Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2023 Michigan Counterplan
Polarization › 1NC --- Polarization --- Abolish FPTP CP

Convert to ranked choice voting or watch American society DIE to polarization :eagle: :eagle: :eagle:

Slaughter et al. 19 Diamond , Fukuyama. Politico 2019 (Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at Stanford University and author, most recently, of . Anne-Marie Slaughter is CEO of New America. Francis Fukuyama is a senior fellow at Stanford University and Mosbacher director of its Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law)  [AB] |dd

We need an electoral system that breaks the current stranglehold of the two-party monopoly, one that would allow voters to choose between a much more nuanced range of positions than “extreme” versus “moderate,” would allow third-party candidates to run without being spoilers and would encourage more civil campaigning and political discourse. The solution is to adopt ranked-choice voting for all state and federal elections, which can be done state by state without a constitutional amendment or even federal legislation. Also known as “instant run-off voting,” the system is currently in place in Maine and 11 American cities. The system is not nearly as complicated as it may sound; it just means that voters get to rank their choices, putting their most favored candidate first and then their second, third, fourth, etc. choices. If no candidate wins a majority outright (an increasingly frequent result in American politics), the candidate with the lowest number of votes is knocked out, and his or her [their] second-choice votes are redistributed among the remaining candidates, a process that continues until a candidate does reach a majority. A century ago, during the Progressive Era, Americans transformed our political system by passing a constitutional amendment to replace the selection of senators by state legislatures with direct senatorial elections. Over 20 states also moved from selecting candidates through the backroom wheeling and dealing of party conventions to the relative transparency of the primary system. We need similarly big reforms today—reforms that will allow the American people to reassert our power over a party system that is badly broken and compel candidates to appeal to a far broader swathe of us than a narrow “base.” The one thing I would do to fix American democracy is to have as many states as possible move to ranked-choice voting—that is, elections in which voters rank-order multiple candidates instead of selecting a single choice. Political polarization is one of the greatest threats to our system today, and replacing our current plurality voting with RCV will facilitate the emergence of third parties by eliminating wasted votes or strategic voting. Party primaries are one of the big drivers of polarization and extremism, and RCV will reduce their importance since the loser of a primary could still come back and run in the main election. RCV will also encourage cross-party cooperation for second preferences, once politicians learn how to play the game. It can be enacted on a state-by-state basis (as Maine has already done) and does not require a constitutional amendment. RCV will generate huge opposition from the two existing parties but is something that potentially could find favor with both the left and right once it is clearly explained. Change the electoral incentives, which are now biased against moderation and compromise. Today, members of Congress, state legislators, governors and other state officials have to first win a low-turnout party primary, in which ideologically militant voters are more likely to vote, and then win a general election by plurality vote. Compromise is politically dangerous, so candidates appeal to their bases. General election voters can’t vote for a third alternative without wasting their vote on a “spoiler.” Switching to ranked-choice voting would enable general election voters to give their first-place votes to independents and moderates who promise to defy this polarizing logic.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Polarization › 1NC --- Polarization --- Abolish FPTP CP

FPTP is the root cause of political polarization, skewed elections, and misrepresentation of voters – even on a mathematical level, it fails.

Steven J. Mulroy 18 Rethinking US Election Law : Unskewing the System. Edward Elgar Pub., 2018. |dd

1. In 2016, 3 million more Americans voted for Hillary Clinton than for Donald Trump for President. Yet Donald Trump became President. 2. In 2012, more Americans voted for Democratic candidates for U.S. House seats than for Republican House candidates. Yet the GOP1 maintained majority control of the House (by 30 seats). 3. A similar comparison for the U.S. Senate is slightly more complicated because Senate terms are staggered and it takes 3 consecutive elections for all 100 Senate seats to be up for election. But in the first 3 elections in this decade (2010, 2012, and 2014), more Americans voted for Democratic Senate candidates than Republican Senate candidates (52%), and yet Democrats won only 46% of the Senate seats. This seems to go against basic assumptions about democracy and majority rule. Our middle-school civics class understanding of American government has always been that the candidate or party who gets the most votes wins. If they get more votes than the other party, they control. They certainly shouldn’t take a back seat to a candidate or party that gets fewer votes. We can call this the “majority criterion.” Unfortunately, the above scenarios are not freakish, once-in-a-lifetime occurrences. They happen periodically throughout our nation’s history. They have affected both parties, both nationally and at the state level. In New Jersey, for example, Republican candidates garnered 51% of the statewide vote for State Assembly in 2013 but Democrats controlled 60% of the seats. How to explain these anomalous results? Although the scenarios above are superficially different, the same dynamic underlies all three. They all divide the electorate into lots of smaller subunits and hold a “winnertake-all” election within each—a situation sometimes called “the unit rule.”2 Whenever you do that, you create the possibility that there will be a significant deviation between (i) the percentage of votes a party receives, and (ii) the percentage of seats the party receives (or, in the case of presidential elections, the number of states the party carries). In close elections, that “skew” between votes and seats can mean that the majority party becomes the loser and the minority party becomes the winner. But even when this “winner loses” situation doesn’t occur, there is almost always a gap between votes and seats, with the majority party either getting robbed of some seats it otherwise earned, or getting a windfall of extra seats it doesn’t deserve. In the parlance of political scientists, the culprits are winner-take-all systems. They allow for a majority-supported candidate or party to “waste” its votes—to distribute them in a less than ideally efficient manner. This can be done in two ways: by “packing” and by “cracking.” Presidential elections create a good example of packing, thanks to the Electoral College. Under our Constitution, we do not vote directly for our President. Instead, we vote to determine whether our state’s Electoral College votes go to one candidate or another, with the winner being the candidate who receives a nationwide majority of Electoral votes. Each state has a number of Electoral votes equal to its number of House and Senate members. Almost all states allocate these Electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis: the party that gets 50.1% or more of the votes in the state gets all its Electoral votes. Because of this, it is easy for a candidate to waste votes by running up an unnecessary and useless supermajority in some states, and coming up just short in others.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Polarization › 2NC --- Polarization --- Denounce Trump CP

Trump’s getting unpopular with republicans. Challenging and pressing Trump kills his support and extremism.

Blake 3/11/23

Aaron Blake is senior political reporter, writing for The Fix. A Minnesota native, he has also written about politics for the Minneapolis Star Tribune and The Hill newspaper. Education: University of Minnesota | “CNN town hall lays bare Trump’s very unpopular Agenda” 3/11/23, The Washington Post | https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/05/11/trump-cnn-town-hall-unpopular-policies/

CNN has come in for plenty of criticism for granting Donald Trump a town hall platform for more than an hour Wednesday night. Despite host Kaitlan Collins’s best efforts to fact-check the former president, he produced a predictable steamroller of false and misleading claims. But there’s something to be said for challenging and pressing Trump on uneasy topics, which rarely happens. And the event at the very least reinforced the extremism that Trump 2024 embodies. Frequently, this came in the form of his repeatedly declining to take positions on issues upon which the American people have clearly decided. But sometimes he went further, embracing unpopular positions that could complicate the 2024 election for him and the Republican Party. Trump re-upped and expanded on his previous suggestions that he would pardon Jan. 6 defendants, saying he would “most likely” pardon a “large portion” of them. He even left open the possibility of pardoning Proud Boys who were convicted of the historic charge of seditious conspiracy just last week. While Republicans have increasingly adopted a more sympathetic view of Jan. 6, a poll last year showed Americans opposed pardoning rioters 68 percent to 20 percent. Some particularly remarkable Trump nonanswers came on the subject of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Asked whether he even wanted Ukraine to win, Trump repeatedly punted — an answer in line with a series of past sympathetic comments about Vladimir Putin and Russia. “I don’t think in terms of winning and losing,” Trump said. “I think in terms of getting it settled so we stop killing all these people.” While many Republicans are skeptical of the United States spending more money on Ukraine’s defense, the question of who Americans want to win is clear. Recent polling shows more than three-fourths of Americans regard Russia as an enemy, while a similar number regard Ukraine as an ally. And a February poll showed two-thirds of Americans want Ukraine to win, compared to just 8 percent who want Russia to win. Trump also repeatedly declined to commit to providing Ukraine with weapons. A recent poll showed Americans supported sending weapons by a 19-point margin. And he declined to call Putin a war criminal — something 80 percent of Americans and 76 percent of Republicans say Putin is, according to a March poll. (Trump explained, “If you say he’s a war criminal, it’s going to be a lot tougher to make a deal to get this thing stopped.”) Trump left open the possibility of reinstituting family separations at the southern border. Asked whether he would do it again, Trump defended it by saying that “when you have that policy, people don’t come.” Pressed, he repeatedly demurred but said, “Well, here’s — we have to save our country, all right?” Polling on this policy back in 2018 regularly showed two-thirds of Americans opposed it. Trump also suggested that not only should the GOP hold out in the debt ceiling negotiations for spending cuts, but that it should allow a default if it doesn’t get them. “If they don’t give you massive cuts, you’re going to have to do a default,” Trump said. He also downplayed what that would mean, saying it would be “really psychological more than anything else.” A recent Washington Post-ABC News poll showed just 26 percent embraced Trump’s hard-line position, while 58 percent said debt payment and federal spending cuts should be handled separately. A previous Post-ABC poll showed just 17 percent of Americans echoed Trump’s lack of concern about a default, while 8 in 10 had significant concerns — 53 percent were “very concerned,” and 29 percent were “somewhat concerned.” (Trump was also confronted with his past comments as president saying there should not be negotiations over the debt ceiling. Asked why he’s saying something different now, he admitted it was “because now I’m not president.”) Trump defended taking classified documents upon leaving the White House — for which he is under federal investigation. “Just so you understand, I had every right to do it,” he said. “I didn’t make a secret of it.” The American people disagree. In a poll last month, only 16 percent of those surveyed said he did nothing wrong, while 47 percent say he broke the law, and 17 percent said he did something unethical. Last and most significant was the hard line on the “stolen election,” or the “big lie.” Trump zeroed in on this from the jump on Wednesday night. “That was a rigged election, and it’s a shame that we had to go through it,” he said. A poll last year showed just 13 percent completely agreed that the election was stolen from Trump, while 52 percent completely disagreed. Two-thirds of Americans at least somewhat disagreed. And we saw in the 2022 election how this brand of election-denialism can cost the GOP. Trump also said that his vice president, Mike Pence, “made a mistake” by not helping him overturn the election on Jan. 6. A poll last year showed Americans disagreed that Pence had that power, 72 percent to 17 percent. Even when the question invoked Trump by name, Republicans disagreed with what it described as the “view of Trump” on the matter, 52-36. While Trump’s allies hailed his performance on Wednesday night, some critics in his party expressed worry about what the interview has wrought. “President Trump’s performance tonight had plenty of fun fodder for his biggest fans,” tweeted GOP consultant Matt Whitlock. “But [it] was toxic nuclear waste for the moderates and independents he (and Republicans everywhere) should be winning as Biden collapses.” CNN CEO Chris Licht, meanwhile, defended his network’s airing the town hall by reportedly saying Thursday morning that “there is so much that we learned last night of what another Trump presidency” would look like. There’s some truth there, and it wasn’t a pretty picture for the GOP’s efforts to recover from three straight poor, Trump-led elections.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Polarization › 1NC --- Polarization --- Denounce Trump CP

Lobbying is PRO CORP – prefer JAMES, it levels the field for non-corp interests groups.

