Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Climate › Now is key- Tipping Points

Human activity drives the rate of climate change by triggering natural feedbacks. Dramatic reductions beyond Paris are crucial to avoid “hothouse earth”

Steffen et al, PhDs, 18

(Will, Chemistry@Australian National, Johan Rockström, View ORCID ProfileKatherine Richardson, Timothy M. Lenton, Carl Folke, Diana Liverman, Colin P. Summerhayes, Anthony D. Barnosky, Sarah E. Cornell, View ORCID ProfileMichel Crucifix, Jonathan F. Donges, Ingo Fetzer, Steven J. Lade, Marten Scheffer, Ricarda Winkelmann, and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene, PNAS August 14, 2018 115 (33) 8252-8259; https://www.pnas.org/content/115/33/8252)

Stability landscape showing the pathway of the Earth System out of the Holocene and thus, out of the glacial–interglacial limit cycle to its present position in the hotter Anthropocene. The fork in the road in Fig. 1 is shown here as the two divergent pathways of the Earth System in the future (broken arrows). Currently, the Earth System is on a Hothouse Earth pathway driven by human emissions of greenhouse gases and biosphere degradation toward a planetary threshold at ∼2 °C (horizontal broken line at 2 °C in Fig. 1), beyond which the system follows an essentially irreversible pathway driven by intrinsic biogeophysical feedbacks. The other pathway leads to Stabilized Earth, a pathway of Earth System stewardship guided by human-created feedbacks to a quasistable, human-maintained basin of attraction. “Stability” (vertical axis) is defined here as the inverse of the potential energy of the system. Systems in a highly stable state (deep valley) have low potential energy, and considerable energy is required to move them out of this stable state. Systems in an unstable state (top of a hill) have high potential energy, and they require only a little additional energy to push them off the hill and down toward a valley of lower potential energy. The Anthropocene represents the beginning of a very rapid human-driven trajectory of the Earth System away from the glacial–interglacial limit cycle toward new, hotter climatic conditions and a profoundly different biosphere (2, 8, 9) (SI Appendix). The current position, at over 1 °C above a preindustrial baseline (10), is nearing the upper envelope of interglacial conditions over the past 1.2 million years (SI Appendix, Table S1). More importantly, the rapid trajectory of the climate system over the past half-century along with technological lock in and socioeconomic inertia in human systems commit the climate system to conditions beyond the envelope of past interglacial conditions. We, therefore, suggest that the Earth System may already have passed one “fork in the road” of potential pathways, a bifurcation (near A in Fig. 1) taking the Earth System out of the next glaciation cycle (11). In the future, the Earth System could potentially follow many trajectories (12, 13), often represented by the large range of global temperature rises simulated by climate models (14). In most analyses, these trajectories are largely driven by the amount of greenhouse gases that human activities have already emitted and will continue to emit into the atmosphere over the rest of this century and beyond—with a presumed quasilinear relationship between cumulative carbon dioxide emissions and global temperature rise (14). However, here we suggest that biogeophysical feedback processes within the Earth System coupled with direct human degradation of the biosphere may play a more important role than normally assumed, limiting the range of potential future trajectories and potentially eliminating the possibility of the intermediate trajectories. We argue that there is a significant risk that these internal dynamics, especially strong nonlinearities in feedback processes, could become an important or perhaps, even dominant factor in steering the trajectory that the Earth System actually follows over coming centuries. This risk is represented in Figs. 1 and 2 by a planetary threshold (horizontal broken line in Fig. 1 on the Hothouse Earth pathway around 2 °C above preindustrial temperature). Beyond this threshold, intrinsic biogeophysical feedbacks in the Earth System (Biogeophysical Feedbacks) could become the dominant processes controlling the system’s trajectory. Precisely where a potential planetary threshold might be is uncertain (15, 16). We suggest 2 °C because of the risk that a 2 °C warming could activate important tipping elements (12, 17), raising the temperature further to activate other tipping elements in a domino-like cascade that could take the Earth System to even higher temperatures (Tipping Cascades). Such cascades comprise, in essence, the dynamical process that leads to thresholds in complex systems (section 4.2 in ref. 18). This analysis implies that, even if the Paris Accord target of a 1.5 °C to 2.0 °C rise in temperature is met, we cannot exclude the risk that a cascade of feedbacks could push the Earth System irreversibly onto a “Hothouse Earth” pathway. The challenge that humanity faces is to create a “Stabilized Earth” pathway that steers the Earth System away from its current trajectory toward the threshold beyond which is Hothouse Earth (Fig. 2). The human-created Stabilized Earth pathway leads to a basin of attraction that is not likely to exist in the Earth System’s stability landscape without human stewardship to create and maintain it. Creating such a pathway and basin of attraction requires a fundamental change in the role of humans on the planet. This stewardship role requires deliberate and sustained action to become an integral, adaptive part of Earth System dynamics, creating feedbacks that keep the system on a Stabilized Earth pathway (Alternative Stabilized Earth Pathway). We now explore this critical question in more detail by considering the relevant biogeophysical feedbacks (Biogeophysical Feedbacks) and the risk of tipping cascades (Tipping Cascades). The trajectory of the Earth System is influenced by biogeophysical feedbacks within the system that can maintain it in a given state (negative feedbacks) and those that can amplify a perturbation and drive a transition to a different state (positive feedbacks). Some of the key negative feedbacks that could maintain the Earth System in Holocene-like conditions—notably, carbon uptake by land and ocean systems—are weakening relative to human forcing (19), increasing the risk that positive feedbacks could play an important role in determining the Earth System’s trajectory. Table 1 summarizes carbon cycle feedbacks that could accelerate warming, while SI Appendix, Table S2 describes in detail a more complete set of biogeophysical feedbacks that can be triggered by forcing levels likely to be reached within the rest of the century. Most of the feedbacks can show both continuous responses and tipping point behavior in which the feedback process becomes self-perpetuating after a critical threshold is crossed; subsystems exhibiting this behavior are often called “tipping elements” (17). The type of behavior—continuous response or tipping point/abrupt change—can depend on the magnitude or the rate of forcing, or both. Many feedbacks will show some gradual change before the tipping point is reached. A few of the changes associated with the feedbacks are reversible on short timeframes of 50–100 years (e.g., change in Arctic sea ice extent with a warming or cooling of the climate; Antarctic sea ice may be less reversible because of heat accumulation in the Southern Ocean), but most changes are largely irreversible on timeframes that matter to contemporary societies (e.g., loss of permafrost carbon). A few of the feedbacks do not have apparent thresholds (e.g., change in the land and ocean physiological carbon sinks, such as increasing carbon uptake due to the CO2 fertilization effect or decreasing uptake due to a decrease in rainfall). For some of the tipping elements, crossing the tipping point could trigger an abrupt, nonlinear response (e.g., conversion of large areas of the Amazon rainforest to a savanna or seasonally dry forest), while for others, crossing the tipping point would lead to a more gradual but self-perpetuating response (large-scale loss of permafrost). There could also be considerable lags after the crossing of a threshold, particularly for those tipping elements that involve the melting of large masses of ice. However, in some cases, ice loss can be very rapid when occurring as massive iceberg outbreaks (e.g., Heinrich Events). For some feedback processes, the magnitude—and even the direction—depend on the rate of climate change. If the rate of climate change is small, the shift in biomes can track the change in temperature/moisture, and the biomes may shift gradually, potentially taking up carbon from the atmosphere as the climate warms and atmospheric CO2 concentration increases. However, if the rate of climate change is too large or too fast, a tipping point can be crossed, and a rapid biome shift may occur via extensive disturbances (e.g., wildfires, insect attacks, droughts) that can abruptly remove an existing biome. In some terrestrial cases, such as widespread wildfires, there could be a pulse of carbon to the atmosphere, which if large enough, could influence the trajectory of the Earth System (29). Varying response rates to a changing climate could lead to complex biosphere dynamics with implications for feedback processes. For example, delays in permafrost thawing would most likely delay the projected northward migration of boreal forests (30), while warming of the southern areas of these forests could result in their conversion to steppe grasslands of significantly lower carbon storage capacity. The overall result would be a positive feedback to the climate system. The so-called “greening” of the planet, caused by enhanced plant growth due to increasing atmospheric CO2 concentration (31), has increased the land carbon sink in recent decades (32). However, increasing atmospheric CO2 raises temperature, and hotter leaves photosynthesize less well. Other feedbacks are also involved—for instance, warming the soil increases microbial respiration, releasing CO2 back into the atmosphere. Our analysis focuses on the strength of the feedback between now and 2100. However, several of the feedbacks that show negligible or very small magnitude by 2100 could nevertheless be triggered well before then, and they could eventually generate significant feedback strength over longer timeframes—centuries and even millennia—and thus, influence the long-term trajectory of the Earth System. These feedback processes include permafrost thawing, decomposition of ocean methane hydrates, increased marine bacterial respiration, and loss of polar ice sheets accompanied by a rise in sea levels and potential amplification of temperature rise through changes in ocean circulation (33). Tipping Cascades. Fig. 3 shows a global map of some potential tipping cascades. The tipping elements fall into three clusters based on their estimated threshold temperature (12, 17, 39). Cascades could be formed when a rise in global temperature reaches the level of the lower-temperature cluster, activating tipping elements, such as loss of the Greenland Ice Sheet or Arctic sea ice. These tipping elements, along with some of the nontipping element feedbacks (e.g., gradual weakening of land and ocean physiological carbon sinks), could push the global average temperature even higher, inducing tipping in mid- and higher-temperature clusters. For example, tipping (loss) of the Greenland Ice Sheet could trigger a critical transition in the Atlantic Meridional Ocean Circulation (AMOC), which could together, by causing sea-level rise and Southern Ocean heat accumulation, accelerate ice loss from the East Antarctic Ice Sheet (32, 40) on timescales of centuries (41). Fig. 3. Download figure Open in new tab Download powerpoint Fig. 3. Global map of potential tipping cascades. The individual tipping elements are color- coded according to estimated thresholds in global average surface temperature (tipping points) (12, 34). Arrows show the potential interactions among the tipping elements based on expert elicitation that could generate cascades. Note that, although the risk for tipping (loss of) the East Antarctic Ice Sheet is proposed at >5 °C, some marine-based sectors in East Antarctica may be vulnerable at lower temperatures (35⇓⇓–38). Observations of past behavior support an important contribution of changes in ocean circulation to such feedback cascades. During previous glaciations, the climate system flickered between two states that seem to reflect changes in convective activity in the Nordic seas and changes in the activity of the AMOC. These variations caused typical temperature response patterns called the “bipolar seesaw” (42⇓–44). During extremely cold conditions in the north, heat accumulated in the Southern Ocean, and Antarctica warmed. Eventually, the heat made its way north and generated subsurface warming that may have been instrumental in destabilizing the edges of the Northern Hemisphere ice sheets (45). If Greenland and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet melt in the future, the freshening and cooling of nearby surface waters will have significant effects on the ocean circulation. While the probability of significant circulation changes is difficult to quantify, climate model simulations suggest that freshwater inputs compatible with current rates of Greenland melting are sufficient to have measurable effects on ocean temperature and circulation (46, 47). Sustained warming of the northern high latitudes as a result of this process could accelerate feedbacks or activate tipping elements in that region, such as permafrost degradation, loss of Arctic sea ice, and boreal forest dieback. While this may seem to be an extreme scenario, it illustrates that a warming into the range of even the lower-temperature cluster (i.e., the Paris targets) could lead to tipping in the mid- and higher-temperature clusters via cascade effects. Based on this analysis of tipping cascades and taking a risk-averse approach, we suggest that a potential planetary threshold could occur at a temperature rise as low as ∼2.0 °C above preindustrial (Fig. 1).

