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Topicality – CNDI 23 › Adopt › At: Enact
Antonin Scalia, 2 – Supreme Court Justice, writing for the majority; currently he is dead (Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 12/10/2, Nexis Uni //DH
[6A] Section 5 provides that HN4 "whenever a [covered jurisdiction] shall enact or seek to [**1437] administer" a voting change, such a change may be enforced if it is submitted to the [****21] Attorney General and there is no objection by the Attorney General within 60 days. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (emphasis added). Clearly the State Chancery Court's redistricting plan was not "enacted" by the State of Mississippi. An "enactment" is the product of legislation, not adjudication. See Webster's New International Dictionary 841 (2d ed. 1949) (defining "enact" as "to make into an act or law; esp., to perform the legislative act with reference to (a bill) which gives it the validity of law"); Black's Law Dictionary 910 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "legislate" as "to make or enact laws"). The web of state and federal litigation before us is the consequence of the Mississippi Legislature's failure to enact a plan. The Chancery Court's redistricting plan, then, could be eligible for preclearance only if the State was "seeking to administer" it.
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › Adopt › At: Enact
Paul McMurdie, 20 – Presiding Judge of the Arizona Appeals Court (The Neth. v. MD Helicopters Inc., 2020 Ariz. App. LEXIS 284, 3/19, Nexis Uni //DH
P19 MD Helicopters' argument regarding the meaning of the terms "enact" and "adopt" is similarly unpersuasive on the question of whether A.R.S. § 12-3252(B)(2) refers only to acts of a foreign country's legislative body, and not of its courts as well. The common usage of the term "enact" does not generally include the actions of a court. See, e.g., 2015 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 170, § 1 (1st Reg. Sess.) ("Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona . . . ." (emphasis added)); Cronin v. Sheldon, 195 Ariz. 531, 537, 991 P.2d 231 (1999) ("[T]he legislature has the authority to enact laws."). But the term "adopt" is not nearly so limited. Courts make law through the adoption of rules or common-law principles. See, e.g., Carrow Co. v. Lusby, 167 Ariz. 18, 24, 804 P.2d 747 (1990) ("We adopt the modern common law view that an owner of livestock owes a duty of ordinary care to motorists traveling on a public highway in open range." (emphasis added)); Judson C. Ball Revocable Tr. v. Phoenix Orchard Grp. I, L.P., 245 Ariz. 519, 523-24, ¶¶ 11, 16, 431 P.3d 589 (App. 2018) (Finding Delaware courts' decision to "adopt" rule of standing for shareholder suits "as a matter of common law" persuasive and deciding to "adopt" that rule as well). Executive agencies are also frequently empowered by the legislature to "adopt" rules and [*16] regulations. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 23-361 (Industrial Commission "may adopt such rules and regulations as necessary" to administer and enforce statutes governing the payment of wages (emphasis added)). And the use of both the terms "enact" and "adopt" must be read to contemplate different things, or one term will be rendered superfluous. See Cont'l Bank, 131 Ariz. at 8.