Lee Drutman 11, “A Better Way to Fix Lobbying,” Issues in Governance Studies, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_lobbying_drutman.pdf

First is that lobbying resources are unequal. There are 16 lobbyists representing business for every one representing a union or public interest group.8 A second problem is that it is often unclear who is arguing for what and why. Without such transparency, accountability suffers. When lobbying is in part a game of who can flood Congress with the most bodies and the most reports and who can pay attention to the most details and moving parts, it’s a game where resources do matter. Disclosure is a hallmark of modern lobbying reforms. Thanks to the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, lobbyists now file quarterly reports listing their clients, issues, institutional targets (e.g. Senate, House, Department of Transportation) and compensation. This was an improvement on the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, which required semi-annual reports, which itself improved on the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, which required minimal disclosure and registration that was roundly ignored. All campaign contributions directly to candidates are disclosed as well. In many respects, the United States has the best lobbying disclosure regime in the world. But it could be better. The problem is that making information publicly available does not automatically make information useful, as Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil have argued convincingly in an excellent book on transparency entitled Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency. For transparency policy to be effective, they found, the information must be both easy to understand and easy to utilize. Users must be able to register their choices clearly, and disclosers must have the ability and incentive to respond meaningfully. Right now, for all its wonders, the current disclosure system doesn’t do a very good job of that. All we know is there is a lot of money and that it is disproportionately coming from business interests. This is probably more disempowering than anything else: the amount of money spent feels so overwhelming, the dominant storyline is that money corrupts, and ergo Washington must be a hopelessly corrupt place: Why even bother? What’s missing is the kind of information that would allow citizens to respond meaningfully. Knowing the rough how much and even a bit of the when is good, but it’s only part of the equation. Citizens also need to know who is advocating for what, and why and how. Such information would allow everybody – members of Congress and their staff, journalists, and the public – to be better informed. If knowledge is power, this brings more power to the individuals most likely to hold organized interests accountable. A NEW SYSTEM I propose a new system that will solve these two problems and make the advocacy process more effective and democratic. Here’s how it will work: Every time a piece of legislation is introduced, the Library of Congress currently makes that legislation available online already though the “THOMAS” System (found at http://thomas.loc.gov). I propose adding a second web-based system: “JAMES” (named for James Madison). JAMES would be a forum for lobbyists, constituents, and other interested parties to come together to publicly and transparently debate legislation, and in the process provide congressional staff, journalists, and the public access to the best available arguments, information, and ideas about public policy – all in a way that is easily searchable and sortable. Separate pages would exist for each bill introduced. Since legislation ranges in complexity and importance, JAMES will reflect that. Many of the 8,000 bills introduced each year are purely symbolic, and will generate little to no activity. Other pieces of legislation are incredibly complex, and may require multiple subpages for separate titles, sections, and amendments. It is important that the Library of Congress hire innovative thinkers and programmers to help develop and guide the architecture of the site as it evolves. (Existing online forums such as Wikipedia, Yelp, and Reddit have all developed innovative mechanisms to usefully aggregate information and could serve as models.) One way to think about JAMES is as a modern variation on notice-and comment rulemaking for the legislative process. Under the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), federal agencies were required to open up administrative rulemakings to transparent public comment. Proposed rules are now published in the Federal Register and anyone can submit a comment. The Obama administration has done an excellent job of making this process more accessible by posting all rules and comments on Regulations.gov. Yet, Regulations.gov remains a 21st century gloss on a mid-20th century commenting process. It does not allow individuals to update their comments as new information becomes available, and it lacks adequate functionality to aggregate, sort, and dis-aggregate comments based on who is writing and what they are saying. In order to make JAMES more easily navigable, different types of participants should use the system in different ways.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Polarization › 1NC --- Polarization --- Denounce Trump CP

Moderate voters are more likely to vote based on candidate rep rather than real alignment – denouncing trump is key for diminishing polarization.

Mike Pilarz, 02-14-2022, "The Overlooked Power of Moderate Voters in the Era of Polarization," University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy,

It’s indisputable that American elected officials are more politically polarized than ever before. Yet  challenges the idea that voters are just as polarized, providing compelling evidence that moderates are more prevalent and powerful than commonly believed. The research was led by , Professor at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy, and a team of coauthors. They propose a novel framework for sorting and studying the American electorate, revealing that moderates hold immense power over electoral change. Moderates are also highly influenced by the ideologies and qualities of a political candidate rather than mere party affiliation. “If you turn on cable news or open your Twitter feed, it seems like Americans are more polarized than ever, and we tend to obsess over the extreme ends of the political spectrum,” said Fowler. “But when you take a closer look, it’s clear that moderates are central to electoral change.” The authors argue that conventional methods of segmenting the electorate can cause us to misunderstand and underestimate the role of moderates. For example, if some respondents are extreme liberals on half the issues and extreme conservatives on the other half, they are classified as moderates. The authors propose a more nuanced approach, modeling the broader pattern of responses to multiple, related policy questions to paint a more vivid picture. Three distinct voting groups emerge from this new model: Those who hold genuine policy views that fit neatly on the traditional liberal-conservative spectrum of ideology. This group comprises nearly three in four Americans, the majority of whom hold moderate views. Those who hold genuine policy views that lean moderate but are idiosyncratic and poorly explained by the traditional liberal-conservative spectrum. For example, they may support higher taxes to fund Social Security but believe the Medicare program should be repealed. This group comprises about one in five Americans, yet is unaccounted for in traditional classifications. Those whose policy views are random and incoherent, either because they don’t pay attention to politics or are inattentive when responding to voter surveys. This small group, comprising about 7 percent of Americans, are more likely to provide extreme responses than even extreme liberals or conservatives. Therefore, the authors argue, it’s crucial to separate them from traditionally defined moderates, though conventional methods do not. The study found that the first group, genuine moderates, are particularly influential on elections. Rather than blind adherence to a particular party, they are highly swayed by the qualities of a particular candidate and willing to switch votes between parties. This group comprised 65 percent of voters who switched parties between the 2012 and 2016 presidential election, followed by the more idiosyncratic moderates at 32 percent of vote switchers. Moderates also appear to be more discerning and deliberate in their voting patterns than ideologues. For example, the study found that moderates’ vote choice in U.S. House elections is four to five times more likely to be influenced by a candidate’s ideologies when compared to the choice of liberals and conservatives, and two to three times more responsive to the candidate’s experience. “Our findings show that to the extent elected officials are polarized, it’s likely not attributable to mass voting behavior.” Fowler said. “Many Americans are not ideologically extreme, and they are especially important for political accountability and selection.” The authors emphasized the importance of ongoing study of America’s political midpoint, and believe their technique provides a repeatable framework for doing so.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Polarization › 1NC --- Polarization --- Denounce Trump CP

[TW] Trump is a court-confirmed felon to the 71st power.

@JAPITTER 7/19/23 via Twitter https://twitter.com/JAPITTER/status/1681694967826137088

Judge Kaplan just confirmed. Trump is a rapist. Trump opened the floor gate by appealing. Now its official.... We can call him a rapist. The Republican frontrunner is a RAPIST! RAPIST! RAPIST! Convicted woman abuser, twice indicted with 71 felonies (so far).

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Pandemics › 2NC --- Pandemics --- R&D CP

The US has the ability to increase R&D and make a global impact through coordination with other countries. The Access to COVID Tools (ACT) proves.

Lurie, et al 21

[Nicole Lurie received her BA and MD from the University of Pennsylvania and served an 8-year term as Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Gerald T. Keusch received his BA from Columbia College and his MD from Harvard Medical School. He is a professor and Associate Director of Medicine and International Health at Boston University. Victor J. Dzau received his BA and MD from McGill University and currently serves as the President of the United States National Academy of Medicine of the United States National Academy of Sciences. He was previously the president and CEO of Duke University Medical Center. “Urgent lessons from COVID-19: why the world needs a standing, coordinated system and sustainable financing for global research and development,” https://doi.org/10.1016/ S0140-6736(21)00503-1.] cgarland