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Climate › Now is key- Tipping Points

Approaching multiple dangerous tipping points that threaten survival

Harry Baker published September 19, 2022

Live Science Staff Writer; Climate 'points of no return' may be much closer than we thought; ’

Climate tipping points — the "points of no return" past which key components of Earth's climate will begin to irreversibly break down — could be triggered by much lower temperatures than scientists previously thought, with some tipping points potentially already reached. There are also many more potential tipping points than scientists previously identified, according to a new study. In climatology, a tipping point is defined as a rise in global temperature past which a localized climate system, or "tipping element" — such as the Amazon rainforest or the Greenland ice sheet — starts to irreversibly decline. Once a tipping point has been reached, that tipping element will experience runaway effects that essentially doom it forever, even if global temperatures retreat below the tipping point. The idea of climate tipping points first emerged in a 2008 paper published in the journal PNAS, when researchers identified nine key tipping elements that could reach such a threshold due to human-caused climate change. In the new study, which was published Sept. 9 in the journal Science, a team of researchers reassessed data from more than 200 papers on the subject of tipping points published since 2008. They found that there are now 16 major tipping points, almost all of which could reach the point of no return if global warming continues beyond 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit (1.5 degrees Celsius) above preindustrial levels. Earth has already warmed by more than 2 degrees F (1.1 C) above preindustrial levels and, if current warming trends continue, is on track to reach between 3.6 and 5.4 F (2 and 3 C) above preindustrial levels, the study authors said in a statement. "This sets Earth on course to cross multiple dangerous tipping points that will be disastrous for people across the world," study co-author Johan Rockström, director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research in Germany, said in the statement. When the researchers conducted their reassessment, they eliminated two of the original nine tipping points due to insufficient evidence — but then, they identified nine new ones that had been previously overlooked, bringing the toal to 16, they reported in the study. "Since I first assessed climate tipping points in 2008, the list has grown and our assessment of the risk they pose has increased dramatically," co-author Tim Lenton, director of the Global Systems Institute at the University of Exeter in the U.K. and lead author of the original 2008 tipping points paper, said in the statement. In the new study, the researchers calculated the exact temperature at which each tipping element would be likely to pass its point of no return. Their analysis revealed that five tipping elements — the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets; Arctic permafrost; tropical coral reefs; and a key ocean current in the Labrador Sea — are in the "danger zone," meaning they are quickly approaching their tipping points. Two of these danger zone tipping points, the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets, are already beyond their lowest potential tipping points of 1.4 F (0.8 C) and 1.8 F (1 C) above preindustrial times respectively, which suggests these two systems may already be beyond saving, researchers wrote. The other 11 tipping points are listed as "likely" or "possible" if warming continues past 2.7 F. Past estimates, such as the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's Sixth Assessment Report, published in three parts in 2021 and 2022, suggested that most major tipping points would be reached only if Earth warmed past 3.6 F, which would give humanity more time to prepare mitigation and adaptation strategies. But according to the new study, those tipping points may be closer than expected. One explanation for this accelerated timeline is that researchers now fully understand the interconnectedness of tipping points. Better climate models now show that the fall of one tipping point could increase the likelihood of another's collapse. For example, if the Arctic permafrost melts due to rising temperatures, it will release more carbon into the atmosphere. This will further increase surface temperatures on land and in the oceans, thereby accelerating melt in major ice sheets and stressing coral reefs. In other words, tipping points are stacked up like dominoes; as soon as one falls, the others could swiftly follow. Therefore, it is imperative to drastically reduce our greenhouse gas emissions immediately before this irreversible chain reaction begins, the researchers warned. "To maintain livable conditions on Earth, protect people from rising extremes, and enable stable societies, we must do everything possible to prevent crossing tipping points," Rockström said. "Every tenth of a degree counts."

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Climate › Now is key- Tipping Points

Action now is key- Immediate reduction of ghg emission key in preventing AMOC collapse, else lock-in guarantees irreversible damage to the climate

Ruairi Casey ‘21 - worked with the LA Times, CNN International, Thomson Reuters Foundation, Foreign Policy, VICE News, Al Jazeera, Irish Times and many others. He has twice been awarded grants or fellowships by JounralismFund.eu, IJ4EU, the Simon Cumbers Media Fund and the UN Foundation.

"Concern grows over Atlantic Ocean ‘conveyor belt’ shutdown," No Publication, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/12/concern-grows-over-atlantic-ocean-conveyor-belt-shutdown

For thousands of years, the circulating currents of the Atlantic Ocean have continuously regulated the temperatures of Europe and North America, producing a warming effect that allows them to enjoy relatively moderate weather conditions. But the effects of anthropogenic climate change have diminished the flow of this vast conveyor belt system, known as the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), and recent scientific research suggests it may even be headed for collapse. The unprecedented slowdown of the vast system has been measured directly since 2004, but analysis of indirect data suggests a longer decline, beginning in the mid to late 19th century and accelerating after 1950. One study, which looked at ice cores and ocean sediments, determined the AMOC was “in its weakest state in over a millennium”. “Everything points to a weakening of the AMOC,” said Sybren Drijfhout, an oceanographer at the University of Southampton. The timeline of a potential collapse of the AMOC remains unclear, but the consequences for the Earth’s climate would be immense. Temperatures in Europe and the east of North America would drop by as much as 5 degrees Celsius (9 degrees Fahrenheit), leading to more extreme winter weather. Coastal cities in North America would be flooded by rising sea levels. It would also disrupt the West African and Asian monsoons, which supply vital rainfall for crops that tens of millions of people depend upon. Under a process known as “thermohaline circulation”, warm water moves north through the Gulf of Mexico towards Europe – the stretch known as the Gulf Stream – with the surface temperature decreasing as evaporation occurs and salinity increases. Becoming denser, the water then sinks in the north Atlantic and whisks south along the ocean floor before “upwelling” to the surface again far into the southern hemisphere. The effects of global warming on the AMOC are twofold. Warmer water is less dense, and freshwater runoff from ice melting in the polar region reduces salinity, which reduces density even further. These factors slow the sinking mechanism that propels the circulation. The last time the AMOC shut down was towards the end of the last ice age, about 14,500 years ago. Then glacial melt flooded the North Atlantic with fresh water, collapsing the system and causing temperatures in Europe to plunge. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found with high confidence that the AMOC will likely weaken over the coming decades, but a total collapse before 2100 is unlikely. “Even though the AMOC is very unlikely to collapse over the 21st century, its weakening may be substantial, which may therefore induce strong and large-scale climatic impacts with potential far-reaching impacts on natural and human systems,” it said. ‘Very massive impact’ Whether the decline of the AMOC will continue in a linear fashion, or reach some tipping point, after which the decline could accelerate precipitously, remains a point of discussion among scientists. “That’s the million-dollar question,” said Niklas Boers, a researcher at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. “Whether it’s just linear, slowing down, or whether there’s actually a loss of stability.” A paper published by Boers in the Nature Climate Change journal in August analysed eight separate indicators, making use of sea surface temperature and water salinity data that stretches back to the 19th century. It found the AMOC may have evolved from a period of relative stability towards a “critical” transition that would signal a profound change in the global climate system. Such a tipping point could see the AMOC halt entirely over a relatively short period of decades. “We have a situation where there’s a threshold … If we reached that threshold, then we will have a very, very massive impact that is possibly practically irreversible,” said Boers. ‘Reduce emissions as fast as possible’ Discrepancies between observed data and existing climate models remain, and there is still no consensus on how long a full shutdown could take. Some estimates suggest as long as several hundred years. “All models agree that in warmer climates that the AMOC will become weaker and weaker,” said Drijfhout. “That doesn’t have to mean a collapse. It could go very, very gradually.” In either case, Western Africa will have to adapt to declining rainfall and Europe to increasingly unpredictable winter weather, on top of other effects already produced by climate change. Further advances in climate modelling could provide a more accurate picture of things to come, but the evidence is already clear that reducing human-caused global heating will be crucial to maintaining stability in the Atlantic system. The most important factor in how the AMOC develops is the amount of greenhouse gases that will be released into the atmosphere in the coming years and decades, said Boer. “There’s not so much room for compromises. So you have to really reduce emissions as much as possible – and as fast as possible.”

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Climate › CC Now/Anthropogenic

And, inequality pervasive in the status quo and is exacerbated by climate change.

