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2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › A2: Winners Win

Empirics prove that winners don’t build capital.

[Markus Siewert 2018 June 2018; Assistant Professorship of Policy Analysis Hochschule für Politik München an der Technischen Universität München and Former Chair for Policy Analysis at the Bavarian, School for Public Policy; “It’s Never Easy for the President to Get Exactly What He Wants,” https://d-nb.info/1164077325/34

Third, agenda-setting offers the White House the opportunity to highlight its priorities, how they are distributed across various policy issues, and in which way policies should be packaged (Rudalevige 2005, 437ff; Wayne 2009b, 317ff). Because the resources of any administration to lobby Congress are not infinite and the multiple political arenas are usually heavily crowded with myriad policy items and problems striving to be solved, the White House needs to prioritize its policy agenda. This involves, among other things, to select some issues over others, decide about their sequencing, how to pursue them, and how much political capital it wants or needs to spend on any given item. Therefore, the administration will focus on certain policies with more attention, on others with less, depending on the prioritization by the president but also upon other considerations, such as the overall density of the policy agenda or imminent pressures of the time. The trick is to not overwhelm Congress with the president’s initiatives. As Lyndon B. Johnson famously quipped, “Congress is like a Whiskey drinker. You can put an awful lot of whiskey into a man if you just let him sip it. But if you try to force the whole bottle down his throat at one time, he’ll throw it up.” (cited in Rudalevige 2002, 113). Thus, the failure to prioritize easily leads to overload of Pennsylvania Avenue with Congress at the one end, and to excessive demands and exhaustion for the White House at the other end. The rocky start of the Clinton administration underlines this argument: since the White House did not pursue a ‘rifle-approach’ to define clear policy priorities for its initial months and then execute them, it got lost in numerous legislative battles and mine-fields early on in its first year. Instead it followed a ‘shotgun-approach’ by addressing as many issues as possible at once leading to an overkill and chaos (Rockman 1996; `Sinclair 2000b).

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › A2: Winners Win

Winner’s don’t win. AND low PC turns case and leads to war.

Sensiba 20, journalist @ Clean Technica (Jennifer Sensiba, “Don’t Encourage Biden To Waste Political Capital,” CLEANTECHNICA, )

If we want clean energy to succeed in the upcoming Biden administration, we have to (a) be realistic, and (b) fight like hell to keep him focused on it as much as possible. Political capital is scarce, and the threats to our future from climate change are real, so allowing the various Democratic lobbies to suck all of the oxygen out of the room is not an option. It’s All About Political Capital In short, political capital is a way to think about political power in democratic countries. Yes, winning elections does give some political power, but you can’t effectively use it unless you have coalitions, alliances, trust, goodwill, and influence. Your earned trust and connections are like money (capital). You can work hard to earn it and build it up, but it’s easy to spend it and even waste it, just like money. If you get power from an election and then quickly spend all of the political capital impressing loyalists, you’ll get to the point where you can’t win future elections (Trump is a great example of this), can’t get votes together for legislation, and can’t get people to help you in a variety of other ways. At worst, a political leader who has run completely out of political capital might not even be able to get normal citizens to follow laws. As the consent of the governed is withdrawn, you see protests, riots, violence, terrorism, and even war.

For better or worse, Biden won’t start out with much political capital to begin with. After a narrowly won election, not taking the Senate (because many voters rejected Trump but voted for Republicans further down the ballot), and then extended accusations of cheating, it’s not going to be easy to get things done.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › A2 PC not finite

Biden PC is finite and must be used wisely

Young 2020 J.T. Young former director of communications in the Office of Management and Budget under GWB. “Biden's political position is tougher than Trump's” The Hill. 11/28/20. <https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/527809-bidens-political-position-is-tougher-than-trumps> Accessed 1/6/20. ARJH

President-elect Joe Biden faces a tougher political position than President Donald Trump did when he took office. This is because of Biden’s thin congressional margins, a fractious Democratic Party and his limited political capital to address these liabilities. Mathematics’ transitive property does not apply in politics. In math, if A is greater than B, and B is greater than C, then A must be greater than C. In 2016, Hillary Clinton won more votes than Trump; in 2020, Biden won more votes than Clinton. Yet when Biden takes office next year, he will be in a tougher political position than Trump was in 2017. When Trump took office, despite losing the popular vote by two percentage points, Republicans controlled the House with a 241 to 194 majority and the Senate with a 51 to 49 majority. When Biden takes office in 2021, at best he will have the smallest congressional majorities in 20 years. And he may well not even have that. Should Real Clear Politics’s three uncalled races all go to the Republicans (and they currently lead in all three), Democrats would hold just 222 of the House’s 435 seats — allowing them to lose four members on each vote and still pass legislation. In the Senate, Biden needs Democrats to win both of Georgia’s two runoffs to just get to a 50-50 Senate, in which Vice President Kamala Harris could cast the tie-breaking vote. If Democrats lose even one of those races, Republicans will control the chamber. Should that happen, Biden would be the first president since George H. W. Bush in 1989 to enter into office with his party being in the Senate’s minority and without full control of Congress. Without control of the Senate, Biden’s ambitious campaign agenda could be stymied. Even with control by virtue of Harris, Biden could not lose a single Democrat senator’s vote and still pass legislation. In the House, depending on the currently three undecided races’ outcomes, Biden could lose anywhere from just four to seven Democrats and still pass legislation. At best, those are extremely tight squeezes. Some argue that lack of Senate control could help Biden by giving him cover for not achieving the Democratic Party’s left wing’s demands. Still, the left — the biggest block of the party — will expect him to deliver, without reducing demands. After all, Biden promised the left a lot to win the nomination. Coupled with the Democratic Party’s losses in the House and inability to pick up Senate seats, redistricting following the 2020 Census could cost the Democrats up to six seats. The 2020 election is more about Trump’s loss than Biden’s victory. This one-sided dynamic means that many of those who voted for Biden did not support him as much as they opposed Trump. With Trump now dispatched, Biden has his work cut out for him to keep this disparate marriage of convenience together. Evidence of Biden supporters’ lack of attachment to him was clear from polling. On Election Day, Morning Consult published a poll in which 44 percent of Biden voters said their vote was against Trump, while 54 percent said it was for Biden. In contrast, 75 percent of Trump voters supported the president and just 22 percent were voting against Biden. Trump’s presidency proves that a personal base is an invaluable political commodity. Trump’s followers supported him through four years of media and opposition vilification. This year alone, it stuck with him through impeachment, pandemic, economic collapse and summer rioting, increasing his popular vote total by 11 million and leaving him just short of reelection. Personal political power influences politics. So too does its absence. A president with it can wield it for and against others. Trump was able to so quickly gain control of the party because he had it. Without his own substantial personal base, Biden is at a tremendous disadvantage to Trump as he enters office. Certainly, as Biden takes office, there will be an immediate, general good feeling, a desire for normalcy and hope for success. However it happens though, this honeymoon ends quickly and, like a couple, the marriage dependent on a honeymoon for long-term happiness, is in trouble. The question for Biden is whether he can successfully forge a personal attachment with the electorate and then use it to aid him with Congress. His difficulty lies in the fact that this is the opposite of the way the presidential dynamic usually works.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › A2: PC doesn’t spillover

Political capital is finite and decisive.

