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2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › 1NCs › 1nc – One-Off

The aff relies on a naturalized understanding of work – creating jobs, providing opportunities for growth, and glorifying useless productivity. In the face of escalating economic and social disruption, the foremost question for this debate must be “why work?”

Frayne ’15 (David, lecturer and social researcher based at Cardiff University, The Refusal of Work: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to Work, 2015, pg. 1-8, )

It’s eight o’clock in the morning. When you come out it will be dark. The sun will not shine for you today. The above quotation is taken from Elio Petri’s 1971 film La classe operaia va in paradiso (The Working Class Goes to Heaven). The film gives a fictionalised account of the struggles of the Italian Autonomist movement: a loose coalition of students, workers, feminists and unemployed people who protested in Italy in the 1960s and 1970s. The quote is a slogan, shouted through a megaphone at eight o’clock in the morning and intended for the ears of the hundreds of workers who at that time were filing through the factory gates for another day of repetitive and hazardous labour. I quote it here as a perfect illustration of what the Autonomists were fighting for. Their cause went beyond the traditional union demands for fairer pay and better working conditions. They acknowledged the need for greater freedom and equality within work, but also fought for the right of workers to lead richer lives outside of work. The Autonomists protested at the wasted time, lack of variety, and excessive administration of life in capitalist society. They fought for the right of workers to feel the sun on their skin, to play with their children, to develop interests and skills outside the factory, and to rest peacefully at night. We might say that the appeal of the Autonomists was not just to the injustices of exploitation, but also to the worker’s diminished sensory experience of the world.

Mirroring these concerns, a range of social critics (from the authors of the Frankfurt School to related critics such as André Gorz) have set out to question work from an emancipatory standpoint, supporting a vision of social progress based on a reduction of work and an expansion of free-time. These critics did not deny the importance of work, nor did they dismiss the many pleasures to be found in productive activity, but they did propose that a reduction of work might leave people with more time and energy for their own self-development. These critiques of work have provoked their readers by highlighting the casualties of a work-centred society: the time for politics, contemplation, conviviality and spontaneous enjoyment, which have been displaced by capitalism’s narrow focus on commercial production and consumption. For today’s students, who find themselves pushed through an education system focused largely on socialising the young for a future job role, to read these critiques is to receive an education in desire, and a reminder that time could be spent differently. The radical nature of these theories, however, has earned them a marginal position in academic and public debates. Whilst important issues like pay inequalities and poor working conditions are still discussed, it is rarer for social commentators to question the ethical status of work itself.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › 1NCs › 1nc – Ethics Gateway

Before the aff can weigh the hypothetical impacts of their plan, they must first defend their ethical orientation towards labor and economic rationality. Left unquestioned, the dogma of work will result in permeant alienation and death. So vote negative to refuse work and open up space for worthwhile existence.

Frayne ’15 (David, lecturer and social researcher based at Cardiff University, The Refusal of Work: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to Work, 2015, pg. 1-8, )

It’s eight o’clock in the morning. When you come out it will be dark. The sun will not shine for you today. The above quotation is taken from Elio Petri’s 1971 film La classe operaia va in paradiso (The Working Class Goes to Heaven). The film gives a fictionalised account of the struggles of the Italian Autonomist movement: a loose coalition of students, workers, feminists and unemployed people who protested in Italy in the 1960s and 1970s. The quote is a slogan, shouted through a megaphone at eight o’clock in the morning and intended for the ears of the hundreds of workers who at that time were filing through the factory gates for another day of repetitive and hazardous labour. I quote it here as a perfect illustration of what the Autonomists were fighting for. Their cause went beyond the traditional union demands for fairer pay and better working conditions. They acknowledged the need for greater freedom and equality within work, but also fought for the right of workers to lead richer lives outside of work. The Autonomists protested at the wasted time, lack of variety, and excessive administration of life in capitalist society. They fought for the right of workers to feel the sun on their skin, to play with their children, to develop interests and skills outside the factory, and to rest peacefully at night. We might say that the appeal of the Autonomists was not just to the injustices of exploitation, but also to the worker’s diminished sensory experience of the world.

Mirroring these concerns, a range of social critics (from the authors of the Frankfurt School to related critics such as André Gorz) have set out to question work from an emancipatory standpoint, supporting a vision of social progress based on a reduction of work and an expansion of free-time. These critics did not deny the importance of work, nor did they dismiss the many pleasures to be found in productive activity, but they did propose that a reduction of work might leave people with more time and energy for their own self-development. These critiques of work have provoked their readers by highlighting the casualties of a work-centred society: the time for politics, contemplation, conviviality and spontaneous enjoyment, which have been displaced by capitalism’s narrow focus on commercial production and consumption. For today’s students, who find themselves pushed through an education system focused largely on socialising the young for a future job role, to read these critiques is to receive an education in desire, and a reminder that time could be spent differently. The radical nature of these theories, however, has earned them a marginal position in academic and public debates. Whilst important issues like pay inequalities and poor working conditions are still discussed, it is rarer for social commentators to question the ethical status of work itself.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › 1NCs › 1nc – Regular

Vote negative to refuse work – our alternative embraces a ‘worthwhile ethic’ and promotes research strategies that resist alienation and work dogma. Debate is a unique site for utopian thinking and your ballot can be a radical act of autonomy.

Frayne ’15 (David, lecturer and social researcher based at Cardiff University, The Refusal of Work: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to Work, 2015, pg. 230-237, )

The vocabulary of my own book has not been a vocabulary of responsibility and duty, but a vocabulary of freedom. My main focus has been on our troubled desire to escape the realities of working life, and my belief is that the most crucial advantage of less work is its promise to allow us to live more varied and convivial lives. For my part, the call for less work is at its most compelling as a celebration of the human capacity for autonomy: ‘the capacity to represent and recreate oneself and one’s relationships, the freedom to design, within obvious bounds, our own lives’ (Weeks, 2011: 168) – a capacity that the work-centred society has blocked through processes of alienation and colonisation. Ultimately, however, if we want to build a strong case against work, we should take a moment to recognise the breadth of today’s critical contributions. Activists would do well to stress that a resistance to the work dogma can simultaneously be a resistance for the environment, for health, for gender equality, for the family, for personal autonomy, and, let us also not forget, for fun

2. Take an active interest in society’s outsiders A research intervention into the work dogma would require researchers to take an active interest in the values and practices of people on the margins of society. The role I imagine for the researcher here is a person who uses her skills and insight to work in solidarity with movements for the refusal of work. Max Haiven and Alex Khasnabish have argued that today’s monopolisation of social research by academic institutions has too often seen researchers working on rather than with social movements. Too often the role of the researcher is to ‘swoop in’ from above, applying a disciplinary perspective and generating grist for the academic mill (Haiven and Khasnabish, 2014: 13). As Michael Billig argues, the publications tied to these research endeavours are often unintelligible and highly self-referential (and, in any case, often fail to see the light of day outside the academy) (Billig, 2013). Like Haiven and Khasnabish, I would like to see a confident defence of the researcher who works in solidarity with social movements for the purposes of transformative social change, as opposed to working on social movements for the purposes of generating academic capital.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › 1NCs › 1nc – Regular

The impact is institutionalized homicide – the modern system of work is the root cause of social decay and results in psychological and material suffering that outweigh the aff.

Black ‘16 Bob Black is an American anarchist. Bob Black graduated from the University of Michigan and Georgetown Law School. He holds two post graduate degrees–one in jurisprudence and social policy from the University of California, Berkeley and the second in Criminal justice from University Of New York, Albany.; 2016; Instead of Work; pg. 1-20. //[TMS—GK]

