that necessitates new ways of thinking about the medium, critically engage with the a-signifying semiotics of its 548 J. HIETANEN AND M. ANDÉHN production, dissemination and viewing of its own constitutive spectacles. Next, we will provide a contrast between what we perceive as a tendency towards a lowest common denominator of videographic inquiry itself, and a proposed, albeit tentative, alternative that we feel could open up possibilities for new ‘images of thought’ on video.

2023 Michigan Kritik
topshelf › 1NC---Short

Vote neg to affirm a radical passivity – this creates a line of flight away from competition and acceleration, forming the basis of a new solidarity and revolution which will destroy semiocapitalism.

Bifo 17 (Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, “Futurability: The Age of Impotence and the Horizon of Possibility”, 2017, pg. 68-69)

In their late work What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari reconsider desire from the point of view of ageing. After a discussion of ageing and of friendship in the conclusion of the book, subtitled ‘From Chaos to the Brain’, they say that at a certain moment one perceives the suffering of the universe, chaos, and the surrounding acceleration that blurs perception, attention and understanding. The universe is too fast for the aged brain to elaborate it. This is the dark side of desire: the technical world that we have created in an age of youthful energy is now too fast and too complex for the human mind to control. In his last book, Chaosmosis, Guattari speaks of the chaosmic spasm: the perception that we are no longer able to follow the rhythm of chaosmotic desire. Physical, affective and historical events are slowing the pace of the brain as mind, and in the dissonance between the speed of the world and the slowness of the mind there is a suffering, which is the dark side of desire. But desire is not only energy and speed. It’s also the ability to find another rhythm. Here I am not only contemplating a problem of ageing, I’m talking about the art of politics, about the art of changing our conceptual frame. We must abandon the point of view of productivity, the expectation of acquisition and of control. We must assume, instead, the point of view of laziness and self-care. We must transform impotence into a line of flight away from the universe of competition. We may discover that being exhausted is not so bad. How do we deal with the problem of exhaustion? Inscribing the reality of death in the political agenda. Transforming decline into a lifestyle of solidarity. The senile generation of Europe may become the subject of a cultural revolution aimed to prepare Western society for a redistribution of wealth and resources. Such a cultural revolution should start with a critique of the cult of energetic youth that permeates modern culture. The ideology of unbounded growth and aggressive competition has underpinned the two pillars of capitalist development; they have nourished the romantic and nationalist ideologies that have aggressively mobilized Western society in late modern times. We need a senile approach to the problem of the future. The cult of competition must be replaced by the cult of solidarity and of sharing. I concede that this prospect seems very unlikely at present. The European population seems determined to defend its privilege with all the means at its disposal. However, this stance cannot bring anything good with it and is already bringing a lot of evil. Young people escaping hard conditions are surrounding Fortress Europe. They bear with them the unconscious memory of centuries of exploitation and humiliation, as well as the conscious expectation of those things that advertising and global ideology have lately promised them. Over the past decades, Europe seemed the continent of peace and social justice. Now it is sinking under a wave of sadness and cynicism. Young people seem unable to alter the social conditions and are wandering in a social labyrinth devoid of solidarity or peace. The senile population could, then, be the bearer of a new hope, if they are able to face the inevitable with an easy soul. They may discover something that humankind has never known: the love of the aged, the sensuous slowness of those who no longer expect any good to come from life except wisdom. This is the wisdom of those who have seen much, forgotten nothing, but still look at everything with innocent curiosity.

2023 Michigan Kritik
topshelf › 1NC---Short

Neoliberalism has created a system of proliferated privatization that makes war and violence inevitable – war has extended itself to the individual for economic gain.

Bifo 16 (Franco Berardi, aka "Bifo," founder of the famous "Radio Alice" in Bologna and an important figure of the Italian Autonomia Movement, is a writer, media theorist, and media activist. He currently teaches Social History of the Media at the Accademia di Brera, Milan., “The Coming Global Civil War: Is There Any Way Out?,” )//JosephCD