Cohen ’19 [Jeffrey E; June; Political Science Professor at Fordham University; the President on Capitol Hill: A Theory of Institutional Influence, “Conclusions: Presidential Influence in Congress,” Ch. 11, p. 241-243]

The present study rehabilitates the idea of presidential influence in Congress. Instead of viewing influence as derived from personal characteristics, this study conceptualizes presidential influence in institutional terms. The major finding here is that presidents have a measurable amount of influence. Although presidents do not possess enough influence to dominate Congress, to force the legislature to accede to their every demand, they do possess enough influence to win on a significant number of roll calls that the president's side would otherwise lose. By winning on more roll calls because of this influence, presidents can affect the public policies produced through the legislative process.

This study conducted several types of analyses to estimate the amount of presidential influence. Since it can be hard to isolate causal effects with observational data, this research paired regression with quasi-experimental treatment effects analyses. The treatment effects analysis for the years 1953 to 2012 suggests that when the president takes a roll call position, the president’s side will win an additional 9% of House floor votes, or about five out of the fifty-four roll call positions that presidents take, on average, annually. Although five additional victories may not sound like much, if it leads to five major policy enactments, it may be consequential for the lives of citizens.2

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › Econ decline turns structural inequality

Econ decline causes persecution and repression of minorities

Kanat 12 - the Research Director at the SETA Foundation at Washington DC. He is also an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, Erie. Dr. Kanat received his PhD in Political Science from Syracuse University; a Master’s degree in Political Science from Syracuse University; and a Master’s in International Affairs from Marquette University. He was awarded the Outstanding Research Award and Council of Fellows Faculty Research Award at Penn State, Erie in 2015. He previously participated in the Future Leaders program of Foreign Policy Initiative.

(Kilic, ““War on Terror” as a Diversionary Strategy: Personifying Minorities as Terrorists in the People’s Republic of China”, p508-509, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Routledge)

According to Tir and Jasinski, for the beleaguered leaders, to use force against ethnic minorities and scapegoat them for the domestic problems of the country may be a more favorable option. This strategy is considered both cost effective and less risky for leaders compared to using force against an external other to deflect public attention. Especially, considering the high level of uncertainty in international conflicts and the possible international opposition in the case of an attack on another state, ethnic minority groups provide more secure and less internationalized targets. Again, for these leaders, compared to classical forms of diversionary strategies and the externalization of domestic conflicts, targeting and scapegoating ethnic minorities are more containable, since the targeted group and the conflict or attack would take place within domestic boundaries, and since there is usually a high degree of reluctance among international organizations and other states to become involved in the domestic conflicts of another state, mostly because of the possible ramifications of their policies on their own domestic problems.10 Tir and Jasinski note that although diverting the domestic public’s attention and gaining public support by attacking ethnic minorities can in some cases be extremely costly and risky, due to the possible spread and prolongation of this conflict, it is still a more viable option for many political leaders. Tir and Jasinski call this strategy “domestic-level diversion” and argue that it is not only available to a larger number of leaders, which challenges the US-centric assumption of classical diversionary scholarship, but that it also often presents a less risky course of action than external diversion, 508 Kilic Bugra Kanat which can be considered another attempt to rescue diversionary theory from the use of force and war.11 Tir and Jasinski found that in the period under study, which includes dates between 1996 and 2002, 15 countries used force against minorities at risk (MAR) in each year. This group of countries contains both democratic and authoritarian countries, including Uganda, Israel, Thailand, India, and China; whereas 43 other countries attacked their minorities through most of those years. According to their study, “both economic underperformance and government unpopularity are associated with statistically significant increases in the likelihood of governmental use of force against MAR groups”. 12 In another model in the same study, Tir and Jasinski change the dependent variable to indicate repressive activities against the minorities that fall short of the use of armed force, including arrest and detention of group members, show trials, execution of leaders, resettlement, etc. The result of this model also confirms “that lower intensity repression against MARs is indeed connected with economic underperformance and government unpopularity”. 13

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › AT: Econ Impact D

Best models go NEG.

Gallea and Rohner 21 – Quentin, PhD, postdoctoral researcher in political economy at the University of Zürich. Dominic, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne. “Globalization mitigates the risk of conflict caused by strategic territory”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 118, No. 39, , 09-28-2021

This contrasts with an intellectual tradition of arguing that globalization, business, and trade may—by fostering interdependence—curb the incentives for engaging in domestic and international conflicts. This argument has its roots ranging as far back as the thinking of De Montesquieu [1758 (2)] or Angell [1909 (3)], has been refined verbally by an array of “liberalist” scholars in international relations (see the survey in ref. 4), and has recently been scrutinized in formal game-theoretical models (see, e.g., refs. 5 and 6).

While a small body of empirical research has linked trade to interstate wars (4, 5, 7, 8), the arguably even more pressing question of how globalization and trade affect domestic conflicts has received even less attention.† This is a major gap in the literature, given that since World War II, roughly 80 to 90% of wars have been within rather than between states (11). Hence, the goal of the current article is to study the question of how places close to strategically important trade routes may be more or less subject to civil conflict and how their fate is affected by surges in globalization.‡

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › AT: Econ Impact D

Defense doesn’t assume the post-COVID landscape – the globe’s a tinderbox, primed for conflict

Labott 21 – Elise, Adjunct Professor at American University’s School of International Service, Columnist at Foreign Policy, MA in Media Studies, New School for Social Research, BA in International Relations from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. “Get Ready for a Spike in Global Unrest”, Foreign Policy, , 07-22-2021

To call 2021 the summer of discontent would be a severe understatement. From Cuba to South Africa to Colombia to Haiti, often violent protests are sweeping every corner of the globe as angry citizens are taking to the streets.

Each country has different histories and realities on the ground, particularly in Haiti, where years of violence and government corruption culminated two weeks ago in the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. But they all faced a perfect storm of preexisting social, economic, and political hardships, which fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic only inflamed further. And they are merely a foreshadowing of the post-coronavirus global tinderbox that’s looming as existing tensions in countries across the world morph into broader civil unrest and uprisings against economic hardships and inequality deepened by the pandemic.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › Block – Econ decline turns China

Specifically, economic decline causes China to press its claims in the SCS.

Bapat 20 – Navin, a Professor in International Relations. He received a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Michigan in 1998 and pursued graduate studies at Rice University, where he received an M.A. (2000) and a PhD (2004) in political science. “Will COVID-19 Cause a War? Understanding the Case of the U.S. and China”, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 26, No. 3, , 08-19-2020

We therefore see that COVID-19 may cause a decline in U.S. economic power, which may undermine its military readiness and ability to support future economic gains. However, the next question is: does the PRC seek to challenge the U.S. for global primacy, and if so, why? In his speech to the Communist Party in 2017, President Xi Jinping claimed that China should now, “take center stage in the world.”4 A key part in of this effort is represented by Xi’s 2013 Belt and Road Initiative (OBOR), which seeks to extend the PRC’s economic, political, and cultural influence throughout south Asia to the Middle East and into Europe. The OBOR utilizes the newly created Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), an alternative to the World Bank, to finance infrastructure projects throughout the different regions (Liao and McDowell 2016). From the power transition standpoint, it therefore appears that the PRC is developing a string of assets and bases extending from the Pacific through the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf. Numerous U.S. military planners view these developments as a deliberative effort to undermine U.S. power and influence in both the Pacific and Middle East theaters.

