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2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › Econ Comp k2 Heg

US competitiveness is the key internal link to hegemony- it maintains the necessary industrial base and bolsters US image abroad

Hughes in 21

Kent, Public Policy Fellow and Chief Economic and International Trade Advisor in the Office of the Director, CEO and President of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; The New Economy and U.S. Global Competitiveness; https://www.kas.de/documents/283221/283270/The+New+Economy+and+US+Global+Competitiveness.pdf/89a84838-1ab7-1310-6977-095ccce95521?version=1.0&t=1615905263752

Where once the United States was the dominant economic power, now that global stage is shared by Europe, East and South Asia, and China. There are important economies on every continent. Where once America seemed home to innovations, now one also needs to look around the world for new ideas, new cures, and new products. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic challenges of German reunification and the Japanese financial crisis, suddenly the United States stood alone as an unrivaled superpower. In 1992, Francis Fukuyama published his End of History and the Last Man. By the end of history, Fukuyama is widely interpreted as saying that democratic capitalism remained as the only path to economic growth and political organization (Fukuyama, 1992). Since that period of contented U.S. hubris, the world has taken yet another turn. China has emerged as a major economic force and presents itself as the model for growth and governance. After the turn of the century, the United States made several serious mistakes. It failed to anticipate the terrorist attacks in September 2001. The subsequent invasion of Iraq proved to be a geopolitical blunder. The global financial crisis revealed that, contrary to global expectations, the U.S. did not effectively control its complicated financial system. Finally, the United States’ muddled mismanagement of the Covid-19 pandemic has raised questions about America’s ability to govern effectively. China had, of course, made the initial mistakes of failing to identify the virus or acting to contain it. But when it moved into action, it proved decisive and effective. China has been quick to emphasize the contrast to the United States. Yet despite China’s rise and American mistakes, much of the world still looks for American leadership in world affairs. Much of Asia welcomes America as a military and even economic counterweight to China. Long-standing allies in Europe and Asia would welcome renewed American commitment to continued economic, political, and military ties. What should America do to Restore Its Leadership? First, it should remember how America and its allies prevailed in World War II. Second, it should recognize that while it is still a major power, the world is now made up of other established and rising powers. Third, it must listen more and talk less. Fourth, it needs to adjust its policies to the new economy and new circumstances. Finally, it needs to restore confidence in public institutions and develop a new national purpose. U.S. Leadership – Traditional Strengths The United States played a leading role in containing the Soviet Union but drew on the active support of allies around the world. In terms of direct competition, the United States out produced and out innovated the Soviet Union. The United States was active in exercising what Joseph Nye has named soft power. For many people, freedom and democracy were more attractive than authoritarian communism. Looking forward, the United States again needs to restore alliances where there are shared interests and shared values at stake. Existing allies in Europe and Asia, have similar complaints about China’s economic strategy and to authoritarian practices in China and elsewhere around the world. In responding to global crises – anticipating future pandemics to dealing with climate change to securing global supply chains – an allied effort can provide effective leadership in what must be a global response. U.S. Leadership – A Multipolar World with an Economy of Many Powers America must recognize that while it may still be the first among peers, the world is made up of many established and other rising powers. It is not 1946, or 1960, or even 2000. America’s domestic and foreign policies will have to adjust to the challenge of many competitors, some of which are geopolitical allies. The competitive landscape is made more complex by the rise of global corporations and international trading rules. Where China may rely on authoritarian rule to guide its international economic activities, the United States will need to use incentives, subsidies, joint ventures, and international agreements to fully draw on its national strengths. U.S. Leadership – Learning from the World America still has strengths and institutions that contain useful lessons for the world. America’s higher education system sets a global standard. The silicon valleys that have emerged around the country offer lessons in innovation. Americans’ tolerance for risk helps drive resilience and innovation. In American leadership nothing is more important than effectively managing the pandemic, restoring economic growth, and responding to national demands for shared prosperity and broad-based economic opportunity. Conclusion: Restoring American Leadership 32THE NEW ECONOMY AND U.S. GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS | MARCH 2021The world also has many lessons to teach America. For instance, every industrial power in the world has universal health care. The systems vary but all cover everyone. There are several variants of capitalism found across the industrial world. The United States and Great Britain leave more to private markets. German industry has labor representatives on one of its corporate boards. Germany also has a system that links companies with technology problems to a set of applied research institutes that can turn to advanced institutes when basic research is required. Japan has a history of working closely with industry, setting national priorities, and adopting policies that drive competitiveness (Hughes, 2005, pp. 94-108). When it comes to K-12 education, America should look at the structure of education in countries that perform the best – Finland and several East Asian countries which lead the field in the international exams of science, mathematics and reading. Adapting foreign solutions to American strengths, values, and traditions will be an effective way to move through the 21st century. U.S. Leadership – New Thinking for the New Economy The U.S. can no longer cling with almost religious devotion to the idea that private markets can solve every problem. Nor can the country count on an education system tied to an agricultural calendar or one dependent on local property taxes. The U.S. needs to adjust its thinking and its actions to the many realities of the new economy. Rising economic powers, new technologies, an economy demanding new skills, the development of cyber weapons, precision guided missiles, and other changes all demand new, creative policies. The pandemic has put a spotlight on existing inequalities in terms of income, wealth, education, and access to health care. The national response to the death of Floyd George has awakened the nation to a renewed effort to create an economy that offers opportunity and a decent income to all Americans. The Biden administration is faced with growing demands to tackle major inequalities, to work toward greater inclusion, and to make progress against climate change. The Biden team seeks to make a range of domestic investments, generate jobs, adjust the military to new threats and new technologies, and forge a successful foreign policy. President Trump’s emphasis on America First contained two basic truths. Competitiveness policy and foreign policy both begin at home. Not a turning inward, but a recognition that in a democracy based on the idea of equality, persistent inequities will undermine the strength of the country.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › Econ Comp k2 beat China

US engaged in competition with China- only a focus on maintaining competitive edge ensures continued hegemony

Martijn Rasser and Megan Lamberth in 2021

Former Senior Fellow and Director, Technology and National Security Program and Former Associate Fellow, Technology and National Security Program; Taking the Helm

A National Technology Strategy to Meet the China Challenge; Center for a New American Security; https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/taking-the-helm-a-national-technology-strategy-to-meet-the-china-challenge

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › Econ Comp k2 beat China

US competitiveness is the backbone of its competition with China- economic, political, and military power all rely on it

Martijn Rasser and Megan Lamberth in 2021

Former Senior Fellow and Director, Technology and National Security Program and Former Associate Fellow, Technology and National Security Program; Taking the Helm

A National Technology Strategy to Meet the China Challenge; Center for a New American Security; https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/taking-the-helm-a-national-technology-strategy-to-meet-the-china-challenge

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › Econ Comp k2 beat China

Shifting the government’s attention to economy is key- China’s growing economically and challenges Western hegemonic superiority

Jaeger 22, Markus Jaeger, Dr. Markus Jaeger is a research fellow at DGAP and an adjunct professor at Columbia University. Prior to joining DGAP, Jaeger was a director at Deutsche Bank Research in New York, where he was responsible for the analysis of US economic and financial markets. Previously, he held a variety of research and advisory roles with Deutsche Bank in London and New York, covering global economics and emerging markets as well as country risk and geopolitics.“The Economics of Great Power Competition,” DCAP, May 02, 2022, sim

