2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Devolution CP › Net Benefit---Congress FoPo DA › Congress FoPo DA---1NC
Riedl 17 [Brian Riedl is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, bachelor's degree in economics and political science from the University of Wisconsin and a master's degree in public affairs from Princeton University, 4-12-2017 https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2017-04-12/washington-is-a-problem-let-the-states-have-more-power]
Devolution recognizes that there is little reason for Washington to impose one-size-fits-all policies on all 50 states and 3,144 counties and county equivalents. Blue states should be free to build larger governments with higher taxes – and red states should be free to do the opposite. Governments can customize local programs to local needs, with solutions based on local values. And citizens can vote with their feet.
Devolution also promotes experimentation. The collapsing ObamaCare exchanges show that even the smartest experts can get the policy terribly wrong. Rather than subject about 320 million people to Washington's mistakes (and then deadlock on a fix), it is better to empower all 50 states to experiment with their own unique policy approaches. Over time, successful policies will be copied by other states, while failures can be replaced with minimal damage.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Devolution CP › Theory/Competition › A2: Perm---Do CP---2NC
Kravitch ’88 [Phyllis Adele Kravitch; August 29, 1988; Federal Judge on the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals; Westlaw, “United States v. Goggin,” 853 F.2d 843]
The government strenuously maintains that the district court's instruction was not erroneous at all, as the district court simply combined the Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction on 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) with the statutory definition of the term “United States,” 21 U.S.C. § 802(28).5 We note, however, that appellants' disagreement, closely analyzed, is not with the district court's definition of the term “United States,” but rather with its lack of explanation of the term “outside.” Assuming arguendo that the district court's instruction on the term “outside” was incomplete, the error, if any occurred, was not “plain.”
<<FOOTNOTE 5>>
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Devolution CP › Theory/Competition › A2: Perm---Do CP---2NC
U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” ]
The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Devolution CP › Solvency › A2: Unconstitutional---2NC
Hood 22 (John Hood, president of the John William Pope Foundation, writer of a syndicated column on politics and public policy for North Carolina newspapers, teaches at Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy, board chair of the NC Institute of Political Leadership; as co-chair of the North Carolina Leadership Forum, based at Duke University; as vice-chair of the James G. Martin Center for Academic Renewal; and on the boards of directors of the State Policy Network, the Student Free Press Association, and the Carolina Liberty Foundation, 11-28-2022, "States should take lead on welfare," Carolina Journal -, https://www.carolinajournal.com/opinion/states-should-take-lead-on-welfare/Accessed July 19th, 2023)sns
I’m a fiscally conservative North Carolinian — and I think state taxes should be significantly higher. No, I haven’t lost my head, or my spine. And while I’m a committed supply-sider, I’m not referring here to projected revenues from a fast-growing economy. I truly mean North Carolina ought to levy higher state taxes. But only if federal taxes go down by at least as much. That is, I believe large swaths of the federal budget represent an illegal use of the tax and spending powers granted to Congress by Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. The programs in question provide for neither “the common defense” nor the “general welfare.” What we call “welfare” spending is a prime example of the problem. When the constitution was drafted and ratified in the 18th century, the prevailing public understanding of the phrase “general welfare” was that it strictly limited the fiscal authority of Congress. As James Madison later put it, the phrase referred to “general and national,” not “local or state” benefit. It was certainly never meant to describe a program giving private individuals money, shelter, food, or other direct benefits. As originally written, then, the constitution allowed Congress to fund a road or port facility if its main purpose was military, for example, but not if it was to facilitate commerce. Madison and other constitutionally minded presidents repeatedly vetoed bills that violated this principle. The principle applies only to the federal government, however. Most state and local governments, including those here in North Carolina, operate under no such constitutional limitation. They enjoy a broad “police power” that Washington lacks — a power not just to enact civil and criminal statutes and enforce them but also to levy taxes to fund a wide variety of expenditures. In other words, regardless of whether you think government should provide a safety net of cash and non-cash benefits, or how such a system should be designed and administered, you ought to be addressing your arguments to governors, state legislators, county commissioners, and the like, not to presidents or federal judges or members of Congress. State and local officials ought to be at least the primary decisionmakers, if not the sole decisionmakers, when it comes to welfare programs. That’s what the federal constitution requires, properly understood. When during the 20th century progressives argued public pensions for single mothers and the elderly, unemployment compensation, and other welfare programs should be provided by the federal government, they should have used the amendment process to ask the American people to revise Article 1. Instead, progressives ignored the constitution, enacted whatever they wanted, and then reshaped the federal judiciary until it became sufficiently deferential to federal power. Their gambit worked. Before the 1930s, most federal spending went to the current armed forces, payments to veterans of prior wars, and payments on federal debts that were overwhelmingly incurred during those wars. Today, entitlements and welfare programs comprise most of the (vastly larger) federal budget. I’m enough of a realist to concede there’s no way to cram the genie back into the bottle. But the current Washington-dominated safety net is unaffordable, unaccountable, and unconscionably destructive of families and the work ethic. In a new book, American Enterprise Institute senior fellows Angele Rachidi, Matt Weidinger, and Scott Winship describe a creative way to strike a better balance between the federal government and the states. They propose to phase in a 50%-50% match for some $300 billion worth of safety-net programs other than Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. States would shoulder more fiscal responsibility for such functions as cash welfare, nutrition assistance, and housing subsidies — but they would also receive vastly more authority to reshape and repackage the programs, along with financial incentives to move families off public assistance altogether (because doing so would count toward a state’s matching requirement). Such a strategy would make American government as a whole smaller as well as more effective. I’d take that deal in a heartbeat
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Devolution CP › Solvency › Solvency---Self-Corecting---2NC
Ayala et al. ‘21 (Researcher at Georgia State University) ,"Georgia State University, https://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2021/03/21-07-Interregional-Mimicking-and-Decentralized-Welfare.pdf