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › Adopt › Congress- Enact
Fay ’92 [Thomas F. Fay, Thomas f. Kelleher, Joseph R. Weisberger, Florence K. Murray, Donald F. Shea; June 10, 1992; Justices on the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, which declined to expand the opinion’s reach on different grounds than the definition of the word ‘adopt’; Westlaw, “In re Advisory Opinion to Governor (Ethics Comm'n),” 612 A.2d]
We are cognizant that definitionally “adopt” does not literally mean “enact,” “develop,” or “create.” However, we do not find the term to be the great source of ambiguity and confusion that the parties have envisioned. On the contrary, in adhering to the foregoing principles of constitutional construction, we are of the opinion that in applying a plain and ordinary meaning to the term, it is clear that “adopt” as it is used in article 3, section 8, was intended to bestow the power to enact substantive ethics laws upon the commission. In support we need only look to this state's historical treatment and understanding of the term. Most notably, the term “adopt” is included in the constitution itself. As previously indicated, article 15, section 4, directed that “on or before June 1, 1988, the general assembly shall adopt implementing legislation for Article III, Sections 7 and 8, and for Article IV, Section 10.” (Emphasis added.) The General Assembly, pursuant to this constitutional directive, terminated the pre-existing Conflicts of Interest Commission and established the Ethics Commission. Thereafter, the General Assembly enacted the code of ethics as contained in chapter 14 of title 36, which the commission subsequently adopted. Obviously, by taking the foregoing actions pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the General Assembly itself understood and construed the term “adopt” as requiring it to “develop,” “establish,” or “enact” legislation to create an ethics commission and, albeit erroneously, a code of ethics. Furthermore, this court has consistently understood “adopt” to mean “create,” “develop,” and “enact.” As previously noted in expounding on the methodology to be employed regarding constitutional construction, we have held that it is indeed proper to “consult what extrinsic sources are available: not only the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention itself but also legislation relating to the constitutional provision in question adopted at the same time as the constitutional amendment or subsequently.” (Emphasis added.) Cianci, 591 A.2d at 1201 (citing In re Opinion to the Governor, 35 R.I. 166, 85 A. 1056 (1913)); see also Gorham v. Robinson, *9 57 R.I. 1, 186 A. 832 (1936). Moreover, we have adhered to the Supreme Court rules governing constitutional construction, which themselves apply the term “adopted.” Specifically, in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 723, 9 L.Ed. 1233 (1838), the Court stated that “ ‘[i]n the construction of the constitution, we must look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when it was framed and adopted * * *.’ ” (Emphasis added.) In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d at 1320; Bailey, 120 R.I. at 391–92, 394 A.2d at 1339. See also Parcell v. State, 228 Kan. 794, 796, 620 P.2d 834, 836 (1980) (in upholding the validity of government ethics commission, the court noted that the commission is “empowered to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of the Campaign Finance Act”). (Emphasis added.) Last, the term “adopt” has been used extensively in this jurisdiction throughout the provisions of the General Laws and perhaps most frequently within the APA. In it the General Assembly provided specific procedures to which each “agency” must adhere in “adopting” rules and regulations.9 Specifically, § 42–35–2(a) provides in pertinent part that “each agency shall * * * (2) Adopt rules of practice * * * (3) Make available to public inspection all rules * * * adopted * * * by the agency.” (Emphasis added.) Section 42–35–3(c) states, “No rule hereafter adopted is valid unless adopted in substantial compliance with this section.” (Emphasis added.) Section 42–35–4(a) provides, “Upon adoption of a rule each agency shall file forthwith in the office of the secretary of state a certified copy of each such rule.” (Emphasis added.) In construing the foregoing provisions of the APA, this jurisdiction has consistently recognized that “adopt” is synonymous with “enact.”10 Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the General Assembly has frequently interchanged alternative terms for “adopt” in conferring legislative power upon administrative agencies.11
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › Adopt › Any of the 3 Branches
Paul McMurdie, 20 – Presiding Judge of the Arizona Appeals Court (The Neth. v. MD Helicopters Inc., 2020 Ariz. App. LEXIS 284, 3/19, Nexis Uni //DH
P19 MD Helicopters' argument regarding the meaning of the terms "enact" and "adopt" is similarly unpersuasive on the question of whether A.R.S. § 12-3252(B)(2) refers only to acts of a foreign country's legislative body, and not of its courts as well. The common usage of the term "enact" does not generally include the actions of a court. See, e.g., 2015 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 170, § 1 (1st Reg. Sess.) ("Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona . . . ." (emphasis added)); Cronin v. Sheldon, 195 Ariz. 531, 537, 991 P.2d 231 (1999) ("[T]he legislature has the authority to enact laws."). But the term "adopt" is not nearly so limited. Courts make law through the adoption of rules or common-law principles. See, e.g., Carrow Co. v. Lusby, 167 Ariz. 18, 24, 804 P.2d 747 (1990) ("We adopt the modern common law view that an owner of livestock owes a duty of ordinary care to motorists traveling on a public highway in open range." (emphasis added)); Judson C. Ball Revocable Tr. v. Phoenix Orchard Grp. I, L.P., 245 Ariz. 519, 523-24, ¶¶ 11, 16, 431 P.3d 589 (App. 2018) (Finding Delaware courts' decision to "adopt" rule of standing for shareholder suits "as a matter of common law" persuasive and deciding to "adopt" that rule as well). Executive agencies are also frequently empowered by the legislature to "adopt" rules and [*16] regulations. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 23-361 (Industrial Commission "may adopt such rules and regulations as necessary" to administer and enforce statutes governing the payment of wages (emphasis added)). And the use of both the terms "enact" and "adopt" must be read to contemplate different things, or one term will be rendered superfluous. See Cont'l Bank, 131 Ariz. at 8.
