2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Devolution Fails---2AC
Stark ‘04 -- Kirk Stark is the Barrall Family Professor of Tax Law and Policy. He teaches Federal Income Taxation, Taxation & Distributive Justice, State and Local Taxation, and the first-year Property course. Professor Stark’s research focuses on taxation and public finance, with an emphasis on state and local tax policy and U.S. fiscal federalism ("Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution," UCLA Law Review 51, no. 5 (June 2004): 1389-1436 // lianamalish)
Working from the core insights of the Tiebout hypothesis, public finance economists have traditionally asserted that all redistributive policies should be concentrated at the most centralized level of government. The reasons behind this central canon of fiscal federalism are straightforward. One concern is that redistribution undertaken by state and local governments creates pecuniary incentives for strategic migration. Where state and local governments redistribute wealth, there is a fear that both the rich and the poor will relocate to escape or take advantage of redistribution. From an efficiency perspective, the costs incurred in these movements represent a deadweight loss. Another concern is that relying on subnational governments to redistribute wealth will result in too little redistribution. In effect, redistributive policies undertaken by state or local governments are likely to create spillover benefits for other jurisdictions, causing the redistributing jurisdiction, which is unable to internalize all of the policy's benefits, to provide too little redistribution. These problems may be avoided by centralizing redistributive policies at the highest level of government. This federal assumption of redistributive policies, centralists argue, would not only avoid the pitfalls described above but would also help to foster a more efficient provision of local public goods.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Devolution Fails---2AC
Richard P. Nathan and Thomas L. Gais, 6-1-2001, "Is Devolution Working? Federal and State Roles in Welfare," Brookings,
In the new world of welfare, two groups need particular attention. One is multi-problem families. The “silos” of governmental bureaucracies make it hard to look across these families’ needs and connect work-related human services, such as child care, job aid, transportation aid, and treatment of drug and alcohol problems, with other services, such as dealing with threats of domestic violence and child abuse. Some efforts to integrate services for these families are impressive, but they are few and far between. The second group needing attention is the working poor—families whose head is working and whose goal is to stay in, and move up in, the labor force. The 1996 welfare reform law allows the use of federal funds to aid adults and children in working-poor families. New efforts under way in many states include informing people about and helping them receive “safety net” benefits (Medicaid and food stamps), as well as providing work-support services like child care, the earned income tax credit, transportation, and job services in a way that avoids stigma and preserves dignity. But, again, progress varies widely by state. Three things are critical in making the changes required. The first is time. States and localities with the most impressive human service systems—Wisconsin, Michigan, Oregon, Riverside County in California—have been working on welfare reform since the 1980s or early 1990s. Even so, they still have many implementation issues to address. Other states may take even longer because of larger populations, more internal diversity, more autonomous counties or cities, or less professional bureaucracies. Second, devolution demands stability in rules and funding. States and localities are making extremely complex institutional connections through contracts and interagency agreements, creating expensive information systems, and implementing vast training and retraining programs—all things that can be upended by unexpected changes in rules and funding. Rapid innovation and thorough planning at the periphery demands continuity at the center. Third, devolution requires visibility for the whole range of families that the new welfare is expected to serve and at the level where service systems and policies are being formulated. If states and localities are to be accountable not just to the relatively few people on the cash assistance rolls but to the many working-poor and low-income families, more and timely information is needed about the economic status of all such families, even down to the county level. Local information of this sort does not now exist, and thus a major piece of an adaptable and accountable devolution initiative is still largely missing. Diversity may be the name of the game for shaping and implementing social policies in American federalism, but effective diversity needs stability at the top and information at the bottom.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › Federalism Bad---Welfare
Herbert Obinger et. al Stephan Leibfried and Francis G. Castles, 2005,Herbert Obinger is Assistant Professor at the Centre for Social Policy Research, University of Bremen and principal investigator at its TranState Research Centre, Stephan Leibfried is Professor of Social Policy and Social Administration in the Department of Political Science at the University of Bremen and co-initiator of Bremen's TranState Research Centre, Francis G. Castles is Professor of Social and Public Policy at the University of Edinburgh, Cambridge University, Federalism and the Welfare State: New World and European Experiences, . Note: modified ableist language.
Federalism can work against the expansion of social policies by creating an inter-state ‘race to the bottom’. State and local governments, Paul Peterson argues, will lower taxes and benefits to make themselves more attractive to businesses and affluent families, and less attractive to poor people who cost more than they pay in taxes.11 David Brian Robertson emphasizes this dynamic in explaining why the US did not enact modern social policies before the New Deal.12 Building on Robertson’s interpretation, Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson suggest that American federalism retarded[slowed] the development of US social policy by accentuating the structural power of business, the influence it exercises through the threat of disinvestment.13 The race to the bottom hypothesis has become ever more plausible as capital mobility has increased. Contemporary governors and state legislators travel to Tokyo as well as to New York to attract investment, and they worry about losing jobs to Mexico or China as well as to other states. Evidence that poor people actually move in pursuit of larger welfare benefits is mixed: proximity to jobs and relatives appear to be bigger factors.14 Similarly, access to labour and markets is more important to business location decisions than state taxes or economic development incentives.15 Even if unfounded, however, the fear of becoming a ‘welfare magnet’ can still influence the decisions of state policy-makers.16 Policymakers may keep taxes and benefits low because they believe that doing otherwise will make their states uncompetitive, regardless of the empirical evidence.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › Federalism Bad---Inequality
Douglas Walker, 6-28-2020, "The Divided States of America: Why Federalism Doesn’t Work, by Donald F. Kettl," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/50/3/e8/5864197
In The Divided States of America, Donald F. Kettl, a professor at the University of Texas–Austin, assesses federalism and its effects in the contemporary United States. Beginning with the dubious premise that federalism has fallen out of both popular and scholarly discourse—the latter in particular ignores the ever-increasing scholarship on the topic—Kettl concludes pessimistically that federalism is in “deep crisis” and must be restructured (p. 7). The book’s thesis can be stated briefly. Federalism exacerbates inequality by permitting states to pursue different policies, leading to different policy outcomes for citizens depending on where one lives. Moreover, inequality is both morally unacceptable and a significant cause of poor life outcomes and political disunity. Therefore, greater federal control of policymaking is essential to the health of the nation. In fleshing out this narrative, Kettl identifies “four generations of federalism” in the United States. The first lasted from the founding to the Fourteenth Amendment and emphasized the legal limitations that the Tenth Amendment placed on federal power. The second comprised the time from 1868 to 1954 during which the U.S. Supreme Court espoused the “separate but equal” doctrine that gutted the protections intended by the Fourteenth Amendment. The third generation was inaugurated by the Court’s Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954 and ended in 1968 at the close of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society. Since the Richard Nixon