In theoretical terms, if we accept that the OBOR represents an effort by the PRC (the rising power) to supplant the U.S., war could still be avoided if the power transition moves at a relatively slower rate. Powell’s (2006) model establishes that dominant powers only initiate preemptive war if they are declining at precipitous rates. This is where COVID-19 poses a significant threat. Since the outbreak, the U.S. economy has declined by 4.8%, and the U.S. is borrowing from its future at high levels.5 If the PRC wanted to challenge the US for supremacy, this would be the time, and there is some evidence that the PRC is exploiting the opportunity. Beginning in May 2020, the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) is engaging in repeated clashes with the Indian Armed Forces in the Ladekh region as part of a longstanding border dispute.6 As of July 2020, China is coming close to forming a strategic partnership with Iran. The pact would give the PRC a foothold in the Middle East, secure discounted oil, and perhaps allow for more oil trades to be settled in non-dollar denominations. This effort is in spite of significant strategic interests in the region and growing hostilities between Washington and Tehran.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › Economy Mod

Turns every impact

Kemp 12 – Geoffrey, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, Served in the White House Under Ronald Reagan, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East”, pg. 233-234, Brookings Institution Press, 06-14-2012

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › Economy Mod

It causes terrorism, civil wars, and diversion that go global – nothing checks

Liu 18 – Dr. Qian, PhD in Economics from Uppsala University, Former Visiting Researcher at the University of California, Berkeley, Managing Director for Greater China at The Economist Group, Guest Lecturer at New York University, Tsinghua University, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Fudan University. “The Next Economic Crisis Could Cause A Global Conflict. Here's Why”, World Economic Forum, , 11-13-2018

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising income inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict.

The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › Economy Mod

Decline cascades – nuclear war.

Maavak 21 – Dr. Mathew, PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, External Researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University, Expert and Regular Commentator on Risk-Related Geostrategic Issues at the Russian International Affairs Council. “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?”, Salus Journal, The Australian Journal for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, Vol. 9, No. 1, pg. 2-8, , 04-14-2021

Various scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Onceinexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals.

Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › Economy Mod

Prove It Act will revitalize and promote US economic growth.

March 15 2023 Bipartisan Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism - A Political Unicorn? https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2023/03/15/bipartisan-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanisma-political-unicorn/?sh=5e657edc68df

For the US, the CBAM has a significant potential to revitalize and promote the domestic economy, especially many industrial sectors that have struggled recently. According to the Climate Leadership Council, US goods are “40% more carbon efficient than the world average,” and over three times more carbon efficient than China. Implementing CBAM legislation would further improve US competitiveness by monetizing its relative efficiency. It would also bring back a significant amount of business and may improve the decades-long huge trade deficit between Washington and Beijing.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › Warming turns structural violence

Climate turns structural violence.

Eric Bonds, Department of Sociology and Anthropology University of Mary Washington, Virginia, United States, 2015, Upending Climate Violence Research: Fossil Fuel Corporations and the Structural Violence of Climate Change, , Xoxo 6/5/2020

There is a high-profile body of work asserting a link between anthropogenic climate change and increased rates of violence. There is also an expanding literature that is highly skeptical of this research. Critics point out that (1) this research has so far produced widely divergent findings, and that there is no consensus on a causal link between climate and the incidence of conflict. Critics also argue that much climate violence research (2) draws upon a longdiscredited environmental determinism, (3) rehashes colonial stereotypes of the global South, (4) naturalizes and depoliticizes inequalities within and between nations, and (5) potentially creates new rationales for militarism and intervention from more powerful states. In the following essay, I build on these critiques, arguing that orthodox climate conflict research also focuses unduly on the potential climate-related violence of the poor, overlooking the violence of the powerful. Drawing from a climate justice perspective, I advocate for more study on the structural violence of climate change. To make this case, I focus on the world’s largest publicly traded fossil fuel companies. Keywords: climate conflict, climate justice, fossil fuel corporations, fossil fuel divestment, structural violence Introduction Will climate change make the world a more violent place? This is one of the more important questions of our time. There are a growing number of warnings coming from influential places about the relationship between climate change and violence. The United States government, for instance, has increasingly labeled global warming a “threat multiplier” (Banusiewicz, 2014; CNA, 2007). 1 Author contact: ebonds@umw.edu. Human Ecology Review, Volume 22, Number 2, 2016 4 Additionally, prominent journalists and policy analysts at important think tanks and advocacy groups have worked to highlight potential connections between global warming and conflict (see for instance EJF, 2014; Friedman, 2013; Werrell & Fernia, 2013). And headlines at major newspapers, for example in the Washington Post, report “there’s a surprisingly strong link between climate change and violence” (Mooney, 2014). But how we answer the question—“will climate change create a more violent future?”—has much to do with the definitions we use. On one hand, the jury is very much out in terms of proving a causal relationship between climate change and increasing conflict. While some research, published in some of the world’s most prestigious journals, has found what the authors describe as a strong link between climatic changes and rates of violence (see Burke et al., 2009; Hsiang et al., 2013), other research, sometimes published in the same journals, has found no such correlation (Buhaug, 2010a, 2010b; Wischnath & Buhaug, 2014). There is, in fact, no consensus among quantitative researchers about the existence of a causal link between changes in temperature and rainfall and increasing violence (Buhaug, 2015; Selby, 2014). As the body of research on a potential climate violence relationship has grown, so too has the number of its critics. An increasing number of authors worry that quantitative climate conflict research, as the next reincarnation of a long-discredited environmental determinism, is simply old wine in a new bottle (Hartmann, 2014; Raleigh et al., 2014). Moreover, according to critics, this research draws upon colonial stereotypes of the global South, implying that its peoples are somehow more predisposed to violence than those of European ancestry (Livingstone, 2015; Raleigh et al., 2014; Selby, 2014; Verhoeven, 2014). Finally, this research implies that the violence of poor people in the most peripheral areas of the global economy is “natural,” hiding from view the ways that histories of colonialism and the contemporary global political economy have conditioned and produced violent conflict (Hartmann, 2010, 2014; Verhoeven, 2011, 2014). Why, given all these problems, has orthodox climate conflict research continued to flourish, and to enjoy such a high public profile? Critics warn that this is because the perspective so closely matches, and is so useful to, governments that are securitizing the issue of climate change and using it as a means to legitimate militarism and ongoing interventions in the global South (Hartmann, 2010, 2014; Selby, 2014; Verhoeven, 2014). Given all the problems with orthodox climate violence research, does this mean that it is safe to say that climate change will not make the world a more violent place? Hardly. I advance instead that anthropogenic climate change is itself a kind of violence (Solnit, 2014). After all, it will certainly cause early deaths and it will drive people from their homes and homelands, all of which will cause untold suffering. Drawing upon a climate justice perspective, I provide here a brief overview of orthodox climate conflict research and further describe its Upending Climate Violence Research 5 critics’ concerns. I add to their critique by arguing that this body of research, as a whole, focuses almost exclusively on the potential violence of the poor, overlooking the violence of the wealthy and powerful groups who benefit most from, and actively work to sustain, a fossil fuel–dependent neoliberal capitalism. To begin amending this bias in the climate violence literature, I draw upon work in sociology, green criminology, and geography to argue that major fossil fuel companies are disproportionately responsible for, and have disproportionately benefited from, the structural violence of climate change.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › Warming turns democracy