EJF ‘22 [EJF, “Inequality is worsening as climate crisis deepens: New report;” 6-8-2022, Environmental Justice Foundation, https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/inequality-is-worsening-as-climate-crisis-deepens-new-report; JFan]

The climate crisis is fuelling inequalities within and between countries worldwide, a new report from the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) has found. Low-income, marginalised people in both developed and developing countries are disproportionately affected by the effects of the rapidly accelerating climate crisis. Developed nations – who have contributed the most to global heating – must immediately cut their emissions and increase financial support for developing nations who did the least to cause this crisis, says EJF. Global heating is a universal threat, and climate shocks and stresses are becoming more frequent and severe as the crisis worsens. Based on figures from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s recent report, 4 in 10 people today now live in areas and conditions that make them highly vulnerable to climate change. But the consequences of global heating are being felt differently between communities and countries due to varying exposure, susceptibility and ability to recover from the impacts. Key Findings: Inequalities driven by global heating are increasing both within and between countries. Both in countries that have contributed least to the climate crisis and major emitter countries, those facing intersecting inequalities and discrimination are disproportionally affected. Climate-related policies often do not address differing vulnerabilities, aggravating marginalisation and inequality. Wealthy countries are still failing to reduce emissions sufficiently, or to provide disproportionately affected countries and communities with adequate support for climate adaptation. Human rights-based, context-sensitive action is needed across all sectors for an effective and equitable solution to the climate crisis. EJF’s new report examines the disproportionate impacts of the climate crisis in some of the major emitter countries as well as in those countries that have contributed least to the crisis. The report reveals that the climate crisis disproportionately affects low-income, marginalised people around the globe. Intersecting forms of discrimination based on gender, race, age, income or social status also significantly increase susceptibility and undermine the ability to cope with and recover from climate effects. Almost 90% of the global burden of climate breakdown-related disease is borne by children under the age of five, for example, and 80% of climate refugees, forced from their homes by global heating, are women. In the USA, Black, Hispanic or Native American people experience roughly 50% greater vulnerability to wildfires compared to other groups. It is important for policymakers to recognise that there are no one-size-fits-all solutions, says EJF, and intersecting vulnerabilities will impact how each individual is affected by the climate crisis and how they are served by protections. Ultimately, climate justice must be woven into all policies across all sectors. Global heating severely threatens the full range of human rights, the report shows, including the right to life, health, food, adequate housing and cultural rights. Weather and natural disasters forced 30.7 million people to leave their homes in 2020, and up to 132 million additional people are at risk of extreme poverty by 2030 because of climate breakdown.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Climate › CC Now/Anthropogenic

Climate change is caused by humans

Ionescu ‘23 — [Byandrei, Earth.com staff writer, “New evidence that climate change is caused by human activities,” 5-29-2023, Earth, https://www.earth.com/news/new-evidence-that-climate-change-is-caused-by-human-activities/, JFan]

A new study led by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WHOI) has provided clear evidence of a human “fingerprint” on climate change, showing that specific signals from human activities have altered the temperature structure of our planet’s atmosphere. While differences between tropospheric and lower stratospheric temperature trends have long been recognized as anthropogenic effects on the climate, scientists have largely ignored what happens from the mid to the upper stratosphere (about 25-50 kilometers above the Earth’s surface). “Including this information improves the detectability of a human fingerprint by a factor of five. Enhanced detectability occurs because the mid to upper stratosphere has a large cooling signal from human-caused CO2 increases, small noise levels of natural internal variability, and differing signal and noise patterns,” the authors explained. While in the troposphere, noise can include daily weather, interannual variability caused by El Niños and La Niñas, and longer-term natural fluctuations in climate, in the upper stratosphere such noises are smaller, making anthropogenic climate change signals easier to distinguish. “Extending fingerprinting to the upper stratosphere with long temperature records and improved climate models means that it is now virtually impossible for natural causes to explain satellite-measured trends in the thermal structure of the Earth’s atmosphere,” the scientists argued. “This research undercuts and rebuts claims that recent atmospheric and surface temperature changes are natural, whether due to the Sun or due to internal cycles in the climate system,” said study lead author Benjamin Santer, an expert in Physical Oceanography at WHOI. “A natural explanation is virtually impossible in terms of what we are looking at here: changes in the temperature structure of the atmosphere. This research puts to rest incorrect claims that we don’t need to treat climate change seriously because it is all natural.” This study is rooted in the earlier work of Suki Manabe and Richard Wetherald in 1967, who utilized a simple climate model to investigate the potential impact of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion on atmospheric temperature. Their modeling revealed a distinct finding: an elevation in CO2 levels resulted in increased heat retention within the troposphere (the lowest layer of Earth’s atmosphere) and decreased heat dissipation in the stratosphere (the layer above the troposphere), consequently causing warming in the troposphere and cooling in the stratosphere. This projection of tropospheric warming and stratospheric cooling in response to rising CO2 levels has been consistently supported by more intricate models and validated through comparisons of model outcomes with global-mean atmospheric temperature measurements obtained from weather balloons and satellites. While these earlier studies focused on global-mean temperature alterations in the middle and upper stratosphere, approximately 25 to 50 kilometers above the Earth’s surface, they did not delve into the intricate patterns of climate change within this particular layer. However, advancements in simulations and satellite data have now made it possible to examine this region more comprehensively. The current study marks the first attempt to identify discernible climate change patterns, often referred to as “fingerprints,” specifically attributed to human activities in the middle and upper stratosphere. “The human fingerprints in temperature changes in the mid to upper stratosphere due to CO2 increases are truly exceptional because they are so large and so different from temperature changes there due to internal variability and natural external forcing. These unique fingerprints make it possible to detect the human impact on climate change due to CO2 in a short period of time (~10 – 15 years) with high confidence,” said co-author Qiang Fu, a professor of Atmospheric Sciences at the University of Washington. “This study shows that the real world has changed in a way that simply cannot be explained by natural causes. We now face important decisions, in the United States and globally, on what to do about climate change. I hope those decisions are based on our best scientific understanding of the reality and seriousness of human effects on climate,” Santer concluded.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Climate › CC Now/Anthropogenic

Climate change coming now - extinction

Ionescu ‘21 [Ionescu, Earth.com staff writer, “Climate change is following a pattern similar to Earth’s largest mass extinction;” 9-21-2021, Earth.com, https://www.earth.com/news/climate-change-is-following-a-pattern-similar-to-earths-largest-mass-extinction/; JFan]

A recent study has found that the mass extinction from 252 million years ago which killed nine of out ten species on Earth was caused by a “toxic soup” of accelerated greenhouse emissions, increased temperatures, and abundant nutrients leading to a huge spike in toxic algae blooms in rivers and lakes. Scientists warn that, although this extinction at the end of the Permian period was caused by prolonged volcanic eruptions, today’s anthropogenic climate change might lead to similar outcomes. By studying fossils, sediment, and chemical records of rocks near Sydney, Australia, researchers from the Swedish Museum of Natural History and the University of Nebraska discovered that a massive volcanic eruption that ran for almost a million years and released enormous amounts of chemicals into the atmosphere caused the Earth’s largest mass extinction 252 million years ago. By stripping the Earth of its ozone layer and poisoning the waters and the atmosphere, this catastrophic event wiped out almost 90 percent of life from Earth. When comparing the fossil records of other warming-related mass extinctions, scientists found highly similar patterns, increasing worries that our current situation might lead to the same catastrophic outcomes. “We’re seeing more and more toxic algae blooms in lakes and in shallow marine environments that’s related to increases in temperature and changes in plant communities which are leading to increases in nutrient contributions to freshwater environments,” reported co-author Tracy Frank, an adjunct professor in the Department of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at the University of Nebraska. “The volcanism was a source of CO2 in the past but we know that the rate of CO2 input that was seen back then was similar to the rate of CO2 increases we’re seeing today because of anthropogenic effects.” According to study co-author Christopher Fielding, a professor emeritus at the University of Nebraska, another important parallel is that the increase in temperature at the end of the Permian coincided with massive increases in forest fires. “One of the things that destroyed whole ecosystems was fire, and we’re seeing that right now in places like California. One wonders what the longer-term consequences of events like that as they are becoming more and more widespread.”

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Aff › 1AC › Leadership/Competitiveness Advantage

GND is key to US competitiveness and leadership

Freeman ‘20 — [Robert, the author of The Best One Hour History series which includes World War I, The InterWar Years, The Cold War, and other titles. He is the founder of The Global Uplift Project which builds small-scale infrastructure projects in the developing world to improve humanity’s capacity for self-development. “How the Green New Deal can save Joe Biden,” 11-20-2020, Red, Green, and Blue, http://redgreenandblue.org/2020/11/20/green-new-deal-can-save-joe-biden-america/, JFan]