administration, Americans have been living in the fourth generation. While each of these periods reveals federalism to be deeply implicated in inequality, the first three deal with racial inequality, whereas the last one deals with inequality in government services. Paired with Kettl’s belief that federalism has become increasingly significant and problematic since the 1960s (p. 13), this periodization curiously implies that federalism was less harmful when states could appeal to decentralization to protect racially discriminatory policies. The first three generations are discussed in cursory fashion. In Kettl’s telling, American federalism primarily served as a mechanism to accommodate slavery and racial discrimination (e.g., 32, 87). He implies that slavery was the primary reason the Constitution protected state autonomy. And, while he does discuss the fight over the national bank and McCullough v. Maryland, he ignores ignore important non-racial topics such as the Alien and Sedition Acts, the War of 1812, and the Nullification Crisis. One gets the impression that if slavery had not existed, neither would federalism. Scholars disagree on federalism’s relationship to racism, but Kettl fails to provide a balanced or nuanced treatment of the complex debate over early American federalism. While the Southern states certainly would not have ratified an abolitionist Constitution, opposition to centralization did not track along sectional lines and discussions of race did not intersect much with discussions of centralization. Some of the strongest supporters of centralization hailed from Virginia, while many prominent Anti-Federalists lived in Northern states. In any case, the bulk of the book focuses on the fourth generation of federalism in the post-1968 era. Throughout the 20th century, traditional restraints on federal spending and regulation subsided, enabling the federal government to use fiscal incentives as a tool to accomplish policy objectives. The government used intergovernmental grants to funnel money to cities during the New Deal and to build the interstate highway system after World War II. Yet for Kettl, fiscal federalism became more destructive in the 1970s. He frequently asserts that Johnson’s Great Society program in the 1960s represented a “national consensus … that inequality was unacceptable,” (p. 79) entailing that “the nation had committed itself to shrinking the gaping inequalities in American society” (p. 129). However, this promise was betrayed by repeated compromises that secured political support for new programs, such as Medicaid, by giving state governments the power to administer them. States were given federal dollars and relatively free rein to pursue national policy goals in their own way. Inevitably, states chose different policies, and some worked harder than others to combat inequality. In the wake of the Affordable Care Act of 2010, for instance, some states created their own health care exchanges while others used federally created exchanges, and some states expanded Medicaid while others did not. Some states spend more money per capita than other states on public goods such as infrastructure, schools, or clean air. The result, Kettl concludes, has been ever-widening inequality that threatens quality of life in the United States. The U.S. is the world’s most unequal wealthy country. Some states have more poverty or inequality than others (pp. 80–85). States differ across a range of outcomes, such as health care, education, crime, and infrastructure. Citing better-performing federal countries such as Canada, Germany, and Switzerland, Kettl concludes that it is not federalism in general but “the particular American version that is the source of the problem” (p. 89). Inequalities occur in large part because some state governments have more money to spend than others. If the Great Society programs were managed centrally from Washington, the federal government could redistribute money from wealthier states to poorer ones, ensuring that outcomes do not depend on where one lives (ex. 18). In addition to being morally unacceptable in itself, Kettl believes that inequality literally is tearing America apart. He cites studies showing that higher inequality is associated with lower levels of societal trust, and that lower trust is associated with less confidence in governmental decisions (p. 140). Moreover, trust in government—especially the federal government—has declined since the 1950s. These trends, Kettle concludes, pose “real and profound” threats to the “American experiment” (p. 142). Kettl ultimately calls for a new Great Society, but with less state control of policy implementation. Federal money would be shifted to prioritize “inequality-busting initiatives,” with much of this money transferred directly to local governments (p. 198). States would continue to implement many policies, but under greater federal oversight and accountability. Kettl is confident that a stronger commitment to fighting inequality by the federal government—combined with enough dollars to force the states to cooperate—would check the tendency toward inequality, misery, polarization, and distrust.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › Federalism Bad---Inequality
Amy n/d (Douglas J. Amy, Professor Emeritus of Politics, leading expert on electoral voting systems, including proportional representation, redistricting issues in the United States, Mount Holyoke College, Second Rate Democracy, No date "The Democratic Drawbacks of Federalism," https://secondratedemocracy.com/the-drawbacks-of-federalism/Accessed July 19, 2023)sns
Imagine you lived in a country where the legal system punished women more harshly than men for the same crime, or single people more harshly than married individuals. You would undoubtedly condemn such practices as being unfair, unequal, and unethical. But federalism does much the same thing – except how badly (or how well) people are treated by the government depends entirely on where they live. The average sentence for a drug offense in Arizona is 17 months, while in Iowa it is 111 months – six times longer. Whether you can be put to death by the state for your crime depends on which state you committed it in. In some states, an unarmed person can be shot down by a civilian who claims to feel threatened, but not in other states. How badly (or how well) people are treated by the government depends entirely on where they live. Rights can also vary from state to state – like the right to vote. Some states are making it easier for people to vote, while others are making it increasingly harder. The availability of vital services is also tremendously variable between states. The quality of public education differs a lot – denying equal opportunity to poor students in many states. The accessibility of abortion services also greatly depends on the individual states. A good democracy requires equal treatment of citizens, but this is exactly what we are not getting with federalism. Donald F. Kettl, in his book, The Divided States of America: Why Federalism Doesn’t Work, has documented how federalism has also worsened economic inequality in the United States – which is already at a higher level than any other advanced democracy. He found that there is a great deal of variation in economic prosperity across states: some, like Connecticut, are well off; while others, like Louisiana, are much worse off. This affects the ability to provide vital government services, especially to working class and poor citizens. People in poor states get lower welfare payments, less access to medical care, inadequate schools, crumbling infrastructure, and less protection from pollution. All of this contributes to more suffering and less economic mobility for citizens of these states. Sometimes government services are inferior by design. Some Republican-dominated legislatures make a priority of cutting taxes and slashing spending on schools, medical care, roads, social welfare programs, etc. However, much of the unequal government services made worse by federalism is not always this intentional, but simply due to the poorest states not having the public resources necessary to provide adequate government services. Nevertheless, the disturbing result, as Kettl concludes, is that “The quality of government services – and the quality of life – increasingly depends on where Americans live.” The level of unequal treatment is rare in countries with unitary states that have laws, funding, and government programs that are largely centralized on the federal level. This ensures that all citizens, no matter where they live, are treated more equally, subject to the same laws and same punishments, and receive the same essential government services. These centralized governments can move funds from richer to poorer areas to ensure that everyone has the same quality schools, medical treatment, and economic opportunity. It’s a shame we can’t say the same thing about this country – and it is a high price to pay for federalism. Laboratories of Democracy or Loopholes of Democracy? One argument for federalism is that it allows states to experiment with different