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2023 Michigan Counterplan
Fertility › 1NC --- Fertility --- PFAS CP

Limiting PFAS is key to solve fertility.

Wei Wang 23 (Wei Wang is the Leonard Kleinrock Chair Professor in Computer Science and Computational Medicine at University of California, Los Angeles and the director of the Scalable Analytics Institute (ScAi). She is also a member of the UCLA Jonsson Comprehensive Cancer Center, Institute for Quantitative and Computational Biology, and Bioinformatics Interdepartmental Graduate Program. She received her PhD degree in Computer Science from the University of California, Los Angeles in 1999. She was a professor in Computer Science and a member of the Carolina Center for Genomic Sciences and Lineberger Comprehensive Cancer Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill from 2002 to 2012, and was a research staff member at the IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, 1/1/2023, accessed 7/19/2023, Environmental Research, “The effects of perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances on female fertility: A systematic review and meta-analysis.” https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001393512202045X)SAADK

Due to water and oil repellence, high surface activity and thermal stability, perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) have been used in a variety of fields and industries over the past few decades, including food packaging, textiles, leather, cookware and upholstery (Butenhoff et al., 2006; Kantiani et al., 2010). Concurrently, the widespread use of PFAS has led to humans being exposed to this persistent form of organic pollution through multiple pathways, this exposure can accumulate in the human body (Kabore et al., 2018; Lu et al., 2017; Park et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2021). Due to the persistent pollution and bioaccumulation of PFAS in the environment, governments have begun to restrict the production and application of PFAS(Buck et al., 2011).

However, pollution from PFAS in the environment remains an ongoing problem, some short-chain or structurally modified PFAS are not regulated as alternatives and have been widely detected in the environment (Lau et al., 2007; Pan et al., 2020). These circumstances have led to the consideration that PFAS exposure may be one of the reasons for the persistent decline in human fertility. Male fertility can be evaluated simply and accurately by sperm quality analysis, but there are no clear indicators or methods to evaluate female fertility.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Education › 2NC --- Education --- Stem Funding CP

Property allocated federal funding solves educational inequality.

Havard 09 University of Baltimore Law “Funny Money: How Federal Education Funding Hurts Poor and Minority Students” Cassandra Jones Havard 2009 https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1306&context=all_fac

Our Nation's public school system is highly decentralized. Yet, more than ever, it is clear that education must be a national priority. Federal funding for education makes a cooperative federalism program in which the state and federal government share responsibility for the program design and policy objectives. This arrangement is a beneficial one. The benefits of strong federal funding for education will yield a more informed citizenry, and a better educated and more skilled workforce, making our country more competitive in an increasingly connected world. Although expenditures for education comprise a significant amount of federal dollars, Congress has consistently chosen not to provide strong commitments, completely fund the Nation's educational systems, or declare a right to education. Unfortunately, the costs of these deficiencies will be borne by the country as a whole. Moreover, the current federal funding system as applied in most states is deeply inequitable and fails to direct funding so as to serve economically challenged populations. Fiscal accountability measures should be strengthened so that the fundamental flaws in the current school finance system make it impossible for the system to provide a maximum return on investment. The statute and implementing regulations should redefine the criteria used to measure comparability and the supplementation requirements. A guarantee of equal educational opportunity is not only what every child deserves, it is what America deserves.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Education › 2NC --- Education --- Stem Funding CP

Federal Investment in Education R&D increases graduation rates and boosts economy.

Correa 23 Thomas B. Fordham institute “The federal government is underinvesting in education research” Daniel Correa [CEO of the Federation of American Scientists.] April 2nd

2023 https://fordhaminstitute.org/national/commentary/federal-government-underinvesting-education-research

But education research is valuable, and smart investments by the federal government in education R & D can produce dividends. Through the federal Education Innovation and Research (EIR) program, promising innovations that make a real difference in student achievement are receiving the support they need to scale up and reach more kids. Meanwhile, federal Small Business Innovation Grants (SBIR) offered by the U.S. Department of Education and the National Science Foundation provide critical financial support to develop new education technologies that help teachers improve their instructional practice and students advance their learning. Right now, a meager fraction of the U.S. Department of Education’s budget goes to education R & D. In 2021, the department spent an estimated $322 million on it, less than 0.2 percent of the agency’s total budget. This stands in stark contrast to federal investments in other sectors. From 2000 to 2020, federal spending on health R & D increased by 125 percent, but only rose by 39 percent in education, lagging behind the overall inflation rate of 50 percent. Given the need for innovation in K–12 schooling—to improve outcomes for kids and strengthen U.S. competitiveness—the amount dedicated to education research must increase significantly. Education R & D is a high-yield investment and should therefore be considered as Congress approaches its appropriations process. Put simply, it’s is good for students and the economy. Let’s look at some examples of education R & D paying off for students, such as successful interventions like the ASSISTments program or Johns Hopkins’s Diplomas Now early warning system. Both have been able to increase learning outcomes for more students thanks to the EIR program. ASSISTments is an online formative assessment tool that more high-need middle school math students were able to access due to an EIR grant. As a result of this investment from the federal government, more kids are benefitting from an intervention that produces a 75 percent increase in learning in two years. Similarly, the Diplomas Now program expanded significantly courtesy of an EIR grant (when it was called Investing in Innovation, or i3). It has radically improved high school graduation rates by instituting early warning systems that track and respond to indicators, such as sixth and ninth graders’ attendance and math and English proficiency, to prevent students from dropping out. A recent article in the Washington Post cited this early warning system as one of the key reasons why Alabama and West Virginia’s high school graduation rates have skyrocketed over the last decade. Beyond success in the classroom, federal investments in education R & D are making a positive impact on the economy. SBIR has spurred the development of numerous commercial ed tech tools and platforms that benefit kids, teachers, and the economy. A few months ago, publishing giant Scholastic acquired Learning Ovations, an ed tech startup that had been funded by SBIR and EIR. These federal dollars seeded an “assessment to instruction” system that facilitates literacy screening, progress monitoring, and instructional planning—all of which are beneficial to students. An added bonus is that this grant led to a significant acquisition, which does good for the economy at large. Other SBIR-funded technology are the Moby.Read app by Analytic Measures, Muzology, and Prisms of Reality, Inc. Moby-Read is self-administered literacy assessment for students in grades K–5 that saves teachers the time of having to conduct individual student assessments. In April 2022, Google acquired the IP rights and announced its intention to integrate the app within its existing suite of educational products. Muzology is an award-winning learning platform, grounded in psychology and music, that engages students as they learn math. Students who used it during the pandemic increased their math proficiency by two years, while other students fell behind. And Prisms of Reality, Inc. used the funding to create an immersive virtual reality platform that teaches math and physics, and is tailored for students from historically underserved populations. The platform includes modules such as “Pandemic: How Can We Save Our City’s Hospitals?” to provide students with relevant and tangible learning experiences. To be sure, not all education research has been valued by educators and education policymakers, and the field sometimes has methodological issues. One researcher found, for instance, that most education studies have very low sample sizes, which limit generalizability. Still, education R & D holds great promise, and when the federal government funds it thoughtfully, the return on investment is high, with positive results showing up in classrooms and the marketplace. For its part, Congress has continued to take steps to increase support for education research, having recently directed the Institute of Education Sciences to use a portion of a funding increase to support quick-turnaround, high-reward scalable solutions intended to significantly improve outcomes for students. Indeed, federal support for education R & D might be one of those rare areas of bipartisan agreement. Congress would be wise to increase funding further.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Education › 2NC --- Education --- Stem Funding CP

Education solves economy.

Allegretto et al. 22 Economic policy institute “Public education funding in the U.S. needs an overhaul” Sylvia Allegretto, [PhD in economics University of Colorado Boulder, Center on Wage and Employment Dynamics co-founder at University of California, Berkeley, research associate] Emma Garcia [Ph.D., Economics and Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, M.A., Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences, Columbia University, B.A., Economics, Pompeu Fabra University] Elaine Weiss [Ph.D., Public Policy, George Washington University J.D., Harvard Law School] July 12th 2022

https://www.epi.org/publication/public-education-funding-in-the-us-needs-an-overhaul/

Public education funding could also be deployed quickly to boost the economy and serve as an automatic stabilizer . The practice of cutting school funding during recessions is not only bad for students and teachers but also hurts the economy overall. The education sector has the potential to help stabilize the economy during downturns, but historically, our policy responses have failed to provide the necessary investment, as discussed in this report. Up to this point, we have shown the characteristics, dynamics, and consequences of the existing education funding system. We have emphasized that fixing the system’s problems and achieving an excellent, equitable, robust, and stable public education system requires more funding—not just a reshuffling of existing funding. We have presented evidence indicating the need for a significantly larger contribution to the system from the federal government on a permanent basis. We have also demonstrated that targeting additional funds to schools during the Great Recession—via ARRA funds in particular— helped offset the large cuts schools experienced due to state and local shortfalls. As stated by Evans, Schwab, and Wagner (2019), “[…] the federal government’s efforts to shield education from some of the worst effects of the recession achieved their major goal.” Based on the observed trends, we considered whether even more sustained federal investments would have better assisted the students, schools, and communities that suffered major setbacks due to the Great Recession. There is another reason for both larger investments and a more robust federal role when state and local budgets experience shortfalls due to economic downturns: School funding can be part of the countercyclical public-spending programs that help the economy recover. While policymakers and economists have long recognized the need for, and the effectiveness of, such automatic stabilizers (programs that pump public spending into the economy just when overall spending is declining), they have not traditionally placed public education spending in this category—yet it belongs there. 20 Federal funding directed toward schools during and in the aftermath of economic downturns can further boost the economy, thereby jump-starting economic recoveries. Stable, sufficient, and equitable education funding would give schools and districts the resources and flexibility to adapt to challenges that they need but have not had during the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, automatic stabilization of public education protects students and school systems against depleted school budgets during recessions and volatile business cycles (Evans, Schwab, and Wagner 2019; Allegretto, García, and Weiss 2021). In addition to averting the harms to students and teachers described above, countercyclical investments would keep the public education workforce employed. The teachers, nurses, counselors, librarians, bus drivers, cafeteria workers, and others who work in public schools made up 53.2% of all state and local public-sector workers in 2019—accounting for nearly 7.0% of total U.S. employment.21 School staff are also family 30 and community members whose spending ripples through their local economies (known as the multiplier effect). Cuts to education revenues and employment thus also affect local communities more broadly, and retrenchment of spending acts as a type of reverse multiplier, resulting in a vicious downward cycle. Federally provided countercyclical fiscal spending on public education set up to kick in based on defined triggers—akin to an expansion of unemployment benefits that kicks in when certain unemployment targets are reached—would have significant “bang-for-yourbuck” multiplier effects. Such automatic spending constitutes smart investment that upholds public education while giving the overall economy a significant boost. Analyzing then President-elect Biden’s American Rescue Plan, which included public education spending, Zandi and Yaros (2021) reported a 1.34 fiscal multiplier for state and local government spending (the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 was signed into law in March 2021). Because the federal government already provides substantial support to state and local governments in such times, bolstering and further targeting that support in a defined and concerted manner would entail a relatively light lift. Despite some challenges, several programs of this nature have been shown to meet their goals in their given policy areas. For example, the federal unemployment insurance (UI) and food stamps (SNAP)22 programs are often cited as having demonstrably positive outcomes when the federal government increases their funding. Both have been heavily criticized for their structural flaws and lack of sufficient resource (Bivens et al. 2021). However, through prior recessions and the pandemic, data illustrate that UI and SNAP nonetheless prevented millions of people from falling into, or deeper into, poverty, as well as averted hunger and evictions. The CARES Act’s first allotment of the Economic Impact Payments and expanded UI benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic kept 13.2 million people out of poverty (Zipperer 2020).23 The Bureau of Economic Analysis broke out the effects of selected pandemic response programs on personal income, illustrating just how heavily Americans leaned on these benefits through the pandemic. In June 2020, UI payments accounted for 15.6% of all wages and salaries in the U.S (BEA 2020). By contrast, just prior to the pandemic UI benefits were negligible in comparison—just 0.27% of wages and salaries overall in February 2020.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Education › 1NC --- Education --- Stem Funding CP

Federal investment solves education disparities, stabilizes economy and provides key safety nets for schooling.