The literature on welfare decentralization has traditionally stressed the potential positive effects of fiscal devolution both in terms of efficiency and coverage of the programs. Regional governments are in a better position to understand both social preferences and needs of poor households and generally they can implement these programs more effectively. However, the expectation that a decentralized provision of welfare is supposed to foster citizens´ wellbeing is challenged by problems of coordination and financing, which at the end may produce a mosaic of highly varied programs—with a striking disparity of protection levels. In addition, competition among jurisdictions does not always yield the result of positive innovation. Ignoring these constraints can result in a generally regressive nationwide distribution of benefits, with the richest jurisdictions paying much higher benefits than the less wealthy ones. These limitations, common to any decentralized welfare system, can be fostered in 28 models of “radical fiscal federalism”, where federal coordination and/or funding do not exist. This was the case of the Spanish safety net design, where these programs were entirely created and regulated by the regional governments. In this paper, we use panel data for Spanish regions with the aim of answering one essential question: Does mimicking among ACs partly explain the level of regional welfare benefits in Spain? While the answer to this question is not a priori obvious, our empirical results corroborate the presence of significant interregional interactions. We find strong evidence of a mimicking behavior: ACs observe what their neighboring governments are doing and then decide their own basic benefit levels. Therefore, our results confirm the conventional wisdom on the territorial interdependency of policy decisions with respect to welfare benefit levels, even within a highly fiscally decentralized framework—where there is no participation of the central government in the design, regulation, or financing of the system. Therefore, mimicking provides a vehicle that can save fully decentralized systems of welfare benefits from the expected race-to-the-bottom. Our results suggest that the divergent trend in welfare benefits triggered by regional differences in fiscal capacity is partially compensated by regional interdependence. Our results are obtained utilizing the spatial lag approach and confirmed when the proposed relationships are analyzed using the spatial error approach. Given the probable inertia of benefit levels, the results obtained under static approaches could be somewhat biased. However, the use of a dynamic model also suggests that, while benefit levels in each region largely depend on regional resources, the mimicking hypothesis is still validated: regional public agents observe what their peers are doing and act accordingly. In short, in this paper we contribute to the current literature by providing strong supporting evidence for the role played by imitation in the determination of decentralized 29 welfare benefits in contexts where these policies are completely decentralized. Therefore, we confirm the results anticipated by other studies that governments pay attention to what their neighbors do, but in our case with the novelty of confirming it even when there is no system of coordination or co-financing from the central government whatsoever.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Devolution CP › Solvency › Solvency---Resource Allocation---2NC
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Robert M. McNab , October 9-10,1997, , Economics Department and Policy Research Center Georgia State University, “FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE”, )
The theory and practice of fiscal decentralization traditionally has had little overlap with the objective of economic growth. Only very recently have normative discussions of fiscal decentralization added economic growth to the traditional list of public finance objectives: efficiency in the allocation of resources, equity in the distribution of income, and economic stabilization. 8 The empirical studies that have attempted to estimate possible effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, reviewed below, have only appeared in the past few years. The basic economic argument for fiscal decentralization is that it can provide greater economic efficiency in the allocation of resources in the public sector. 9 Under the assumption public officials respond to the desires of their constituents, subnational governments are better able to match these preferences, especially when these preferences differ across jurisdictions. These gains in efficiency are enhanced if taxpayers are mobile because they can migrate or sort themselves out among the jurisdictions that best match their preferred tax-expenditure package, as first discussed in Tiebout's (1956) seminal piece. 1o In short, if preferences for public goods differ across regions or individuals, the level of welfare achieved through a uniform provision of public goods by a central government is inferior to that which can be attained by a decentralized provision which allows for differences across jurisdictions. Thus fiscal decentralization is concerned with the assignment of expenditure functions and tax revenue sources among different levels of government (federal or central, state or provincial, and local or municipal) to best achieve an efficient allocation of resources. 11 Efficiency is one of the three objectives, the other two being income redistribution and macroeconomic stability, initially stated by Musgrave (1959) and widely accepted as guiding government policy. But if decentralized governments can play an important role in efficiency, there is wide consensus that the objectives of income redistribution and macroeconomic stability are better pursued by the central or federal governments. Even though subnational governments may differ in their preferences for income redistribution, the mobility of households and businesses will tend to make differences in redistributional policies self-defeating because the rich would move out of and the poor would move into the jurisdiction. 12 Attempts to implement macroeconomic stabilization by sub national governments will also be ineffective because of the considerable economic "leakages" associated with local expenditures.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Devolution CP › Solvency › Solvency---Growth---2NC
Richard Reinsch 2022, law degree from NC, leading scholar on American constitutionalism, Director of the B. Kenneth Simon Center for American Studies and AWC Family Foundation Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. (JGR) https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/commentary/the-american-people-must-relocate-power-the-states
When American citizens look to Washington, D.C., they find much to be disappointed in and even less to believe in. The fundamental problem is that the federal government has, through its regulatory and spending powers, usurped much of the governing authority for the republic. However, for reasons both predictable and lamentable, it has failed to govern well for decades, with policy breakdowns occurring across the board. Peter Schuck observed in his book “Why Government Fails So Often” that most federal government policies cannot pass a transparent cost-benefits test. But this dysfunctional government results from size and scope—from the federal government vastly exceeding a competency scale that our Constitution attempted to establish. There is no manifest line in the Constitution that guides the distribution of power between the federal government and the state governments. In the Federalist Papers, Publius argues that the question will be decided by citizens about where to place power, and their judgment will turn on competency in administration. This process inevitably will be a deliberative one, influenced by elections, arguments, and results. If so, we should record that federal spending is