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › Adopt › Practice or use
Merriam-Webster, no date (“Adopt.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adopt.)
adopt verb ə-ˈdäpt adopted; adopting; adopts Synonyms of adopt transitive verb 1 : to take (someone or something) by choice into a relationship They adopted Canada as their home. : such as a : to take (a child born to other parents) voluntarily as one's own child especially in compliance with formal legal procedures Many young couples … are experiencing infertility problems, and as a result, some are looking to adopt a child.— Sonia Krohn b : to acquire (an animal) as a pet especially from an animal shelter The family adopted a dog. 2 : to begin to practice or use (something, such as an approach or manner) people who adopt a healthy lifestyle He adopted a moderate tone. Over the past year, I've adopted the habit of buying clothes and home goods only from ethical brands.— Sunny Montgomery Adopted from France, the widespread Victorian custom of leaving visiting cards led to the production of many types of card cases.— William C. Ketchum, Jr. The big three airlines have adopted different strategies in response to the pandemic.— Ted Reed Barnard explained that it was only in 1974 that the group adopted the name ABBA.— Faith Qinga
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › In The United States › SS- All States and Territories
Social Security Administration, No Date – ["Social Security Programs in the United States," Social Security Administration: Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, ] /jsam
Nearly all work performed by citizens and noncitizens is covered if it is performed within the United States (defined for Social Security purposes to include all 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the territories of Guam and American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands). In addition, the program covers work performed outside the United States by American citizens or resident aliens who are employed by an American employer, employed by a foreign affiliate of an American employer electing coverage for its employees, or (under certain circumstances) the self-employed.
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › In The United States › All States and Territories
H. R. 3907 in 2021
H.R.3907 - Facial Recognition and Biometric Technology Moratorium Act of 2021; https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3907/text
IN THE UNITED STATES.—The term “in the United States” means all areas within the external boundary of the United States, its territories and possessions, including airports, ports of entry, and border zones.
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › Fiscal Redistribution › Progressive Taxes Only
Andre Decoster & Guy Van Camp 98, Decoster is at KU Leuven; Van Camp is at FOD Sociale Zekerheid, “The unit of analysis in microsimulation models for personal income taxes: fiscal unit or household?,” Center for Economic Studies, Papre DPS 98.33
If the main objective of the evaluation of a tax reform is to give empirical content to the redistributive effects of different tax systems before and after the reforms, a formal expression of the concept of redistribution is required. Redistribution is defined here as the shift of income which occurs in the post-tax distribution from high to low incomes. Hence, it can be measured by comparing the pre-tax Lorenz curve with the post-tax concentration curve. Our measure of redistributive effect is therefore defined as: Π [ ] RS = − ∫ L p L p dp XT X − 2 0 1 () () (2) where the superscript of ΠRS refers to Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) who applied this measure to the US tax system, and L p xf x dx X y ( ) ( ) = ∫ µ 0 0 1 ≤≤ = p p Fy and ( ) (3) L p x t x f x dx t X T y − = − − ∫ ( ) ( ( )) ( ) µ( ) 1 0 0 1 ≤≤ = p p Fy and ( ) (4) are, respectively, the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income ( x ) and the concentration curve with respect to pre-tax income of after-tax income ( x tx − ( ) ), with: p : the population shares of the pre-tax distribution f x( ) : the density function of x F x( ) : the distribution function of x µ : mean income (pre tax) t x( ) : the tax liability corresponding with taxable income x t : the average tax rate.