The Green New Deal operationalizes both the economic motive and the ecological imperative to move to a new energy substrate to power industrial civilization across the globe. This means that massive sectors of the U.S. economy will be rebuilt to use renewable energy. Automobiles will rapidly move from being powered by oil to being powered by electricity. The implications for batteries, machine tooling, and manufacturing, to say nothing of “gas” stations and repair shops will be epochal. If automobiles were integral to U.S. culture and economic dominance in the 1900s, their new incarnation will be pivotal to transformation and survival in the 2000s. Energy generation and distribution will be similarly revolutionized. If you drive north from Indianapolis or east from San Francisco or south from Abilene, you encounter thousands of industrial-scale windmills spanning hundreds of square miles. Wind generation in the U.S. doubled between 2008 and 2017 and its pace of growth is accelerating. It is telling that three of the five largest wind farms in the U.S. are located in Texas, the largest oil-producing state. Tens of millions of buildings, from homes to commercial structures, will have to be retrofitted to utilize energy more efficiently. This will require the employment of millions of skilled tradesmen. Local energy production, through solar collectors, will also grow exponentially, again, employing millions of skilled workers. All manner of common and civic structures generally lumped under the heading of “infrastructure” will need to be modernized. This includes everything from the national electricity distribution grid to transit systems, public buildings, water and gas distribution networks, highways, and more. Once again, this will require the retraining and employment of millions of skilled tradesmen. The question necessarily arises: how will this once-in-a-century transformation be paid for? There are several sources, some direct, some indirect. Their totality more than pays for the Green New Deal, indeed, makes it a net income and wealth generator over coming decades. Most importantly, leadership by the government and targeted investment incentives will incent private capital to fund the bulk of the transition. This is how the government helped midwife the transition to oil and automobiles in the twentieth century. It built millions of miles of modern roads and interstate highways without which high-powered automobiles would have been useless. One of the second-order effects was the vast panoply of culture that we know of as suburbia, almost all of it built from private capital. The first round of “seed money” from the government can come from taxing the income of the top 10% of income earners. In the 40 years between 1977 and 2007, their share of national income grew from 34% to 47%, a staggering increase over a relatively short period of time, much of it unearned but “gifted” to them by the sole artifice of lower income taxes. If all we did was to increase taxes on this class even a little bit, it would yield trillions of dollars of funding to underwrite the tens of millions of high-paying jobs needed to carry out the buildout. Much of the funding would come from increased tax revenues generated from millions of skilled tradesmen being re-employed in high-earning jobs across the entire spectrum of the U.S. economy. Their higher incomes and spending would also generate greater economic activity in its own right. This is what occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, often known of as “the golden age of capitalism.” Government investments in the foundations of the economy led to many times more private investment and many multiples more, again, of private spending. Much of the funding will be secured by reducing military spending, now clocking in at nearly a trillion dollars a year. This would be possible by reducing the need for oil, and, therefore, the need for the U.S. to garrison the Middle East. In the past two decades, the U.S. has spent more than $6 trillion on ill-conceived, failed, and counterproductive wars in the Middle East. This amount, alone, would be enough to pay for the whole of the Green New Deal and would make the world, and, therefore, the U.S., safer from international terror. With lower-cost energy powering more and more economic activity, the economy as a whole would become increasingly competitive in global markets. Right now, the U.S. runs trade deficits in excess of $600 billion a year. That is $600 billion a year that is shipped directly out of the U.S. to other countries. The cost of funding those deficits raises the cost of borrowed money, and therefore the cost of everything in the economy that is bought or operated on borrowed money, which is to say almost everything. A more efficient and productive economy would also mean that the U.S. government itself would have to borrow less to keep the economy working. Over the past 40 years, the government has borrowed $26 trillion, the cumulative increase in the national debt over that period. It is an almost inconceivable and definitely unsustainable sum, a sign of just how much damage Supply Side Economics has inflicted on the economy. As with trade deficits, lowered annual budget deficits would result in lower interest rates in the economy as a whole, making everything bought on borrowed money cheaper. A final, indirect source of funding would come from reduced damage incurred from climate change. The fires afflicting the west, the floods in the Midwest, the hurricanes in the south, Hundred Year Freezes in the northeast, crop damage throughout the country; these have real economic costs that are not less because they are not explicitly tallied to climate change. They cost hundreds of billions of dollars a year and are growing wildly. Simply reducing their incidence would effectively free up hundreds of billions of dollars a year for use in the private economy. Making the U.S. economy more competitive in global markets would help maintain its status as one of the leading countries of the world. Not making this transition and keeping the economy dependent on a twentieth century energy substrate while the rest of the world—including our greatest adversary, China—is moving onto future energy systems, is an ironclad prescription for technological stagnation, economic atrophy, and national decline. It is far less a choice of whether, than the choice of how to, and how quickly.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Aff › 1AC › Leadership/Competitiveness Advantage

U.S.-China war goes nuclear.

Talmadge 18, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (Caitlin, 10/15/18, "Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control", Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option)

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese war is Taiwan. Beijing’s long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington’s longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Were Washington to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, the world’s sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities—whether doing so was Washington’s stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China’s conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China’s attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China’s ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China’s sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear-armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China’s growing land-based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China’s ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China’s coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country’s interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military’s failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, high-intensity conventional war. China’s vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China’s real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored U.S. strategy to ensure a conventional victory would likely endanger much of China’s nuclear arsenal in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China’s nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the “no first use” pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea-based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in wartime developments that could shift China’s assumptions about U.S. intentions. If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose—on an unpopulated area or at sea—as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Aff › 1AC › Leadership/Competitiveness Advantage

US Power checks Chinese revisionism – without it, China will invade Taiwan and take over the Pacific

Brands ’20 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 10-1-21; "The End of China’s Rise”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-01/end-chinas-rise; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-23-2022; AH]

RING OF FIRE Eurasia has often been a deathtrap for aspiring hegemons: there are too many nearby enemies that can make common cause with offshore superpowers. For almost 40 years, a rising China avoided strategic encirclement by downplaying its global ambitions and maintaining friendly relations with the United States. But that period is over. As Beijing has become more aggressive in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and elsewhere, it has engendered hostility nearly all around. Over the past five years, the United States has abandoned engagement and embraced neo-containment. Washington has carried out its largest naval and missile expansion in a generation, imposed its most aggressive tariffs since World War II, and implemented its tightest restrictions on foreign investment since the Cold War—all directed at China. Arms sales and military support to frontline states have increased; U.S. technological sanctions are threatening to destroy Huawei and other Chinese firms. In 2021, China’s deputy foreign minister complained that “a whole-of-government and whole-of-society campaign is being waged to bring China down.” The United States’ turn against China has contributed to a broader backlash against Beijing’s power. In Northeast Asia, Taiwan has become more determined than ever to maintain its de facto independence, and the government has approved a bold new defense strategy that could make the island extremely hard to conquer. Japan has agreed to cooperate closely with the United States to fend off Chinese aggression in the region. Through its own belligerence, Beijing has given the U.S.-Japanese alliance an explicitly anti-China cast. The countries around the South China Sea are also starting to hedge against China. Vietnam is acquiring mobile shore-based missiles, Russian attack submarines, new fighter aircraft, and surface ships armed with advanced cruise missiles. Singapore has quietly become a significant U.S. military partner. Indonesia increased its defense spending 20 percent in 2020 and another 21 percent in 2021. Even the Philippines, which courted China for most of President Rodrigo Duterte’s term, is now reiterating its claims in the South China Sea and ramping up air and naval patrols. China’s ambitions are provoking a response beyond East Asia, too, from Australia to India to Europe. Everywhere Beijing is pushing, a growing cast of rivals is pushing back. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a strategic partnership that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—has emerged as a focal point of anti-China cooperation among the most powerful democracies in the Indo-Pacific. The new AUKUS (Australia–United Kingdom–United States) alliance unites the core of the Anglosphere against Beijing. The United States is forging overlapping mini-coalitions to ensure that advanced democracies stay ahead in key technologies, while the G-7 and NATO are staking out tougher positions on Taiwan and other issues. To be sure, counter-China cooperation remains a work in progress, because many countries still rely on trade with Beijing. But these interlocking partnerships could eventually form a noose around Beijing’s neck. FLAMING OUT China is a risen power, not a rising one: it has acquired formidable geopolitical capabilities, but its best days are behind it. That distinction matters, because China has staked out vaulting ambitions and now may not be able to achieve them without drastic action. The CCP aims to reclaim Taiwan, dominate the western Pacific, and spread its influence around the globe. Xi has declared that China seeks a “future where we will win the initiative and have the dominant position.” Yet that dream is starting to slip away, as growth slows and China faces an increasingly hostile world.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Aff › 1AC › Leadership/Competitiveness Advantage

US competitiveness is the backbone of its competition with China- economic, political, and military power all rely on it

Martijn Rasser and Megan Lamberth in 2021

Former Senior Fellow and Director, Technology and National Security Program and Former Associate Fellow, Technology and National Security Program; Taking the Helm

A National Technology Strategy to Meet the China Challenge; Center for a New American Security; https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/taking-the-helm-a-national-technology-strategy-to-meet-the-china-challenge

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Aff › 1AC › Leadership/Competitiveness Advantage

Green Jobs are key to econ competitiveness – they represent the bulk of economic advancement and job growth

Marcacci 22 Silvio Marcacci - is Energy Innovation's Senior Director of Communications, leading media relations as well as communications outreach and message strategy across all of the firm's policy programs. “Clean Energy Jobs Are Booming, Making Up For Rising Fossil Fuel Unemployment,” Forbes, Jun 29, 2022 ///Mgal