Work makes a mockery of freedom. The official line is that we all have rights and live in a democracy. Other unfortunates who aren't free like we are have to live in police states. These victims obey orders or-else, no matter how arbitrary. The authorities keep them under regular surveillance. State bureaucrats control even the smaller details of everyday life. The officials who push them around are answerable only to higher-ups, public or private. Either way, dissent and disobedience are punished. Informers report regularly to the authorities. All this is supposed to be a very bad thing. And so it is, although it is nothing but a description of the modem workplace. The liberals and conservatives and libertarians who lament totalitarianism are phonies and hypocrites. There is more freedom in any moderately Stalinized dictatorship than there is in the ordinary American workplace. You find the same sort of hierarchy and discipline in an office or factory as you do in a prison or monastery. In fact, as Foucault and others have shown, prisons and factories came in at about the same time, and their operators consciously borrowed from each other's control techniques. A worker is a part-time slave. The boss says when to show up, when to leave, and what to do in the meantime. He tells you how much work to do and how fast. He is free to carry his control to humiliating extremes, regulating, if he feels like it, the clothes you wear or how often you go to the bathroom. With a few exceptions he can fire you for any reason, or no reason. He has you spied on by snitches and supervisors, he amasses a dossier on every employee. Talking back is called "insubordination," just as if a worker is a naughty child, and it not only gets you fired, it disqualifies you for unemployment compensation. Without necessarily endorsing it for them either, it is noteworthy that children at home and in school receive much the same treatment, justified in their case by their supposed immaturity. What does this say about their parents and teachers who work? The demeaning system of domination I've described rules over half the waking hours of a majority of women and the vast majority of men for decades, for most of their lifespans. For certain purposes it's not too misleading to call our system democracy or capitalism or-better still-industrialism, but its real names are factory fascism and office oligarchy. Anybody who says these people are "free" is lying or stupid. You are what you do. If you do boring, stupid, monotonous work, chances are you'll end up boring, stupid, and monotonous. Work is a much better explanation for the creeping cretinization all around us than even such significant moronizing mechanisms as television and education. People who are regimented all their lives, handed off to work from school and bracketed by the family in the beginning and the nursing home at the end, are habituated to hierarchy and psychologically enslaved. Their aptitude for autonomy is so atrophied that their fear of freedom is among their few rationally grounded phobias. Their obedience training at work carries over into the families they start, thus reproducing the system in more ways than one, and into politics, culture and everything else. Once you drain the vitality from people at work, they'll likely submit to hierarchy and expertise in everything. They're used to it. We are so close to the world of work that we can't see what it does to us. We have to rely on outside observers from other times or other cultures to appreciate the extremity and the pathology of our present position. There was a time in our own past when the "work ethic" would have been incomprehensible, and perhaps Weber was on to something when he tied its appearance to a religion, Calvinism, which if it emerged today instead of four centuries ago would immediately and appropriately be labeled a cult. Be that as it may, we have only to draw upon the wisdom of antiquity to put work in perspective. The ancients saw work for what it is, and their view prevailed, the Calvinist cranks notwithstanding, until overthrown by industrialism-but not before receiving the endorsement of its prophets. Let's pretend for a moment that work doesn't turn people into stultified submissives. Let's pretend, in defiance of any plausible psychology and the ideology of its boosters, that it has no effect on the formation of character. And let's pretend that work isn't as boring and tiring and humiliating as we all know it really is. Even then, work would still make a mockery of all humanistic and democratic aspirations, just because it usurps so much of our time. Socrates said that manual laborers make bad friends and bad citizens because they have no time to fulfill the responsibilities of friendship and citizenship. He was right. Because of work, no matter what we do we keep looking at our watches. The only thing "free" about so-called free time is that it doesn't cost the boss anything. Free time is mostly devoted to getting ready for work, going to work, returning from work, and recovering from work. Free time is a euphemism for the peculiar way labor as a factor of production not only transports itself at its own expense to and from the workplace but assumes primary responsibility for its own maintenance and repair. Coal and steel don't do that. Lathes and typewriters don't do that. But workers do. No wonder Edward G. Robinson in one of his gangster movies exclaimed, "Work is for saps!" Both Plato and Xenophon attribute to Socrates and obviously share with him an awareness of the destructive effects of work on the worker as a citizen and a human being. Herodotus identified contempt for work as an attribute of the classical Greeks at the zenith of their culture. To take only one Roman example, Cicero said that "whoever gives his labor for money sells himself and puts himself in the rank of slaves." His candor is now rare, but contemporary primitive societies which we are wont to look down upon have provided spokesmen who have enlightened Western anthropologists. The Kapauku of West Irian, according to Leopold Posposil, have a conception of balance in life and accordingly work only every other day, the day of rest designed "to regain the lost power and health." Our ancestors, even as late as the eighteenth century when they were far along the path to our present predicament, at least were aware of what we have forgotten, the underside of industrialization. Their religious devotion to "St. Monday"-thus establishing a de facto five-day week 150-200 years before its legal consecration-was the despair of the earliest factory owners. They took a long time in submitting to the tyranny of the bell, predecessor of the time clock. In fact it was necessary for a generation or two to replace adult males with women accustomed to obedience and children who could be molded to fit industrial needs. Even the exploited peasants of the ancien regime wrested substantial time back from their landlord's work. According to Lafargue, a fourth of the French peasants' calendar was devoted to Sundays and holidays, and Chayanov's figures from villages in Czarist Russia-hardly a progressive society likewise show a fourth or fifth of peasants' days devoted to repose. Controlling for productivity, we are obviously far behind these backward societies. The exploited muzhiks would wonder why any of us are working at all. So should we. To grasp the full enormity of our deterioration, however, consider the earliest condition of humanity, without government or property, when we wandered as hunter-gatherers. Hobbes surmised that life was then nasty, brutish and short. Others assume that life was a desperate unremitting struggle for subsistence, a war waged against a harsh Nature with death and disaster awaiting the unlucky or anyone who was unequal to the challenge of the struggle for existence. Actually, that was all a projection of fears for the collapse of government authority over communities unaccustomed to doing without it, like the England of Hobbes during the Civil War. Hobbes' compatriots had already encountered alternative forms of society which illustrated other ways of life-in North America, particularly-but already these were too remote from their experience to be understandable. (The lower orders, closer to the condition of the Indians, understood it better and often found it attractive. Throughout the seventeenth century, English settlers defected to Indian tribes or, captured in war, refused to return. But the Indians no more defected to white settlements than Germans climb the Berlin Wall from the west.) The "survival of the fittest" version-the Thomas Huxley version---of Darwinism was a better account of economic conditions in Victorian England than it was of natural selection, as the anarchist Kropotkin showed in his book Mutual Aid, A Factor of Evolution. (Kropotkin was a scientist-a geographer-who'd had ample involuntary opportunity for fieldwork whilst exiled in Siberia: he knew what he was talking about.) Like most social and political theory, the story Hobbes and his successors told was really unacknowledged autobiography. The anthropologist Marshall Sahlins, smveying the data on contemporary huntergatherers, exploded the Hobbesian myth in an article entitled "The Original Affluent Society." They work a lot less than we do, and their work is hard to distinguish from what we regard as play. Sahlins concluded that "hunters and gatherers work less than we do; and rather than a continuous travail, the food quest is intermittent, leisure abundant, and there is a greater amount of sleep in the daytime per capita per year than in any other condition of society." They worked an average of four hours a day, assuming they were "working" at all. Their "labor," as it appears to us, was skilled labor which exercised their physical and intellectual capacities; unskilled labor on any large scale, as Sahlins says, is impossible except under industrialism. Thus it satisfied Friedrich Schiller's definition of play, the only occasion on which man realizes his complete humanity by giving full "play" to both sides of his twofold nature, thinking and feeling. As he put it: "The animal works when deprivation is the mainspring of its activity, and it plays when the fullness of its strength is this mainspring, when superabundant life is its own stimulus to activity." (A modern version---dubiously developmental-is Abraham Maslow's counterposition of "deficiency" and "growth" motivation.) Play and freedom are, as regards production, coextensive. Even Marx, who belongs (for all his good intentions) in the productivist pantheon, observed that "the realm of freedom does not commence until the point is passed where labor under the compulsion of necessity and external utility is required." He never could quite bring himself to identify this happy circumstance as what it is, the abolition of work-it's rather anomalous, after all, to be proworker and anti-work-but we can. The aspiration to go backwards or forwards to a life without work is evident in every serious social or cultural history of pre-industrial Europe, among them M. Dorothy George's England In Transition and Peter Burke's Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe. Also pertinent is Daniel Bell's essay, "Work and its Discontents," the first text, I believe, to refer to the "revolt against work" in so many words and, had it been understood, an important correction to the complacency ordinarily associated with the volume in which it was collected, The End of Ideology. Neither critics nor celebrants have noticed that Bell's endof-ideology thesis signaled not the end of social unrest but the beginning of a new, uncharted phase unconstrained and uninformed by ideology. It was Seymour Lipset (in Political Man), not Bell, who announced at the same time that "the fundamental problems of the Industrial Revolution have been solved," only a few years before the post- or meta-industrial discontents of college students drove Lipset from UC Berkeley to the relative (and temporary) tranquility of Harvard. As Bell notes, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, for all his enthusiasm for the market and the division of labor, was more alert to (and more honest about) the seamy side of work than Ayn Rand or the Chicago economists or any of Smith's modem epigones. As Smith observed: "The understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose life is spent in performing a few simple operations ... has no occasion to exert his understanding ... He generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become." Here, in a few blunt words, is my critique of work. Bell, writing in 1956, the Golden Age of Eisenhower imbecility and American self-satisfaction, identified the unorganized, unorganizable malaise of the 1970s and since, the one no political tendency is able to harness, the one identified in HEW's report Work in America, the one which cannot be exploited and so is ignored. That problem is the revolt against work. It does not figure in any text by any laissez-faire economist-Milton Friedman, Murray Rothbard, Richard Posner-because, in their terms, as they used to say on Star Trek, "it does not compute." If these objections, informed by the love of liberty, fail to persuade humanists of a utilitarian or even paternalist turn, there are others which they cannot disregard. Work is dangerous to your health, to borrow a book title. In fact, work is mass murder or genocide. Directly or indirectly, work will kill most of the people who read these words. Between 14,000 and 25,000 workers are killed annually in this country on the job. Over two million are disabled. Twenty to twenty-five million are injured every year. And these figures are based on a very conservative estimation of what constitutes a work-related injury. Thus they don't count the half million cases of occupational disease every year. I looked at one medical textbook on occupational diseases which was 1,200 pages long. Even this barely scratches the surface. The available statistics count the obvious cases like the 100,000 miners who have black lung disease, of whom 4,000 die every year, a much higher fatality rate than for AIDS, for instance, which gets so much media attention. This reflects the unvoiced assumption that AIDS afflicts perverts who could control their depravity whereas coal-mining is a sacrosanct activity beyond question. What the statistics don't show is that tens of millions of people have their lifespans shortened by work-which is all that homicide means, after all. Consider the doctors who work themselves to death in their 50s. Consider all the other workaholics. Even if you aren't killed or crippled while actually working, you very well might be while going to work, coming from work, looking for work, or trying to forget about work. The vast majority of victims of the automobile are either doing one of these work-obligatory activities or else fall afoul of those who do them. To this augmented body-count must be added the victims of auto-industrial pollution and work-induced alcoholism and drug addiction. Both cancer and heart disease are modern afflictions normally traceable, directly, or indirectly, to work. Work, then, institutionalizes homicide as a way of life. People think the Cambodians were crazy for exterminating themselves, but are we any different? The Pol Pot regime at least had a vision, however blurred, of an egalitarian society. We kill people in the six-figure range (at least) in order to sell Big Macs and Cadillacs to the survivors. Our forty or fifty thousand annual highway fatalities are victims, not martyrs. They died for nothing--or rather, they died for work. But work is nothing to die for.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › 1NCs › 1nc – Regular

The aff relies on a naturalized understanding of work – creating jobs, providing opportunities for growth, and glorifying useless productivity. In the face of escalating economic and social disruption, the foremost question for this debate must be “why work?”

Frayne ’15 (David, lecturer and social researcher based at Cardiff University, The Refusal of Work: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to Work, 2015, pg. 1-8, )

It’s eight o’clock in the morning. When you come out it will be dark. The sun will not shine for you today. The above quotation is taken from Elio Petri’s 1971 film La classe operaia va in paradiso (The Working Class Goes to Heaven). The film gives a fictionalised account of the struggles of the Italian Autonomist movement: a loose coalition of students, workers, feminists and unemployed people who protested in Italy in the 1960s and 1970s. The quote is a slogan, shouted through a megaphone at eight o’clock in the morning and intended for the ears of the hundreds of workers who at that time were filing through the factory gates for another day of repetitive and hazardous labour. I quote it here as a perfect illustration of what the Autonomists were fighting for. Their cause went beyond the traditional union demands for fairer pay and better working conditions. They acknowledged the need for greater freedom and equality within work, but also fought for the right of workers to lead richer lives outside of work. The Autonomists protested at the wasted time, lack of variety, and excessive administration of life in capitalist society. They fought for the right of workers to feel the sun on their skin, to play with their children, to develop interests and skills outside the factory, and to rest peacefully at night. We might say that the appeal of the Autonomists was not just to the injustices of exploitation, but also to the worker’s diminished sensory experience of the world.