Allegretto et al. 22 Economic policy institute “Public education funding in the U.S. needs an overhaul” Sylvia Allegretto, [PhD in economics University of Colorado Boulder, Center on Wage and Employment Dynamics co-founder at University of California, Berkeley, research associate] Emma Garcia [Ph.D., Economics and Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, M.A., Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences, Columbia University, B.A., Economics, Pompeu Fabra University] Elaine Weiss [Ph.D., Public Policy, George Washington University J.D., Harvard Law School] July 12th 2022

https://www.epi.org/publication/public-education-funding-in-the-us-needs-an-overhaul/

The hope for the public education system in the United States is to provide a sound education equitably to all children regardless of where they live or into which families they are born. However, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed four interrelated, long-standing realities of U.S. public education funding that have long made that excellent, equitable education system impossible to achieve. First, inadequate levels of funding leave too many students unable to reach established performance benchmarks. Second, school funding is inequitable, with low-income students often and communities of color consistently lacking resources they need to meet their needs. Third, the level of funding reflects an overall underinvestment in education—that is, the U.S. is not spending as much as it could afford to spend in normal times. Fourth, given that educational investments are not sufficient across many districts even during normal times, schools are unable to make preparations to cope with emergencies or other unexpected circumstances. An added, less known feature is that economic downturns make all four of these problems worse. Downturns exacerbate funding inadequacies, inequities, underinvestment, and unpreparedness, causing cumulative harm to students, communities, and the public education system, and clawing back any prior progress. The severity of these problems varies widely across states and districts, as do the strength of states’ and localities’ economic and social protection systems, which may either compensate for or compound the problems. The pandemic-led recession made these four major financial barriers to an excellent, equitable education system more visible, leading to serious questions about the U.S. education-funding model, which relies heavily on local and state revenues and draws only a small share of funding from the federal government. While public education is one of our greatest ideals and achievements—a free, quality education for every child regardless of means and background—the U.S. educational system is in need of significant improvements. As the report will show, the core barriers to delivering universally excellent U.S. public education for all children—funding inadequacies and inequities that are exacerbated during tough economic times—were present in the system from the very start. They are the outcomes of a funding system that is shaped by many layers of policies and legal decisions at the local, state, and federal levels, creating widespread disparities in school finance realities across the thousands of districts across the country in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. This complex funding puzzle speaks to the need for a funding overhaul to attain meaningful and widely shared improvements. In this report, we first provide an overview of the characteristics of the U.S. education funding system. We present data analyses on school finance indicators, such as equity, adequacy, and effort, that expose the shortcomings of funding policies and decisions across the country. We also discuss factors behind some of these shortcomings, such as the heavy reliance on local and state sources of funding. Second, we illustrate that recessions exacerbate the funding challenges schools face. We parse a multitude of data to present trends in school finance indicators both during and after the Great Recession, demonstrating that the immediate effects of federally targeted funds helped schools navigate recession-induced budget cuts. We also look at the shortfalls and inequitable nature of those investments. We explore how increased federal investments—in good economic times and bad—could help address these long-standing problems. We argue that public education funding is not only an investment in our societal present and future, but also is a ready-made mechanism for countering economic downturns. Economic theory and evidence both demonstrate that large, broadly distributed programs providing public support serve as cushions during economic downturns: they spur overall spending and thus aggregate demand when private spending falls. As we note, there are strong arguments for placing public education spending within the broader category of effective fiscal responses to recessions that are countercyclical—designed to increase spending when spending in the economy overall is contracting and thus stave off or lessen the severity of a downturn. Increases in public education spending during downturns work as automatic stabilizers for schools and provide stimulus to boost economic recovery. We review existing research on the consequences of funding in general and of funding changes—evidence that supports a larger role for the federal government. Third, we discuss the benefits of rethinking public education funding, along with the societal and economic advantages of a robust, stable, and consistent U.S. school funding plan, both generally and as a countercyclical policy. We show that federal investment that sustains school funding throughout recessions and recoveries would provide three major advantages: It would help boost educational instruction and standards, it would provide continued high-quality instruction for students and employment to the public education workforce, and it would stimulate economic recovery. Education funding, in particular, would blanket the country while also targeting areas with the most need, making the recovery more equitable. We conclude the report with final thoughts and next steps. A funding primer The American education system relies heavily on state and local resources to fund public schools. In the U.S. education has long been a local- and state-level responsibility, with states typically concerned with administration and standards, and local districts charged with raising the bulk of the funds to carry those duties and standards out. The Education Law Center notes that “states, under their respective constitutions, have the legal obligation to support and maintain systems of free public schools for all resident children. This means that the state is the unit of government in the U.S. legally responsible for operating our nation’s public school systems, which includes providing the funding to support and maintain those systems” (Farrie and Sciarra 2021). Bradbury (2021) explains that state constitutions assign responsibility for “adequate” (“sound,” “basic”) and/or “equitable” public education to the state government. Most state governments delegate responsibility for managing and (partially) funding public pre-K–12 education to local governments, but courts mandate that states remain responsible. States meet this responsibility by funding their schools “through a statewide method or formula enacted by the state legislature. These school funding formulas or school finance systems determine the amount of revenue school districts are permitted to raise from local property and other taxes and the amount of funding or aid the state is expected to contribute from state taxes. In annual or biannual state budgets, legislatures also determine the actual amount of funding districts will receive to operate their schools” (Farrie and Sciarra 2020). The federal government seeks to use its limited but targeted funding to promote student achievement, foster educational excellence, and ensure equal access. The major federal agency channeling funding to school districts (sometimes through the states) is the U.S. Department of Education.1 Figure A shows the percentage distribution of total revenue for U.S. public elementary and secondary schools for the 2017–2018 school year, on average. As illustrated, revenues collected from state and local sources are roughly equal (46.8% and 45.3%, respectively). Two other factors also stand out. First, revenue from property taxes accounts for more than one-third of total revenue (36.6 %). Second, federal funding plays a minimal role, providing less than 8% of total revenue (7.8%). As discussed later in the report, this heavy reliance on local funding is a major driver in the funding challenges districts face. Key metrics reveal the four major financial barriers to an excellent, equitable education system Fully comprehending how school funding works and how it contributes to systemic problems requires drawing on key metrics and characteristics that define the education investments or education funding. Understanding these metrics is the first step toward designing a comprehensive solution. The adequacy metric tells us that funding is inadequate Adequacy, one of the most widely used school finance indicators, measures whether the amount raised and spent per student is sufficient to achieve a certain level of output (typically a benchmark of student performance or an educational outcome). We use the adequacy data provided by Baker, Di Carlo, and Weber (2020). These authors, who use the School Finance Indicators Database, compare current education spending by poverty quintile with spending levels required for students to achieve national average test scores—typically accepted as an educationally meaningful benchmark. The authors’ estimates account for factors that could affect the cost of providing education, including student characteristics, labor-market costs (differences in costs given the regional cost of living), and district characteristics (larger districts for example may enjoy economics of scale). Figure B reveals that spending is not nearly enough, on average, to provide students with an adequate education. As this figure illustrates, relative to the wealthiest districts, the highest-poverty districts need more than twice as much spending per student to provide an adequate education. As the figure also shows, the gaps between what is spent on each student and what would be required for those students to achieve at the national level widen as the level of poverty increases. Medium- and high-poverty districts are spending, respectively, $700 and $3,078 per student less than what would be required. For the highest-poverty districts, that gap is $5,135, meaning districts there are spending about 30% less than what would be required to deliver an adequate level of education to their students. (Conversely, the two low-poverty quintiles are spending more than they need to reach that benchmark, another indication that funds are being poorly allocated.) The equity metric tells us that funding is inequitable An equitable funding system ensures that, all else being equal, schools serving students with greater needs—whether for extra academic, socioemotional, health, or other supports—receive more resources and spend more to meet those needs than schools with a lower concentration of disadvantaged students. Across districts, states, and the country as a whole, this means allocating relatively more funding to districts serving larger shares of high-poverty communities than to wealthier ones. While our funding system does allocate additional funds based on need (e.g., to students officially designated as eligible for “special education” services under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and to children from low-income families through the federal Title I program), in practice, more funding overall goes to lower-needs districts than to those with high levels of student needs. Figure C compares districts’ per-student revenues and expenditures by poverty level, and shows gaps relative to low-poverty districts. The figure is based on data from what was, when this research was conducted, the most recent version of the Local Education Agency Finance Survey (known as the F-33) (NCES-LEAFS, various years). As shown in the figure, on average, per-student revenue and spending in school districts serving wealthier households exceed revenue and spending in all other districts. In low-poverty districts (i.e., districts with a poverty rate in the bottom fourth of the poverty distribution), per-student revenues averaged $19,280 in the 2017–2018 school year, and per-student expenditures averaged $15,910. In the high-poverty districts (i.e., in the top fourth of the poverty distribution), per-student revenues were just $16,570, and per-student expenditures were $14,030. High-poverty districts raise $2,710 less in per-student revenue than the lowest–poverty school districts, reflecting a 14.1% revenue gap—meaning high-poverty districts receive 14.1% less in revenue. Per-student spending in high-poverty districts is $1,880 less than in low-poverty districts, an 11.8% gap. 2 In other words, rather than funding districts to address student needs, we are channeling fewer resources—about 14% less, per student—into districts with greater needs based on their student population. Adequacy and equity are closely intertwined In recent decades, researchers have explored challenges to both adequacy and equity in U.S. public education. For example, Baker and Corcoran (2012) analyzed the various policies that drive inequitable funding. Likewise, lawsuits that have challenged state funding systems have tended to focus on either the inadequacy or inequity of those schemes.3 But in reality, especially given extensive variation across states and districts, the two are closely linked and interact with one another. At the state level, for example, apparently adequate levels of funding can mask disparities across districts that innately mean inadequate funding for many, or even most, districts within that state (Farrie and Schiarra 2021) that correlates positively with disparate levels of parents’ private investments in their children’s education and related support (Caucutt et al. 2020; Duncan and Murnane 2016; Kornrich 2016; Schneider, Hastings, and LaBriola 2018). Substantial research on incomebased gaps in achievement demonstrates that large and growing wealth inequality plays a role. Parents at the top of the income or wealth ladders, who can and do pour extensive resources into their children’s human capital, constantly set a baseline of performance that can be hard for children and schools without such investment to attain (Reardon 2011; García and Weiss 2017).5 The “effort” metric tells us that many states are underinvesting in education relative to their capacity “Effort” describes how generously each state funds its schools relative to its capacity to do so. Researchers measuring effort determine capacity to spend based on state gross domestic product (GDP), which can vary widely (just as wealthier neighborhoods can raise more revenues even with lower tax rates, states with higher GDP and thus greater revenue-raising capacity can attain higher revenue with a lower effort, i.e., generate more resources at a lower cost). The map (Figure D), reproduced from Farrie and Sciarra 2021, shows state funding effort from the 2017–2018 school year. As Farrie and Sciarra (2021) note, states fall naturally into four groups: • High-effort, high-capacity: States such as Alaska, Connecticut, New York, and Wyoming are high- capacity states with high per-capita GDP, and they are also higheffort states: They use a larger-than-average share of their overall GDP to support pre-K–12 education, which generates high funding levels. • High-effort, low-capacity: States such as Arkansas, South Carolina, and West Virginia have lower-than-average capacity, with low GDP per-capita, but they are high-effort states. Even with above- average efforts, they yield only average or below-average funding levels. • Low-effort, high-capacity: States such as California, Delaware, and Washington are high-capacity states that exert low effort toward funding schools. If these states increased their effort even to the national average, they could significantly increase funding levels. • Low-effort, low-capacity: States such as Arizona, Florida, and Idaho are low-capacity states that also make lower-than-average efforts to fund schools, generating very low funding levels. Evidence shows that districts and schools lack the resources to cope with emergencies As the COVID-19 pandemic has made clear, our subpar level of preparation to cope with emergencies or other unexpected needs reflects another aspect of underinvestment. As García and Weiss (2020) not about the COVID-19 pandemic, “Our public education system was not built, nor prepared, to cope with a situation like this—we lack the structures to sustain effective teaching and learning during the shutdown and to provide the safety net supports that many children receive in school.” Whether due to lack of resources, planning, or other factors, districts, schools, and educators struggled to adapt to the pandemic’s requirements for teaching. Schools were unprepared not only to support learning but also to deliver the supports and services they were accustomed to providing, which go far beyond instruction (García and Weiss 2020). This lack of preparation was the result of both a lack of contingency planning as well as a failure to build up resources to be ready “to adequately address emergency needs and to compensate for the resources drained during the emergencies, as well as to afford the provision of flexible learning approaches to continue education” (García and Weiss 2021). A lack of established contingency plans to ensure the provision of education in emergency and post-emergency situations, whether caused by pandemics, other natural disasters, or conflicts and wars (as examined by the education-in-emergencies research), prevents countries from being able to mitigate the negative consequences of these emergencies on children’s development and learning. The lack of contingency plans also leaves systems unprepared to help children handle the trauma and stress that come from the most serious events. This body of literature has also shown that access to education and services—and an equitable and compensatory allocation of them—helps reduce the damage that students experience during the crisis and beyond, since such emergencies carry long-term consequences (Anderson 2020; Özek 2020). Public education’s over-reliance on local funding is a key factor behind the troubling funding metrics The heavy reliance on local funding described above is at the core of the school finance problems. Extensive research has exposed the challenges associated with this unique American system for funding public schools.6 The myriad factors that drive school funding—politics and political affiliation, state legislative and judicial decisions, property values, tax rates, and effort, among others—vary substantially from one community to another. Thus, it is not surprising that this system has contributed to institutionalizing inequities, especially in the absence of a strong federal effort to counter them. It is well understood that the local sources of revenues on which school districts heavily rely are often distributed in a highly inequitable way. Revenues from property taxes, which make up a hefty share of local education revenues, innately favor wealthier communities, as these areas have a much larger capacity to raise funds based on higher property values despite their lower tax rates.7 These higher property-tax revenues in wealthier areas lead to greater revenues for their districts’ schools, since property-tax revenues account for such a significant share of the total. State and federal funding are insufficient to compensate for these locally driven inequities State funding of public education is the largest budget line item for most states.8 Along with federal funding, state funding is expected to make up for local funding disparities and gaps.9 Federal funding, in particular through Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), is specifically designed to compensate low-income schools and districts for their lack of sufficient revenues to meet their students’ needs.10 Similarly, state funding is intended to offset some of the disparities caused by the dependence on local revenues. However, in reality, state and federal sources do not provide enough to lesswealthy school districts to make up for the gap in funding at the local level, as shown in Figure E. As the figure shows, the U.S. systematically funds schools in wealthier areas at higher levels than those with higher rates of poverty, even after accounting for funding meant to While state revenues are a significant portion of funding, they only modestly counter the large locally based inequities. And while federal funding, by far the smallest source of revenue, is being deployed as intended (to reduce inequities), it inevitably falls short of compensating for a system grounded in highly inequitable local revenues as its principal source of funding. As such, although states provide their highest-poverty districts with $1,550 more per student than to their lowest-poverty districts, and federal sources provide their highest-poverty districts with $2,080 more per student than to their lowest-poverty districts, states and the federal government jointly compensate for only about half of the revenue gap for high-poverty districts (which receive a per-student average of $6,330 less in property tax and other local revenues). That large gap in local funding leaves the highest-poverty districts still $2,710 short per student relative to the lowest-poverty districts, reflecting the 14.1% revenue gap shown in Figure C. Even though high-poverty districts get more in federal and state dollars, they get so much less in property taxes that it still puts them in the negative category overall. Disparities shortchange states’ (and districts’) ability to access and allocate the resources needed for effective education Given the heavy reliance on highly varied local funding, it is no surprise that there is similarly significant variation across states with respect to almost every aspect of funding discussed here. Table 1 reports federal, state, and local funding for each state and for the District of Columbia, with local funding broken down into three categories. Nationally, in 2017–2018, local and state sources accounted for 45.3% and 46.8% of total revenue, respectively; just 7.8% comes from the federal government. However, these averages mask substantial variation in the shares of revenue apportioned by each source across states. Local revenue, for example, ranges from just 3.7% of total public-school revenue in Vermont and 18.2% in New Mexico, on the lower end, to a high of 63.4% in New Hampshire. The same is true with respect to state revenue. The state that contributes the smallest share to its education budget is New Hampshire at 31.3%, with Vermont contributing the largest share (89.9%). There is also quite a bit of variation in the share represented by federal funds—from just 4.1% in New Jersey to 15.9% in Alaska. (The cited values are highlighted in the table. We omit the District of Columbia and Hawaii from these rankings because of the unusual composition of their funding streams, but we provide their values in the table.) As shown earlier in the discussion of the map in Figure E, there are also large disparities in funding effort—how generously each state funds its schools relative to its capacity to do so, based on state GDP. High-effort, high-capacity states such as Alaska, Connecticut, New York, and Wyoming use a larger-than-average share of their overall GDP to support pre-K–12 education and they generate high funding levels