The USA, a large, wealthy, sovereign nation, has important advantages when it comes to its R&D preparedness and response ecosystem. Through its government agencies, including NIH, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, US Food and Drug Administration, and Department of Defense, the USA has the resources, funding, and coordination necessary to sustain essential end-to-end R&D functions before and during a pandemic. The US Government supports basic and translational research, public and private sector development partner- ships, and early and sustained development of products, including clinical trials, manufacture, regulatory approval, procurement and, ultimately, distribution of products. It also has a strong private sector pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector able, if not necessarily always willing, to engage in pandemic disease research, manufacture, and distribution of new products. During the COVID-19 pandemic, many of these organisational roles have been taken on by ACTIV and Operation Warp Speed—emergency programmes to identify useful therapeutics and to fund at-risk vaccine development, production, and advanced purchase contracts.20,22 On Jan 15, 2021 the incoming Biden administration announced that Operation Warp Speed would be phased out and a new structure would be created within the White House Coronavirus office to focus on improving vaccine distribution under new leadership.23 Although there were many shortcomings in the US response to the pandemic, vaccine R&D was not among them—witness the collaboration between NIAID and Moderna Therapeutics to develop its mRNA vaccine candidate and Operation Warp Speed to move vaccine production forward by funding development and manufacturing before proof of efficacy was available.15,22 However, the primary intent of this effort was to produce products explicitly for USA use; substantial public funding covered much or all of the cost of development and advanced purchase for some products, with a goal that they would be free to the USA public during the pandemic. Advance purchase commitments might not be sufficient, however, for companies to sell their products at a price affordable globally, especially to low-income countries. In contrast, the global system, comprised of 195 member nations of the UN and its agencies, is fragmented, poorly coordinated, and under-resourced. Some of these countries (for example the UK, France, Germany, Russia, China, India, and a few others) have remarkable scientific expertise and financial and infrastructure resources, but only a few can support an end-to-end R&D system from basic research before a crisis to approved products during the response to an outbreak. Some countries, such as the USA or Russia, followed their own path without collaborating with any coordinated global effort. Although the R&D roles and responsibilities for the various components of the ecosystem might be apparent, it is at best uncertain which entities have the responsibility and resources to support a global system for the multitude of essential activities for development and deployment. Although recognising that the global system is comprised of the efforts of individual countries, as well as scientists and multinational companies and organisations, the table identifies the major R&D activities required for the emerging end-to-end R&D preparedness and response ecosystem, contrasts US and global capacity, highlights the gaps revealed during the COVID-19 pandemic in the USA and around the world, and indicates what needs to be created, developed, and financed. CEPI had already recognised some of these needs for vaccine development, even before January, 2020;24 however, there were no global entities with a clear mandate, responsibility, or resources to initiate product development in a pandemic. There were also no recognised organisations to support a pathogen repository, host their sequence information, grow and share virus isolates for essential research, and organise and collect biological reference materials from patients to support product development and validation of new diagnostic tests. Fortunately, some organisations simply stood up and did the right thing using their existing resources, but the ability to support, let alone to coordinate, investigators around the world was inadequate. In early January, 2020, as the first reports of the new outbreak in China became evident, CEPI mobilised the vaccine developers that it was already supporting to discuss how to pivot ongoing R&D to COVID-19. CEPI executed its first COVID-19 vaccine development agreements later that month.24 In contrast, the lack of similar pre-existing go-to entities to activate development of diagnostics and therapeutics, or other essential products, soon became apparent. Had there been a CEPI-like entity for diagnostics or therapeutics could these essential products have been created more rapidly? What seems likely is that shortening deployment of diagnostics and therapeutics by a few weeks would have favourably and substantially altered the evolution of the pandemic and saved many lives. Unlike the USA and a few other countries, the rest of the world faced a resource and responsibility challenge because there were no global entities with a mandate, financing arrangements, or the ability to coordinate multiple independent actors to test, approve, manufac- ture, scale up, or ensure equitable global access to new products. Instead, advanced purchase commitments negotiated by high-income countries with major pharmaceutical and biotech companies for vaccines and diagnostics threatened to consume all the early supply. High-income countries, which account for 14% of the world’s population, made deals during 2020 with manufacturers for over 50% of the anticipated supply of vaccines.25 This competitive dynamic among wealthy nations, characterised as vaccine nationalism, served to drive up prices for everyone and leave out half of the world’s population living in low-income and middle- income countries from timely access to the same products.26 In response to the urgent need for global coordinated action, an unprecedented gathering of heads of govern- ments, institutions, and industries took place in late April, 2020, to commit to work together to accelerate development, production, procurement, and delivery of COVID-19 health technologies that can control and end the pandemic. The Access to COVID Tools (ACT) Accelerator was formed as a 2-year, term limited, coalition of global heath organisations including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, CEPI, Gavi (the Vaccine Alliance), the Global Fund, UNITAID, Wellcome Trust, and WHO; private sector partners; and other stakeholders to collaborate to accelerate the development and ensure the equitable distribution of COVID diagnostics, treat- ments, and vaccines.27 The ACT Accelerator has made substantial strides towards these goals in its first 9 months, providing access to rapid diagnostic tests and treatments (eg, dexamethasone and oxygen), and by establishing the COVID-19 Vaccine Facility (COVAX), which is pooling global resources to expedite the development, manu- facture, and procurement of vaccines to ensure global equitable access.28 Although the ACT Accelerator and COVAX are promising initiatives, with 43 current donor governments, foundations, corporations and organisations listed on the Gavi COVAX hub29 at the time of publication, a few countries with financial ability to support this effort initially refused to join, and current funding pledges remain grossly inadequate for the need. The gaps in manufacturing, procurement, and equitable access to diagnostics, therapeutics, and other essential products are even more striking than those related to vaccines, and mechanisms to address them have been slower to develop. In all these areas, inadequate financial support and major dependence on the private sector has been a substantial impediment for products developed through the R&D ecosystem to reach all who are in need. Financing of ACT Accelerator has depended primarily on donor funds designated for assistance to low-income countries; this is an inadequate model, either to meet global needs in a pandemic or to finance the type of global R&D infrastructure that is required for the future, particularly as pandemics impact the entire world. Furthermore, global financing instruments to support the ramp up of manufacturing at scale and, if necessary, at risk, and funding to procure products must be in place at the front end of the response to a pandemic. Fundraising during a pandemic cannot get the job done; in fact, it diverts attention from essential R&D and programme implementation and further delays equitable access.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Pandemics › 1NC --- Pandemics --- R&D CP

Key to prevent the next major pandemic.

Wellcome 21 [Wellcome is a global charitable foundation that funds research in the areas of climate change, infectious disease, and mental health. Julia Gillard is the Chair of the Board of Governors and served as Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister (2007-2013). “How to prevent another major pandemic,” .] cgarland

Provide a sound financial footing for pandemic preparedness and response The problem Global solutions need collective investment. Since the Covid-19 pandemic started, we have seen increased investment in research, manufacturing and distribution of Covid-19 tests, treatments and vaccines. Paradoxically, we’ve not seen the same increase in Research and Development (R&D) for diseases that are at risk of becoming the next pandemic. Continuing to fight the Covid-19 pandemic doesn’t lower the chances of another health threat. The health and economic benefit of investing in these tools now and for future pandemic diseases has never been clearer. But major gaps in the world’s capabilities persist, such as in globally networked surveillance and research to prevent and detect emerging or escalating infectious diseases. The mechanisms to mobilise global funding for these crucial tools are limited, leaving every country in our interconnected world vulnerable. The solution We need governments to build collective financing mechanisms to transform the world’s ability to prepare for and respond to pandemic threats. Governments’ contributions to new financing mechanisms, such as , must be in proportion to their ability to pay. And this money must be in addition to overseas development assistance, so that it doesn’t compete with other critical health and development priorities. 3. Invest in the gaps in infrastructure to monitor and respond to threats The problem Covid-19 has shown us the blind spots in the world’s ability to detect, track and respond to emerging viruses. The world did not have the right infrastructure in place to respond to Covid-19 and so it could not act at speed to contain the initial outbreak. To prevent pandemics, we need to invest in three areas: surveillance, manufacturing and co-ordinated research and development. The solution Surveillance Finding new pathogens quickly is critical to containing them. There are too many global ‘dark spots’ where new viruses cannot be identified – but building locally-owned, internationally-connected will ensure we can spot potential dangers before they become a global problem. This network must work with local communities and be used between outbreaks to tackle other infectious diseases and urgent global threats. With sustainable, long-term investment this network can inform powerful regional and international responses to all infectious diseases rapidly and efficiently. Manufacturing Throughout Covid-19, we have seen what happens when vaccines and treatments are produced in a small number of countries. High-income countries buy-up the global supply, leaving the virus to thrive elsewhere. Access to these tools is a question of both supply and delivery. We need to increase regional manufacturing capacity. This will ensure more people will have access to treatments and vaccines. While efforts to diversify manufacturing capacity could take several months to have a positive impact on Covid-19 vaccine supply, increasing regional manufacturing capacity will have long term benefits for future pandemics globally, while ensuring local needs are met. Research and Development (R&D) At the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, very little was known about the virus, even less how to diagnose, treat and prevent it. Thankfully, scientists could build on existing research on other coronaviruses, such as vaccines for MERS and new mRNA technology. . Next time, the world may not be so lucky. , where failures to continue key areas of research between outbreaks led to a delay in the development of usable diagnostics, treatments and vaccines when the next outbreak hit. There are still no WHO-approved diagnostic tests for six out of the . We must be prepared for all plausible scenarios – and this means more investment in R&D. We need a system that leads and supports equitable and collaborative R&D programmes to deliver a full range of countermeasures, such as diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines, available to respond to a pandemic. It would need to work with industry as well as global health organisations and have equitable access to its products at its heart. And will only be successful if leaders commit to transparency and openness in sharing the information they collect with the world.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Marine Ecosystem

MPAs solve marine habitats, climate and more

Horrox et al. 21 [James Horrox, Frontier Group, Steve Blackledge and Kelsey Lamp, Environment America Research & Policy Center, “How Marine Protections Keep Our Waters Wild: New Life for the Ocean,” Feb 2021, Environment America Research & Policy Center is a 501(c)(3) organization]