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › Fiscal Redistribution › Progressive Taxes Only
Alexander Hicks 86, Northwestern University; 1986; “Class Influence on Redistributive Policy: The Case of U.S. State Governments, 1951-1961*”; Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 14; University of Kansas Libraries, JSTOR
The present redistributive policy focus is on a particular type of government redistribution that may be called direct fiscal redistribution to the poor (hereafter DFRP). Fiscal redistribution refers here to redistribution of money and in-kind income among strata of households by means of both government spending and taxing (i.e., fiscal) activities. For example, increased generosity in public assistance payment levels and reliance upon progressive income as opposed to regressive sales taxes can provide positive fiscal redistribution. Direct fiscal redistribution refers to that part of such redistribution that can be accounted for in terms of government's relatively direct and immediate give-and-take of expenditures and taxes to and from income strata of households. Current evidence suggests that such redistribution is considerable in advanced capitalist political democracies, especially vis-à-vis the poor (e.g., Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977; Hicks and Swank, 1984b). During the 1970s DFRP apparently augmented the "pre-fisc" income share of poor households in the U.S. by over 100 percent (see Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977: 74 on the U.S.; and Hicks and Swank, 1984b on advanced capitalism).
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › Fiscal Redistribution › Progressive Taxes Only
Lindert ’17 [Peter; July 1; Distinguished Professor Emiritus at UC Berkeley whose core focus is the study of the causes and effects of modern fiscal redistribution, Ph.D., Cornell University and research associate with the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); ECINEQ, “The Rise and Future of Progressive Redistribution,” http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Lindert2017.pdf]
(B.) Definitions This essay follows the difference between pre-fisc and post-fisc income inequality - that is, between original income (or market income or gross income) on the one hand and final income (or net income) on the other. While other studies have tried to give separate treatment to such intermediate inequalities as that of post-tax pre-transfer income, or a disposable income concept that ignores the distribution of aid in kind, this study sets those aside, and focuses on the full set of fiscal effects. The overall inequality measure that is used most here, as in most recent studies, is the gini coefficient, a putative measure of the share of national income that would have to be redistributed to achieve full income equality, in the absence of any behavior responses to such a massive transfer. Fiscal redistribution is simply the difference in the pre-fisc and post-fisc gini's, following a practice that has been handed down since that path-breaking study by Reynolds and Smolensky (1977). Progressivity obtains if the post-fisc inequality (gini) is less than the pre-fisc inequality, and regressivity obtains in the opposite case. Where possible, I shall take care to note cases involving very different effects on upper and middle groups' fortunes versus the effects on middle versus poor. Progressive or regressive relative to what? Let us define fiscal neutrality as the counterfactual policy setting both taxes and transfers at the same shares of income up and down the income spectrum. In such a case the gini coefficients of inequality would be the same both before and after individual incomes are affected by the government budget, and the net redistribution would be zero, neither progressive nor regressive. More specifically, let this counterfactual policy be one of the same aggregate budget size. Agreeing on these definitions will not dispel all the problems with the comparisons, and we must first review some obvious ways in which the measures fall short of capturing the overall impacts on the distribution of income. (C.) Caveats The limitations of conventional incidence calculations like those cited here are so strict that the fiscal incidence calculations are useful only as plausible suggestions about the direction of effect and the general orders of magnitude. As public finance textbooks warn their readers repeatedly, one should never imagine that all the possible effects of a particular set of budgetary flows have been worked out. Let us confront the traditionally cited dangers here – and then proceed with the traditional calculations anyway, while taking care to flag cases in which our knowledge of the underlying history warns that the measures mislead seriously. Time horizons: For one thing, the conventional annual measures of fiscal incidence are too short-run, failing to match either the duration of the effects of that year’s budgetary changes or the lifetimes of the affected individuals. The effects of this year’s budgetary policies can