Mirroring these concerns, a range of social critics (from the authors of the Frankfurt School to related critics such as André Gorz) have set out to question work from an emancipatory standpoint, supporting a vision of social progress based on a reduction of work and an expansion of free-time. These critics did not deny the importance of work, nor did they dismiss the many pleasures to be found in productive activity, but they did propose that a reduction of work might leave people with more time and energy for their own self-development. These critiques of work have provoked their readers by highlighting the casualties of a work-centred society: the time for politics, contemplation, conviviality and spontaneous enjoyment, which have been displaced by capitalism’s narrow focus on commercial production and consumption. For today’s students, who find themselves pushed through an education system focused largely on socialising the young for a future job role, to read these critiques is to receive an education in desire, and a reminder that time could be spent differently. The radical nature of these theories, however, has earned them a marginal position in academic and public debates. Whilst important issues like pay inequalities and poor working conditions are still discussed, it is rarer for social commentators to question the ethical status of work itself.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › ! - Readiness › Turn – Heg → War

American unipolarity sanctions unfettered interventionism, inflaming global conflicts and collapsing multilateral governance regimes.

Glaser, 19 — John Glaser; Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Master of Arts in International Security at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. (3-15-2019; "The Amnesia of the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment;" Cato Institute; https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/amnesia-us-foreign-policy-establishment; //GrRv)

Trump is certainly hostile to what he sometimes refers to as “globalism”: multilateralism, free trade agreements, international institutions, and any international legal regime that could impose constraints on U.S. power. He is antagonistic toward allies and treaties, withdrawing the U.S. from the Paris climate agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Iran nuclear deal, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the UN Human Rights Council. But those excoriating Trump for his disregard for rules and norms rarely mention similar, routine violations of this rules-based order by his predecessors. And while the foreign policy establishment is firm in its condemnation of Trump’s “turning away from global engagement,” as Richard Haass of the Council on Foreign Relations put it, their harshest criticisms seem reserved for those few sporadic instances in which Trump tries to jettison lengthy and failed military deployments, as in Syria and Afghanistan, or expresses insufficient enthusiasm for permanent overseas garrisons. The pundits, practitioners, and politicians that make up the foreign policy establishment have rarely respected the non-interventionist principles at the core of the United Nations, an institution exemplifying the liberal rules-based international order that the United States helped establish following World War II. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter says “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state…” According to the Charter, which American post-war planners helped write, the use of force is illegal and illegitimate unless at least one of two prerequisites are met: first, that force is used in self-defense; second, that the UN Security Council authorizes it. This prohibition against war is not some trivial aspiration. Non-intervention is the centerpiece of international law and the United Nations has repeatedly sought to underline its significance. In 1965, the General Assembly declared “No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any state.” Again in 1970, it unanimously reaffirmed the illegality of “armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats.” In 1981, the General Assembly further specified that the Charter’s “principle of non-intervention and non-interference” prohibited “any … form of intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at another State or group of States, or any act of military, political or economic interference in the internal affairs of another State.” The United States is currently engaged in active military hostilities in at least seven countries, namely Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Niger. That tally doesn’t include drone strikes in Pakistan, combat operations in Kenya, Cameroon, and Central African Republic, or other interventions of unknown magnitude. The true number might be closer to 14 countries. The White House is also explicitly threatening U.S. military action to change the regime in Venezuela and against Iran for a host of spurious reasons. Not one of these cases meets the prerequisites for legal military intervention (a plausible self-defense case can be made for the war in Afghanistan, but it expired a long time ago). No other state in the international system uses force more than the U.S. has. Throughout the Cold War, the United States used military means to interfere in other countries about twice as often as did the Soviet Union. This doesn’t include interventions below the threshold of military action: from 1946 to 2000, Washington meddled in foreign elections more than 80 times (compared to 36 by the Soviet Union or Russia over the same period). Covert operations to overthrow democratically elected governments, as in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile, were a staple of U.S. conduct in this period, and according to the Rand Corporation, “the number and scale of U.S. military interventions rose rapidly in the aftermath of the Cold War.” The Congressional Research Service lists more than 200 individual U.S. military interventions from 1989 to 2018, a rate that no other country even comes close to matching. It’s hard for America to act as the guarantor of a rules-based order that it consistently violates. When President Obama condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, saying international law prohibits redrawing territorial borders “at the barrel of a gun,” it was somewhat awkward: The United States did exactly that in the 1999 Kosovo war, which lacked Security Council approval, and successive administrations have similarly supported Israel as it annexes and occupies territory in violation of international law. Secretary of State John Kerry castigated Russia’s territorial grab this way: “You just don’t in the 21st century behave in 19th century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped up pretext.” As it happens, that’s a rather apt description of the Bush administration’s brazenly illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003. Washington often appeals to international law to justify military action against despots who commit atrocities, as it did when it secured UN Security Council approval in 2011 to bomb Libya. But even there, when the initial use of force was authorized, the Obama administration rapidly exceeded the mandate of the resolution by pursuing what amounted to a regime-change strategy. And such appeals to humanitarianism are highly selective: U.S. military power has also been used to assist Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s most regressive authoritarian regimes, commit war crimes and keep an impoverished and largely defenseless population in Yemen under siege. America’s delinquency isn’t restricted to the use of force. Though 139 other countries have done so, Washington has refused to sign on to the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court. And although the United States has badgered China for violating the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which defines maritime rights and responsibilities, the U.S. refuses to ratify the treaty itself. For all the talk of China’s unfair trade practices, the only country that receives more formal complaints about WTO violations than China is the United States—and China does a better job of complying once complaints are made. The political establishment in Washington has always accepted this unique role for the United States. We’re the policeman of the world. We enforce the rules and therefore assert the right to violate them, even as we (often violently) deny others that same prerogative. Any claim to special privileges rests to some extent on whether the international community sees it as legitimate. The problem is that America’s increasing disregard for the rules has undermined its legitimacy and that of the order itself: More than any other single nation, its actions determine the basis of international norms. As U.S. foreign policy becomes more transparently lawless, the power of international law to constrain state behavior weakens accordingly. To legitimize the Russian annexation of Crimea, President Vladimir Putin actually cited the “Kosovo precedent.” In 2016, Chinese officials dismissed U.S. criticisms of Beijing’s human rights record by citing the “notorious…prison abuse at Guantanamo.” The United States, Chinese diplomat Fu Cong told the UN Council on Human Rights, “conducts large-scale extra-territorial eavesdropping, uses drones to attack other countries’ innocent civilians, its troops on foreign soil commit rape and murder of local people. It conducts kidnapping overseas and uses black prisons.” And when American officials lambaste Iran for backing the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad despite his use of chemical weapons, Iranian officials frequently remind the world that the United States aided Saddam Hussein while he deployed chemical weapons on a much larger scale. Our hypocrisy has always been a threat to our legitimacy, but in the past it was often managed with careful rhetoric and diplomatic maneuvers designed to conceal the discrepancy between our words and our deeds, to camouflage our violations in language that reinforced the order or appealed to higher values. Trump is distinct from his predecessors not because his foreign policy is a radical departure, but because he is carrying out similar policies without the moralistic righteousness of his predecessors . Saving the liberal order means adhering to the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force except in self-defense or unless authorized by the Security Council. It means rolling back our global military footprint and adopting a more restrained foreign policy that at least approximates the manner in which we expect other nations to behave. It means recognizing that the United States is not exempt from the rules and norms it often punishes others for transgressing, and it means acknowledging that the foreign policy establishment has done at least as much damage to the rules-based order as has President Trump.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › ! - Readiness › Turn – Heg → Terrorism

Attacks risk nuclear escalation.

Arguello and Buis 18 [Irma Arguello and Emiliano J. Buis 18. Arguello is founder and chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation, and head of the secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network; Buis is researcher and professor at the NPSGlobal Foundation. 03/04/2018. “The Global Impacts of a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: What Would Happen? What Should We Do?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 114–119]

Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the post- Cold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentatxion – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › ! - Readiness › Turn – Heg → Terrorism

Heg causes terror—that independently makes it unsustainable.

Oezel 14 (Yasemin Oezel is a student at the University of London, 2014, “The Impact of the ‘Unipolar Moment’ on US Foreign Policies in the Mid-East”, https://www.e-ir.info/2015/09/13/the-impact-of-the-unipolar-moment-on-us-foreign-policies-in-the-mid-east/, acc 7/22/21)

In the following, I will illustrate that the interconnectedness of the contemporary globalized world does not allow and never did allow a unipolar international system to last more than a decade (Haass 2008: p. 48). Although the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is conventionally accepted as an act of America’s unipolarity, it will be illustrated that the invasion was only possible due to the acceptance of Western allies and the participation of countries in West Asia. In contrast to Krauthammer, I will argue that Western allies and allies in the Middle East do not have to follow and can obstruct US foreign policies in today’s globalized system (Haass 2008: p. 51). Whereas there seemed to be a common acceptance of the necessity of regime change in Iraq, the so-called superpower cannot invade contemporary Syria by itself due to the lack of ‘following’ allies and opposing powers such as Russia and Iran.

US Foreign Policies in Iraq: Then and Now

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › ! - Readiness › Turn – Heg → China/ Russia War

China-Russia alliance leads to nuclear escalation.