Marine protected areas safeguard wildlife and ecosystems 13 A growing body of scientific research indicates that MPAs that are at least highly protected – and fully protected ones in particular – consistently help to support larger, healthier and more diverse populations of fish and other marine animals.58 No-take reserves currently make up only around 3 percent of U.S. waters,59 but studies have shown that these areas can help protect the balance and integrity of marine ecosystems, lead to an increase in fish biomass and size and density of organisms, promote species diversity, and prevent species loss within their boundaries.60 They can also have a positive effect on the ocean around them, increasing the abundance and diversity of marine life in adjacent areas.61 MPAs have been found to yield the greatest benefits when they are large, highly protected, isolated by deep water or sand, well-enforced, and longstanding. According to a 2014 study published in the journal Nature, when all five of these criteria are met, benefits increase “exponentially.”62 MPAs promote increased biomass, abundance and density of marine species Highly protected, well-managed and effectively enforced MPAs can lead to an increase in the density and abundance of marine species within their boundaries.63 A 2009 analysis synthesizing a range of monitoring studies on the ecological effects of no-take marine reserves around the world showed that the protections afforded by these reserves result in significant average increases in biomass (the total mass of living organisms in a specific area), the size and density of organisms, and the number of species present within the reserves.64 For example, in half of the reserves, total biomass of studied species was more than triple that of unprotected areas, and density more than 60 percent higher.65 In some cases, where the density and abundance of organisms is especially low outside of the reserves, the increases were even greater. One study, examining the Governor Island reserve in Australia, found that the biomass of rock lobsters was 2,300 percent higher in the protected area than outside it.66 Across five studies measuring density of various marine species in the Las Cruces Reserve in Chile, the number of individuals of the species being studied was found to be on average 2,210 percent higher inside the reserve than outside it.67 Of these studies, the two reporting the largest increases were both focused on the Chilean abalone, a species of sea snail that was “incredibly rare” prior to the creation of the reserve, and remained so everywhere except in the protected areas, where its population rebounded.68 Numerous other studies have documented the benefits of MPAs for marine life:69 • A 2017 analysis found that average biomass of fish in fully protected MPAs was 670 percent greater than in nearby unprotected areas and 343 percent greater than in partially protected MPAs.70 The study also found that fish biomass was restored in fully protected marine reserves over time after the impleMarine protected areas safeguard wildlife and ecosystems mentation of protections, whereas in partially protected MPAs it was not.71 • A study of marine reef fish in Tsitsikamma National Park off the coast of South Africa, one of the world’s oldest fully protected MPAs, found that the density of certain fish species in the protected area is around 42 times higher than in unprotected areas.72 • Within five years of the implementation of protections on Georges Bank in the Gulf of Maine, the density of legal-sized scallops reached up to 14 times that of scallops in fished areas.73 Crabs, anemones, sea urchins, and other invertebrates returned, and yellowtail flounder also began to recover.74 • MPAs can lead to larger fish populations beyond their boundaries, either through fish migrating from the protected area or the dispersal of larvae spawned within it.75 • In tropical environments, unfished reefs with large fish biomass tend to have greater coral coverage and lower levels of coral disease than unprotected reefs, with fewer bacteria, viruses and pathogens.76 MPAs protect and enhance biodiversity Marine protected areas can protect biodiversity, strengthening ocean ecosystems by keeping natural processes intact and enhancing the resilience of their inhabitants. Highly to fully protected MPAs foster greater biodiversity, which in turn boosts overall ecosystem health.77 A 2006 meta-analysis of data from 44 fully protected MPAs showed that, post-designation, levels of biodiversity in these areas increased by an average of 23 percent, and fish numbers in surrounding areas also significantly increased as a result of spillover from the protected zones.78 Increased biodiversity in turn increases degraded ecosystems’ ability to recover from degradation.79 For example, within two decades of its designation, a fully protected area in New Zealand’s Leigh Marine Reserve recovered from destruction of kelp forests triggered by the unchecked growth of its sea urchin population, which thrived in the absence of heavily-fished predator species.80 Restrictions on fishing within the MPA opened space for a rise in predator populations, including sea urchin-eating fish, resulting in an increase in overall biodiversity, a revival of the area’s kelp forest, and a return of the local ecosystem to a complex, healthy condition.81 In addition to benefiting resident species, well-connected, ecologically coherent MPA networks that provide effective links across marine habitats have been shown to benefit highly mobile marine animals like whales and sea turtles by protecting important sites along their migratory routes, such as feeding and breeding grounds.82 In the western Pacific, protection of the nesting beaches and foraging habitats of green turtles, including a significant portion of their migration routes to foraging grounds outside the protected area, has played a role in rescuing these populations from the brink of extinction.83 Since migratory species tend to have preferences for particular sets of conditions, such as temperature or oxygen concentrations, and often gravitate toward particular areas where these conditions lead to an abundance of prey, protecting such areas can benefit Kelp forests, like this one in the Channel Islands National Park off the coast of California, are important carbon sinks, and support a rich diversity of marine life. Photo: U.S. National Park Service Marine protected areas safeguard wildlife and ecosystems 15 these species.84 This has been the case for certain kinds of seabirds, for example. A study of the distribution and foraging habitat use of three species of tropical booby in two MPAs in a network in the Central Pacific found that each MPA encapsulated more than 85 percent of foraging habitat for each species, suggesting that these areas are valuable to these highly mobile tropical species.85 Highly and fully protected MPAs can help mitigate the impacts of climate change Global warming is taking its toll on the ocean, with increasing acidification, oxygen depletion, changes in water temperature and currents, intensification of extreme weather events, and degradation of coral reefs and other critical wildlife habitats.86 But the oceans themselves may be an important ally in combating this crisis.87 For example, oceans and coastal habitats, such as mangroves and salt marshes, not only soak up huge quantities of carbon dioxide, but can also fortify our shorelines against rising sea level and extreme weather events that are all but guaranteed to become more frequent as the climate crisis escalates.88 Research suggests that networks of MPAs that protect these coastal ecosystems can therefore help safeguard both human communities and ocean ecosystems against the impacts of climate change.89 Protected marine reserves have been shown to increase the resilience of marine species to climateinduced impacts. For example, when climate-driven oxygen depletion in Baja California devastated local populations of pink abalone, the protection these reserves provided for large adult mollusks with high egg production enabled abalone populations in the protected areas to recover more quickly than those outside the reserves, and moreover, helped to replenish non-protected surrounding areas through larval spillover across the reserves’ borders.90 The increased complexity of ecosystems nurtured by MPAs in itself enhances the ability of protected areas to withstand climate-induced impacts. Research has shown that reserves with complex ecosystems are more resilient to the effects of climate change than unprotected areas.91 Increased diversity in fish communities gives these communities greater resilience to variations in temperature, for example.92 Similarly, studies have revealed that increased biodiversity enhances reef fish biomass and resilience against the climate change impact of rising temperatures.93

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Marine Ecosystem

MPAs sequester carbon – solves for ocean acidification, warming, and bio-d loss.

Kaplan 21 [Sarah Kaplan is a climate reporter at the Washington Post covering humanity's response to a warming world, “How protecting the ocean can save species and fight climate change,” March 18, 2021, Washington Post, ]

The research, published Wednesday in the journal Nature, comes weeks before a United Nations biodiversity conference at which nations will set new targets for conserving plants, animals and the ecosystems they inhabit. Many countries, including the United States, have said they aim to protect 30 percent of their land and water by 2030.

“Now there are scientific and economic studies showing that not valuing nature is a great existential risk to humanity,” said conservationist Enric Sala, an explorer-in-residence at National Geographic and a lead author of the report. “But if we protect the right places … it’s a ‘win-win-win’ situation.”

2023 Michigan Counterplan
LIO › 1NC --- LIO --- Security Order CP

Increasing US security order regenerates the Liberal International Order

Global Agenda Council, 16, 7-2016, "Strengthening the Liberal World Order: A World Economic Forum White Paper", [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/strengthening_liberal_world_order_wef-1.pdf]//PL