The United States and its allies are status quo powers; China and Russia are revisionist powers. Russia wants to change the status quo in Eastern Europe, China in East Asia. Despite the Ukraine war, China continues to present a greater long-term challenge to the status quo than Russia. China is rising economically, while Russia is experiencing stagnation and relative decline. Whether Russo-Chinese cooperation intensifies or not, China’s rise has important implications for American strategy, transatlantic relations, and German and European defense policy. The United States is strongly committed to defending the status quo in Asia as well as in Europe, and it has good reasons for doing so. Preventing the rise of a hegemonic power on either side of the Eurasian landmass has been a strategic interest for more than a century. The United States fought two world wars and committed to an extensive forward military presence and extensive security guarantees during the Cold War to prevent Europe and East Asia from falling under German, Japanese, or Soviet hegemony. Whether or not a Sino-Russian geopolitical bloc emerges, both China and Russia are set on a collision course with the United States and its allies. Economically, the US-led alliances are well-positioned to engage in long-term geopolitical competition, provided the United States manages to maintain alliance cohesion. But to remain competitive, America will need to shift attention and resources to Asia – Russian revisionist policies notwithstanding. This will force its European allies to take on greater responsibility for defending the status quo in Europe. Germany has a pivotal role to play here. As the economically and financially most powerful country in Europe, it will have little choice but to contribute to strengthening European security. Unlike smaller countries, it cannot free-ride on the security provided by its European allies. Germany also has at its disposal greater economic, financial, and technological resources than its European partners. The main challenge will be to convert economic resources into military power and enhanced security in an efficient and effective way. Economic might is the foundation of political and military power. It is also a prerequisite for engaging in successful long-term geopolitical competition. Paul Kennedy and Robert Gilpin have famously argued that shifting economic fortunes underpin the rise and fall of great powers. The economically stronger or ascendant power, or alliance of powers, emerges victorious, often but not always in the wake of a ‘hegemonic war.’ Anecdotal evidence suggests that more forceful military mobilization or more innovative military tactics may confer a temporary advantage, but rarely translate into strategic victory. How do the US-led alliances on the one hand and China and Russia on the other hand compare in terms of economic power? At present, the aggregate economic resources of the United States and its allies outstrip the combined resources of China and Russia. But the current and prospective ‘balance of economic resources’ is much more favorable for the status quo powers in Europe than in Asia. The economies of European NATO members are five times larger than Russia’s, and even prior to the imposition of the war-related sanctions, the Russian economy was already stagnating. Its long-term growth outlook is weak, given its demographics, dependence on natural resource exports, and uncompetitive domestic markets. Russia will be lucky if its growth rate matches that of low-growth major European economies like France and Germany, especially if the substantial one-off drop due to sanctions is taken into account. In Asia, however, the aggregate economic size of the US-led alliances exceeds China’s by a far smaller margin. The Chinese economy is also growing much faster. Under reasonable assumptions, it will be twice as large as the US economy by the middle of this century. It will then exceed the combined economic size of the United States and its regional allies. These are baseline projections, and it is worth noting that significant risks attach to China’s future growth trajectory, much more than to the outlook of the mature, lower-growth advanced economies of the United States and allies. Chinese growth has averaged nearly ten percent a year since its economic opening in the late 1970s. More recently, trend growth has dropped closer to six percent and is set to decline further. China’s official 2022 target is five and a half percent. By comparison, the present US growth potential is estimated to be around two percent or less. China certainly has sufficient savings to finance capital accumulation. But this is of little use if not enough profitable investment opportunities can be identified. Doubling down on infrastructure investment will only lead to excess debt accumulation and raises the risk of a financial and economic crisis. Rapidly deteriorating demographics, a declining catch-up growth potential, and the so-called middle-income trap represent considerable risks to China’s economic outlook. So-called economic rebalancing to make growth more sustainable is proving challenging. Nevertheless, in all reasonable scenarios, Chinese economic growth will exceed American growth. The Chinese economy will therefore continue to pull ahead of the American economy. This will allow China to increase defense expenditure far more rapidly than the United States and its allies, while keeping it stable as a share of GDP and thereby limiting the resource drain on the economy. China’s increasing economic might will force the United States to mobilize and allocate greater resources to Asia. With Chinese capabilities focused on Asia, the United States – which deploys its military assets globally – will face an increasingly difficult strategic challenge. As a result, America’s European allies will need to take greater responsibility for European defense.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › Econ Comp k2 beat China

Economic competitiveness is vital to countering Chinese hegemony- a strong economic base is key to modern military power and diplomatic influence

Atkinson 22, Robert D. Atkinson is the founder and president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation as well as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. He has served in advisory roles in the Clinton, George W. Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations and is the author of four books, including Innovation Economics: The Race for Global Advantage., “How to Win the US-China economic war”, Foreign Policy, November 8, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/08/us-china-economic-war-trade-industry-innovation-production-competition-biden/.//Isim

It is dawning on the United States that China is not just a military adversary but an economic one. The two countries are at war for primacy in both innovation and production capacity as much of Beijing’s economic gain in advanced industries comes at Washington’s loss—and vice versa. This trend is likely to continue. Chinese President Xi Jinping acknowledged as much last year when he stated, “Technological innovation has become the main battleground of the global playing field, and competition for tech dominance will grow unprecedentedly fierce.” Economic war is distinct from economic competition. Canada and the United States, for example, compete economically, but both nations understand that trade is conducted on the basis of a mutually beneficial comparative advantage. By contrast, China has launched massive frontal assaults on U.S. technology and industry capabilities. Beijing’s 2006 National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology can be considered an initial strike in this conflict, followed in 2015 by Xi’s “Made in China 2025” strategy. Both identified key technologies in which China sought to achieve self-sufficiency, and both are backed by restrictions on foreign firms’ market access in key industries, widespread intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, enormous subsidies for Chinese firms, and much more. The latter document also added numerical targets for China’s market share in leading industries. Economic war is not unprecedented. From 1900 to 1945, Germany used a wide array of unfair trade practices to gain economic and political power globally, ultimately in service of its military power. But Beijing has taken economic war to another level. China’s long-standing and increasing attacks are designed to crush its competitors—and make the United States an economic vassal state. Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s trade war was a response—albeit a poorly formulated one—to China’s long assaults on U.S. industrial and technological capabilities. At the time, most experts in Washington ascribed this to Trump’s protectionist proclivities rather than a recognition that the United States was in a full-scale economic war. It is only in the last few years that the intent and extent of China’s economic aggression has become more widely understood. U.S. President Joe Biden’s new export ban on advanced chips and semiconductor equipment to China is evidence that he and some people in his administration have caught on. Despite Biden’s ban, the United States remains largely unprepared for a protracted economic war with China. Beijing’s innovation-mercantilist practices—which seek to gain a large share of advanced industry output by using tactics considered illegal by the World Trade Organization—go far beyond the industrial policies of other nations. Ignoring them and believing that China will change course—or assuming that China can’t succeed because it is not a democratic, free market country or has an aging population, as many U.S. policymakers do—is akin to putting its head in the sand and hoping for the best. The stakes are high: Winning the war will boost domestic wages, competitiveness, and economic and national security. Losing will do the opposite. The U.S. national security establishment takes planning for military war seriously. It spends significant resources on war-gaming exercises and supporting the U.S. Defense Department. It has numerous war colleges to study combat. It enlists endless consultants to advise on every aspect of war. It employs historians to learn from prior conflicts. And it coordinates with agencies from across the federal government. Such a system is largely absent for economic warfare. There is no planning. No assessment. No strategy. No economic security system. At best, there are individual programs and initiatives that fail to constitute a whole-of-government strategy or system. Absent an invasion of Taiwan, it seems there is no Chinese economic attack that could awaken Washington from its slumbers. Most of Washington does not—at least yet—see economic relations with Beijing in win-lose terms. Although policymakers understand that foreign adversaries can and do attack vital U.S. national security interests, they are less willing to acknowledge that the same can be true when it comes to vital U.S. economic interests. Indeed, most economic advisors still proffer the notion of comparative advantage, where trade is a mutually beneficial win-win. The United States, they say, might be good at producing passenger jets, whereas China is good at producing 5G equipment. But China’s massive subsidies and other unfair practices used to build up advanced domestic industries—in telecommunications equipment, high-speed rails, construction equipment, aerospace, semiconductors, biotechnology, clean energy, automobiles, computing, artificial intelligence, and more—have nothing to do with comparative advantage. They reflect a desire for dominance through industrial predation: boosting their own firms while crushing foreign competitors’ ability to compete. This is why there is a strong negative correlation between the change in the respective shares of global output that China and the United States held in advanced industries from 1995 to 2018. In other words, China gained shares in the industries the United States lost. Washington also persists in holding on to the free market doctrine that firms maximize economic welfare when they act in their own interests without government aid or strategic direction. Yet even the most devoted follower of economists Adam Smith or Friedrich Hayek believes that market forces alone will not generate a nation’s needed military capabilities. That’s why governments must intervene and plan. But too many experts in Washington don’t extend that logic to capabilities for economic war. To be sure, economic war and military war are different; there are few, if any, direct casualties from economic war, and battles take place over a much longer period of time. But both ultimately threaten the ability of the state to exist autonomously.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › Infra k2 Econ Comp