Chang 18 (Gordon G., author of The Coming Collapse of China and Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes On the World, “China and Russia Have Set a Nuclear Collision Course With the United States,” 4 September 2018, https://www.thedailybeast.com/china-and-russia-have-set-a-nuclear-collision-course-with-the-united-states, DOA: 9-4-2022) //strikethrough of rhetoric

China, the New York Times reported last week, “can now challenge American military supremacy in the places that matter most to it: the waters around Taiwan and in the disputed South China Sea.” Therefore, Beijing can, in the words of the paper, “make intervention in the region too costly for Washington to contemplate.” Too costly to contemplate? Unfortunately, assessments like these, often heard in U.S. policy circles, can embolden the already arrogant Chinese and make their adventurism—and war—more likely. Moreover, any conflict between China and the United States in the Pacific could quickly escalate to nuclear war. China, surpassing the U.S. last year, now boasts the world’s largest navy, and it is adding to its fleet “at a stunning rate,” according to the Times. Even last year, the count was lopsided with China claiming 317 surface vessels and subs in active service and the U.S. 283. Of course, it’s not clear how capable the People’s Liberation Army Navy is. The PLAN, as it is known, has never participated in a large-scale wartime engagement at sea, and its fleet is not, on the whole, as modern as America’s. Nonetheless, China has a few critical advantages. Its naval assets are concentrated along its shores and U.S. forces are spread around the globe; areas of likely conflict are near China and far from America; and the PLAN has some crucial weapons that are better than those of the United States, especially anti-ship missiles. Beijing has also gone big into “asymmetric” warfare, for instance militarizing fishing fleets, enlisting the “little blue men” of what has become a maritime militia. “Beijing has clearly relished challenging the U.S. Navy and Air Force.” The Chinese also have one other advantage: the will to use force to take what is in the possession of others. In their peripheral seas, they grabbed control of the Paracel Islands, in the northern portion of the South China Sea, from South Vietnam in 1974 after a short battle. The Chinese also seized Mischief Reef from the Philippines in a series of actions from late 1994 to early 1995, and they snatched Scarborough Shoal, also from Manila, in early 2012. Now, China is, among other things, pressuring other Philippine features in the South China Sea and using menacing tactics to take over a chain of uninhabited islets currently under Japanese control in the East China Sea. Moreover, Beijing has clearly relished challenging the U.S. Navy and Air Force in the global commons, threatening and on occasion harassing American ships, planes, and drones. The seizure of an American drone in international waters in December 2016, in sight of the USNS Bowditch and in defiance of radio commands, was brazen and nothing short of an act of war. ADVERTISING Moreover, Beijing’s harassment of the USNS Impeccable in March 2009 in the South China Sea, using its maritime militia, was so severe that it constituted an attack on the United States. “The key point is that China accepts the risk of escalation to a greater extent than does the U.S., because China uses confrontation to alter the status quo in its favor,” Anders Corr, editor of Great Powers, Grand Strategies: The New Game in the South China Sea, told the National Interest at the beginning of this year. “For regional warfare, especially in Asia, the People’s Liberation Army is equipped for nuclear operations both offensive and defensive.” — Richard Fisher of the International Assessment and Strategy Center China is apparently willing to escalate all the way. But the New York Times, in its reporting last month, did not mention one Chinese threat to American forces in the region: nuclear attack. “For regional warfare, especially in Asia, the People’s Liberation Army is equipped for nuclear operations both offensive and defensive,” Richard Fisher of the International Assessment and Strategy Center told The Daily Beast. “If China can conjure a ‘defensive’ political moral high ground to justify offensive military campaigns to retrieve ‘lost’ territory, we should be prepared for China’s very early use of nuclear weapons to support its theater campaign. We can, for example, expect China to ‘demonstrate’ nuclear weapons at sea to deter American or Japanese military support for Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, or even outright Chinese use of nuclear weapons against Japanese bases supporting U.S. forces coming to the defense of Taiwan.” And American planners have to be concerned that China’s military partner, Russia, would join a conflict on Beijing’s side. In September 2016 the two militaries, in an eight-day naval drill, practiced “joint island seizing missions” in the South China Sea. Moscow might even take advantage of turmoil in Asia to try to further expand its territory in Europe, perhaps using “little green men” as it did in Crimea in 2014 and later in Eastern Ukraine. Or maybe its nukes. Russian leader Vladimir Putin has long threatened the offensive use of such weapons. As Stephen Blank, a scholar at the American Foreign Policy Council, told me, “Russia evidently views nuclear weapons as a legitimate war-fighting weapon as its deployments, 22 procurement programs, exercises, and doctrine suggest.” He notes that Moscow is constructing a nuclear weapons storage facility in Crimea and deploying nuclear-capable Kalibr cruise missiles to the Mediterranean. China has an announced “no-first-use” policy, but for decades hostile public statements from Chinese generals and diplomats have cast doubt on whether Beijing would in fact adhere to that promise in a wartime setting. For instance, in August 2011 Xu Guangyu, a retired Chinese general working at the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, blurted out to Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post a comment indicating Beijing had developed plans to launch “a surprise attack on the U.S.” These shocking comments, at a minimum, indicate that in the post-Cold War world the concept of nuclear deterrence is breaking down. The erosion of deterrence looks like it is working to the benefit of the Chinese. Because of China’s formidable military advantages and its willingness to escalate, there are many voices, notably Lyle Goldstein of the Naval War College and Hugh White of the Australian National University, urging American acceptance of Chinese domination of East Asia. That is the wrong conclusion. A pair of European democracies in the 1930s tried avoiding conflict with a militant state, with spectacularly bad results. Of course, the People’s Republic of China is not the Third Reich of Germany, but German territorial ambitions naturally grew in reaction to British and French timidity and Chinese ones now are expanding fast as Americans recoil at the prospect of confronting Beijing. During the Cold War, the United States maintained a far more resolute stance. Then, Washington and its allies deterred a Soviet attack in Europe when the “correlation of forces” greatly favored the Warsaw Pact, and the West in general prevented nuclear war by deterring a foe with superior conventional and nuclear arsenals. Washington convinced Moscow—and its NATO allies—that the United States was willing to go to war to defend itself and friends, thereby keeping the peace in Europe and, for the most part, elsewhere. Since the Soviet collapse, however, Americans and others think far less about deterrence and have let nuclear arsenals age. The Chinese and Russians have noticed. China is bulking up nuke stockpiles. North Korea, after making fast progress on both nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles, has made recent threats to use its most destructive weapons. Iran, a friend of both Beijing and Pyongyang, is not far from weaponizing the atom with their help. Pakistan, an early beneficiary of Beijing’s proliferation, already has a sizeable nuclear arsenal. Russia continues to threaten neighbors, particularly the three Baltic states, all of which are NATO members, and Ukraine, which is not. It looks, in short, like a new nuclear age.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › ! - Readiness › Turn – Heg → China/ Russia War

It’s impossible to defend against both. China’s the larger threat, but Russia will punish the US if the relationship doesn’t stabilize.

Hal Brands 22, Prof of Global Affairs at John Hopkins University, 1-18-2022, "The Overstretched Superpower," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-01-18/overstretched-superpower?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20220618, jy