Warming turns democracy

Samuel Miller, 7-30-2018, [Samuel Miller McDonald studies climate and energy politics at Oxford University.], "This May Be the Most Overlooked Threat of Climate Change," New Republic, , Xoxo 7/14/2020

National crises make governments vulnerable to autocracy—a rather obvious assessment, perhaps, but one rarely seen in debates about climate change. Take the Maldives, an atoll nation in the Indian Ocean. Rising seawater is projected to consume most, if not all, of the country this century. In 2008, the Maldives chose its first democratically elected president, Mohamed Nasheed. Almost immediately, he made climate change preparations central to his administration. He announced plans to move 360,000 Maldivian citizens to new homelands in Sri Lanka, India, or Australia, and he promised to make the Maldives the world’s first carbon-neutral country. Nasheed also demonstrated a flair for the dramatic, staging an underwater Cabinet meeting that turned him into a viral climate celebrity. “What we need to do is nothing short of decarbonizing the entire global economy,” he said. “If man can walk on the moon, we can unite to defeat our common carbon enemy.” In 2012, the military deposed Nasheed, forcing him to flee the country at gunpoint after mass protests over economic stagnation and spikes in commodity prices. His eventual successor, Abdulla Yameen, has since suspended parts of the constitution, giving himself sweeping powers to arrest and detain opponents, including two of the country’s five Supreme Court justices and even his own half-brother. Meanwhile, Yameen has tossed out Nasheed’s climate adaptation plans and rejected renewable energy programs, proposing instead to build new islands and economic free zones attractive to a global elite. “We do not need cabinet meetings underwater,” his environment minister told The Guardian. “We do not need to go anywhere. We need development.” If any lesson can be drawn from the power struggle in the Maldives, it is that people who feel threatened by an outside force, be it foreign invaders or rising tides, often seek reassurance. That reassurance may come in the form of a strongman leader, someone who tells them all will be well, the economy will soar, the sea walls hold. People must only surrender their elections, or their due process, until the crisis is resolved. This is perhaps the most overlooked threat of climate change: Major shifts in the global climate could give rise to a new generation of authoritarian rulers, not just in poorer countries or those with weak democratic institutions, but in wealthy industrialized nations, too. Number of the Maldives’ inhabited islands that flood annually: 37 of 185 Number that will eventually need to be abandoned: 61 The Maldives’ Freedom House Rating: Dropped 20 percentage points since Nasheed was deposed Sources: The United Nations; The Guardian; Freedom House Refugee crises, famine, drought—these are materials strongmen can use to build power. Already, strife and civil instability are spreading throughout the global South, with droughts and floods stoking conflict and refugee crises in parts of Africa and the Middle East. According to a 2016 paper in Science, climate change will increase the risk of armed conflict across Africa by 50 percent by 2030. Eastern Africa is particularly vulnerable. The genocidal strife in Darfur is one of the bloodiest examples, but even countries with robust economies and democracies are susceptible. In Kenya, for example, a crippling drought has led to rapid inflation of food prices, doubling the number of food-insecure people since 2014. That, and disputes over who owns land in the Laikipia region, north of Nairobi, has contributed to violent clashes there, threatening the political stability of the country. This has enabled Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta to tighten his grip on power. In October, amid reports that he’d rigged a recent presidential election, Kenyatta declared the drought a national disaster—this, just weeks before the next round of voting. He was reelected and, amid continued chaos, has cracked down on his opponents in the media. It’s not just developing nations that are at risk of opportunistic climate-fueled authoritarianism. Wealthy countries may possess the resources to insulate themselves from the near-term physical impacts of climate change—they can afford sea walls, emergency services, and air conditioning. But when conflicts over resources break out in the developing world, they are bound to generate crises that spill into wealthier countries. Refugee crises, famine, drought—these are materials strongmen can use to build power. Civil instability is already spreading in the global South. A study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in 2015 drew a direct link between the 2007–2010 drought in the greater Fertile Crescent, which “exacerbated existing water and agricultural insecurity and caused massive agricultural failures and livestock mortality,” and Syria’s 2011 civil war, which has forced millions of people to seek refuge in Europe. Their arrival has helped fuel antidemocratic movements throughout the continent. “Even the specter of refugee crises and population movements can impact attitudes toward authoritarianism,” said Jonathan Weiler, co-author of Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics. These fears aren’t going away: According to a 2017 study published in The Lancet, extreme weather could displace up to a billion people around the world by the middle of the twenty-first century—an unprecedented human migration will undoubtedly influence the politics of wealthy countries, pushing them to the right. The best way to counteract this phenomenon is naturally to halt, or at least slow, the effects of climate change. So far, the Paris agreement is the only tangible result of those efforts, and its fate is far from certain, with the United States threatening to withdraw. But this might change, if the problems caused by climate change—not just stronger hurricanes, droughts, and rising seas, but political rupture—keep washing up on the disappearing shorelines of wealthy governments.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › Warming turns Russia

Climate change is the biggest internal link to Russia strategic decisions.

Cyrus Newlin and Heather A. Conley, 1-13-2021, [Cyrus Newlin Associate Fellow, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program; Heather A. Conley Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic; and Director, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program], "Climate Change Will Reshape Russia," No Publication, , Xoxo 3.25.2021