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Economy › 2NC --- Economy --- NFT Gaming CP

NFT games generate sufficient individual income.

Thisaru Rathnayake 22 (Thisaru Rathnayake---Department of Information Technology, Faculty of Computing, General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University, 2022, 7/19/2023, KDU Institutional Repository, “Computer Game Industry and Economy Growth: A Study on How Blockchain Computer Games Make Impact on Current Economy Crisis in Sri Lanka.”http://ir.kdu.ac.lk/bitstream/handle/345/6439/IRC%202022%20Proceedings%20_Com_draft%20FOC-294-300.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)SAADK

The solid business model is developing NFT games or crypto games or name it blockchain games. This NFT games are predicated to become the predominant business model in gaming within ten years of time. Further, the NFT games are a better business model for funding games. For example, when someone invested in a new web3 game and inside of the game gamers building a mafia metaverse and raise $3M in their initial NFT drop. NFTs allows access to new capital market and raise capital from the crowd. NFT games will open economy paths, and by building the games on programmable assets (tokens + NFTs) can create economic value than a single game. NFTs are beneficial for gamers. Gamers can have ownership of the assets they buy like in physical nature, earn through game and can go to next levels of the game while collecting assets. Years ago, game development companies switched to the model of selling game items, cosmetics to gamers. But currently the digital stuff gamers buying is not resellable. So now NFT ownership allows to resell the purchased items. With this NFT near future games will be fully robust and will have programmable economies. Developing NFT games will be a better business model and will able to cause a good impact.

From the beginning of blockchain game development and start of the games like CryptoKitties craze, NFT games have developed and started to offer play to earn models. That is the beginning of the mix of world finance and gaming, providing gamers to earn income as they play and increase the performance of the games.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Economy › 1NC --- Economy --- NFT Gaming CP

NFT gaming solves the economy---Philippines and Venezuela prove!

Thisaru Rathnayake 22 (Thisaru Rathnayake---Department of Information Technology, Faculty of Computing, General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University, 2022, 7/19/2023, KDU Institutional Repository, “Computer Game Industry and Economy Growth: A Study on How Blockchain Computer Games Make Impact on Current Economy Crisis in Sri Lanka.”http://ir.kdu.ac.lk/bitstream/handle/345/6439/IRC%202022%20Proceedings%20_Com_draft%20FOC-294-300.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)SAADK

Suppose game development company needs to add NFTs to their existing game. Is it possible to add NFTs like that? Answer is yes. Turning a traditional game into NFT game is possible if the game developer is able to create smart contract and insert it into code which is bit similar to game porting. Both processes do is edit the game code and adapt game mechanics, content to the new game format. Transferring traditional game to NFT takes broad scope and resources. So to do this transformation game developer have to look into three main processes. First keep the game balanced. When NFTs inserted to traditional games it may imbalance games. Every game component must be adjusted to the new format so that new settings do not clash with each other. Second is maintaining structure and functionality. Even after implementing NFTs, developers have to keep quality of the factors like game structure, mechanics, functionality, device compatibility, load capacity and optimal performance. Finally, the third step is to maintaining an optimal size to quality ratio. After implementing NFTs the final game size must remain optimal for the platform. It is challenging to do so while maintaining the quality of each component of a game. according to aforesaid facts can turn the traditional game into NFT game but it takes many resources and such decision should take carefully.

Globaly there are many examples of communities which highlight the potential of NFT games building a new economy. The video called What play-to-earn gaming can tell us about the future of the digital economy — and the metaverse [12] describe about how Axie Infinity popularized in the Philippines and how the gamers play the game and earn income. According to the reports Philippines and Venezuela also facing for a economic downfall and people are unable to earn even daily wages. So some of them start to play NFT games like Axie Infinity and earn at least 60$ per day. What they do is play the game, earn tokens, then sell it in crypto currency and then convert them into the real money. They use that money for their survival. Gamers in economically challenged countries like Sri Lanka can earn income inside the digital word. That is far more significant than physical economy.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Economy › 2NC --- Economy --- Textiles CP

Textile industry makes buckets dawg.

Amanda Forster & Kelsea Schumacher 22 (Amanda Forster is a materials research engineer in the Material Measurement Laboratory at the National Institute of Standards and Technology in Gaithersburg, MD.  She recently completed a developmental detail as a program analyst in NIST’s Program Coordination Office and retains an interest in science policy. She holds a B.S. in textile chemistry and a M.S. in textiles, fiber, and polymer science from Clemson University and a Ph.D. in materials science and engineering from the University of Maryland, College Park, Kelsea Schumacher is a researcher at National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 11/30/2022, accessed 7/19/2023, POLICY AND PRACTIVE REVIEW article, “Textiles in a circular economy: An assessment of the current landscape, challenges, and opportunities in the United States.” https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frsus.2022.1038323/full#:~:text=The%20textile%20and%20clothing%20industry,for%20Sustainable%20Fashion%2C%202021).SAADK

Textile production has increased dramatically over the last two decades, reaching nearly 100 million metric tons (Mt) produced in 2020, nearly double that produced in 2000 and quadruple the production of 1970 (Niinimäki et al., 2020). While demand for cotton, wool, and cellulosics has remained fairly constant over the decades, demand for synthetics, especially polyester, has increased tremendously (). It is estimated that today 60% of clothing and 70% of household textiles comprise synthetic fibers, and this trend is expected to increase into the future as consumers in emerging economies adopt Western lifestyles and attire (Niinimäki et al., 2020; ). Currently, 60% of global fiber produced is destined for the fashion industry, with the remainder used for interiors, industrial textiles, geotextiles, agrotextiles, and hygienic textiles, among other uses (Niinimäki et al., 2020).