Infrastructure key to competitiveness – semiconductors prove

Gina M. Raimondo 22 (Gina M. Raimondo serves as the 40th U.S. Secretary of Commerce and was sworn in by Vice President Kamala Harris on March 3, 2021. As Secretary of Commerce, she is focused on a simple but vital mission — to spur good-paying jobs, empower entrepreneurs to innovate and grow, and help American workers and businesses compete; US department of Commerce; Remarks by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo on the U.S. Competitiveness and the China Challenge;

We are also revitalizing U.S. domestic manufacturing, particularly advanced manufacturing. Over the past decades, communities across the country have seen manufacturing shut down, businesses shutter, and the local engines of innovation grind to a halt, as we exported jobs and manufacturing capacity to China and the rest of Asia and reduced investment in the workforce development and infrastructure necessary to maintain our long-term competitiveness. I felt the effects of this shift firsthand. My father worked his whole career in the Bulova Watch Factory in Providence. But after 28 years, his job moved to China as the company chased cheap labor. And just like all his friends, my father was forced into early retirement. What happened to my father is hardly unique. It happened to millions of Americans over the last 40 years. While we watched China become a world leader in manufacturing and reap the massive benefits of manufacturing-driven innovation, the U.S. economy became LESS competitive and overly dependent on China for an increasing number of critical technologies and goods. It is worth noting, by the way, that China achieved its success through massive state support of its industries. COVID opened our eyes to the long-term risk for both the private sector and the American people of this over-dependence on China and the need to rebuild domestic manufacturing and innovation. Semiconductors are ground-zero in this technological competition and central to our new investment strategy. They drive innovation in nearly every emerging technology and support critical national security applications. The U.S. invented the semiconductor industry and once led the world in producing the most advanced chips. Today, we no longer manufacture the world’s most advanced semiconductors and produce only 10 percent of global chip capacity. Meanwhile, since 2020, nearly 75 percent of the new global capacity for certain mature chips has been added in China. The CHIPS and Science Act marks the beginning of a new chapter in U.S. innovation where we reverse that decline and ensure that the United States retains its leadership in the technologies and industries of the 21st century. In the coming years, the Commerce Department will invest $52 billion in domestic semiconductor manufacturing, including workforce training and R&D, to create a vibrant domestic industry. But this public investment is only a starting point. It is designed to spur the business community to crowd in private capital and be our partner in making the kinds of investments that generate long-term returns for business and advance American competitiveness. Our goal is to lay a foundation for American business to do what American business does best – innovate, scale, and compete.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › Infra k2 Econ Comp

Critical Infrastructure is key to economic competitiveness- it increases efficiency and attracts investment

Public Safety Canada 2015

Public Safety Canada, department of the Canadian government responsible for matters of public safety, Role of Critical Infrastructure in National Prosperity, Government of Canada, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-rl-crtclnfrstrctr-ntnlprsprty/index-en.aspx

Strategic View This shared narrative begins by examining how each nation addresses the interrelationship between critical infrastructure, national prosperity, and the national economy at the strategic level. The governmental policies, doctrine and directives of members approach this in various manners but they do establish that modern, efficient infrastructure is vital to the success of modern economies and national prosperity. Well-designed infrastructure is an essential driver of national prosperity and is a pre requisite for economic expansion and for future growth to occur. Infrastructure enables a nation’s productivity, quality of life, and economic progression by driving growth, creating jobs, and improving productivity, quality of life and efficiency. It underpins growth by providing the supporting networks upon which we all rely. Networked infrastructure, such as transportation and communications, boost long-term economic output because they provide benefits to other sectors, such as improved business efficiency, effective mechanisms to coordinate and manage supply chains and product delivery. Resilient and dependable networks enable business confidence which leads to increased business investment and growth and the creation of new economic opportunities. Investment in infrastructure and how these investments are managed can also have a significant impact on government economic objectives. New investments can make a significant contribution to productivity and economic performance if they have high benefit-cost ratios. Infrastructure investments are essential for the functioning of the economy and contribute to business efficiency, connectivity and business growth which can result in improved confidence in current and future infrastructure. In addition, investing in infrastructure has a real impact on creating and sustaining jobs. The most recent U.S. estimate from the President’s Council of Economic Advisors notes that every US$1 billion in Federal highway and transit investment funding supports 13,000 jobs for one year. Analysis of data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 2012 annual data as well as from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) suggests that “68 percent of the jobs created by investing in infrastructure are in the construction sector, 10 percent in the manufacturing sector, and 6 percent in retail trade.” In Canada, as part of the Moving Ontario Forward Plan launched in 2014, the Government of Ontario estimates that investments totaling CAD$130 billion over 10 years in public infrastructure will support more than 110,000 jobs. In addition, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities formulates that every CAD$1 billion in infrastructure investment translates into approximately 11,000 jobs.” In Australia, as part of the Asset recycling initiative the Commonwealth Government will provide incentive payments to states and territories that sell assets and reinvest the sale proceeds to fund world-class infrastructure across Australia. This Initiative will leverage close to $40 billion of new infrastructure investment from the states and territories over five years. Conversely, an inadequate supply of infrastructure or unreliable infrastructure service can inhibit the investment of productive capital or reduce output. Underdeveloped or aging infrastructure can negatively impact a nation’s or region’s economic competitiveness. Since infrastructure investment is essential to economic growth, the United States launched the Build America Investment Initiative in the summer of 2014. This initiative was designed to increase infrastructure investment and economic growth by engaging with local governments across the U.S. as well as private sector investors to encourage collaboration, expand the market for public-private partnerships (PPPs) and put federal credit programs to greater use. The United States recognizes that modern and efficient infrastructure – whether moving goods to our harbors and ports or connecting people to services or gigabits to our offices and homes – helps small businesses to expand, manufacturers to export, investors to bring jobs to our shores, and lowers prices for goods and services for American families. New Zealand has made significant investments in infrastructure since 2009 to address historic patterns of varied investment levels, including over NZ$12 billion on roads, NZ$3.2 billion on rail, NZ$2.1 billion on faster broadband, NZ$5 billion on increasing the capacity, performance and reliability of the National Grid, and $16.5 billion on the rebuilding of Christchurch following the earthquakes. The Future Investment Fund was also established in 2012 which has provided almost NZ$5 billion of new capital spending including almost NZ$1 billion in transport, over NZ$600 million in education and almost NZ$700 million in health. Australia has committed $29.5 billion to the roll out of a national broadband network that will enhance the efficiency of Australia’s telecommunications infrastructure. The provision of a fast reliable network will support Australia’s future economic and social growth. Increased connectivity will enable access to new markets, reduce costs and drive innovation. This initiative is estimated to yield net economic benefits of $18 billion to Australia. Governments do play a unique role in infrastructure due to their ability to provide strategic direction through planning and regulation. This role sets the environment to support wider infrastructure planning and investments and thus economic prosperity. Governments can also be a significant owner/provider themselves, although their investments alone may not be sufficient when considering the budgetary monies available and the magnitude of repair, upgrades and new development required to maintain economic competitiveness. Governments can consider promoting an attractive climate for private investment in infrastructure to improve the quality, quantity and competitiveness of economies, as well as removing barriers to private investment in public infrastructure, to improve the attractiveness of public infrastructure as an investment. Extensive and efficient infrastructure is critical for ensuring the effective functioning of the economy, as it is an important factor in determining the location of economic activity and the kinds of activities or sectors that can develop within a country. Well-developed infrastructure reduces the effect of distance between regions, integrating the national market and connecting it at low cost to markets in other countries and regions. Redundancy and Threat to Critical Infrastructure Critical infrastructure is the backbone to modern society and it is essential to national prosperity. Resilient and secure infrastructure is vital for economic prosperity because it not only underpins the effective operating of businesses and services, but also underpins long term confidence and planning in a region, and thus ongoing investment levels. Providing this resilience and security can therefore act as both a direct injection into the regional or sectoral economy as well as a catalyst to further economic growth and investment. However, when there are disruptions to the services critical infrastructure provides, such as energy, transportation, and communications networks, there can potentially be costly direct economic impacts, such as the cost of repairing damage to physical structures, and indirect economic impacts to society, such as the business disruption to the global supply chain and an increase in short term and long term unemployment. These disruptions of critical infrastructure can affect the timely delivery of goods and services that are imperative to national economies, which can be measured in the loss of business and tax generated revenue in the affected areas. In addition, when critical infrastructure is disrupted there can be broader regional and national impacts. When large-scale disasters strike there are tangible and measureable direct and indirect economic impacts to a disrupted and dispersed workforce, to commerce and manufacturing sectors denied power, transportation, supply chains, and society as a whole. For example, in the United States, Hurricane Sandy caused US$65 billion in damages and economic loss and in New Zealand the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 are estimated to have caused NZ$40 billion in economic loss. In Australia the 2011 Queensland floods resulted in $A 2.4 billion in damages and a reduction in GDP of $A30 billion. Persistent or irrecoverable damage and prolonged recovery times to businesses and economies serve to extend losses. These serve to underscore the importance of enhancing critical infrastructure resilience within organizations. Modern societies are becoming increasingly dependent on the critical infrastructure systems that provide essential services that support economic prosperity. However, because these systems are increasingly interdependent the potential exists for initial large and small failures to cascade into events of catastrophic proportions. When our critical infrastructure is diminished or disrupted, we feel the economic impact from threats and consequences. Investing in resilience and mitigation and building robust and redundant systems throughout our countries can minimize the length and magnitude of these disruptions.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › Infra k2 Econ Comp