now so large and so encompassing that it swallows the ability of the states to be self-governing and accountable to their citizens. This has occurred through ever-expanding federal grants-in-aid. These programs should be culled for the restoration of constitutional order and its commitment to a self-governing people. >>> Federalism in Crisis: Urgent Action Required to Preserve Self-Government As Philip Hamburger argues in his new book “Purchasing Submission,” the federal government can impose laws and rules on the states through the so-called Spending Power. The constitutional authority of the government to act in this capacity is suspect, and its consequences go beyond the mere size of the expenditures. And yet, on federal spending, we are also facing real limits on government power, with negative consequences in the form of inflation, chronic indebtedness, and lost economic growth. Our country even faces potential catastrophic entitlement cuts, since, as a debtor nation, we continue to pay for present expenses with long-term debt instruments that we cannot afford to pay without drastic tax increases, spending cuts, or both. Of course, most of our state governments eagerly seek federal grants and funding. Even though such money comes with strings attached to Washington, most states can’t leave well enough alone. What do they lose by taking the money—funds that enable them to claim success for services to constituents whose real costs are not actually paid for by the state’s taxpayers? The loss is that we as citizens no longer govern ourselves in an open and competitive fashion versus other states. This crucial discipline over state governments is circumvented. However, the loss of self-government includes not only the states. Members of Congress no longer focus their undivided attention on what should be for them the more pressing objectives of national government. The federal government now gets wagged by the tail, turned on behalf of local concerns and interests that are served by grant programs. The failure here is to assume that federal spending in the form of grants to states and localities will produce better policy results than if local priorities had been decided by the actual authorities elected by that state’s voters. Thus does the centralization of power and its enthronement of experts continue unabated as the prime mover in American government. What must happen for the proper liberation of the states to govern themselves in full? That would entail ceasing federal grants through a constitutional amendment. This would save billions of dollars and, crucially, restore Congress to its proper function of deliberating national problems and issues. The American people must be able to locate authority and accountability in their state governments, which should be led by officials who are fully transparent with their citizens about the costs of programs that must be borne by actual citizens in the state, not by federal taxpayers in an endless game of fiscal shapeshifting. In this way, the federal government would stick to its basic set of truly national issues. The states would become what they were meant to be: entities that govern close to the people, shaping the communities within their jurisdiction, in ways that a national government cannot.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Devolution CP › Solvency › Solvency---Empirics---2NC
Nathan & Gais 2001 (Richard P. Nathan, former director of the Rockefeller Institute of Government, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the State University of New York at Albany, Thomas L. Gais, director of the Rockefeller Institute of Government, conducted research and written on American federalism; the implementation of social programs, especially welfare reform, by state and local governments; 6-1-2001, "Is Devolution Working? Federal and State Roles in Welfare," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-devolution-working-federal-and-state-roles-in-welfare/Accesssed July 11, 2023)sns
The 1996 law is complicated—even, in a sense, schizophrenic. It sets strict federal requirements about work and limits on how long families can receive federally aided welfare benefits, now called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). But it also encourages states to develop their own welfare reforms by adopting variants on the work-first approach, emphasizing quick engagement in work-related activities and moving people off public assistance. States not only have accepted but have frequently embraced the goal of getting people into jobs, especially unsubsidized jobs, as quickly as possible. Moving beneficiaries into jobs and reducing caseloads have been critical operational goals going all the way down to local welfare offices. Work participation rates are at historic highs, particularly in states that had already been reforming welfare under federal waivers. States have used their flexibility to signal the emphasis on work. They have organized new ways to deliver services, the most striking and widespread being linkages to workforce development systems. Many states have demanded that people who apply for cash assistance first search for jobs, cooperate with child support enforcement efforts, or engage in other activities before they qualify for benefits. States have increased their services, especially those involving work supports, such as child care and transportation, while greatly reducing their cash assistance. In 1999, the median state spent only about 55 percent of its total “welfare” budget on cash assistance. Most states do not appear to have greatly reduced total spending on social services, and some have actually increased it. The “race to the bottom” that some critics anticipated never took place. One reason may be the design of the block grant—TANF offered states generous funding during a time of economic growth. But another reason may have been the greater political legitimacy accorded to welfare programs because family heads who are working are seen as more deserving of support. Federal agencies have given states flexibility in using their welfare block grant funds. Rules are loose, permitting states to assist the heads of working families without making their families subject to federal time limits. The task of defining “work activities” has been turned over to the states. And Washington has not rigorously audited state spending. State Variations While all states share the focus on work first and the activist approach to reforming their human service systems, many variations exist in tone, structure, spending, and operations. States differ, for example, in their operational goals. Some try to meet TANF’s performance requirements by engaging a large and growing share of their cash assistance caseloads in work activities. Others reduce caseloads, either by moving beneficiaries into jobs or providing them with alternatives to continuing cash assistance. Although some states are beginning to incorporate other goals in their welfare systems, work participation rates and caseloads remain dominant criteria in day-to-day operations, if for no other reason than that failure to meet the required work participation rates, after factoring in a caseload reduction credit, can exact big financial penalties. States differ even more in how they try to achieve these goals. Minnesota, Michigan, and Kansas, for example, all emphasize work engagement rather than caseload reduction, but each pursues a different approach. Minnesota emphasizes financial incentives to work. It gives cash assistance to families well over the poverty level by offering generous benefits and disregards. It also supplements earnings with a state earned income tax credit and provides substantial work supports, including a child care program available to many working families. The aim is to encourage poor families to mix earnings and assistance and increase total income (and to increase work participation rates among families on the rolls).