The textile manufacturing sector is a complex industry due to its fragmented and heterogeneous nature that is dominated by small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Hasanbeigi and Price, 2012). In the current linear model (), the value chain of textiles is characterized by vertical disintegration and global dispersion of successive processes that span several industries including agriculture (natural fibers) and petrochemicals (synthetic fibers) as well as manufacturing, distribution logistics, and retail (Niinimäki et al., 2020).

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Economy › 1NC --- Economy --- Textiles CP

Increased recycled initiatives solves the economy.

Kelsea Schumacher & Amanda Forster 22 (Kelsea Schumacher has a Ph.D. in energy and environmental policy from the University of Delaware, and a B.S. and M.S. in environmental and civil engineering, respectively, from Oregon State University, Amanda Forster is a materials research engineer in the Material Measurement Laboratory at the National Institute of Standards and Technology in Gaithersburg, MD, 11/30/2022, accessed 7/15/2023, Frontiers in Sustainability, “Textiles in a circular economy: An assessment of the current landscape, challenges, and opportunities in the United States.” https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frsus.2022.1038323/full)SAADK

The current linear model is highly incentivized for waste: it is less expensive to discard a textile product than it is to redirect it toward a circular business model. Further, the current system taxes labor, which is generally the highest cost for a company, and not waste (i.e., taxes the desired input rather than undesired output). Currently, circularity is considered additive (e.g., takeback and resell is an added business strategy for brands) rather than a replacement to the existing model.

Many argue that a CE for textiles is not possible without policy and legislation to serve as a catalyst. Designed thoughtfully, policy and legislation can create a level playing field, promote investment, incentivize textile recovery and infrastructure development, and ultimately encourage innovation and participation in recovery. Policy approaches need to be carefully crafted to lessen creation with new resources, disincentivize waste, and instead drive efficiency and reuse of materials. That said, textiles policies need to avoid material monopolies, deterrence from reuse/repair, and unfair access (Brasch, 2021). Table 8 presents several policy approaches that can be implemented at the local, state, and/or federal level that can aide in facilitating a circular economy for textiles.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Economy › 2NC --- Economy --- Tourism CP

More ev.

Festus Adedoyin & Naila Erum 21 (Festus Fatai Adedoyin is a Fellow of the Higher Education Academy, a Chartered Management and Business Educator, and a lecturer at the Department of Computing and Informatics, Bournemouth University, Naila Erum is a Postdoc Scholar, Accounting Research Institute, , 2/17/2021, accessed 7/12/2023, Tourism Economics, “How does institutional quality moderates the impact of tourism on economic growth? Startling evidence from high earners and tourism-dependent economies?” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1354816621993627)SAADK

Tourism is considered a positive sector by which to address various economic issues (unemployment, poverty, foreign exchange, financial debt, infrastructural development and monetary instabilities) that give rise to sustainable growth, industrialisation, urbanisation, globalisation and development (Chulaphan and Barahona, 2018; ; Tugcu, 2014). Moreover, through tourism, there has been a supply of foreign exchange for financing foreign-domestic debts, taxation, job opportunities and wealth creation. Although this has been associatively linked with expansion in the inbound and outbound benefits of tourists alongside its economic expenditure contributions, it is made possible through the windows of demand and supply channels of tourists’ involvement in the areas of employment, job creation and human capacity development (Nassani et al., 2019; ). Tourism has also helped the stimulation of foreign investments and currency exchange rate (Sokhanvar, 2019), leading to an increase in foreign exchange earnings and adding to the real gross domestic product (GDP), among other significant impacts of tourism on economic growth. For example, Chulaphan and Barahona (2018) opine that the influx of tourists from South Asia and Oceania accounted for Thailand’s economic growth and development. Furthermore, the work of  establishes a positive contributory impact of tourism to Iran’s economy in spite of the country’s geopolitical status.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Economy › 2NC --- Economy --- Tourism CP

Increased support of the tourism industry is key for sustainable growth.

Festus Adedoyin & Naila Erum 21 (Festus Fatai Adedoyin is a Fellow of the Higher Education Academy, a Chartered Management and Business Educator, and a lecturer at the Department of Computing and Informatics, Bournemouth University, Naila Erum is a Postdoc Scholar, Accounting Research Institute, , 2/17/2021, accessed 7/12/2023, Tourism Economics, “How does institutional quality moderates the impact of tourism on economic growth? Startling evidence from high earners and tourism-dependent economies?” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1354816621993627)SAADK

This study sets out to investigate the differences in the impact of tourism, economic and governance indices on economic growth in tourism-dependent and high-earning countries. Specifically, it sought to identify the effect of governance indices on tourism-led growth. Pooled OLS, fixed effects, REs and system GMM estimators were used to analyse the data in the study. The robustness of the results is confirmed by applying a Dumitrescu–Hurlin panel causality test. The results confirm the presence of the TLGH among the two country groups. While infrastructure also contributes to economic growth, its impact is slightly higher in top earners than in tourism-dependent economies. Furthermore, the influence of governance on tourism through an interaction term between institutional quality and tourist arrivals was found to reverse the impact of tourism on growth from positive to negative in both high-earning and tourism-dependent countries. The results suggest that weak institutions in both country groups allow corrupt practices, which divert the positive impact that tourism should have on economic growth.

From a policy standpoint, it is greatly desirable that more effective measures be employed to curb corrupt practices, especially in the tourist industry, so as to prevent the diversion of tourism revenue for private gain. Findings show that in the absence of poor governance, tourism is a major contributor to economic growth in both the tourism-dependent and high-earning countries. As such, strengthening institutions remains of great importance in the 51 countries studied. More specifically, the takeaway from our study of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and destination marketing organisations/agencies (DMOs) is that it can be gleaned from the empirical findings we present that tourism-dependent economies and high earners from tourism are pertinent to sustainable economic growth. Thus, NGOs, DMOs and other stakeholders in the tourism industry can form strategies and provide specific promotion for certain destinations in light of institutional quality.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Economy › 1NC --- Economy --- Tourism CP

Covid undermined tourism but a resurge ensures sustained growth.

ITA 23 (The International Trade Administration is an agency in the United States Department of Commerce that promotes United States exports of nonagricultural U.S. services and goods, 2023, accessed 7/12/2023, International Trade Administration, “Travel and Tourism Industry.” https://www.trade.gov/travel-tourism-industry)SAADK

International travel plays a critical role in the US economy. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2019, international visitors spent $233.5 billion experiencing the United States; injecting nearly $640 million a day into the U.S. economy. The U.S. travel and tourism industry generated $1.9 trillion in economic output; supporting 9.5 million American jobs and accounted for 2.9% of U.S. GDP. At 14.5% of international travel spending globally, international travelers spend more in the United States than any other country.

As recovery efforts continue, the International Trade Administration actively supports the industry via the twin pillars of the  and the . Working together, we provide a range of data and related products to support the international outreach and promotion efforts of U.S. destinations and attractions. With over 100 offices throughout the United States and in 75 countries around the world, we are where you are and where you want to be.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Domestic Terrorism › 2NC --- Domestic terrorism --- Prosecution CP

Clarification of domestic terrorism key.

Rosenberg & O’Connor 21 USA today “We need a domestic terrorism law. Call these crimes what they are, for victims and America” Chuck Rosenberg [former U.S. attorney, senior FBI official, head of DEA] Tom O'Connor [former FBI special agent & president of FBI agent’s association] March 15 2021 https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/03/15/domestic-international-terrorism-deserve-same-legal-treatment-column/4684258001/

In 1983, a racist anti-Semite named Robert Jay Mathews founded “The Order,” a white supremacist neo-Nazi group vehemently opposed to the federal government, which Mathews believed was controlled by “Zionists.” The Order sought to establish a homeland in the Pacific Northwest from which Jews and people of color would be excluded. To fund its operations, the group counterfeited currency and committed violent bank and armored car robberies. The Order also established a “hit list” of enemies that included Alan Berg, a Jewish radio host whose barbed commentary antagonized white supremacist groups. In 1984, Berg was assassinated in front of his Denver home by members of The Order, shot a dozen times with an automatic weapon. The killing of Alan Berg was an act of domestic terrorism, but his assassins were not charged with the federal crime of domestic terrorism. Why? Because there is no federal crime of domestic terrorism. Instead, the killers were convicted in federal court of racketeering and violating Berg’s civil rights. While their federal sentences generally mirrored what they would have received for first-degree murder convictions in the state system, none of them was convicted of domestic terrorism. This is a problem. We used to disagree on terrorism law Though several members of The Order are dead and some are imprisoned, its vile progeny lives on in this country. As the 2017 rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, and the Jan. 6 riot at the U.S. Capitol demonstrated (yet again), these loathsome groups are desperate, dangerous and emboldened in ways we never could have imagined. We spent most of our professional lives in federal law enforcement. For years we disagreed on whether the United States needed a federal statute to ensure that domestic terrorists were prosecuted and punished the same way we prosecute and punish international terrorists in federal court. Essentially, we disagreed on whether it mattered if white supremacists who killed someone like Alan Berg were convicted of murder in state court or convicted of a comparable crime in federal court. Chuck, a former federal prosecutor, believed that even if the federal government could not prosecute members of The Order as domestic terrorists or as murderers for the Berg homicide (because federal murder statutes are jurisdictionally narrower than state murder statutes), their severe punishment in the federal system for their heinous conduct fit their crimes. And if the federal government could not prosecute a domestic terrorist for murder, then a state government could do so. Murder, after all, is illegal in every state and so domestic terrorists did not get away with … well … murder. For instance, Dylann Roof, a neo-Nazi white supremacist who killed nine Black church members in Charleston, South Carolina, in 2015, pleaded guilty to nine state murder counts following his federal conviction for hate-crime related offenses. Because the federal government could not prosecute the murders as murders (or Roof as a domestic terrorist), the state ably handled that part of the case. Holding Roof fully accountable and ensuring that he spends the rest of his life in prison, whether because of a federal prosecution or a state prosecution, was a just outcome. Tom, a former FBI agent who worked domestic terrorism cases, saw it differently: Although these criminals would be held accountable for their crimes, the nature and place of the conviction mattered. He wants to ensure that our federal criminal laws reflect our shared values — and that we identify and punish domestic terrorism clearly and directly. Call it terrorism no matter who attacks We now fully agree. Words matter. Characterizations matter. Labels matter. Properly accounting for domestic terrorism so that there is a clear picture of the scope of the problem in this country matters. There is a gap in the federal criminal code and in the different ways we describe these despicable crimes, and this gap needs to be closed. Similarly, victims of domestic terrorists — Alan Berg in Denver, Heather Heyer in Charlottesville, Brian Sicknick in Washington, D.C., and so many others — are not technically considered victims of terrorism in a federal court proceeding, though that is exactly what they are. This is also a problem and needs to change. What cemented our agreement is a moral equivalency argument. The acts of The Order and like-minded hate groups, or of Dylann Roof, are every bit as contemptible and dangerous as the acts of international terrorists. Terror is terror, regardless of the nationality, race, religion, motive or warped ideology of the terrorist. .

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Domestic Terrorism › 2NC --- Domestic terrorism --- Prosecution CP

Clear federal punishment key to prevent domestic terrorism.