policy approaches that, if successful, can then be adopted in other states. State governments are seen as “laboratories of democracy” and a force for progress. For example, the state government of California has led the way in more stringent environmental regulations. And some state governments have been pioneers in other areas, such as the legalization of marijuana and gay marriage. It is clear that sometimes when citizens become frustrated by the constant gridlock in Washington and the impossibility of policy reform on that level, they turn to state government for the solution. And it is true that at times state level reforms can become “contagious” and spread to other states and even eventually provoke action on the federal level – as it did with women’s right to vote. Some states and cities also allow citizens to pass reforms directly through initiatives and referendums – without the support of reigning political officials. This has led to argue that federalism may be used to facilitate progressive political change. However, federalism can also serve to impede reform across the nation. In fact, in overall practice, federalism most often works to preserve the status quo and impede nationwide change – compared to unitary government. Decentralized power in the states gives opponents more opportunities to obstruct or ignore national mandates for reform. Decades of delay in giving civil rights to minorities is a classic example of this problem. The states’ rights movement was able to preserve discrimination and the oppression of African Americans in large parts of the country for a hundred years after the Civil War. now show that a majority (60%) of Americans prefer life imprisonment over the death penalty. And yet we remain the only advanced Western democracy to still practice this arcane punishment – with 30 states having the death penalty still on the books. In these other countries, abolishing the death penalty usually took a vote in just one national legislative body. In the U.S., to get rid of it nationwide, we need the approval of 99 state houses and senates (Nebraska is unicameral) and 50 governors. Such are the obstacles to change posed by federalism. Universal healthcare is another example of how state power can serve to impede policy reforms. We are alone among major western democracies in not providing affordable health care for all citizens. The Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) took a major step forward in extending coverage to millions of previously uninsured Americans. An important part of this plan was the extension of Medicaid coverage in the states, with the federal government paying for 90% of the costs. But 24 Republican controlled states have refused to do so, leaving millions of people in these states without affordable health care. It has been found that between 2014 and 2017, because of these states’ decision not to expand Medicaid coverage. For many political scientists, these issues illustrate how federalism is another example of the ways in which American government often allows the minority to rule over the majority. , one of the foremost authorities on federalism, argues it is a mistake to believe that it promotes freedom by reining in the power of the federal government. Federalism “may actually promote tyranny by its constant frustration of majorities,” and “is an impediment to freedom.” Federalism: Stifling Constitutional Reform Another way that federalism slows political reform and frustrates majorities is its effects on the constitutional amendment process. To pass, an amendment must get the support of two-thirds of the House and Senate and then three-quarters of the states. This extra step of state approval has been the graveyard of many good amendments, including a child-labor amendment in 1924, an amendment to make Washington, D.C. a state in 1978, and an equal rights amendment in 1982. Disturbingly, a small minority of the states control the amendment process. It only takes 13 states, constituting as little as 4% of the population to block an amendment. As discussed , the need for state approval and the fact that it requires a uniquely difficult three-quarters supermajority is part of what makes our constitution the hardest one to change of all major democracies. Most of these other countries are unitary nations that don’t have sub-national units like states that are part of the amendment process, and if they do, the supermajority needed for passage is lower. Abandoning the Poor: The Human Costs of Devolution “Devolution” – the transfer of federal programs to the states – can be as bad as the term itself sounds: a step backwards in the evolution of effective policies. That has certainly been the case with U.S. poverty policy. have long known what works best in reducing poverty – it can be learned by looking at other democracies that do a much better job at this than we do. They rely primarily on well-funded, centralized anti-poverty programs that are universal – that apply equally to everyone. We have a few successful programs like that, especially Social Security and Medicare. If we wanted to help the poor, we would be passing programs like universal daycare and low-cost college education. But instead we are using devolution to create more fragmented and less well-funded programs in the states. A disturbing example of this is our only cash assistance program for the poor – Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF – often still called “welfare”). Since the 1990s, TANF has been devolved to the states. They now get a federal cash grant of TANF funds and they have a great deal of flexibility on how to spend them and on who – all in the spirit of increasing experimentalism in poverty policy on the state level. But the results have been particularly discouraging – especially for poor people. The federal government does not require the states to spend all the TANF grants on cash assistance. State budgets are notoriously precarious, especially in economic downturns, so it is not surprising that many states routinely divert TANF funds intended for needy families and use them to fill holes in their general budgets, or even to fund tax cuts. Louisiana, for instance, only spends about a third of its allocated state and federal TANF funds on cash assistance for poor families. Federalism has contributed to the United States’ dubious distinction of being the advanced democratic country with the highest levels of adult and child poverty. States also now have a wide discretion on what requirements they can put on TANF assistance. The result has been the predictable federalist mishmash of helpful and draconian policies. Some states have made it easier to get assistance, but many have made it much harder – instituting stricter work requirements than required by federal law, shortening the time people can get benefits, imposing harsher penalties – like termination from the program — for violations of any rules, and imposing family caps that restrict the amount of assistance to larger families. Some states also have made it a policy for employees in their welfare offices to actively discourage people from applying. The human impacts of this devolution of welfare policy are striking. At the start of TANF in the 1990s, out of 100 people in poverty, 68 received TANF cash assistance. Today that figure has plummeted to only 22 out of a hundred – the lowest in the program’s history. In 16 states the ratio is down to 10 or less out of a hundred poor. And show that these families left off of assistance are worse off. Also, not surprisingly, the states where the poor receive the least assistance are with two factors: Republican control of state government, and a higher percentage of African Americans needing assistance. So in the case of poverty policy, the Republican’s goals of reducing the role of the federal government, cutting welfare spending, and kicking people off the rolls were aided considerably by federalism and devolution. As a Center on Budget and Policy Priorities concluded: State and federal governments have a critical role in ensuring that low-income families have access to a minimum level of support to meet their basic needs. Instead, states — with no national standards to hold them accountable for assisting families in need — have acted in their own self-interest, not in the best interest of families in poverty and particularly of families of color. In this way, federalism has contributed to the United States’ dubious distinction of being the advanced democratic country with the highest levels of adult and child poverty. The Rise of Radical Federalism in the Courts Republicans have also been trying to re-define federalism and further hobble the federal government through the courts. In recent years, libertarian legal scholars and powerful conservative legal groups like the Federalist Society have been pushing a plan to undermine the power of Congress vis a vis the states and radically rewrite the rules and practice of federalism in the United States. This legal offensive focuses on reinterpreting the Commerce Clause in the Constitution. This clause gives Congress the power to “to regulate