ASIA FIRST Biden’s initial theory of foreign policy was straightforward: don’t let smaller challenges distract from the big one. Of all the threats Washington faces, Biden’s interim national security strategy argued, China “is the only competitor” able to “mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.” That challenge has become greater as China has accelerated its efforts to overturn the balance of power in Asia. When Biden took office, U.S. military leaders publicly warned that Beijing could invade Taiwan by 2027. Biden was not naive enough to think that other problems would simply vanish. With trouble brewing on this central front, however, he did seek a measure of calm on others. Biden avoided another doomed “reset” with Russia, but held an early summit with Putin in a bid to establish a “stable and predictable” relationship. He also sought to find a path back to the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, thereby reducing the growing risk of confrontation in the Middle East. Finally, Biden ended the U.S. war in Afghanistan, a decision he justified by arguing that it was time to refocus attention and resources on the Indo-Pacific. Relations with U.S. allies followed the same pattern: the administration dropped U.S. opposition to the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline linking Russia and western Europe, wagering that ending a contentious dispute with Germany would make it easier to win Berlin’s cooperation vis-à-vis Beijing. Biden’s emerging defense strategy has a similar thrust. The Trump administration made a major shift in U.S. defense planning, arguing that the Pentagon must relentlessly prepare for a conflict against a great-power challenge—particularly from China—even though that meant accepting greater risk in other regions. Biden’s Pentagon likewise spent 2021 focusing on how to deter or defeat Chinese aggression, withdrawing scarce assets such as missile defense batteries from the Middle East, and making longer-term budgetary investments meant to “prioritize China and its military modernization as our pacing challenge.” TROUBLE EVERYWHERE Biden is undoubtedly right that the Chinese challenge overshadows all others, despite unresolved debates in Washington over exactly when that challenge will become most severe. His administration has made major moves in the Sino-American competition during its first year—expanding multilateral military planning and exercises in the western Pacific, focusing bodies such as NATO and the G-7 on Beijing’s belligerence, and launching the AUKUS partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom. Yet Biden hasn’t enjoyed anything resembling a respite on other fronts. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan precipitated the collapse of the government there, generating a near-term crisis that consumed Washington’s attention and leaving longer-term legacies—strategic and humanitarian—that are likely to do the same. Meanwhile, a brutal internal conflict in Ethiopia destabilized one of Africa’s most important countries. Most problematic of all, U.S. relations with Iran and Russia became worse, not better. The United States is an overstretched hegemon, with a defense strategy out of balance with the foreign policy it supports. Iran has taken a hard-line stance in negotiations on a revived nuclear deal while steadily decreasing the amount of time it would need to produce a potential weapon. Tehran’s proxies have also conducted periodic attacks against U.S. personnel and partners in the Middle East as part of an ongoing effort to force an American withdrawal from the region. Putin, for his part, has authorized or at least permitted significant cyberattacks against critical infrastructure in the United States. He threatened war against Ukraine in the spring and has now mobilized forces for what U.S. officials fear could be a major invasion and prolonged occupation of that country. To preserve the peace, Moscow has demanded an acknowledged Russian sphere of influence and the rollback of NATO’s military presence in eastern Europe. What exactly Putin has in mind for Ukraine is uncertain, but “stable and predictable” is clearly not how he envisions his relationship with the United States. These are ominous signs for 2022. The United States could find itself facing grave security crises in Europe and the Middle East in addition to persistent and elevated tensions in the Pacific. And these possibilities hint at a deeper problem in U.S. statecraft, one that has been accumulating for years: strategic overstretch. MORE WITH LESS Facing trouble on many fronts is business as usual for a global power. U.S. foreign policy—and the defense strategy that buttresses it—has long been designed with that problem in mind. After the Cold War, the United States adopted a “two major regional contingencies” approach to defense planning. In essence, it committed to maintaining a military large and capable enough to fight two serious wars in separate regions at roughly the same time. U.S. planners were under no illusion that Washington could fully indemnify itself against all the threats it faced if they happened to manifest simultaneously. Their aim was to limit the risk inherent in a global foreign policy by ensuring that an enemy in one theater could not wage a successful war of aggression while the Pentagon was busy with a crisis in another. Just as the United Kingdom, the superpower of its day, had a two-power naval standard in the nineteenth century, a unipolar United States had a two-war standard for a generation after 1991. Over time, however, the two-war standard became impossible to sustain. The defense spending cuts associated with the Budget Control Act of 2011 (later compounded by the sequestration cuts of 2013) forced the Pentagon to adopt a somewhat stingier “one-plus” war standard aimed at defeating one capable aggressor and stalemating or “imposing unacceptable costs” on another. Meanwhile, the number of threats was increasing. During the post-Cold War era, the Pentagon worried mostly about potential conflicts in the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula. But the events of 2014 and 2015—the Islamic State’s rampage through Iraq and Syria, Russian aggression in Ukraine, and China’s drive for dominance in the South China Sea, along with ongoing operations in Afghanistan—showed that U.S. allies and interests were now imperiled in several regions at once. Leaders in Moscow and Tehran see that the United States is stretched thin and eager to pay more attention to China. Washington’s enemies were also growing more formidable. The two-war standard was primarily focused on rogue states with second-class militaries. Now, the United States had to contend with two near-peer competitors, China and Russia, that boasted world-class conventional capabilities alongside the advantages that would come from fighting on their own geopolitical doorsteps. By the end of Barack Obama’s presidency, it was an open question whether the United States could defeat China if Beijing assaulted Taiwan, or Russia if Moscow invaded the Baltic region. What was clear was that any such war would require the overwhelming majority of the Pentagon’s combat power, along with virtually all of its airlift and sealift capabilities. This realization prompted a major change in U.S. defense planning. The Trump administration’s defense strategy declared that the two-war standard was history. The U.S. military would henceforth be sized and shaped to win one major war against a great-power competitor. The United States would still be capable of “deterring” aggression in other theaters, but, as a bipartisan commission that included several current Biden administration officials pointed out, how exactly the Pentagon would do so without the capability to defeat such aggression remained ambiguous. Shifting to a one-war standard was a sensible way to motivate the lethargic Pentagon bureaucracy to find creative solutions to the urgent, daunting challenge of war with a near-peer rival. It involved a sober recognition that losing a great-power war could inflict a death blow on the U.S.-led international order. Yet the 2018 defense strategy was also an acknowledgment of overstretch: the United States could focus on its primary challenge only by reducing its ability to focus on others. This limitation is the root of the problem Biden has inherited, and it has some dangerous implications. THE CREDIBILITY GAP The most glaring danger, highlighted by the concurrent crises in eastern Europe and East Asia, is that the United States could have to fight wars against China and Russia simultaneously. This would indeed be a nightmare scenario for a one-war military. But it wouldn’t take a global security meltdown to reveal the problems caused by Washington’s predicament. First, overstretch limits U.S. options in a crisis. Where the United States should draw the line against Russian aggression in eastern Europe, how hard it should push back against Tehran’s provocations in the Middle East, and whether it should use force to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threshold state are matters that reasonable people can debate. But the fact that the United States increasingly has a China centric defense strategy has a constraining effect in other theaters. If a U.S. president knows that the Pentagon will need everything it has for an all-too-plausible war with China, he or she will be less inclined to use force against Iran or Russia, lest Washington be caught short if violence erupts in the Pacific. This issue leads to a second problem: the loss of diplomatic influence in situations short of war. Since the Taiwan and Ukraine crises of early 2021, some observers have speculated that Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping are coordinating their coercion as a way of threatening Washington with a two-front war. The reality is that explicit coordination is hardly necessary to profit from U.S. overextension. Historically, overstretched superpowers have eventually faced hard choices. Leaders in Moscow and Tehran can see that the United States is stretched thin militarily and eager to pay more attention to China. This gives them an incentive to push Washington harder in hopes of achieving gains at the expense of a distracted superpower. As the Russia expert Michael Kofman has written, Putin’s strategy of using military coercion to revise the post-Cold War order in Europe is premised on his belief that the “greater threat from China” will eventually “force Washington to compromise and renegotiate.” The more intense its focus on China, the higher the price the United States may be willing to pay for restraint in other places. The perils of overstretch, however, are not confined to secondary theaters. Weakness at the periphery can ultimately cause weakness at the center. A decade ago, the United States withdrew its forces from Iraq to economize in the Middle East and pivot toward the Pacific. Iraq’s subsequent collapse forced Washington to reengage there, fighting a multi-year conflict that devoured resources and attention. Similarly, if the United States finds itself in a showdown with Iran or if Russia attempts to revise the status quo in eastern Europe, Washington may once again find itself pivoting away from the Pacific to reinforce under-resourced regions that still matter to U.S. security. America’s defense strategy is increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific, but its foreign policy remains stubbornly global. That’s a recipe for trouble all around. TOUGH CHOICES To be clear, military power is hardly the only thing that matters in global affairs. But it is a necessary component of an effective foreign policy, if only because force remains the ultimate arbiter of international disputes. Xi, Putin, and other U.S. adversaries are unlikely to be swayed by Biden’s “relentless diplomacy” unless they are also awed by the military power that backs it up. Historically, overstretched superpowers have eventually faced hard choices about how to address mismatches between commitments and capabilities. When the United Kingdom found itself with more rivals than it could handle in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it began appeasing those that were less dangerous and proximate—including the United States—to concentrate on containing Germany. When the Korean War revealed that Washington’s containment policy outstripped its military resources, the United States was forced to undertake a significant defense buildup to close the gap. The Biden administration may try to skirt this dilemma by managing tensions with Iran, Russia, and other challengers while encouraging allies in Europe and partners in the Middle East to take greater responsibility for their own defense. That’s an understandable instinct. In the near term, both the geopolitical costs of true retrenchment and the financial costs of rearmament may seem to exceed the difficulties of muddling along. Yet Biden’s first year has already shown that overstretch inflicts damage on the installment plan. Eventually, the world will punish a superpower that allows its strategic deficit to grow too big for too long.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › ! - Readiness › Turn – Heg → China/ Russia War

A Russia-China coalition causes extinction — cyber-attacks, Russian aggression, and Chinese expansionism.

Kendall-Taylor & Shullman, 19 — Andrea Kendall-Taylor; PhD in Political Science from Yale, is a Senior Fellow in and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security an Adjunct Professor in Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. David Shullman, PhD, Political Science, is Senior Adviser at the International Republican Institute and an Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. (5-14-2019; "A Russian-Chinese Partnership Is a Threat to U.S. Interests;" Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-05-14/russian-chinese-partnership-threat-us-interests; //GrRv)

While Washington takes a wait-and-see approach, Moscow and Beijing could be coordinating to significantly thwart U.S. interests over the next 15 to 25 years. The two powers may never forge a formal military alliance, but they could still work together in ways that cause major headaches for the United States. Imagine, for example, that Russia and China coordinate the timing of hostile actions on their peripheries. If China made aggressive moves in support of its sovereignty claim in the South China Sea at the same time that Russia made further incursions into Ukraine, U.S. forces would struggle to respond effectively to either gambit. Nonmilitary collaboration between Russia and China could weaken the United States and even threaten its way of life. Both countries are likely to use their cyber and disinformation capabilities to, as the director of national intelligence put it in January, “steal information, to influence our citizens, or to disrupt critical infrastructure.” China currently does not exhibit Russia’s zeal for using such measures, particularly against the United States; but if U.S.-Chinese relations darken, Beijing could plausibly take a page from Russia’s playbook and mount coordinated, deniable cyberattacks or interference campaigns against the United States. China and Russia behave very differently in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives, but the combined effect of their actions is often greater than the sum of its parts. In Europe, for example, China has amassed economic influence through growing trade relationships and Belt and Road-related infrastructure investments not contingent on standards for democratic governance and human rights, particularly in eastern Europe, Greece, and Italy. This engagement will ultimately translate into political leverage, as it already has in many countries in Asia. Russia, for its part, appears intent on pursuing hybrid tactics that disrupt democratic processes. On their own, each of these activities is already worrisome for the United States and Europe. But a scenario in which each country’s actions amplify the other’s is not hard to imagine. China, for example, could eventually use its growing ownership of European ports and rail lines to slow a NATO response to Russian aggression. Likewise, Beijing could use the economic leverage it has accrued to quietly dissuade an already reluctant NATO member state such as Hungary or Turkey from responding to Russia’s hybrid tactics, which could ultimately serve to discredit NATO’s commitment to collective defense.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › ! - Readiness › Turn – Heg → China/ Russia War

Pursuit of hegemony causes counterbalancing — pushes Russia and China into a military alliance.