Goldman 19 New York Times “F.B.I., Pushing to Stop Domestic Terrorists, Grapples With Limits on Its Power” Adam Goldman [Pulitzer prize winner on reporting] June 4, 2019 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/us/politics/fbi-domestic-terrorism.html

EVERETT, Wash. — Dakota Reed’s mind brimmed with thoughts of mass murder. In November, he wrote on Facebook, “I am shooting for 30 Jews.” The next month, he uploaded a video of himself in his bedroom of his mother’s Seattle-area home proudly displaying new gun sights he had mounted on his AR-15-style semiautomatic rifle. White supremacist propaganda adorned the walls. He said he was “fixing to shoot up” a school. The F.B.I., which had been investigating the 20-year-old Mr. Reed for about four months, weighed charging him. But federal prosecutors were concerned that the threat was too vague, so the F.B.I. quickly passed the case on to local law enforcement officials, who thought they could build a case under state law. In early December, a detective from the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office arrested Mr. Reed. He pleaded guilty in May to making bomb threats and was sentenced on Tuesday to a year in jail. The outcome was typical of the limits the F.B.I. faces investigating domestic terrorism cases, roughly defined as violent acts inside the United States intended to intimidate a part of the population. The First Amendment protects hate speech and other activities that might be early indicators of plans to commit violence, keeping agents from investigating or making arrests in many cases. Agents cannot always rely on federal law, unlike in so-called international terrorism cases where statutes were enacted to address the threat after the Sept. 11 attacks. Instead, the F.B.I. often turns to local prosecutors to charge people they are concerned might be planning domestic attacks. Now with an increase in such attacks in recent years, particularly racially motivated mass shootings in Charleston, S.C.; Pittsburgh; San Diego; and elsewhere that drew heightened attention, a debate has emerged about whether federal law enforcement, in particular the F.B.I., is sufficiently equipped to tackle the problem using existing laws and resources. “The rise of white supremacy is an undeniable threat,” said Senator Tim Kaine, Democrat of Virginia, one of several lawmakers who have voiced concerns about the problem. “As the threat of violent white supremacy continues to mount, we must do more.” Democrats and others have called on President Trump to forcefully disavow racism and urged his administration to address racist violence, a flash point for him since he said there were “very fine people on both sides” after a man who attended a white nationalist rally in Charlottesville, Va., in 2017 drove his car into a crowd of protesters, killing a woman and injuring others. While Mr. Trump’s critics have accused him of ignoring the growing problem, the White House made fighting domestic terrorism a priority, adding it to the National Strategy for Counterterrorism. But the challenge for federal law enforcement goes deeper than just needing support from the president’s bully pulpit. A federal statute defines domestic terrorism but carries no penalties. Some former and current law enforcement officials said in interviews that it was time for Congress to pass a new law aimed at people who commit political violence. But civil rights advocates and many in law enforcement worry that such laws would brush up against the First Amendment or invite government overreach. “Law enforcement needs more effective tools,” said Mary McCord, a former top national security prosecutor who has drafted a proposed statute to criminalize the stockpiling of weapons intended to be used in a domestic terrorist attack. “I recognize the very legitimate concerns of those in the civil rights community, but I would hope that their concerns could be addressed through oversight.” After nearly two decades where international terrorism cases, chiefly involving Islamic extremism, seized headlines and garnered more arrests, domestic terrorist attacks have overtaken them in recent years both in terms of arrests and killings, Michael C. McGarrity, the F.B.I.’s top counterterrorism agent, last month. “Individuals affiliated with racially motivated violent extremism are responsible for the most lethal and violent activity,” he said. According to the F.B.I., violent domestic extremists carried out six attacks in 2018 that killed 17 people. The previous year, Mr. McGarrity said, eight people died in five attacks. Domestic terrorism-related arrests narrowly outpaced international ones for the first two quarters of the current fiscal year, 66 to 63. The increase in arrests marks something of a return to the 1990s, when the F.B.I. devoted significant resources to infiltrating and dismantling violent white supremacist and right-wing militia organizations from which lethal terrorists like David Lane and Timothy McVeigh emerged. The F.B.I. shifted course after the Sept. 11 attacks. Congress passed the Patriot Act, granting substantial powers to the government to fight international terrorism, including electronic surveillance and secret access to bank and library records. Federal investigators began frequently using a charge of material support for terrorism to prosecute Islamic terrorism suspects.Prosecutors rarely used the charge to arrest far-right, anti-government terrorists, who are primarily white. Civil rights advocates and others have argued that current laws unfairly target racial or religious minorities. Domestic terrorism became an afterthought at the F.B.I., seen as less prestigious than hunting down members of Al Qaeda. The fast track to top jobs meant spending time in one of the bureau’s two sections devoted to fighting international terrorism. Eventually, the F.B.I. reorganized its domestic terrorism section in 2013 to more closely resemble the way its agents investigated international terrorism, dividing the country into three regions. Officials described the shift as more of a natural evolution than a response to an event. Among those regions, the F.B.I. has seen an uptick in arrests on the West Coast and Great Lakes, part of a recent trend over the past several years that won the attention of counterterrorism officials. In his congressional hearing, Mr. McGarrity said the F.B.I.’s counterterrorism division allocated about 20 percent of its resources to counter domestic threats. Out of 4,000 open terrorism cases, about 850 are designated as domestic terrorism. While Ms. McCord and others have advocated tougher laws, some civil rights advocates and former F.B.I. agents worry that, like after Sept. 11, additional powers could lead to abuses. Human rights advocates have criticized aggressive sting operations, the use of informants and other tools that law enforcement officials have used in international terrorism cases. In some cases, the bureau “may have created terrorists out of law-abiding individuals by conducting sting operations that facilitated or invented the target’s willingness to act,” Human Rights Watch wrote in a comprehensive report in 2014. “Law enforcement agencies already have the investigative and prosecutorial tools they need, and they should prioritize resources and policies to meaningfully address white supremacist violence,” said Hina Shamsi, a national security expert at the American Civil Liberties Union. Adam Lee, the former top F.B.I. agent in Richmond, Va., does not believe a new statute is necessary. He cited laws against hate crimes and racketeering as well as others as adequate for fighting domestic terrorism. “We can hold those groups and people to account most effectively by using the investigative methods we used to break up the mafia and violent street gangs,” Mr. Lee said. He was in the job when the Rise Above Movement, a group of violent neo-Nazis from California, descended on Charlottesville in 2017. Federal investigators in Los Angeles were tracking the men before they were charged last fall with conspiracy to riot for attacking counterprotesters in Virginia and across California. But in a blow to prosecutors, a federal judge threw out the anti-riot charges against the men on Monday, saying they were “unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.” Federal law enforcement officials have had success targeting suspects in cases involving a dangerous mix of speech and violence — but often only after they have unleashed deadly carnage. The white supremacist Dylann S. Roof, who gunned down nine black churchgoers in Charleston in 2015, was convicted of 33 counts, including hate crimes resulting in death, and ultimately sentenced to death. The following year, three far-right militia members were convicted in federal court of plotting to blow up an apartment complex in Kansas where Somali Muslims lived. They were sentenced to more than 20 years in prison. More recently, the F.B.I. in February arrested Lt. Christopher P. Hasson, an officer in the Coast Guard accused of stockpiling guns and drugs. Prosecutors described him as a domestic terrorist and white nationalist who drew up a list of prominent cable news journalists and Democratic politicians to be killed, saying he was on the cusp of turning his “thoughts into action.” His lawyers argue he did nothing wrong and is being punished for “private thoughts.” Federal prosecutors have also charged 19-year-old John Earnest in the April shooting at a San Diego synagogue that killed one and wounded three. Before the shooting, he posted a manifesto online, an anti-Semitic screed filled with white nationalist conspiracy theories. He faces dozens of hate-crime charges that carry the death penalty. Without a punishment for domestic terrorism under federal law, it is impossible to say whether prosecutors could have targeted Mr. Reed under it. He matched the elements in what the F.B.I. calls its domestic terrorism “triangle”: an ideology, the threat of violence and a possible crime. Mr. Reed, who lived with his mother in the Monroe suburb of Seattle, worked at a Fred Meyer superstore and had no criminal history aside from a 2011 citation as a juvenile for “reckless burning.” But his online presence spoke to a young man fascinated with firearms, white supremacist ideology and violence. After the Anti-Defamation League alerted the F.B.I. to threatening Facebook posts by seven accounts he ran, agents began monitoring his posts last fall. The F.B.I. and local law enforcement grew alarmed when Mr. Reed vowed to “shoot up a school” and displayed an assault rifle in a room covered in extreme-right iconography. His online accounts showed photographs of an arsenal seemingly in his possession, including three AR-15 rifles, two hunting rifles, a pump-action shotgun and at least one handgun. The authorities decided to intervene, the threat of school shooting too great. When detectives searched Mr. Reed’s room, they seized a dozen firearms. Mr. Reed told investigators that his menacing posts were only meant to get attention and that he intended only “to hurt people’s feelings,” citing his First Amendment right to reprehensible speech. Even after he was released on bail, Mr. Reed railed against the government on Facebook, hinting at violence. He was jailed again. He pleaded guilty on May 10, according to a news report, smiling to reporters after he was led away. Before his client was sentenced on Tuesday, Mr. Reed’s lawyer, Rick Merrill, said Mr. Reed was remorseful. He was not stockpiling weapons — some of which belonged to family members — for an attack, and he never intended to hurt anyone, Mr. Merrill said. Superior Court Judge Paul W. Thompson disagreed. “I don’t find this was a mistake,” he said. “This was intentional, offensive, hateful actions that I can only conclude were designed to cause fear in the community.”

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Domestic Terrorism › 1NC --- Domestic terrorism --- Prosecution CP

Lack of legitimate prosecution measures destroy ability to deter and address domestic terrorism- federal statute solves.

Harvard Law Review 23 “Responding to Domestic Terrorism: a Crisis of Legitimacy” VOLUME 136, ISSUE 7, MAY 2023 https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-136/responding-to-domestic-terrorism-a-crisis-of-legitimacy/

This Note takes the position that both the Wholesale Reform and Status Quo camps raise valid concerns, such as the need to resolve ambiguity in the current regime, the considerations surrounding the expressive value of criminal law in labeling terrorism as such, and the potential for abuse if the government’s power were expanded. However, while each side identifies compelling considerations in the reform debate, each fails to grapple with limitations identified by their counterparts. Most concerningly, they misidentify the core problem underlying the current regime. While the Wholesale Reform camp identifies the problem as a lack of tools to address the problem and the Status Quo camp identifies the problem as a lack of political will, this Note argues that the core problem is the lurking problem of legitimacy. The reform debate as currently framed fails to grapple adequately with heightened legitimacy concerns within the United States’ increasingly polarized and fragmented political environment. Contrary to arguments of those in the Status Quo camp, the current political climate — the inherently political nature of questions of terrorism, extreme polarization, lack of trust in institutions — makes success under the current regime unlikely. The criminal justice system and the ability of the executive branch to wield authority in this area depends on the buy-in of a variety of actors — the public, juries, and judges. Currently, the executive branch may technically have tools to prosecute domestic terrorists. However, Congress did not expressly authorize these tools to be used against domestic terrorism. This undermines the Executive’s ability to assert credibly that domestic terror conduct is properly governed by the current statutory scheme and that the Executive has the authority to use this scheme to address domestic terrorism. It may sometimes be legally appropriate to stretch the criminal law to address new and novel threats — especially given the declining health of the legislative branch. Yet there are objective and subjective legitimacy concerns that make such an approach in the context of domestic terrorism normatively concerning and functionally challenging. A. Concerning Legitimacy Inversion