When U.S. policymakers ponder Russia’s trajectory, they tend to focus on the leadership and longevity of President Vladimir Putin and the nature of his regime, on the Kremlin’s growing authoritarian tendencies at home and the poisoning of opposition figures, on Russia’s nuclear arsenal and cyber capabilities, or on Russia’s projection of power abroad, from election interference to military interventions in Ukraine and Syria. Rarely does climate change make the shortlist. Yet it is climate change, as much as any one politician or set of policies, that will exert the strongest force on Russia’s strategic future, reshaping its politics, economy, and society for decades to come. Russia is warming 2.5 times faster than the rest of the world. In 2020, regions across Russia have experienced the hottest temperatures on record, contributing to forest fires that burned through acreage the size of Greece and emitted one-third more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere than in 2019 (Russian forests account for one-fifth of the world’s total). Flash floods in Siberia destroyed entire villages and displaced thousands of residents. Snow coverage was at a record low in 2020, and Arctic sea ice coverage shrank to its second-lowest extent in over 40 years. Permafrost, which covers nearly two-thirds of Russian territory, is rapidly thawing. More dramatic freeze-thaw cycles in the subsoil are eroding urban infrastructure in Russia’s Arctic cities, home to over 2 million people, and pose a mounting risk to Russia’s 200,000 kilometers of oil and gas pipelines, not to mention thousands of miles of roads and rail lines bridging some of Russia’s widest rivers. Permafrost thaw recently toppled a diesel storage tank near the Arctic city of Norilsk, spilling 21,000 tons of diesel into the Ambarnaya river and surrounding subsoil. It has been linked to outbreaks of anthrax and the discovery of vast methane craters. At its current rate of thaw—about 1 degree Celsius per decade—Russia’s permafrost layer will stop freezing completely in three decades. This could result in a potentially catastrophic, one-off release of carbon into the atmosphere which will no longer be Russia’s problem alone. According to one study, a 30 to 99 percent reduction in near-surface permafrost would release an additional 10 to 240 billion tons of carbon and methane into the atmosphere and potentially put the globe “over the brink” by 2100. Russia is already the fourth-largest emitter of greenhouse gases, accounting for 4.6 percent of all global emissions. Its per capita emissions are among the highest in the world—53 percent higher than China, and 79 percent higher than the European Union. Dramatic shifts in global weather patterns, accelerated by warming Arctic waters and a diminishing ice cap, are expected to increase droughts in Russia’s rich southern agricultural “bread basket” regions encompassing Stavropol and Rostov. This could pose food security risks and threaten a primary Russian export: wheat. Though climate change will expand arable land in Russia in its northern latitudes, the northern topsoil tends to be thinner and more acidic than in Russia’s most productive southern regions and would not make up for its losses. In fact, arable land shrank by more than half to just 120,000 acres in 2017. In June of this year, regional officials in Stravopol, one of Russia’s major wheat regions, projected a remarkable 40 percent decline in wheat crop in 2020 as a result of droughts. This too has global implications: Russia is a core part of global food chains, accounting for 20 percent of global wheat exports, so climate disruption to Russian agricultural output will have strong effects well beyond Russia’s borders and budget coffers. As agriculture shifts north, scientists are concerned that the cultivation of carbon-rich soils will create a separate carbon feedback loop and expedite global warming. The Economics of Climate Change in Russia The threat to the Russian economy from climate change is twofold. An increase in droughts, floods, wildfires, permafrost damage, and disease could lower GDP by 3 percent annually in the next decade, according to Russia’s Audit Chamber. Climate damage to buildings and infrastructure alone could cost Russia up to 9 trillion rubles ($99 billion) by 2050, according to Deputy Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic Alexander Krutikov. Meanwhile, Russia’s overreliance on hydrocarbon production is a conspicuous vulnerability as the world shifts toward low-carbon sources of energy and carbon neutrality. Natural gas and Arctic liquified natural gas may serve as bridge for Russia into a lower-carbon future, but global demand for gas is expected to be in sharp decline by mid-century. Russia’s top-down federal policy strongly favors state-led and managed industrial oil and gas giants. Though Russia has immense potential as a source of renewable energy, the share of renewables in Russia’s energy mix is negligible—under 0.1 percent for wind, solar, and geothermal—and there are no clear plans to invest significantly in their growth. Nor do current strategy documents foresee a major growth in nuclear and hydropower, which currently account for 36 percent of Russia’s electricity mix but under current plans will only climb to 43 percent by 2050. (To limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, renewables must account for 70-85 percent of global electricity by 2050.) How Is the Russian Government Responding? Russian climate policy at the federal and regional level is nascent and is handicapped by thinly stretched budgets. The need to respond to more environmental disasters with less money is becoming a growing friction point between regional governments and Moscow. An expected increase in extreme weather events and infrastructure degradation requires proactive planning and significant long-term investments into infrastructure modernization and resilience, forest management, and other adaptive measures, but regional governments are chronically under resourced and heavily in debt (some regions have begun to fall into bankruptcy). A reduction in international hydrocarbon demand will further constrict the federal budget just as the material costs of climate change will begin a parabolic ascent. This shrinking budget is abetted by chronic corruption and public service mismanagement—issues which, unlike climate change, are politically front and center in the minds of Russians. All of these dynamics fuel a very public blame game between regional political elite, business, and federal authorities over who bears the financial and moral responsibility for managing the consequences of climate change. Putin himself has offered mixed messaging on global warming, acknowledging for the first time only in October 2019 that global warming was a result of human activities, but just a month later he cast doubt on the prospects of a global shift to renewable energy, stating, “When these ideas of reducing energy production to zero or relying only on solar or wind power are promoted, I think humanity could once again end up in caves, simply because it won’t consume anything.” Though a growing chorus of officials are voicing concern about the economic consequences of a changing climate for Russia, the prevailing view remains one of passive resignation or misguided optimism. Some officials recognize the reality of climate change but contend that it is beyond Russia’s means to resolve and that Russia should therefore extract revenue from its abundant hydrocarbon resources while there is still global demand. Others believe Russia will benefit economically from warmer temperatures by way of an increase in arable land and greater use the Northern Sea Route for commercial shipping—a bet that makes dangerous assumptions about the ability of Russia to replace energy exports with agriculture and presumes as-yet-unproven sustained commercial interest in an Arctic shipping route. This policy ambivalence is encapsulated in Russia’s approach to the Paris climate accord. Russia signed on to the agreement in 2019 in an apparent recognition of the threat, but because it used 1990 as its benchmark, a year when the country was still part of the Soviet Union and emitted nearly 2.4 billion tons of carbon, Russia can effectively increase its emissions over the next decade and still meet its 30 percent reduction target. Russia’s emissions are set to rise through the next decade, according to a Ministry of Economic Development strategy document published in March 2020. Legislation introduced in 2019 as part of Russia’s ratification of the Paris Agreement would have instituted emissions quotas and carbon pricing, but lobbying efforts by the influential Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs significantly diluted the bill, resulting in weaker provisions on emissions reporting and the elimination of a national carbon trading system and penalties for polluters. How Is Russian Society Responding? The environment is front of mind for Russians. According to a January 2020 survey by the independent Levada Center, environmental degradation was named the biggest threat to humanity in the twenty-first century (48 percent), followed by international terrorism (42 percent) and wars (37 percent). Of Russia’s environmental challenges, respondents viewed air pollution as the most important in a year that set new records for instances of hazardous air quality in Russia, due in part to wildfires and industrial pollution. Yet the immediacy of local environmental challenges in Russia—from air pollution to waste management practice to wildfires—has not translated into broader apprehension about global warming or activism to change public policy. An April 2020 Ipsos survey found that only 13 percent of Russians ranked climate as the most important environmental issue facing their country—well below the world average of 37 percent. Russians were also comparatively less concerned about future energy sources and choices and held the lowest overall levels of support for government action to combat climate change. One contributing factor to this seeming contradiction is likely the tightening of Russia’s civic space. The imposition of “foreign agent” laws has hollowed out environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Russia and muffled voices sounding the alarm on global warming. Public support for environmental NGOs has declined in recent years even as a growing number of Russians are ready to protest over local environmental issues. Economic realities also contribute. Years of anemic economic growth, the dual shocks of Covid-19 and low oil prices, and a tight-fisted approach to fiscal stimulus has reduced the average Russian’s household wealth. The Kremlin is prioritizing jumpstarting the economy by supercharging its hydrocarbon and industrial model. For many Russians who are just getting by financially, issues such as price hikes, unemployment, and inequality supplant concern over climate change. Despite a more repressive political climate, there has been an uptick in environment-related protests in recent years. In April 2019, thousands turned out in the Arctic region of Arkhangelsk to protest the construction of a new landfill for Moscow’s ballooning waste. That summer, over 2,000 people turned out in the Ural city of Yekaterinburg to protest the construction of a church in one of the city’s few remaining green spaces. More recently, in Bashktorstan, in Russia’s southern Urals region, protests erupted over a local company’s plans to mine a rare limestone hill regarded as sacred by local residents. In general, the landscape for environmental activism in Russia is more fluid and decentralized than in the West, with informal protest groups springing up around specific, local issues and then dissipating. But though protests have been local, it is not coincidental that Russia’s Arctic, Siberian, and Far East regions—where the impacts of climate change will be concentrated—are also bearing the brunt of chronic economic underdevelopment. Importantly, these same regions are traditionally more independently political minded and less supportive of Kremlin-backed initiatives. Change Is Coming to Russia Externally Although many Russian officials will continue to emphasize the economic opportunities of climate change and downplay its consequences for Russia, they are growing concerned about the sweeping changes being made to the climate policies of major export markets, particularly the European Union, with its ambitious plans for a New Green Deal and target for carbon neutrality by 2050. An EU plan to introduce a carbon border adjustment tax, which in a baseline scenario would cost Russian exporters 33 billion euros by 2030, has forced Russian firms to confront the reality of a global shift toward low-carbon development and the rising the cost of their emissions. China, meanwhile, has pledged to be carbon neutral by 2060. A new economic reality is gaining a toehold: in December 2020, Deputy Finance Minister Vladimir Kolychev acknowledged that global peak oil demand may have passed and indicated his ministry was preparing for extended lower budget revenues (oil and gas sales account for roughly one-third of federal budget revenue). The Russian energy and industrial lobby remain influential voices against carbon emission quotas and are a primary cause of domestic climate policy stasis, but a growing number of Russian companies, including some hydrocarbon producers such as Novatek and more internationally exposed firms such as Lukoil, are moving ahead of the government to cut emissions and address sustainability issues. They have been given a push by international financial institutions and growing investor requirements for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) metrics. Some of Russia’s largest companies are making expensive investments into improving their sustainability ranking as low scores hit others in the pocket. Polyus, Russia’s largest gold producer, and Novatek were upgraded to an ESG ranking of “A” in 2020—ahead of many industry peers. Change Has Already Arrived Climate change will continue to compel change within Russia whether its leaders acknowledge the issue or not. The most immediate and significant thrust for change within Russia will come from the outside, as major energy export markets accelerate their environmental policies. This poses an existential threat to Russia’s economic model of hydrocarbon and mineral export, a threat heightened by years of weak domestic growth and a global economy suppressed by the pandemic. But change is also occurring from within, as climate-linked environmental disasters take their toil and as scarce state resources fail to address the growing frequency and magnitude of infrastructure decay, wildfires, local pollution, and other climate-related challenges, fueling protests and increasing tensions between regional governors and Moscow. The Russian Arctic, in particular, will be a case study in how climate change, regional political dynamics, and Russia’s economic ambitions interact, as businessmen, regional officials, and federal ministers, including key members of the Kremlin’s inner circle, jockey for state development resources but defer responsibility for funding disaster recovery and climate resilience. Our research and analysis must determine how climate change and climate policies—both internally and externally—will shape Russia’s future, and, in the near term, how the Kremlin and its fossil fuel export-based economy will—or will not—respond.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › Warming turns hegemony