Infrastructure key to economy- increases jobs, trade, and growth

Puentes 15

Robert, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Why Infrastructure Matters: Rotten Roads, Bum Economy, Brookings

Infrastructure enables trade, powers businesses, connects workers to their jobs, creates opportunities for struggling communities and protects the nation from an increasingly unpredictable natural environment. From private investment in telecommunication systems, broadband networks, freight railroads, energy projects and pipelines, to publicly spending on transportation, water, buildings and parks, infrastructure is the backbone of a healthy economy. It also supports workers, providing millions of jobs each year in building and maintenance. A Brookings Institution analysis Bureau of Labor Statistics data reveals that 14 million people have jobs in fields directly related to infrastructure. From locomotive engineers and electrical power line installers to truck drivers and airline pilots, to construction laborers and meter readers, infrastructure jobs account for nearly 11 percent of the nation’s workforce, offering employment opportunities that have low barriers of entry and are projected to grow over the next decade. Important national goals also depend on it. The economy needs reliable infrastructure to connect supply chains and efficiently move goods and services across borders. Infrastructure connects households across metropolitan areas to higher quality opportunities for employment, healthcare and education. Clean energy and public transit can reduce greenhouse gases. This same economic logic applies to broadband networks, water systems and energy production and distribution.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › US Infra Low

US infrastructure is down in every category- lack of funding and resources

Schaper, David, 2021

David Schaper is a correspondent on NPR's National Desk, based in Chicago, primarily covering transportation and infrastructure, as well as breaking news in Chicago and the Midwest; https://www.npr.org/2021/03/03/973054080/potholes-grid-failures-aging-tunnels-and-bridges-nations-infrastructure-gets-a-c

the latest report card on the nation's infrastructure shows that the needs are great but funding is lacking. Many of the country's roads, bridges, airports, dams, levees and water systems are aging and in poor to mediocre condition. And they're in need of a major federal investment to keep from getting worse and to withstand the harsh effects of a changing climate, according to the American Society of Civil Engineer. The group gives the nation's infrastructure in general a grade of C-minus on its quadrennial infrastructure report card, up from a D-plus four years ago. ASCE says the U.S. made some modest and incremental improvements in some infrastructure categories, including railroads, drinking water systems and inland waterways and ports. But 11 of the 17 infrastructure categories evaluated are graded in the "D" range, and as last month's power and water failures due to brutal winter storms and extreme cold show, many infrastructure systems are increasingly susceptible to catastrophic failure. "This not a report card anyone would be proud to take home," said ASCE Executive Director Thomas Smith in a news release. "We have not made significant enough investments to maintain infrastructure that in some cases was built more than 50 years ago." Transit system in the U.S. gets the lowest grade, a D-minus, as some 45% of Americans lack access to transit and the existing transit infrastructure, from subway tunnels to station facilities, is aging and in need of repair. One particular concern is the condition of the nation's bridges. According to the Infrastructure Report Card, 42% of the 617,000 bridges in the U.S. are more than 50 years old, and more than 46,000 of them are rated as structurally deficient. That doesn't mean that they're in danger of collapsing but indicates that they are in poor condition. The number of bridges that slipped from good condition to fair over the last four years increased as well. Another concern is the state of dams, levees and stormwater systems. Dam and levee failures, like one in Midland, Mich., last year, are happening more often as warming climate creates more severe thunderstorms with heavier rainfall amounts. Stormwater systems are also increasingly being overwhelmed, causing catastrophic flooding. The engineers' group says the U.S. is spending only half of what it needs to invest in infrastructure improvements just to bring systems up to par, and projects an infrastructure funding shortfall of $2.59 trillion over the next 10 years. If the country doesn't pay its overdue infrastructure bill, ASCE estimated that the U.S. will lose $10 trillion in economic growth and will lose more than 3 million jobs by 2039. Crumbling infrastructure costs every American household $3,300 in hidden costs a year, according to ASCE, from lost time and increased fuel consumption while sitting in traffic jams, to extra car repairs due to poor road conditions. "As this study shows, we risk significant economic losses, higher costs to consumers, businesses and manufacturers – and our quality of life – if we don't act urgently," Smith said. "When we fail to invest in infrastructure, we pay the price." On the campaign trail, President Biden talked about spending up to $2 trillion over 10 years to upgrade the nation's crumbling infrastructure. And there are signs that his administration could propose a comprehensive infrastructure plan as soon as this month. But both of his predecessors in the White House talked about grandiose infrastructure spending plans, too, but had little success.

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AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › US Infra Low

The United States isn’t working to solve infrastructure now- the profit motive proves

Carpenter and Hamilton 2020

Daniel and Darrick, professor of government and chair of FAS department and professor at the new school for social research, a federal job guarantee: anti-poverty and infrastructure policy for a better future, Scholars Strategy network, https://scholars.org/contribution/federal-job-guarantee

An Opportunity to Diversify and Rejuvenate the Government Workforce. There is nothing well-timed about any crisis, especially one that carries thousands to their graves and leaves others physically and emotionally scarred. Yet the imperative for direct government hiring comes at a time when government workforces nationwide are losing vast numbers of workers. As Baby Boomers retire, government is experiencing what is sometimes called a silver tsunami, with mass retirements from civil service at the local, state, and federal levels. These workers are on average older, and more likely to be both white and male than the workers who will replace them. A direct government employment program thus offers a unique opportunity to rejuvenate American government workforces and to diversify them at the same time. Why Not Contracting? Critics of the plan might argue that the government can hire by offering competitive contracts to private employers. This has been a growing mode of public spending in the last three decades in the United States, yet it comes with major drawbacks. First, there is no antipoverty guarantee in government contracting, as the distribution of income depends upon the structure of contracting firms. Government contractors emerge in those sectors where the profits are larger and, hence, the labor share of income is probably lower. This also explains why lobbying for government contracts comprises an industry in its own right, diverting energy and resources from more socially valuable uses. Nor is there consistent evidence that government contracting provides superior efficiency. Although comparisons between contractor and direct hiring are complicated by the kinds of work done by different kinds of agencies and firms, defense agencies have reported that civilian employment is cheaper than contractor provision for a wide range of services. And finally, the profit motive alone has not sparked adequate commercial activity to address our nation’s infrastructure needs.