Hawn, 18 — Jeff Hawn; Analyst at Stratfor, a geopolitical intelligence and advisory firm. (12-10-2018, "China, Russia and the formation of an 'Eastern Entente;'" https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/420664-china-russia-and-the-formation-of-an-eastern-entente; //GrRv)

Indeed, if one weighs Russia and China’s mutual interest versus their mutual animosities, an argument begins to form that the two Eurasian powers’ conflict with the West may be enough to overcome their history of distrust. First, and perhaps most important is that neither power poses an existential threat to the other. Russia is not looking to convert China to its government system and the same goes for China. Any competition between the two states is framed in the realist sense of great power competition over land and resources. The West meanwhile actively espouses its own democratic system as a superior form of government, and has spent the last three quarters of a century trying to spread its ideals across the world. Secondly, there is the issue of territorial integrity. While it is true that Russia and China share a massive land border, that border sits at the far frontier of both nations. In contrast, both China and Russia have American troops within easy striking distance of their centers of power. In Europe, American tanks stationed in the Baltic States sit about 385 miles from Moscow. In the Pacific, the US 7th Fleet is based in Japan in addition to thousands of American troops deployed in Korea. These military assets are well within striking distance of China’s seaboard, the heart of its economy, and home to the majority of its population. Both Russia and China view the U.S. and its allies as attempting to constrain their respective efforts to secure regions of strategic significance for them. China and Russia’s similarities do not end there. Both nations are former imperial powers that see themselves as the victims over extended periods of national humiliation forced on them by the Western powers. When that is taken into consideration, the two nations’ desire to cooperate begins to makes sense. So what do Russia and China have to gain from increased cooperation? Is their ultimate goal dominion over the United States, as some alarmists would have us believe? I do not believe so. Both states are the heirs to the most brutal school of realpolitik. Their goal in cooperating is to offset the U.S. global hegemony, and carve out spheres of influence that will boost their own security and economic growth. Neither nation will benefit from a complete U.S. retreat form the world stage, but both have much to gain if they can challenge U.S. supremacy. Indeed, there remain strong points of contention between Russia and China, especially the Central Asian states in Russia’s traditional backyard, which China has increasingly been playing in as part of its One Belt One Road initiative. However, it can be argued that in Central Asia we are seeing the most tangible result of Chinese and Russia entente. Both can benefit from the region’s development, while security and counter terrorism cooperation help to prop up friendly regimes, and keep the lid on potential jihadist threats a serious concern for both states. There are already strong signs that China and Russia are seeing the benefits of working together. The two nations militaries frequently hold joint exercises, most notably Vostok 2018 when 3,500 Chinese troops participated in the exercises. Economic investment has lagged behind, but both China and Russia have recently signaled a desire to boost the economic heft of their shared border region. The nascent Russian-Chinese Business Advisory Committee announced in September 2018 an ambitious goal of a cumulative $100 billion joint investment and development projects. There certainly will be tension between the two states. Vostok was marred by reports of Russian naval vessels being followed by a Chinese spy ship, and Russian state media printed several critical articles of the Chinese J-15, which is derived from Soviet technology purchased from Ukraine. These spats should not distract from the broader trend that is unfolding, both nations’ security dilemmas on their respective eastern and western flanks. Dilemmas made more pressing by U.S. sanctions and tariffs. The ability to, if not trust their neighbor, at least trust that for the moment their interests are aligned has helped the China- Russia entente build momentum. As the U.S. and Western animosity grows toward Russia and China, it will continue to push them to closer cooperation, and make rending their partnership far more difficult. Between 1972 and 1990, U.S. grand strategy called for counterbalancing these two powers. At the time both states had more to gain through engagement with the U.S. than they did with each other. Over the last two decades, that has reversed substantially. So perhaps the question should not be if China and Russia would form an alliance, but whether or not they already have, and how strong it can grow?

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › ! - Readiness › Turn – Heg → China/ Russia War

Pursuit of hegemony is unsustainable and motivates a Sino-Russian coalition — causes fiscal and military overstretch, domestic polarization, and global war.

Porter, 19 — Patrick Porter, PhD, is a professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham, Chair of Strategic Studies at the University of Exeter, Academic Director of Strategy and Security Institute and Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI. (“Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition;” The Washington Quarterly; 42:1; pg. 14-15; //GrRv)

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.” If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more. Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28 After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expendable for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources. To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place. Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › ! - Readiness › ! – AT Readiness Crisis

A readiness crisis is incredibly unlikely — adversaries couldn’t exploit gaps in revenue.

Michael E. O’Hanlon, IR PhD, 16, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, "The state of U.S. military readiness", Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/08/15/the-state-of-u-s-military-readiness

Last week retired General David Petraeus and I wrote a Wall Street Journal op-ed arguing that, while the U.S. military is certainly facing a number of significant strains and future challenges, there is no crisis in military readiness. Unit by unit, today’s American armed forces are very good and rather well-prepared for the various tasks they could be called upon to undertake. To be sure, they remain better prepared for counterinsurgency and stabilization missions than for high-end warfare. The Army, and the U.S. military in general, continue to recover from Iraq and Afghanistan; that effort will take some additional time. And there is plenty of room for debate about whether the military is large enough, and also about whether it is following the right strategy to prepare for new threats. But on balance, the quality of our armed forces today is quite good. This point is important enough to be worth nailing down decisively. This op-ed attracted a number of criticisms. I would like to respond to several personally. Some have said that Army budgetary resources are inadequate. But they are, unit by unit, substantially greater than during the Reagan buildup, even after being adjusted for inflation. There are anecdotes of Army rifle companies that are undermanned, and other such concerns about hollow force structure. My best guess is that some of these problems, to the extent they are real, result in certain units from the process of downsizing (which the Army has been doing in recent years). For example, if there is a plan to combine two units into one and the plan has not yet been put into effect, the preexisting units might have shortages just before they are merged. Or, a unit about to deploy might be capped at a certain numerical size (given President Obama’s quantitative troop ceilings imposed on various operations abroad, for better or for worse). That might require it to deploy understrength. But across the Army, there is no systematic mismatch between soldiers and targeted force structure, so this should be at worst a localized and temporary problem. There are other anecdotes of tank crews never having fired a live round, and related stories of unpreparedness. If this is so, I question how the Army is allocating resources among its different units. Again, training dollars are robust, by any historical measure and when compared with what the Army calculates that it needs. Yes, sequestration caused temporary problems—but that was back in 2013. Yes, Iraq and Afghanistan caused problems—but we have been downsizing from them since 2011 and now have fewer than 15,000 soldiers deployed (out of a total Army—active plus reserve plus National Guard—of nearly one million soldiers). That represents a 90 percent reduction from peak deployments today—and deployed numbers have been quite modest since about 2013. If the Army has not used these last three years to begin to recover, I would humbly submit that there could be a case for rethinking some of its force management concepts. Yes, the Army and other services have had to cope with new operations from Liberia to the Baltic states to other hotspots in recent times. But these have all been small operations, totaling at most a few thousand troops each, for a grand total of less than 10,000 in all—and generally far fewer than that at any given time. Budgets for overseas contingency operations have come down far slower than have forces deployed abroad over the last half decade. This means that there are some extra dollars from the war supplementals that the military can use for recovery. So again, available resources do not appear to be a major problem. In fact, they are relatively robust and generous at present. To be sure, given the normal life cycle of major units, the Army will need several more years to fully recover from all of the strains of recent operations abroad. There is no case for complacency, or for declaring victory. Nor is there a case for cutting readiness budgets. And to be sure, one can have a vigorous debate about whether the size of the Army has been cut at least a bit too much; indeed, General Petraeus and I make this case, in the op-ed as well as our forthcoming Foreign Affairs article. But there is not, to my mind, a strong case for questioning the unit-by-unit excellence of the Army in particular, or the U.S. military in general. Nor is there a serious concern about the adequacy of resources on a unit-by-unit basis for equipment, people, and training. In short, there is no readiness crisis requiring dramatic policy intervention. Luckily, for those would-be adversaries who might be listening to our debate, there is therefore also no window of opportunity to exploit in America’s ability to defend its global interests.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › ! - Readiness › IL – AT Troops K2 Readiness

Robots will replace many soldiers.

Kelsey D. Atherton, 1-22-2014, "Robots May Replace One-Fourth Of U.S. Combat Soldiers By 2030, Says General," Popular Science, https://www.popsci.com/article/technology/robots-may-replace-one-fourth-us-combat-soldiers-2030-says-general/ gac

By the middle of this century, U.S. Army soldiers may well be fighting alongside robotic squadmates. General Robert Cone revealed the news at an Army Aviation symposium last week, noting that the Army is considering reducing the size of a Brigade Combat Team from 4,000 soldiers to 3,000, with robots and drones making up for the lost firepower. Cone is in charge of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the part of the Army responsible for future planning and organization. If the Army can still be as effective with fewer people to a unit, TRADOC will figure out what technology is needed to make that happen. While not explicitly stated, a major motivation behind replacing humans with robots is that humans are expensive. Training, feeding, and supplying them while at war is pricey, and after the soldiers leave the service, there’s a lifetime of medical care to cover. In 2012, benefits for serving and retired members of the military comprised one-quarter of the Pentagon’s budget request. To understand what Cone is proposing (besides robot soldiers), we need to understand two fundamental building blocks of the modern U.S. Army. The first is the nine-man squad, almost the smallest useful unit of force. For some purposes, it can be split into two smaller fireteams, but the Army designs vehicles with the nine-man squad in mind, and then writes doctrine for how these squads (some with, some without vehicles) will move and fight. The second building block worth knowing is the Brigade Combat Team. It’s the smallest large unit that can be sent into combat independently. If the Army can reduce number of people in squads, it can reduce the total manpower everywhere, and it can acquire vehicles that are both smaller and cheaper. In order to reduce manpower without reducing fighting ability, the Army will need to make sure that Brigades have everything they need to be just effective. In order for that to happen, Cone said the Army will “need to fundamentally change the nature of the force, and that would require a breakthrough in science and technology.” Cone expects this to happen by 2030 to 2040.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › ! - Readiness › IL – AT Troops K2 Readiness

Robots will replace most human troops and solve recruitment issues.