Are we heading into the Third World War? Yes and no: war has been with us for the past fifteen years, it promises to be with us for a long time, and it threatens to destroy the last remnants of modern civilization. The exacerbation of xenophobia across the West and the rise of nationalism in countries like France are causes and effects of a looming war whose sources lie in the past two hundred years of colonial impoverishment and humiliation of the majority of the world population, not to mention neoliberal competition and the privatization of everything—including war itself. Pacifism is becoming irrelevant as the conditions of war become irreversible. How can we oppose war when killers shoot at a peaceful crowd at a concert? War is becoming normal: the stock exchange no longer reacts to massacres, as its main concern is the looming stagnation of the world economy. After every armed attack, whether by Islamists or white supremacists, by random murderers or by well-trained fundamentalist killers, Americans run to buy more weapons. So weapons are not only increasing in the arsenals of nations, but also in the kitchens and bedrooms of everyday families. A Republican assemblywoman from Nevada named Michele Fiore recently posted a Christmas family portrait on Facebook. At first glance, it’s like any other holiday card, with three generations of a family in red shirts and jeans in front of a Christmas tree. Upon closer inspection, you see that Mrs. Fiore, her adult daughters, their husbands, and even one of her grandchildren are all holding firearms. The privatization of war is an obvious feature of neoliberal deregulation, and the same paradigm has generated Halliburton and the Sinaloa Cartel, Blackwater and Daesh. The business of violence is one of the main branches of the global economy and financial abstraction does not discriminate criminal money from any other kind. The process of externalization and privatization is now provoking a worldwide civil war that is feeding itself. According to Nicholas Kristof, “in the last four years more people have died in the United States from guns (including suicides and accidents) than Americans died in the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq combined.” Are we heading toward a global war? Not exactly: no declarations of war are being issued, but innumerable combat zones are proliferating. No unified fronts are in sight, but fragmented micro-conflicts and uncanny alliances with no general strategic vision abound. “World war” is not the term for this. I would call it fragmentary global civil war. And the fragments are not converging, because war is everywhere. Now, as US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter claims, “destructive power of greater and greater magnitude falls into the hands of smaller and smaller groups of human beings.”2 When war is privatized, no geopolitical order in the world can be imagined, no arrangement among the conflicting religious tribes can be pursued. No beginning and no end—an endless war, as Bin Laden promised. From the Paradise in which he certainly dwells, Mr. bin Laden must be looking upon the rise of the Caliphate of Death with a smile: so far, he can easily claim that the Army of Allah is winning the war. Some American Republicans claim that the killings are related to mental illness. In a way, they are right. But they misunderstand the causes and the extent of what they label mental illness. Mental illness is not the rare malady of an isolated dropout, but the widespread consequence of panic, depression, precariousness, and humiliation: these are the sources of the contemporary global fragmentary war, and they are spreading everywhere, rooted in the legacy of colonialism and in the frenzy of daily competition. Neoliberal deregulation has opened the way to a regime of worldwide necro-economy: the all-encompassing law of competition has canceled out moral prescriptions and legal regulations. Since its earliest phases, Thatcher’s neoliberal philosophy prescribed war among individuals. Hobbes, Darwin, and Hayek have all been summoned to conceptualize the end of social civilization, the end of peace. Forget about the religious or ideological labels of the agents of massive violence, and look at their true nature. Take the Sinaloa Cartel and Daesh and compare them to Blackwater and Exxon Mobil. They have much more in common than you may think. Their common goal is to extract the maximum amount of money from their investments in the most exciting products of the contemporary economy: terror, horror, and death. Necro-capitalism is the emerging economic order of the world. The narco business is a pillar of the Mexican economy, and in fact the head of the Sinaloa Cartel, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, was listed by Fortune magazine as one of the most prominent businessmen of 2012. Why not? After all, he is just a neoliberal entrepreneur who deals in deregulated kidnappings, drug trafficking, and murder. Like neoliberal corporations investing money in the ultimate business, the Iraqi-Syrian caliphate and the Mexican narco army pay salaries to their soldiers, who are necro-proletarians. The narco business recruits unemployed young men from Monterrey, Sinaloa, and Veracruz. The caliphate recruits young men from the suburbs of London, Cairo, Tunis, and Paris, then trains them to kidnap and slaughter people at random. Daesh salaries have been estimated to be as much as one thousand US dollars a month. The group acquires this money from ransom, oil, and taxes imposed on millions of Sunni people. They deliver a postmodern medievalism, but one that is not at all backwards. On the contrary, it is an anticipation of the future. In a video released by Dubiq, the advertising agency of the Islamic State, the rhetoric is the same as any other type of advertising: buy this product and you’ll be happy.3 Multiple camera angles, slick graphics, slow motion, and even artificial wind give the whole thing a more dramatic mood: join the cause and you’ll find friends, warmth, and well-being. Jihad is the best therapy for depression. A message for feeble-minded people, for suffering people craving warmth, virile friendship, belonging. Not so different from the ads that we see every day in our city streets, only more sincere when it comes to the subject of suicide. Suicide is crucial in this video: 6,500 current or former US military soldiers commit