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AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › US Infra Low

US Infrastructure is declining now because of a lack of investment

James McBride and Anshu Siripurapu, November 2021 (Anshu Siripurapu covers economics, energy and geopolitics and edits the Daily News Briefs. James McBride is the Depute Managing editor at CFR). “The State of U.S. Infrastructure” https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/state-us-infrastructure

The U.S. population has more than doubled since the 1960s, when most of the country’s major infrastructure systems were designed. Many are reaching the end of their lifespan, and are dangerously overstretched, experts say. The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) has compiled regular “report cards” on the state of U.S. infrastructure since the 1980s. In its 2021 report [PDF], the ASCE found that the nation’s infrastructure averaged a “C-,” up from a “D+” in 2017 and the highest grade in twenty years. Still, the group estimated that there is an “infrastructure investment gap” of nearly $2.6 trillion this decade that, if unaddressed, could cost the United States $10 trillion in lost GDP by 2039. Other analysts agree that the shortfall is large. McKinsey researchers say that $150 billion per year will be required between 2017 and 2030 to keep abreast of all the country’s infrastructure needs. Transportation will require the largest chunk of funding needs. The U.S. Government Accountability Office finds that nearly one in four bridges are deficient, with 10 percent categorized as structurally deficient and 14 percent categorized as functionally obsolete. While America’s airports carry the most passengers of any country in the world, its aviation infrastructure is also overburdened, with some 20 percent of all arrivals and departures delayed in 2019, according to the Department of Transportation’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics. The country’s rail systems are a mixed bag. U.S. commercial rail, a large portion of which is owned by the private freight industry, is among the most developed in the world, moving nearly 40 percent of the nation’s goods. At the same time, the focus on freight rail has relegated passenger rail to a lower priority. Amtrak, the United States’ main provider of intercity passenger rail, has more than $30 billion in backlog [PDF] of infrastructure investments. The country’s water and energy systems are under stress. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that drinking water, wastewater, and irrigation systems will require $632 billion in additional investment over the next decade. Ports and waterways, which handle over one-fourth of the country’s freight transport, face mounting delays. The operators of the U.S. electrical grid are struggling to make the necessary investments, and increasing power outages are costing the economy billions of dollars. Meanwhile, experts warn of the “broadband gap,” in which rural and low-income communities suffer from a lack of infrastructure to deliver reliable, fast internet, referred to as broadband. A 2020 Federal Communications Commission report [PDF] finds that some 18 million Americans, the majority of whom live in rural areas, lack access to any broadband network. Other estimates suggest that more than twice as many people lack access. Governors from both major parties identify internet access as a priority in their state, and propose plans costing tens of millions of dollars.

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1AC › Econ Inequality Advantage

FJG ensures a full employment economy and solves inequality

Paul et al. 18 Mark Paul is a Postdoctoral Associate at the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University. William Darity Jr. is the Samuel DuBois Cook Professor of Public Policy, African and African-American Studies and Economics and the Director of the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University. Darrick Hamilton is Professor of Economics and Urban Policy at the Milano School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy and Department of Economics at the New School for Social Research, and Director of the Doctoral Program in Public and Urban Policy at The New School.; MARCH 9, 2018; The Federal Job Guarantee - A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment; Isim

A job guarantee would fundamentally transform the current labor market in the United States. Our current conception of full employment is inadequate; we discuss a bold policy in this paper to bring the United States to a permanent, more accurate indicator of full employment­—by which we mean that everyone who seeks a job can find one at non-poverty wages. Beyond providing full employment, the job guarantee could be a turning point for American workers. Workers are faced with stagnating real wages and a continued erosion of labor’s share of income. The job guarantee could significantly alter the current power dynamics between labor and capital—particularly for low-wage workers and traditionally marginalized groups.

Benefits of the program reach beyond those directly employed under the NIEC. If a job guarantee were to be implemented, it also would function as a de facto employment floor in the labor market. Private employers would have to offer wages and benefits that are at least competitive with the NIEC in order to attract workers. The universal nature of the program would ensure jobs for all—including those with some forms of disability who may not be employed through the private sector. The universal design is critical to ending working poverty and involuntary unemployment; this is in contrast to other forms of intervention in the labor market, such as minimum wage laws, which do not ensure access to employment in the first place. Nevertheless, complementary changes to the existing social insurance system would be necessary to eliminate poverty entirely, as some individuals may be unable to work for various reasons.[54] Despite the discussion of full employment as a national priority for nearly a century now, policymakers have failed to deliver an economy that prioritized employment for all. Full employment is a goal that the private market is unable to achieve, therefore requiring government intervention in the labor market. Above, we discuss a transformative policy proposal—a federal job guarantee—whereby the government engages in the direct hiring of workers at non-poverty wages to achieve, and maintain, a full employment economy. Whether or not policymakers agree with the specifics we suggest in our proposal, we encourage them to think about bold solutions to achieve and maintain full employment. Restructuring our public policies to eradicate involuntary unemployment and poverty is within our reach.

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1AC › Econ Inequality Advantage

Jobs guarantee is key to making structural changes that solve inequality- addresses wages and labor power

Pavlina R. Tcherneva in 2023

Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Economics at Bard College, the Director of OSUN’s Economic Democracy Initiative, and a Research Scholar at the Levy Economics Institute, NY. She specializes in monetary and fiscal policy coordination and employment policy., The Job Guarantee: MMT's Proposal for Full Employment and Price Stability, Working Paper Series Open Society University Network Economic Democracy Initiative

To sum up, while the Federal Reserve has no reliable theory of inflation or the NAIRU, it nevertheless insists on forfeiting jobs for price stability. By contrast, MMT argues that public policy has both the responsibility and the ability to achieve and maintain both. Only the currency issuer can institute and implement automatic anticyclical economic stabilizers, including an employment stabilizer. This is the macroeconomic function of the Job Guarantee. It is worth pointing out that, while this specific Job Guarantee framework emerges from an understanding of the unique currency-issuing powers of the state, as a real-world policy solution, the Job Guarantee is also available to nations that do not issue or control their currencies. This is because they too will continue to face the outsized costs of unemployment. Whatever the monetary system, the public sector is responsible for the unemployed; it bears the unavoidable real and financial costs of unemployment and related social problems. In a certain sense, paying for poverty and unemployment is already baked into government budgets and the Job Guarantee, as will be discussed below, is a superior policy method for eliminating them compared to conventional methods. A non-sovereign monetary system, however, may face obstacles to achieving and maintaining tight long-run full employment, because the policy space available to do so is smaller than that of monetarily sovereign nations. The above discussion highlights a core MMT claim: unemployment is a public sector failure that only the state can remedy. While unemployment is reproduced in multiple ways, in all cases, it is a situation when someone is willing to work for currency, a demand that only the issuer can ultimately 6 choke off. From here, it follows that the private sector cannot provide employment to all, not only because it runs against the logic of the profit motive, but also because the private sector does not have (and is unwilling to part with) the very means to employ the unemployed (currency), precisely at a time when the problem of unemployed is most acute (in downturns). Furthermore, the logic of the private sector is to minimize its cost of production, including labor costs. Therefore, providing jobs for all who need them is inherently outside the purview of private sector activity. To put it directly, firms are not in the business of hiring every job seeker who comes a knocking. A STRUCTURAL POLICY, NOT JUST A JOBS PROGRAM The Job Guarantee is a structural macroeconomic policy that secures full employment and price stability, while addressing the inequities already embedded in the labor market, including the large social and economic costs of unemployment. It is important to make the case for the Job Guarantee, even if the NAIRU were abandoned as a policy guide, because the convention (even among laborfriendly economists) is to define ‘full employment’ as some positive level of involuntary unemployment. This is because conventional policy approaches simply cannot deliver jobs for all.6 And, even when they aim for low levels of unemployment, they continue to work through the highly-unequal existing labor market mechanisms. The Job Guarantee is a game-changer for the economy and the most vulnerable workers. It is well understood that official statistics do not capture the true levels of unemployment – especially those experienced by people of color, with disabilities, caregivers, veterans, or in regions of ongoing economic distress. Indeed, the labor market is not a fair game and structural inequities in hiring are exacerbated by the fact that there are not enough employment opportunities for all. As the COIVID experience showed (Cajner et al. 2020), job losses are not experienced equally either: the lower the wage – the higher the job losses and the slower the recovery in lost payrolls. This is true for garden-variety recessions too. Job losses among low wage workers, who have the least capacity (savings or other assets) to weather a recession, occur earlier, longer and are proportionately greater than those for people at the high end of the income distribution (Tcherneva 2012). The perennial threat of unemployment is a powerful force of reproducing inequities in the labor market, denying certain workers employment opportunities, eroding wages and benefits for those who work, and growing the precariat. The Job Guarantee helps secure decent employment for all, and especially for the most disenfranchised groups and people facing systemic barriers to employment.

