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2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Carbon Tax › AT: BAT

BATs bad---multiple warrants---risks trade war

Melissa Lin ND, worked in ECM, tech startups, and management consulting, advising Fortune 500 companies across multiple sectors. "What is the Border Adjustment Tax? Potential Benefits and Risks," Toptal Finance Blog, https://www.toptal.com/finance/corporate-finance-consultants/what-is-the-border-adjustment-tax-potential-benefits-and-risks, accessed 7-23-2023 | AKG

Increased Consumer Prices: Experts are divided as to whether the border adjustment tax would cause increased consumer prices. Some experts argue that businesses would almost certainly pass the cost increases to consumers, who would experience price hikes in imported goods (including everything from foreign cars and gas to avocados and clothing). David French, SVP of government relations at the National Retail Federation, recently commented, “I really hope everybody understands that what they’re really talking about is a 20% tax on the U.S. consumer.” There is a fear that this cost burden will be particularly difficult for working class and middle class families to shoulder. For example, if the tax includes oil imports, rural Americans will likely be more affected than the more affluent residing in cities.

Others argue that though the 20% import tax might be passed onto customers in the short to medium term, it would concurrently cause an appreciation in the dollar value that would eventually neutralize the additional consumer cost. Harvard economist Martin Feldstein believes that, in accordance with economic theory, the U.S. dollar would appreciate to 125% of its current value—an amount that would more than counter the expected 20% increase in the price of imported consumer goods. However, this assertion has faced apprehension as skeptics cast doubt around Washington’s ability to accurately predict future foreign currency exchange rates. Skeptics emphasize the sheer number of factors influencing such rates, including federal rate increases, commodity prices, and the overall strength of the U.S. economy.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Carbon Tax › AT: BAT

BAT increases oil prices

Tim Fitzgibbon 17, Serves petroleum clients around the world, drawing on deep specialist expertise on topics related to refining strategy and petroleum market economics; leads research on petroleum market outlooks. "Implications of a border adjustment tax," https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/oil-and-gas/our-insights/implications-of-a-border-adjustment-tax, accessed 7-23-2023 | AKG

Prices for oil products in the US will also be higher with a BAT, as a result of both higher costs for refiners and higher values for product exports. Prices for oil products across the US are essentially set based on prices in the big refining center along the US Gulf Coast, which acts as the marginal source of supply for all other regions. Prices in the Gulf Coast region are linked to the cost of crude to refiners and the value of oil products in the international market, both of which would rise with a BAT. Traditionally, prices for oil products in the Gulf Coast have been set based on the marginal cost of producing them from crude oil in a Gulf Coast refinery. As crude prices have risen and fallen, product prices have followed, passing on much of the volatility in global crude prices to consumers. If a BAT resulted in higher crude prices for refiners, we would expect this increase to result in higher prices for US gasoline, diesel, and other fuels, largely keeping refiners whole and transferring wealth from consumers to domestic oil producers (and the US government). In the current market, this trend is reinforced by the connection of US product prices to the international market. The US currently imports around 1 million barrels per day of oil products such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. These imports would be exposed to the same 20 percent higher cost as imported crude, raising the marginal cost of product in any region relying on imports for supply.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Carbon Tax › AT: Carbon Tax

Carbon tax disproportionately affects Alaska

George Rauscher 23, State Representative. "OPINION: Border adjustment tax will raise Alaska energy prices, hurt consumers," Anchorage Daily News, https://www.adn.com/opinions/national-opinions/2023/07/02/opinion-border-adjustment-tax-will-raise-alaska-energy-prices-hurt-consumers/, accessed 7-24-2023 | AKG

Devastating inflation and rising energy costs are still driving up daily expenses for Alaskans, yet these senators are pushing legislation requiring the Biden administration’s Department of Energy to study the amount of carbon dioxide emitted from the production of materials including steel, plastic and aluminum, among others. Let’s be clear. This study will likely lead to the implementation of a carbon border tax — a tax that will pass directly to consumers while overriding states’ rights to oppose it. In February, Gov. Mike Dunleavy created the Alaska Energy Security Task Force to develop a statewide energy plan that will “evaluate the energy generation, distribution, and transmission for the state of Alaska and its communities.” As the State House Energy Chairman, I was honored to be appointed a member of the task force in March. Dunleavy recognizes Alaska’s leadership position as an energy producer is vulnerable to outside global events like we saw with the invasion of Ukraine, during which Alaskans’ energy costs skyrocketed. As policymakers here in Alaska, we are preparing and planning for these types of disruptions so the market can sustain and not put unnecessary pressure on energy producers and our citizens. The study proposed in the PROVE IT Act would tell the Biden administration which countries emit certain levels of carbon dioxide through the production of paper, petroleum, and steel, among others, that could be used to impose a tariff on those countries. Democrats and activist environmental organizations say this would help reduce pollution from other countries. The real result would be a tax on carbon dioxide — a tax on energy in every form. Our businesses would be strained and forced to increase their prices as the costs to farm, produce, manufacture, and transport goods would become more expensive. Consumers would bear the brunt. In 2020, Murkowski suggested that revenue generated from carbon taxes could be used for wealth distribution. We can forgo that handout by taking a conservative approach and not increasing taxes and costs on financially strapped Alaskans. As chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, Murkowski has long championed our state’s natural resources and the responsible development of critical products. She deserves credit for advancing some powerful legislation under challenging circumstances. Oil and gas help power our economy in Alaska, and the industry is by far the state’s largest taxpayer. Even considering a carbon tax that would increase their operating costs should be out of the question. Instead, proponents of this misguided legislation should look for solutions to reduce energy costs for consumers, not increase them. Americans do not want carbon taxes. A recent nationwide survey found that 65% of voters oppose a tax on carbon dioxide emissions collected at the gas pump and in heating and utility bills. Families across the country would face even higher costs of goods. Americans know this legislation does not make sense. Climate activists know the legislation is unpopular because they’ve watched different versions of it do down to defeat year after year. This latest effort is a thinly veiled attempt to move this process along. We need our lawmakers, especially fiscal conservatives, to stop it now. I urge Senator Murkowski and her colleagues to oppose a carbon border adjustment tax so as not to increase costs for Alaska families.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Carbon Tax › AT: Carbon Tax

Carbon tax lowers oil demand

Nick Macaluso et al 18, Environment and Climate Change Canada, NERA Economic Consulting, RTI International, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "THE IMPACT OF CARBON TAXATION AND REVENUE RECYCLING ON U.S. INDUSTRIES," PubMed Central (PMC), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7050298/, accessed 7-23-2023 | AKG

Putting a price on carbon emissions is intended to reduce the demand for fossil fuel-based energy sources and encourage the use of low or nonemitting energy sources such as natural gas, renewables (e.g., hydro, wind, solar, etc.) and nuclear. A carbon tax increases the cost of fossil fuels that emit more carbon encouraging consumers and businesses to switch to other, often cleaner fuels. Although these fuels may be initially more expensive, the higher price induces users to use lower-carbon energy sources, reduce energy use, or use energy more efficiently. The EMF 32 modeling and cross model comparison results are consistent with this theory. Modeling results clearly show that implementing a carbon tax lowers the demand for emissions-intensive energy sources such as coal and oil, while it increases the demand for relatively less emissions-intensive energy sources such as natural gas and renewables.

For EMF 32, the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook 2016 reference scenario excluding the Clean Power Plan guides the baseline behavior for almost all models.6 Despite this harmonization, there is variation in primary energy use across the models. In addition, four models (DIEM, G-Cubed, IGEM, and ADAGE-US) focus on fossil fuels and do not explicitly account for renewables in the model. This could have consequences on compliance costs.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Carbon Tax › AT: Carbon Tax

Carbon Tax Regressive

Roumeen Islam 22, Economic Advisor for the Infrastructure Global Practice. "What a carbon tax can do and why it cannot do it all," World Bank Blogs, https://blogs.worldbank.org/energy/what-carbon-tax-can-do-and-why-it-cannot-do-it-all, accessed 7-20-2023 | AKG

There are good reasons why governments may not want to use carbon taxes, and one of them relates to their welfare impacts. For example, a carbon tax on fossil fuels is often regressive in its impact- hurting poorer people relatively more than richer ones. Even when it might be progressive, poorer people still suffer a welfare loss when prices rise, making their consumption basket more expensive. Devising transfers to compensate them for this loss is not a simple matter. Compensation systems may not be well developed, and it may be difficult to identify those hurt or to get funds to them. Thus, even if governments impose a tax, they may still balk at levying a carbon tax high enough to reduce emissions to the extent they desire. Another reason that governments may hesitate is that adopting new taxes can be politically difficult because there are entrenched business interests that would lose.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › GND › AT: GND

GND bad for middle class --- skyrocketing cost

Steve Scalise 19, House Majority Leader. "Radical "Green New Deal" Is Bad Deal for Working Families," https://scalise.house.gov/press-release/radical-green-new-deal-bad-deal-working-families, accessed 7-20-2023 | AKG

“Democrats just unveiled a laughable plan to make air travel obsolete, force household electricity rates to skyrocket, and guarantee taxpayer-funded welfare to everyone 'unwilling to work,' all within 10 years. But after 10 years of Speaker Pelosi's 'Green Dream,' all we would have left to show for it is massive unemployment, lower wages, skyrocketing costs on everything from electricity to medical devices, and weakened national security.