suicide each year, according to Dubiq. While Americans die alone in anger and despair, God’s soldiers die eager to meet some seventy virgins waiting in Paradise to fuck the warriors. Do you remember Yugoslavia? For some time, it was a rather healthy federation of twenty-five million people. Different ethnic and religious communities coexisted, factories were managed by workers, everybody had a privately owned house, and nobody suffered from hunger. Then came the International Monetary Fund, the Polish pope pushing Croatians into religious war against the Orthodox Serbs, and Germany delivering weapons to the fascist Ustaša. In 1990, the United States cut off all forms of credit to Yugoslavia unless separate elections were held in each state of the federation within six months. As a consequence, Yugoslavia—no longer able to conduct foreign trade—was condemned to commercial bankruptcy, which reinforced the divisive tendencies of its states. The US then funded the individual states to dissolve the federation, also supporting parties and movements that promoted this process. Meanwhile, Germany shipped arms to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. In March of 1991, fascist organizations in Croatia called for the overthrow of the Socialist government and the expulsion of all Serbs from Croatia. On March 5, 1991, they attacked the federal army base at Gospić, and civil war began. The extreme right-wing Croatian party Democratic Union, which used the flag, emblems, and slogans of the pro-Nazi Ustaša party, seized power. Citizenship, property rights, employment, retirement benefits, and passports were granted only to Croats and to no other ethnic group. Thus, 300,000 Serbs armed themselves and entered the fray with unspeakable brutality. The destruction of Yugoslavia can be seen as a return of Hitler’s ghost to the world scene. Ethnic-religious wars caused around 170,000 casualties, as ethnic cleansing was practiced in every area of the federation. After seven years of violence, a new state order emerged based on a paradigm of ethnic-religious identification, a principle thought to have been extinct after the end of the Second World War and the defeat of Nazism. Twenty years after the Nazi-neoliberal wars of Yugoslavia, in all those small nation-states (except perhaps Slovenia) unemployment is rampant, people are impoverished, schools are privatized, and public infrastructure is in disrepair. Today, the Yugoslavia of the Nineties may well be a blueprint for the European future: German Ordoliberalism has impoverished social life, depleted public services all over the continent, and inflicted humiliation on Syriza which has jeopardized the core of European solidarity. The failure to deal with the new wave of migrants from the East has exposed the political fragility of the European Union, and now fuels a new outburst of fear, racism, shame, and bad conscience. From the Balkans to Greece, from Libya to Morocco, are the ten million people amassing at these borders going to be the perpetrators of the next terrorist wave? Or will they be the victims of the next Holocaust? After the attacks in the center of Paris on Friday, November 13, a nervous French President declared: “The security pact takes precedence over the stability pact. France is at war.” Bin Laden’s dream has been fulfilled. A small group of fanatics has provoked fragmentary global civil war. Can it be stopped? In the present condition of perpetual economic stagnation, emerging markets are crumbling, the European Union is paralyzed [Debilitated], the promised economic recovery is elusive, and it is hard to foresee an awakening from this nightmare. The only imaginable way out of this hell is to end financial capitalism, but this does not seem to be at hand. Nevertheless, this is the only prospect we can pursue in such an obscurantist time: to create solidarity among the bodies of cognitive workers worldwide, and to build a techno-poetic platform for the collaboration of cognitive workers for the liberation of knowledge from both religious and economic dogma. A fragmented front of nationalist parties is gaining the upper hand: they oppose the euro currency and globalization, and they call for the restoration of national sovereignty. This front has assembled in the governing coalition of Hungary (which includes Nazis and authoritarian nationalists), in the Italian right-wing of Matteo Salvini, in the Polish government, in the anti-European British party UKIP, and in the rightist majority of the Bavarian CSU. This anti-euro front of European forces is converging with Russian nationalism under the authoritarian leadership of Putin and the banner of national populism and unrelenting Islamophobia. After the humiliation of Syriza, the future of Europe is held captive by the opposition between financial violence and national violence. In order to grasp the dynamic that drives the global civil war, we first have to see the relation between the icy wind of financial abstraction and the reaction of the aggressive body of society separated from its brain. The icy wind of financial abstraction is instilling in the European soul a sense of desolation that Michel Houellebecq has described in his books. La soumission (Submission) is a novel about the sadness that emerges from the vanishing of collective desire. Submission to the Supreme Entity (be it God or the market) is the source of the present gloom, and the source of the present war. Globalization has brought about the obliteration of modern universalism: capital flows freely everywhere and the labor market is globally unified, but this has not led to the free circulation of women and men, nor to the affirmation of universal reason in the world. Rather, the opposite is happening: as the intellectual energies of society are captured by the network of financial abstraction, as cognitive labor is subjugated to the abstract law of valorization, and as human communication is transformed into abstract interaction among disembodied digital agents, the social body is detached from the general intellect. The subsumption of the general intellect into the corporate kingdom of abstraction is depriving the living community of intelligence, understanding, and emotion. And the brainless body reacts—on one side, a huge wave of mental suffering, and on the other side, the much-advertised cure for depression: fanaticism, fascism, and war. And at the end, suicide.