Memo to job-seekers: The United States’ clean energy industry is hiring, faster than the overall national economy, and it’s paying above-average wages. The 2022 U.S. Energy and Employment Report (USEER), released by the U.S. Department of Energy, details dramatic growth across every major clean energy occupation – especially in the electric vehicle industry. Meanwhile most of the fossil fuel industry continued losing jobs, even as the economy roared back from its COVID-induced downturn. Overall energy sector jobs rose 4% in 2021, adding more than 300,000 jobs to reach more than 7.8 million total energy-related jobs. U.S. energy sector job growth outpaced overall U.S. jobs growth, which rose 2.8% in 2021. Nearly 3.1 million of the total energy sector jobs are in net-zero aligned industries, composing 41% of total energy jobs. Net-zero aligned jobs are related to renewable energy, grid technologies, transmission and distribution, energy storage, nuclear energy, biofuels, energy efficiency, and electric vehicles. “Amidst the unique challenges of a nation coming out of a global pandemic, America’s energy sector stands out with considerable job growth across nearly all industries,” said U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm. “Jobs critical to our clean energy transition are on the rise and poised for continued expansion.” Clean energy technologies—like wind turbines, solar panels, and electric vehicles—offer a bright spot for the U.S. manufacturing sector if the federal government continues implementing emissions reduction policies, and particularly if the U.S. Senate passes proposed reconciliation legislation. Adding jobs in these industries will boost our economic competitiveness in a 21st century global clean energy economy while fighting climate change. Clean energy, electrified vehicles lead job growth USEER covers all jobs in the professional operations, construction, utility operations, and production associated with energy infrastructure and use – including motor vehicle manufacturing. Energy sector jobs were one of the fastest-growing sectors of the U.S. economy before the COVID pandemic, which cost it nearly 840,000 jobs. But rebounding energy sector job growth is not evenly distributed. While the electric power generation sector grew 2.9% led by solar and wind energy, coal and nuclear jobs both declined. Fuel sector jobs – particularly in extraction – tumbled 3.1% with the petroleum sector shedding 31,600 jobs for the largest total job losses of any sector, and the coal fuel sector losing 7,100 jobs for the largest percentage loss of any sector at 11.8%. Motor vehicle and component parts manufacturing was the standout sector in 2021, adding 228,000 jobs, a 9.8% annual gain. Hybrid electric, battery electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell manufacturing comprised 65,000 of the sector’s total job growth. These jobs in carbon-reducing vehicle manufacturing grew a collective 25% in 2021, and were the only subcategory of energy jobs that did not decrease in 2020 due to COVID. Clean energy jobs offer higher wages than the national average, and are widely available to workers without four-year degrees, meaning most Americans can access them. Brookings Institution research finds landing a clean energy job can equal an 8%-19% income increase, and 45% of all workers in clean energy production only have a high school diploma, while earning higher wages than similarly educated peers in other industries. Wind turbine technician and solar photovoltaic installers are forecast by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to be two of the top five fastest-growing occupations through 2030. Wind turbine technician jobs are expected to grow 68% and pay more than $56,000 per year, while solar installer jobs are expected to grow 52% and pay nearly $48,000 per year. Energy sector jobs also enjoy higher union representation than the overall economy, with 10% of the energy workforce represented by a union or covered under a project labor agreement compared to 6% within the private sector. States with strong climate policies see high job growth USEER also reports state-level job growth, and the states that set clear clean energy policy and investments are reaping rewards. Michigan added 35,500 new energy jobs, pacing the country, totaling more than 390,000 jobs. This growth was powered by motor vehicle jobs, spurred by the U.S. auto industry’s strategic investments in electric vehicles. Michigan Governor Whitmer established an economywide net zero by 2050 goal in 2020, just the fourth nationwide, heavily focused on transitioning from coal power to renewable energy with dramatic electric vehicle infrastructure investments. California ranked third in total new energy jobs, adding nearly 30,000 new positions. This growth was fueled by about 11,000 new jobs in carbon-reducing motor vehicle manufacturing. Jobs in the state’s electric vehicle industry pay an average of more than $91,000, well above California’s average annual wage of $60,400. This growth has been fueled by the state’s ambitious zero-emission vehicle target of all new car sales being zero-emission by 2035. Expanding federal climate policies could create millions of new jobs That relationship between clear policy to reduce emissions through a clean energy transition is backed up at the national level, and could be supercharged by enacting federal policies to hit net-zero targets. G7 Leaders Convene For Summit At Schloss Elmau GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN, GERMANY - JUNE 26: U.S. President Joe Biden speaks at the "Global ... [+]GETTY IMAGES While the Biden administration has gone further on this front than any other administration in history, truly transforming our economy and creating millions of new jobs depends on the U.S. Senate passing proposed reconciliation legislation. As the clean energy industry expands, strong labor standards and prevailing wage guarantees can ensure new jobs are equitable, while investing in fossil fuel-dependent communities can help workers transition to stable careers. Energy Innovation modeling of the U.S. Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, which would push nationwide emissions to near net zero through a combination of economywide policies, would create more than 3.2 million new jobs by 2030 and nearly 5 million new jobs by 2050 while increasing annual GDP 2.4% in 2050. Modeling of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) which was signed into law by President Biden, and reconciliation legislation which is still under consideration by the U.S. Senate, showed the combined bills would create up to 638,000 new jobs in 2030. These jobs would be concentrated in manufacturing, construction, and job creation. USEER notes the IIJA’s impacts have not yet been felt, but predicts the more than $63 billion in energy sector funding would help expand clean technology deployment and transition fossil fuel-dependent communities and workers. Still, policies and investments contained in the reconciliation legislation would contribute the largest share of these long-term jobs, underlining how important passage in the U.S. Senate would be to U.S. economic growth. Modeling also shows that transitioning to all electric vehicle sales, which the reconciliation legislation could help jump start, would be a job engine. Research shows that pushing to reach 100% all-electric new car and truck sales by 2035 across the U.S. would support more than 2 million jobs in 2035. Federal and state governments have shown that setting clear policies like emissions reduction goals, clean energy deployment targets, stable tax incentives, clean energy infrastructure investments, and workforce transition will fight climate change while creating jobs and strengthening the economy. Expanding clean energy can keep our economy growing – if policymakers invest in our future by enacting smart climate policies.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Aff › 1AC › Leadership/Competitiveness Advantage

US leadership on climate change is key to resolve a host of global existential threats

Rep. Casten 5-2-19

(Sean, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/05/02/house-passes-climate-bill-economic-opportunity-us-leadership-column/3642769002/)

If you find yourself in a hole, stop digging. We have a decade to figure out how to reverse global warming if we ever want to ensure a habitable planet for our children. It’s going to take a full, species-wide effort to figure out how to do so in a way that minimally disrupts our quality of life. And yet, under the Trump administration, we have reversed course. It’s time to stop digging. For too long, our nation has lacked conviction, settling for partial steps, struggling to reconcile economic and environmental pressures. But those delays, while inexcusable, pale next to President Donald Trump’s active sabotage of our environment. Continuing on this path is a risk to national security, public health and the welfare of future generations. And that is why I am so pleased to be a part of a new majority whose leadership is not afraid to recognize the hole we are in — the new majority that, on Thursday, stopped digging and passed H.R. 9, the Climate Action Now Act. I am proud to serve as a co-lead of H.R. 9 that would prevent this administration from making the United States the only nation on Earth not party to the Paris Climate Accords. H.R. 9 also challenges the Trump administration to step up and show us their plan for combating climate change. H.R. 9 rebukes the reckless attitudes of this president and brings us back to the global bargaining table to participate in the critical discussion over how to turn the tide and embrace a low carbon economy before it is too late. But, ultimately, H.R. 9 merely pauses the digging. And that raises the question — what’s next? Stop hand-wringing and start innovating As a former CEO of a clean energy company, I humbly submit that, contrary to much of the hand-wringing that seems to deter this body from acting: There are no economic or technical barriers preventing us from profitably reducing greenhouse gas emissions. All we have to do is recognize that lowering fossil fuel use also lowers fossil fuel expense. Replacing our old, dirty energy infrastructure with new, efficient and clean infrastructure isn’t a cost to be feared but an investment we should be eager to make. Lowering fossil fuel use will make our energy bills lower, our manufacturers more profitable, our wallets a little fuller and our planet safer. Climate change is a threat we should fear. But addressing climate change is an economic opportunity to be embraced. Our failure to seize that opportunity so far speaks only to the inefficiencies and distortions in our regulations that create needless barriers to capital deployment. But we can fix those laws! And by embracing the goals of the Paris Climate Accord, we can unleash the innovation of our manufacturers, businesses and regulators to drive those investments forward. US must not ignore existential climate threat This is a once-in-a-generation opportunity for transformative economic growth. It is on a scale with the industrial and information revolutions. Americans should be leading the way on combating climate change and developing the clean energy economy of tomorrow, not running from the challenge. American leadership is not kowtowing to despots, it’s not declaring phony emergencies to build unnecessary walls, and it’s not ignoring the single most serious threat to the existence of human life on Earth. From Normandy to the Cold War, American leadership has been about identifying long-term existential threats to the entire population and then leading the rest of the world to mobilize around a shared set of goals and values. H.R. 9 is the first opportunity in over a decade for our Congress to reclaim America's leadership role on climate, and I am proud to be part of passing it Not because it’s enough. But because the world depends on American leadership, and if the White House refuses to lead, the House will. Onward.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Aff › 1AC › Leadership/Competitiveness Advantage

Criticisms of China provides the opportunity for U.S. climate leadership

Scott Moore, Erin Sikorsky, 11-15-2021, "The U.S. Can Steal China’s Climate Leadership Crown," Foreign Policy, -- MG

For decades, China was a leader in international climate negotiations. But that changed at the latest United Nations climate change conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. At the November 2022 summit, known as COP27, China became the target of criticism for failing to do enough to address climate change. The disapproval came not just from other big greenhouse gas emitters but also from other developing countries: Gaston Browne, the prime minister of Antigua and Barbuda and chair of the influential Alliance of Small Island States, called China a “major polluter” that could no longer expect a “free pass” on contributing to climate finance. This shift underscores an inconvenient truth for Beijing: Given its status as the world’s largest emitter and second-largest economy, China’s climate commitments increasingly look insufficient, and even its former allies in climate negotiations want Beijing to do more. This creates major geopolitical vulnerabilities for China—and opportunities for the United States and its allies. In short, Beijing’s leadership loss on climate is Washington’s gain. China has played an essential role in climate talks since the 1990s. Beijing took part in the original negotiations that led to the main global climate agreement, the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, which then-Premier Li Peng signed in 1992. As China became the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gasses in the early 2000s, it began to play a more prominent role in international climate policy, underscored by a 2014 U.S.-China joint announcement in which Beijing, for the first time, promised to take steps to reduce its emissions alongside similar steps pledged by Washington. In 2020, when the United States had stepped back from its climate commitments under the Trump administration, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged to reach net-zero emissions by 2060. Despite this increasingly prominent role, the bedrock of China’s climate policy has remained the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”—the idea that while all countries should do their part to fight climate change, wealthy industrialized nations that contributed the bulk of emissions over time should bear most of the effort and expense. This principle helps hold together the Group of 77, or G-77, a caucus of developing countries at the United Nations. Beijing has long been influential in the G-77—so much so that it is technically called the Group of 77 and China—and has coordinated its role in U.N.-sponsored climate negotiations largely through the coalition. Yet it has become increasingly difficult for China to draw a clear line between itself and the industrialized nations it argues should bear the brunt of costs in responding to climate change. When the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015, China was able to secure its status as a developing country in the world’s climate regime. But every year since then, China has been the world’s largest emitter. Though China was responsible for about 12 percent of cumulative global emissions since the start of the Industrial Revolution to 2017—compared to 25 percent for the United States and 22 percent for the European Union and United Kingdom—China now emits about a third of the world’s greenhouse gasses each year, well ahead of any other economy. Analysis suggests China could surpass the United States’ cumulative emissions around 2050.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Aff › 1AC › Leadership/Competitiveness Advantage

China’s investments in clean energy place it far ahead of the United States in all climate sectors.