“Pelosi and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's ‘Green New Deal’ is a bad deal for working families, and America's seniors and middle-class would be left footing the bill. If Democrats abolish fossil fuels, electricity and transportation costs will skyrocket. If Democrats abolish cattle farming, food costs will skyrocket. The list of devastation goes on. Democrats call climate change ‘our World War II,’ but this plan reads more like a war on American families and American jobs.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › GND › AT: GND

GND fails---disproportionately impacts minorities

Derrick Hollie 19, president of Reaching America and host of Reaching America on Demand podcast. "‘Green New Deal’ Would Hit Minorities the Hardest," Daily Signal, https://www.dailysignal.com/2019/03/07/green-new-deal-would-hit-minorities-the-hardest/, accessed 7-12-2023 | AKG

The “Green New Deal” will fail for many reasons. One is that the people pushing it seem oblivious to the needs of poor and minorities families, who would be directly hurt by the plan.

By one estimate, that Green New Deal would cost $600,000 per household and eliminate the use of all fossil fuels in just 10 years. It would result in higher energy prices for all Americans, but would disproportionately hurt people of color and other minorities who are the most susceptible to energy poverty. Energy poverty occurs when households are unable to afford their basic electric and heating needs due to high energy prices. Yes, we need to protect the environment. But unrealistic proposals like the Green New Deal only contribute to energy poverty and won’t work for low-income families. We need an energy approach that makes better use of what we have, especially if it can keep costs low and create jobs. One of the answers is natural gas. Natural gas is abundant and affordable compared to most forms of energy, and it burns cleaner than other fossil fuels. In fact, shifting to gas-fired plant generators was the single greatest factor in the United States achieving a 28 percent reduction in CO2 emissions since 2005, according to the Energy Information Administration. Right now, America needs better access to natural gas. This winter’s polar vortex exposed natural gas supply problems in the Northeast. We’ve certainly made progress—America is producing more natural gas than ever—but there isn’t enough pipeline infrastructure to move enough natural gas into the communities that need it most. When temperatures dropped to the teens and single-digits, demand exceeded supply and forced prices to skyrocket. There’s simply no excuse for forcing low-income African-Americans and other minorities to choose between heating a home and putting food on the table.  These pipeline shortages are bad enough, but they are made worse by the same activists who claim social justice in supporting the Green New Deal. Where’s the social justice and compassion in blatantly opposing affordable, traditional energy resources that are becoming cleaner and more efficient every year? Recently, I saw some of these “keep it in the ground” people in economically depressed Buckingham County, Virginia, protesting the construction of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, where a pipeline compressor would create jobs and up to $1 million in tax revenues. That’s a desperately needed economic jolt to a county where every third person is African-American. But the activists, with their bullhorns, T-shirts, and protest signs, ignored the potential benefits of this project and claimed to be fighting “environmental racism” by opposing the pipeline compressor. All of the protestors were white. The Atlantic Coast Pipeline could save consumers in Virginia and North Carolina more than $377 million in electricity bills annually—states with disproportionately high black populations. How a pipeline that would make life more affordable and create more prosperity is racist is beyond my comprehension. Sadly, the only environmental racism I see is actually “green energy discrimination” foisted upon minority households, who can least afford higher energy costs. I’m all for renewable energy where it makes sense and where it doesn’t needlessly drive up our cost of living. If electric cars are attractive to consumers, let them compete in a free market without the help of government subsidies—our tax dollars. The working poor and middle class need to rely on affordable energy, and no one should be vilified for using a fuel-efficient gasoline engine to get to work. That’s ridiculous. More pipeline infrastructure projects are needed to transport oil and natural gas from where it’s refined to cities and towns where it’s needed. Lower fuel costs also keep prices for commodities—food, construction materials, and industrial goods—in check. There is a practical, realistic path forward when it comes to modernizing our national infrastructure and pipeline grid. We can do it while improving energy efficiency and lowering greenhouse gas emissions. But the Green New Deal, with its $93 trillion price tag, isn’t any viable plan at all. It’s a pipe dream—a bad deal for America. 

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Climate › Too Late---2NC

Its already too late—climate change hobbles efforts to combat climate change

Heinberg 22 [Richard Heinberg, Richard is Senior Fellow of Post Carbon Institute, and is regarded as one of the world’s foremost advocates for a shift away from our current reliance on fossil fuels. "The Renewable Energy Transition Is Failing", 11/22/2022, Independent Media Institute, | czx]

As daunting as they are, the financial, political, and material challenges to the energy transition don’t exhaust the list of potential barriers. Climate change itself is also hampering the energy transition—which, of course, is being undertaken to avert climate change. During the summer of 2022, China experienced its most intense heat wave in six decades. It impacted a wide region, from central Sichuan Province to coastal Jiangsu, with temperatures often topping 40 degrees Celsius, or 104 degrees Fahrenheit, and reaching a record 113 degrees in Chongqing on August 18. At the same time, a drought-induced power crisis forced Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., the world’s top battery maker, to close manufacturing plants in China’s Sichuan province. Supplies of crucial parts to Tesla and Toyota were temporarily cut off. Meanwhile, a similarly grim story unfolded in Germany, as a record drought reduced the water flow in the Rhine River to levels that crippled European trade, halting shipments of diesel and coal, and threatening the operations of both hydroelectric and nuclear power plants. A study published in February 2022 in the journal Water found that droughts (which are becoming more frequent and severe with climate change) could create challenges for U.S. hydropower in Montana, Nevada, Texas, Arizona, California, Arkansas, and Oklahoma. Meanwhile, French nuclear plants that rely on the Rhône River for cooling water have had to shut down repeatedly. If reactors expel water downstream that’s too hot, aquatic life is wiped out as a result. So, during the sweltering 2022 summer, Électricité de France (EDF) powered down reactors not only along the Rhône but also on a second major river in the south, the Garonne. Altogether, France’s nuclear power output has been cut by nearly 50 percent during the summer of 2022. Similar drought- and heat-related shutdowns happened in 2018 and 2019. Heavy rain and flooding can also pose risks for both hydro and nuclear power—which together currently provide roughly four times as much low-carbon electricity globally as wind and solar combined. In March 2019, severe flooding in southern and western Africa, following Cyclone Idai, damaged two major hydro plants in Malawi, cutting off power to parts of the country for several days. Wind turbines and solar panels also rely on the weather and are therefore also vulnerable to extremes. Cold, cloudy days with virtually no wind spell trouble for regions heavily reliant on renewable energy. Freak storms can damage solar panels, and high temperatures reduce panels’ efficiency. Hurricanes and storm surges can cripple offshore wind farms.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Climate › Defense---2NC

Current climate predictions are inaccurate and overestimated

NZW 23 [Net Zero Watch, Net Zero Watch is highlighting and discussing the serious implications of expensive and poorly considered climate change policies."Climate models behind Net Zero policies are 'thoroughly flawed'", 07/05/2023, | czx]

The world’s climate policies are based on computer simulations of the atmosphere that are thoroughly flawed. That’s the conclusion of a new paper published by Net Zero Watch. The paper, by US climate writer Willis Eschenbach, describes the results of a review of the computer code inside NASA’s Model E climate simulation. It shows that, far from being based on basic physics, in many places the model incorporates crude corrections to make the output look vaguely reasonable. Eschenbach says: It’s clear that in many places the physics in the computer code is simply wrong and gives ludicrous output. But instead of fixing it, NASA scientists have simply put crude corrections to hide the problem. This destroys the credibility of NASA’s predictions.” Andrew Montford, Net Zero Watch director said: We know from the Covid debacle that computer models are no basis for public policy. It would be a pity if politicians refuse to learn that lesson and allow further damage to be inflicted on the public.” 