2023 Michigan Kritik
topshelf › 1NC---Short

We have reached endless production: semiocapitalism recycles and resells us as subjects that commodifies all cultural meaning mediating moral pursuits and all genre. The production of production suffocates the world in inevitable ecological and humanitarian crises. The machine subsumes all knowledge and rationality engraining cultural consumption into the psyche that holds us hostage to the system while annihilating any alternative.

Hietanen and Andéhn 17 [Joel and Mikael, Professor at the University of Helsinki and Senior lecturer at Royal Holloway, University of London, “More than meets the eye: videography and production of desire in semiocapitalism”, ] cent

Several seminal works attempt to link cultural production to the future of capitalism in a way that seems to arrive at an incessant cyclicality of repetitious desiring – endless signs of production (Baudrillard, 2007; Deleuze & Guattari, 2013; Guattari, 2014). These dystopian views are also often coupled with greater processes of increasing stratification of wealth and ecological and humanitarian crises in a world suffocating under the pressure of increasingly frantic processes of commodification. For Guattari, these tendencies and their cultural production bring about capitalist refrain, in which semiocapitalism, in its evermore penetrating experimentations of commodification, perpetually seeks to homogenise the possibility of affective experience to its lowest common denominator (let us all watch sitcoms that even laugh in our place, that are equally (not) funny to everyone, let us all experience an authentic holiday that is carefully commodified and regimented to produce an expected experience). Here the desiring production of subjectivation increasingly coincides with the machinic repetition of the orders of capitalism itself – a digitally mediated spectacle of ‘enforced happiness and enjoyment’ (Baudrillard, 1998, 546 J. HIETANEN AND M. ANDÉHN p. 80). It would seem we have a keen desiring tendency to connect and go along with all this, as it is increasingly argued that conventional leftist criticisms seem to forget that in all this injustice and alienating tendencies there is a subversive libidinal enjoyment lurking (Deleuzre & Guattari, 2013; Fisher, 2014b; Lyotard, 2004; TomšIč, 2015). These desiring investments are now encapsulated in subjectivation that increasingly has come to produce the desire of capital itself. This radical claim argues that there is an abundance of potential desire in the affective tendencies of capitalism itself, and even its injustices and repressive orders can be unconsciously ‘enjoyed’ as subjectivity is seduced in a mad dash of consumption and social competition (Baudrillard, 2007; Deleuze & Guattari, 2009; Lyotard, 2004) where there is ‘an anxious anticipation, not that there may not be enough, but that there is too much, and too much for everyone’ (Baudrillard, 1988, p. 30). Following Deleuze and Guattari (2013), desiring is relentless and always in tension, attaching itself to more desiring potential and desiring its own annihilation for ‘desire desires death too’ (p. 19). This desiring readily attaches itself to pain (see Scott, Cayla, & Cova, 2017), but also cruelty, submissiveness, drug addiction and the like in the pursuit ‘negating the ego itself’ in the intense potential of pleasure in apathy (also Deleuze, 1989b, p. 29). In semiocapitalism, this kind of psychoanalytic enjoyment takes the form of something akin to the masochistic pleasure of a commodified Stockholm syndrome, where one sides with the hostage-taker in every act of consumption that the incessant desiring of the machinic unconsciousness prompts. It has been successfully incorporated by consumer subjectivities to the point where no conceivable alternative to Western consumerism can be readily imagined (Genosko, 2012; Schiermer, 2011; Stavrakakis, 2007), but that does not mean that consumption is not enjoyed even when its alienating and unjust ramifications are increasingly understood by consumers themselves (Lyotard, 2004; Žižek, 2002). Indeed, even the engagement with attempts to commodify the resistance to the system itself, as in the case of ‘ethical’ brands, can be observed to be readily enjoyable as a form of mischievous make-believe (Walz, Hingston, & Andéhn, 2014; also Bradshaw & Zwick, 2016). As Deleuze and Guattari (2013) note, capitalism is a process of desire and proliferation, or ‘production for production’s sake […] The capitalist machine does not run the risk of becoming mad, it is mad from one end to the other and from the beginning, and this is the source of its rationality’ (p. 423). These logics are embodied in subjectivities of consumption whose machinic unconsciousness produces desiring engulfed in relentlessly producing signs of consumption, personal branding and individualistic achievement (see Scott et al., 2017). To interject and ask ‘how does videography, including my own works, play into, or oppose this greater tendency?’ may help facilitate more critical, and in our opinion more subversive, works to emerge within our field. Going back to the example of a pop-music, consider what one may observe through a semiotic analysis of a video in the hip-hop genre (for an illustrative example, see ‘THat Part’ 2 ). One may identify a veritable smorgasbord of semiotic categories commonly seen as cultural symptoms of (take your pick): the almost indefinite glorification of masculine hubris, brazen demonstrations of purchasing power, femininity relegated to something akin to machines of male pleasure (but only if they look sexually arousing to the male gaze) that is one, of only a few, in a set array of positions of qualified independence available. All these interpretations common to semiotic analysis would constitute critiques on the level of the semiotic symbols in the video alone. In a manner of speaking, they would stay largely ‘within’ the video itself. What thinking about a-signifying semiotics can potentially add to this is a way to diagnose why such portrayals of lifestyles are appealing as a semiotic whole – even in the face of their obvious superficiality – and what kinds of subjectivations that engaging with this medium produces. The repetitive cyclicality and affective emptiness of these videos lie in stark distinction to some of the intensities of its predecessor scenes. This emancipatory potential now seems eerily absent. The pop music video seems not only to have lost its longing for new imaginations, but has also moved to a point where even its attempts to ironise itself have lost all possibilities of signification beyond its own machinic emergence as a commodity. Even when a hip-hop artist (such as in the example above) makes an ironic spectacle of the music industry, the irony no longer points to any alternatives, but is subsumed by its own cyclical circulation of pop music production with the appropriate video aesthetics. In its formulaic, constantly inwardbackwards referencing to its ironic distance it relentlessly approaches the capitalist refrain. That is a point at which the constant quest for difference becomes predicable and loses its ability to affectively evoke new ways of thinking; the mindless staring into the TV-screen as another iteration of the sitcom formulae is displayed provides a striking example of what millions experience every day. Approaching the capitalist refrain, we encounter a situation in which one can no longer even imagine, or meaningfully discuss alternative or new ways of thinking, as its irony has been inverted to retrospective banality that no longer even recognises the possibility of meaningful engagement. Instead, the possibilities of desiring production (on platforms such as YouTube) is mostly to participate in flows of largely unconnected ‘comments’ or to click on the next suggested video of similar type according to algorithmic statistics that now machinically channel ‘taste’ (also Zwick & Dholakia, 2004). This is your subjectivity now. Click on the next video. Repeat. These affective tendencies are interwoven in technologies that guide possible interaction with the medium. In a Guattarian sense, the subject was ‘never there’, but the desire for producing a subject was always productive, now having formed allencompassing connections to a desiring productive logic in a capitalist sense. This leaves us with a simulacrum of cultural meaning in the form of audiovisual music expression, a retrospective longing in consuming diversities of sameness. ‘Machinic enslavement and a-signifying semiotics work together’ (Bueno, 2017; Genosko, 2009, p. 123) in this simulation of video-mediated musical experience as repetition of the same set of possibilities, and thus only interpreting its semiotic content cannot reveal it as a cultural tendency that produces movement for subjectivities constitutive of capitalist unconscious desire. Endless and relentless production of production. No intensities, nofuture, the end of genres. To what end do we identify these tendencies as informing consumer research videographies? Let us start by asking: how and for what purposes are we producing spectacles of consumption in the form of video? We might start by imagining videographic inquiry based on a critical engagement with the capitalist refrain we have described above. We hope that videography can, in a way that necessitates new ways of thinking about the medium, critically engage with the a-signifying semiotics of its 548 J. HIETANEN AND M. ANDÉHN production, dissemination and viewing of its own constitutive spectacles. Next, we will provide a contrast between what we perceive as a tendency towards a lowest common denominator of videographic inquiry itself, and a proposed, albeit tentative, alternative that we feel could open up possibilities for new ‘images of thought’ on video.