Terrorism is definitionally political. The difference between regular violence and terrorism is terroristic intent — motivation by a political aim or an ideology. Moreover, apart from the objective definition, terrorism also involves a subjective component: was the violence and/or the underlying ideology legitimate? One recent study found that “politics constrain the American public’s understanding of terrorism,” as public perception of who is a terrorist is shaped by one’s own political persuasion. Indeed, many of the American Revolutionaries committed conduct that could be understood as terrorism, but few Americans would characterize it as such because the modern view is that the conduct was legitimate. As defining terrorism involves a question of legitimacy — specifically the legitimacy of violence — the governmental response to terrorism likewise involves a question of legitimacy. In order for the government to respond to terrorism effectively, it needs buy-in as to its authority. Because terrorism is political in nature, its invocation is subject to greater political scrutiny and — especially in the domestic terrorism context — accusations of illegitimate targeting of political opponents. Indeed, while there is certainly active debate over the legitimacy of the accusations, it is notable that Republicans in the House of Representatives have established what they are referring to as a “new ‘Church Committee’” to investigate allegations of political targeting in the Executive’s response to domestic terrorism. Thus, in order to prosecute terrorism effectively, the violence must be viewed as illegitimate, and the government’s response must be viewed as legitimate. The current political environment involves an inversion of this necessary dynamic. The increase in political polarization and decreasing trust in institutions undermine governmental legitimacy, while there is a simultaneous increase in the perception of political violence as legitimate. Democratic erosion undermines governmental legitimacy, which in turn undermines political authority. It is against this backdrop that the current legislative scheme operates. Every move the government makes is under intense scrutiny from the “other side,” which stands ready to accuse those in power of illegitimacy and overreach. And sometimes those accusations bear out. But, given the trends of democratic erosion, the objective question of whether the government has overstepped is often immaterial to those making accusations of illegitimacy and overreach. And where there is actual government overreach, the political fallout will be outsized. B. The Problem of Ambiguity The legitimacy inversion discussed above breeds skepticism and mistrust, heightens risks, and amplifies the problems of ambiguity inherent to the current regime. Any ambiguity in whether the Executive is authorized to act in response to real and growing domestic terror threats will be weaponized — presenting perceived legitimacy problems. Ambiguity also heightens the risk of actual, rather than perceived, abuse — presenting actual legitimacy problems. 1. Perceived Legitimacy Problems. — Public perception of the executive branch’s approach to domestic terrorism is not just a public relations problem. Prosecutors generally do not bring cases they cannot win. Public perception has implications for whether cases are “winnable” in several ways. First, criminal juries are guided in part by their perceptions of the legitimacy of the pertinent laws and legal authorities. Even when cases are resolved through plea agreements before making it to a jury, which is the case in ninety-seven percent of federal convictions, “prosecutors’ decisions — which cases to charge, what charges to bring, and what charges to dismiss — reflect the realities of how juries or judges decide tried cases, and what sentences judges will impose.” A prosecutor’s assessment of her case, the risks of going to trial, and the value of a plea deal connect to her assessment of how other actors in the system will respond — “all of these phenomena are expressive.” And these phenomena are tied, “at least in part, [to] a disagreement between the community and the criminal justice authority over how the criminal law should be written, how it should be enforced, or both.” With this disconnect, prosecutors’, juries’, and judges’ expressive decisions “are [then] symptoms of the criminal justice system’s illegitimacy.” This illegitimacy hinders the Executive’s ability to pursue effectively its policy goals through the use of the criminal justice system. While the current terrorism framework has occasionally been used to target domestic terror conduct, there is ample reason to think that authority to bring those charges is not clear. In a 2020 press release, the FBI suggested that a recent prosecution was “the first time a material support charge . . . [was] used in a domestic terrorism case.” This was untrue. In response, commentators argued that “[the] erroneous statement by the FBI may suggest that FBI field offices around the country are not aware that § 2339A charges can be and are brought against suspected domestic terrorists.” If the subject-matter experts are unclear as to the scope of their authority, it is reasonable that laypeople may see such an approach as illegitimate. This, in turn, affects the prosecutorial calculus and calls into question whether cases are winnable. 2. Actual Legitimacy Problems. — In addition to legitimacy concerns inherent to the public perception of an approach that requires creative prosecutions, objective concerns also persist. First, consider the risk of abuse. A recent study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that despite ninety-three percent of protests across the United States being peaceful, there is a developing security dilemma in which “escalating violence in some metropolitan areas of the United States . . . pits such groups and loose networks as anti-fascists and anarchists against white supremacists, anti-government militias, and a host of others, such as the Three Percenters, Proud Boys, Patriot Prayer, and Oath Keepers.” In this context, the government may not be able to differentiate adequately between peaceful, First Amendment–protected conduct and genuine threats of domestic terrorism. Moreover, those who are concerned about the civil liberties risks associated with aggrandizing the federal government’s power in this context argue that the risk of selective political targeting of groups is higher due to political polarization. Recently, evidence has come to light of abuse and overreach targeting domestic groups, such as progressive activists and “Black Separatists,” with no congressional oversight over FBI actions relating to domestic terrorism. Even with the FBI’s history of targeting left-of-center groups, the risk of overreach and abuse of right-wing groups exists as well. The second objective legitimacy concern is one of separation of powers and political legitimacy. “[T]he criminal law should be exact. It should say what it means and mean what it says.” And the policy choices of what conduct should be criminalized and how it should be criminalized are choices that are properly decided by the legislative branch. Yet Congress has seemingly abdicated its role in making these policy choices. Indeed, “[t]he consequence of this legislative failure has been to transfer effective criminal lawmaking power to politically unaccountable prosecutors and, on occasion, to judges willing to set some constitutional or statutory limits on prosecutorial discretion.” This is especially concerning given that the DOJ maintains independence from the President and “Congress cannot use many of the tools for monitoring and managing delegated criminal enforcement authority that it can draw on to constrain bureaucratic discretion in other areas.” Moreover, specifically in the national security space, “Congress and the courts have notoriously failed to check executive power that often undermines individual rights.” From this perspective, these kinds of significant and widely contentious policy questions, like whether federal law should criminalize domestic terrorism as such and how concerns about risks to civil liberties should be balanced against any threat, should be decided by Congress rather than gap-filled in the context of relatively independent executive branch discretion. IV. The Problem with the Terrorism Sentencing Enhancement In response to this political reality, many have pointed to a more robust use of the sentencing enhancement as a viable middle ground solution — at least with respect to the problem of prosecuting domestic terrorism. Using the enhancement provides expressive value because it requires a judge to make a legal determination as to whether the defendant’s conduct constituted terrorism. Indeed, this tool was highlighted in Assistant Attorney General Matt Olsen’s testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee and noted in the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security’s Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism. While the sentencing enhancement is currently the primary tool federal prosecutors have to label a domestic terrorist as a domestic terrorist — and the only tool that involves a congressional mandate to do so — its use to address the lack of a clear statutory approach to domestic terrorism presents more problems than it solves. For several reasons stemming from the unique context of federal sentencing, the enhancement cannot bear the weight of being the primary tool the executive branch uses to respond to domestic terrorism. Yet the specific legitimizing features of the sentencing enhancement — (1) express congressional authorization for use in the domestic terrorism context, and (2) a requirement that the government prove terroristic intent — could and should appear in other parts of the terrorism statutory scheme. A. Problem with Discretion Prosecutorial discretion is a necessary component of the American legal system. However, not all criminal statutory schemes provide prosecutors with the same amount of discretion. In the case of domestic terrorism and the use of the terrorism enhancement, prosecutors have significant discretion — to choose whether to charge a crime that would implicate the terrorism enhancement, whether to seek the enhancement, whether to seek the upward departure in cases where the standard enhancement is not applicable, and whether to advocate any other enhancements, departures, or variances. And while this discretion requires prosecutors to make a factual showing as to why an enhancement or departure applies, they need do so based only on a preponderance of the evidence — a far lesser burden of proof than is required for a conviction. Moreover, they do not need to make this showing to a jury and they can use evidence that would be otherwise inadmissible at trial. Therefore, in many domestic terrorism cases under the current regime, the only way a prosecutor can obtain a legal label of domestic terrorism involves a significant amount of discretion paired with notably reduced burdens of proof and persuasion. These concerns as to the sentencing enhancement echo many of the issues the Status Quo camp identifies in considering additional reforms. First, the risk of abuse is especially present in the context of the politically charged crime of terrorism. And because the executive branch is politically accountable, there is a concern the Executive will be overly responsive to public demand for accountability in high-profile cases involving terrorism. Second, there is the ever-present risk of implicit (and explicit) bias and prejudice in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion — especially in the context of a broadly applicable, completely discretionary sentencing enhancement. Third, due to the politically charged nature of labeling domestic terrorists as such, even when not abused, political criticism is likely unavoidable. There will always be examples of cases involving “the other side” that could be characterized as proof that prosecutors are not requesting the enhancement equitably. Fourth, some have raised the concern that the broad applicability of the terrorism enhancement stacks the deck against defendants in the context of plea bargaining. B. The Nature of Sentencing While prosecutors have a significant amount of discretion, they do not have the ultimate authority to apply the enhancement. Judicial discretion further restricts executive discretion, presenting several additional problems stemming from the uniqueness of sentencing. While judges are required to make findings as to the applicability of enhancements, the inquiry does not stop there. Sentencing judges also consider policy factors external to the case at hand — including how prosecutors in other cases exercised their discretion. A judge could find the sentencing enhancement unequivocally applicable in applying the law to the facts. However, at this stage, the judge must engage in an inquiry into policy factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), posing the risk that the judge will make decisions based on intuition or bias. In this context, intuition as to whether someone is a terrorist or deserves the “draconian” punishment that results from the application of the terrorism enhancement is especially concerning given that “the prototypical perpetrator is Muslim, Middle Eastern, or both.” The flexibility of the sentencing factors has led to critiques from all sides that the enhancement is being used aggressively, inconsistently, or not aggressively enough. A recent case illustrates the challenge inherent in trying to use the sentencing enhancement for its expressive value. As of October 2022, the DOJ has charged over one thousand defendants in connection with the January 6 attack on the Capitol. Yet, in only one case, against Guy Reffitt, has the DOJ sought the terrorism enhancement. The sentencing judge rejected the attempt. Judge Friedrich refused to apply the enhancement not because she found it was inapplicable, but rather because, pursuant to § 3553(a), the enhancement had not been applied in other cases involving January 6 defendants and would therefore result in an “unwarranted sentencing disparity” with those cases. On one hand, one could view the layering of judicial discretion on executive discretion as a necessary check. However, judges are not politically accountable by design, which raises a question as to whether they should be the ultimate arbiters of labeling terrorists when there has been a finding that they meet the relevant statutory requirements. Moreover, this case demonstrates the difficulty of actually achieving uniformity through sentencing. While Judge Friedrich used other January 6 defendants as the comparator for the purpose of evaluating the § 3553(a) factors, she need not have looked so narrowly. Instead, Judge Friedrich might have examined the cases of Ruby Montoya and Jessica Reznicek, climate activists who were charged with conspiring to damage the Dakota Access Pipeline and against whom judges applied the terrorism sentencing enhancement. Under this framing, she might have found that not applying the enhancement would create an unwarranted sentencing disparity between Reffitt — who was armed with a pistol while actively participating in an insurrection and “threatened to ‘physically attack, remove, and replace’ lawmakers” — and Montoya and Reznicek, who burned equipment and damaged a pipeline. Montoya and Reznicek are serving seventy-two months and ninety-six months under the enhancement, respectively, while Reffitt is serving eighty-seven months for his conduct without the enhancement. It is at least arguable that the sentencing enhancement was just as, if not more, appropriately applicable to Reffitt’s conduct as it was to either Montoya’s or Reznicek’s. And beyond the question of uniformity, the inquiry into “unwarranted sentencing disparities” creates incentives for the government to be more aggressive in its use of the sentencing enhancement — because if it is not, then it might forfeit its ability to seek the enhancement in subsequent cases successfully. C. A Blunt Tool for a Nuanced Problem A final problem with a more aggressive use of the terrorism enhancement is that it is a particularly blunt tool. Mechanically, the enhancement increases a defendant’s offense level to not less than thirty-two and increases the defendant’s criminal history to Category VI — the highest criminal history category. Critics have described the enhancement as “draconian” and judges have refused to apply it because of its severity. For instance, Judge O’Toole refused to apply the enhancement over concerns about fairness, later stating that “the automatic assignment of the defendant to a Criminal History Category VI . . . is not only too blunt an instrument to have genuine analytical value, it is fundamentally at odds with the design of the Guidelines. It can, as it does in this case, import a fiction into the calculus.” Similarly, Judge Land found that the terrorism enhancement’s requirement of automatic enhancement “ignores the individual ‘history and characteristics’ of the Defendant, and instead places too much weight on a questionable interpretation of what constitutes a federal crime of terrorism under the Guidelines.” He too declined to apply the enhancement because it was “excessive.” Not only do these examples again highlight judicial discretion, but they also demonstrate the bluntness of the tool. The fact that the sentencing enhancement “treat[s] a wide range of crimes alike” makes it an inappropriate choice to serve as the primary mechanism to address domestic terror prosecutions as such. Indeed, the DOJ seems to have recognized this bluntness, as it has exercised restraint in its requests to use the enhancement in a variety of domestic terrorism contexts. Congress should legislatively authorize a broader set of tools for the domestic terrorism context, subject them to a legal determination that any conduct charged constitutes terrorism, and make any minor adjustments to the statute as necessary to ensure it is adequately designed to address both international and domestic terrorism. While this would constitute a reform, it is distinct from the Wholesale Reform approach in that the goal is not to add tools for prosecutors, but rather to authorize tools that those taking the Status Quo approach argue already exist. This reform would also solve the expressive value and ambiguity concerns raised by the Wholesale Reform camp. Many tools that are currently available in the international terrorism context would form a more robust and democratically legitimate response to the current domestic threat that would neither upset the current balance between security and civil liberties nor leave the executive branch with overbroad discretion to designate defendants as terrorists. While specific comprehensive legislative proposals are beyond the scope of this Note, a couple of concrete examples of reform are worth discussing. As previously mentioned, this Note advocates an approach, patterned off the 1996 sentencing enhancement reform, of amending the current legal regime to clearly apply to domestic terrorism and to require a factfinder to find terroristic intent. One example concerns the material-support statute — specifically, § 2239A. Many have proposed reforming the material-support statute, such as by eliminating the list of predicate offenses from § 2339A, providing for designations of domestic terrorist organizations, adding crimes to the list of federal crimes of terrorism, or requiring the government to prove “specific intent to support an organization’s unlawful activities.” This Note’s proposed reform does not chart uncharted territory in this regard. However, its motivation for reform differs from that of existing proposals, which affects the precise contours of what these broad categories of reforms might look like in practice. In taking cues from the sentencing enhancement and focusing on the legitimacy concerns that have been identified, Congress should amend the material-support statute to apply clearly to domestic terrorism. It might do this by adding an express provision to § 2339A authorizing its use in cases where conduct occurs outside or within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. In addition, hewing closer to its approach in response to the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress might reexamine the list of predicate offenses in § 2339A and add any offense it identifies as being typical in the context of domestic terrorism that is not currently included. This is more in line with the sentencing enhancement’s approach whereby the Sentencing Commission expanded “international terrorism” to “federal crime[s] of terrorism,” without expressly applying the enhancement to domestic terrorism. If Congress, in response to January 6, expanded the list of predicate offenses to include crimes typical to the domestic terrorism context, that would clearly indicate that Congress had intended to authorize this statutory tool to be used to respond to domestic terrorism. Additionally, the same avenue providing for a broader understanding of terroristic intent under the upward-departure provision of the sentencing enhancement could also be applied to the material-support statute. This is slightly complicated by the fact that the terroristic intent component of § 2339A is contained within the federal-crime-of-terrorism prong, which is cross-referenced in a variety of other contexts. Assuming Congress was unwilling to more broadly standardize the different intent standards and definitions of terrorism — international, domestic, transcending national boundaries, and so on — it might graft a broader intent prong within § 2339A itself. This might look like adding a provision specifying that where conduct does not fit the definition as set forth in § 2332b(g)(5), the material-support charge nonetheless applies if the government can prove the kind of intent set forth in § 2331(5)(b). Briefly, another example of reform would be to amend § 2332b — terrorism transcending national boundaries — to include domestic terrorism. Though there is little case law, this provision has been interpreted to require only a minimal international nexus. Indeed, the First Circuit assumed without deciding that conduct transcending national boundaries needed to be “substantial,” but that a mere exchange of information with someone overseas was sufficient to constitute conduct transcending national boundaries. This criminal charge could thus apply to domestic terrorists who were in contact with a sympathetic party in another country. Given the sparse case law, it is not clear whether this minimal nexus requirement would hold if this provision was used more robustly to target primarily domestic conduct. So this too might be a statute that could be amended to address domestic terrorism more clearly. Congress might also consider attaching a terroristic intent requirement to this charge to further legitimize its use and counterbalance any incidental expansion of authority. The types of reform this Note proposes certainly will not change the minds of all those who view the current system as illegitimate. But a congressional mandate authorizing extant prosecutorial tools would insulate the DOJ from accusations of overreach while ensuring effective prosecution of domestic terrorism. Conclusion Domestic terrorism is not going away. Nor does it seem that the trends contributing to democratic erosion will recede. Yet the current approach is insufficient to respond to this threat. The current debate over reform does not adequately engage with the legitimacy challenges that are exacerbated in the context of the politically charged problem of domestic terrorism. While calls for increased use of the sentencing enhancement are misguided, the instinct to reach for that particular tool is understandable given several legitimizing features. These features need not be unique to the sentencing enhancement. Congress should (1) amend the current regime, not to expand executive power but instead to clarify and clearly authorize it in the domestic terrorism context, and (2) require a finding of terroristic intent. These reforms would strike a balance between the Wholesale Reform and Status Quo positions, address their core motivations, and account for the realities that shape the executive branch’s political authority to address domestic terrorism