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Energy Independence › Impact

American Energy is key to control the European Industry and lessen Putin’s influence.

Ben Lefebvre 23, Ben Lefebvre has covered energy industry and policy issues for nearly a decade, 2/23/2023, "How American energy helped Europe best Putin," , eb

Instead, a flow of American energy has given the United States a growing role in the continent’s economy, while pushing Russia to the side.

U.S. companies provided 50 percent of Europe’s liquefied natural gas supplies in 2022, along with 12 percent of its oil. Russian oil and gas shipments to the continent have shriveled by half, beset by boycotts, sanctions and an EU price cap. Global oil and gas trade routes have been redrawn and renewable energy development has received a massive financial and political shot in the arm.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Energy Independence › Impact

American Energy Independence is critical to national security.

Ryan Zinke 23, Ryan Zinke served as Secretary of the Interior under President Trump, 7/24/2023, "American energy dominance makes the world safer," , eb

I have no doubt that we are all watching the the events unfold in Ukraine with heartbreak and horror. And yet, we are seeing the inspirational courage of the Ukrainian people as they take up arms and fight for their families, liberty and their land.

The Biden Administration’s retreat and failure in Afghanistan coupled with their inability to deliver any meaningful deterrent to Putin’s onslaught over the past year has given the world a clear message: America under Biden will not or cannot protect and defend freedom. Our allies no longer trust us and our adversaries no longer fear us. Like negotiating with terrorist to rescue the abandoned Americans left in Afghanistan, the US and our allies are only able to caste ineffective sanctions in response. Why? An underlying reason is that Russian has an energy stranglehold on Europe that can be countered.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Energy Independence › UQ

The US has the resources to take Europe and themselves out the grasp of other’s oil.

Sen Markwayne 23, Markwayne Mullin, a Republican, represents Oklahoma in the U.S. Senate, 5/23/2023, "Biden's radical green energy policies strain our electric grids. Here's how bad it will get if they continue," , eb

The Biden administration’s overreaching energy regulation is sacrificing Americans’ ability to run their businesses and power their homes.

Democrats’ Green New Deal (GND) policies have left America dependent upon unreliable energy sources that strain our electric grids, cause rolling blackouts across the country, and have increased energy costs by over 40%. Just this past December, more than 10 states experienced rolling blackouts as the demand for electricity exceeded our available supply. Time and again, environmentalists have overlooked the continued necessity of fossil fuels to power our world.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Energy Independence › 1NC

American independence stops global energy wars.

Zakaria ’19 — Amro Zakaria, Managing Director, Market Trader Academy, United States of America, Expert in Financial Services, 16 yr. experience; 2019; “U.S. Energy Dominance: from Whale Oil to Shale; How the New U.S. Energy Doctrine will Change the World”; IAEE Energy Forum, Second Quarter 2019, Vol. 2, pp. 17-19, IAEE.

As it pertains to energy production, it also meant that there should be no barriers to exploiting America’s natural resources, aggressively securing market share to America’s hydrocarbons overseas, and becoming an energy exporter for the first time since 1953. This paradigm shift marked a change in the status of oil, from a strategic commodity grounded in national security interest to further becoming a significant component of the country’s exports and GDP.

The new direction has yielded quick results. For the first time, U.S. crude has found its way to China and India, traditional markets for producers that consider the U.S. the vital ally. The significance of those two markets lies in the fact that they are projected to have the most substantial increases in energy demand in years to come. In India alone, the growth in demand is expected to increase by 333% by 2040. The question becomes, how will the relationship between the U.S. and its oil-producing allies change when competition for global market share of oil exports turns the U.S. from an indispensable partner to a heavyweight contender and a possible existential threat?

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Energy Independence › 1NC

GND devastates American energy independence, greenlights foreign oil weaponization, AND circumvents AFF solvency.

Barton 19, BA in accounting and MA in Natinal Security and Strategic Studies. He has worked in numerous banking positions and in the White House. (Michael James, 2-22-2019, "Green New Deal Strengthens Putin But Weakens America," Investor's Business Daily, https://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/green-new-deal-dictators-america/)

Progressive lawmakers in Congress just rolled out their "Green New Deal," a sweeping bill designed to end America's reliance on fossil fuels. They hope to ultimately eliminate gas-powered cars, airplanes, and even outdoor BBQ grills.

Environmental activists aren't the only ones delighted with the proposal. Petro-state dictators like Russian President Vladimir Putin, Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro are grinning too. They know the bill would make Americans dependent on foreign oil and gas production, weaken American influence abroad, and .

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › REEs DA › Internal

I/L/!: Great Power Competition causes loss of global US influence and nuclear war

Brands and Montgomery 20 [Hal Brands and Evan Branden Montgomery; Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and a Bloomberg Opinion columnist; senior fellow and director of research and studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and author of articles in Foreign Affairs, International Security, Security Studies, and the Journal of Strategic Studies; Spring 2020, "One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition"; Texas National Security Review, https://tnsr.org/2020/03/one-war-is-not-enough-strategy-and-force-planning-for-great-power-competition/; Accessed 7/20/2023; AO]