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1AC › Econ Inequality Advantage

Growing economic inequality drives diversionary nationalism and makes war inevitable.

Frederick Solt 11. Ph.D. in Political Science from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, currently Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa, Assistant Professor, Departments of Political Science and Sociology, Southern Illinois at the time of publication. “Diversionary Nationalism: Economic Inequality and the Formation of National Pride.” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 73, No. 3, pgs. 821-830, July 2011.

One of the oldest theories of nationalism is that states instill the nationalist myth in their citizens to divert their attention from great economic inequality and so forestall pervasive unrest. Because the very concept of nationalism obscures the extent of inequality and is a potent tool for delegitimizing calls for redistribution, it is a perfect diversion, and states should be expected to engage in more nationalist mythmaking when inequality increases. The evidence presented by this study supports this theory: across the countries and over time, where economic inequality is greater, nationalist sentiments are substantially more widespread. This result adds considerably to our understanding of nationalism. To date, many scholars have focused on the international environment as the principal source of threats that prompt states to generate nationalism; the importance of the domestic threat posed by economic inequality has been largely overlooked. However, at least in recent years, domestic inequality is a far more important stimulus for the generation of nationalist sentiments than the international context. Given that nuclear weapons—either their own or their allies’—rather than the mass army now serve as the primary defense of many countries against being overrun by their enemies, perhaps this is not surprising: nationalism-inspired mass mobilization is simply no longer as necessary for protection as it once was (see Mearsheimer 1990, 21; Posen 1993, 122–24). Another important implication of the analyses presented above is that growing economic inequality may increase ethnic conflict. States may foment national pride to stem discontent with increasing inequality, but this pride can also lead to more hostility towards immigrants and minorities. Though pride in the nation is distinct from chauvinism and outgroup hostility, it is nevertheless closely related to these phenomena, and recent experimental research has shown that members of majority groups who express high levels of national pride can be nudged into intolerant and xenophobic responses quite easily (Li and Brewer 2004). This finding suggests that, by leading to the creation of more national pride, higher levels of inequality produce environments favorable to those who would inflame ethnic animosities. Another and perhaps even more worrisome implication regards the likelihood of war. Nationalism is frequently suggested as a cause of war, and more national pride has been found to result in a much greater demand for national security even at the expense of civil liberties (Davis and Silver 2004, 36–37) as well as preferences for “a more militaristic foreign affairs posture and a more interventionist role in world politics” (Conover and Feldman 1987, 3). To the extent that these preferences influence policymaking, the growth in economic inequality over the last quarter century should be expected to lead to more aggressive foreign policies and more international conflict. If economic inequality prompts states to generate diversionary nationalism as the results presented above suggest, then rising inequality could make for a more dangerous world. The results of this work also contribute to our still limited knowledge of the relationship between economic inequality and democratic politics. In particular, it helps explain the fact that, contrary to median-voter models of redistribution (e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981), democracies with higher levels of inequality do not consistently respond with more redistribution (e.g., Bénabou 1996). Rather than allowing redistribution to be decided through the democratic process suggested by such models, this work suggests that states often respond to higher levels of inequality with more nationalism. Nationalism then works to divert attention from inequality, so many citizens neither realize the extent of inequality nor demand redistributive policies. By prompting states to promote nationalism, greater economic inequality removes the issue of redistribution from debate and therefore narrows the scope of democratic politics.

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1AC › Econ Inequality Advantage

Slow growth goes nuclear – breaks down global cooperation

Landay 17 (Jonathan – Reuters National Security Correspondent, 1/9/17, “U.S. intelligence study warns of growing conflict risk”, )

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The risk of conflicts between and within nations will increase over the next five years to levels not seen since the Cold War as global growth slows, the post-World War Two order erodes and anti-globalization fuels nationalism, said a U.S. intelligence report released on Monday. “These trends will converge at an unprecedented pace to make governing and cooperation harder and to change the nature of power – fundamentally altering the global landscape,” said “Global Trends: Paradox of Progress,” the sixth in a series of quadrennial studies by the U.S. National Intelligence Council. The findings, published less than two weeks before U.S. President-elect Donald Trump takes office on Jan. 20, outlined factors shaping a “dark and difficult near future,” including a more assertive Russia and China, regional conflicts, terrorism, rising income inequality, climate change and sluggish economic growth. Global Trends reports deliberately avoid analyzing U.S. policies or choices, but the latest study underscored the complex difficulties Trump must address in order to fulfill his vows to improve relations with Russia, level the economic playing field with China, return jobs to the United States and defeat terrorism. The National Intelligence Council comprises the senior U.S. regional and subject-matter intelligence analysts. It oversees the drafting of National Intelligence Estimates, which often synthesize work by all 17 intelligence agencies and are the most comprehensive analytic products of U.S intelligence. The study, which included interviews with academic experts as well as financial and political leaders worldwide, examined political, social, economic and technological trends that the authors project will shape the world from the present to 2035, and their potential impact. ‘INWARD-LOOKING WEST’ It said the threat of terrorism would grow in coming decades as small groups and individuals harnessed “new technologies, ideas and relationships.” Uncertainty about the United States, coupled with an “inward-looking West” and the weakening of international human rights and conflict prevention standards, will encourage China and Russia to challenge American influence, the study added. Those challenges “will stay below the threshold of hot war but bring profound risks of miscalculation,” the study warned. “Overconfidence that material strength can manage escalation will increase the risks of interstate conflict to levels not seen since the Cold War.” While “hot war” may be avoided, differences in values and interests among states and drives for regional dominance “are leading to a spheres of influence world,” it said, The latest Global Trends, the subject of a Washington conference, added that the situation also offered opportunities to governments, societies, groups and individuals to make choices that could bring “more hopeful, secure futures.” “As the paradox of progress implies, the same trends generating near-term risks also can create opportunities for better outcomes over the long term,” the study said. THE HOME FRONT The report also said that while globalization and technological advances had “enriched the richest” and raised billions from poverty, they had also “hollowed out” Western middle classes and ignited backlashes against globalization. Those trends have been compounded by the largest migrant flows in seven decades, which are stoking “nativist, anti-elite impulses.” “Slow growth plus technology-induced disruptions in job markets will threaten poverty reduction and drive tensions within countries in the years to come, fueling the very nationalism that contributes to tension between counties,” it said. The trends shaping the future include contractions in the working-age populations of wealthy countries and expansions in the same group in poorer nations, especially in Africa and South Asia, increasing economic, employment, urbanization and welfare pressures, the study said. The world will also continue to experience weak near-term growth as governments, institutions and businesses struggle to overcome fallout from the Great Recession, the study said. “Major economies will confront shrinking workforces and diminishing productivity gains while recovering from the 2008-09 financial crisis with high debt, weak demand, and doubts about globalization,” said the study. “China will attempt to shift to a consumer-driven economy from its longstanding export and investment focus. Lower growth will threaten poverty reduction in developing counties.” Governance will become more difficult as issues, including global climate change, environmental degradation and health threats demand collective action, the study added, while such cooperation becomes harder.