The liberal world order that arose after World War II rested on three pillars: a liberal economic order that could bring a greater degree of prosperity to all who participated in it; a liberal political order that favored democratic governance; and a strategic order that suppressed the great power conflicts that had produced so much destruction in the first half of the 20th century. The first two involved extensive mutual cooperation among nations and peoples. The latter depended almost entirely on the power and commitment of a single power: the United States. It was the US military presence in both Europe and Asia that effectively put an end to the cycle of warfare that had plagued both regions. American military power acted as a guarantor of mutual security that allowed former enemies – such as Germany and France – to join in economic and political union without fear of another conflict. In East Asia, the American presence allowed Japan, and later China, to focus on economic growth and modernization without fear of another round of conflict that had caused such damage to both countries between the 1890s and the 1940s. In the Middle East, too, albeit with less consistent success, the United States served as a mediator and guarantor of the security of the leading nations, even those that were engaged in conflict with one another. The fact that the world has gone seven decades without a great power war is, in historical terms, a remarkable achievement. Even the “long peace” that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars was not without costly great power wars (the Crimean War of the 1850s and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871). This long and broad era of strategic peace has, in turn, made possible the other successes of the liberal world order: the unprecedented prosperity of the post-war era and equally unprecedented spread of democratic governance. Today, however, this strategic order is being challenged on several fronts. In Europe, Russia has committed the first cross-border aggression by a major power since World War II, raised the specter of renewed nuclear competition and caused tensions with NATO allies from the Baltics in the North to Turkey in the South. In East Asia, China’s greater military power and expanding strategic reach have raised questions about the reliability of America’s security guarantees to its allies and to America’s ability to play its traditional role of keep international trade routes and sea lanes open. These challenges promise to be especially pressing in the South and East China Seas, where Chinese territorial claims conflict with those of other nations, including close allies of the United States, and in some cases conflict with international law. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Iran has deployed forces in Syria and supported guerrilla forces in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine in a bid for growing hegemony in the region. The forces of ISIS have gained control of territory spanning the border between Iraq and Syria and threaten to grow stronger, feeding off sectarian strife in both countries. The crises in the Middle East have also spilled over into Europe, putting immense pressure of European political institutions and on security ties among European countries and between Europe and the United States. The chaos and destruction in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East have produced the largest mass movement of people since World War II. This has tested institutional ability and strained the capacity of frontline states. It has also fuelled populist and xenophobic rhetoric intended for domestic political audiences in the United States and particularly Europe that has sought to blur the lines between those owed international protection and economic migrants. While the security concerns are real, and vetting and vigilance are necessary, it is crucial that the US and its partners live up to their commitment to protect internationally endangered persons under the Refugee Convention. This is not only a question of doing the moral or legally obligated thing, it is smart policy. Denying entry to refugees based on a fear of radicalization at home does not resolve security concerns, it merely pushes greater numbers of at-risk communities towards the conditions that foster violence, hopelessness and alienation. At the same time, the United States and its partners must lead an effort to update the current legal and instituti Global Agenda Council on the United States - Strengthening the Liberal World Order framework established after World War II and ill-suited for the modern world. These challenges will not go away but must be addressed, intelligently and firmly. The US must provide leadership, including military leadership, to help provide a solution to the Syrian political crisis while also reducing and eliminating the threat posed by ISIS. Overall, to sustain the liberal world order requires that the United States continue to play the role it has played since World War II in providing security and deterring aggression. At a time when much of the world has come to doubt America’s will to continue its global engagement, steps need to be taken to provide reassurance. Reassuring Allies and Friends of American Reliability The first task is to reassure friends and allies of the dependability of US security guarantees. Nations that begin to question America’s reliability will seek other means of protecting their security, and while we would like to believe that they do so in ways that serve both their interests and ours, it is more often the case that the courses they choose are destructive and disruptive to the liberal order and to general security. Gulf States supporting radical forces in the sectarian struggles of the Middle East, for instance, have lessened everyone’s security, including their own. A close ally such as Japan should not be left on its own to meet the challenges of a region where the exercise of Japanese military power, unmoored from close ties with America, raises historical concerns. In Asia as well as in Europe, allies facing a China growing in power and ambition or a Russia with great power and expansionist ambitions need to be reassured that the US has both the will and the capacity to provide defense against aggression. That has been and remains the cornerstone of the security system that has undergirded the liberal world order. To this end, we must first work to strengthen the political, military and economic capacity of allies. The stronger they are, the more effective is the deterrence provided by the alliance. While dependence on the US for ultimate security is unavoidable in this international system, to the degree allies can do more on their own and can partner with the United States to provide overall security, the alliances will be healthier and American public support for a globally engaged foreign policy will be greater. At the same time, it is important to demonstrate to friends and allies that the US can provide diplomatic solutions to problems, has a unique capacity to bring parties together to find common solutions to problems and does not pursue aims by strictly unilateral or military means. Although effective leadership often requires moving out ahead of other powers, the United States needs to avoid creating the perception of being a rogue superpower. Establishing a Modus Operandi with Independent Powers We also need to find ways to incorporate rising democratic powers and organizations that are not traditional American allies into the overall security framework. This means finding a modus operandi with nations like India and Brazil, or the Arab League, which do not want to join an American alliance system but share some common interests. Whether this requires new institutions or simply a supple diplomacy remains to be seen. But an effective American policy will find a way to work with independent powers that nevertheless share a common world view. Having reassured allies and friends of America’s reliability as a provider of security and a facilitator of diplomatic solutions, it becomes possible to deal more effectively with real and potential adversaries. There is no more effective deterrent to opponents of the liberal world order, and to a stable security order, than the reality and perception of a strong, unified alliance and cooperation among friendly states that share common goals. Behind that must be the evident willingness and capability of the United States to act to deter aggression; but the perception of effective US leadership, and the welcoming of an American role by friends and allies, adds significantly to deterrence. In dealing with actual or potential adversaries, the first step must be effective deterrence and containment. It is essential that the United States make clear that the costs of aggression outweigh the benefits and that success is impossible. This requires, above all, maintaining sufficient military strength, and the will to use it, so that potential challengers have a clear sense of the risks. Nothing invites aggression like ambiguity, in terms of both means and will, on the part of the deterring power. With effective deterrence established, however, it is possible and desirable to offer would-be challengers an alternative Global Agenda Council on the United States - Strengthening the Liberal World Order path. While making it clear that military action will not succeed and will be costly, the United States can also make clear, through diplomatic and economic “carrots and sticks”, that a peaceful rise through integration into the existing economic and political system is a much more fruitful course. Wherever possible, coalitions that espouse these views should be assembled with the US operating as an indispensable partner. Ending Sequestration and Increasing US Defense Capabilities The United States spends more on defense than any other nation in the world, and indeed more than the next 10 nations combined. This fact is often noted to suggest that the US defense budget is either high enough or too high. What many fail to take into account, however, is that the United States plays a unique role in the world. No other nation has the global responsibilities that the United States has shouldered. The fact is, the US has been the main provider of security throughout the world for the past 70 years. Its navy keeps the sea lanes open to international trade. Its land, air and naval forces help maintain the peace in East Asia, Europe, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Therefore, American forces must have far greater capacity and reach than those of other nations. Today, as a result of budget cuts, including those mandated by the so-called sequester, America’s ability to continue playing this vital role in all these theatres is increasingly in question. Every recent secretary of defense, every chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and every head of every service has warned that, unless spending on defense increases, US forces will lose their capacity to provide security, will “hollow” out, will be inadequately trained and equipped to carry out their global missions. Given the role that the US plays in providing the underlying security that allows the liberal world order to function and flourish, continuing down this path not only threatens US security, but also the order itself. To carry out any of the goals in this report, therefore, will require taking on the political challenge of fighting to lift the sequester caps. As a political matter, this may require compromises on both taxes and non-defense domestic spending. If so, those compromises should be made

2023 Michigan Counterplan
LIO › 1NC --- LIO --- Econ Version CP

Multi-prong approach that supports free trade, integration, and strong defense reinvigorates liberal order

Global Agenda Council, 16, 7-2016, "Strengthening the Liberal World Order: A World Economic Forum White Paper", [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/strengthening_liberal_world_order_wef-1.pdf]//PL

As the United States emerges from the global economic crisis, it has the opportunity to refocus and reinvest in the liberal economic order it helped create and shape it for the future. Multilateral institutions within this order emerged stronger and more resilient after the crisis, with their relevance and need underscored. However, their continued centrality to the system rests on leadership from within, most notably from the United States. Existing multilateral financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, will inevitably evolve to reflect changing realities and a shifting economic balance of power. American policy should work to ensure that these changes are consistent with liberal economic norms and reflect the legitimate needs of partners that share and benefit from this order. New institutions, meanwhile, have arisen and will continue to arise, sponsored by powers that may wish to challenge the existing order. The US, together with its allies, should strive to embrace these new institutions and engage constructively with them, encouraging them insofar as they reinforce liberal economic norms, discouraging them when they challenge those norms and, in general, urging them to engage collectively as part of a larger multilateral system, rather than seek to operate as an alternative. Free Trade and the Global Trading System Free, fair and open rules-based trading systems are the cornerstone of the liberal economic order, whether through the World Trade Organization (WTO) or regional trade agreements with partners. The US has benefitted from this system that it helped create, both economically and strategically, while at the same time advancing US interests and values. Other partners within this system have also benefited, including the new rising economic powers and especially China. The US currently has a robust trade agenda underway and should push forward to realize both the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), made up of 12 countries and encompassing 40% of global GDP and one-third of all trade, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), made up of the US and its EU allies representing $1 trillion in trade every year. While not every trade agreement is a good agreement, both of these agreements should enable the US and its partners to set new and higher standards of trade that will raise the bar throughout the global trading system. Both the TPP and TTIP agreements are ambitious in scope and substance. Congress and the American public will need to understand fully how the US can benefit from them, both economically and strategically. Given concerns expressed about trade on both sides of the political aisle, there is no guarantee that divisions between parties, and within parties, might not squander this opportunity. These trade agreements must fully incorporate the will of Congress as set forth in Trade Promotion Authority by law. Having accomplished this objective, the US must then lead with these two important regional trade agreements to shape the future of globalization and the multilateral system. The US should also continue to push forward productive initiatives at the WTO, such as the 2013 Trade Facilitation Agreement, now awaiting ratification, which could improve efficiency in the global trading system by reducing costs and administrative burdens associated with moving goods across borders. While enhancing and enforcing the legal and institutional architecture of the global free trade system is of strategic and economic importance to the United States, so too is the imperative that trade routes channeling trillions of dollars’ worth of goods around the globe remain open and safe for trade and commerce. Whether in the South China Sea or in Arctic waters, the principle of freedom of navigation underpins the global trading system and must be maintain Global Agenda Council on the United States - Strengthening the Liberal World Order Existing Institutions and the Bretton Woods System The United States was the principal founder of the institutions in the Bretton Woods system, including the IMF and World Bank. These institutions have been important partners in supporting the liberal order. The US and its allies have looked to these institutions to address the economic dimensions of the Ukraine crisis and the West African Ebola crisis. As the largest shareholder, the US has led these institutions through many transitions. These institutions need to be robust, representative and legitimate to work. This means that they need to reflect economic realities, including the growing economic contributions of nations like China and India. A multilateral economic institution in which the Benelux countries have a greater voting share than China cannot expect to play a central role in the global economic order of the 21st century. Because the US has an interest in the continued health and legitimacy of such institutions, it is in America’s interest to support the necessary reforms of those institutions. There is enough blame to go around, but for several years Congress failed to approve the US-led 2010 IMF quota reforms to expand representation of emerging economies to reflect their role in the global economy and increase financial resources. As a result, the US risked losing a substantial degree of influence at the IMF or seeing the IMF itself delegitimized. China and others benefitted from US inaction on IMF quota reform to gain support for the AIIB and the New Development Bank. In the future, Congress and the Administration need to act cooperatively and decisively to show that the US will engage constructively and lead the IMF through transitions to come. Further, Bretton Woods international financial institutions play a crucial strategic role in the rules-based liberal international economic order and should not be taken for granted. The United States must refocus and re-invest in its own system and provide the financial and intellectual resources necessary to ensure that these institutions can fulfil their mandates. In addition to contributing sufficient financial resources, this includes ensuring continuous, highly qualified US representation on each of the executive boards of these institutions. The past several years have seen many of these board seats left vacant. The US should continue to be actively involved in leadership selection as the management terms at these institutions come to an end. Finally, the US should seek ways to amplify the impact of these institutions in the field of public-private cooperation. In a world in which private capital flows to developing countries outweigh official development assistance by more than 10:1, finding ways to meld institutional actors and business is crucial. This entails standard-setting, confidence-building and ensuring the existence of predictable rules and legal security. Here the Bretton Woods Institutions and especially the World Bank Group play a key role. The US should lead the push to reinforce the IFC and, in particular, to strengthen the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency through bolstering its mandate and increasing its operational funds. Channeling the forces of the private sector is one of the challenges and necessities of the global liberal economic order. New Institutions Rising economic powers have already responded to their lack of proportional influence at existing development institutions by creating new institutions, such as the New Development Bank and the AIIB, where they can wield greater influence. The emergence of new institutions must be expected, and some of these new institutions may well challenge not only the existing institutions, but also the liberal economic order itself. It is very much in the interest of those with a stake in the liberal economic order for the US and its allies to help shape these new institutions in a way that is compatible with the existing liberal economic order. This is possible. Over the decades since World War II, new regional development institutions emerged without the United States’ direct involvement, such as the Islamic Development Bank, CAF (the Development Bank of Latin America) and the European Investment Bank, with each finding its role within the greater development institutional system and leaving the overall system no weaker. The United States should strongly encourage new development and financing institutions, like the New Development Bank and the AIIB, to collaborate and integrate with existing regional and multilateral development institutions to ensure they uphold high standards. It should also be willing to embrace them if they prove through their actions that they aim to complement and engage rather than compete in the existing system.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Inequality › 2NC --- Inequality --- UBS CP

UBS Solves.