One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition Hal Brands, Evan Braden Montgomery What are the implications of the Department of Defense's adoption of a one-war standard that is focused on defeating a great-power rival? Hal Brands and Evan Braden Montgomery discuss the gap between America's global commitments and the military challenges it can realistically meet. Beyond the military challenges that a one-war standard introduces are a set of broader diplomatic and geopolitical challenges. The military balance — and the military options to which a country can realistically resort in war — invariably shapes risk-taking and decision-making in peacetime.36 Here, too, the one-war standard introduces deep challenges for a superpower that must manage peacetime competition and diplomatic crises in multiple theaters at once. Most of these implications flow from a basic imbalance between U.S. defense strategy and the larger grand strategy the National Defense Strategy is meant to support. The 2017 National Security Strategy makes clear that America is not retrenching geopolitically: It remains committed to its longstanding, three-theater grand strategy that aims to preserve stability and uphold favorable configurations of power in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific.37 Yet, any grand strategy rests on a foundation of military power, and the National Defense Strategy essentially acknowledges that Washington has only one theater’s worth of military power should war break out. If it is true, as Defense Department planners have long argued, that the ability to respond to more than one challenge at a time is critical to America’s global credibility and confidence, then a one-war standard will presumably affect the calculations of policymakers in the United States and around the world. Consider the view from Washington. If U.S. officials know that fighting Iran or North Korea will fatally undermine the Defense Department’s ability to defeat China or Russia, they will be less likely to act assertively — through military measures or even diplomatic or economic sanctions that risk escalation — in response to provocations by Tehran or Pyongyang. By the same token, if an American president understands that a conflict with either China or Russia would eat up the country’s global combat power, she may be less willing to risk war in a crisis over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the Baltic for fear of leaving America strategically exposed in the Middle East or Northeast Asia. The United States could unintentionally end up not with a one-war standard but a zero-war strategy, because committing the American military anywhere poses too great a risk to Washington’s commitments and interests everywhere.38 To be clear, the argument here is not that an American president would decline to respond to a clear-cut, large-scale assault on U.S. interests — such as a North Korean missile attack on Japan or America itself, or an outright Russian invasion of Estonia or Poland. Nor is it that fighting a war against Iran or North Korea (much less China or Russia) is a desirable outcome. The argument is that American leaders will feel less confident that they can assert the nation’s interests vigorously in a crisis or competition that falls short of outright war, that they will be more hesitant in committing U.S. forces abroad, and that this will inevitably undermine Washington’s geopolitical leverage in dealing with great powers and lesser powers alike. U.S. policymakers might be self-deterred from issuing coercive threats against Iran for fear of compromising the Defense Department’s ability to defeat China. Or they might just have to bluff — issuing coercive threats that can’t be carried out without inflicting unacceptable costs on America’s broader global posture — with all the accompanying dangers if that bluff is eventually called.39 Indeed, the fact that the United States is executing a three-theater grand strategy with a one-war military will not be lost on other countries. In an extreme scenario, American competitors could exploit U.S. intervention in one theater to roll the iron dice in another, or they could lend support, whether covert or overt, to Washington’s adversary in order to bleed U.S. forces and further deplete their ability to intervene elsewhere.40 Short of such measures, American competitors could use the conflict as a source of diplomatic leverage against the United States — taking advantage of Washington’s weak bargaining position to force U.S. officials to accept a nonviolent change in the status quo.41 The United States could unintentionally end up not with a one-war standard but a zero-war strategy, because committing the American military anywhere poses too great a risk to Washington’s commitments and interests everywhere. An overstretched superpower could also lose leverage vis-à-vis its rivals before even a single conflict is underway. If Washington faces so much as a realistic prospect of war with Russia or China in the coming years, North Korea or Iran may feel emboldened to push for gains below the threshold of outright conflict, confident that U.S. officials will not escalate because the Defense Department cannot handle multiple challenges at once. Russian leaders might perceive that they have greater geopolitical running room in Eastern Europe or the Middle East if the United States finds itself in a crisis, or facing higher tensions, with China. Meanwhile, the calculations of U.S. allies and partners will also be affected. The National Defense Strategy is premised on helping regional allies and partners become more assertive and self-reliant so they can decrease the overall burdens on the United States.42 But American friends in the Persian Gulf or Western Pacific may instead feel forced to draw in their horns at a time of U.S. involvement in a faraway theater, lest they end up in one war while Washington is preoccupied with another. In short, every global power — from the British Empire at its peak to the United States during the Cold War — faces the same basic dilemma: It cannot possibly meet all of the threats to its interests if those threats manifest at the same time.43 The one-war standard sharpens this timeless dilemma by widening the gap between the number of theaters in which the United States is committed and the number of theaters in which it can plausibly respond. The wider that gap becomes, the more it will influence the decisions of the United States and other countries in war and peace. It is true, of course, that there are also clear risks associated with not focusing intently enough on being able to defeat a single great-power adversary. If America cannot credibly claim that it can rebuff Russian or Chinese aggression because it has remained preoccupied with lesser threats, then U.S. geopolitical leverage in Europe and the Western Pacific will decline precipitously — as will America’s ability to deter conflict. Yet, in buying down this particular type of geopolitical risk, the one-war standard threatens to expose the United States to all the other risks that come from having a one-theater force in a three-theater world. A quiet revolution in American defense strategy is currently underway. The U.S. military is no longer focusing on combating rogue states, terrorist groups, and other deadly, albeit relatively weak, enemies. Instead, the Defense Department is setting its sights on China and Russia: great-power rivals that are contesting American military advantages and threatening to reorder the world. “The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by … revisionist powers,” the 2018 National Defense Strategy states.1 Deterring these rivals, and defeating them should deterrence fail, will require far-reaching changes in what the American military buys and how it fights. The main pillar of this strategy is a new approach to force planning, which outlines how the U.S. military should be built to fight. For more than a generation, the United States maintained a two-war standard to ensure that it could defeat a pair of regional adversaries simultaneously or in quick succession. Now, the Defense Department has adopted a one-war standard geared toward defeating a great-power rival. In other words, rather than planning to win multiple medium-sized wars, the Defense Department is preparing to win a single major war against a formidable competitor, one that can match (at least in some areas) American military might. This shift represents the most significant departure in American defense strategy since the end of the Cold War, and it has tremendous ramifications for a country that still has security commitments — and security challenges — around the globe. The one-war standard reflects serious strategic thinking and is rooted in real budgetary constraints. It is a recognition that defeating a great-power adversary would be far more difficult than anything the U.S. military has done in decades, and that losing a great-power war would be devastating to America’s global interests. It is meant to galvanize a sluggish bureaucracy to undertake the radical changes necessary to prevent this grim scenario from coming to pass. Yet, it is far more dangerous than its advocates publicly acknowledge.2 The most obvious risk of a one-war standard is that America might need to fight more than one war at a time. In fact, a one-war standard could increase this risk by tempting an opportunistic adversary to use force in one theater while Washington is occupied in another. Proponents of the one-war approach offer a number of options for avoiding a second war, if possible, or fighting it, if necessary, but these options are not promising: They would leave the United States strategically exposed, militarily overextended, or much more reliant on highly escalatory options that lack credibility. And as America loses the ability to handle challenges in more than one theater, it will also lose leverage in peacetime competitions and diplomatic crises. In short, the one-war standard exposes a serious mismatch between America’s global commitments and the military challenges it can realistically meet — a grand strategy-defense strategy gap that may prove extremely damaging in war and peace alike. Why This National Defense Strategy Matters At the core of every U.S. defense review is a “force planning construct,” which specifies the number, type, and frequency of conflicts that the American military must be prepared to face.3 This construct is arguably the most important element of a defense review. It establishes what the Defense Department should buy, how it should organize its forces, and what contingencies it should prioritize. In other words, it spells out what the U.S. military must be able to do, and how big and how capable it must be, to achieve the nation’s objectives. The key innovation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy is its one-war, great-power-centric force planning construct. “In wartime,” the document states, “the fully mobilized Joint Force will be capable of: defeating aggression by a major power; deterring opportunistic aggression elsewhere; and disrupting imminent terrorist and WMD threats.”4 Of these tasks, the first — defeating great-power aggression — is also the most important. As Jim Mitre, who helped develop the strategy, writes, the National Defense Strategy shifts the Department of Defense away from planning for “two simultaneous major wars, in separate theaters against mid-tier enemies,” in favor of a laser-like focus on “defeating aggression by a [single] great power.”5 That means the U.S. military should be sized and shaped to beat China or Russia in a high-intensity war, not to defeat some combination of weaker states such as Iran and North Korea. The one-war construct is significant because it breaks with every U.S. defense strategy of the post-Cold War era. From George H.W. Bush’s “Base Force” concept to Barack Obama’s Defense Strategic Guidance, multiple administrations have reaffirmed that the United States must be able to prevail in two conflicts simultaneously or nearly simultaneously. In the 1990s, for example, the U.S. military was structured to defeat Saddam Hussein’s Iraq without fatally compromising its ability to fight North Korea. The idea was to ensure that a bad actor in one theater could not exploit America’s preoccupation in another theater. That, in turn, was critical to the credibility of a grand strategy based on upholding stability in multiple theaters around the world. As the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review declared, a two-war capability is “the