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1AC › Econ Inequality Advantage

Inequality hollows out economics resilience and locks in slow growth---shocks are inevitable, only worker stability makes recovery possible.

Kate Bahn 21. Washington Center for Equitable Growth Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, "Kate Bahn testimony before the Joint Economic Committee on monopsony, workers, and corporate power". Equitable Growth. 7-14-2021. https://equitablegrowth.org/kate-bahn-testimony-before-the-joint-economic-committee-on-monopsony-workers-and-corporate-power/

Thank you Chair Beyer, Ranking Member Lee, and members of the Joint Economic Committee for inviting me to testify today. My name is Kate Bahn and I am the Director of Labor Market Policy and the interim Chief Economist at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth. We seek to advance evidence-backed ideas and policies that promote strong, stable and broad-based growth. Core to this mission is understanding the ways in which inequality has distorted, subverted and obstructed economic growth in recent decades. Mounting evidence, which I will review today, demonstrates how the rising concentration of corporate power has increased economic inequality and made the U.S. economy less efficient. Reversing the trends that have led to a “second gilded age” is critical to encouraging a resilient economic recovery following the pandemic-induced economic crisis of 2020 and encouraging a healthy, competitive economy for the future. Introduction The United States boasts one of the wealthiest economies in the world, but decades of increasing income inequality, job polarization, and stagnant wages for most Americans has plagued our labor market and demonstrated that a rising tide does not lift all boats. Furthermore, economic evidence demonstrates how inequality results in an inefficient allocation of talent and resources while increasing corporate concentration that enriches the few while holding back the entire economy from its potential. Understanding the causes and consequences of the concentration of corporate power will guide policymaking in order to ensure that the economic recovery in the next phase of the pandemic will be broadly shared and ensure a more resilient economy. “Monopsony” is a key economic concept to understand in this discussion. Monopsony is the labor market equivalent of the better-known phenomenon of “monopoly,” but instead of having only one producer of a good or service, there is effectively only one buyer of a good or service, such as only one employer hiring people’s labor in a company town. Like in monopoly, this phenomenon is not limited to when a firm is strictly the only buyer of labor. Today I will explain the circumstances and effects of employers having significant monopsony power over the market and over workers. When employers have outsized power in employment relationships, they are able to set wages for their workers, rather than wages being determined by competitive market forces. Given this monopsony power, employers undercut workers. This means paying them less than the value they contribute to production. One recent survey of all the economic research on monopsony finds that, on average across studies, employers have the power to keep wages over one-third less than they would be in a perfectly competitive market. Put another way, in a theoretical competitive market, if an employer cut wages then all workers would quit. But in reality, these estimates are the equivalent of a firm cutting wages by 5 percent yet only losing 10 percent to 20 percent of their workers, thus growing their profits without significantly impacting their business. It is not only important for workers to earn a fair share so they can support themselves and their families, but also critical to ensure that our economy rebuilds to be stronger and more resilient. Prior to the current public health crisis and resulting recession, earnings inequality had been growing since at least the 1980s while the labor share of national income has been declining in same period. This is cause for concern as recent evidence suggests that the labor share of income has a positive impact on GDP growth in the long-run. The unprecedented economic shock caused by the coronavirus pandemic revealed how economic inequality leads to a fragile economy, where those with the least are hit the hardest, amplifying recessions since lower-income workers typically spend more of their income in the economy. But the crisis also demonstrated how economic policy targeted toward workers and families can provide a foundation for growth. This is because workers are the economy, and pushing back against the concentration corporate power by providing resources to workers is the foundation for strong, stable and broadly shared growth. The Causes of Monopsony The concept of monopsony was initially developed by the early 20th century economist Joan Robinson, who examined how lack of competition led to unfair and inefficient economic outcomes. The prototypical example of monopsony is a company town, where there is one very dominant employer and workers have no choice but to accept low wages since they have no outside options. This is the most extreme case, but it is important to note that firms have monopsony power in any circumstance where workers aren’t moving between jobs seamlessly in search of the highest wages they can get. Firms can use monopsony power to lower workers’ wages any time workers: Have few potential employers Face job mobility constraints Can only gather imperfect information about employers and jobs Have divergent preferences for job attributes Lack the ability to bargain over those offers I will go through each of these factors in turn and demonstrate how labor markets are unique compared to other markets in dealing with competitive forces. While concentrated labor markets are not the norm, they are pervasive across the United States, especially within certain sectors or locations. When markets are very concentrated, employers can give workers smaller yearly raises or make working conditions worse, knowing that their workers have nowhere to go to find a better job with better pay. (See Figure 1.) A study published in the journal Labour Economics by economists Jose Azar, Ioana Marinescu, and Marshall Steinbaum finds that 60 percent of U.S. local labor markets are highly concentrated as defined by U.S. antitrust authorities’ 2010 horizontal merger guidelines. This accounts for 20 percent of employment in the United States. Research by economists Gregor Schubert, Anna Stansbury, and Bledi Tsaka goes further by estimating workers’ outside options, or the likelihood a worker is able to change into a different occupation or industry. This study finds that even with a more expansive definition of job opportunities more than 10 percent of the U.S. workforce is in local labor markets where pay is being suppressed by employer concentration by at least 2 percent, and a significant proportion of these workers facing few outside options are facing pay suppression of 5 percent or more. As study co-author Anna Stansbury noted, “for a typical full-time workers making $50,000 a year, a 2 percent pay reduction is equivalent to losing $1,000 per year and a 5 percent pay reduction is equivalent to losing $2,500 per year.” Certain sectors are now very concentrated, such as the healthcare industry. In a paper by the economists Elena Prager and Matt Schmitt, they find that hospital mergers led to negative wage growth among skilled workers such as nurses or pharmacy workers. Consolidation and outsized employer power, alongside other phenomenon such as the fissuring of the workplace, may have broader impacts on the structure of the U.S. labor market when it affects the overall structure of the labor market, including the hollowing out of middle class jobs that have historically been a pathway for upward mobility.

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1AC › Econ Inequality Advantage

And, massive Job losses are coming- artificial intelligence and tech innovation undermine employment and wages

Kelly 21

(Jack, senior contributor at Forbes, CEO of WeCruitr, Artificial Intelligence Has Caused A 50% To 70% Decrease In Wages—Creating Income Inequality And Threatening Millions Of Jobs, Forbes, )

The middle and working classes have seen a steady decline in their fortunes. Sending jobs to foreign countries, the hollowing out of the manufacturing sector, pivoting toward a service economy and the weakening of unions have been blamed for the challenges faced by a majority of Americans. There’s an interesting, compelling and alternative explanation. According to a new academic research study, automation technology has been the primary driver in U.S. income inequality over the past 40 years. The report, published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, claims that 50% to 70% of changes in U.S. wages, since 1980, can be attributed to wage declines among blue-collar workers who were replaced or degraded by automation. Artificial intelligence, robotics and new sophisticated technologies have caused a wide chasm in wealth and income inequality. It looks like this issue will accelerate. For now, college-educated, white-collar professionals have largely been spared the fate of degreeless workers. People with a postgraduate degree saw their salaries rise, while “low-education workers declined significantly.” According to the study, “The real earnings of men without a high-school degree are now 15% lower than they were in 1980.” Much of the changes in U.S. wage structure, according to the paper, were caused by companies automating tasks that used to be done by people. This includes “numerically-controlled machinery or industrial robots replacing blue-collar workers in manufacturing or specialized software replacing clerical workers.” Artificial intelligence systems are ubiquitous. AI-powered digital voice assistants share everything you want to know just by asking it a question. Instead of a live person addressing a problem, a corporate chatbot forces you to engage with it. The technology is remarkable. It helps diagnose cancer and health issues. Banks use sophisticated software to check for fraud and bad behaviors. Driverless automobiles, newsfeeds, social media and job applications are all controlled by AI. The World Economic Forum (WEF) concluded in a recent report, “A new generation of smart machines, fueled by rapid advances in AI and robotics, could potentially replace a large proportion of existing human jobs.” Robotics and AI will cause a serious “double-disruption,” as the pandemic pushed companies to fast-track the deployment of new technologies to slash costs, enhance productivity and be less reliant on real-life people. The WEF asserts automation will slash about 85 million jobs by 2025. In a dire prediction, WEF said, “While some new jobs would be created as in the past, the concern is there may not be enough of these to go round, particularly as the cost of smart machines falls over time and their capabilities increase.” Management consulting giant PriceWaterhouseCoopers reported, “AI, robotics and other forms of smart automation have the potential to bring great economic benefits, contributing up to $15 trillion to global GDP by 2030.” However, it will come with a high human cost. “This extra wealth will also generate the demand for many jobs, but there are also concerns that it could displace many existing jobs.”