Warming turns hegemony—Climate change military overstretch

AP 2009—Fox News, August 9, 2009, “Report: Climate Change Could Warrant U.S. Military Action.,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/elections/2009/08/09/report-climate-change-warrant-military-action

Climate change will pose profound challenges to the United States in the coming decades, raising the prospect of military intervention to deal with its effects, The New York Times reported, citing military and intelligence analysts. Crises such as drought, violent storms, mass migration and pandemics could topple governments, feed terrorist movements or destabilize entire regions. The Times reported that for the first time, intelligence agencies and the Pentagon are taking a hard look at the possible security implications resulting from climate change. In particular, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, will face the prospect of food shortages, water crises and catastrophic flooding driven by climate change that could call for U.S. military response. The U.S. military also faces a direct challenge with climate change, the Times reported, because many of its installations are vulnerable to storm surges and rising seas and plans to protect naval stations in Norfolk, Va., and San Diego, Calif., are already underway. "The sense that climate change poses security and geopolitical challenges is central to the thinking of the State Department and the climate office," said Peter Ogden, chief of staff to Todd Stern, the State Department's top climate negotiator. A U.S. government study of glaciers released Thursday said climate change is melting America's glaciers at the fastest rate in recorded history, exposing the country to higher risks of drought and rising sea levels. "The observations show that the melt rate has definitely increased over the past 10 or 15 years," Ed Josberger, a USGS scientist, said. "This certainly is a very strong indicator that climate change is occurring and its effects on glaciers are virtually worldwide."

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › Warming turns China

Warming turns China - creates rationale for conflict

Derek Bolton, 2-17-2012, "Shifting Winds in the South China Sea," Foreign Policy In Focus, , Xoxo 7/14/2020