sine qua non of a superpower.”6 The Case for the One-War Standard The 2018 National Defense Strategy thus signals that America must reshape its military for a new era. That shift is based on four key factors. First, and most important, are strategic considerations. Unlike in the 1990s or 2000s, when America’s main opponents were non-state actors or rogue states, Washington’s chief competitors now include resurgent or rising great powers — near-peer competitors, in Pentagon parlance — that pose a serious threat to U.S. military primacy and could seriously challenge American alliance commitments in key regions. Since the early 2000s, both China and Russia have undertaken far-reaching military modernization programs that have emphasized the tools needed to coerce U.S. allies and hold at bay American forces that would presumably come riding to the rescue. As a result, both countries now combine increasingly advanced capabilities with profound geographic advantages, given that plausible conflict scenarios would unfold in their own back yards. These factors, in turn, would require the United States to project military power into the jaws of Chinese or Russian anti-access/area-denial capabilities in order to defend local allies and partners.7 The one-war construct is significant because it breaks with every U.S. defense strategy of the post-Cold War era. This challenge is far more severe than anything the Defense Department has faced in recent decades. It will require fundamentally rethinking how U.S. forces will project power into contested environments, operate without secure rear areas, cope with attacks on their supply lines and communications infrastructure, and prevent a numerically superior adversary from overrunning exposed allies and partners before America can mount an effective response. It will undoubtedly demand a very different type of force than the one that thrashed Saddam Hussein in 1991 and 2003, conducted stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has chased terrorists around the greater Middle East since 2001.8 And because the consequences of losing a conflict against China or Russia would be so damaging — from fracturing alliances to causing unfavorable shifts in regional balances of power — the United States must ensure that it can defeat these countries should conflicts erupt. From this perspective, shifting to a great-power-centric force planning construct reflects a frank acknowledgment that America now lives in a very different world. The strategic argument is reinforced by resource considerations. The fact that America faced relatively weak rivals during the post-Cold War era made it plausible, at least in theory, for the Defense Department to defeat more than one at a time.9 Today, however, a conflict with either China or Russia would consume the vast majority of America’s global combat power as well as critical enablers such as airlift and sealift (its ability to move forces and materiel into key theaters via air or sea). As a result, the United States simply cannot defeat two rivals — whether two great powers or one great power and one weaker power — simultaneously or nearly simultaneously with the resources at hand. Indeed, it is not clear whether the Department of Defense can even execute the one-war standard outlined in the National Defense Strategy with the resources available to it.10 In this sense, anything beyond a one-war standard defies the laws of budgetary physics. The shift to a one-war standard also reflects bureaucratic considerations. For years, U.S. officials — including several secretaries of defense — have understood that great-power competition is returning.11 And for years, bureaucratic inertia has kept the Department of Defense from adapting as rapidly as it should. Key Defense Department stakeholders have often prioritized capacity (the size of the force) over new and disruptive capabilities, while clinging to legacy systems that are becoming less relevant for great-power conflicts.12 The one-war force planning construct thus serves as a bureaucratic blunt instrument. It is an unmistakable signal to actors within the Pentagon that the department must fundamentally change what it buys, how it trains, and where it focuses its attention and resources. Dean Acheson once wrote that the true purpose of NSC-68, another landmark statement of U.S. defense strategy, was “to so bludgeon the mass mind of ‘top government’ that not only could the President make a decision but that the decision could be carried out.”13 The one-war standard aims to achieve something similar within a large and unwieldy Department of Defense. Finally, there is the influence of historical trends. If the one-war standard marks a departure from post-Cold War defense planning, it is nonetheless part of a longer-running pattern. Since the mid-2000s, the Defense Department has been gradually moving toward less expansive defense strategies in response to resource constraints and the growing difficulties of war. In the early 2000s, the U.S. military was sized to defeat aggression in one theater, while also pursuing forcible regime change in another theater and conducting multiple, smaller operations elsewhere — all of which added up to a highly ambitious, “two-plus war” standard.14 By 2012, budget cuts and the sobering experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan had led the Obama administration to undertake a subtle retrenchment. Obama’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance called for an ability to defeat aggression in one theater while simply imposing “unacceptable costs” in another theater — a lesser, “two-minus war” standard.15 The one-war force planning construct then emerged after years of relative defense austerity, and as Chinese and Russian modernization made the Defense Department’s “pacing threats” far more formidable than before.16 The shift to a one-war standard was thus not undertaken lightly. It rests on a set of powerful and, in many ways, reasonable considerations. The trouble is that the National Defense Strategy also carries with it a great deal of risk and offers few solutions for how to manage it. Can America Avoid a Second War? The most obvious risk of a one-war standard is that the United States could confront two or more conflicts at the same time. This is hardly far-fetched given that the United States currently faces at least five potential opponents — China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and several major terrorist organizations — across three separate theaters — Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific — in addition to the possibility that unexpected events or crises, such as a massive chemical weapons attack in Syria, a civil war in Venezuela, or a natural disaster at home or abroad, could require the use of the American military. A two-war scenario could occur organically, with two crises escalating to conflicts more or less independently, which happened in 1965 when the United States invaded the Dominican Republic to avert a feared Communist takeover at the same time as it was escalating its involvement in Vietnam. Alternatively, the fact that the United States has a one-war standard could actually make a two-war scenario more likely. If American troops were involved in a major contingency but the United States lacked sufficient reserves to fight other rivals, then revisionist actors might see a window of opportunity to alter the status quo in their favor and jump through it while they had the chance. In either case, Washington would face the unenviable dilemma of either sending whatever forces were available to a second theater, even if they were outmatched, or allowing a major challenge to go unanswered. Proponents of a one-war standard are not blind to the possibility of simultaneous conflicts. But they downplay this danger with arguments that all have serious limitations.17 If American troops were involved in a major contingency but the United States lacked sufficient reserves to fight other rivals, then revisionist actors might see a window of opportunity to alter the status quo in their favor and jump through it while they had the chance. The first argument holds that America can avoid a second war by dominating the first war. The Department of Defense’s ability to prevent opportunistic aggression, the thinking goes, ultimately rests on the battlefield effectiveness of U.S. forces. Hence, demonstrations of strength are the key to deterrence. If those forces perform well enough in the initial war, and if they win quickly enough to avoid being tied down for too long, they will discourage potential challengers from starting another conflict.18 For example, if China attacked Taiwan, and if Washington intervened and quickly achieved a decisive victory, then leaders in Russia, Iran, North Korea, and elsewhere would surely hesitate to exploit the situation, fearful that they would meet the same fate. In other words, the dreaded window of opportunity for American adversaries would never open or would quickly slam shut. And because the ability to deter a second contingency turns on the outcome of the first, there is a clear rationale for focusing relentlessly on acquiring the capabilities and competencies needed to win one major war, rather than sustaining the capacity needed to fight two. The demonstration argument is intuitively plausible, but also problematic. After all, demonstrations cut both ways: They can reveal weaknesses as well as strengths.19 Even the most effective force can experience human errors, suffer technical failures, and take losses that tarnish its image of invulnerability. At the very least, its performance will divulge information about its preferred methods of operating as well as its tolerance for risk, which watchful rivals might use to their advantage. In addition, the strengths that U.S. forces would showcase in this scenario may not be relevant to other threats the country faces. Like earlier strategic reviews, the 2018 National Defense Strategy calls for the United States to deter aggression. But aggression comes in many different forms, from large-scale military campaigns to less overt gray-zone provocations.20 The demonstrated ability to thwart one form of aggression may not translate into effective deterrence against others. To return to the previous example, stopping a Chinese conventional assault on Taiwan does not necessarily prove that the Department of Defense could defeat a Russian paramilitary incursion in Eastern Europe. Moreover, success in dealing with one type of challenge might simply convince a rival to undertake another. Finally, and most important, even if the United States won the first war, victory against a capable state rival would almost certainly take a heavy toll. Because the U.S. military relies on highly skilled personnel that cannot be replaced easily and highly complex platforms that cannot be reconstituted quickly, even modest losses would seriously hamper the Defense Department’s ability to take on another adversary in short order. A second argument holds that the United States need not deter a second war because it can simply choose to delay its military response and fight that second conflict after it has wrapped up the first. From this perspective, America’s most important consideration would be to concentrate on the business at hand — namely, winning the war that is underway rather than spreading U.S. forces too thin by trying to fight a pair of wars at once. After the United States has defeated Russia’s bid to dominate the Baltic states, for instance, it could turn its attention toward defeating Iranian aggression in the Persian Gulf or meeting a Chinese challenge in the South China Sea — with the understanding that it would have to roll back some gains that the second adversary made while America was otherwise occupied. The delay argument also makes sense at first glance. The ability to fight conflicts sequentially instead of simultaneously might keep opportunistic aggressors in check because they know they will be on the receiving end of a U.S. response eventually. Yet, the virtues of postponing intervention are not as clear-cut as they might seem. Opting for delay risks allowing an opportunistic aggressor to successfully alter the status quo in ways that could be difficult to reverse. Indeed, National Defense Strategy advocates make a compelling case for the virtues of denial — that is, a conventional defense strategy that emphasizes disrupting and degrading enemy operations so that an adversary never achieves its aims in the first place — because the political and military costs of trying to