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1AC › Econ Inequality Advantage

Inequality is increasing – reduced labor power and unemployment

Siripurapu 22 (Anshu Siripurapu – Georgetown Law Student and Journalist. “The U.S. Inequality Debate.” Council on Foreign Relations. 4/20/22. )

Income and wealth inequality in the United States is substantially higher than in almost any other developed nation, and it is on the rise, sparking an intensifying national debate. The 2008 global financial crisis, the slow and uneven recovery, and the economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have deepened these trends and challenged policymakers to respond. Economists say the causes of worsening inequality are complex and include a failure to adapt to globalization and technological change, shifting tax policy, reduced bargaining power among workers, and long-standing racial and gender discrimination. The effects of inequality are similarly varied, and they have exacerbated crises such as the pandemic and deepened societal divisions. Inequality can also weaken democracy and give rise to authoritarian movements. President Joe Biden has pledged to reduce economic inequality with new social spending financed by higher taxes on the wealthy and corporations, but he faces opposition from those who say his plans go too far. According to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office [PDF], income inequality in the United States has been rising for decades, with the incomes of the highest echelon of earners rapidly outpacing the rest of the population. Even among high earners, income gains have been heavily skewed toward the top of that bracket. The growth of CEO pay is illustrative of this trend. In 1965, a typical corporate CEO earned about twenty times that earned by a typical worker; by 2018, the ratio was 278:1, according to the Economic Policy Institute, a progressive think tank. Between 1978 and 2018, CEO compensation increased by more than 900 percent while worker compensation increased by just 11.9 percent. The picture is much the same when looking at wealth—that is, total net worth rather than yearly income. In 2021, the top 10 percent of Americans held nearly 70 percent of U.S. wealth, up from about 61 percent at the end of 1989. The share held by the next 40 percent fell correspondingly over that period. The bottom 50 percent (roughly sixty-three million families) owned about 2.5 percent of wealth in 2021. Moreover, inequality in the United States outpaces that of other rich nations. This is captured by the steady rise in the U.S. Gini coefficient, a measure of a country’s economic inequality that ranges from zero (completely equal) to one hundred (completely unequal). The United States’ Gini coefficient was forty in 2019—the same as Bulgaria’s and Turkey’s, and significantly higher than that of Canada, France, and Germany—according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a group of advanced economies. Recent economic shocks have deepened these trends. The so-called Great Recession from 2007 to 2009 caused incomes to fall, and even when they recovered to pre-recession levels in 2015, the median income was the same as it was in 2000: $70,200. The recovery was also unequal: by 2016, the top 10 percent had more wealth than they did in 2007 while the bottom 90 percent had less. Experts say the economic turmoil caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, including the largest spike in unemployment in modern history, will similarly exacerbate inequality. Low-wage workers were far more likely to be laid off and less likely to be rehired, though massive government stimulus helped blunt the impact. Meanwhile, a boom in stock and home prices primarily benefited wealthy Americans, who own more of these assets. Though wages rose at the fastest pace in decades, so did prices, and this inflation effectively canceled out wage gains.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
1AC › Competitiveness Advantage

Federal jobs guarantee solves – it invests the resources states can’t generate, and ensures flexibility in response to infrastructure needs

Carpenter and Hamilton 2020

Daniel and Darrick, professor of government and chair of FAS department and professor at the new school for social research, a federal job guarantee: anti-poverty and infrastructure policy for a better future, Scholars Strategy network, https://scholars.org/contribution/federal-job-guarantee

What would a federal job guarantee program look like? The program would be administered by the Department of Labor and overseen by the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary and Department of Labor will be charged with working in conjunction with other agencies, and states and localities to identify an inventory of public infrastructure tasks and associated jobs. 1. Jobs to support state and local governments. State and local governments account for most of the government employment in the United States, and they comprise an important part of our federalist system. In a range of policy domains – public health, education and job training, infrastructure, health provision and conservation – it is state and local governments that have the legal authorities and historical capacities to act. Yet state governments also have the weakest capacity to respond to an economic crisis. First, state governments have nothing like the Federal Reserve to back their debt (this is one among several reasons that the Federal Reserve has recently been looking into mass purchases of municipal bonds). They cannot print money. Second, state governments lack the expansive revenue-generating capacity of the federal government. Beyond this, state governments have in recent decades constrained their powers with balanced budget amendments, while a number of states (Illinois and Connecticut are two examples) have badly underfunded pension systems, and still others have tethered their income to commodity (especially petroleum) sales, which are at historically low prices and whose price declines have damaged state revenues. Workers and some capital costs for projects at the local, county, or state levels can be funded in a way to provide regional full employment and infrastructure needs. The projects and areas with the greatest needs could be cued to receive the federal intervention sooner. The Department of Labor would work closely with local governments. Local and state governments would, in conjunction with community organizations, develop project proposals to address local infrastructure needs, similar to the local, state, and federal collaborations in the design of direct government employment programs of the New Deal. Localities are likely most aware of the infrastructure needs to offer the greatest benefit to their communities. In order to minimize inequality across states and reduce the burden of discrimination, the workers under this program would be federally employed but would be tasked or apportioned (perhaps by formula, to reduce near-term political discretion) to states according to their economic, public health, and infrastructure needs. Even if the work occurs at the state and local level, the federal government needs to step in to provide the jobs, and there are a range of tools it has to do so. The traditional tool consists of program-specific block grants that have been an important feature of American government since the New Deal and especially the Nixon era. The problem with these grants is that they often permit state and local officials to withhold important resources from populations in need, as occurred with so many states’ refusal to take Medicaid expansions under the Affordable Care Act. Our proposal would build upon the strengths of grants by making the jobs available to states and local governments, but would address the inequality-related weakness of these programs by making the employees federal workers who, as such, are made available to state and local governments. In order to avoid potentially unconstitutional imposition of requirements upon state governments (which were declared unconstitutional in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012)), the federal government could offer these jobs as an option, as it did with Medicaid expansion in the Affordable Care Act. Another alternative is to allow state and localities to develop a bank of proposals for physical and human infrastructure from which a federal authority (operating under formulaic or discretionary procedures) can prioritize with regards to urgent and useful needs. The state and localities can even administer the program with federal oversight, however, the workers would be ultimately employed by the federal government, as opposed to state or local employees by way of a federal grant.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
1AC › Competitiveness Advantage

U.S.-China war goes nuclear.

Talmadge 18, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (Caitlin, 10/15/18, "Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control", Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option)

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese war is Taiwan. Beijing’s long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington’s longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Were Washington to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, the world’s sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities—whether doing so was Washington’s stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China’s conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China’s attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China’s ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China’s sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear-armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China’s growing land-based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China’s ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China’s coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country’s interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military’s failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, high-intensity conventional war. China’s vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China’s real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored U.S. strategy to ensure a conventional victory would likely endanger much of China’s nuclear arsenal in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China’s nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the “no first use” pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea-based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in wartime developments that could shift China’s assumptions about U.S. intentions. If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose—on an unpopulated area or at sea—as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline.

And hegemony is an impact filter for all great power wars- deterrence prevents conflict