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Devolution CP › Solvency › Solvency---Empirics---2NC
Michael D., 12-15-2022, Former Senior Fellow, Cato Institute "Welfare Reform," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/welfare-reform
Given the failure of more than 50 years of federal welfare policy to significantly reduce poverty or increase economic mobility, it should be apparent that the federal government does not know best. Nor have we demonstrated that we know enough about how to reduce poverty to impose a one‐size‐fits‐all policy throughout the country. Five decades of failure should have taught us to be modest. Wherever possible, Congress should shift both the funding and operational authority for welfare and other anti‐poverty programs to the states. The “laboratories of democracy,” as Justice Louis Brandeis described them, should be the primary focus of anti‐poverty efforts, not an afterthought. That means more than simply giving states the authority to tinker with programs as they exist today. It means federal funding, even in block grant form, should not be accompanied by federal strings. Instead, states should be given control over broad categories of funding, with the ability to shift funds freely between programs at their discretion, but within a framework in which their efforts are rigorously evaluated and held accountable for achieving results.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Devolution CP › Solvency › Solvency---Efficiency---2NC
Sow, Razafimahefa, 3-17-2015, (Sow is a Technical Advisor to the Minister at Ministry of Finance and Budget, Razafimahefa is and economist at International Organization and IMF) "Fiscal Decentralization and the Efficiency of Public Service Delivery," IMF, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Fiscal-Decentralization-and-the-Efficiency-of-Public-Service-Delivery-42789
Fiscal decentralization can improve the efficiency of public service delivery through preference matching and allocative efficiency. Local governments possess better access to local preferences and, consequently, have an informational advantage over the central government in deciding which provision of goods and services would best satisfy citizens’ needs (Hayek, 1945; Tiebout, 1956; Musgrave, 1969). When provided by the jurisdiction that has the control over the minimum geographic area, costs and benefits of public services are fully internalized, which is expected to improve allocative efficiency (Oates, 1972). Fiscal decentralization can also ameliorate efficiencies by fostering stronger accountability. Geographical closeness of public institutions to the local population (final beneficiaries) fosters accountability and can improve public service outcomes, particularly in social sectors such as education and health (Ahmad, Brosio, and Tanzi, 2008; Cantarero and 2 Previous studies focused solely on a specific country or a specific group of countries. 4 Pacual Sanchez, 2006). Local accountability is expected to put pressure on local authorities to continuously search for ways to produce and deliver better public service under limited resources, leading to “productive effeciency.”Accountability can foster larger spending in public investment and in growth-enhancing sectors, such as education and health (Keen and Marchand, 1997; Arze del Granado and others, 2005; Bénassy-Quéré and others, 2007; Kappeler and Valila, 2008; Fredriksen, 2013). Local accountability can be strengthened through a direct election of local authorities by the local population. Furthermore, fiscal decentralization can improve efficiency through the “voting with one’s feet” hypothesis. Decentralization gives voters more electoral control over the authorities (Seabright, 1996; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Hindriks and Lockwood, 2005). It encourages competition across local governments to improve public services; voters can use the performance of neighboring governments to make inferences about the competence or benevolence of their own local politicians (Bordignon and others, 2004). Fiscal decentralization may lead to a decrease in lobbying by interest groups, distorting policy choices and increasing waste of public funds.
.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Devolution CP › Solvency › Solvency---Block Grants---2NC
Riedl 21 -- Brian Riedl is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, focusing on budget, tax, and economic policy. Riedl holds a bachelor’s degree in economics and political science from the University of Wisconsin and a master’s degree in public affairs from Princeton University (“Devolution: Four Proposals to Empower States and Reduce Washington’s Political Strife,” Manhattan Institute, April 15th, Available online at // lianamalish)
For the past 30 years, the most furious devolution debate has involved the federal welfare system. The 1996 reform—which replaced the open-ended Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grants to states—exposed the radical differences between conservative and liberal approaches to poverty relief that make a case for state customization and experimentation based on local values. AFDC was the first broad national welfare entitlement (it was part of the 1935 Social Security Act); replacing it was the first revocation of a major entitlement for low-income families. While TANF is only one piece of the federal welfare system, it was a major departure from the past and does inform the federalism debate: first, its existence was made possible by the example of welfare reforms undertaken in Wisconsin, Connecticut, and New York City in the early 1990s, using federal AFDC waivers to impose work requirements and time limits, as well as require child school attendance;[60] and second, TANF displayed many of the promises (and challenges) of welfare devolution. TANF replaced the open-ended AFDC cash entitlement for families (with minor children) earning below a certain income with a fixed-amount block grant that allowed states to create their replacement system—but one that must require work activities and include a five-year lifetime limit on benefits (both with significant exemptions). Beyond that, states were given broad latitude to design their welfare systems as long as they met four federal goals that generally involved assisting needy families, promoting work and marriage, and reducing out-of-wedlock pregnancies. The law also required states to contribute their own funds to the new system—80% of what they had spent in the old AFDC system.[61] On the positive side, TANF has shown that block grants can succeed if Washington sets broad goals and provides states with flexibility in program design. Despite hysterical predictions of mass starvation, third-world poverty, and death,[62] TANF has exceeded even its most optimistic predictions. Following the passage of welfare reform, the number of families collecting AFDC/TANF quickly fell from 4.5 million to 2 million—and then to 1.2 million by 2018.[63] Many of these families moved into full-time jobs that paid much more than welfare and began the journey toward self-sufficiency.[64] The poverty rate quickly fell to its lowest level in nearly 30 years; the black poverty (and black child poverty) rates fell so far that even the “Great Recession” of 2007–09 did not raise poverty rates to pre-TANF levels.[65] While critics credit the economic boom of the late 1990s for this progress, previous economic expansions did not produce such large poverty and caseload reductions, and subsequent recessions showed a lower poverty ceiling than before 1996 for most populations.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Devolution CP › Solvency › Solvency---2NC
Michael D. Tanner, 12-15-2022, Michael Tanner was a Cato Institute senior fellow and headed research into a variety of domestic policies, with an emphasis on poverty and social welfare policy, health care, and Social Security and entitlement reform. "Welfare Reform," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/welfare-reform,