Theodore Chia, October 26, 2022, (“How China is Winning the Race for Clean Energy Technology”, ) #GayFrog

For the past two decades, a clean energy revolution has been quietly taking place across the globe. More recently, a heated global race has begun with China at the head of the pack. Judging from the emissions data, you wouldn’t think China is ahead. China’s carbon emissions have yet to peak, while the United States and the European Union have drastically lowered their carbon emissions over the last decade. The UK is now at 44% below its 1990 levels and plans to reduce annual carbon emissions to 70% below 1990 levels by 2045. Having peaked its carbon emissions in 2007, the United States has reduced its carbon emissions to 2% above its 1990 levels. China plans to peak its emissions by 2030. But recent investments in fossil fuel have cast doubt on that scenario. At the same time, however, China has been making massive investments in energy transition. “China saw an economic opportunity in low-carbon industries,” according to Kelly Sims Gallagher, Director at the Tufts University Center for International Environment and Resource Policy, “and they formed industrial policy.” While Europe was an early mover in clean energy, China has harnessed its competitive advantage in policy consistency and lower-cost capital to lead the market in solar, wind, and EV technology exports. With the passage of the CHIPS, Infrastructure, and Inflation reduction bills in 2022, the United States has finally significantly accelerated clean energy investment. But is it too late for the Americans to catch up? At a recent Critical Issues Confronting China talk hosted by the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Gallagher gave an update on the current state of the global race for Leadership in low-carbon tech and provided her outlook on the future of clean energy. Five key takeaways: China’s clean energy innovation was driven by economic opportunism By 2009, China had made strong political commitments to renewable energy development and there was a noted government acceptance of climate science. But it was rather recognition of the immense economic potential in the green energy innovation that drove China past its tipping point. In 2009, China was already on track to pass the US as the world’s largest market for wind turbines and had begun pitting state owned power companies against each other to see which could build solar plants fastest. According to Gallagher, China initially made forays into clean energy technology as a means for export, but was able to adroitly set up a domestic market when conditions for outward investment and trade turned sour. Today, China is a veritable green power. It leads the world in renewable energy production figures and is the world’s largest producer of wind and solar energy, as well as the largest domestic and outbound investor in renewable energy. A fear of China drove the U.S. to act on clean energy Nothing exemplifies the return of Great Power politics more than the race for clean energy. Where decades of activism and warnings from scientists had failed to push significant policy change, fear of falling behind China has created a bipartisan effort to invest in clean energy transition. Together, the CHIPS and Science Act, Infrastructure Deal, and Inflation Reduction Act have brought close to half a trillion dollars in fiscal incentives and investments into the growth of clean energy and low-carbon technologies in the US. However, while the bills will boost research and development, they bring in limited regulation. Gallagher pointed out that according to the Department of Energy’s own estimates, the U.S. is “not competitive” in most clean energy sectors. It is still too early to tell if the massive influx of capital will be enough for the U.S. to win the clean energy race. “It’s a little daunting for the U.S.,” Gallagher said. Speaking of China’s dominance in the supply chains for low-carbon technologies, she added, “China is a planning economy, and that has really paid off.” While China maintains an advantage in the race, the U.S. still has some areas where it might have a slight edge. China seems to have an all-round lead on the U.S. in terms of trade balance, R&D investment, and patenting. On the investment front, China had surpassed the U.S. by the late 2000s and Europe by 2012 to be the world leader in low carbon technology investment, pumping in annually at least US$100 billion into innovation by 2014. As of 2018, Chinese investment in clean energy technology was almost double that of the U.S. (The scenario changes when accounting for nuclear investments by the U.S.) At the same time, China’s State-Owned Enterprises are still making massive investments in fossil fuels that entrench the high-carbon economy and signal a bumpy energy transition for China in the coming future. Still, China’s clean energy leadership is signaled not just by its robust investment, trade, and patent figures but rather the number of clean energy jobs. Arguing that a competitive economy is shown through job creation, Gallagher noted that China has created many jobs in the clean energy sector. A case study in solar energy: Nowhere is China’s leading position clearer than in the solar energy sector. China has an estimated 2.7 million people employed in the solar energy sector, making up more than half of the world’s 4.3 million solar jobs. How did China do it? Initially China’s solar industry began in the 1990s to supply Germany’s high demand. The Chinese government provided tax incentives and credits to lure in investors and scoured the globe for supplies of machinery and polysilicon. This vertically integrated supply chain in China created a mammoth solar manufacturing industry that produced more solar panels for less. When western countries imposed tariffs (charging dumping), the Chinese government was able to quickly develop a domestic market. In contrast, the U.S. outsourced its solar production to China. In 2014, the U.S. had a dozen factories producing Photovoltaic wafers and ingots. Today, none exist. According to Gallagher, the disassembling of clean energy infrastructure is making it difficult for the U.S. to claw its way back. The outlook for the U.S. is grim Gallagher concluded that U.S. competitiveness in low carbon technology had completely eroded and that Chinese dominance in the clean energy supply chain will not soon go away. China’s carefully operated state machinery, political commitment, and industrial backing will let it keep its advantage in the clean energy race for the years to come. Gallagher characterized China’s recent investments in fossil fuels as a response to a temporary response to global energy instability. But the direction and momentum of China’s industrial policy will continue China on the path of clean energy dominance. There is one bright spot of hope for the U.S. however: U.S. climate-related spending is due to take off in the next 5 years and will focus on the next step of the clean energy transition: electricity and energy systems integration opportunities (Liu et al., 2015; Samad et al., 2010).

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Aff › 1AC › Climate Justice Advantage

The Green new deal is key to creating systemic economic changes that address inequity and transition the US to renewable energy- now is key

Boyle et al in 21

Alaina D. Boyle, Graham Leggat, Larissa Morikawa, Yanni Pappas, Jennie C. Stephens; Green New Deal proposals: Comparing emerging transformational climate policies at multiple scales; Energy Research & Social Science Volume 81, November 2021, 102259;

As wildfires, hurricanes, droughts, floods, extreme temperatures, and other climate disruptions worsen around the world, it is increasingly recognized that systemic change facilitated by transformational policy is required to prevent the human and economic losses currently projected [1], [2]. Widespread recognition of the deep interconnections among climate change, social equity, and economic activity has led to a growing transformation-focused climate justice movement that advocates for equity and social justice to be at the core of all climate policy [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. Moving away from proposed climate policies that exacerbate and perpetuate economic disparities, a new set of policies are rapidly emerging that focus on a just transition, where communities that will be most affected by the shift away from fossil fuels to a renewable-based low-carbon society are empowered and supported. These policies explicitly address the social and economic structures that have enabled the worsening climate crisis, and prioritize protecting vulnerable populations both locally and internationally [8]. Among the most prominent and influential of these new proposed policies is the US Green New Deal (GND) Resolution (H.R. 109 Recognizing the duty of the Federal Government to create a Green New Deal), which was proposed in 2018 and introduced in the U.S. Congress in February 2019 [9]. In 14 pages, the 2019 GND resolution describes large-scale national goals across sectors for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and pollution reductions, employment, infrastructure, housing, health and equity. The breadth and ambition of the proposal, which calls for 10 years of intensive investment and mobilization, is justified with references to recent climate science reports that call for urgent action. The resolution is based on the assertion that climate change is a direct threat to the United States, exacerbating environmental, economic, and social instabilities, and that the Federal Government, therefore, has both a responsibility and an opportunity to make large public investments to accelerate the transition to a green, healthy economy through job training, job creation, infrastructure, healthcare, and housing. By explicitly invoking the New Deal from the 1940s, the GND recalls the example of large-scale U.S. Federal investment in public mobilization to alleviate unemployment, develop physical infrastructure, and enact public works [10]. Despite the widely perceived success of the New Deal in stimulating positive outcomes for American society, the proposed GND (H.R. 109) has been met with vigorous opposition, and the economic and political feasibility of the proposed policy vision has been hotly debated [11]. Public opinion of the GND, which was developed and proposed by liberal Democrats, has polarized primarily along party lines as the Republican Party has opposed both large public investments and climate action, although there has also been some pushback by centrist Democrats. Given the partisan associations of the major media outlets in the US, soon after the GND was first proposed, many Republicans harshly critiqued it in part due to what Gustafson et al. (2019) call the “Fox News effect”, where more critical coverage by the outlet caused a sharp decline in support for the policy among conservative Republicans [8]. Despite the rigorous, partisan political debates about the federal GND resolution, other new proposals asserting the need for integrated multi-sectoral coordination and investment at other levels of government, including state, municipal, regional, and tribal, have been rapidly emerging. While ambitious climate policies that address justice have been implemented in other countries, H.R. 109 was the first to explicitly connect unprecedented investment in social, economic, and climate goals to a just transition for local communities and more equitable climate outcomes relative to GHG emissions globally [12]. Building on the ambition and inspiration of the US national-level proposal, these GND-type policies have been proposed to spur major public investment in multiple interconnected aspects of the transition toward a renewable-based society including the environment, labor, and infrastructure across multiple levels of government, from US cities to the EU. A broad range of communities, advocates, and organizations have leveraged the GND framework to advocate for their priorities including Indigenous rights, racial equity, and labor rights. Although some proposals using the GND framework include specific economic and policy mechanisms, the initial federal GND proposal of 2019 focuses on broad goals and leaves the specifics of policy design and implementation to be developed. Emerging research on the feasibility of the national GND is growing, including studies integrating economic, political, and systemic transition framework lenses [3], [13], [14], [15], [16]. Most of this work was published prior to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, before the unprecedented federal investment in the US workforce through the CARES (Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security) Act that followed, and before the need for massive public investments in the United States was so much more acute and widespread. In a time where cities and regions across the world face immense increases in unemployment rates and the depths of social inequalities revealed and exacerbated by COVID-19, pandemic recovery offers a new mechanism to provide public investments to simultaneously achieve multiple goals including creating jobs, addressing a legacy of injustices, and accelerating a transition toward renewable energy. In both the United States and Europe, the GND framework has been explicitly recognized as a crucial framework for confronting the climate crisis as part of pandemic recovery. Not all climate policies that apply a GND-type framework, however, use the language of the GND to connect explicitly to the original GND proposal. The Biden administration, for example, appears to be taking a “quiet” approach to climate policy; avoiding linking their climate policies to the GND in an attempt to avoid the kind of polarizing media coverage and political opposition that has hindered H.R. 109 since its introduction [8], [17]. In contrast to the Biden/Harris administration being careful not to explicitly associate its ambitious climate plans as embracing the proposed GND, the European Commission integrates the 2019 European Green Deal with COVID-19 recovery in NextGenerationEU [18].

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Aff › 1AC › Climate Justice Advantage

Policymakers have an ethical obligation to frame climate policy to reduce inequality and focus on structural injustice

Saurabh Biswas et al in 2022

Angel Echevarria, Nafeesa Irshad, Yiamar Rivera-Matos, Jennifer Richter, Nalini Chhetri, Mary Jane Parmentier & Clark A. Miller; Authors and Affiliations Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Saurabh Biswas; School for the Future of Innovation in Society, Arizona State University, Angel Echevarria, Nafeesa Irshad, Yiamar Rivera-Matos, Jennifer Richter, Nalini Chhetri, Mary Jane Parmentier & Clark A. Miller; Ending the Energy-Poverty Nexus: An Ethical Imperative for Just Transitions; Science and Engineering Ethics volume 28, Article number: 36 (2022)

Arguments for a just transition are integral to debates about climate change and the drive to create a carbon-neutral future. Decarbonizing the energy sector involves disruptive changes to both energy technologies and broader societies and economies (Miller et al., 2013, 2015). In the past, energy transitions have wrought major shifts in industries, regulations, workforces, and markets (Jones, 2014), as well as the forms and geographies of resource extraction (Pasqualetti, 2011). As a result, profound ethical questions arise about the meaning and impact of energy transitions for diverse groups of people within and across societies (Jasanoff, 2011, 2018; Miller, 2014; Sovacool et al., 2017). Proponents of a just transition insist, therefore, that the design and navigation of future energy transitions acknowledge and mitigate the resulting disruptions in people’s lives, livelihoods, health, and environments. As the Just Transition Alliance (2020) put it, for example: “Just Transition” is a principle, a process and a practice. The principle of just transition is that a healthy economy and a clean environment can and should co-exist. The process for achieving this vision should be a fair one that should not cost workers or community residents their health, environment, jobs, or economic assets. Any losses should be fairly compensated. And the practice of just transition means that the people who are most affected by pollution—the frontline workers and the fenceline communities—should be in the leadership of crafting policy solutions. This definition encompasses both an ethical and a justice-oriented stance. Energy ethics and justice are overlapping fields. Both raise questions about the normative dimensions of energy transitions. Energy ethics is concerned with the social principles, values, and norms that govern energy transitions. Energy justice uses distributive, recognition, and procedural frameworks familiar from environmental justice movements to interrogate and challenge patterns of inequitable distributions of benefits and burdens in an energy transition, focusing especially on historically marginalized populations and communities (Bethem et al., 2020; Bickerstaff, 2017; Biswas et al., 2021; Heffron & McCauley, 2017; Jenkins et al., 2018; McCauley et al., 2019; Jetten et al., 2020; Sovacool & Dworkin, 2015). Questions of distributive justice interrogate how the benefits and burdens of energy systems and transitions are distributed across groups. Recognition justice “refers to the acknowledgement of, and respect for, the complex circumstances and vulnerabilities of individuals and social groups in patterns of cultural value” (Lewis et al., 2020, p 425–426). Procedural and participatory justice focus on how decisions get made, the differential abilities of and opportunities for groups to contribute to and shape decision-making, and the institutional barriers that limit or constrain their participation. Two broad approaches rooted in ethics and justice currently frame discussions of just energy transitions, and are present in the Just Transition Alliance quote above. The first can be described as internal to the transition and emphasizes the anticipation, assessment, and redressing of harms created by the transition itself and the inclusion in transition governance of groups or communities potentially harmed by its disruptions. This approach tends to focus on current coal, oil, or gas workers whose employment is threatened (Pai et al., 2020; Pai & Carr-Wilson, 2018, 2019); communities that may lose tax revenues or businesses due to the decline of these industries or confront environmental risks from legacy infrastructures stranded by the transition (Roemer & Haggerty, 2021); or communities confronting challenges due to the siting of new energy infrastructures, such as lithium mines, solar and wind farms, or natural gas wells (Barandiaran, 2015; Kinchy, 2017; Mulvaney, 2019). In this paper, we focus on a second approach to ethics and justice in energy transitions, which is systemic or societal in scope. This approach complements attention to the proximate dynamics and impacts of the transition itself with a focus on the distant societal and economic outcomes the transition brings into being and how they compare to conditions prior to the transition. It poses the question: do the transformative social, economic, and technological changes wrought by energy transitions create more just societies and economies, or do they instead reinforce or recreate long-standing injustices and inequalities? The present reality is that carbon-based energy systems systematically help create and foster a wide range of structural inequalities and injustices across markets and societies (Sovacool, 2016). We propose, therefore, that those leading energy transitions have an ethical obligation to redress these existing inequalities and injustices, in addition to proactively addressing any potential additional harms created by the transition process, thus contributing to more just, equitable, and fair societies and markets. This can be accomplished by using ethical and justice principles and practices to inform the (re)design of energy systems and the work of carrying out energy transitions by institutions in the energy sector and with regulatory or governance authority over energy, as well as by civil society organizations and communities working with them. Ultimately, we argue, just transitions to carbon-neutral energy systems should promote the creation of alternative socio-energy arrangements that intentionally create and improve positive social, political, economic and environmental conditions and outcomes for the world’s lowest income and least well-off communities, rather than continue to diminish them.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Aff › 1AC › Climate Justice Advantage

A just transition away from fossil fuels is the key site for ending environmental injustice- the scale of change requires opens space for structural reforms

Saurabh Biswas et al in 2022

Angel Echevarria, Nafeesa Irshad, Yiamar Rivera-Matos, Jennifer Richter, Nalini Chhetri, Mary Jane Parmentier & Clark A. Miller; Authors and Affiliations Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Saurabh Biswas; School for the Future of Innovation in Society, Arizona State University, Angel Echevarria, Nafeesa Irshad, Yiamar Rivera-Matos, Jennifer Richter, Nalini Chhetri, Mary Jane Parmentier & Clark A. Miller; Ending the Energy-Poverty Nexus: An Ethical Imperative for Just Transitions; Science and Engineering Ethics volume 28, Article number: 36 (2022)

The current transformation of energy systems from carbon-based to carbon-neutral fuels and technologies offers a once-in-a-century opportunity to not simply redesign of socio-energy systems to address climate change but to also redesign them in ways that reconfigure the relationships between energy and poverty. At stake in clean energy transitions are the vast majority of the world’s energy resources, the supply chains and systems that transform those resources into usable energy, the industries and organizations that control energy resources and operate energy systems, and the use of that energy to power societies and economies worldwide. Worldwide, electric utilities and the oil, coal, and gas industries all face existential risks as several transitions unfold, and many parts of the global financial sector are confronting the consequences of massive intertwining of monetary and energy systems. Aspects of these systems and industries may well survive. However, as is illustrated by the above example of Puerto Rico’s bottom-up energy initiatives, renewable energy resources, technologies, and imaginaries also contain at least the potential to nucleate vastly different designs, organization, and governance of socio-energy systems. Solar energy, in particular, can be configured into radically different socio-technological forms, including, e.g., solar-powered devices, like lanterns, lights, and libraries (Linzy & Hosman, 2018); rooftop and solar home systems; community-scale solar; and utility-scale power plants. As such, it offers an especially fertile ground for rethinking the human relationship to energy (Miller et al., 2018). What would it take to leverage this opportunity to redesign socio-energy systems so that they are generative of more equitable conditions in terms of environmental sustainability, long-term economic thriving, and community health and self-determination, in order to interrupt and end the energy-poverty nexus? In our view, it will take new strategies for identifying, analyzing, and reversing the negative feedback loops that link energy insecurity with economic, social, human, and political insecurity and, instead, leveraging the design of energy systems to grow wellbeing and thriving for communities. Key to this are three innovations, each of which derives from the ideas discussed in this article. The first, which directly addresses the challenges of equity among the inhabitants of socio-energy systems, including but not limited to energy users, is to leverage a user-centered perspective on energy to ensure that the ability of people and communities to create value through engagements with energy systems is equitably distributed across all communities and, for all, outweighs the costs, burdens, and risks that energy systems impose. This is our definition of generative. The system is generative of benefits that outweigh costs, burdens, and risks. For all communities, in other words, energy systems should be generative of improved conditions over time, not extractive and destructive to community cohesion: net benefits should flow in rather than just out. The second, which addresses positionality amidst energy infrastructures, is to disperse energy ownership more equitably and much more broadly. Major aspects of the energy-poverty nexus flow from the concentration of ownership over resources, assets, systems, and opportunities and the resulting concentration of wealth and power. Key to this will be the future of ownership over the billions of solar panels required to power the global economy in a post-carbon future and the sunlight they capture. Solar panels are literally the next oil. But energy ownership will also be at stake in a wide array of other facets of the future of energy and transportation, as it has been historically in debates over, e.g., public versus private power and state versus private ownership of oil. Finally, the third innovation is to grow local capacity to engage in and ideally control energy governance. Understanding the full ramifications of energy development, with regard to both existing centralized, carbon-based energy systems and future alternatives, “requires ethnographic attention to the moral commitments, people, and practices that constitute and defend it” (Smith, 2014, p. 36), an exercise that is made significantly easier when people positioned within energy systems have greater power to effectively govern their own energy affairs. This may be the most difficult innovation of all, as it requires finding ways to balance local decision-making with the demands for high-levels energy security and/or to decentralize socio-energy systems to reduce the costs of systems failures (although decentralization, too, comes with its own challenges in terms of achieving universal energy rights and responsibilities, as existing electricity systems illustrate). There is a pressing and immediate need to rethink what our energy systems should be generating beyond accessibility and affordability. Our research demonstrates that the energy-poverty nexus poses deep challenges at the intersection of energy systems and community life. Only by unpacking how the energy-poverty nexus works in each community and designing alternative arrangements that are more generative of local value creation, ownership, and control can the energy-poverty nexus be ended. The specific dynamics of the energy-poverty nexus vary quite significantly from place to place, even as the general analysis holds that energy insecurities and economic insecurities tend to reinforce one another in strong feedback dynamics. Thus, while solutions must be tailored to the particular situations of any given community, the broad framework holds of redesigning energy systems so that they work to enhance human capabilities and empower value creation that outweighs their costs and risks. Energy production and access are often posited as a solution to poverty. Yet many of the consequences of energy system design and operation play a persistent role of in exacerbating and perpetuating poverty, both in a financial sense and, more broadly, in terms of human capabilities. As societies seek to transform energy systems to mitigate climate change, now is the time to focus on how to ensure that the energy systems of the latter half of the twenty-first century and beyond do not continue to replicate those same inequalities and injustices. A major accomplishment of a just transition to a new global energy future should be to design and implement carbon-neutral energy systems that also act to help the worst-off communities determine their own energy futures, alleviate poverty, and grow capabilities by disentangling and ending the energy-poverty nexus.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Aff › 1AC › Climate Justice Advantage

Inequality outweighs war and is the root cause of negative disads

Lee, MD/MDV Yale, 16

(Bandy X, Medicine&Law@Yale, Causes and cures VII: Structural violence Aggression and Violent Behavior Volume 28, May–June 2016, Pages 109-114)

Behavioral violence, in measurements by the tolls of street violence or war, is more noticeable, even though the “tranquil” waters of structural violence may contain much more violence. American violence scholar James Gilligan (1999) compared structural violence to the most deadly military conflicts: estimating 49 million military and civilian deaths from World War II, or about 8 million per year from 1939 to 1945, or even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the United States and the former Soviet Union at 232 million, could not even begin to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year, during times of peace as well as of war. In other words, every fifteen years, on average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating thermonuclear war or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. He also described structural violence as increased rates of disabilities and deaths among the people who occupy the bottom class. He noted that the suffering of people from lower classes are the product of people above who have collective bargaining power making choices that determine the allocation of resources. Unlike behavioral violence, its lethal effects operate continuously rather than sporadically; it can occur independently of any intention to kill anyone (for example, it can be a byproduct of wishing to maximize one's wealth and power); and it is usually invisible, in the sense that deaths from structural violence may appear to have other causes, natural or violent. More recent figures bear out these conclusions even more startlingly, as we will see in the next section. Gilligan (2001) also articulated how, through the mechanisms of shame, humiliation, and inferiority, the disparities in classes are the most potent cause of behavioral violence, such as suicide, homicide, warfare, or capital punishment (Bloom, 2001). American anthropologist Paul Farmer (2003) also developed the concept of structural violence by first defining structure as a pattern of collective social actions within institutional practices, law, economic policies, and other habitual elements. These structures can materially manifest through facilities such as roads, server systems, hospitals, and schools. He described violence as suffering resulting from social arrangements that put individuals in harm's way. Since the exertion of structural violence is systematic—that is, indirect—by everyone who belongs to a certain social order, no one is at fault, at the same time as everyone of that order is at fault. Cumulative historical forces and processes work together to constrain individual agency inversely, if not always neatly, with the ability to resist marginalization and oppression, and deny them the benefits of social progress.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Aff › 1AC › Climate Justice Advantage

The status quo’s technocratic framing of climate perpetuates inequality by excluding marginalized communities and limiting technological solutions that fail to change social structures

Jennie C. Stephens in 2022

School of Public Policy and Urban Affairs, Northeastern University; Beyond Climate Isolationism: a Necessary Shift for Climate Justice; Current Climate Change Reports volume 8, pages83–90 (2022);

Climate isolationism is dangerous because it is exclusive and ineffective in advancing the transformative social change that is needed to reduce the suffering of climate change. A review of the literature on public perception of low carbon technologies reveals that the narrowness of climate isolationism results in limited opportunities for people to connect and that interest and awareness about these technologies are constrained [55]. The technocratic focus limits public discourse because it excludes people for whom these abstract, scientific terms, or the technological details may not be meaningful and it makes the challenge seem distant and unapproachable [63]. Not only does the very technical way of discussing climate change resonate with only a small subgroup of society, it also often projects the need for sacrifice and hardship rather than highlighting benefits and opportunities [54]. Climate isolationism is also exclusive because many proposed technological “solutions” are also expensive and perceived as options that are only accessible to the rich. Driving a Tesla electric vehicle, for example, is not an option for most people, so the focus on this technological innovation results in many people feeling disempowered and disengaged [68]. This disempowerment is compounded by science and engineering fields that continue to be dominated by white men [78]. Despite efforts to diversify science and engineering, persistent racial, gendered, and economic injustices of our economy and our educational systems perpetuate exclusive access to science and engineering [74]. Participating in science continues to be a selective activity only accessible to a privileged few [40]. The lack of diversity within the fields of science and engineering limits the scope of inquiry and constrains the types of connections that are made among science, technology, and society [63]. As we move to incorporate innovative responses that promote social justice to climate change beyond technological justifications for energy transformation, there is a need to include other kinds of expertise, experiences, and perspectives. When the climate crisis is framed as a scientific problem with a possible technological fix, the systemic societal and economic problems, including the concentration of wealth and power among those profiting from maintaining fossil fuel reliance, are all-too-often ignored [63]. The prevalence of climate isolationism has encouraged too many leaders to be blind to the important opportunities for improving people’s lives and strengthening communities as we transition away from a society reliant on fossil fuels [62]. The narrow technocratic approach of climate isolationism has not only been ineffective in mobilizing transformative change but it has also resulted in climate and energy programs and policies that exacerbate inequities and perpetuate injustice [32]. Because the social dimensions of climate and energy have not been adequately considered, we have ended up with policies that further exclude and disadvantage low-income communities, women, and communities of color [57]. The quantitative technocratic tendency of climate isolationism reinforces a dubious technological optimism [9], which has led to growing interest and funding for technological fixes to the climate crisis [67]. While technology is an essential part of a transition toward a more just, equitable, and climate-stable future, investments in science and technology have not yet been balanced with investments in social science, social infrastructure, social innovations, and social justice. This lack of investment in social infrastructure and social innovations has weakened our social ties and reduced our societal resilience [2]. For decades, strategic governmental responses to the climate crisis have been focused almost exclusively on investments in science and technology [61], while very little has been invested in social innovation. Some examples of social innovations include cooperative ownership of businesses, non-extractive finance like zero-interest, negative interest, or low-interest loans, and community-based initiatives to support the provisioning of local and regionally appropriate energy, food, and other essentials.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Aff › 1AC › Climate Justice Advantage

Inequality pervasive in the status quo and is exacerbated by climate change.

EJF ‘22 [EJF, “Inequality is worsening as climate crisis deepens: New report;” 6-8-2022, Environmental Justice Foundation, https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/inequality-is-worsening-as-climate-crisis-deepens-new-report; JFan]

The climate crisis is fuelling inequalities within and between countries worldwide, a new report from the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) has found. Low-income, marginalised people in both developed and developing countries are disproportionately affected by the effects of the rapidly accelerating climate crisis. Developed nations – who have contributed the most to global heating – must immediately cut their emissions and increase financial support for developing nations who did the least to cause this crisis, says EJF. Global heating is a universal threat, and climate shocks and stresses are becoming more frequent and severe as the crisis worsens. Based on figures from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s recent report, 4 in 10 people today now live in areas and conditions that make them highly vulnerable to climate change. But the consequences of global heating are being felt differently between communities and countries due to varying exposure, susceptibility and ability to recover from the impacts. Key Findings: Inequalities driven by global heating are increasing both within and between countries. Both in countries that have contributed least to the climate crisis and major emitter countries, those facing intersecting inequalities and discrimination are disproportionally affected. Climate-related policies often do not address differing vulnerabilities, aggravating marginalisation and inequality. Wealthy countries are still failing to reduce emissions sufficiently, or to provide disproportionately affected countries and communities with adequate support for climate adaptation. Human rights-based, context-sensitive action is needed across all sectors for an effective and equitable solution to the climate crisis. EJF’s new report examines the disproportionate impacts of the climate crisis in some of the major emitter countries as well as in those countries that have contributed least to the crisis. The report reveals that the climate crisis disproportionately affects low-income, marginalised people around the globe. Intersecting forms of discrimination based on gender, race, age, income or social status also significantly increase susceptibility and undermine the ability to cope with and recover from climate effects. Almost 90% of the global burden of climate breakdown-related disease is borne by children under the age of five, for example, and 80% of climate refugees, forced from their homes by global heating, are women. In the USA, Black, Hispanic or Native American people experience roughly 50% greater vulnerability to wildfires compared to other groups. It is important for policymakers to recognise that there are no one-size-fits-all solutions, says EJF, and intersecting vulnerabilities will impact how each individual is affected by the climate crisis and how they are served by protections. Ultimately, climate justice must be woven into all policies across all sectors. Global heating severely threatens the full range of human rights, the report shows, including the right to life, health, food, adequate housing and cultural rights. Weather and natural disasters forced 30.7 million people to leave their homes in 2020, and up to 132 million additional people are at risk of extreme poverty by 2030 because of climate breakdown.