restore the status quo ante after an opponent has secured its objectives are likely to be far higher.21 But delaying intervention takes denial off the table, unless the United States is fortunate enough to face a particularly inept second aggressor that fails to make gains even while unopposed by American forces. An even bigger limitation, however, is that the delay argument only makes sense when the first war is also the most important war — when it is a conflict against China or Russia, rather than against Iran, North Korea, or some other, lesser threat. In this case, the dangers of failing to win the first war would almost certainly outweigh the dangers of allowing aggression in a second theater to go temporarily unanswered. For instance, if the United States were fighting China and Iran tried to take advantage of the situation, few would disagree that Washington should focus on dealing with Beijing and only turn its attention to Tehran later. The more significant concern is that swearing off wars against certain opponents comes perilously close to abandoning deterrence altogether. That calculus would be scrambled, however, if the situation were reversed. If the United States was fighting a regional power like Iran when a great power like China decided to initiate a crisis, the second war would be far more strategically consequential than the first, and the costs of delay would probably be far higher. That would leave the United States with the choice of either breaking off the first conflict and fighting the second with a weakened force, or somehow trying to juggle two wars with a force designed for one. Put another way, opportunistic aggression may not be a challenge that America can afford to ignore. The final argument holds that the United States can avoid this dangerous situation — in which fighting a regional power undercuts America’s ability to fight a great power — by exercising strategic discipline. That is, it can simply choose not to intervene at all against hostile regional powers, keeping its powder dry in case great-power conflict breaks out.22 There are, of course, many reasons to be cautious about committing U.S. forces against second- or third-tier opponents in lower-priority theaters. Adapting for an era of great-power competition certainly requires stricter prioritization and the more judicious application of limited resources. Yet, the discipline argument still falls short, and not solely because the U.S. track record when it comes to focusing on China and Russia (as opposed to, say, North Korea and Iran) is already mixed at best. The more significant concern is that swearing off wars against certain opponents comes perilously close to abandoning deterrence altogether. No one should want to see the United States spend blood and treasure unnecessarily, or in ways that weaken its overall strategic position. Yet, simply refusing to use force against second-tier opponents absent some truly extreme provocation signals that America cannot and will not respond forcefully to aggression short of the outrageous. That, in turn, is a recipe for the dissipation of U.S. influence and the destabilization of areas, such as the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East, that still matter to American security. Strategy in the Second War If demonstrations, delay, and discipline cannot adequately reduce the danger that America will find itself confronting simultaneous conflicts, the Defense Department will need other methods of deterring or, if necessary, fighting multiple wars at once, unless it is ready to walk away from longstanding U.S. commitments. The public version of the National Defense Strategy hints that the United States can indeed deter multiple rivals within the framework of a one-war standard but doesn’t provide much detail on how.23 There are three obvious options, however, none of which are mutually exclusive, but all of which have serious liabilities. The first option is outsourcing deterrence and warfighting by relying on allies to preserve the status quo in their home regions. From the Nixon administration’s “Twin Pillars” approach in the Middle East, which depended on Saudi Arabia and Iran as the first line of defense against regional instability and Soviet encroachment, to the recurring attempts to court India as a bulwark against Chinese expansion in South Asia, the United States has often tried to reduce the burdens of upholding regional orders, especially (but not exclusively) at moments when its relative power seemed to be in decline.24 Likewise, the National Defense Strategy calls for the United States to “strengthen and evolve [its] alliances and partnerships into an extended network capable of deterring or decisively acting to meet the shared challenges of our time.”25 From this perspective, the Trump administration’s efforts to compel allies to increase defense spending and to sell additional arms to strategically important states could lay the foundation for better burden-sharing or burden-shifting in the future.26 Calling on allies and partners plays on America’s chief geostrategic advantage: its unrivaled global network of security relationships. Moreover, U.S. allies and partners from East Asia to the Persian Gulf to Western Europe certainly could enhance their military power in ways that would make them more resilient to coercion and aggression.27 Yet, there are many reasons to be skeptical that allies, in any of these regions, would be willing and able to deter local threats largely on their own. Between resource constraints, domestic political debates, divergent threat perceptions, and historical feuds that prevent allies from working closely with one another, there are enough barriers to believe that true outsourcing is not a viable option. Indeed, the reason the United States has not been able to extricate itself from commitments in these theaters — despite periodic efforts over the past 70 years to do so — is precisely because those allies and partners have not been able to summon the collective will and capability to confront the threats they face without the promise of American military support. And even if the United States could theoretically convince its allies in, say, Europe and the Persian Gulf to develop vastly improved military capabilities by announcing that America would not necessarily come to their aid in a crisis, doing so would risk forfeiting the other great benefit of U.S. security commitments and force deployments — the suppression of conflicts between American allies and partners, which has contributed enormously to the relative global peace of the post-World War II era.28 The second strategic option is escalation: placing greater reliance on nuclear weapons to deter or fight an opportunistic aggressor. On its face, this would seem to be a natural way of compensating for the limits of U.S. conventional military strength.29 The United States retains a large nuclear arsenal to provide escalation dominance over at least some of its rivals, as well as to make credible its extended deterrence guarantees to allies. Since 1945, America has always reserved the right to use nuclear weapons first during a conflict. Therefore, it should be well positioned to use nuclear forces to deter threats in a second theater or fight a second contingency if deterrence fails. Yet, escalating is even more problematic than outsourcing. A credible escalation strategy requires pronounced nuclear advantages over potential enemies. Unfortunately, Washington does not have the same advantages it did as recently as the early 2000s. China and Russia — as well as other countries — have been developing and fielding new nuclear systems and, in some cases, expanding their nuclear arsenals. The United States is just now beginning to recapitalize its aging nuclear arsenal after many years of deferring modernization. Moreover, there are questions about its ability to fund and field newer capabilities before older capabilities must be retired and about whether planned modernization programs will actually produce new advantages given countervailing steps by some opponents.30 A strategy of escalation would face other credibility problems, as well. If there were doubts about America’s willingness to use nuclear weapons to prevent the Soviet Union from overrunning Western Europe (and overturning the global balance of power) during the Cold War, it is presumably harder for allies or adversaries to believe that the United States would start a potentially cataclysmic nuclear war to defend far less significant territories such as Estonia or Taiwan today.31 Using nuclear weapons first in a conflict against China or Russia would require a fundamentally different approach to deterrence and warfighting — one for which American leaders have not sought to prepare the American public or world opinion. Even the credibility of first use against non-nuclear armed states would be suspect in many scenarios. The United States has worked for several decades to narrow the conditions under which it would employ nuclear weapons, counting instead on its conventional military power to deter aggression, and has shed most of its tactical and theater nuclear capabilities, which could leave it in the position of relying on “massive retaliation light.”32 In sum, unless the United States is willing and able to reverse prior efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its defense strategy, unless it can rebuild its strategic arsenal over a relatively short period of time, and unless it can identify realistic limited nuclear options (beyond the changes advocated for in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review) that allow it to counter conventional threats or inflict selective punishment — each a tall order in its own right — escalation is probably not the answer.33 The third and final option is mobilizing: increasing the capacity of the joint force to manage threats after they materialize. If, for instance, the United States were to face the strategic nightmare scenario — simultaneous conflicts against China and Russia — it could undertake a World War II-style mobilization that would dramatically expand the military and provide whatever level of resources was necessary.34 Yet, the prospect of mobilization raises questions of will and ability. If Russia and China both launched major, unprovoked assaults on U.S. interests, a large and rapid mobilization of America’s manpower and industrial resources might be politically feasible. It is not a given, however, that the public would support such a mobilization to fight limited wars that began in ambiguous ways in theaters thousands of miles from American shores. Adversaries, knowing this, could calibrate their aims and actions to increase the probability that U.S. mobilization and military intervention would be controversial at home. China, for example, could issue an ultimatum against Taiwan without actually firing a shot or use its coast guard vessels rather than its navy to provoke Japan in the East China Sea, while Russia might seize a small piece of territory in a Baltic state rather than occupy an entire country, and might use unmarked soldiers or contractors rather than uniformed military personnel. Under these conditions, would there be significant popular and political support for a U.S. military response, let alone for marshaling the extra personnel and materiel necessary to fight a pair of wars? Even if the case for intervention were clear cut and support for mobilization high, a variety of factors — including years of consolidation among leading defense companies, low production rates of high-end weapons, and increasingly complex yet fragile supply chains — suggest that the industrial base is not equipped to ramp up production on short notice.35 The United States can and should take steps to improve its mobilization capacity, just as it should modernize its nuclear arsenal and push its allies to fortify their defenses. But it probably cannot rely on these measures as substitutes for conventional forces-in-being. Risk-Taking, Decision-Making, and the Military Balance Beyond the military challenges that a one-war standard introduces are a set of broader diplomatic and geopolitical challenges. The military balance — and the military options to which a country can realistically resort in war — invariably shapes risk-taking and decision-making in peacetime.36 Here, too, the one-war standard introduces deep challenges for a superpower that must manage peacetime competition and diplomatic crises in multiple theaters at once.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › REEs DA › Internal