Anna Coote and Andrew Percy 20. [Anna Coote is a Principle Fellow at the New Economics Foundation and was Commissioner for Health with the UK Sustainable Development Commission. Andrew Percy is Co-Director of the Universal Basic Services Network at the UCL Institute for Global Prosperity. “The case for universal basic services,” Policy Press, ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-3984-0.] cgarland

Child care. As an indicator of the budget required to provide decent child care as a universal service we use the figure of 1.4% of GDP, derived from an average of the four most generous countries’ current spending on child care (p. 64). Adult social care. We have used projections of the extra costs over and above healthcare spending, while acknowledging large differences in the balance between formal provision and informal care in different countries. The OECD 30 average for 2014 was 1.4% of GDP and we have used this to indicate a starting point for expenditure (p. 70). Housing. Based on a significant expansion of social-rent housing, we have budgeted 0.5% GDP using estimates from the IGP UBS report (2017). In this case, capital costs are spread over a 30- year bond issue, and savings from unneeded future housing benefits are taken into account. Enormous differences between countries in land and building costs, as well as existing stock of socially rented properties, make this a hard service to budget uniformly across countries, but a commitment of 0.5% of GDP would certainly have a significant impact in any country (p. 84). Transport. A budget of 0.4% of GDP for enhanced transport represents a reasonable estimate for additional spending required to provide universal access to local transport to reach employment and other public services (p. 90).9 Information. Around 0.6% of GDP could cover both service access and devices in a typical OECD country, although alternatives such as public WiFi could significantly reduce the per-person costs in some areas (p. 98). An expansive UBS programme along the lines we suggest would represent a significant increase in current public spending. To put this in perspective, however, our figure represents less than 15% of total government spending in every OECD country except Chile and Ireland.10 In the late 1940s, UK government spending rose by some 20% of GDP to fund post-war reconstruction and the new welfare state. More recently, in 2008, both UK and USA governments increased public spending by more than 6% of GDP to cope with the financial crisis.11 While these events are not directly comparable, they do suggest that, when governments decide to increase spending, it is more a matter of political choice than applying rules of contemporary economics. It is worth noting that our costings do not account for the potential savings that can be generated by a radical shift towards UBS. First, there are likely to be economies of scale where needs are met collectively rather than individually. Second, we want services to be organized to enable people to co- produce – as far as possible – the ways in which their needs are met. By bringing uncommodified human resources into the process, this can not only improve the well-being of the individuals concerned – provided they are adequately supported – but also improve the quality and scope of the services without a corresponding increase in the overall cost. We believe this can be done by transforming the policies and practices of public institutions, rather than by ‘dumping’ state responsibilities on poor communities. Third, collective action to meet needs can prevent harm that would otherwise require more costly interventions. Fourth, UBS can generate considerable returns on investment in social and ecological as well as economic terms. Where would the money come from? The main options for generating public funds for UBS are: raising existing taxes, creating new taxes, borrowing, and redistributing funds from other areas of government spending. We have noted that borrowing (by issuing long-term government bonds) is a suitable option for investing in some aspects of the material infrastructure, such as housing. But to keep things simple here, we will concentrate on taxation and revenue options available across countries with both shared and sovereign currencies. Figure 6.2 reveals the wide discrepancy in total tax takes across the OECD. The OECD average is 34% of GDP, but many EU member states exceed this proportion and in France, Denmark, Sweden and Italy it is well over 40% of GDP. Tax revenues in the ‘anglophone’ countries are below average: in the United Kingdom 33%, Canada 32%, Australia 28% and the United States 27%. Tax regimes and other revenue-raising policies also vary widely between countries. They depend on political support and this, in turn, depends on specific national factors including history and culture. In some countries, local governments have far stronger revenue-raising powers; in federal systems, such as the United States and Germany, states have considerable fiscal autonomy. Given this variation in the size and composition of taxes, it is simply not possible to make general recommendations here as to what should be raised to cover the cost of UBS. Thus we concentrate on the United Kingdom.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Inequality › 1NC --- Inequality --- UBS CP

Universal Basic Services are key to reducing inequality and maintaining democracy by increasing solidarity---UBI will fail.

Coote and Percy 20. [Anna Coote is a Principle Fellow at the New Economics Foundation and was Commissioner for Health with the UK Sustainable Development Commission. Andrew Percy is Co-Director of the Universal Basic Services Network at the UCL Institute for Global Prosperity. “The case for universal basic services,” Policy Press, ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-3984-0.] cgarland

All of us, however much or little we earn, need certain things to make our lives possible - and worth living. A roof over our heads, nourishing food, education, people to look after us when we can't look after ourselves, health care when we are ill, water and electricity, transport to take us where we need to go and (these days) access to the internet. We also need money so that we can pay for some of these things directly, such as food, rent and utility bills, although sometimes we cannot afford them. We pay for other things, such as education and roads, indirectly through taxes because we could never afford to buy them outright unless we were very rich. In the United Kingdom, the National Health Service provides free health care at the point of need, so you do not have to worry about the cost of treatment or buying private health insurance. In most rich countries, there are some things that you don't need to pay for directly because they are collectively provided - although free services sometimes fall short of adequate. What all these things have in common is that they are everyday essentials that everybody needs to live a decent life. Suppose, then, that we all clubbed together and made sure they were available and affordable for everyone. Suppose we pooled our resources so that the risk of suffering the ruinous consequences of going without one or more of these essentials was shared between us. That's the goal of universal basic services (UBS): acting together to help each other, and ourselves, so that everyone has access to three things that are fundamental to a successful, peaceful, functioning democracy: security, opportunity and participation. It is not exactly a new idea. It echoes the ambitions of Roosevelt's New Deal in the 19305 and the UK post-war settlement. Both were based on the premise that the whole of society is responsible for - and dependent upon - the well-being of every member of society. Therefore, governments were compelled to act against the scourge of unemployment and poverty and to combat the associated evils of illness, squalid housing and poor education. Funds were gathered through taxes and national insurance schemes to pay for schools, health care, housing and income support for those unable to earn - and all this helped to generate employment and a productive economy. As well as take-home pay, people received a virtual income in the form of public services. This has been described as part of a 'social wage' that includes state pensions and benefits. It was worth a great deal to everyone, and especially to those on low incomes, because it met their needs and did not have to be paid for directly. We still have a virtual income or 'social wage' today, but it is much diminished and misunderstood. After the economic disruptions of the 1970s, government policies have chipped away at the post-war consensus and at the value of the social wage. They have done this by promoting a vision of economic success based on personal choice, private ownership, a small state and a free market, blaming the jobless and poor for their own troubles and urging individuals to help themselves. Since 2008, the effects in many countries have been ratcheted up by tax cuts and severely reduced public spending. Where the quality of free schools and health care has declined as a result, more people are encouraged to leave the public system and pay privately for what they need. Many services, including care for children and disabled adults, as well as housing and transport, have been stripped down to the bare bones, abolished all together or left to the vagaries of voluntarism and philanthropy. This steady erosion of services, often combined with cuts to the value of social security benefits, has led to a deepening rift between rich and poor and to millions living in destitution in the world's richest countries. It doesn't have to be like this. Our goal is to reclaim the collective ideal and rebuild the social wage. Let's start by defining our terms. 'Universal basic services' (UBS) encapsulates three crucial concepts. What we mean by each of them is best described in reverse order. Together they sum up what we mean by 'public services' whenever we refer to them in the following pages: Services: collectively generated activities that serve the public interest.1 Basic: services that are essential and sufficient (rather than minimal) to enable people to meet their needs. Universal: everyone is entitled to services that are sufficient to meet their needs, regardless of ability to pay. Central to our case is that UBS should be expanded in practice, both by improving the quality of existing services such as health care and education, and reaching into new areas such as care, housing, transport and access to digital information. We are seeking radical change that builds on the best we already have. We don't want to return to the 'good old days' or simply to have more of what we've had in the past. Our proposal is radical for three main reasons. First, central to our case is the collective ideal, which has been submerged and discredited by the politics of individual choice and market competition. We aim to reverse that trend, recognizing that what we do together and how we care for each other is the key to enabling all of us to meet our needs and live lives that we value. Second, we aim for sufficiency and sustainability. Universal basic services form an essential part of an agenda for sustainable development, which we must embrace as a matter of priority to safeguard the future of human civilization. Third, we are seeking to overhaul the traditional model of public services so that they are genuinely participative, controlled by the people who need and use them, and supported rather than always directly provided by the state. We need these radical changes now, not just because we want to help make people's lives better (which we do) but because we are convinced that this is the only way for modern societies to survive and flourish. Existing welfare systems are struggling to meet today's needs. They haven't adapted far or fast enough to demographic, technological and ecological challenges. They have come under sustained attack from political forces that seek to shrink the state and grow the market. People are being driven apart by an ideology that promotes individualism, competition and accumulation, which in turn have stifled aspirations, heightened insecurities, exacerbated environmental problems and accelerated political polarization. All these things undermine democracies, which depend for their health and strength on shared interests and goals, mutual understanding and cooperation. We want this book to fuel a big debate about how to tackle today's urgent problems, such as widening inequalities, crumbling welfare systems and unsustainable consumption. We focus here on a particular range of needs to illustrate our approach. But we certainly do not want to limit the scope of UBS, which could extend much further. As we shall see, it is not about applying a single plan of action to all of life's necessities but about adopting a set of value-based guidelines and customizing them to suit a variety of different needs and circumstances. The term UBS was first given voice in October 2017 in a report from the Institute for Global Prosperity, University College London.? It offers an approach that is distinct from 'universal basic income' (UBI). The latter is a proposal to give regular, unconditional cash payments to everyone, rich and poor - ostensibly to reduce poverty and inequality, promote opportunities and solve problems arising from ungenerous, stigmatizing systems of income support. We wholeheartedly endorse the principle that everyone should have the right to a minimum income and that no one should suffer blame or stigma for falling on hard times. Radical reform of income support, although not the topic of this book, is extremely urgent. But the solution to the problem of inadequate social security is not 'UBI', universal, unconditional cash payments that are sufficient to live on, which is how it is defined by many of its leading advocates. We can find no evidence that UBI could ever live up to the more ambitious claims that are made for it. 3 On the other hand, we are convinced that UBS holds out real promise for achieving similar goals. Instead of plugging into the neoliberal formula of individual consumption within a market-based system, UBS offers a collective approach that supplements - and reduces dependence on - individual monetary income. As we argue later, more and better public services can deliver far better results in terms of equality, efficiency, solidarity and sustainability.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Hegemony › 2NC --- Heg🦅--- Philippines CP

US heg is being tested in the South China Sea.