Given the failure of more than 50 years of federal welfare policy to significantly reduce poverty or increase economic mobility, it should be apparent that the federal government does not know best. Nor have we demonstrated that we know enough about how to reduce poverty to impose a one‐size‐fits‐all policy throughout the country. Five decades of failure should have taught us to be modest. Wherever possible, Congress should shift both the funding and operational authority for welfare and other anti‐poverty programs to the states. The “laboratories of democracy,” as Justice Louis Brandeis described them, should be the primary focus of anti‐poverty efforts, not an afterthought. That means more than simply giving states the authority to tinker with programs as they exist today. It means federal funding, even in block grant form, should not be accompanied by federal strings. Instead, states should be given control over broad categories of funding, with the ability to shift funds freely between programs at their discretion, but within a framework in which their efforts are rigorously evaluated and held accountable for achieving results. Some states may wish to emphasize job training or public service jobs. Others may feel that education provides the biggest bang for the buck. In some states, housing may be a priority; in others, the need for nutrition assistance may be greater. Some may wish to impose strict eligibility requirements, while others may choose to experiment with unconditional benefits, even a universal basic income. Moreover, states that have successfully reduced poverty while also reducing the number of people on the welfare rolls should be allowed to shift funds to other priorities entirely. Success should be rewarded. States that fail to achieve results, after accounting for factors beyond their control, should have their funding reduced, with any shortfall made up from state funds. Failure should not be subsidized. While shifting funds from the federal government to the states represents a good first step, the states should go even further by moving away from in‐kind benefits and to direct cash payments. While it is reasonable for taxpayers to seek accountability for how their funds are used, this paternalism may be both unnecessary and self‐defeating. For starters, arguments that the poor can’t be trusted with cash are too often based on erroneous and racially biased stereotypes rather than on sound evidence. In fact, studies from states that drug‐test welfare recipients suggest that the use of drugs is no higher among welfare recipients than among the general population.14 And numerous studies have shown that even when welfare recipients are given totally unrestricted cash, they do not increase their expenditure on “temptation goods” like tobacco or alcohol.15 Furthermore, cash benefits can allow the poor to decide for themselves how much of their income should be allocated to rent, food, education, or transportation. They might also choose to save more or invest in learning new skills that will help them earn more in the future. A 2015 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority report found that 53 percent of American households with incomes less than $25,000 had no investment accounts, compared to just 1 percent of households making over $150,000 a year without investment accounts.16 We can’t expect people to behave responsibly if they are never given any responsibility. Cash benefits also could encourage mobility, helping to break up geographic concentrations of poverty that can isolate the poor from the rest of society and reinforce the worst aspects of the poverty culture, especially if those benefits are received early in life. Armed with money instead of vouchers redeemable only at certain locations, the poor could escape bad neighborhoods the same way vouchers and tax credits allow children to escape bad schools. Doing so can produce tremendous results: Chetty et al. (2016), for example, found that families that moved into low‐poverty areas before their children entered their teen years saw the children go on to earn 31 percent more later in life than did comparable children who remained in high‐poverty areas. Beyond higher earnings, children from families that moved saw a wide range of other positive outcomes. They were more likely to attend college, less likely to be single parents, and more likely to live in better neighborhoods when they grew up and left home.17 Any cash payment system should be designed to help low‐income Americans solve their immediate problems without becoming ensconced in the welfare system. Thus, Congress could encourage states to expand existing cash‐diversion programs, which provide lump‐sum cash payments in lieu of traditional welfare benefits.18 Currently in use in 32 states and DC, these programs are designed to assist families facing an immediate financial crisis or short‐term need. The family is given a single cash payment in the hope that if the immediate problem is resolved, there will be no need for going on welfare. In exchange for receiving the lump‐sum payment, welfare applicants in most states—but not all—give up their eligibility for TANF for a period ranging from a couple of months to a year.19 Several studies indicate that for individuals who had not previously been on welfare, diversion programs significantly reduced their likelihood of ending up there. Studies also suggest that diversion participants are subsequently more likely to work than become traditional recipients of welfare.20 Finally, Congress should reform the EITC to turn it into a pure wage supplement. Benefits should be available to childless adults and should not rise with the number of children in a family. Payments should arrive monthly rather than in an annual lump sum. Any additional cost due to expansion should be paid for by reductions in other welfare programs.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Devolution CP › 1NC › 1NC---Devolution (Cheating)
Tanner ’22 [(Michael D Tanner; 12-15-2022; Former Senior Fellow at the CATO Institute, headed research on domestic policy regarding poverty and social welfare "Welfare Reform," Cato Institute, )//IshMonkey]
Consolidate and decentralize federal welfare programs; move to cash transfers; emphasize individual control
Given the failure of more than 50 years of federal welfare policy to significantly reduce poverty or increase economic mobility, it should be apparent that the federal government does not know best. Nor have we demonstrated that we know enough about how to reduce poverty to impose a one‐size‐fits‐all policy throughout the country. Five decades of failure should have taught us to be modest.
2023
Michigan
Counterplan
Devolution CP › 1NC › 1NC---Devolution
Tanner ’22 [(Michael D Tanner; 12-15-2022; Former Senior Fellow at the CATO Institute, headed research on domestic policy regarding poverty and social welfare "Welfare Reform," Cato Institute, )//IshMonkey]
Consolidate and decentralize federal welfare programs; move to cash transfers; emphasize individual control
Given the failure of more than 50 years of federal welfare policy to significantly reduce poverty or increase economic mobility, it should be apparent that the federal government does not know best. Nor have we demonstrated that we know enough about how to reduce poverty to impose a one‐size‐fits‐all policy throughout the country. Five decades of failure should have taught us to be modest.
2023
Michigan
Evidence
Renewables are not inevitable but the aff increases their production.
Matt Ferrell 21, Matt Ferrell is a designer by trade. He explores sustainable and smart technologies like EVs, solar panels, and smart homes, 04/06/2021, “Is the future of renewable energy inevitable?”, , eb
As of 2019, renewable technologies accounted for only 11% of the world’s primary energy. Although things like solar and wind power are growing fast, there are many criticisms that give the perception that their future dominance may not be a sure bet. Panels and turbines typically last between 20 – 30 years before needing service or replacement. They’re also intermittent and require energy storage to provide consistent electricity.1 2 3 That energy storage can be expensive and often has a limited lifespan of its own. Not to mention lingering questions about their recyclability.