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Diversionary War › 2NC --- Diversionary Wars --- NFS CP

Even the possibility of a US first strike can lead to nuclear escalation.

[Michael S. Gerson, Feburary 2011, "The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy: The Case for No First Use," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, , js]

If a nuclear-armed opponent believes that the United States might use nuclear weapons first in a disarming strike, a severe crisis could be especially dangerous and unstable. A crisis is "stable" when neither side has an overriding incentive to use nuclear weapons first, and both sides are aware of this situation. Conversely, a crisis is "unstable" when one or both states have an overriding incentive to strike first. Given U.S. quantitative and qualitative advantages in nuclear forces and given that current and potential nuclear-armed adversaries are likely to have nuclear arsenals with varying degrees of size and survivability, in a future crisis an adversary may fear that the United States could attempt a disarming nuclear first strike. Even if the United States has no intention of striking first, the mere possibility of such a strike left open by a policy of not ruling one out could cause suboptimal decision-making in the heat of an intense crisis and increase the chances that nuclear weapons are used. The U.S. option to use nuclear weapons first could generate crisis instability in three ways. First, in a severe crisis, intense apprehensions about a U.S. first strike could prompt an opponent to take measures to increase the survivability of its forces and help ensure nuclear retaliation, such as adopting a launch-on-warning posture, rapidly dispersing forces, raising alert levels and mating warheads to missiles, or pre-delegating launch authority to field commanders. These actions increase the possibility of an accidental launch or other miscalculations that could lead to unauthorized use. Second, in the midst of an intense crisis, trepidations about a U.S. first strike could create incentives for signaling and brinksmanship that increase the chances of miscommunication and nuclear escalation. For example, concerns about a U.S. attack could prompt an adversary to take measures to decrease the vulnerability of its forces, such as mating warheads to delivery vehicles, fueling missiles, or dispersing forces. While the opponent might intend these measures to deter a U.S. counterforce strike by increasing the survivability of its forces, U.S. political and military leaders might misperceive these actions as a sign of the opponent's impending nuclear attack and decide to preempt. Third, a state could be enticed to preempt out of fear that if it does not launch first, it will not have a second chance. A "use-it-or-lose-it" mentality might give an opponent a strong incentive to preempt. In this context, the adversary’s motivation to use nuclear weapons first comes not from the possibility of gaining some advantage, but rather from the belief that waiting and receiving what it believes to be a likely U.S. first strike would only lead to an even worse outcome.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Diversionary War › 2NC --- Diversionary Wars --- NFS CP

“No First Strike” Policy key.

[Arms Control Association, 6-2-2022, "Pledging 'No First Strike': A Step Toward Real WMD Cooperation," , js]

To achieve its goals in stopping new WMD threats, the United States should begin with a reassessment of its own nuclear doctrine and force structure. Both remain locked in the Cold War paradigm. The nuclear doctrines of damage limitation and extended deterrence in Europe were responses to a Soviet threat that no longer exists. Yet these doctrines continue to require nuclear forces and war plans that would give the United States a first-strike capability if an NMD were deployed. A U.S. pledge of "no first strike" is a necessary first step in establishing a new nuclear offense-defense relationship that maintains deterrence while motivating the cooperation necessary to stop the growing threats of WMD from terrorists and rogue states.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Diversionary War › 1NC --- Diversionary Wars --- NFS CP

A “No first strike” policy prevents nuc war and escalation

[John Quiggin, John Quiggin is Professor of Economics at the University of Queensland. 10-20-2022, "A 'no first use' U.S. nuclear policy could save the world ," Independent Australia, , js]

After failing to conquer its near neighbour, there is no prospect that Russia could launch a successful conventional attack on NATO. There is, therefore, no need for tactical nuclear weapons. The same is true of a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan by China. By adopting a "no first use" policy, the U.S. could greatly reduce the risk of an accidental nuclear war or an unintended process of escalation. Such a policy would certainly face resistance from the U.S. military, which never saw a weapons system it didn’t find essential — as it would from the Republican party. The U.S. is one of a handful of countries that don’t ban the use of landmines. The Trump Administration revoked restrictions on the use of landmines and sought to develop new ones. Still, there is hope. Richard Nixon, of all people, committed the U.S. to ban chemical weapons and stocks were finally destroyed under George W Bush. And the Biden Administration has moved towards a ban on landmines. A "no first use" commitment once made, would be difficult to roll back, even for a future Trump Administration.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Disinformation › 2NC --- Disinformation --- Inoculation CP

Inoculation is effective for all users regardless of predisposition or initial opinion

Wood 06,

Michelle L. M. Expertise and Prior Attitude: Exploring New Moderators in the Context of Inoculation Research. 2006.