I/L: An energy transition spurs a clean energy arms race and global competition.

Bremmer and Kupchan 21 [Ian Bremmer, Cliff Kupchan; American political scientist, author, and entrepreneur focused on global political risk, founder and president of Eurasia Group, a political risk research and consulting firm; an American political analyst and former government official, as well as chairman of the Eurasia Group, where he specializes in Russia and Iran; 1/4/2021; “Top Risks 2021”; Eurasia Group; https://www.eurasiagroup.net/files/upload/top-risks-2021-full-report.pdf; Accessed 7/23/2023; AO]

But beyond the headlines, the energy transition will be dominated by competition and a lack of coordination. India, Australia, and Brazil will fiercely protect their carbon intensive assets from international pressure and competition. Europeans will remain the biggest climate investors at home and abroad, and they will also prepare to start taxing imports from high(er) carbon countries such as China, Russia, and the United States. China will launch a massive domestic decarbonization program as part of its 14th five-year plan while using its state capitalist model to dominate global supply chains for new technologies. And as the US scrambles to catch up to China in what will quickly become a global clean energy arms race, it will make climate and the energy transition a matter of industrial and national security policy.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › REEs DA › Internal

I/L: An energy transition would cause global power competition and power shifts.

Hammelehle 22 [Julia Hammelehle, 6/20/2022, "Power Shifts: On the Geopolitics of the Energy Transition," Security Conference, https://securityconference.org/en/media/msc-blog/article/power-shifts-geopolitics-energy-transition/; Accessed 7/23/2023; AO]

In addition to the threats arising from an energy transition that is both too slow and highly unequal, the transition itself leads to multiple security challenges. Concerning potential domestic risks, particular attention should be paid to the following two aspects. First, the path towards net zero could destabilize countries that heavily rely on the income from fossil fuels. Accounting for more than 90 percent of revenues in states like Iraq or Kuwait, the hydrocarbon industry constitutes the backbone of these countries’ economic and social models. As the social contract in petro-states is based on compensating for citizens’ lack of representation with pay-outs from fossil fuel revenues, a declining income from hydrocarbons could lead to fractures in society and political instability. Adapting to the new socioeconomic realities and diversifying the economy comes with huge challenges for all fossil fuel states. Yet, the countries that are most at risk are those with high production costs, low fiscal space, and high political fragility – states like Nigeria, Chad, and Iraq. Second, while the green energy transition offers huge opportunities for those states that are rich in renewable energy or in metals and minerals needed for green technologies, the surging demand for these resources also comes with challenges. Since raw materials such as lithium, cobalt, and rare-earth elements are strongly concentrated in countries with weak governance structures and high levels of fragility, rising competition over the control of green economy resources risks to fuel conflicts, to foster corruption, and to increase inequality and democratic deficits. In addition to these threats, there are significant concerns about severe human rights abuses and environmental degradation in the mining industry. Energized Rivalry Besides the potential for increasing state fragility, the path towards decarbonization is accompanied by significant power shifts and changes in trade patterns between states. The energy transition has thus also profound implications for the relationship between states. One example is the rising competition for leadership in the green economy. Given that low carbon technology constitutes a key factor for countries’ future prosperity, it has been described by some analysts as the “geo-economic battleground of the future.” As the role of clean energy technologies for global power competition is rising, so are the West’s concerns about the leading position of China in this field. For instance, the current US climate envoy John Kerry warned in 2019 “that it would be folly to replace a world order too dependent on Middle Eastern oil with one that’s too dependent on Chinese technology.”

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › REEs DA › Internal

I/L: It is impossible to solve emissions now-- no resources, lagging developing countries, and supply issues. Attempts cause great power competition between US and China.

Yergin 22 [Daniel Yergin; vice chairman of S&P Global, recipient of United States Energy Award, former chairman of the Department of Energy’s Task Force on Strategic Energy Research and Development; 12/1/2022; "Bumps in the Energy Transition"; IMF; https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2022/12/bumps-in-the-energy-transition-yergin; Accessed 7/19/2023; AO]