2023
Michigan
Evidence
Recycling can’t solve for lack of materials
Millis 22 [Mark P. Millis, 7/2022, Mark P. Mills is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a faculty fellow at Northwestern University’s McCormick School of Engineering and Applied Science. "MINES, MINERALS, AND “GREEN” ENERGY: A REALITY CHECK" Manhattan Institute, | czx]
For green energy advocates, the idealized vision for recycling encompasses deploying a “circular economy” as a number-one priority for dealing with the material implications of clean tech.52 But the idea of a green energy circular economy based on the goal of 100% recycling is a pipe dream.53 Many materials, especially high-value metals, can be significantly recycled. But we can consider the implications and lessons for green waste by looking at the 50 million tons of so-called e-waste generated globally from worn-out or outmoded digital devices that are also built using many critical and rare minerals. The tonnage of global e-waste equals “the weight of all commercial aircraft ever built” and is forecast to double in the next several decades.54 The millions of tons of e-waste contain hundreds of tons of gold and thousands of tons of silver (generally the primary target of recyclers, for obvious reasons) as well as more than a dozen other elements.55 In order to increase e-waste recycling from today’s 20% level, the World Economic Forum (among others) proposes various measures to increase consumer “awareness,” add new regulations and subsidies, and push to redesign the original devices. The Forum estimates that these efforts would reduce consumer costs by 14% over the next two decades.56 But as the scale of global recycling grows, many governments and some environmental organizations are beginning to focus on the serious health and safety issues that have been ignored.57 So far, the majority of e-waste recycling—as is much other waste—takes place in poorer nations willing to undertake the labor-intensive, largely unregulated, and sometimes hazardous processes involved. Ghana, for example, is where Europe exports the largest quantity of its e-waste.58 Meantime, the global recycling industry is still adjusting to a new reality: two years ago, China abruptly banned the importation of waste, asserting that much of it was “dirty” and “hazardous.” China’s ban is forcing local U.S. governments and municipalities to reduce or even halt recycling programs.60 As one industry expert in Oregon observed: “Recycling is like a religion here. . . . It has been meaningful for people in Oregon to recycle, [and] they feel like they are doing something good for the planet— and now they are having the rug pulled out from under them.”61 The China ban has spotlighted the inherent challenges with recycling, especially the notion of a “circular economy.” The challenge with recycling trace minerals is essentially the same as in mining itself: much depends on concentrations. The concentration of useful minerals in e-waste and green waste is very low and often far lower than the ore grades of those minerals in rocks. In addition, the physical nature of trashed hardware is highly varied (again, unlike rocks), making it a challenge to find simple mechanisms to separate out the minerals. Recycling processes are often labor-intensive (hence the pursuit of cheap labor, sometimes child labor, overseas) and hazardous because techniques to burn away unwanted packaging can release toxic fumes.62 If “urban mining”—the oft-used locution for capturing minerals hidden in worn-out products—were easier, cheaper, and safer than mining new materials, there would be a lot more of it, and it would not require subsidies and mandates to put into effect. While technology, especially automation and robotics, will eventually bring more economically viable and cleaner ways to recycle, the challenges are daunting and progress has been slow. That’s the reason that the overall global levels of net recycling and capture of most metals (for all purposes, not just e-waste and green waste) are below 20%, and much lower than those for all the rare earths.63 Even as Apple has championed recycling programs for its products—including inventing a robot to disassemble iPhones (it can only do iPhones)64 and opening a new Material Recovery Lab in Austin, Texas—the company, along with many other tech companies, vigorously promotes green energy.65 But there is as much cobalt in a single EV battery, for example, as there is in 1,000 iPhones, as much plastic in a single wind turbine as in 5 million iPhones, and as much glass in a solar array that could power a single data center as in 50 million iPhones.66 A recent Department of Energy vision for offshore wind (never mind onshore wind farms) in the U.S. would lead to nearly 10 thousand tons of neodymium alone “buried” inside more than 4 million tons of machinery that will eventually head for waste dumps.67 That sounds like a lot of material worth recovering, but it pencils out to a neodymium concentration in the trash that is one-tenth of the natural ore grade for that mineral at a mine site.68 Such realities can lead to the surprising outcome that the energy required to recover a recycled mineral can be greater than expended to get it from nature’s ore.69 That doesn’t mean that recycling won’t continue to have a role, even a greater one. But its limits are clear. The challenges in meeting the requirements for global minerals in the future will not be met with wishful thinking about “circular economies.”
2023
Michigan
Evidence
Pushes towards renewables fail—leads to job loss and price hikes—empirical evidence proves
Mckitrick 12 [Ross Mckitrick, Ross R. McKitrick is a Professor of Economics and CBE Fellow in Sustainable Commerce at the University of Guelph where he specializes in environment, energy and climate policy, "Green energy failure", 8/10/12, Fraser Institute, | czx]