Webb 2-19-2018, Mint Press News on February 19, 2018 by Whitney Webb (more by Mint Press News) | (Posted Feb 20, 2018) THE U.S. MILITARY WILL HAVE MORE ROBOTS THAN HUMANS BY 2025. Whitney Webb has been a professional writer, researcher and journalist since 2016. She has written for several websites and, from 2017 to 2020, was a staff writer and senior investigative reporter for MintPress News. She currently writes for her own outlet Unlimited Hangout and contributes to The Last American Vagabond and MintPress News. https://www.mintpressnews.com/the-u-s-military-will-have-more-robots-than-humans-by-2025/237725/ gac

While cyborg soldiers and fully automated weapons have long been fodder for futuristic sci-fi thrillers, they are now a reality and, if the Pentagon gets its way, will soon become the norm in the U.S. military. As Defense One reported last Thursday, the Army had just concluded a live-fire exercise using a remote-controlled ground combat vehicle complete with a fully automated machine gun. The demonstration marked the first time that the Army has used a ground robot providing fire in tandem with human troops in a military exercise and, as Defense One noted, “it won’t be the last.” Indeed, last week’s exercise represents just the latest step in the Pentagon’s relatively quiet tip-toe into converting the U.S. Armed Forces to a machine-majority force. Faced with low recruitment and an increased demand for soldiers, the Department of Defense is seeking to solve that problem altogether while also increasing the military’s firepower and force in combat. Though unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), better known as drones, are the most well known of these devices, the Pentagon has been investing heavily—for decades—in a cadre of military robots aimed at dominating air, sea, and land. In 2010, the Pentagon had already invested $4 billion in research programs into “autonomous systems” and, since then, its research wing—Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, better known as DARPA—has been spending much of its roughly $3 billion annual budget funding robotic research intended for use in military applications. According to former U.K. intelligence officer John Bassett, DARPA’s investments in robotics and automated weapons will not only quickly become the norm in the U.S. military, they will soon replace humans, who are set to become a minority in the U.S. military in a matter of years. During a recent speech, Basset—a 20-year veteran of the British spy agency Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) and very familiar with U.S. military research—warned that the U.S.’ attempts to “stay ahead of the curve” will result in the Pentagon’s deployment of thousands of robot soldiers over the next few years. The upshot, according to Basset, is that the U.S. Army will have “more combat robots than human soldiers by 2025”—just seven years from now. The mechanization revolution in the military, however, isn’t set to stop there. According to the Army’s official Robotic and Autonomous Systems (RAS) strategy, the Army plans to have autonomous “self-aware” systems “fully integrated into the force” between 2031 and 2040 along with the complete automation of logistics. The strategy also states that, by that time, the Army will have a cadre of robots at its service including “swarm robots” that will be “fully powered, self-unpacking and ready for immediate service,” along with advanced artificial intelligence designed to “increase combat effectiveness,” particularly in urban combat zones. Now that ground robots are undergoing testing alongside human soldiers, the Army’s vision along with Basset’s prediction are set to become the new reality of the U.S. military. Ground robots like those used in the recent Army exercise are hardly the only type of robot soldier soon to be at the Pentagon’s disposal. Weapons manufacturers have been all too eager to comply with the Pentagon’s growing demand for automated war machines and have already developed a variety of such devices, to the delight of senior military officials. In 2015, U.S. weapons giant Lockheed Martin began working with the military to develop automated networks that manage complex missions involving both unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, an effort still underway. That same year, the Navy began deploying underwater drones. A year later in 2016, Boeing—now the largest defense contractor in the U.S.—launched an unmanned submarine designed for exploratory missions as well as combat, followed by DARPA’s release of an autonomous drone ship to be used for hunting down enemy submarines, set to be used by the U.S. Navy later this year. While such machines have been advertised as combat aids to human soldiers, DARPA has also been working on developing so-called “killer robots”—i.e., robot infantry set to replace human soldiers. Many of these robots have been developed by the Massachusetts-based and DARPA-funded company Boston Dynamics, whose veritable Sears Catalog of robots includes several models designed specifically for military use. One of those robots, dubbed “Atlas,” is capable of jumping and backflips, carrying heavy loads, navigating uneven terrain, resisting attacks from a group of humans and even breaking through walls. Another Boston Dynamics robot, called “WildCat” can run at sustained speeds of nearly 20 miles per hour. By comparison, a gifted human runner can briefly sprint at about 16 miles per hour. Of course, the Pentagon’s interest in robotic warfare systems is not limited to machines alone. As The Atlantic reported in 2015, DARPA has been focused on “transforming humans for war” since 1990 by combining man and machine to create a “super soldier.” In 2001, DARPA made its first major advance in this area when it unveiled two exoskeleton programs. By 2013, this had evolved into a “super soldier” suit known as TALOS (Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit), which is complete with imaging systems, cooling/heating, an oxygen tank, embedded sensors and more. It is expected to be fully functional by later this year. Most of DARPA’s other “super soldier” programs remain secret, however. Of those that are acknowledged, the most disconcerting is the “Brain-Machine Interface,” a project first made public by DARPA at a 2002 technology conference. Though its goal was to create “a wireless brain modem for a freely moving rat,” which would allow the animal’s movements to be remotely controlled, DARPA wasn’t shy about the eventual goal of applying such brain “enhancement” to humans in order to enable soldiers to “communicate by thought alone.” Even this went too far for some defense scientists, who warned in a 2008 report that “remote guidance or control of a human being” could quickly backfire were an adversary to gain access to the implanted technology, and who also raised concerns about the moral dangers of such augmentation. DARPA, for its part, seems hardly concerned with such possibilities. Michael Goldblatt, director of the DARPA subdivision Defense Sciences Office (DSO), which oversees the “super soldier” program, told journalist Annie Jacobsen that he saw no difference between “having a chip in your brain that could help control your thoughts” and “a cochlear implant that helps the deaf hear.” When pressed about the unintended consequences of such technology, Goldblatt stated that “there are unintended consequences for everything.” While those “unintended consequences” may not keep DARPA higher-ups like Goldblatt awake at night, concerns about the Pentagon’s plan to embrace a mechanized future have been common outside of the military. In attempts to quell those concerns, the Pentagon has repeatedly assuredthat humans will always remain in control when it comes to making life-and-death decisions and that they are putting special care into preventing robots from engaging in unintended attacks or falling prey to hackers. They have even enlisted experts to help add “ethics” so its robotic soldiers will not violate the Geneva Conventions and will “perform more ethically than human soldiers.” This may seem a rather low bar to those who are aware of the Pentagon’s egregious record of human rights violations and war crimes. If the Pentagon’s use of drones is any indication, the military’s “ethical” use of automated killing machines is indeed suspect. Previous reporting has shown that those who doubt the Pentagon’s professed concern over preventing “unethical” consequences resulting from its development of a robot army are right to do so. As journalist Nafeez Ahmed reported in 2016, official U.S. military documents reveal that humans in charge of overseeing the actions of military robots will soon be replaced by “self-aware” interconnected robots, “who” will both design and conduct operations against targets chosen by artificial-intelligence systems. Not only that, but these same documents show that by 2030 the Pentagon plans to delegate mission planning, target selection and the deployment of lethal force across air, land, and sea entirely to autonomous weapon systems based on an advanced artificial intelligence system.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › ! - Readiness › NU – Heg Unsustainable

The pursuit of hegemony is unsustainable – lack of funding and overstretch destroy American primacy

Metz 18 (Steven, Senior Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 5-9-2018, "America’s Increasingly Unsustainable Pursuit of Global Primacy," No Publication, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/26874/america-s-increasingly-unsustainable-pursuit-of-global-primacy)//EAW

The United States obsesses about its global strategy more than any nation on earth. This fixation is reflected in the fact that Congress requires the executive branch to produce regular reports on its security strategy. A year ago, the Trump administration published its inaugural National Security Strategy. A few months later, the Pentagon released its National Defense Strategy to explain how U.S. military power would be used to implement the National Security Strategy. As it has in the past, Congress then created a bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission to assess the Pentagon’s strategy. This included an august team of top policy experts and former officials from the Pentagon, the uniformed military, Congress, the intelligence community and the diplomatic corps. A few weeks ago, this commission released its latest report. Unsurprisingly, and despite the appearance of constant and vigorous policy debate in Washington, the report didn’t offer any alternatives to the strategy that the United States has pursued for the past few decades, instead recommending an even more vigorous pursuit of global primacy and military dominance. It looked like the mainstream position on American strategy on steroids. America’s fixation with primacy and military dominance, while now the orthodoxy, is a relatively recent thing. It was initially intended as a temporary expedient to help stave off the Soviet Union as Europe and other regions rebuilt after World War II and dozens of new nations emerged out of the former European colonial empires. But during the course of the Cold War, the United States somehow became addicted to primacy, no longer seeing it as a temporary expedient but as the new normal. It didn’t have to be this way. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the United States might have considered its global mission complete, disengaged from all but the most vital parts of the world, and undertaken a major military demobilization. Instead, political leaders opted for a smaller but even more advanced and adept military, seeking to “overmatch” any potential adversary. Along the way, the use of armed force became the tool of first resort in American statecraft, supplanting the balanced mix of military, diplomatic and economic power that characterized America’s Cold War strategy. Although a few policy experts and political leaders have advocated a more restrained approach to national security, most of them, both Republicans and Democrats, remain committed to global primacy and military dominance. Making the case for this requires convincing the public that the alternatives are dangerous, even frightening. The National Defense Strategy Commission report hits this theme hard. “The security and wellbeing of the United States are at greater risk than at any time in decades,” it warns. “America’s military superiority—the hard-power backbone of its global influence and national security—has eroded to a dangerous degree. Rivals and adversaries are challenging the United States on many fronts and in many domains. America’s ability to defend its allies, its partners, and its own vital interests is increasingly in doubt. If the nation does not act promptly to remedy these circumstances, the consequences will be grave and lasting.” Americans are so accustomed to global primacy and military dominance that they have difficulty imagining other options or seriously weighing the costs against the benefits. The implication of this dark perspective is that the U.S. defense budget, which is already the largest on earth by far, needs to be increased. Just this week, the Senate Armed Services Committee heard testimony from the commission and used it to call for even more Pentagon funding. But what the National Defense Strategy Commission or any equivalent group hasn’t done is seriously examine or reckon with the underlying assumptions of this orthodox strategy. For instance, advocates assume that without U.S. military dominance, the global system—or at least some parts of it—will devolve into conflict or fall under the control of hostile nations that might keep the United States out of the regions they monopolize. That was a valid concern during the Cold War when America faced an expansionistic Soviet Union bent on world domination. But it no longer is. The idea that China, Russia, Iran or some other adversary might shut out American businesses for political reasons is farfetched in today’s interconnected global economy. Yet the idea that America’s economic health depends on primacy and military dominance has been repeated so often that it is an article of faith among mainstream policy experts and political leaders. Another questionable assumption is that the United States must be capable of militarily overmatching any potential adversary. While military dominance is certainly nice to have, the only way to sustain it is by increased deficit spending, cutting entitlements like Social Security and Medicare, diminishing investment in health care, infrastructure and education, or increasing taxes. Making the Department of Defense more efficient, which is often touted as a magic bullet, is a good idea, but even the National Defense Strategy Commission admitted that it will not be enough to sustain, much less increase, America’s military dominance. Today though, Americans are so accustomed to global primacy and military dominance that they have difficulty imagining other options or seriously weighing the costs against the benefits. As Patrick Porter, a professor of strategic studies at the University of Exeter, puts it, “Alternative grand strategies based on restraint and retrenchment are hardly entertained, and debate is narrowed into questions of execution and implementation.” So long as this continues, the United States will remain stubbornly committed to its quest for global primacy and military dominance, hoping against hope that some elixir of Pentagon reform and increased support from U.S. allies will make it work. Eventually, though, this myth will collapse, and then a serious debate about America’s role in the world will really begin.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › ! - Readiness › NU – Readiness Low