commerce . . . among the several states.” Before the 1930s, the Court interpreted this clause extremely narrowly and in fact used it to shut down some early New Deal programs. But the Court eventually adopted a broader interpretation of what constituted “commerce” and this made possible the many large federal efforts we know today, like Social Security, civil rights laws, Medicare and Medicaid, environmental protection, business and banking regulations, and so on. It has become routine for Congress to use this clause to justify exercising legislative power over the activities of states and their citizens. But in recent years the Supreme Court has begun to discard this long-standing legal interpretation of the Commerce Clause and start to narrow it in a way that could severely restrict the activities of the federal government. As explained in The New Republic: “a small band of determined legal academics has set out to persuade the Supreme Court to undo the New Deal—and have almost won.” In fact, this new narrow interpretation has already been used in several key federal cases. The Congressional laws seeking to clean up hazardous waste, restrict firearms in school zones, and discourage violence against women. The Commerce Clause was also the basis for invalidating an important part of Obama’s Affordable Care Act. The Court ruled that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause with its “individual mandate” that would have required uninsured individuals to secure health insurance in an attempt to stabilize the health insurance market. As Adam Cohen, author of , has warned, this radical right-wing legal movement “says that, basically, all of the large social programs that were created during the New Deal, the social safety net, is unconstitutional, that it exceeds the power of Congress. We could see a radical conservative Supreme Court in a few years actually striking down things like the federal minimum wage.” In short, this new vision of federalism is a threat to the centralized regulatory powers and social welfare programs that are an essential part of modern government and a well-functioning society. These strong and popular federal programs form the backbone of all modern democratic states and nowhere else are they under attack in the courts the way they are in the United States. Only here.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › Federalism Bad---Democracy
West 22 -- Darrell M. West, Senior Fellow – Center for Technology Innovation, Douglas Dillon Chair in Governmental Studies (“Why federalism has become risky for American democracy”, Brookings, 9-23-2022, Available Online at )
State and local governments long have been considered “laboratories of democracy” that spawn valuable innovation. But recently states have taken this a step farther entering a risky new phase that pits blue states against red ones and blue cities against red states, and threatens democracy as a whole. As opposed to tolerating policy experimentation by different jurisdictions, some leaders are seeking to impose their own policy views on other places. Taken to an extreme, this behavior likely would intensify conflict and escalate policy nullification on a broad scale.
Take, for instance, the recent intensification of arguments over immigration. Governors Ron DeSantis of Florida and Greg Abbott of Texas have bussed unwanted arrivals from the southern border to New York City, Washington, DC, and Martha’s Vineyard as a way to express their discontent with national policy. These leaders are upset over so-called “sanctuary cities” that are pro-immigrant and seeking to attract media attention to their cause. While successful at generating press coverage, this confrontational stance puts innocent people in the middle of policy disputes and disrupts social service delivery in the targeted states.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › States---Offense---Debt
Polimedia & Souris 18 (Chayenne Polimedio, Program Officer for U.S. Democracy at the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, senior research manager at the Partnership for Public Service, developed ideas to help Congress earn the public’s trust and to empower the federal government’s use of strategic foresight and futures thinking, Elena Souris, policy analyst for the Political Reform program, worked at the City of San Antonio's International Relations Office, in Rep. Marc Veasey's (D-Texas) Dallas district office, 2-27-2018, "Why federalism is hard," Vox, https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2018/2 /27/17058498/federalism-hard/Accessed July 19, 2023)sns
The word federalism used to make liberals raise their eyebrows in suspicion and skepticism. States’ poorly funded welfare programs, paralyzing debt, and resistance to guidance from the federal government were enough reasons to make federalism, as principle of government, something from which progressives would keep their distance. But after the 2016 election, that changed. After eight years of expectation that the White House would set strong national policy, followed by an epic setback, liberals rushed to quote Justice Louis D. Brandeis pointing out that states are “laboratories” of democracy, where a “single courageous state” can “try novel social and economic experiments.” Federalism has quickly become a tool to challenge and resist White House executive orders and the latest congressional bills. Indeed, federalism has no ideological alliance. Heather Gerken, dean and professor at Yale Law School and one of the country’s leading experts on constitutional law and election law, told us that “federalism has long been the darling of conservatives. But that’s a mistake because federalism is for everybody.” But while the idea of federalism seems promising, the practice of it is a lot more complicated. Over the past year, we’ve gathered data for the Laboratories of Democracy Database, a platform for tracking how states are testing new ideas for financing campaigns, structuring voting systems, setting district boundaries, and expanding participation. From this research, states like Washington and Arizona offer an especially optimistic and promising picture of what the future of progressive federalism could look like. Via strong campaign finance laws, robust public financing for campaigns, and independent redistricting commissions, these states are experimenting with new ideas, and the appetite for expanding those ideas has ballooned to a national scale. But the enormous size and complexity of the United States means that when it comes to reform at the state and local levels, there’s little standardization and no systematic analysis of the effects of reform. On top of that, the drama of politics means that states are always under threat of losing federal funding, are stuck having to navigate partisanship and state/city conflicts, and don’t necessarily have the resources to create easily accessible repositories of information. There is no standardization One of the biggest challenges we faced while gathering data from all 50 states was figuring out how to depict that information in an accessible and clear way. With 50 states come just as many different ways to regulate the financing of elections. Even the vocabulary state legislatures and election boards use fluctuates. Election cycle, election period, election segment — they all mean different things. Imagine being a first-time candidate, without a lot of support, trying to abide by the rules. Or imagine being a voter trying to figure out how and when she can contribute to a campaign. There’s no systematic analysis of the effects of reform While there are exciting and promising innovations at the state and local levels — like Seattle’s voucher program, through which eligible Seattle residents receive $100 in democracy vouchers to support candidates in the city’s elections — states often implement reforms and then forget about them. Take Hawaii and Massachusetts’s partial public funding programs for candidates, which, according to Demos, is only used by one in 10 candidates running for office. Implementing reform is one thing. Getting it to stick is another. Impact is another question. As in science, experiments don’t always go well, and not all federalist reforms will translate into positive findings. New policies have transition periods that can add to voter confusion as they try to register to vote, participate in elections, or follow the news. Other policies can impede the democratic process, like voter ID and early voting laws that discourage voters and shorten participation windows. Some research has shown that public funding makes it harder, not easier, to elect moderate candidates. And even when it does work, the process is complicated. New York City has only been able to apply new campaign finance reforms because it’s required to publish an analysis and hold hearings after every election to continue making improvements. But that’s not the case across the board. There aren’t easily accessible or transparent repositories of information State websites were unclear and often contradictory, but finding answers in legislation or guides was just as