The South China Sea, although far from tranquil, has yet to revert to the volatility and violence witnessed in the late 1980s. However, current efforts to maintain stability and implement confidence-building measures could soon be overtaken by environmental changes in the region. As global warming takes its toll on the South China Sea (SCS), it has begun to redefine the very nature and physical characteristics of the region. These transformations have the potential to further escalate the already heightened competition among states, increasing the likelihood of conflict. As noted by Will Rogers in a report by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), climate change could indeed “act as an accelerant to destabilization.” A Bevy of Disputes The waters, islands, and resources of the SCS have been hotly contested among the littoral states of Southeast Asia in recent decades. Overlapping claims to maritime jurisdictions, Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZs), and various islands have been further complicated by rising nationalism in the region. Recent and ongoing discoveries of significant natural resources — including fish stocks, minerals, natural gas, and oil reserves — have only reinforced territorial claims and buttressed hard-line positions. China, Vietnam, and Taiwan all lay claim to the entirety of the SCS, while the Philippines claims a significant portion as well. In addition to contradicting one another, these claims also tend to overlap with the EEZs of other countries in the region. Other quarrels abound. Vietnam and China have yet to resolve an ongoing bilateral dispute over their competing territorial claims to the Paracel Islands, though China has maintained effective control of the islands since 1974. Meanwhile the Spratly Islands are engulfed in a multilateral dispute among China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Malaysia, all of whom maintain overlapping claims to various features of the islands. Some progress has been made establishing mechanisms to at least manage the potential outbreak of conflict, such as the 2002 Declaration of Conduct. Other confidence-building measures have met with reasonable success, though these have also been unable to address the underlying causes of the disputes. Environmental vicissitudes could potentially negate what progress has been achieved thus far. In his CNAS report, Rogers strives to evaluate how concerns over global warming — and especially its effects on resource development — affect the foreign policies of SCS states. This specifically applies to fish stocks, the growing demand for alternative forms of energy, and the recent influx of droughts in the region. Shifting Seas, Rising Tides As CNAS scholar M. Taylor Fravel notes, SCS countries have in part sought to assert their territorial claims through commercial fishing — or, in the case of China, by challenging the commercial activities of other states. This has already led to a number of confrontations between countries, a worrisome development given the rising naval capabilities in the region. For example, in 2010, diplomatic relations between China and Japan were temporarily suspended after a Chinese fishing vessel rammed a Japanese patrol boat. The effects of global warming may further complicate this situation. As sea temperatures in the SCS continue to rise, large quantities of fish will migrate north into even more heavily disputed waters. As fishermen are forced to follow suit, the probability of future confrontations will increase, raising the likelihood of a more serious conflict. Moreover, the level of fishing required to maintain present per capita consumption would need to increase 25 percent by 2030. This will lead to higher levels of fishing in an increasingly smaller and more volatile segment of the SCS. The fact that present-day fishing, which is more dispersed and less abundant, has already led to near outbreaks of conflict does not bode well for the future. Droughts and water contamination have also become a growing problem in Southeast Asia. In Vietnam, concerted development efforts have led to increased pollution and a constrained freshwater supply. These concerns are exacerbated by rising sea levels and the corresponding increase in sodium deposits on the mainland, which is detrimental to agriculture. With Vietnam’s development efforts centered partially on increased agricultural exports, the country cannot afford such setbacks. Meanwhile, China’s hydroelectric power output was set to decline by 30-40 percent by the end of 2011 due to increased droughts. Accordingly, China is now seeking to double the number of its hydroelectric dams on the Mekong River, aiming to construct four new dams by 2020. China is pressing on in spite of protests from countries downstream that rely heavily on water from the Mekong for agriculture, especially Vietnam and Thailand. With Vietnam already struggling to maintain adequate levels of clean water, future cutbacks could be devastating. China’s disregard for the needs of other countries with respect to the Mekong River does not bode well for its behavior in the SCS. Alternative Forms of Energy As evidenced by China’s intensified development of hydroelectric power, concerns over climate change have led to increased investment in alternative forms of energy in the region. Although greener for the environment, this poses distinct geopolitical challenges. Not least is the threat of nuclear proliferation in the region as countries seek to limit their dependence on oil. Vietnam plans to harness nearly 1,000 Megawatts (MWs) of nuclear power by 2020, 4,000 MWs by 2025, and 10,000 MWs by 2030. Indonesia and Thailand are set to achieve similar goals by 2020. This will inevitably foster fears over the possible military applications of nuclear programs, especially given the already hostile environment and intense competition in the region. Although the IAEA and a regional non-proliferation regime might help reduce tensions, nuclear reactors may further complicate an already complicated environment. The countries of the region have considerable reason to reduce their dependence on oil. Oil exploitation in the SCS is both expensive and politically risky (if not impossible), and oil imported from the increasingly unstable Middle East must pass through the narrow and vulnerable straits of Malacca. However, all nations in the region will continue to actively pursue oil reserves in the sea, both for export and domestic consumption, even if demand is reduced. Vietnam, for example, could see oil exports as a way to offset its faltering agricultural sector. Moreover, as economies in the region continue to grow, so too will the demand for energy. New investments in alternative energy will also lead to increased demand for the minerals associated with such technology, which can be found in abundance in the SCS. States developing these technologies will be driven to compete for these resources. Consequently, energy competition will be driven not merely by oil and natural gas, but also by rising demand for alternative energy.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › Warming turns China

But Warming Turns US-China War

Hal Brands, 08/19/2019, [Hal Brands is a Bloomberg columnist and a professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.], "To meet China challenge, the U.S. has to fight climate change," Japan Times, , Xoxo 8/10/2020

WASHINGTON – The two greatest challenges for American statecraft in the 21st century are becoming more severe — and seemingly pulling the United States in opposing directions. Relations with China are deteriorating by the day, presaging a prolonged competition over the shape of global order. Meanwhile, the worsening effects of climate change — demonstrated by the shocking melting of ice in Greenland this summer — are invoking the specter of ecological catastrophe. And while dealing with the changing climate will undoubtedly require cooperation between Beijing and Washington — the world’s two largest emitters of greenhouse gases — winning the geopolitical struggle with China will require the U.S. to take a harder-edged, more competitive approach. Statecraft is the art of reconciling the apparently irreconcilable, and the U.S. need not abandon either its environmental or its geopolitical objectives. But Washington must navigate between two bad strategies to execute the right one. The need to balance climate-change diplomacy with sharpening geopolitical rivalry is relatively new. After the end of the Cold War, climate-change diplomacy was conducted on the assumption that the geopolitical conflicts of previous eras had receded, easing the inevitable tradeoffs created by a process that required asymmetric economic sacrifices. “Most nations worry about the same global threats,” U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said a few months before the United Nations climate-change summit in Copenhagen in 2009; the U.S. could lead by “uniting diverse partners around common concerns.” Today, by contrast, the zero-sum aspects of the U.S.-China relationship are prominent, forcing thoughtful policymakers to consider how to approach climate-change diplomacy in a more competitive world. The Trump administration, of course, has largely dodged this challenge, by amping up confrontation with China while essentially abandoning the Paris accords and international climate-change diplomacy. But denying that a problem exists will not make it go away, and so Trump’s abdication is deferring the challenge to his successor. At a strategic level, there are three basic options for managing the simultaneous intensification of climate change and U.S.-China rivalry. The first (bad) idea, which flows naturally from the “America First” mentality that brought Trump to power, is that the U.S. should simply de-emphasize multilateral diplomacy on climate change. China, the thinking goes, is the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide. So it should not be allowed to transfer the global costs of adaptation to the U.S. by forcing Washington to make bigger, earlier cuts than China in its own greenhouse gas emissions, as stipulated in the U.S.-China bilateral agreement of 2014. More important, the long-term effects of climate change will supposedly hurt a badly polluted China more than a comparatively clean America. As climate change imposes mounting social and economic costs on China, the U.S. will reap a competitive advantage. This approach, however, is short-sighted and wrong-headed. According to one recent study, the U.S. will actually pay a significantly higher economic price than China as climate change progresses. In fact, Beijing’s authoritarian system might prove better than America’s messy democracy at undertaking the vast engineering projects — constructing seawalls, for instance — that are needed to mitigate the effects. This approach would also be diplomatically disastrous: Key allies, especially in Europe, will not sign up for a counter-China coalition if they perceive that Washington, rather than Beijing, is thwarting effective climate-change diplomacy. And even if the U.S. did out-compete China in a dramatically warming world, the victory would prove Pyrrhic indeed. A second bad strategy would move to the other extreme, making geopolitical concessions in hopes of getting Beijing to cooperate on a more aggressive global program to slow climate change. The Obama administration was sometimes accused of taking this approach in the run-up to Copenhagen in 2009 and Paris in 2015, although former officials have rejected this allegation. But the basic temptation will be there, particularly for progressives who are inclined to prioritize environment over geopolitics. In this scenario, a post-Trump president might mute U.S.-Chinese disputes over Taiwan or the South China Sea as a way of getting an agreement that would commit Beijing to more aggressively curb its emissions. Yet this strategy ignores that the Chinese government is a ruthlessly self-interested, Leninist party-state. It will address climate change — or not — based primarily on its assessment of whether doing so will bring benefits to China and the Chinese Communist Party. This calculus probably will lead — and already has led — to greater Chinese concern with climate issues, given China’s enormous environmental problems and the high economic and social costs that a warming globe will impose on Beijing. But if the U.S. makes unrelated concessions in hopes of moving Beijing farther and faster on climate, it will simply give China’s rulers incentive to pocket those concessions while never quite delivering on climate — so that they can keep extracting more concessions. A climate-first strategy may or may not benefit the environment, but it will cost the U.S. dearly in geopolitical terms. The question, then, is whether the U.S. can take a third route: Competing fiercely while preserving cooperation where interests align. This idea may seem counterintuitive. Yet history suggests that, while hard, is not impossible. During the Cold War, Washington and Moscow clashed far more dangerously than Washington and Beijing are jousting today. Yet they worked together on certain shared interests. They pursued smallpox eradication programs that saved millions of lives. They joined forces to build a remarkably effective nuclear nonproliferation regime. They concluded agreements, such as the Helsinki Accords, to reduce tensions in key regions, and inked arms control treaties to limit the danger of another sort of ecological catastrophe — nuclear war. Achieving something similar in the U.S.-China relationship would require careful balancing. U.S. officials would have to show that they will not allow China to establish linkage between climate and other issues — and to demonstrate that they will not go easy on key geopolitical disputes as the price of “improving the atmosphere” for future negotiations. Yet they would also need to keep open lines of communication on climate change even in periods of high tension, and reinforce the point — publicly and privately — that competition is some areas does not preclude collaboration in others. This sounds obvious, but is critically important; the momentum toward rivalry can otherwise color all aspects of the relationship. It may also be helpful to preserve scientific exchanges and international forums where technical experts can meet in relatively politics-free zones, just as exchanges of arms control and disarmament experts helped lay the intellectual groundwork for certain U.S.-Soviet agreements. Most basically, this approach requires reviving climate diplomacy as an American priority. There are legitimate critiques of the Paris agreement and other Obama-era climate initiatives. There are legitimate disagreements about how to proceed. But simply absenting the U.S. from international efforts to address climate change, as Trump has done, leaves Washington diplomatically isolated and dangerously behind the curve in dealing with a worsening problem. To its credit, the Trump administration has shown that it is possible to reorient the American geopolitical debate on China. It will be up to Trump’s successors to show that doing so doesn’t require ignoring the other profound global threat to American well-being in the 21st century and beyond.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › Warming turns econ