Despite a growing global consensus, obstacles to reducing net carbon emissions to zero are stark The global disruptions in energy markets and the war in Ukraine have added impetus to the push for renewable energy and the drive toward net-zero carbon emissions. Yet, even as the global consensus around the energy transition becomes stronger, the challenges to that transition are also becoming clearer. In addition to the uncertain pace of technological development and deployment, four issues in particular stand out: The return of energy security as a prime requirement for countries Lack of consensus on how fast the transition should and can take place, in part because of its potential economic disruptions A sharpening divide between advanced and developing countries on priorities in the transition Obstacles to expanding mining and building supply chains for the minerals needed for the net-zero objective The need for energy security was a concern that had largely faded over the past several years. The energy shock, the economic hardship that ensued, skyrocketing energy prices that could not have been imagined 18 months ago, and geopolitical conflicts—all these have combined to force many governments to reassess strategies. This reassessment recognizes that the energy transition needs to be grounded in energy security—that is, adequate and reasonably priced supplies—to ensure public support and avoid severe economic dislocations, with the dangerous political consequences that can follow. The current global energy crisis did not start with the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Rather, it began in late summer of 2021. The economic rebound that came with the ending of the global COVID-19 lockdowns fired up global energy consumption. Oil, natural gas, and coal markets all tightened in the latter part of 2021, sending prices up as demand pushed against what became apparent—insufficient supply. It was in November 2021, three months before the invasion, that the US government announced the first release from its strategic petroleum reserve. What has become clear is that “preemptive underinvestment” has constrained the development of adequate new oil and gas resources. There are a number of reasons for this underinvestment—government policies and regulations; environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations by investors; poor returns caused by two price collapses in seven years; and uncertainty about future demand. The shortfall in investment was “preemptive” because of what was mistakenly assumed—that sufficient alternatives to oil and gas would already be in place at scale by now. Some have described what is currently unfolding as the “first energy crisis of the energy transition”—a mismatch between supply and demand. If it does prove to be only the first, future such crises will create uncertainty, cause major economic problems, and undermine public support for the energy transition. Energy transitions throughout history The first energy transition was from wood to coal in the 18th century. Although coal was used as early as the 13th century in Britain because the cost of wood had gone up, it emerged as a distinctive industrial fuel only in January 1709—when English metalworker Abraham Darby proved that coal was, as he said, “a more effective means for iron production” than wood. He noted, though, that “there are many who doubt me foolhardy.” Yet energy transitions have hardly been swift. Although the 19th century is known as the “century of coal,” that century actually still ran, in the words of energy scholar Vaclav Smil, on “wood, charcoal, and coal residues.” It was not until 1900 that coal supplied half the world’s energy demand. Oil was discovered in the United States in 1859. More than half a century later, on the eve of World War I, then First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill directed the conversion of the Royal Navy from coal to oil for technological reasons—speed, flexibility, ease of refueling, and the elimination of crews shoveling coal. But it took until the 1960s, a century after it was discovered, for oil to overtake coal as the world’s number one energy source. Until now, energy transitions have unfolded over long periods of time (see “Picture This” in this issue of F&D). They also have really been energy additions rather than transitions. In the six decades since oil overtook coal as the world’s number one energy source, the global consumption of coal has almost tripled. The current climate-driven energy transition is meant to be achieved quickly—in little more than a quarter century. And it is meant to be transformative. Coal is to disappear, and the European Union anticipates that hydrogen will provide 20 to 25 percent of its total energy by 2050. While it is the focus of increasingly intense activity and ambition, hydrogen provides less than 2 percent today. The objective of this transition is not just to bring on new energy sources, but to entirely change the energy foundations of what today is a $100 trillion global economy. Speed of the transition If energy security is the first challenge of the transition, timing is the second. How fast should it—and can it—proceed? There is much pressure to accelerate a significant part of the 2050 carbon emission targets toward 2030. But it sometimes seems that the scale of what is being attempted is underestimated. In my book The New Map (2021), I looked at the previous energy transitions, and it is clear that this one is like no other. All previous transitions were driven largely by economic and technological advantages—not by policy, which is the primary driver this time. Each of the preceding transitions unfolded over a century or more, and none were the type of transition currently envisioned. The objective of this transition is not just to bring on new energy sources, but to entirely change the energy foundations of what today is a $100 trillion global economy—and do so in little more than a quarter century. It is a very big ambition, and nothing on this scale has ever been attempted up to now. Some have warned that because the scale of the transition is so large and far-reaching, the macroeconomic impact needs deeper analysis. The economist Jean Pisani-Ferry, cofounder of Bruegel, Europe’s leading economic think tank, has observed that accelerating the targets for net carbon emission reductions too aggressively could create much larger economic disruptions than generally anticipated—what he called “an adverse supply shock—very much like the shocks of the 1970s.” Such a transition, Pisani-Ferry presciently wrote in 2021, just before the current energy crisis began, is “unlikely to be benign and policymakers should get ready for tough choices.” He subsequently added, in 2022: “Climate action has become a major macroeconomic issue, but the macroeconomics of climate action are far from the level of rigor and precision that is now necessary to provide a sound basis for public discussions and to guide policymakers adequately. For understandable reasons, advocacy has too often taken precedence over analysis. But at this stage of the discussion, complacent scenarios have become counterproductive. The policy conversation now needs methodical, peer-examined assessments of the potential costs and benefits of alternative plans for action.” North-South divide The third challenge is the emergence of a new North-South divide—a sharpening difference between developed and developing countries on how the transition should proceed. The original North-South divide of the 1970s was a collision between developed and developing nations over the distribution of wealth and, in particular, the pricing of commodities and raw materials. That division faded with globalization and advances in technology, as reflected in the shift in nomenclature to “emerging market” nations. For developing countries, what seems a singular emphasis on reducing emissions needs to be balanced against other urgent priorities—health, poverty, and economic growth. The new North-South divide reflects disagreement over climate and transition policies, their impact on development, and who is responsible for cumulative and new emissions and who pays. The global commodity shocks triggered by the war in Ukraine and the interest rate increases and currency devaluations that have ensued have only deepened the pressures on developing countries. For developing countries, what seems a singular emphasis on reducing emissions needs to be balanced against other urgent priorities—health, poverty, and economic growth. Billions of people still cook with wood and waste, resulting in indoor pollution and poor health. Many of these countries are looking to increased use of hydrocarbons as integral to raising standards of living. As former Indian Petroleum Minister Dharmendra Pradhan put it, there are multiple paths for energy transitions. India, while making a big commitment to renewables, is also building a $60 billion natural gas distribution system. Developing countries are seeking to initiate and expand the use of natural gas to reduce indoor pollution, promote economic development and job creation, and, in many cases, eliminate the emissions and pollution that come from burning coal and biomass. There may be a tendency in countries with advanced economies to wave away this divide, but the reality was sharply captured in September 2022, when the European Parliament voted, in an unusual expression of extraterritoriality, to condemn a proposed oil pipeline from Uganda through Tanzania to the Indian Ocean. The parliament denounced the project for what it said would be the pipeline’s detrimental impact on climate, environment, and “human rights.” The parliament is headquartered in France and Belgium, where the per capita income is about 20 times greater than in Uganda. Not unexpectedly, the condemnation set off a furious reaction in Uganda, where the pipeline is viewed as crucial to economic development. The deputy speaker of the parliament denounced the European resolution as “the highest level of neocolonialism and imperialism against the sovereignty of Uganda and Tanzania.” The energy minister added, “Africa has been green, but people are cutting down trees because they are poor.” The national student union in Uganda took to the streets to demonstrate against the European Parliament, with one of the student leaders saying, “The Europeans have no moral superiority.” Whatever the specific issues, it’s hard to deny the sharp difference in perspectives. The split is particularly evident when it comes to finance. Western banks and multilateral financial institutions have shut off finance for pipelines as well as for ports and other infrastructure related to hydrocarbon development. One African energy minister summed up the impact of the denial of access to finance as akin to “removing the ladder and asking us to jump or fly.” Finding a balance between the perspectives of the developing world, where 80 percent of the globe’s population live, and Western Europe and North America will take on increasing urgency. Finance shut off The fourth challenge will be ensuring new supply chains for net zero. The passage in the United States of the Inflation Reduction Act, with its massive incentives and subsidies for renewable sources of energy; the REPowerEU plan in Europe; and similar initiatives elsewhere will accelerate the demand for the minerals that are the building blocks for renewable energy, which requires wind turbines, electric vehicles, and solar panels, among other things. A host of organizations—the IMF, the World Bank, the International Energy Agency (IEA), the US government, the European Union, Japan—have all issued studies on the urgency of those supply chains. The IEA projects that the world economy will be moving from “a fuel intensive to a mineral intensive energy system” that will “supercharge demand for critical minerals.” In The New Map, I summarize this as the move from “Big Oil” to “Big Shovels.” S&P Global, the financial and analytical firm of which I am vice chairman, has sought to build upon those studies and quantify what that “supercharged demand” for minerals might be. S&P Global’s study “The Future of Copper: Will the Looming Supply Gap Short-Circuit the Energy Transition?” (2022) focused on that metal because the thrust of the energy transition is toward electrification, and copper is “the metal of electrification.” The study took the types of year 2050 targets advanced by the US administration and the EU and assessed what realizing those targets would require for specific applications—for instance, the different components of an offshore wind system or electric vehicles. An electric car, for example will require at least two-and-a-half times more copper than a vehicle with a conventional internal combustion engine. The conclusion of this analysis is that copper demand would have to double by the mid-2030s to achieve the 2050 goals The choke point is supply. At the current rate of supply growth—which encompasses new mines, mine expansion and greater efficiency, and recycling, as well as substitution—the amount of copper available will be significantly smaller than the copper supply requirements. For instance, the IEA estimates that it takes 16 years from discovery to first production for a new mine. Some mining companies say more than 20 years. Permitting and environmental issues are major constraints around the world. Also, copper production is more concentrated than, say, oil. Three countries produced 40 percent of world oil in 2021—the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Just two countries produced 38 percent of copper—Chile and Peru. Copper is crucial Copper prices have fallen about 20 percent from their high point this year. That reflects the metal’s oft-noted role as “Dr. Copper”—its price as a predictor of economic slowdowns and recessions. And indeed, the IMF sees a sharp slowdown in global growth in 2022 and projects further slowing in 2023 and potential recession—as do many other forecasters. But, post-recession, the coming flood of demand from the energy transition will cause copper prices to rise again. As has been the historical pattern, the surge in demand and prices will likely create new tensions between resource-holding countries and mining companies, which in turn will affect the rate of investment. Moreover, as the race to net zero intensifies, there is a risk that the competition for minerals will become caught up in what has become known as the “great power competition” between China and the United States. S&P Global’s copper study is meant to contribute to a deeper analysis of the physical challenges to the energy transition. The wind industry has what a 12th century English champion of windmills called “the free benefit of wind.” And solar has the free benefit of the sun. But the physical inputs that go into harnessing wind and solar power are not costless. The effort to push a significant part of the 2050 goals toward 2030 will likely have to contend with significant physical constraints.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › UBI Bad

The UBI is an almost un-tested, expensive proposal, that leaves poor families even more vulnerable than they already are.

Minogue ’18 [Rachel Minogue, Leader of Professional and Business Services Portfolio as Senior Analysis on Supply Chain Resiliency, International Trade Administration, Washington D.C.; May 2018; “Five Problems with Universal Basic Income”; https://www.thirdway.org/memo/five-problems-with-universal-basic-income]

The numbers speak for themselves: UBI is either very expensive or very stingy. The progressive version of UBI is expensive to the point of impossibility, while the conservative version is penny-pinching and punitive. Looking first at the former, consider an annual grant of $12,000 for all American adults aged 18 to 64, like Stern proposes. Stern estimates his plan would cost between $1.75 trillion and $2.5 trillion. The high end of this range seems realistic. Almost two-thirds of the population, or 200 million people, would receive a monthly UBI check for $1,000, with a cost of approximately $2.4 trillion every year, or one-eighth of GDP.9 Social Security beneficiaries currently receiving less than $1,000 a month would also get a supplement, adding an estimated $52 billion a year.10 By comparison, our entire existing social safety net costs $2.6 trillion. That includes Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Unemployment Insurance, and veterans’ benefits.11

Unless these critically important programs are eliminated, a UBI program would need to be paid for with higher taxes. It’s not clear whether it’s even possible to raise enough revenue for this initiative. The federal government took in approximately $3.3 trillion in 2017, so a taxes-only approach to funding Stern’s UBI would require an unheard-of 73% increase in federal revenue.12 Even if defense spending was slashed by one-third, for example, a 52% tax increase would still be required.13 Funneling all of a tax increase into UBI would also neglect our existing programs, like Social Security, which needs financial support to remain solvent past 2034.14

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › UBI Bad

A UBI will only be increasing the federal budget deficit, adding to the national and federal government debt.

Hughes, ’23 [Ryan A. Hughes, Founder of Bull Oak Capital, an investment advisory firm in San Diego, CA; January 2023; “Universal Basic Income is a Bad Idea” https://bulloakcapital.com/blog/universal-basic-income-is-a-bad-idea/#:~:text=UBI%20is%20expensive.,require%20a%20significant%20tax%20increase.]

In the U.S., the Roosevelt Institute think tank says that a $1,000 a month payment would grow the economy by $2.5 trillion by 2025 if paid for by increasing the federal deficit. On the other hand, if the UBI were paid for with taxes, there would be no net benefit to the economy.

However, net wealth is not created by simply redistributing money from one class of people to another. Wealth is created by increased labor, trade, and innovation. As such, I have difficulty believing that UBI could grow the economy by $2.5T.