Budget cuts overwhelm — readiness is terminally decked

Cooper, US Government MA, 17 [John Cooper is the senior communications manager for the Davis Institute for National Security, "Defense Leaders Agree: US Military Readiness Is at a Dangerous Low", 2/10/17, dailysignal.com/2017/02/10/defense-leaders-agree-us-military-readiness-is-at-a-dangerous-low]

This week on Capitol Hill, several top U.S. military leaders from across the armed services presented a sobering case to Congress: U.S. military readiness is the lowest it has been in decades, leaving it unprepared to defend America’s interests at home and abroad. In testimony before the Senate and House Armed Services committees, the vice chiefs of staff of the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force articulated pressing concerns about the state of their branchs’ readiness to respond to conflicts overseas or attacks on the homeland. The hearing highlighted substantial readiness and capacity issues within each of the services: Army: Of 58 total brigade combat teams (the Army’s main combat building block), only three are considered ready for combat. Navy: The Navy’s fleet is the smallest it has been in nearly 100 years. This makes ship repairs harder to complete, as those vessels are needed on the waterways. Marine Corps: Eighty percent of Marine aviation units do not have even the minimum number of aircraft they need for training and basic operations. Air Force: The Air Force is the smallest and, in terms of many of its aircraft, oldest it has ever been. The service had 8,600 aircraft in 1991 while today it only has 5,500, and those aircraft are an average of 27 years old. Worse, fewer than half of those aircraft are prepared to take on and defeat our adversaries. These troubling findings by the services echo those laid out by The Heritage Foundation in its 2017 Index of U.S. Military Strength, which rated the Army as “Weak” and the other three branches as “Marginal” in terms of their ability to fight and win major conflicts. What was noteworthy about the vice chiefs’ testimony beyond these startling numbers, however, was their brutal honesty. For eight years under the Obama administration, top defense officials were largely silenced and prevented from articulating their concerns about budget cuts and decreased readiness to policymakers with the ability to reverse undeniable decline. What this hearing and other recent public statements are showing, however, is that defense leaders believe they can now begin to speak openly about the challenges they face, and that Congress and the administration can address these negative trends—especially those caused by diminishing resources. Make no mistake—budget cuts, especially sequestration cuts implemented indiscriminately across the board beginning more than five years ago, have been devastating to the U.S. military. Look at flying hours, for example. Navy, Marine, and Air Force pilots have all seen their flying hours substantially reduced because there simply is not enough money to fly sorties. This has led to pilots being unable to maintain cockpit skills, which like everything else, will atrophy without constant tuning and training. Worse, this inability to maintain proficiency has led to lethal accidents and loss of aircraft, which may have been preventable—to say nothing of the danger of thrusting our service men and women into combat without giving them the opportunity to train and maximize their readiness. John Venable, a Heritage senior research fellow for defense policy and retired F-16 pilot with more than 4,400 hours in the cockpit, has written that the 2015 Air Force average of 150 flight hours per year per pilot (just under three a week) means “the most current and qualified Air Force fighter pilots are flying at a rate so low that we would have considered them unfit for combat in the 80s and 90s.” And this is 20 to 30 years later, in a world where our enemies have become stronger, more advanced, and more aggressive. Even if the budget for flight hours existed, however, in many cases it simply would not matter, because the majority of the services’ aircraft are not even considered flyable. According to multiple reports just this week, about two-thirds of the Navy’s fighter/attack aircraft and more than half of the Marine Corps’ total aircraft fleet are unable to even get off the ground. These problems are merely the tip of the iceberg. The American people can expect to hear more accounts like these in the coming months as we learn more about the declining state of U.S. military readiness. However, hope is not lost.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › ! - Readiness › NU – Readiness Low

Readiness is shot – old tech and budget cuts

Chalfant, BA, 17 (Morgan, "The US Army's Ground Combat Systems are at Risk of Being Surpassed by Russia and China." Business Insider. www.businessinsider.com/us-army-ground-combat-systems-surpassed-by-russia-china-2017-1)

The U.S. Army’s ground combat systems risk being surpassed by those being developed by foreign countries such as Russia and China, according to a new report from the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service. The Army is currently using main battle tanks, tracked infantry fighting vehicles, tracked self-propelled artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems developed during the Soviet era. Billion-dollar plans to modernize the force’s ground combat systems have been cancelled over the last decade. Meanwhile, potential adversaries have prioritized funding new weapons systems and technologies for their forces, raising concerns among American experts about the shrinking capability gap between the United States and other nations. “Countries such as Russia and China are not only upgrading existing ground combat systems with new and effective survivability and lethality features but are also developing entirely new ground combat systems for domestic use and possible export,” the Congressional Research Service wrote in a report published this month. “Given the U.S. has ‘no new ground combat vehicles under development’ and new systems are a ‘multi-decade effort’ due largely to resource constraints and DOD’s Acquisition process, there is a possibility one or more upgraded or newly developed foreign ground combat systems could emerge and surpass its U.S. counterpart,” the report states. Military leaders from across the armed services have highlighted how defense spending reductions put in place by the Budget Control Act of 2011 have forced them to fund current readiness at the expense of other priorities, including modernization. “Predictable and consistent funding is absolutely essential for the Army to build and sustain current readiness and progress toward a more modern, capable future force,” Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley said in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services in September. “We simply cannot sustain readiness or build the Army our nation needs in the future if we return to sequestration-level funding in fiscal year 2018.” Russian servicemen drive a T-14 Armata tank (front) during a rehearsal for the Victory Day parade in Red Square in central Moscow, Russia, May 7, 2015. Russia will celebrate the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War Two on May 9. REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY Russian servicemen drive a T-14 Armata tank during a rehearsal for the Victory Day parade in Red Square in central MoscowThomson Reuters “While the Army is reducing end-strength, we made a deliberate decision to prioritize readiness, reduce infrastructure maintenance, and decrease funding for modernization,” Milley said. “These choices devote resources to today’s fight, but decrease investments for future modernization and infrastructure readiness, and emergent demands.” The Congressional Research Service compared ground combat systems developed by the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Israel, identifying shortfalls in U.S. systems and potential advantages of foreign systems. For instance, the report states that main battle tanks under development by Russia and China are “employing larger caliber main guns than their Western counterparts, theoretically offering greater range and armor penetration.” Russia is currently developing the high-technology Armata T-14 tank, a prototype of which was unveiled at the 2015 Victory Day parade in Moscow. The Telegraph reported last year that a leaked internal British military intelligence document described the tank as “the most revolutionary step change in tank design in the last half century.” Russia has been able to test a variety of new weapons systems in Syria while supporting Bashar al-Assad’s forces. Pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine also have used new weapons from Moscow to fight Ukrainian government forces in the eastern part of the country. China last July unveiled the newest variant of its ZTZ-96 main battle tank, which participated in army games organized by the Russian defense ministry. Constraints on the U.S. defense budget have been a source of concern among some Republican lawmakers, who say that sequestration should be ended and funding for the U.S. military boosted. President Donald Trump has said he will end sequestration and rebuild the armed forces, though it is unclear how much he wants to increase the defense budget.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › NL › AT Unemployment

No link—employment doesn’t predict enlistment and other factors outweigh

Mongilio 22

Heather, master’s degree in science journalism. “Tough Military Recruiting Environment is About More than Low Unemployment, Experts Say.” USNI News. 12/1/2022. https://news.usni.org/2022/12/01/tough-military-recruiting-environment-is-about-much-more-than-low-unemployment-experts-say LJS

A low unemployment rate in the United States has been one of the most cited reasons for the more difficult recruitment environment, but Berger argues that while it might be a contributing factor, it deserves less of the blame. “Yet, some of our deepest challenges are chronic, indicating that the strength of the economy may be less critical than commonly thought,” Berger wrote. “For example, the Marine Corps has struggled—in good economic times and bad—to produce and retain an adequate number of pilots, even for the newest, most modern aircraft.” The commandant, in his article, also evaluates the shrinking pool of eligible candidates. Most recent numbers suggest that 77 percent of Americans between the ages of 17 and 21 are not eligible to serve in the military, retired Rear Adm. Robert Besal, who works with advocacy group Mission Readiness, told USNI News. The top three reasons for ineligibility are failure to pass entrance exams, health concerns and prior criminal activity, including drug abuse. One of the main health concerns is childhood obesity, which Besal said counts for 30 percent of those who are ineligible. Mission Readiness is attempting to fix the pool of eligibility by trying to get funding for educational and nutrition programs, Besal said, but that requires getting congressional and other legislative officials to think in the long term. Programs that would help childhood obesity and failure to pass entrance exams should start with children as young as three years old, Besal said. But the payoff will not be for another 15 years, when that child becomes eligible for service. But while Mission Readiness looks at what can be done for the future, there are limited options for the services right now to fix the ineligibility problem, Berger wrote. “Military leaders have few levers to pull to increase the number of Americans eligible for service, and the biggest and most immediate lever—lowering standards—is not one military leaders or most Americans want,” he wrote. “To effect enduring change requires understanding and addressing the declining propensity to serve.” The economy can contribute to recruitment challenges, but it is a cyclical factor, Asch, who is a senior economist at RAND, told USNI News Historically, when there is low employment, it’s harder for the military to recruit, she said in an interview Nov. 2. This could be the case for the military right now, but it’s all speculation, she said. “I don’t think it’s an either-or situation,” Asch said. “I think it’s a matter of understanding the array of factors that could be having an effect and then teasing out their relative importance and for what particular groups, under what circumstances.” Berger also points out that recruitment challenges persist even when the unemployment rate is higher, which generally is associated with better recruiting, suggesting that the economy, while a factor, is not the sole cause for recruiting woes. Berger pointed to a lack of trust in the military, a factor that Besal also highlighted.