But Warming wrecks the economy

Kimberly Amadeo, 6-30-2020, [Kimberly Amadeo has 20 years of experience in economic analysis and business strategy. She writes about the U.S. Economy for The Balance.], "What Has Climate Change Cost Us? What's Being Done?," Balance, , Xoxo 7/13/2020

The U.S. is one of the world’s richest countries. A recent study found that the planet's wealthiest 1 billion people emit 60% of greenhouse gases. The poorest 3 billion produce only 5%.25 That’s why you may hear people say income inequality can cause climate change. What's the Economic Impact of Climate Change? Insurance From 1980 to 2019, extreme weather cost $1.775 trillion.26 Munich Re, one of the world's largest reinsurance firms, blamed climate change for $24 billion of losses in the California wildfires.27 It warned that insurance firms would have to raise premiums to cover rising costs from extreme weather. That could make insurance too expensive for most people. GDP Scientists estimated that, if temperatures only rose 2 degrees Celsius, the global gross domestic product would fall 15%. If temperatures rose to 3 degrees Celsius, the global GDP would fall 25%. If nothing is done, temperatures will rise by 4 degrees Celsius by 2100.28 29 Global GDP would decline by more than 30% from 2010 levels.30 That's comparable to the Great Depression, where GDP fell to -26.7%.31 The only difference is that it would be permanent. Employment The World Employment and Social Outlook 2018 estimated that climate change threatens 1.2 billion jobs.32 The industries most at risk are agriculture, fisheries, and forestry. Maine has already seen a decline in its lobster catches.33 Natural disasters caused or compounded by humans cost 23 million working-life years annually from 2000 to 2015.34 On the other hand, efforts to stop climate change would create 24 million new jobs by 2030.3536 Immigration Climate change creates mass migration around the world. People are leaving flooded coastlines, drought-stricken farmlands, and areas of extreme natural disasters. Since 2008, events related to climate or weather have displaced 22.5 million people annually, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.3738 Some forecasts predict that by 2050, climate change could cause as many as 1 billion people to emigrate.3940 Immigration at the U.S. border can be expected to increase as climate change worsens conditions in Latin America. The World Bank estimates that as many as 3.9 million people in Mexico and Central America will migrate internally by 2050 due to climate impact, and that subsequent deterioration will further exacerbate the movements of these migrants.41 Drought, shifting rain patterns, and extreme weather destroys crops and leads to food insecurity. The World Food Program found that almost half of Central Americans left because there wasn't enough food.42 National Security In 2017, Congress proclaimed that “climate change is a direct threat to the national security of the United States.” Climate change endangers 128 military bases.43 A 2018 Pentagon survey revealed that U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland has experienced storm surge flooding and hurricane damage. The Cape Lisburne Long Range Radar Station in Alaska has lost a seawall from extreme weather.44 In response, Congress asked the Department of Defense to identify the 10 most vulnerable sites and recommend solution strategies.45 Food Prices As America experiences more extremely hot days, food prices are rising. Corn and soybean yields in the U.S. precipitously plummet when temperatures rise above 84 degrees Fahrenheit.46 Those crops feed cattle and other meat sources and create spikes in beef, milk, and poultry prices. Worker productivity declines sharply, particularly for outdoor jobs.47 That further increases the cost of food. A 2019 study found that a warming ocean has pushed global sustainable fish yields down 4% since 1930. That's 1.4 million metric tons. In the North Sea and Sea of Japan, that decline is 35%. That affects Atlantic cod, haddock, and herring.48 Many species are threatened with extinction. That affects the 3 billion people who rely on fish for their primary source of protein.49 It also affects the $150 billion fishing industry and the 59 million people employed.50 It especially affects the U.S., which imports more than 80% of its seafood

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Carbon Border Tax DA › 1NC › Warming turns disease

Global warming turns disease—Increases range and transmission rates

Boyles and Chang 2009— (Salynn. Louise. MD. “Report: Climate Change Threatens Health: Scientists Say Global Warming Will Increase Malaria and Other Diseases.” May 13, 2009. WebMD Health News. <http://www.webmd.com/news/20090513/report-climate-change-threatens-health> Accessed: 6/3/09)

According to the report: Rising temperatures will affect the spread and transmission rates of vector-borne and rodent-borne diseases like malaria, dengue fever, Lyme disease, hantavirus, tick-borne encephalitis, and a host of other diseases. According to one model, there will be as many as 320 million additional cases of malaria in 2080. And 6 billion people will be at risk for dengue fever, compared to 3.5 billion today. As ocean temperatures rise and more intense seasonal weather events occur as a result, cholera outbreaks may increase.