hard. Some files were hundreds of pages long; others were scanned and unsearchable. In rare cases, the full legislative text isn’t easily available. A career technologist who spoke with us off the record said that states should provide data in a format that’s easy for people and advocates to understand. That means data that’s online and machine-readable, relevant, and user-centered. To do this on a national scale, though, requires cooperation between the federal government and states to create accessible files and resources. The Governance Lab, an organization that works to promote the importance of open data as a way to improve governance, outlines six principles that aim to make data more open and easier to use, with the goal of promoting transparency: Open by default Timely and comprehensive Accessible and usable Comparable and interoperable For improved governance and citizen engagement For inclusive development and innovation Throughout our research and data gathering for voting and elections systems, as well as for campaign finance regulation, most states failed to pass the criteria above. Ultimately, this expert told us that a main reason for the slow progress is the lack of stakeholdership: It’s a good idea, but it’s not anyone’s top priority. The threat of losing federal funding can make states reform-shy Despite the autonomy states enjoy due to decentralized government, they’re not always immune to retaliation if they choose to go against the federal government. States’ refusal to comply with and direct challenges at federal law can have serious and lasting consequences for states. Sanctuary cities, for example, have been threatened with losing crucial federal funding if they don’t comply with immigration guidelines. Another unique aspect of American federalism is the difference between state and federal budgeting and funding. While the federal government can operate in a deficit, 49 state governments can’t (Vermont is the only clear exception). Additionally, unfunded mandates from the national level put financial pressure on states, and new tax reforms could have major consequences for high-tax states like California, Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. Already, as Harold Meyerson at the American Prospect explains, states are the “primary funders of education, transportation, local infrastructure, and public safety.” As a result, states quickly feel economic strain, meaning that any tough decisions could target new reforms like public financing first. Conflicts between levels of government can increase gridlock The 2016 election showcased an interesting juxtaposition: a Republican majority at the federal and state level, accompanied by an increase in support for local, progressive ballot measures like increased gun regulations, legalized marijuana, and higher minimum wages. However, in the past, as Boston University professors Katherine Levine Einstein and David M. Glick have pointed out, this contrast has translated into political battles between governments. In Texas, for example, local city ordinances in 2015 banning fracking and plastic bags were overturned by the Republican state government concerned about a “patchwork of local regulations” governing oil and gas production, an interesting switch in the usual big government argument. North Carolina and Tucson saw similar conflicts over LGBT protections and gun regulations. While this back-and-forth is important for the checks-and-balances aspect of federalism, it can also increase polarization and gridlock, as states find themselves engaging in never-ending fights both inside their state and against the federal government. Is federalism the future? Federalism is not all bad, of course. In fact, it may help decrease partisan warfare. For Gerken, “federalism is a way to soften the problem of polarization by creating incentives for compromise between a federal government controlled by one party and states controlled by another,” something that’s particularly important today, when compromise at the national level seems increasingly unlikely. When states are given room to implement their own ideas and policies, it also makes national politics less high stakes and works against the winner-takes-all model that so often polarizes our current environment. To Gerken, it’s good for democratic compromise to have “powerful states” because “in a one-sided Washington, a state can do something by themselves.” President Trump may not need a Democratic vote to get through legislation, but he’ll eventually need to be able to work with California, Massachusetts, or New York. That kind of state leverage allows for what Gerken and a colleague called uncooperative federalism, where “states use [their] regulatory power … to resist federal policy.” It’s an especially effective strategy in areas where the federal government lacks the ability to carry out policies itself, Gerken explained. With Obamacare, the federal government didn’t have the apparatus to run a fully federally funded system and needed the states to step in; not all cooperated. The Trump administration hasn’t always been able to enforce its immigration policy for the same reason: not enough actors to carry out the policy, and thus vulnerable to states that don’t cooperate. For liberals, progressive federalism, as an idea, is a promising alternative to legislative setbacks at the national level. In the words of Pittsburgh Mayor Bill Peduto, cities can act as “urban labs” where programs that are “suffocated” in Congress “can be sent to grow.” While the Progressive Era of the early 20th century used the power of the federal government to enact social and economic reforms to lessen the negative effects of industrialization, today, progressive federalism takes advantage of decentralization and aims to use the power of state and local governments as tools against the Trump administration. But using federalism as a model for legislative reform will require a much more serious, in-depth, and systematic endeavor to understand how differently states operate. Implementing real standardization would be impossible, but for scale and transferability purposes, states would need to present information in organized, uniform ways, so that those who aren’t as familiar with the governing and legislative process have a real shot at pushing for progressive reforms. And even with the right infrastructure in place, pushing for more federalism can easily backfire. Federalism is an attractive idea when your party isn’t in power and you’re scrambling to figure out how not to see roll backs of legislation. As Harold Meyerson at the American Prospect pointed out, “the love of federalism is a sometime thing; its critics and champions switch places depending on who is in power at which level of government.” But federalism itself is a long-term, nonpartisan endeavor. By pushing for more 10th Amendment rights in court, Gerken argues that opportunistic federalists looking for temporary political advantage may find they set a dangerous precedent that limits federal power in the long run.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › States---Medicare---2AC
Erin Brown and Elizabeth McCuskey 20 Brown is a JD, MPH, is the Catherine C. Henson Professor of Law and director of the Center for Law, Health & Society at Georgia State University College of Law. McCuskey, JD, professor of law at University of Massachusetts School of Law and an adjunct member of Saint Louis University School of Law’s Center for Health Law Studies. Her work is published or forthcoming in a range of journals and media. 2020 “Federalism, ERISA, and State Single-Payer Program” , AnKh
ERISA’s express preemption provision contains an exception: a “savings” clause that saves from preemption state laws that regulate insurance.201 However, the savings clause contains an exception-to-the-exception, the “deemer” clause, which has been interpreted to exempt self-funded employer plans from the state insurance regulations saved by the savings clause.202 The upshot of the convoluted interplay between ERISA’s savings and deemer clauses is that states may regulate so-called “fully insured” employee health plans, but self-funded plans are completely beyond the reach of state law.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › States---Medicare---2AC
Rachel Block 21 had senior health policy staff roles in the New York state legislature, worked at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, where she held several senior management positions directing policy development and operations for Medicaid, State Children’s Health Insurance, and federal survey and certification programs, founding executive director for the Vermont Health Care Authority. 7/19/2021 , AnKh
States sometimes forge new paths in health policy. For example, Washington State recently created the first long-term care insurance law and established one of the first public options on its health insurance marketplace. Yet, in practice, many state health policy decisions are made in the context of the US federalist system — where the federal and state governments share responsibility for administration, funding, and oversight.
In some cases, federal law may preempt states from taking aggressive or new actions in the name of “national consistency.” There’s not much state officials can do in those instances except lobby their congressional delegation. But more often, federal policy sets a floor above which states may set their own requirements — and there is an interplay of requirements and incentives between the two levels. Without careful policy planning, overlapping federal and state regulations can result in chaos. But if the regulations are coordinated, states may use a combined federal–state policy toolbox to strengthen population health.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › States---Medicare---2AC
Erin Brown and Elizabeth McCuskey 19 Brown is a JD, MPH, is the Catherine C. Henson Professor of Law and director of the Center for Law, Health & Society at Georgia State University College of Law. McCuskey, JD, professor of law at University of Massachusetts School of Law and an adjunct member of Saint Louis University School of Law’s Center for Health Law Studies. Her work is published or forthcoming in a range of journals and media. 7/22/19 , AnKh
To finance these universal and comprehensive benefits, state single-payer bills use several strategies to capture health expenditures from the existing multipayer system, while navigating a number of financial and legal impediments. First, the state bills would consolidate federal funds from Medicare, Medicaid, and the ACA exchanges into the state single-payer plan using waiver provisions in those federal programs. The Department of Health and Human Services has considerable discretion to deny state applications for each of these federal waivers; however, and the state bills generally lack fallback plans for capturing federal funds should the agency deny the waivers. Nor do the state single-payer bills confront financial obstacles from state constitutional prohibitions on deficit spending, which constrain state plans when tax revenues fall during economic recession.
Second, but perhaps more crucially, state single-payer bills must find ways to redirect the employer-sponsored health plans that currently cover 49 percent of Americans—a daunting legal task under ERISA. ERISA preempts all state laws that “relate to” employer-sponsored benefits, so states cannot simply mandate that employers cease offering health benefits. States do retain broad power to regulate health care providers and health insurers, but ERISA preempts the application of state insurance regulations to employers’ self-funded health plans, which now comprise more than 60 percent of all employer-sponsored health benefits. ERISA challenges states’ abilities to capture employer health spending—a source of funding that would be critical to the viability of a single-payer system.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › States---Perm
Beyond Deng, Elizabeth Link, 6-1-2001, "Is Devolution Working? Federal and State Roles in Welfare," Brookings,
Federal agencies have given states flexibility in using their welfare block grant funds. Rules are loose, permitting states to assist the heads of working families without making their families subject to federal time limits. The task of defining “work activities” has been turned over to the states. And Washington has not rigorously audited state spending.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › States---Deficit---Welfare Fragmentation
Daguerre & Conlan 22 --- Anne Daguerre is a reader in Social Justice at the University of Brighton Business School and a research associate at Sciences Po Bordeaux, France. Her areas of expertise are welfare reform, labor market policies, and social policy and administration. Tim Conlan is University Professor Emeritus of Government and Public Policy at George Mason University. His research focuses on federalism, intergovernmental relations, and public policy. (“The rise of ‘fend for yourself Federalism’ is fraying America’s welfare state”, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2-25-2022, Accessible Online at )
If, as seems likely, Joe Biden faces the prospect of prolonged congressional gridlock over much of his agenda, the challenges posed by the vertical separation of powers—the US federal system—are likely to become more important. President Biden, like many of his predecessors, may well seek to salvage portions of his social agenda by bypassing Congress and seeking to govern through executive action. This will require utilizing the tools of executive federalism, particularly federal waivers, to try and get the states to implement his policies. Biden, after all, gained crucial experience managing intergovernmental relations as Vice President. Barack Obama placed him in charge of overseeing implementation of his administration’s massive stimulus initiative, the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and his record was impressive. The then Vice President oversaw the channeling of hundreds of billions of dollars of grants to the states as well as associated rulemaking to ensure that money was spent promptly but appropriately–no simple task.
‘Fend for yourself Federalism’ and the welfare state
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › States---Deficit---Taxes
Daron Acemoglu 2010, Daron Acemoglu is an Institute Professor at MIT and an elected fellow of the National Academy of Sciences, American Philosophical Society, the British Academy of Sciences, the Turkish Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Econometric Society, the European Economic Association, and the Society of Labor Economists.
While in a few societies economic institutions are designed to provide property rights protection, a level playing field, and basic public goods necessary for economic growth, in many they are structured to maximize the rents captured by the "elite," the individuals or social groups monopolizing political power (e.g., Douglass C. North 1981; Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson 2005. The elite often choose entry barriers, regulations and inefficient contracting institutions that retard economic growth and create resource misallocations in order to protect their economic rents and redistribute resources to themselves (e.g., Mancur Olson 1982; Per Krusell and Jose-Victor Rios Rull 1996).1 However, if resources could be redistributed to the elite with fewer distortions, a more efficient allocation of resources, with (part of) the proceeds accruing to the elite, could be chosen. For example, when the necessary fiscal instruments and the associated state capacity are absent, the elite may choose economic institutions and policies so as to redistribute income to themselves by reducing the productivity of competing groups and thus manipulating fac tor prices (Acemoglu 2007). Direct taxation, if feasible, would be both more efficient and more profitable for the elite. This reasoning suggests that when the state becomes more "developed," achieves greater "capacity," and has access to a larger set of fiscal instruments, there will be less need for such inefficient, indirect methods of redistribution and the allocation of resources will improve (e.g., Acemoglu 2007; Timothy J. Besley and Torsten Persson 2010). The example of the development of the English state and economy in the eighteenth century is often used to sup port this presumption. This paper points out that, in contrast to this argument, the availability of more efficient means of taxation is a double-edged sword because of its impact on the political equilibrium; because more efficient means of taxation increase the potential benefits of controlling the state, they may also intensify political conflict aimed at capturing this control. This indirect effect counteracts the benefits from more efficient taxation and may dominate the direct effect, so that the allocation of resources may deteriorate when the society and the state have access to additional fiscal instruments. More generally, although greater state capacity and stronger states may bring a variety of economic benefits, they will also increase the value of controlling the state and thus induce increased political conflict and infighting.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › States---Deficit---Private Capture
Bulfone et al. 5-17-2022, (PhD, Assistant Professor at Leiden University) "No strings attached: Corporate welfare, state intervention, and the issue of conditionality," Sage Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10245294221101145
The work of Alice Amsden on performance standards provides particularly important insights in this regard (; ). Amsden argues that the successful industrial upgrading in countries like South Korea, Malaysia, or China depends on the capacity by domestic state elites to create control mechanisms to discipline corporate behavior. These control mechanisms revolve around the idea that subsidies or other forms of monetary advantages to corporate recipients need to be subject to monitorable, redistributive, and results-oriented performance standards (, 8). If corporate recipients failed to meet these performance standards, state actors would withdraw their financial support, and eventually take more radical measures like ownership repossessions. Performance standards could relate to a wide variety of goals including firm-level managerial practices, sectoral industrial policy goals, or broader national policy goals. Concretely, corporate recipients could be asked to meet “export targets, local content requirements, debt-equity ratio ceilings, national ownership floors, operating scale minima, investment time-table obligations, regional location criteria, and eventually product quality specifications and environmental rules” (, 25).
When performance standards were not established, or enforced, state officials ended up being captured by corporate interests. This in turn led to a massive transfer of financial resources from the public to the private sphere with negligible developmental and industrial outcomes (). We urge the CPE literature to share this concern for conditionality, as there is no reason to believe that it is only state actors in developing countries that face the risk of a socialization of losses and a privatization of risks when engaging in industrial or innovation policies (; ; ).
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › States---Deficit---General
Justin Schweitzer, 5-5-2022, Senior Research Analyst at Teamsters; VP of Organizing at Nonprofit Professional Employees Union"How To Address the Administrative Burdens of Accessing the Safety Net," Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/how-to-address-the-administrative-burdens-of-accessing-the-safety-net/
As elements of program design, administrative burdens are typically sold as measures to weed out ineligible people and prevent fraud. Yet by focusing more on preventing so-called undeserving people from accessing benefits than on simply delivering vital services, policymakers have created so many hoops that participants must jump through that those who need help most are far too frequently denied it. Worst of all, administrative burdens perpetuate inequity because they tend to be most heavily placed on supports for low-income people, rather than those that serve the population as a whole. As a result, more often than not, administrative burdens fall hardest on people of color, people with disabilities, women, LGBTQ people, and the elderly. Consequently, they come with significant economic costs, not savings: The economy is weaker when those who are eligible for support are prevented from receiving it, excluding people and communities from spending, safety, and stability.
Without significant and sustained progress on easing administrative burdens in the safety net, many of the people most in need of help will continue to be cruelly excluded because of needless barriers completely unrelated to their eligibility, with themselves, their families, and the entire economy suffering as a result.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › States---Deficit---General
Taneisha Fair ’20, The Center for Community Solutions in January 2020 as a Research Assistant/Contract Manager, previously worked at United Way of Greater Cleveland in the 211 program for more than three years, starting as a Community Resource Specialist, has a BA from Kent State University in interpersonal communication, with a minor in nonprofit management, “Unequal under the law: State control of social services perpetuates inequality,” https://www.communitysolutions.com/unequal-law-state-control-social-services-perpetuates-inequality/ Rxie
Black Americans have been excluded from receiving benefits many times since the United States started offering social services decades ago. When the nation’s first federal health care program was created by the Freedman’s Bureau, Black Americans affected by a post-Civil War smallpox outbreak were largely ignored and given minimal assistance, which caused high mortality rates.[1] In the 1930s, New Deal antipoverty efforts sought to bring relief to Americans during and after the Great Depression, but southern states had enough congressional power to ensure that Black people were excluded from benefits like Social Security, minimum wage, and the G.I. Bill through selective work restrictions.[2] While many laws that fueled more explicit racial discrimination were repealed after the civil rights movement and other welfare rights efforts, current rules and processes often still perpetuate racial bias. A more recent example is the social welfare reform of the 1990s. During this time, the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program was established as a block grant to replace the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and states were given more discretion to decide who receives benefits and how funds are spent. Cash assistance was no longer an entitlement available to anyone who met eligibility requirements. With no standard federal definition for what makes a family “needy,” states had broad freedom to choose eligibility criteria and income thresholds, mandate work requirements, and impose time limits for how long families can receive assistance. One study examined the level of inequality in the provision of safety-net programs across states from 1994 through 2014, measuring “generosity of benefits and inclusiveness of receipt.”[3] The authors found that the level of inequality in how generous or inclusive a state’s program was were highest in TANF-related programs and lowest in food assistance and health insurance, as the latter two programs have more oversight from the federal government. TANF policies for eligibility requirements and sanctions are harsher in states with a larger Black population. More than 25 years after welfare reform, states with the smallest maximum TANF monthly benefit are concentrated in the Southern U.S., and those with the highest are found in states in the Northeast.[4] According to the Urban Institute,[5] TANF policies for eligibility requirements and sanctions are harsher in states with a larger Black population, and the maximum benefits provided are lower with shorter time limits. For instance, as of July 2019, the highest amount for a single-parent family of three, $1,066 per month, is found in the more homogenous state of New Hampshire,[6] where 93 percent of the population is white and less than 2 percent is Black.[7] Comparatively, Mississippi, has a population that is 59 percent white and 38 percent Black, and offers a maximum benefit of just $170 per month. A Midwestern state like Ohio, falls in between with a maximum benefit of $497 for a population that is 81 percent white and 13 percent Black. Moving forward, we can help to prevent this inequality by monitoring policy outcomes and practices at the federal, state and local levels more closely using a racial equity lens While the welfare reform of the ‘90s did not explicitly discriminate based on race, public perception of welfare became more negative as recipients became more diverse. This saw new stereotypes of Black beneficiaries like the infamous “welfare queen” emerge. In the case of TANF, state discretion aided the reinforcement of these racial biases and resulted in inequal provision of social benefits across the country. Moving forward, we can help to prevent this inequality by monitoring policy outcomes and practices at the federal, state and local levels more closely using a racial equity lens. Community Solutions is committed to doing so. A new proposal to convert Medicaid into a block grant, much like TANF policies, would exclude certain populations and cause increased inaccessibility.[8] Given the results of TANF, there is the danger that any move to give more “flexibility” to states’ could deepen racial disparities and increase geographic variations in benefits. It’s important not to ignore the truth that there is an interplay of historical, economic and social factors in racial bias that have been built into the structure of the social welfare system. Leaders at all levels of government must recognize this, use this knowledge to assess current policies and inform future decisions in service delivery to ensure everyone has equal access to the social safety net.