Tiffany You, 22 , "The South China Sea Dispute: China’s Challenge to US Hegemony," Journal of Interdisciplinary Public Policy, https://jipp.org/read/3-1-the-south-china-sea-dispute//PL

Following the collapse of the USSR towards the end of the 20th century, the international system transferred from a world order characterized by bipolar competition between two opposing superpowers to one of unipolar hegemony dominated by the United States. However, this has been accompanied by protracted debates over the durability of American hegemony. During the 1990s, the United States’ technological, economic, and military superiority was unrivaled, and many believed it would be a long time before the country’s global leadership was challenged. However, now in 2022, new evidence suggests that this was not the case and that the era of American primacy is coming to an end, owing largely to the rise of the People’s Republic of China. As China advances toward becoming a major superpower, it challenges US hegemony, particularly in continental Asia and the Asia-Pacific. This conflict is typified in the South China Sea, a marginal sea that is part of the Pacific Ocean and covers an area of approximately 3.5 million square kilometers. Despite its relatively small geographical area, it has in the past decade remained a considerable interest to the world’s superpowers. This has been due to a multitude of reasons, including its strategic positioning with one-third of the world’s shipping passing through the region each year and its holdings of huge untapped gas and oil reserves. At first glance, the disputes in the South China Sea involving China and its neighbors appear to be disagreements between distant nations with little significance to the United States. However, America has several interests (geopolitical, geostrategic, and economic) that give it good reason to hold a stake in this dispute. The United States has made public statements regarding its official South China Sea policy. It believes that the People’s Republic of China has no right to lawfully assert a maritime claim and that the country’s constant harassment of fisheries and offshore energy development in the area to exploit resources are markedly illegal. More specifically, the United States rejects China’s claims of the 12 nautical mile territorial sea radius surrounding its claims on the Spratly Islands. The Spratly Islands are hotly contested by countries in the region, and give China rights to prime holdings in the center of the South China Sea, but the United States and others believe China lacks any lawful claim to the islands. To even a congressional level, America has made clear that its support of international freedom rejects any unrightful (or expansionary) acts in the South China Sea. However, I argue that long-term geographic power in the South China Sea is the driving force behind the United States’ interest in the region itself. Whoever controls the South China Sea will have permanent geographic power, an essential component of any state’s foreign policy. The United States understands the historical significance of its dominance over the American continent in its rise to superpower status: that is how it imposed itself and ended European hegemony on the continent. Likewise, in its geopolitical competition against China, the US cannot allow China to pursue the same goals and achieve the same outcomes as the Monroe Doctrine. Antonio Gramsci’s revolutionary thesis of cultural hegemony posits that the United States must contain China's ambitions in order to maintain its own position; and, if “containment” is not implemented, the region will likely witness a gradual transition of power. Thus, whether it is injecting weakness, delaying China's development, preventing the formation of a global center of power, or being part of a revisionist policy to change the world to its image, the end goal of the United States’ revisionist policy is to prevent a regional power transition process. In this regard, it should be emphasized that the failure of the containment policy is the greatest risk of the South China Sea dispute. If the US fails, we will witness an immediate power transition, increasing the risk of falling headfirst into a Thucydides trap (the claim that the war between Athens and Sparta was attributable to the rise of one great power and the fall of another). Since the Obama Administration’s ‘pivot’ towards Asia in 2011, the United States has been shifting its policy stances. Speaking for the country, former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton called for an “increased investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise—in the Asia-Pacific region,” which was interpreted as a response to China’s growing expansion. One particular aspect of this has been the freedom of navigation operations led by the US Navy: supplying arms to rim states in the South China Sea (such as Vietnam) with military and lethal aid and patrolling near the artificial islands created by China in the disputed Spratly archipelago. The United States affecting its policy of containment in the South China Sea has by far been one of its most important in our world today. Failing to do so against China would have immense implications on global politics and society in the near future, as its stance in the region would give it both the economic and geopolitical power needed to rise to the dominant world power. As a result, to the United States, it is believed that it must not only impose a strategy to maintain its current position, but it must also succeed. In many ways, China’s rise in an American-led global system has precipitated the US-China power shift. In retrospect, the power transition began in 1978, when China embarked on a modernization strategy. Signs of China's rise drew global attention in the early 1990s, and its growth accelerated in the early 2000s. Massive changes occurred, and the China threat emerged, overshadowing China’s relations with the rest of the world. China had never contributed to the establishment of the current global order; instead, it had sought its demise for decades prior to 1978. China had no way of challenging the American-led order at the time. Instead, it was forced to become a part of this system, especially in terms of economic development. Leaving aside China’s recent misfortunes, the country has a rich sociopolitical, strategic, and cultural history. However, China’s rise has been governed by an authoritarian regime that rejects globally shared democratic ideologies. China’s ability to install a challenge in the South China Sea could signal a shift in the global hegemonic order rather than merely a rise in influence in neighboring Asian regions. If China successfully establishes its influence and shapes events in the South China Sea, it will mark a significant step up the hierarchical ladder. In this sense, both powers are expected to defend their respective interests. Gramsci’s theory predicts an increase in the likelihood of conflict, with China becoming more confident and assertive and the US becoming more nervous after losing the economic battle, as China is expected to surpass US GDP by 2030. The power transition between the United States and China differs significantly from previous transitions. While there is no clear guide for the US and China in the unfolding events, many changes are expected, particularly in the South China Sea. As a result, while China's ultimate success in modernizing its economy and military is not guaranteed, the likelihood of success is increasing. So, the high probability of China’s success in achieving most of its development goals by 2050 remains high, signaling the end of an old world order and the beginning of a new one.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Hegemony › 1NC --- Heg🦅--- Philippines CP

US presence in the Philippines is key to check Chinese aggression and maintain heg.

Edward Wong, 7-13-2021,( Edward Wong is a diplomatic correspondent over foreign policy) "The Hegemony’s Contest in the South China Sea," Sage Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/21582440211031216//PL