The pledge by Ontario PC leader Tim Hudak to roll back key provisions of the Ontario Green Energy Act is a courageous move and deserves to be applauded. It will likely spark intense debates as we head into the upcoming election. It is hard to say whether public opinion will be on his side, but the facts certainly are. The Green Energy Act (GEA) was proposed as both an environmental policy and a job-creation policy. It is misguided on both scores. With regard to job creation, there is nothing special about subsidizing electricity generation. It's just as harmful as subsidizing anything else. We have long and lamentable experience in Canada with failed job creation schemes based on subsidies to money-losing industries. From Sprung cucumbers to Bricklin sports cars, governments have regularly learned and relearned, at taxpayer expense, the immutable rule that if a business plan depends on subsidies, the jobs it creates are not sustainable, and if the business is profitable on its own, it doesn't need subsidies. An industry that depends on subsidies for its survival is not a net source of jobs. The funds for the subsidies have to be raised through taxation, and the burden of taxes kills more jobs than the subsidies create. This is as true for wind power as it is for greenhouse cucumbers, and it doesn't matter if the taxes are visible or are hidden in the form of feed-in tariffs and artificially inflated electricity bills. In countries like Spain and the U.K., which launched their own versions of the GEA a decade ago, the job losses are now being confirmed by independent analyses. In the U.K., a report by Verso Economics used the Scottish government's own macroeconomic model to show that, despite receiving net transfers of about £330-million ($521-million) from the rest of the U.K. for its renewables sector, Scotland still experienced a net job loss from wind power, and for the U.K. as a whole, 3.7 jobs were lost for every job created in renewable energy. In Spain, researchers at King Carlos University found that, on average, each job in the wind sector cost the country more than £1-million, implying a loss of 2.2 private sector jobs for every new job created in the renewables sector. There is no magic Ontario fairy dust that will spare Ontarians from the same fate. The Green Energy Act will raise electricity costs and decrease employment. If the goal was to promote industry and create jobs, it is guaranteed to fail. The GEA was also introduced to improve the environment. Here again it fails. First, when people talk about green Ontario they usually picture peaceful rolling hills and pleasant countryside. But that is precisely what is being destroyed through the rapid proliferation of industrial wind-turbine installations across the Ontario landscape. The GEA strips local authorities of their customary planning and zoning tools for protecting environmental amenities. As a result, the green that people actually want to enjoy is being ruined in the name of green ideology. Second, expanding the renewables portfolio is redundant since 75% of Ontario's electricity comes from nuclear and hydro power, which do not generate emissions. Twenty-two per cent comes from coal-and natural gas-fired power plants. Ontarians have paid hundreds of millions of dollars for installation of advanced emission control devices on those plants. As a result, Ontario air pollution levels have fallen dramatically since the 1970s and 1980s, a point easily confirmed by consulting any edition of the government's annual Air Quality in Ontario report. The particular type of emissions that gets talked about now as the main health concern is called PM2.5, or ultra-fine particles smaller than 2.5 microns in diameter. According to Environment Canada's emissions inventory, Ontario's coal-fired power plants released 699 tonnes of PM2.5 in 2009. Is that a lot? One way to tell is to compare it with another source nobody worries about: residential wood fireplaces. According to the same Environment Canada emissions inventory, Ontario residential wood-burning fireplaces released 1,150 tonnes of PM2.5 in 2009, 65% more than all the coal-fired electricity generation together. That does not mean Ontario has a crisis of air pollution from wood fires. It means PM2.5 emissions from coal-fired power plants are at levels well below what is considered not a problem when coming from other, more picturesque sources. The Ontario Clean Air Alliance has published claims that Ontario's coal-fired power plants cause 316 deaths, 440 hospital admissions, 522 emergency room visits and 158,000 minor illnesses each year. Its numbers are based on a 2005 simulation study for the provincial government that focused almost entirely on the effects of PM2.5. (It also considered ground-level ozone, but emphasized that most of the ozone precursors originated in the United States). How plausible are these claims? If cor-rect, they imply that wood-burning fireplaces cause 520 deaths per year, etc. But that is nothing compared with the implied effects from people driving on unpaved roads. According to Environment Canada, dust from unpaved roads in Ontario puts a whopping 90,116 tonnes of PM2.5 into our air each year, nearly 130 times the amount from coal-fired power generation. Using the Clean Air Alliance method for computing deaths, particulates from country-road usage kills 40,739 people per year, quite the massacre considering there are only about 90,000 deaths from all causes in Ontario each year. Who knew? That quiet drive up back country roads to the cottage for a weekend of barbecues, cozy fires and marshmallow roasts is a form of genocide. Of course such a conclusion is absurd, but it follows from the screwy way numbers are used in this debate. If we are going to say that 699 tonnes of PM2.5 from power generation kills 316 people, then 90,116 tonnes of PM2.5 from unpaved roads must kill a proportionately much larger number. Likewise, paving just eight-10ths of 1% of Ontario's dirt roads would cut annual PM2.5 emissions by an amount equivalent to shutting down all Ontario coal-fired power plant units. And then Ontario wouldn't need to shut them down, and the province could have inexpensive, reliable electricity from them for many years to come. The third argument is that putting up windmills and solar panels will reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But the power they generate is variable and unreliable, so fossil fuel-based power stations have to run in the background to take up the slack whenever the wind dies down or the clouds roll by. The actual reductions are less than advertised. Moreover, the emission reductions achieved come at far too high a cost. Whenever energy policy is discussed, the government's case always traces back to a confidential 2005 cost-benefit analysis that supposedly showed it was a good idea to shut down Lambton and Nanticoke coal generating stations. That report assessed the social costs of greenhouse gas emissions from keeping the power plants running at between $2.4-billion and $3.5-billion higher than the alternatives. Even if we take those figures at face value -and there are good reasons to consider them inflated relative to the cost of purchasing emission offsets -it is less than half the cost of the Samsung deal alone, not to mention the rest of the GEA boondoggle, which doesn't even yield enough new electrical generating capacity to replace what is lost in shutting down the coal plants. If the goal is to reduce air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, the GEA goes about it in the most costly and ineffective way ever tried -yet another failure. There are cheaper and more effective options that don't create big cost increases for households and businesses. Whether the goal is to create jobs or protect the environment, the GEA is a failure, and the provincial Tories should be applauded for taking on the challenge of phasing it out.