The recent debate on health care reform has occurred mostly at the national level. The Affordable Care Act, or ACA, was a momentous change for the U.S. health care system. So far, 20 million people have gained health insurance coverage due to the ACA—a historic reduction in the number of uninsured people in the United States.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › States---Deficit---General
Paul E. Peterson ’96, is the Henry Lee Shattuck Professor of Government and Director of the Program on Education Policy and Governance at Harvard University, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and Senior Editor of Education Next, a journal of opinion and research. “When to Devolve” October 1. https://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/pub_06.pdf Rxie
The Redistributive Capacity of States and Localities For the same reason that local governments are well-suited to providing economic development—to attract labor and capital—they are not effective at serving the needs of the poor, the sick, and the disabled. Programs that serve these needs may be characterized as primarily redistributive, because they shift resources from the “haves” to the “have nots.” Generally speaking, local governments shun such programs. For example, they avoid progressive income taxes. Only about 3 percent of local revenues comes from this source. Any locality making a serious attempt to tax high-income groups for programs targeting the poor will attract more poor citizens and drive away the most productive local contributors elsewhere. No amount of determination on the part of local political leaders can make redistributive efforts succeed. If no other force is able to stop their efforts, bankruptcy will. The smaller the territorial reach of a local government, the less its capacity for redistribution. Most small suburbs in metropolitan areas have almost no capacity to meet the special needs of low-income citizens, because the effects of such actions would be immediately felt in the suburb’s tax rate, property values, and attractiveness to business. The greater territorial reach of states makes them better at redistribution than most local governments. The costs of moving across state lines are more substantial than those of changing residence within a metropolitan area. In contrast to the 17 percent of the population who change residence every year, only 3 percent move across a state line. Even so, labor and capital can and do move, and states must take that possibility into account in their policymaking. Since 1962, state and local redistributive spending has edged up slightly, from a very low 2.2 percent of GNP in 1962 to 3.5 percent in 1990. Over the same period, national government redistributive spending has more than doubled, rising from 4.9 percent to 10.3 percent of GNP. Thus, as a share of the nation’s expenditures on the elderly, the poor, and the needy, state and local redistributive spending has declined. In 1962, states and localities contributed 31 percent of the nation’s redistributive expenditures; in 1990, they contributed only 25 percent. The trend is particularly striking, since it took place during the period when the civil rights movement awakened the country to problems of poverty, the government introduced the Great Society program, and entitlements became an entrenched part of American social policy. State and local reluctance to participate in the redistributive movement cannot be attributed to the political climate. Over most of the period between 1962 and 1990, Democrats controlled at least part of state government in most states and held unified control in many. Less state and local involvement in redistribution is rooted not in partisan politics but in the competitive pressures that limit state redistributive capacities. To understand these pressures, Kenneth Scheve, Jr., Mark Rom, and I estimated the effects of the benefit THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR No. 6 2 Less state and local involvement in redistribution is rooted not in partisan politics but in the competitive pressures that limit state redistributive capacities. States act as if they fear becoming a magnet for the poor and the sick, resulting in a “race to the bottom” as each state tries to shift redistributive costs to other states. levels of neighboring states on a state’s average cash welfare benefits and Medicaid expenditures per recipient. Our estimate, based on annual data for the years 1976 to 1989, took into account interstate differences in tax capacity, poverty rates, and partisan control. We found that a state cuts its average benefits per recipient by $30 for every $100 that benefits during the previous year exceeded those of the average contiguous state. Welfare benefits were further cut if a state’s poverty population was on the increase. We also found that Medicaid benefits were subject to similar downward pressures. These findings suggest that states act as if they fear becoming a magnet for the poor and the sick, resulting in a “race to the bottom” as each state tries to shift redistributive costs to other states. Current economic trends are further limiting state and local redistributive capacity. Capital, entrepreneurial activity, and skilled labor have become ever more mobile. State and local governments now face increasingly competitive relationships with each other and must attend ever more strictly to economic development. The result is that they are growing ever more reluctant to provide for the needy within their ranks.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
States CP Updates › Adv CP---States---TANF › Net Benefit---PTX
Haskins, 11-6-2019, "The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program: Time for Improvements," Sage Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002716219881628
To address these problems and concerns, TANF reform proposals have been put forward by a number of individuals and groups. These efforts have included a comprehensive five-year reauthorization bill crafted by senior Republicans on the House Committee on Ways and Means, which has jurisdiction over TANF, as well as by a senior House Democrat who subsequently became a member of the committee. The Republican legislation was approved on a partisan vote in Ways and Means in May 2018 but was never considered on the House floor. Similar legislation was introduced in early 2019 by senior Republicans in the House and Senate but has not been acted on in either body. The Democrat bill, titled the “RISE Out of Poverty Act,” introduced by Rep. Gwen Moore (D-WI), would significantly expand TANF and child care funding; replace the current Contingency Fund with one modeled after the Emergency Contingency Fund included in the 2009 stimulus law; and make a number of changes in work requirements, time limits, and other policies that would tend to increase TANF caseloads and spending. In each case, the legislation provides an indication of key TANF issues under debate.
Simply whether they participate in a pre-defined set of activities that may or may not prepare them for employment and help them move out of poverty. The meas What follows is an overview of possible reforms that respond to most of the problems and concerns that we have outlined. Most have at least some promise of attracting bipartisan support
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
States CP Updates › Adv CP---States---TANF › Solves Infrastructure---2NC
Justin Schweitzer, 4-5-2022, Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress and a masters from John Hopkins in Applied Economics "TANF Must Be Able To Respond Faster and Stronger to Economic Crises," Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/tanf-must-be-able-to-respond-faster-and-stronger-to-economic-crises/ Accessed 7/19/2023. 🔔
Create a permanent subsidized jobs program that gets ramped up during downturns
During the Great Recession, 39 states and Washington, D.C., used $1.3 billion of the $5 billion TANF Emergency Fund to create more than 260,000 subsidized jobs.69 Subsidized employment is not simply the creation of government-funded jobs, but rather an important workforce intervention that provides paid work experience and on-the-job training that will help workers who face structural barriers find stable, better-paying employment in the long term.70 Additionally, subsidized employment provides vital income to families in need, support for businesses that can allow them to withstand or even expand during a recession, and financial stimulus for local economies. Unfortunately, despite being a very successful part of the TANF Emergency Fund during the Great Recession,71 subsidized jobs programs were ended by most states when the funding expired in September 2010, or states simply stopped placing people in the subsidized jobs in the months leading up to this deadline.72
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
States CP Updates › Adv CP---States---TANF › Solves Inequality---2NC
Justin Schweitzer, 4-5-2022, Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress and a masters from John Hopkins in Applied Economics "TANF Must Be Able To Respond Faster and Stronger to Economic Crises," Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/tanf-must-be-able-to-respond-faster-and-stronger-to-economic-crises/ Accessed 7/19/2023. 🔔
Automatically ease individual requirements on participants during downturns
When economic conditions trigger the new permanent TANF Emergency Fund, the program should also adjust performance measures and incentives to encourage additional stimulus for low-income families facing immediate hardship. During downturns, when jobs are much harder to find and retain, all work and behavior requirements and sanctions should be automatically suspended, and TANF recipients who previously lost some or all their benefits due to sanctions should have them fully restored. No paperwork, caseworker interviews, or other administrative burdens to maintain benefits should be required during this period either, as tracking and managing compliance are administratively costly and often result in otherwise eligible participants losing their benefits due to minor errors.67