WASHINGTON — President Biden and his aides have tried to reassure Chinese leaders that they do not seek to contain China in the same way the Americans did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. But the announcement on Thursday that the U.S. military is expanding its presence in the Philippines leaves little doubt that the United States is positioning itself to constrain China’s armed forces and bolstering its ability to defend Taiwan. The announcement, made in Manila by Lloyd J. Austin III, the U.S. defense secretary, was only the latest in a series of moves by the Biden administration to strengthen military alliances and partnerships across the Asia-Pacific region with an eye toward countering China, especially as tensions over Taiwan rise. “This is a really big outcome,” said Jacob Stokes, a senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Society and an adviser to Mr. Biden when he was vice president. “You can better mass forces and project power if you can rotate into those locations in the Philippines.” Video 1:10 U.S. Says It Will Expand Its Military Footprint in the Philippines Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III announced a deal to give the U.S. military access to four more bases in the Philippines, bringing the total to nine. Credit Credit...Pool photo by Jam Sta Rosa He added that the greater military presence “sends a deterrent message to China.” Under Mr. Biden, the United States is working to strengthen military ties with Australia, Japan and India, and it has gotten the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to speak out on potential threats from China. Image President Biden and President Xi Jinping stand in front of the Chinese and American flags. President Biden, standing with President Xi Jinping of China, has said that the U.S. military would defend Taiwan in the event of conflict with China, but his aides insist that the policy of strategic ambiguity has not changed. Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times Mr. Austin’s announcement signals that the United States could use its own armed forces to push back harder against the Chinese military’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea, where China and several Southeast Asian nations, including the Philippines, have territorial disputes. More important, they could aid Taiwan if the People’s Liberation Army were to attack or invade the democratic, self-governing island, which China considers part of its territory. Mr. Biden has said four times that the U.S. military would defend Taiwan in the event of conflict, but his aides insist that American policy has not changed. Since the United States ended formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979, it has avoided declaring whether it would deploy military forces to defend Taiwan, a position commonly known as “strategic ambiguity.” A congressional mandate requires every presidential administration to give weapons of a defensive nature to Taiwan, and Mr. Biden’s team is intent on accelerating that and shaping the sales packages so that Taiwan becomes a “porcupine” that China would fear attacking. Understand U.S.-Philippine Relations A Complex Alliance: The United States and the Philippines have long had a close — though at times unsteady — relationship. Here’s what to know. Biden-Marcos Meeting: President Biden met President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines at the White House on May 1, a visit meant to send a message to China as tensions rise. Countering Beijing: Driven by worry about Chinese aggression, Marcos has been moving closer to the United States, a shift that has made the Philippines the linchpin of Biden’s strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Reviving Ties: In February, Washington and Manila announced a deal to give the U.S. military access to four new locations in the Philippines. In April, the two nations held their biggest joint military exercise. A greater U.S. military presence in the Philippines would go beyond that — it would make rapid American troop movement to the Taiwan Strait much easier. The archipelago of the Philippines lies in an arc south of Taiwan, and the bases there would be critical launch and resupply points in a war with China. The Philippines’ northernmost island of Itbayat is less than 100 miles from Taiwan. The United States is relying on Japan, which, like the Philippines, is a military treaty ally, to be the bulwark on the northern flank of Taiwan. Mr. Biden promised Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan last month that the Americans would help build up the Japanese military. Jake Sullivan, the White House national security adviser, spoke by telephone with Eduardo M. Año, his counterpart in Manila, on Jan. 17 to discuss the military cooperation agreement between the two nations and sites in the Philippines for American equipment and troops, a senior Biden administration official said. Mr. Sullivan reached out just days after Mr. Año took up his post. That conversation built on a meeting that Mr. Biden had with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September. Mr. Marcos took office last June, and he has said that he plans to push back against China’s claims in the South China Sea. Editors’ Picks I Dated a Celebrity. Do I Have to Tell My Wife? A Pie Shop on Chicago’s South Side Serves More Than Dessert Can Stress Cause Hair Loss? SKIP ADVERTISEMENT “It was a valuable conversation for them to take stock of the alliance and plan for how we strengthen it,” Mr. Sullivan said on Thursday night. The announcement in Manila by Mr. Austin took place right before Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken was scheduled to fly to China in the first visit there by a U.S. State Department head since 2018. That timing could be interpreted by Chinese leaders as a signal that the main U.S. policy priority in the region is working with allies and partners to rein in China, rather than stabilizing relations with Beijing. “The U.S. side, out of selfish interests, holds on to the zero-sum mentality and keeps strengthening military deployment in the Asia-Pacific,” Mao Ning, a Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman, said at a news conference in Beijing on Thursday. “This would escalate tensions and endanger peace and stability in the region. Regional countries need to remain vigilant and avoid being coerced or used by the U.S.” The new agreement allows the United States to put military equipment and build facilities in as many as nine locations across the Philippines, which would lead to the biggest American military presence in that country in 30 years. “This is an opportunity to increase our effectiveness, increase interoperability. It is not about permanent basing,” Mr. Austin said in Manila. “It is a big deal. It’s a really big deal, in that, you know, it provides us the opportunity, again, to interact a bit more in an effective way.” The last American soldiers left the Philippines in the 1990s, and the country’s Constitution now bars foreign troops from being permanently based there. Image A U.S. Marine helicopter taking off from a beach. A U.S. Marine helicopter participating in an annual U.S.-Philippines joint military exercise. The last American soldiers left the Philippines in the 1990s, and the country’s Constitution now bars foreign troops from being permanently based there.Credit...Aaron Favila/Associated Press In November, a Philippine general identified five possible sites for the agreement. The announcement on Thursday mentioned nine, though Mr. Austin and his aides did not publicly say where the additional four sites would be located. Randall Schriver, a former assistant secretary of defense for the Asia-Pacific region, said in an interview that he thinks the four sites are on the northern island of Luzon, in the southwest province of Palawan and part of the old U.S. military facility at Subic Bay. Mr. Schriver added that the Pentagon’s aim is to get at least one site that each of the U.S. armed services — the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force — could use as a point for surging forces, if necessary. They would not just be air bases, and a big question is how much construction would be needed to get each one ready. The sites would likely be incorporated as soon as possible into the U.S. military’s regional exercise schedule, and the Pentagon could leave equipment behind rather than bring it back to home bases, Mr. Schriver said. The agreement extends the Pentagon’s forward presence in the Indo-Pacific region — in addition to forces in Australia, South Korea, Japan and Guam, military officials said. “Sites could potentially be used for a wide range of missions such as joint military training, disaster relief and humanitarian efforts, and combined exercises,” said Lt. Col. Martin J. Meiners, a Defense Department spokesman. One of the most important activities at the bases would probably be logistics — storing fuel, ammunition, spare parts and equipment, said current and former military officials, including some who served in the Philippines. Pentagon officials said on Thursday that the military was working out the details of how many U.S. military forces would be located at the bases at any given time, how long those rotational tours of duty would be, and what the troops would do once they were there. By adding to the Pentagon’s vast logistics network, the agreement makes it more difficult for an enemy to target U.S. supply hubs in the region. “Logistics wins battles and campaigns and wars,” said David Maxwell, a retired Army Green Beret commander who served in the Philippines. In the early 1990s, the United States had nearly 6,000 troops permanently based in the Philippines. Officials said under the new basing plan, that figure would be dramatically lower, with a combination of uniformed U.S. service members, American civilian contractors, and local Filipino contractors and security personnel. “Our actual presence will be very limited and temporary,” said Joseph H. Felter, a former top Pentagon official on Southeast Asia who now directs Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. In other parts of the world where U.S. forces are temporarily based, such as in Iraq, Syria and Somalia, military deployments of six months to one year are common, but the length of tour duties varies, officials said. In any war, operational and supply bases would be among the first targets an enemy would try to strike. Mr. Maxwell said a key to the bases’ success will be what kind of air and missile defense systems are deployed to protect them against possible Chinese ballistic or cruise missile attacks, or warplanes dropping precision-guided bombs. “If China is going to try to take steps with its missile arsenal to take out locations where the U.S. projects forces, it now has more targets it would have to deal with,” Mr. Stokes said. “China has a big missile arsenal and many aircraft, but this still presents it with a bigger problem.”

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Genocide › 2NC --- Genocide --- Arms Sales CP

U.S. arms sales are the crucial mechanism enabling the genocide. We have a moral responsibility to end them.

Bachman 19 — Jeff Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights and Director of the Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights MA Program at the School of International Service at American University, holds a Ph.D. in Law and Public Policy from Northeastern University, 2019 (“Senate Vote Could End US Complicity in the Saudi-Led Genocide in Yemen,” American University School of International Service, February 15th, Available Online at https://www.american.edu/sis/news/20181126-us-complicity-in-the-saudi-led-genocide-in-yemen-spans-obama-trump-administrations.cfm, Accessed 07-28-2019)

The U.S. House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly to pass legislation to deny further military assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen.

The bipartisan vote for the bill was a repudiation of the Obama and Trump administrations’ support for the Saudis and a war that many charge includes violations of human rights. A Saudi-led coalition of states has been aggressively bombing Yemen and imposing an air and naval blockade of its ports for more than three years, leading U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to describe Yemen as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Genocide › 1NC --- Genocide --- Arms Sales CP

Morally, we should treat the U.S. as if it was the direct perpetrator of this genocide.

Bachman 19 — Jeff Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights and Director of the Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights MA Program at the School of International Service at American University, holds a Ph.D. in Law and Public Policy from Northeastern University, interviewed by Kay Summers, Senior Director of Marketing and Communications at the School of International Service at American University, 2019 (“The US’s Role in the Hidden Genocide in Yemen,” American University School of International Service, January 28th, Available Online at , Accessed 07-28-2019)

The Arab state of Yemen has been locked in a civil war since 2014—a conflict that escalated significantly in March 2015, when a Saudi-led coalition began air strikes against the Houti rebels. This coalition has been backed by the US and the UK, despite producing a humanitarian crisis that has left 8.4 million people on the brink of famine.

SIS professor Jeff Bachman, director of the Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights Program at SIS, recently published an article for Third World Quarterly making the case that the violence and destruction in Yemen amount to genocide. We posed a few questions to Bachman to break this down further.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Food Security

15-minute Cities provide low income neighborhoods with better access – solving food deserts.

C40 Knowledge Hub 2023, "C40 Knowledge Community," Policy Briefs, https://www.c40knowledgehub.org/s/article/15-minute-cities-Debunking-the-myths?language=en_US//KOO

However, many millions of others do not due to the car-centric urban planning paradigms that dominated the last century. Since World War II, urban planning models promoted by urban thinkers such as Le Corbusier forcibly separated the areas where people live from areas for work, shopping or socialising and introduced lower-density rules. This has created car dependency, congestion, high air pollution, food deserts, long commutes, segregation, isolation and inconvenience for those unable to drive, along with many other problems.1 The dense development that characterises areas that were typically built before these planning rules were introduced, and which are often considered most attractive today, became illegal to build in many places. Transport infrastructure investment favoured cars, and many cities demolished productive streets and mixed-use neighbourhoods to enable the expansion of urban roads, highways and parking, making walking and riding dangerous and unpleasant. Once-thriving neighbourhoods, high streets and shops declined as speed for through-traffic was prioritised over the on-street experience for people using them. In most cases, there were no public consultations asking people if they wanted their city to look and feel this way.

Since the 1960s, urbanists including Jane Jacobs from Canada and Jan Gehl from Denmark have called on urban planners to adopt a more people-centric approach, promoting mixed use, density, walkability and more. This approach creates places where people want to shop, linger and spend their time. It creates walkable distances and more custom for local businesses. It requires traffic to be calmed and cars to be deprioritised to create safer, more pleasant public spaces and street environments, provide more space for alternative modes of transport, and other uses that bring streets to life. The popularity of these ideas has grown steadily in recent years. The 15-minute city concept developed principally by Carlos Moreno, the chief architect behind the Paris plan, builds on that foundation to offer an adaptable framework for people-centred urban development that emphasises proximity and access to amenities. Cities everywhere can adopt it today.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Fertility › 2NC --- Fertility --- PFAS CP

It solves dawg.

NRDC 23 (The Natural Resources Defense Council is a United States-based 501 non-profit international environmental advocacy group, 4/2023, accessed 7/19/2023, FEDERAL DRINKING WATER MONITORING OVERLOOKS MANY PFAS, “COMMUNITY-LED WATER TESTING FINDS DANGEROUS LEVELS OF PFAS THAT THE EPA DOES NOT TEST FOR,” https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/federal-drinking-water-monitoring-overlooks-many-pfas-fs-20230412.pdf)SAADK

Although UCMR5 will provide a valuable overview of the state of PFAS contamination nationally, it is important to keep in mind the EPA’s testing limitations—and the limitations of regulators’ current approach to tackling the PFAS crises more broadly. The results of NRDC’s drinking water study underscore the need for a comprehensive approach to managing PFAS, including developing methods to expand testing for individual PFAS and to measure the total amount of PFAS in drinking water.

Importantly, actions can be taken immediately to reduce PFAS exposures. There are scalable and effective treatment techniques available to reduce PFAS in drinking water.9 Additional research is needed to ensure that these technologies adequately address short- and ultrashort-chain PFAS, which are increasingly detected in drinking water.10 Special attention is needed to protect vulnerable populations, including communities that have known or historical contamination, pregnant and nursing mothers, infants, and children.