A key finding of the current study is that inoculation was effective for all subjects - those who were initially supportive, neutral, and opposed. For each group, subjects exposed to the inoculation message had more positive attitudes toward agricultural biotechnology following the attack message than their respective controls. The inoculation message conferred resistance similarly among opposed and high certainty neutral subjects via the mechanism of increasing threat. The study also provided support for the counterarguing mechanism behind resistance, particularly among supportive subjects. Among initially neutral subjects, distinct results emerged for those with high vs. low attitude certainty. For example, high attitude certainty subjects experienced significant threat as compared to their controls, while low attitude certainty subjects did not. High attitude certainty subjects also experienced greater resistance than their low attitude certainty counterparts. Based on the findings, the author reasoned that the initial attitudes reported by high attitude certainty neutral subjects likely represented true neutral positions toward agricultural biotechnology, while attitudes reported by low attitude certainty subjects likely represented non-attitudes. The study provided additional evidence that inoculation operates in part via priming. Inoculated subjects were significantly more likely than controls to use information provided directly in the inoculation message to counterargue the attack message. In addition, experts were found to make significantly greater use of both playback and novel messages than their novice counterparts. The results suggest that experts experienced spreading activation as they were able to search their long-term memories and retrieve novel information during the counterarguing process. Experts also seem to have engaged in top-down retrieval of the most recently primed information provided directly in the inoculation message, as explained by the storage bin model. The current study contributes to inoculation research by suggesting that researchers should not be constrained by the medical inoculation analogy to use inoculation techniques with supportive subjects only. The positive inoculation results for initially opposed and initially neutral subjects suggest that inoculation treatments can potentially benefit all subjects.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Disinformation › 1NC --- Disinformation --- Inoculation CP

Solves disinformation and social media propaganda on a psychological level.

Zerback 22

Zerback, Thomas ; Töpfl, Florian. “Forged Examples as Disinformation: The Biasing Effects of Political Astroturfing Comments on Public Opinion Perceptions and How to Prevent Them.” Political Psychology, vol. 43, no. 3, Oxford: Wiley Subscription Services, Inc, pp. 399–418, doi:10.1111/pops.12767.

The origin of the term “astroturfing” can be traced back to a brand of artificial grass (“AstroTurf”), which is used as a floor cover in stadiums and playgrounds (Zhang et al., 2013). AstroTurf mimics natural grass, and strategic communications have adopted the term to describe the imitation of civic grassroots movements that are in fact fabricated by other societal actors whose identities remain in the dark (Mackie, 2009). With the diffusion of digital media, new types of astroturfing have emerged and are referred to as digital or online astroturfing (Kovic et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2013). In principle, every individual or organization in both economic and political realms can covertly commission astroturfing campaigns. In this article, we focus on political online astroturfing that has been described as “a form of manufactured, deceptive and strategic top-down activity on the Internet initiated by political actors that mimic bottom-up activity by autonomous individuals” (Kovic et al., 2018, p. 71). Astroturfing messages are not necessarily false or inaccurate, but they are deceptive in that they maliciously pretend to originate from “a genuine grassroots movement or sentiment” while they are “in fact orchestrated centrally and top down” (Keller et al., 2020, p. 257; Walker, 2014), while the principals intentionally seek to hide their true identity as well as their strategic goals. As such, they share some features with fake news (Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019) but differ from the latter in that there is no attempt made to resemble journalistic content and factuality is not necessarily low. For political online astroturfing messages, common venues and distribution channels are websites containing information on matters of public interest (e.g., global warming), direct messages, and particularly user comments beneath news content that attract large audiences (Kovic et al., 2018). Astroturfing comments are thus frequently found on the websites and/or social media sites of news organizations offering their audiences opportunities to comment (see Hille & Bakker, 2014; Keller et al., 2020; Zelenkauskaite & Balduccini, 2017; Zelenkauskaite & Niezgoda, 2017). Astroturfing agents invade such habitats of public discourse and exploit their openness, anonymity, and reach by fabricating user comments that benefit the interests of their principal. Different approaches are used to recruit agents: In some cases, real users are simply paid to comment by using either their personal or fake accounts (sock puppets) (Chen et al., 2011). In other cases, agents create automated social bots that act like real users and spread the astroturfing messages (Ferrara, 2017; Kovic et al., 2018). In recent years, multiple instances of political online astroturfing activities have been documented around the world including campaigns across and within national borders and in various contexts including elections, protests, and others (see Woolley & Howard, 2018 for an overview). Particularly Russia and China have repeatedly used online astroturfing as a propaganda tool to influence political discourse in other nations as well as their own (Han, 2018; King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017; Lysenko & Brooks, 2018). Commissioned by Russia’s ruling elites, a collective of workers centered around the so-called St. Petersburg Internet Research Agency (IRA) (Chen, 2015; Lukito et al., 2020; Zelenkauskaite & Niezgoda, 2017) have imitated authentic users during the 2016 U.S. presidential election (National Intelligence Council, 2017) and the recent COVID-19 crisis (EU vs. Disinformation, 2020). Although the exact number of forged accounts is unknown, a dataset released by Twitter in 2018 gives a first impression of the scale of Russia’s efforts (Nimmo et al., 2018). Between 2016 and 2018, the company identified 10 million tweets stemming from 4,500 dubious accounts; 3,800 of these were believed to be affiliated with the IRA. Similarly, the Chinese government instructs and coordinates users (mostly state employees) to post government-friendly comments online. King et al. (2017) estimated the yearly number of such government-induced social media comments targeted at the domestic audience to be almost half a billion. Other political astroturfing campaigns have been observed in the context of the U.K. referendum on membership of the European Union (Brexit) (Llewellyn, Cram, Hill, & Favero, 2019) as well as in the run-up to national elections in France (Ferrara, 2017), South Korea (Keller et al., 2017, 2020), and the United States (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; Woolley & Guilbeault, 2017). The goals of political astroturfing activities are diverse and encompass the change of beliefs, opinions, and attitudes; the creation of uncertainty, distrust, and political cynicism (Zhang et al., 2013); or simply a distraction of the population from other issues (Golovchenko et al., 2020; Keller et al., 2020; King et al., 2017; Linvill, Boatwright, Grant, & Warren, 2019; Linvill & Warren, 2020). The specific content and persuasive tactics applied within the astroturfing messages can vary widely and depend on the goals of the campaign. They range from supporting specific policy positions to attacking minority groups—from undermining trust in specific institutions to spreading confusion by disseminating a flurry of alternative and contradictory explanations for a key political event (EU vs. Disinformation, 2019, 2020; Linvill et al., 2019; Linvill & Warren, 2020; Xia et al., 2019). However, in each case, the underlying tactic is to pretend that the message communicated reflects the people’s voice, which in turn is expected to serve as a source of social influence by suggesting a broader social consensus regarding certain opinions (Zhang et al., 2013). This notion of consensus is central because it constitutes an important link between astroturfing comments and a long-standing line of research on media effects called exemplification. The exemplification approach has specifically focused on the question of how single incidents or opinions depicted in the media can affect our opinions and notions of social reality, particularly our perceptions of public opinion (Daschmann, 2000; Zillmann, 2002; Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). In the following, we explain how exemplification connects (1) to the assumed effects of astroturfing comments on public opinion perception and (2) why we expect inoculation messages to be an effective countermeasure against this influence Effects of Political Online Astroturfing Comments on Public Opinion Perception The first question we have to answer is why online user comments should influence perceptions of public opinion. Exemplification theory is a specifically useful theoretical approach to answer this question (Zillmann, 1999): It states that people’s perceptions of social reality partly depend on single incidents that they encounter in the media—so-called exemplars. Exemplars can be events (e.g., car accidents) but also opinions voiced by individuals. Empirical research has shown that the recipients’ notion of how the public thinks about issues can be altered by exposing them to opinion exemplars in journalistic news stories (e.g., Brosius & Bathelt, 1994; Zerback & Peter, 2018). More recent research also confirmed this effect with regard to user-comment exposure on social media (e.g., Ross & Dumitrescu, 2018; Zerback & Fawzi, 2017) or in the comment sections of journalistic news outlets (e.g., Lee, 2012). For example, Zerback and Fawzi (2017) exposed participants to user comments on Facebook, which either supported or opposed the eviction of violent immigrants and afterwards asked them to assess how the general population thinks about the issue. They showed that those who were exposed to comments opposing eviction perceived less support for eviction in the general population. Similar results have been observed by other researchers (e.g., Lee & Jang, 2010). From a theoretical point of view, exemplar effects are assumed to originate from cognitive heuristics in that exemplars depicted in the media are perceived as representatives of a broader group. Consequently, the audience tends to generalize certain features of the exemplar (e.g., an opinion) to that group (representative heuristic). This tendency to generalize intensifies when similar exemplars (e.g., similar opinions) are encountered repeatedly because the incidents become cognitively available and more easily accessible (Zillmann, 2002). Given the theoretical and empirical insights to date, we therefore assume that exposure to online astroturfing comments will also influence readers’ perceptions of public opinion. H1: Online astroturfing comments influence perceptions of public opinion in the direction of the comments. Immunizing Citizens Against Political Online Astroturfing If Hypothesis 1 holds, then astroturfing comments pose a threat to public discourse because they convey an intentionally manipulated and biased picture of opinion distributions in society. Hence, the question arises of what can be done to prevent this potentially harmful impact. Inoculation theory is a promising approach in this regard (McGuire, 1964). It is a theoretical framework that rests on the idea that people can be immunized against the effects of persuasive messages by exposing them to a preemptive inoculation message. Inoculation messages typically consist of two elements: a description of a threat and a preemptive refutation. The threat component includes a warning that there will be a persuasive attack in the future intended to alter one’s attitudes. The following preemptive refutation then educates the individual about the persuasive tactics employed by the sender. Two common forms of preemptive refutations can be distinguished: refutational-same messages educate the recipient about the exact arguments employed by the persuader and refute them. Refutational-different messages present and refute arguments that are not part of the following persuasive attempt. Both variants have been shown to effectively hamper persuasive effects of attack messages (Banas & Rains, 2010; McGuire, 1964) and can serve as a powerful tool to protect the audience from the effects of persuasive messages (see also the meta-analysis by Banas and Rains, 2010, and the extensive literature reviews by Compton and Pfau, 2005, and Compton, 2012). Although most studies on inoculation concentrate on preventing message-induced attitude change, there is reason to believe that immunization can also be achieved regarding public opinion perceptions. To substantiate this assumption, we have to recall the mechanisms by which exemplars affect our assessments of public opinion: People perceive individual opinions depicted by the media as representatives of the group that the individual typifies. For example, if a person in the media is perceived as a common citizen, then his opinion is likely to be generalized to the opinion held by the population in general. This also means that if a person is not perceived to be part of the general population, then his or her opinion will not be generalized—at least not to the same extent. In fact, studies have shown that the similarity between an exemplar and the target population to be assessed affects the strength of the generalization effect (Peter & Zerback, 2017; Zerback & Fawzi, 2017). Zerback and Fawzi (2017) asked participants to assess public opinion in two different target populations: the German general population and the German Internet users. They found that the online exemplars’ opinions were generalized to both target populations, but the effect was more pronounced in the case of the Internet population. In accordance with other researchers (e.g., Zillmann & Brosius, 2000), the authors explain this effect by referring to the work of Tversky (1977) who assumed that the degree of correspondence between an object (the exemplar) and a class of objects (the target population) determines if a person judges the object to be a member of that class. Hence, people should generalize from single exemplars to broader populations particularly in cases when the exemplar and the target population share various characteristics. What can we conclude from these theoretical assumptions and empirical findings regarding the effect of inoculation messages on the tendency to generalize from online comments? As we have already seen, the two key ingredients of an inoculation message are educating people about a possible threat (the persuasive attack) and a refutational preemption. In our context, these ingredients involve informing people about the existence of fake comments intended to alter their political attitudes. As soon as they have acquired this knowledge, they are more likely to consider the possibility that some online comments may in fact be manufactured and therefore do not represent actual citizen voices. Consequently, inoculation should hamper or even annihilate the exemplification effect simply because the online comments lose their status as an exemplar.