2023
Michigan
Evidence
Renewables are wasteful
Fraser 19 [Peter, Fraser, Former Head of Gas, Coal and Power Markets Division, "More of a good thing – is surplus renewable electricity an opportunity for early decarbonisation? – Analysis", 10/09/2019, IEA, | czx]
We are entering a world where renewables will make up an increasing share of our electricity supply – the electricity sector was the leading sector for energy investment in 2018, the third year in a row that this has occurred. This trend is set to continue. In WEO 2018’s New Policies Scenario, 21% of global electricity production is projected to come from variable renewables by 2040, up from 7% in 2018, supported by about $5.3 trillion of investment. The EU share is even higher at around 39%. In our more ambitious Sustainable Development Scenario, which aims to get energy system emissions down to levels consistent with the Paris goals, variable renewables are projected to supply 38% of global electricity in 2040 (44% in the EU), a level that would require nearly $8.5 trillion of generation investment. Regardless of scenario, this rapid expansion of renewables will inevitably lead to particular challenges to operating power systems. This is best highlighted by the so-called duck curve, made famous by the California ISO. The curve was developed to show the impact of increasing distributed solar PV capacity on the demand for grid electricity. As solar PV capacity grows, the demand for grid electricity falls during the day with the greatest decrease in the middle of the day when PV production is highest – the belly of the duck. In the afternoon as PV production declines towards sunset, the demand for grid electricity can grow quite quickly – the neck of the duck. The duck is growing faster than anticipated. Five years ago, the California ISO had expected California midday demand to drop over 40% on a sunny spring day by 2020 thanks to the growth of small solar PV systems. In fact, by 2018, the spring mid-day demand on the high voltage system had already decreased by two thirds. The consequent increase in supply required in the late afternoon as solar production recedes, was already close to 15 GW, significantly greater than the 2020 anticipated level of 13 GW. This rapid expansion of renewables will inevitably lead to challenges to operating power systems. The result is that some excess supply needs to be curtailed to balance the system. While the percentages of solar and wind production that have to be curtailed in California are rather small, in other jurisdictions the share is more significant. In China, for example, the national average for wind curtailment was around 7% in 2018, with much higher levels in certain provinces. In the Canadian province of Ontario about one quarter of variable renewable generation in 2017 had to be curtailed, along with cuts in nuclear and hydropower output. This was in a jurisdiction where wholesale market prices were zero or negative almost one-third of that year. The challenges are clear – a world with higher shares of variable renewable energy (VRE) – i.e., wind and solar PV – will face challenges with integration. This is a priority area of work for the IEA, and we are focused on providing insights on the issues and technologies that can be employed to deal with higher shares of variable renewables. One of these insights is that renewables integration can be divided into a set of six phases dependent partly on the share of variable renewables in the system, but also on other system-dependent factors such as the share of storage hydro and interconnections. The percentages of solar and wind production that have to be curtailed in some jurisdictions is. As more countries move to higher shares of VRE, it appears that there could be “too much of a good thing” – excess generation that may have to be curtailed and appears as wasteful. The tendency is to treat this primarily as a technology problem for the power system to solve. Indeed part of the solution will lie in improvements in technology. We will need some form of energy storage to convert the excess at one time of day into necessary power system supply at another. Smart grids, especially smarter distribution systems, will be better able to manage increasing shares of renewables as well – and they too will likely have more energy storage. And finally, the growth of EVs (currently driving global battery demand) represents a huge potential source of storage and demand-side flexibility as well. But treating this only as a technical problem is missing the economic perspective. Trillions of dollars of investment in renewables is expected in the coming years, and so there is a risk that billions of dollars of renewable electricity – zero marginal cost, zero carbon – could be wasted.
2023
Michigan
Evidence
Adoption of renewable energy spikes energy prices—reinforces inequality
Constable and Montford 22 [John Constable, B.A., English, Magdalene College, Cambridge. Ph.D., English, Cambridge University, and Andrew Montford, Bsc, Chemistry, St Andrews University.1 Registered Accountant, "Taking Back Control: Addressing Britain's Energy Crisis", 5/22, Net Zero Watch, | czx]
This paper outlines the policies required to restore the economic and engineering efficiency of the GB electricity system and the energy sector as a whole. These counterintuitive measures would cut costs to consumers in the short term. They will also improve system stability and energy security, and prepare the sector for a medium- and longer-term reconstruction that will address the systemic failures currently prevailing, returning the system to acceptable levels of reliability, bringing further price reductions for consumers, as well as lowering carbon emissions. The measures are practical and hard-headed; they recognise that the UK’s current acute exposure to natural gas is, paradoxically, the result of the climate and renewables policies of the last two decades. The plan also recognises that gas dependency is beyond remedy in the short term, since only gas can support the large renewables fleets what we have built, battery storage being wholly uneconomic and likely to remain so. We are overly dependent on gas and must address this dependency by improving the efficiency with which we use this fuel and broadening the range of sources from which we obtain it. In the short term there is no alternative to gas, and rather than pretending otherwise, with distracting upbeat remarks about nuclear, which is relevant only in the medium to longer term, and naive plans for additional renewables, which will only prolong and deepen the current crisis, the government should be candid with the public and focus relentlessly on replacing the older combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) with new models that are more thermally efficient (and thus cheaper and cleaner) and on increasing UK production of natural gas onshore and offshore. This will be surprising to many, but it is an unavoidable conclusion from the engineering and economics of our situation. Indeed, the goal of increasing fuel diversity while cutting consumer costs requires that the UK reduce renewable energy infeed and restore the efficiency of the conventional energy system on which we are entirely reliant for security, in spite of vast investment in solar and wind power. The principal measures recommended include: • Rapid and proactive development of all domestic fossil fuel supplies, particularly gas and oil in the North Sea, but also onshore shale gas. • Rapid upgrade and expansion of the gas generation fleet, improving thermal efficiency and reducing generation costs. • Use of UK foreign policy and market power to secure long-term natural gas supply contracts from friendly sources. • Rapid reduction of subsidies and electricity system balancing costs through the imposition of balancing costs on renewables, firm power contracts and the discounted buyback of subsidy entitlements. These measures should be backed up by clear plans, if other measures fail, for compulsory discounted buy-back of subsidy entitlements and temporary state ownership of all previously subsidised renewable energy generation. • Dispatch of renewables only when economic as a fuel saver, and a progressive reduction of renewable energy infeed to the electricity system as new conventional generation is built, restoring system efficiency, reducing system balancing costs, and obviating the need for underutilised network expansion. • Firm but judicious support for new nuclear electricity generation in the longer term, and most importantly for new high-temperature nuclear modular reactors to provide industrial heat, reducing natural gas demand. • Planning for new ultra-supercritical coal generation as a medium-term backstop should nuclear power fall behind schedule. Decisions along these lines are now unavoidable and will have to be taken by a UK government at some point in the future, and the sooner the better if the onset of an acute national economic and security disaster is to be avoided. Unless policy is reformed, system reliability and security will begin to fall precipitately and consumer prices will continue to rise quickly. The program of measures we outline is daunting and difficult; the consequences of timid inaction will be much worse. 2 3 Understanding the UK’s energy crisis The UK electricity system and the broader energy supply industries and their markets are dysfunctional, the result of misguided and counterproductive environmental and climate policies. While the current energy crisis was triggered by the economic effects of coronavirus and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the fundamental causes of the emergency stretch back to the early 2000s when the Blair government interrupted the prudent and engineerable gasto-nuclear trajectory that the UK was following and mistakenly made the introduction of subsidised renewable energy the governing priority of national energy policy.
2023
Michigan
Evidence
Renewables cause an environmental and security crisis.
UIA 21, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD PROBLEMS & HUMAN POTENTIAL, 17/10/2021, “Conflicts arising from depletion of renewable resources”, , eb
NATURE: