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2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › UNIQUENESS › AT: Oil

Oil proves

Lazarus 2/25 (David, His work has earned an Emmy, a Golden Mike, two National Headliner Awards and multiple honors from the Society of Professional Journalists. He was named Journalist of the Year by the Consumer Federation of California.“Higher oil prices are unlikely to derail U.S. economic growth (for now)”, https://ktla.com/news/money-smart/higher-oil-prices-are-unlikely-to-derail-u-s-economic-growth-for-now/#:~:text=Goldman%20Sachs%20estimates%20that%20U.S.,borrowing%20costs%20for%20consumers%20down.)

Higher energy costs could deter the Federal Reserve from raising interest rates too aggressively in coming months. This would help keep borrowing costs for consumers down. Economists say it’s unlikely the U.S. economy will plunge into recession because of higher oil prices — as opposed to what happened during the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973 and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The big difference today is that the United States isn’t as dependent on foreign oil as it was back then. We’re also consuming less energy as a percentage of gross domestic product because of the sweeping shift to a service economy rather than a manufacturing economy. What this means for you is that despite near-inevitable pain at the gas pump, and possibly higher consumer prices resulting from increased transportation costs, the U.S. economy should remain relatively strong.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › UNIQUENESS › Inflation is Transitory

The literature confirms current inflation is transitory

Droke ‘21 (Clif, equity research analyst and writer for Cabot Wealth Network “Inflation Threat Is Overstated,” Seeking Alpha, 12-30-2021https://seekingalpha.com/article/4477309-inflation-threat-overstated)

Lately, talk of inflation has been all the rage on Wall Street. The fear of inflation was stoked when the Labor Department revealed that producer price growth hit a record on a year-over-year basis in November (up 9.6%), while consumer prices hit a 14-year high. This sparked a wave of concern among investors, who naturally fear that such price spikes could become an established pattern. But despite growing worries over inflation, a question that must be asked - especially in light of the strengthening U.S. dollar - is how much of a threat is inflation to the economy? Here, I'll make the case that while rising consumer prices will continue to be an issue in the coming months, the threat is overstated with price increases likely attenuating in the second half of 2022. Looking at only retail prices, there's no denying that rising living costs are a major issue right now. The 18-month U.S. national gasoline price average is $3.29/gallon according to GasBuddy, the highest level since 2014 (but still under the $3.93 average price in 2012). Food prices are also on the rise, with meat prices in particular "seriously out of hand" in the words of a recent Money magazine article. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, meanwhile, overall meat prices in November were up nearly 15% from the previous month, while beef was up 21% from a year ago. "The food at home index rose 6.4 percent over the past 12 months, the largest 12-month increase since the period ending December 2008," BLS observed. Most investors regard inflation as defined as the yearly percentage change of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which gives an outsize importance to the prices that consumers pay for goods and services like food, transportation and medical care. But the classical definition of inflation involves a combination of higher prices, higher interest rates and rising wages. The nominal rate of interest isn't rising, as the following graph illustrates. What's more, the real rate of interest (defined as the difference between the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate) is actually negative. This shows that the inflation we're now experiencing isn't classical inflation , but rather rising commodity prices due to a combination of high central bank money printing and government spending levels, coupled with supply-chain problems. Moreover, if inflation was completely out of control, we should be seeing a substantially weaker dollar. Instead, we find that the U.S. dollar index has shown some strength in recent months (see chart below). The stronger dollar tells us that the demand for money is still high enough to keep inflation from spiraling completely out of control. Moreover, another question that should be asked is whether it's possible something could happen to (unexpectedly) reverse the trend of higher consumer prices? If so, it doesn't take much imagination to guess what the catalyst might be, viz. China's debt crisis. China's largest real estate operator, Evergrande, creates nearly 4 million jobs each year. As many analysts have pointed out, should it collapse, it could create a crisis similar in magnitude to the Lehman Brothers collapse in the U.S. some 14 years ago. (Reuters recently alluded to this in a report titled, "China Evergrande's snowballing debt crisis.") But the problem doesn't stop with Evergrande. According to Liz Brumer-Smith of Motley Fool: "Since 2013, China has used a unique system of local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) to help stimulate economic growth through infrastructure improvements. China doesn't reveal much about its financial vulnerability, but estimates from Goldman Sachs show outstanding debts for LGFVs could be well over $8 trillion today and make up around 52% of the country's GDP. Many of these LGFVs are considered risky and 'weak,' meaning in the event of collapse, far more than Evergrande's indebtedness could be at risk. Such a collapse would undoubtedly send shockwaves around the world and ripple into the financial markets of all developed nations that do business with China. Ironically, this would also likely "solve" the current commodity price inflation dilemma. But even if China's debt problems can be contained in the coming year, another factor that should serve to attenuate inflation would be the winding down of the global pandemic. A growing number of observers believe that the omicron variant could be the last wave of the virus, with many predicting that this spring will witness the end of widespread virus-related restrictions. If that prediction materializes, it would presumably take quite a bit of the edge of inflation since it would imply lower emergency spending levels by state and federal governments, as well as higher production levels in the private sector (thereby relieving supply problems). That said, rising consumer and producer prices will almost certainly remain a problem in the first half of the new year. Crude oil prices, in particular, remain elevated, and the energy sector bull market shows no signs of ending anytime soon. For that reason, I expect the Invesco DB Commodity Index Tracking Fund (DBC), which is heavily skewed toward the energy sector, to be one of the top performers of the first half of 2022. In summary, while inflation is still very much a problem in the intermediate term, the economic threat posed by inflation is at least somewhat overstated, given the persistent strength of the U.S. dollar in the past year. Moreover, there are good reasons for expecting rising prices to attenuate by the second half of 2022, including diminishing Covid restrictions and the potential deflationary pressure of a China debt crisis.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › UNIQUENESS › Inflation is Transitory

No inflation fueled decline, fundamentals are under control.

Paul Krugman 3/24/22. Distinguished professor in the Graduate Center Economics Ph.D. program and distinguished scholar at the Luxembourg Income Study Center at the City University of New York. Professor emeritus at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs. 2008 sole recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his work on international trade theory. B.A. from Yale University in 1974 and his Ph.D. from M.I.T. in 1977. He has taught at Yale, M.I.T. and Stanford. At M.I.T. he became the Ford International Professor of Economics. "How High Inflation Will Come Down." 

Rising prices will get worse before they get better. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caused the prices of oil, wheat and to soar. Official measures of the cost of shelter don’t yet fully reflect last year’s surge in the cost of . So there’s still a lot of inflation in the pipeline. The , however, believes that high inflation will be a temporary phenomenon. Furthermore, the Fed believes that it can bring inflation down relatively painlessly — that it can achieve a so-called soft landing. But doesn’t this fly in the face of history? After all, the last time America had to bring high inflation under control, during the 1980s, the cost was . The unemployment rate soared to 10.8 percent and didn’t get back to 1979 levels until 1987. Are there good reasons to believe that this time is different? Actually, there are. The landing probably won’t be as soft as the Fed envisions, but this time disinflation shouldn’t, or at least needn’t, be an extremely painful process. To see why, we need to look at history more closely and appreciate the important differences between the last big inflation and our current situation. Forty years ago, as many economists will tell you, inflation was “” in the economy. That is, businesses, workers and consumers were making decisions based on the belief that high inflation would continue for many years to come. One way to see this entrenchment is to look at the wage contracts — typically for three years — that unions were negotiating with employers. Even then, most workers weren’t unionized, but these deals are a useful indicator of what was probably happening to wage- and price-setting more generally. So what did those wage deals look like? In 1979, union settlements with large companies that didn’t include a cost-of-living adjustment specified an average wage increase of in the first year and an annual average of 8.2 percent over the life of the contract. As late as 1981, the United Mine Workers negotiated a contract that would raise wages over the next several years. Why were workers demanding, and employers willing to grant, such big pay hikes? Because everyone expected high inflation to persist for a long time. In 1980 the of professional forecasters predicted 8 percent annual inflation over the next decade. Consumers surveyed by the expected prices to rise by about 9 percent annually over the next five to 10 years. With everyone expecting inflation to continue, workers wanted raises that would keep up with rising prices, and employers were willing to grant those raises because they expected their competitors’ costs to be rising as fast as their own. What this did, in turn, was make inflation self-perpetuating: Everyone was raising prices in anticipation of everyone else raising prices. Ending this cycle required a huge shock — an economy so depressed both that inflation fell and that workers were compelled to accept . Things are very different now. Back then almost everyone expected persistent high inflation; now few people do. expect inflation eventually to return to prepandemic levels. While consumers expect high inflation over the next year, their longer-term expectations remain “” at fairly moderate levels. expect inflation to moderate next year. This means that we almost surely aren’t experiencing the kind of self-perpetuating inflation that was so hard to end in the 1980s. A lot of recent inflation will subside when oil and food prices stop rising, when the prices of used cars, which rose (!) over the past year during the shortage of new cars, come down, and so on. The big surge in rents also appears to be , although the slowdown won’t show up in official numbers for a while. So it probably won’t be necessary to put the economy through an ’80s-style wringer to get inflation down. That said, the Fed is probably too optimistic in believing that we can get inflation under control without any rise in unemployment. Statistical measures like the unprecedented number of , anecdotal evidence of labor shortages and, yes, suggest that the job market is running unsustainably hot. Cooling that market off will probably require accepting an uptick in the unemployment rate, although not a full-on recession. And for what it’s worth, the Fed’s plan for gradual rate hikes, which has already led to a major rise in , is likely to cause that unfortunately necessary cooling-off, especially combined with the fact that fiscal policy has as the big spending of early 2021 recedes in the rearview mirror. So my message for those intoning dire warnings about the return of ’70s-type stagflation — which some of them have been itching to do for years — is that they should look at their history more carefully. The inflation of 2021-22 looks very different, and much easier to solve, from the inflation of 1979-80.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › UNIQUENESS › U – Stocks Up

Inflation subsides now. Key to growth.

Krugman 22, PhD, Professor of Economics

(Paul, “Don’t Tell Anyone, but 2021 Was Pretty Amazing,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/04/opinion/2021-economic-recovery.html)

Grumpy New Year! There probably weren’t many Americans who started 2022 feeling celebratory. We’re going through yet another Covid wave, which is scary and wearying even though Omicron appears to pose a relatively low risk of serious illness if you’re fully vaccinated. Holiday travel was a mess, with the combination of the pandemic and severe weather causing thousands of flight cancellations. Yet there’s a good chance that once time has passed and we’ve had a chance to regain perspective, we’ll consider 2021 to have been a very good year, at least in some ways. In particular, although nobody seemed to notice, it was a year of spectacular economic recovery — and one in which many dire warnings failed to come true. Let me give you some background. Here’s the U.S. unemployment rate since 1979, the beginning of a nasty double-dip recession that was, at the time, the worst slump to hit America since the 1930s: The good news about that episode was that when the slump finally ended, the economy bounced back quickly — so quickly that Ronald Reagan was able to boast about “morning in America” and ride the recovery to a landslide electoral victory. After that, however, we seemed to lose our knack for economic recovery. The next three recessions — 1990-91, 2001 and 2007-9 — were followed by sluggish recoveries in which unemployment took years to come down. Then came Covid. The economics of 2020 were, to use the technical term, weird: The economy went into lockdown, experiencing a huge but temporary spike in unemployment. But what would 2021 look like? Many people expected at least a partial replay of the sluggish recovery that followed the 2008 financial crisis; in late 2020, forecasters surveyed by the Philadelphia Fed expected a 5.8 percent unemployment rate at the end of 2021. In fact, unemployment was already down to 4.2 percent by November. Here’s a comparison you may find illuminating: the cumulative decline in the unemployment rate starting in December 1982 — the beginning of Reagan’s boom — compared with the decline over the course of 2021: Yes, by this measure (and many others) we’re in the middle of another morning in America, despite the drag caused by a lingering pandemic and supply-chain disruptions. So, about those disruptions: Can we talk for a moment about the Grinch that didn’t steal Christmas? There was a lot of skepticism a couple of months back, when major retailers said that despite supply issues, they expected to be able to meet consumer demand. But I’ve seen almost no reports of empty shelves and frustrated shoppers. And in this case absence of evidence really is evidence of absence, because you know that some media organizations would have loved to hype stories of holiday woe if they could find them. But because Fox News and Newsmax recently got busted using photos of empty shelves taken in other years and other countries to bash Joe Biden, they appear to have been cautious about reporting a miserable Christmas experience unless they could find actual examples — and apparently they couldn’t. So why are people still so downbeat? There continues to be a huge divergence between people’s negative views about “the economy” — a perception based in part on partisan attitudes, in part on media coverage — and their mostly favorable reporting on their own financial situation: Still, inflation is a real problem, and what happens to inflation over the course of 2022 will have a big retrospective effect on how we regard the economy of 2021. I still expect (hope?) to see inflation gradually subside as we work through the remaining kinks in the supply chain. Measures like the cost of container shipping are still elevated but off their peaks; surveys of purchasing managers suggest that delivery times are still bad but improving. If inflation does come down, 2021 will look in the rearview mirror like an unambiguous success story, a tale of an economy that powered through temporary bottlenecks and rapidly returned to full employment. Obviously that’s not the only possible outcome — and for a variety of reasons, which I’ll probably talk about in the next newsletter, it will be quite a few months before we’ll have a clear picture on the inflation front. But one thing is clear: 2021 was a banner year for economic recovery. And people should know that.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › UNIQUENESS › U – Stocks Up

Inflation is down and stocks are up – banks are surviving but on the brink.

Choe, 6/13 (Stan, AP News, “Stock market today: Wall Street rises as inflation keeps cooling, June 13, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/stock-market-interest-inflation-ubs-d06229cfad2ea0c822fc9085df098b0d)

NEW YORK (AP) — Stocks rose Tuesday after a cooler reading on inflation cemented Wall Street’s bets for the Federal Reserve to hold off on hiking interest rates this week. The S&P 500 was 0.7% higher in late morning trading, ticking further into heights it hasn’t touched since April 2022. The Dow Jones Industrial Average was up 176 points, or 0.5%, at 34,248, as of 11:13 a.m. Eastern time, while the Nasdaq composite was 0.8% higher. The U.S. stock market has been on a roll amid hopes the economy can avoid a severe recession and inflation will fall enough for the Federal Reserve to take it easier on its rate increases. Tuesday’s report showed that food, fuel and other prices for consumers were 4% higher in May than a year earlier, the latest slowdown from its peak above 9% last summer. The data pushed traders to immediately amp up bets for the Fed on Wednesday to announce no change to interest rates. If it does, that would mark the first meeting in more than a year where it doesn’t hike rates. The Fed has already pulled its benchmark short-term rate up to its highest level since 2007, which has slowed inflation but has also helped cause several U.S. bank failures and a contraction in the manufacturing industry. Oracle was one of the biggest forces pushing the S&P 500 higher after it reported stronger profit for the latest quarter than expected. It climbed 2.6%, as it also announced plans to develop artificial-intelligence services for organizations. A rush into AI has helped a select group of stocks to huge gains this year, driving much of the stock market’s rally. Nvidia rose 2.8% Tuesday to raise its gain for the year to nearly 178%. That’s raised concerns about a possible bubble, though supporters say AI is the next revolution to remake the economy. A survey of global fund managers by Bank of America found the majority believe widespread adoption of AI in the next two years will increase profits, according to a BofA Global Research report. That survey, though, also said the majority of fund managers believe the Fed is still not done hiking interest rates. Many traders expect the Fed to resume raising rates in July, even if it holds steady this week. Tuesday’s inflation report showed that not only is overall inflation still too high, so are prices underneath the surface. The Fed prefers to look at inflation after stripping out food, fuel and housing costs, hoping to get a better view of where the trend is heading. Such “supercore” inflation is still above the Fed’s comfort level. The worry is that additional hikes by the Fed will mean more pressure on the U.S. banking system when it’s already cracked under the weight of much higher rates. Bank customers are pulling their deposits in search of higher yields at money-market funds. At the same time, high rates are knocking down the values of bonds that banks bought and other investments they made when rates were low. Three high-profile U.S. bank failures since March have shaken confidence in the system, and that’s caused some banks to make it tougher for households and businesses to get loans. That puts additional brakes on the economy, raising the risk of a recession. Zions Bancorp. fell 3.5% after it appeared to cut its forecast for upcoming net interest income to “decreasing” from “moderately decreasing.” Just two weeks remain until the start of the third quarter of the year. That’s notable because many investors came into this year predicting a recession would hit by the third quarter, yet the job market has remained remarkably resilient and propped up the economy. “Today, the recession has not arrived, and we are witnessing that reckoning in public market equity valuations via the recent rally,” said Alexandra Wilson-Elizondo, deputy chief investment officer of multi asset solutions at Goldman Sachs Asset Management. But that doesn’t mean the economy is in the clear. “With inflation stubbornly high, we do see the business cycle eventually ending in recession, as the Fed will have to break the back of the labor market to make material progress toward their 2% target” on inflation, she said.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › UNIQUENESS › U – Inflation Slowing

Inflation is expected to go down in 2023- January jobs report proves

Sheffey ‘23 (Ayelet, senior economic policy reporter, Americans are on track to see 'a significant decline in inflation' this year, Fed's Powell says, insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/when-will-inflation-go-down-significant-decline-this-year-powell-2023-2)

This could be the year Americans finally see prices going down — but it's not going to be painless, the head of the nation's central bank said. On Tuesday, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell joined The Economic Club of Washington, DC to discuss topics including the bank's latest actions raising interest rates, labor market conditions, and Powell's favorite book genre (it's spy fiction). This discussion came after a shocking jobs report last week that found the US economy added 517,000 jobs in January, far surpassing economists' forecasts. Given that the Fed has been relying on a softening labor market to bring inflation down, the January jobs report raises the question of how the Fed will incorporate that data when deciding how high to raise interest rates next month to keep the US on track to reach its pre-pandemic 2% inflation level goal. Powell indicated on Tuesday that he's confident Americans will see prices go down this year, but it'll likely take increased interest rate hikes to make that happen. "We expect 2023 to be a year of significant decline in inflation," Powell said. "This process is likely to take quite a bit of time," he added. "It's not going to be, we don't think, smooth. It's probably going to be bumpy." He also cautioned that should the next jobs report surpass expectations like January's, "it may well be the case that we have to do more rate hikes, more than is priced in."The Fed made clear in December that it is not considering cutting interest rates in 2023 — the question now is how long the central bank will keep raising rates, and to what extent, before pausing the process. After Powell announced a 25 basis point interest rate increase on February 1, he said during the press conference that to effectively fight inflation, it's better to raise interest rates too much than too little. "I continue to think that it's very difficult to manage the risk of doing too little and finding out in six or 12 months that we actually were close but didn't get the job done and inflation springs back and we have to go back in, and now you really do worry about expectations getting unanchored," Powell said.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › UNIQUENESS › U – Inflation Slowing

Data shows inflation at its lowest point in years

Duggan ‘23 (Wayne, Forbes Advisor contributor, February CPI Report Shows Inflation Keeps Falling, Forbes, .

A key measure of U.S. prices in February shows that inflation continues to gradually cool off in the U.S. The Labor Department reported the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose 6% from a year ago in February, right in line with many economists’ expectations. On a monthly basis, CPI gained 0.4% in February. This is the lowest rate of annual CPI inflation since October 2021. It’s also a slight improvement from January’s level of inflation. The CPI reading is the latest indicator that the Federal Reserve’s battle against inflation is slowly chipping away at record-high prices, but the struggle remains real in 2023. The February data comes after January’s 6.4% year-over-year CPI came in hotter than economists had expected. Prior to 2021, the CPI hadn’t gained more than 4% a year in any month since 2008. Core CPI inflation, which excludes volatile food and energy prices, was up 5.5% in February on an annual basis and up 0.5% on a monthly basis. Key parts of the February inflation report show that many essentials are still seeing huge annual price increases. Food prices were up 9.5% compared to a year ago and energy prices were up 5.2%. Other segments continue to see big declines. Used car prices fell 13.6% compared to February 2022, for instance. The inflation report arrives after the Labor Department reported that the U.S. economy added 311,000 jobs in February, exceeding economist expectations of 200,000 new jobs. U.S. wages were up 4.6% year-over-year in February as well, but rising prices are preventing many Americans from getting more mileage out of their paychecks. The data is yet another sign that the Fed’s path forward in the inflation battle will likely not get any easier. In late February, the Commerce Department reported that the core personal consumption expenditures part of the PCE price index—another key inflation report—was up 4.7% in January, up slightly from December. Core PCE is the Fed’s preferred measure of inflation. Rising PCE is a bad sign for interest rates and the economy as a whole.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › UNIQUENESS › U – Inflation Slowing

Inflation is down now- As gas has become cheaper

Smialek 1/23/23

Jeanna, writer for the New York Times and previously Bloomberg News, Inflation is Cooling, Leaving America Asking: What Comes Next? The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/23/business/economy/inflation-turning-point.html

“I was really starting to feel financially squeezed in a way that I hadn’t felt ever before, since finishing college,” Mr. Bate said. Since then, he has received a promotion and a raise that amounted to 12 percent. Gas prices have fallen, and local housing costs have moderated enough that next month he is moving into a nicer apartment that costs less per square foot than his current place. “My personal situation has improved a good amount,” Mr. Bate said, explaining that he’s feeling cautious but hopeful about the economy. “It’s looking like it might shape out all right.” People across the country are finally experiencing some relief from what had been a relentless rise in living costs. After repeated false dawns in 2021 and early 2022 — when price increases slowed only to accelerate again — signs that inflation is genuinely turning a corner have begun to accumulate. on an annual basis for six straight months, dipping to 6.5 percent after peaking at about 9 percent last summer, partly as gas has become cheaper. But the deceleration is true even after volatile food and fuel are stripped out: So-called core consumer prices have climbed 0.3 percent or less for each of the past three months. That’s faster than the 0.2 percent month-to-month changes that were typical before the pandemic but much slower than the 0.9 percent peak in April 2021. America may have reached an inflection point on inflation at last. The question now centers on what will happen next. Some economists expect inflation to remain stubbornly faster than before the pandemic, while others anticipate a steep deceleration. Some anticipate something in between. Which prospect plays out matters enormously: The speed and scope of the inflation cool-down will inform how high Federal Reserve policymakers raise rates, how long they leave them elevated and how much pain they inflict on the economy.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › UNIQUENESS › U – Inflation Slowing

Inflation has slowed.

Pickert, 6/13 (Reade, Bloomberg Econ News, with Jordan Yadoo, Matthew Boesler and Sophie Caronello, “US Inflation Slows, Giving Room for Fed to Pause Rate Hikes,” June 13, 2023,

US inflation slowed in May, supporting the case for Federal Reserve officials to pause their run of interest-rate hikes this week. Both the consumer price index and the core CPI — which excludes food and energy — decelerated on an annual basis, highlighting inflation’s descent since peaking last year. At 4%, year-over-year inflation is now at its lowest level since March 2021, according to data out Tuesday from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. That said, a key gauge of prices closely watched by the Fed continued to rise at a concerning pace. The core CPI rose 0.4% for a third straight month, in line with estimates. The overall CPI, however, increased a smaller 0.1%, aided by lower gasoline prices. Here are some of the top-line figures in the report: METRIC ACTUAL MEDIAN ESTIMATE CPI MoM +0.1% +0.1% Core CPI MoM +0.4% +0.4% CPI YoY +4% +4.1% Core CPI YoY +5.3% +5.2% The figures come just a day before the Fed is set to make a decision on whether to raise interest rates for an 11th-straight meeting or to pause and further assess economic conditions. Several policymakers, including Chair Jerome Powell, have signaled they prefer to skip a rate hike at the June 13-14 meeting, while still leaving the door open to future tightening if needed. Economists generally agree the central bank will leave rates unchanged Wednesday, but the next CPI report due in July will play a key role in determining what the Fed will do at that month’s meeting. “This is a pretty good print in terms of signaling that we are likely to see the core CPI soften materially starting next month,” Omair Sharif, president of Inflation Insights LLC, said in a note. “The way things are going now, I suspect we’ll see a soft core that will tamp down odds of a July hike.” The S&P 500 opened higher and Treasury yields fell as traders marked down the probability of a rate hike this week. Price Pressures in the US Ease Annual headline inflation of 4% in May was the lowest since March 2021 CPI (YoY, NSA)Core CPI, excluding food & energy (YoY, NSA) 0 5 10 % 2020 2021 2022 2023 Headline est. =4.1%Core est. = 5.2% Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics The details showed shelter, used cars and motor vehicle insurance all contributed to the monthly advance. Meantime, airfares and household furnishings declined. Excluding housing and energy, service prices climbed 0.2% from a month earlier, according to Bloomberg calculations, which is more consistent with pre-pandemic trends. The metric was up 4.6% from a year earlier, extending a decline since peaking late last year. While Powell and his colleagues have stressed the importance of looking at such a metric when assessing the nation’s inflation trajectory, they compute it based on a separate index. The two gauges can diverge significantly, like in April when the CPI-based figure softened to a nine-month low whereas the other — based on the personal consumption expenditures price index — accelerated. The May PCE price index will be released later this month. Shelter costs, which are the biggest services component and make up about a third of the overall CPI index, reaccelerated to 0.6%. That was bolstered by an increase in the cost of hotel stays and still-elevated rents. The gasoline price index fell 5.6%. Grocery prices edged higher after falling for two straight months, while dining out got more expensive. Much of the pullback in the CPI from its 40-year high last June has been driven by disinflation, if not outright deflation, in merchandise categories — a function of normalizing supply chains and a broader shift in consumer preferences toward services. But that trend has reversed somewhat in recent months. So-called core goods prices, which exclude food and energy commodities, rose 0.6% for a second month. How far the Fed can push the economy without spurring a recession is unclear, especially since the current data offer a mixed report.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › UNIQUENESS › U – No Rate Hikes

The contractionary monetary cycle is over – future rate hikes are priced in

Justin Lanhart, 6/14/23, The Wall Street Journal, “The end of the Fed’s tightening is still in sight,” https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-end-of-the-feds-tightening-is-still-in-sight-1a50bb2f, mm

The end of the Fed’s tightening campaign now seems in sight, if it hasn’t already arrived. The central bank’s policy makers on Wednesday left their target on overnight rates steady at a range of 5% to 5.25%—the first time they didn’t raise rates at the conclusion of a policy-setting meeting since January last year. They did indicate that they expect to raise rates by another half percentage point by the end of the year, more than many expected. But if the next inflation report shows signs of further cooling, even that could be in doubt. Yet Fed officials don’t think they will soon be bringing rates much lower than they are now, either, with their projections now showing they expect the rate range will be 4.5% to 4.75% at the end of next year. And investors are starting to recognize that this higher-for-longer expectation might come true. When the Fed has raised rates in the past, it has often hiked them to the point where the job market cracks, plunging the economy into a recession that leads the central bank to quickly reverse course and cut rates sharply. Investors had been figuring that would be the pattern this time around: At one point in March, shortly after Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank collapsed, interest-rate futures implied an expectation that the central bank would lower its rate target to a range of 3.75% to 4%, or lower, by the end of this year, a contrast to current expectations that are roughly split between the Fed holding rates steady and raising them by a quarter point. But although the job market has loosened a bit, it still looks quite healthy, with unemployment low and plenty of job vacancies waiting to be filled. As long as that is true, even if inflation cooled substantially, policy makers wouldn’t see much point in cutting. Now interest-rate futures imply that the Fed’s target range will finish out the year around where it is now. This shift in expectations is having an effect on long-term interest rates, too. The yield on the 10-year Treasury, which in theory largely reflects investors’ short-term rate expectations over the next decade, has lately been pushing higher faster than the yield on the 3-month Treasury. If inflation does, in fact, keep cooling, and the job market remains in good shape, then that is a trend that will continue, and might even lead to a point where long-term yields are higher than short-term ones—not, as is usually the case when the yield curve un-inverts, because a recession has hit, but because one has been avoided. This would, of course, be great news for the economy. But for investors, being stuck in a higher-for-longer rate regime would be a bit more complicated.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › UNIQUENESS › U – No Rate Hikes

The Fed is at the end of its monetary tightening cycle – inflation is under control, but further rate hikes will destabilize the economy

Ryan Herzog, 6/14/23, (associate professor of economics at Gonzaga University), The Conversation, “Why the Federal Reserve’s epic fight against inflation might be over,” https://theconversation.com/why-the-federal-reserves-epic-fight-against-inflation-might-be-over-207693, mm

The Federal Reserve’s decision to hold rates steady signals that central bankers believe it is time to hit pause, at least temporarily, on their aggressive campaign to tame runaway inflation. The latest data, not to mention several other factors, however, suggests it’s time for a full stop. On June 14, 2023, the Fed chose not to lift rates for the first time in 11 meetings, leaving its target interest rate – a benchmark for borrowing costs across the global economy – at a range of 5% to 5.25%. Over 10 consecutive hikes beginning in March 2022, the Fed had raised rates a whopping 5 percentage points. “Holding the target range steady at this meeting allows the committee to assess additional information and its implications for monetary policy,” the central bank said in a statement. The Fed indicated it still expects to raise rates two more times by the end of the year. As an economist who follows the central bank’s actions closely, I believe there’s good reason to think the Fed’s brief hiatus is likely to turn into a permanent vacation. The fastest rate of inflation since the 1980s is what prompted the Fed to hike interest rates so much. So it makes sense that inflation would be a key indicator of when its job is complete. The latest consumer price index data, released on June 13, showed core inflation – the Fed’s preferred measure, which excludes volatile food and energy prices – falling to an annual rate of 5.3% in May 2023, the slowest pace since November 2021. That’s down from a peak of 6.6% in September 2022. While the data shows inflation remains well above the Fed’s target of around 2%, there’s good reason to believe that it will continue to fall regardless of what the Fed does. Shelter, a measure of the cost of owning or renting a home, is the largest component of the consumer price index, accounting for more than one-third of the total. In its latest report, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported shelter costs rose 8% from a year ago. After stripping that out, inflation was up just 2.1%. The thing is, the data reported by the bureau doesn’t reflect the reality of what’s happening in the current housing market. The Bureau of Labor Statistics relies on a survey that gauges rental prices from 50,000 leases, many of which were signed during the rental bubble in 2021 and 2022. A better measure of current market rents is the Zillow Observed Rent Index. That index suggests rates are declining – rents rose 4.8% year over year in May, aligning with pre-pandemic rates. Comparing the two measures suggests the official consumer price index data lags behind the market by four to six months. Using current rents would put inflation much closer to where the Fed wants it to be. Jason Furman, former chair of the government’s Council of Economic Advisors, created a modified version of core inflation – which uses a market-based measure of shelter prices – at 2.6%. Moreover, it is likely that further rate hikes will do more harm than good – particularly to the banking sector – and without helping lower inflation below its current trajectory. Several regional lenders, including Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic, collapsed earlier this year following bank runs. Combined, they had over a half-trillion dollars in assets. While there were several factors behind the banks’ demise, an important one was the Fed’s aggressive rate hikes, which caused the value of many of their assets to fall. The banks catered to depositors with accounts that exceeded the US$250,000 threshold protected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. These depositors ran for the hills when they learned about the extent of the bank losses. This turmoil, in tandem with higher rates, is also cooling business activity. This means the Fed doesn’t need to go as high on rates as it otherwise would have. Further troubles loom over the banking sector. In recent days, notable figures in the finance industry, such as Goldman Sachs CEO David Solomon and former U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, have warned that nearly $1.5 trillion in commercial real estate loans will require refinancing over the next three years. The combination of already high interest rates and low office occupancy rates will likely force banks to absorb hundreds of billions of dollars in loan losses, inevitably putting more banks on the brink of failure. And if the Fed keeps raising rates, the situation is likely to get a lot worse. The Fed was behind the curve in 2021 and 2022 in realizing inflation was getting out of control, and it has been historically slow in recognizing the impact of rental rates on inflation. The June pause in raising rates should give the Fed time to take a break, look at the data and, I hope, realize inflation is closer to its target than it appears. But if it continues to raise rates, I believe the central bank will be repeating the same mistakes it made in the past.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › UNIQUENESS › U – No Rate Hikes

Inflation is slowing down

Wallace, 6/13 (Alicia, CNN, “CPI report: US inflation is coming back down to Earth,” June 13, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/13/economy/cpi-inflation-may/index.html)

Consumer prices in May rose at the slowest annual pace since March 2021, according to fresh data released Tuesday by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The Consumer Price Index, a key inflation gauge that measures price changes for a basket of goods and services, increased 4% for the year ending in May. That represents a sharp pullback from April’s 4.9% and is slightly below economists’ expectations for a 4.1% gain, according to Refinitiv. On a monthly basis, prices ticked up 0.1%. Economists were expecting prices to increase by 0.2% from April to May. It’s the 11th consecutive month that inflation has slowed, and it’s a welcome reprieve from the painful shock of persistently high inflation endured during the past two years. This time last year, that CPI print was more than double at 8.6%. “It’s another step in the right direction,” Nancy Vanden Houten, lead US economist at Oxford Economics, said in an interview with CNN. A drop in energy prices and a slowdown in food price hikes helped bring down the headline number, as did the influence of what is known as base effects: A year ago, inflation was marching upward and setting fresh 41-year highs before topping out at 9.1% in June. While 4% is a far cry from 9.1%, it’s also still well above the desired inflation target for the Federal Reserve, which has been in the throes of a historic monetary tightening campaign since March 2022. The Fed would like to see inflation (as measured by the core Personal Consumption Expenditures index) settle in at 2%. “Inflation is still much too high, but the trend is in the right direction, and the Fed is ready to take a break from raising interest rates,” Chris Zaccarelli, chief investment officer for Independent Advisor Alliance, said in a statement. “They’ve raised rates for 10 consecutive meetings in a row and the [5 point] increase is the most and fastest pace in decades, so they want to wait and see if their actions are sufficient to keep inflation moving in the right direction.”

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › UNIQUENESS › U – No Rate Hikes

Inflation is under control and the Federal Reserve is holding interest rates steady.

Horsley, 6/14 (Scott, NPR Correspondent, “Taking a breather: Fed holds interest rates steady in patient battle against inflation,” June 14, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/06/14/1181946330/taking-a-breather-federal-reserve-holds-interest-rates-steady-inflation-battle

The Federal Reserve left interest rates unchanged Wednesday, but reaffirmed its commitment to battling stubborn inflation. After raising interest rates at the last ten meetings in a row, Fed policymakers opted to hold their benchmark rate steady, between 5 and 5.25%. They signaled that additional rate hikes are possible, if necessary to bring prices under control. "The committee is completely unified in the need to get inflation down to 2%, and we'll do whatever it takes to get it down to 2%," Fed chairman Jerome Powell told reporters. "We understand that allowing inflation to get entrenched in the U.S. economy is the thing that we cannot allow to happen for the benefit of today's workers and families and businesses but also for the future." The central bank's decision to forego an eleventh consecutive rate hike comes a day after the Labor Department reported mixed progress on restoring price stability. Consumer prices in May were up 4% from a year ago — the smallest annual increase since March 2021. Much of the drop in inflation last month resulted from falling gasoline prices, which are notoriously erratic. Excluding volatile prices for energy and food, inflation is still running at 5.3% — more than two-and-a-half times the Fed's 2% target. "Things are still moving in the right direction and encouraging," says Kathy Bostjancic, chief economist at Nationwide. "But when we look at what we call the 'core' consumer price index, there is where you still see some stickiness."

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › 1NC › 1nc – Developing Economies Impact

2. Global economic insecurity will cascade and cause nuclear war.

Maavak ‘21 (Mathew, PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Expert and Regular Commentator on Risk-Related Geostrategic Issues at the Russian International Affairs Council, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?”, Salus Journal – The Australian Journal for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, Volume 9, Number 1, p. 2-8)

Various scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Once inexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals. Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset INTRODUCTION The new decade is witnessing rising volatility across global systems. Pick any random “system” today and chart out its trajectory: Are our education systems becoming more robust and affordable? What about food security? Are our healthcare systems improving? Are our pension systems sound? Wherever one looks, there are dark clouds gathering on a global horizon marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998). The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020). An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity. COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach. METHODOLOGY An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020): • Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006); • Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012); • Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and • Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources. ECONOMY According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid- 2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity. The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak. The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007). Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit. According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019): “You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author). President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period. A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016). In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade. ENVIRONMENTAL What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation: The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs. Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated. Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity. Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021). Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications. On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabriabased ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008). The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section. Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade. GEOPOLITICAL The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic. Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › 1NC › 1nc – Developing Economies Impact

1. Rate hikes spill over – they’ll collapse developing economies around the world.

Martin ’22 (Jamie is a history professor at Georgetown University, “The U.S. Wants to Tackle Inflation. Here’s Why That Should Worry the Rest of the World,” April 28, 2022, )

As the Federal Reserve begins to raise interest rates to tackle the highest inflation the United States has seen in decades, it confronts a growing risk that it will spark a recession in the process. The trade-off faced by the Fed — between price stability and employment — is usually framed in strictly domestic terms. But aggressive efforts to quell inflation in the United States can have major, unpredictable effects around the world, often with long-lasting, negative consequences for countries in the Global South. And the United States will not be immune to worldwide economic trends. The inflation hawks should consider all of this as they figure out how to address rising prices in the United States today. History is a good guide to how destructive the Fed’s policies can be for the rest of the world. Just look back to the 1980s. After several years of rising prices, President Jimmy Carter appointed Paul Volcker to lead the Fed in 1979. Mr. Volcker raised the federal funds rate — the interest rate that banks charge one another for short-term borrowing and which guides other interest rates — up to nearly 20 percent. By the end of 1982, unemployment had reached 10.8 percent in the United States, but inflation slowed, and Mr. Volcker acquired a mythic status as a farsighted leader unafraid to make tough decisions. That’s why he is cited in so many calls for the Fed to aggressively tackle inflation today. But the effects of Mr. Volcker’s decisions were felt beyond the United States’ borders. As interest rates rose, debts accrued by foreign countries became more difficult to service. This led to a wave of defaults among countries that had borrowed heavily on international markets in the years before, beginning with Mexico in 1982 and then spreading throughout Latin America and beyond. In developing countries, the debt crisis that followed the so-called Volcker shock was profoundly traumatic. Across Latin America, it led to a collapse in G.D.P., rising unemployment and skyrocketing levels of poverty, from which the region made a slow and imperfect recovery over the “lost decade” that followed. Even those who claim Mr. Volcker made the right decision admit that he precipitated what may have been the “worst financial disaster the world had ever seen” in Latin America — the consequences of which were even worse than those of the Great Depression. Among heavily indebted states in Africa, the effects were similar. But American policymakers at the time did not give much attention to the global repercussions of their decisions. As Mr. Volcker himself later admitted, “Africa was not even on my radar screen.” An even more relevant example may be from the early 20th century. The first time that the Fed — along with other major central banks — helped spark a global recession was in 1920. By the end of World War I, two years earlier, the world was facing a serious inflationary crisis caused by many of the same forces at work today: global supply chain disruptions, shipping shortages and loose monetary policies. Then, as now, the price of wheat soared as Russian sources disappeared from global markets. From the Gold Coast (now Ghana) to Argentina, food, fuel and clothing became unaffordable, at the same time that an influenza pandemic killed millions. As wages failed to keep pace with rising costs of living, a wave of uprisings, racist mob violence and mass strikes broke out around the world. The immediate cause was the war’s effects on trade, shipping and finance. But even after the war’s conclusion, these inflationary pressures did not subside. In early 1920 the Fed, alongside other major central banks, sharply raised interest rates. This reined in inflation, but it came at the cost of a worldwide recession: In 1920-21, unemployment in Britain reached heights rivaling those of the Depression; the United States saw a deep, though relatively short-lived, deflationary crisis. The longest-lasting effects of this recession were in poorer, nonindustrialized economies throughout Europe’s colonial empires and Latin America. When commodity prices collapsed, the producers and exporters of goods like wheat, sugar and rubber were devastated. The long-term effects of the crash of 1920-21 on these economies was similar to those of the Depression and the slump of the 1980s. What will be the effects of the Fed’s efforts to tackle inflation today? It’s not just distant history that counsels caution. In 2013, the slightest hint by Ben Bernanke, then the chairman of the Fed, that monetary tightening was around the corner was enough to send many emerging market economies into a tailspin. The prospect of higher borrowing costs led to capital outflows and currency instability that battered Indonesia, Brazil, India, South Africa and Turkey with particular severity. The decade that followed saw sluggish performance for many emerging market economies. Conditions are now ripe for the Fed to precipitate another global crisis. Of particular concern are extremely high levels of emerging-market debt. The International Monetary Fund estimates that about 60 percent of low-income developing countries are experiencing debt distress or are close to it. Sri Lanka’s recent default may be the first domino to fall. Tighter monetary policy in the United States will push many other countries to raise their interests rates to prevent capital flight and currency instability. But this will contract their economies, threatening recovery from the pandemic and delivering another blow to their long-term growth.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › 1NC › 1nc – Warming Impact

2. Climate change causes extinction – it triggers every impact.

Kemp et al. '22 [Luke Kemp: Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge; Chi Xu: School of Life Sciences, Nanjing University; Joanna Depledge: Cambridge Centre for Environment, Energy and Natural Resource Governance, University of Cambridge; Kristie L. Ebi: Center for Health and the Global Environment, University of Washington; Goodwin Gibbins: Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford; Timothy A. Kohler: Department of Anthropology, Washington State University; Johan Rockström: Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research; Marten Scheffer: Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Wageningen; Hans Joachim Schellnhuber: Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research; Will Steffen: Fenner School of Environment and Society, The Australian National University; Timothy M. Lenton: Global Systems Institute, University of Exeter; PNAS;"Climate Endgame: Exploring catastrophic climate change scenarios"; 5-20-2021; published by PNAS; accessed 4-3-2023; https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2108146119#sec-3; ror]

The Potential for Climate Catastrophe There are four key reasons to be concerned over the potential of a global climate catastrophe. First, there are warnings from history. Climate change (either regional or global) has played a role in the collapse or transformation of numerous previous societies (37) and in each of the five mass extinction events in Phanerozoic Earth history (38). The current carbon pulse is occurring at an unprecedented geological speed and, by the end of the century, may surpass thresholds that triggered previous mass extinctions (39, 40). The worst-case scenarios in the IPCC report project temperatures by the 22nd century that last prevailed in the Early Eocene, reversing 50 million years of cooler climates in the space of two centuries (41). This is particularly alarming, as human societies are locally adapted to a specific climatic niche. The rise of large-scale, urbanized agrarian societies began with the shift to the stable climate of the Holocene ∼12,000 y ago (42). Since then, human population density peaked within a narrow climatic envelope with a mean annual average temperature of ∼13 °C. Even today, the most economically productive centers of human activity are concentrated in those areas (43). The cumulative impacts of warming may overwhelm societal adaptive capacity. Second, climate change could directly trigger other catastrophic risks, such as international conflict, or exacerbate infectious disease spread, and spillover risk. These could be potent extreme threat multipliers. Third, climate change could exacerbate vulnerabilities and cause multiple, indirect stresses (such as economic damage, loss of land, and water and food insecurity) that coalesce into system-wide synchronous failures. This is the path of systemic risk. Global crises tend to occur through such reinforcing “synchronous failures” that spread across countries and systems, as with the 2007–2008 global financial crisis (44). It is plausible that a sudden shift in climate could trigger systems failures that unravel societies across the globe. The potential of systemic climate risk is marked: The most vulnerable states and communities will continue to be the hardest hit in a warming world, exacerbating inequities. Fig. 1 shows how projected population density intersects with extreme >29 °C mean annual temperature (MAT) (such temperatures are currently restricted to only 0.8% of Earth’s land surface area). Using the medium-high scenario of emissions and population growth (SSP3-7.0 emissions, and SSP3 population growth), by 2070, around 2 billion people are expected to live in these extremely hot areas. Currently, only 30 million people live in hot places, primarily in the Sahara Desert and Gulf Coast (43). Fig. 1 omitted. Overlap between future population distribution and extreme heat. CMIP6 model data [from nine GCM models available from the WorldClim database (45)] were used to calculate MAT under SSP3-7.0 during around 2070 (2060–2080) alongside Shared SSP3 demographic projections to ∼2070 (46). The shaded areas depict regions where MAT exceeds 29 °C, while the colored topography details the spread of population density. Extreme temperatures combined with high humidity can negatively affect outdoor worker productivity and yields of major cereal crops. These deadly heat conditions could significantly affect populated areas in South and southwest Asia(47). Fig. 2 takes a political lens on extreme heat, overlapping SSP3-7.0 or SSP5-8.5 projections of >29 °C MAT circa 2070, with the Fragile States Index (a measurement of the instability of states). There is a striking overlap between currently vulnerable states and future areas of extreme warming. If current political fragility does not improve significantly in the coming decades, then a belt of instability with potentially serious ramifications could occur. Fig. 2 omitted. Fragile heat: the overlap between state fragility, extreme heat, and nuclear and biological catastrophic hazards. GCM model data [from the WorldClim database (45)] was used to calculate mean annual warming rates under SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5. This results in a temperature rise of 2.8 °C in ∼2070 (48) for SSP3-7.0, and 3.2 °C for SSP5-8.5. The shaded areas depict regions where MAT exceeds 29 °C. These projections are overlapped with the 2021 Fragile State Index (FSI) (49). This is a necessarily rough proxy because FSI only estimates current fragility levels. While such measurements of fragility and stability are contested and have limitations, the FSI provides one of the more robust indices. This Figure also identifies the capitals of states with nuclear weapons, and the location of maximum containment Biosafety Level 4 (BS4) laboratories which handle the most dangerous pathogens in the world. These are provided as one rough proxy for nuclear and biological catastrophc hazards. Finally, climate change could irrevocably undermine humanity’s ability to recover from another cataclysm, such as nuclear war. That is, it could create significant latent risks (Table 1): Impacts that may be manageable during times of stability become dire when responding to and recovering from catastrophe. These different causes for catastrophic concern are interrelated and must be examined together. Table 1 omitted. Defining the Key Terms Although bad-to-worst case scenarios remain underexplored in the scientific literature, statements labeling climate change as catastrophic are not uncommon. UN Secretary-General António Guterres called climate change an “existential threat.” Academic studies have warned that warming above 5 °C is likely to be “beyond catastrophic” (50), and above 6 °C constitutes “an indisputable global catastrophe” (9). Current discussions over climate catastrophe are undermined by unclear terminology. The term “catastrophic climate change” has not been conclusively defined. An existential risk is usually defined as a risk that cause an enduring and significant loss of long-term human potential (51, 52). This existing definition is deeply ambiguous and requires societal discussion and specification of long-term human values (52). While a democratic exploration of values is welcome, it is not required to understand pathways to human catastrophe or extinction (52). For now, the existing definition is not a solid foundation for a scientific inquiry. We offer clarified working definitions of such terms in Table 1. This is an initial step toward creating a lexicon for global calamity. Some of the terms, such as what constitutes a “plausible” risk or a “significant contributor,” are necessarily ambiguous. Others, such as thresholding at 10% or 25% of global population, are partly arbitrary (10% is intended as a marker for a precedented loss, and 25% is intended as an unprecedented decrease; see SI Appendix for further discussion). Further research is needed to sharpen these definitions. The thresholds for global catastrophic and decimation risks are intended as general heuristics and not concrete numerical boundaries. Other factors such as morbidity, and cultural and economic loss, need to be considered. We define risk as the probability that exposure to climate change impacts and responses will result in adverse consequences for human or ecological systems. For the Climate Endgame agenda, we are particularly interested in catastrophic consequences. Any risk is composed of four determinants: hazard, exposure, vulnerability, and response (3). We have set global warming of 3 °C or more by the end of the century as a marker for extreme climate change. This threshold is chosen for four reasons: Such a temperature rise well exceeds internationally agreed targets, all the IPCC “reasons for concern” in climate impacts are either “high” or “very high” risk between 2 °C and 3 °C, there are substantially heightened risks of self-amplifying changes that would make it impossible to limit warming to 3 °C, and these levels relate to far greater uncertainty in impacts. Key Research Thus Far The closest attempts to directly study or comprehensively address how climate change could lead to human extinction or global catastrophe have come through popular science books such as The Uninhabitable Earth (53) and Our Final Warning (10). The latter, a review of climate impacts at different degrees, concludes that a global temperature rise of 6 °C “imperils even the survival of humans as a species” (10). We know that health risks worsen with rising temperatures (54). For example, there is already an increasing probability of multiple “breadbasket failures” (causing a food price shock) with higher temperatures (55). For the top four maize-producing regions (accounting for 87% of maize production), the likelihood of production losses greater than 10% jumps from 7% annually under a 2 °C temperature rise to 86% under 4 °C (56). The IPCC notes, in its Sixth Assessment Report, that 50 to 75% of the global population could be exposed to life-threatening climatic conditions by the end of the century due to extreme heat and humidity (6). SI Appendix provides further details on several key studies of extreme climate change. The IPCC reports synthesize peer-reviewed literature regarding climate change, impacts and vulnerabilities, and mitigation. Despite identifying 15 tipping elements in biosphere, oceans, and cryosphere in the Working Group 1 contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report, many with irreversible thresholds, there were very few publications on catastrophic scenarios that could be assessed. The most notable coverage is the Working Group II “reasons for concern” syntheses that have been reported since 2001. These syntheses were designed to inform determination of what is “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system, that the UNFCCC aims to prevent. The five concerns are unique and threatened ecosystems, frequency and severity of extreme weather events, global distribution and balance of impacts, total economic and ecological impact, and irreversible, large-scale, abrupt transitions. Each IPCC assessment found greater risks occurring at lower increases in global mean temperatures. In the Sixth Assessment Report, all five concerns were listed as very high for temperatures of 1.2 °C to 4.5 °C. In contrast, only two were rated as very high at this temperature interval in the previous Assessment Report (6). All five concerns are now at “high” or “very high” for 2 °C to 3 °C of warming (57). A Sample Research Agenda: Extreme Earth System States, Mass Mortality, Societal Fragility, and Integrated Climate Catastrophe Assessments We suggest a research agenda for catastrophic climate change that focuses on four key strands: • Understanding extreme climate change dynamics and impacts in the long term • Exploring climate-triggered pathways to mass morbidity and mortality • Investigating social fragility: vulnerabilities, risk cascades, and risk responses • Synthesizing the research findings into “integrated catastrophe assessments” Our proposed agenda learns from and builds on integrated assessment models that are being adapted to better assess large-scale harms. A range of tipping points have been assessed (58–60), with effects varying from a 10% chance of doubling the social cost of carbon (61) up to an eightfold increase in the optimal carbon price (60). This echoes earlier findings that welfare estimates depend on fat tail risks (31). Model assumptions such as discount rates, exogenous growth rates, risk preferences, and damage functions also strongly influence outcomes. There are large, important aspects missing from these models that are highlighted in the research agenda: longer-term impacts under extreme climate change, pathways toward mass morbidity and mortality, and the risk cascades and systemic risks that extreme climate impacts could trigger. Progress in these areas would allow for more realistic models and damage functions and help provide direct estimates of casualties (62), a necessary moral noneconomic measure of climate risk. We urge the research community to develop integrated conceptual and semiquantitative models of climate catastrophes. Finally, we invite other scholars to revise and improve upon this proposed agenda. Extreme Earth System States. We need to understand potential long-term states of the Earth system under extreme climate change. This means mapping different “Hothouse Earth” scenarios (21) or other extreme scenarios, such as alternative circulation regimes or large, irreversible changes in ice cover and sea level. This research will require consideration of long-term climate dynamics and their impacts on other planetary-level processes. Research suggests that previous mass extinction events occurred due to threshold effects in the carbon cycle that we could cross this century (40, 63). Key impacts in previous mass extinctions, such as ocean hypoxia and anoxia, could also escalate in the longer term (40, 64). Studying potential tipping points and irreversible “committed” changes of ecological and climate systems is essential. For instance, modeling of the Antarctic ice sheet suggests there are several tipping points that exhibit hysteresis (65). Irreversible loss of the West Antarctic ice sheet was found to be triggered at ∼2 °C global warming, and the current ice sheet configuration cannot be regained even if temperatures return to present-day levels. At a 6 °C to 9 °C rise in global temperature, slow, irreversible loss of the East Antarctic ice sheet and over 40 m of sea level rise equivalent could be triggered (65). Similar studies of areas such as the Greenland ice sheet, permafrost, and terrestrial vegetation would be helpful. Identifying all the potential Earth system tipping elements is crucial. This should include a consideration of wider planetary boundaries, such as biodiversity, that will influence tipping points (66), feedbacks beyond the climate system, and how tipping elements could cascade together (67). Mass Morbidity and Mortality. There are many potential contributors to climate-induced morbidity and mortality, but the “four horsemen” of the climate change end game are likely to be famine and undernutrition, extreme weather events, conflict, and vector-borne diseases. These will be worsened by additional risks and impacts such as mortality from air pollution and sea level rise. These pathways require further study. Empirical estimates of even direct fatalities from heat stress thus far in the United States are systematically underestimated (68). A review of the health and climate change literature from 1985 to 2013 (with a proxy review up to 2017) found that, of 2,143 papers, only 189 (9%) included a dedicated discussion of more-extreme health impacts or systemic risk (relating to migration, famine, or conflict) (69). Models also rarely include adaptive responses. Thus, the overall mortality estimates are uncertain. How can potential mass morbidity and mortality be better accounted for? 1) Track compound hazards through bottom-up modeling of systems and vulnerabilities (70) and rigorously stress test preparedness (71). 2) Apply models to higher-temperature scenarios and longer timelines. 3) Integrate risk cascades and systemic risks (see the following section) into health risk assessments, such as by incorporating morbidity and mortality resulting from a climate-triggered food price shock. Societal Fragility: Vulnerabilities, Risk Cascades, and Risk Responses. More-complex risk assessments are generally more realistic. The determinants of risk are not just hazards, vulnerabilities, and exposures, but also responses (3, 72). A complete risk assessment needs to consider climate impacts, differential exposure, systemic vulnerabilities, responses of societies and actors, and the knock-on effects across borders and sectors (73), potentially resulting in systemic crises. In the worst case(s), a domino effect or spiral could continuously worsen the initial risk. Societal risk cascades could involve conflict, disease, political change, and economic crises. Climate change has a complicated relationship with conflict, including, possibly, as a risk factor (74) especially in areas with preexisting ethnic conflict (75). Climate change could affect the spread and transmission of infectious diseases, as well as the expansion and severity of different zoonotic infections (76), creating conditions for novel outbreaks and infections (6,77). Epidemics can, in turn, trigger cascading impacts, as in the case of COVID-19. Exposure to ecological stress and natural disasters are key determinants for the cultural “tightness” (strictness of rules, adherence to tradition, and severity of punishment) of societies (78). The literature on the median economic damages of climate change is profuse, but there is far less on financial tail risks, such as the possibility of global financial crises. Past studies could be drawn upon to investigate societal risk. Relatively small, regional climate changes are linked to the transformation and even collapse of previous societies (79, 80). This could be due to declining resilience and the passing of tipping points in these societies. There is some evidence for critical slowing down in societies prior to their collapse (81, 82). However, care is needed in drawing lessons from premodern case studies. Prehistory and history should be studied to determine not just how past societies were affected by specific climate hazards but how those effects differ as societies change with respect to, for example, population density, wealth inequality, and governance regime. Such framing will allow past and current societies to be brought under a single system of analysis (37). The characteristics and vulnerabilities of a modern globalized world where food and transport distribution systems can buffer against traumas will need to feature in work on societal sensitivity. Such large, interconnected systems bring their own sources of fragility, particularly if networks are relatively homogeneous, with a few dominant nodes highly connected to everyone else (83). Other important modern-day vulnerabilities include the rapid spread of misinformation and disinformation. These epistemic risks are serious concerns for public health crises (84) and have already hindered climate action. A high-level and simplified depiction of how risk cascades could unfold is provided in Fig. 3.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › 1NC › 1nc – Warming Impact

1. Rate hikes reverse the green energy transition – guarantees climate change.

Ferguson and Storm ’23 (Thomas Ferguson is professor emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, and director of research at the Institute for New Economic Thinking, Servaas Storm is a senior lecturer at the Delft University of Technology, “Central banks raising interest rates makes it harder to fight the climate crisis,” 6 May 2023, )-mikee

Higher rates slow the renewable energy transition and shield oil and gas producers from competition by low-carbon producers In late 2021, consumer price inflation surged in many countries. Prices shot up again following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In response, central banks drastically tightened monetary policy – raising interest rates from near zero to around 5% or more. Since the interest rate hikes have failed to bring down core inflation to the target rate of 2% favored by the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB), the pressure for further rate hikes has been insistent. We have long doubted that central bank rate rises could control the new inflation at a socially acceptable price. In most countries, wages lag well behind inflation. Too much of the rise in prices clearly reflects the impact of higher profit margins and obvious supply bottlenecks. In such conditions, leaving control of inflation to central banks is like asking an old-time central bank to fix a harvest failure. Only targeted policies to increase output and control profit margins in strategic sectors, not general increases in the price of borrowed money, have much chance of working. But relying on central bank rate rises in the current situation is folly for another reason: the reality of the climate crisis, which now greatly complicates the task of central banks and policymakers. One reason is obvious: higher interest rates considerably slow down the renewable energy transition. This happens in two ways. First, newly applied renewable energy technologies, which have relatively large front-loaded costs, are more competitive (relative to the already installed fossil fuel technologies) only when interest rates are low. Engineering studies show that the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) of solar photovoltaics (PV) and wind onshore will increase by 11% and 25%, respectively, if interest rates are 4-4.5% (rather than around zero). Investments in new renewable energy capacity are thus only viable if market prices allow them to earn their full LCOE. Estimates by the International Energy Agency suggest that the LCOE of a gas-fired power plant would increase by about 4% if interest rates were to increase from 3% to 7%, whereas that of offshore wind and solar PV (utility scale) could rise by more than 30%. Second, high interest rates shield legacy oil and gas producers from the competition of up-and-coming low-carbon energy producers. They will enable oil and gas giants to continue to maximize revenues from their decaying, sun-setting assets; oil in particular can keep charging more and more for less and less for a long time. The year 2022 already gave us a flavor of the shape of things to come: Exxon posted $56bn in net profits for the year, while all oil majors combined made close to net $200bn. These windfall profits are very good news for shareholders, as Exxon is planning to spend $30bn on share repurchases in 2023 and another $50bn in 2024. But they are bad news for the rest of us – as high interest rates de-incentivize investments in renewables, lock our economies more deeply into fossil-fuel dependence, slow down decarbonization and put us even more strongly on the road to hothouse Earth.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › 1NC › 1nc – Top

b. Link: The plan freaks out the Fed – they see full employment as inflationary – that causes a return to rate hikes.

Popli ’23 (Nik, reporter at TIME, he covers economic policy and national politics, “It Could Be Harder to Find a Job and Get a Pay Raise if the Fed Gets Its Way,” FEBRUARY 9, 2023, )

Despite the good news, Fed officials were “probably hoping for more of a slowdown in the jobs report,” says David Wessel, director of the Hutchins Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at the Brookings Institution. “What we’ve seen in the last couple of months with a falling rate of inflation and slowing wage growth at a very tight and strong labor market does challenge the conventional wisdom on which economists, including those at the Fed, generally rely,” Wessel tells TIME. In his first public comments since the jobs report, Powell acknowledged this week that the jump in hiring was “stronger than anyone I know expected” and that the process of getting inflation back to normal levels will require some pain for workers. “There has been an expectation that it will go away quickly and painlessly—and I don’t think that’s at all guaranteed,” Powell said during a moderated discussion before the Economic Club of Washington, D.C. on Tuesday. “The base case for me is that it will take some time, and we’ll have to do more rate increases, and then we’ll have to look around and see whether we’ve done enough.” To Powell and central bankers, the hiring boom is viewed as an obstacle in its fight to corral the fastest inflation in decades. Officials are also worried that wage growth could stop inflation from returning to their 2% target, another of the Fed’s aims that puts its interests at odds with American wage-earners. Wessel points out, for instance, that the Fed was likely glad to see the pace of wage increases come down. Average hourly pay grew 4.4% in January from a year earlier, down from a peak of 5.6% in March. The Fed’s long-standing belief is that a job market with strong hiring and increased wages typically fuels higher inflation. Under this economic model, consumers are more likely to spend freely when they have higher incomes, and companies tend to raise their prices to help cover climbing labor costs. It might seem odd to regard wage increases as a problem, but the Fed’s approach highlights the harsh trade-offs at the heart of the battle against inflation: To keep prices stable, it needs to be harder for workers to find a job and get a pay raise, according to the Fed. The central bank has been aggressively increasing interest rates to slow the economy and bring inflation back to around its 2% target. Last Wednesday, the Fed raised its benchmark interest rate for an eighth time since March, although at a slower pace, and indicated that further increases were probable. Fed Chair Powell has suggested that hard times are coming, particularly for workers. “I wish there were a completely painless way to restore price stability,” Powell said at a news conference on Dec. 14. “There isn’t.” Reich believes that the Fed has been too focused on the dangers of a tight labor market leading to higher wages, a stance that he says “neglects the other side of their mandate—to promote maximum employment.” For the most part, the approach appears to be working to reduce inflation—but not without painful consequences. Price increases are moderating, and some economists think consumers have seen the worst of it. The Consumer Price Index, which is the government’s main inflation gauge, rose 6.5% year-over-year in December, down from a peak increase of 9.1% recorded in June. But last month’s labor benchmarks tell a different story. The unemployment rate dropped to a new 53-year low of 3.4% as employers added an explosive 517,000 jobs. And despite the pain of inflation, most businesses have appeared busy over the last year—from airplanes to restaurants to stores. The Fed’s main inflation-fighting tool is its ability to move interest rates, effectively raising the cost of borrowing money and ultimately slowing the economy. But to some economists and labor experts, this isn’t the most effective tool. “The Fed is using the one tool it has—raising interest rates—and that’s dangerous,” says Reich, who believes the Fed is showing callous disregard for the economic welfare of millions of Americans by pursuing policy that stunts job growth. “The people who are most likely to lose their jobs and certainly who are no longer getting wage increases are poor and low-income people, who are disproportionately, people of color and women,” Reich says. “They are the ones who are being drafted into the inflation fight when the economy slows. They’re the first to lose their jobs, just as they are the last to get jobs when the economy tightens.” Most estimates say that unemployment will have to reach as high as 7.5%, more than double its current level, to get inflation down to the Fed’s target of 2%. “The Fed wants more unemployment,” Wessel says. “[Chair] Jerome Powell keeps saying that, well, maybe we can just reduce the number of unfilled jobs, the job vacancies without anybody actually losing their job, but that’s a bit harder.”

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › 1NC › 1nc – Top

a. Uniqueness: Inflation is decreasing and the Fed has stopped raising interest rates.

Rugaber, 6/14 (Christopher, AP News Journalist, “Fed Chair Powell sees progress on inflation, though not quickly enough,” June 14, 2023,

WASHINGTON (AP) — Inflation may be cooling — just not yet fast enough for the Federal Reserve. Chair Jerome Powell offered a nuanced view Wednesday of how the Fed intends to address its core challenge at a time when inflation is both way below its peak but still well above the central bank’s 2% target: Give it more time, and maybe some help from additional interest rate hikes. Yet on a hopeful note, Powell also suggested that the trends that are needed to further slow inflation, from lower apartment rents to slower-growing wages, are starting to click into place. As a result, the Fed decided Wednesday to forgo another increase in its benchmark interest rate, leaving it at about 5.1%. The pause followed 10 straight hikes in 15 months — the fastest series of increases in four decades. By leaving rates alone, at least for now, Powell and other top Fed officials hope to use the extra time to more fully assess how higher borrowing rates have affected inflation and the economy. They also want to see whether the collapse of three large banks this spring will weigh on lending and growth. In a surprisingly hawkish signal, the Fed’s policymakers issued projections Wednesday showing they envision as many as two additional quarter-point rate hikes before the year ends. (In Fed parlance, “hawks” generally favor higher rates to quell inflation, while “doves” typically advocate lower rates to aid a healthy job market.) Before this week’s policy meeting, Fed watchers had expected the policymakers to signal just one more rate increase this year. In their new projections, the members of the Fed’s interest-rate committee were less divided than many economists had expected, with 12 of the 18 policymakers foreseeing at least two more quarter-point rate increases. Four favored one quarter-point hike. Only two envisioned keeping rates unchanged. The policymakers also predicted that their benchmark rate will stay higher for longer than they envisioned three months ago. Powell noted that wage growth has slowed and cited some signs that the job market is cooling. Those factors, he added, should reduce inflationary pressures. “I would almost say that the conditions that we need to see in place to get inflation down are coming into place,” Powell said. “But the process of that actually working on inflation is going to take some time.” Inflation dropped to 4% in May compared with a year earlier, down sharply from a 9.1% peak last June. And many economists expect it to decline further. Rental costs are falling, and used car prices, which spiked in April and May, are also likely to drop. Yet Powell underscored that the Fed will need to feel confident that inflation is moving steadily closer to its 2% target. “We’re two and a quarter years into this, and forecasters, including Fed forecasters, have consistently thought that inflation was about to turn down ... and been wrong,” he said. “We want to get inflation down to 2%, and we just don’t see that yet.” At the same time, Powell stopped short of saying the Fed’s policymakers have committed to resuming their hikes when they next meet in late July. At one point in the news conference, he referred to Wednesday’s decision as a “skip,” which would imply that the Fed planned to raise rates at the July meeting. He then corrected himself: “I shouldn’t call it a skip,” he said. But Powell emphasized that the Fed wants to move more slowly after its breakneck pace last year, when it carried out four straight three-quarter-point hikes, followed by a half-point increase and then three quarter-point hikes this year. The Fed’s aggressive streak of rate hikes, which have made mortgages, auto loans, credit cards and business borrowing costlier, have been intended to slow spending and defeat the worst bout of inflation in four decades. Average credit card rates have surpassed 20% to a record high. “Given how far we have come, it may make sense for rates to move higher but at a more moderate pace,” he said. “It’s just the idea that we’re trying to get this right.” Should inflation come down further, some economists think the Fed may not actually have to raise rates again. “With inflation set to moderate noticeably, we are skeptical that the Fed will resume hiking interest rates,” Ryan Sweet, chief U.S. economist of Oxford Economics, wrote in a note. “Our baseline forecast is for the Fed to remain on hold through the remainder of this year before gradually easing in early 2024.”

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › Notes

Explanation

You can understand this disadvantage as an “Inflation DA,” “Interest Rates DA,” or simply an “Economy DA.”

It argues that if the federal government pursues significant fiscal redistribution it would lead to the Federal Reserve (aka “The Fed”) raising interest rates to combat the real or perceived inflation that results from plan.

The uniqueness is pretty good because the while inflation has been high for a while, the Fed recently paused rate hikes and signaled that inflation is cooling off. The economy is avoiding a recession and we’re recovering from many of the supply issues from Covid. Growth might be slow, but the Fed is ensuring a soft transition.