continue for generations – think of the enduring effects of this year’s wealth tax, or this year’s spending on public health or education, for example. We’ll return to this in Part III. Ultimately we care about the inequality of resources that people have over their entire lifetimes. This year’s fiscal effects may mislead, by missing effects on the length of life, or by missing correlations between effects on incomes in different years of the same lifetime.10 [Footnote 10]I re-emphasize that the “full set of fiscal effects” must include benefits in kind, and not just cash benefits. Studies have found that in-kind benefits such as health and education greatly reduce inequality even within the same year (see, for example, Paulus et al. (2010) and Aaberge et al. (2010)). Fortunately, some of our main sources have taken care to include the distributive effects of in-kind benefits. (1) The CEQ project (Lustig and Higgins 2016) has included in-kind benefits of health, education, and other public programs. (2) The DINA project’s paper on the United States (PSZ 2016) has included the in-kind benefits from two major health-care programs (Medicare and Medicaid). It covers public education by assuming that past, not current, public education spending accounts for a fixed share of current labor earnings. (3) The OECD’s calculations generally omit payments in kind from their estimates of how redistribution changes over time, though they have discussed the relevance of in-kind transfers for their most up-to-date estimates (OECD 2011, p. 39; OECD forthcoming). (4) The study of Sweden to which we turn shortly (Bengtssen, Holmlund, and Waldenström 2016) also omits transfers in kind.[End Footnote 10] Behavioral responses are assumed away by such measures. That is, they assume that the tax or benefit sticks, like flies to flypaper, exactly where it is imposed or paid out. People are supposedly taxed on their incomes without deciding to engage in less or more of the income-generating behavior. People in need are assumed to go on working or not working the same amount regardless of any social assistance they receive. Beyond peoples’ failures to change their income-generating behavior in the first round, the traditional calculations further assume no subsequent effects on prices and factor rewards, which fits uneasily with the calculations’ implying that spending is affected. As an extreme variant of this behavioral-response issue, other effects missed by the magnitudes of tax revenues and expenditures arise in the cases where a fiscal exaction is prohibitively expensive. If a tax makes people avoid an activity altogether, this can have great effects on the income distribution even though there are no tax collections to distribute between rich and middle and poor. In a later section, I’ll use the Corn Law example to underline the point that in some cases a strong impact is hidden in prices and quantities of overall behavior, with no visible reflection in taxes or expenditures. In addition, most of this paper sets aside the broader set of non-fiscal redistributive institutions, such as labor laws, human bondage, laws governing business competition, and policies favoring or harming certain output sectors.
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › Fiscal Redistribution › Taxes and Transfers
Bozio et al in 2020
Antoine Bozio, Bertrand Garbinti, Jonathan Goupille-Lebret, Malka Guillot, Thomas Piketty; Predistribution vs. Redistribution: Evidence from France and the U.S.; World Inequality Lab; https://wid.world/document/predistribution-vs-redistribution-evidence-from-france-and-the-u-s/
Public policies aiming to reduce inequalities can be classified into two categories. First, for a given level of pretax inequality, taxes, transfers and other public spending can reduce post-tax income inequality. This is what is usually called redistribution policies. The public economics literature has largely been influenced by an approach which treats pre-tax inequalities as given, and where the policy options for reducing inequalities largely rest on various combination of tax-and-transfers, with the constraints imposed by the behavioral responses to the tax and transfer system (e.g., this is the generic logic of optimal taxation literature).1 However, public policies can also affect the pretax distribution of income (what we will call “predistribution”). For instance, the legal and social system contributes to determine the bargaining power of workers vis-à-vis firm owners and managers, via wage-setting rules, corporate laws, trade regimes or labor market regulations. Similarly, educational and health care policies impact the access to skills and jobs, and therefore the overall inequality of labor earnings. Trade and technological changes can also influence the relative earnings of different skills or occupation, as well as a range of market regulations. Finally, taxation and transfers can also affect pre-tax income either via changes in bargaining incentives or through different dynamics of capital accumulation. Although these channels are known to impact inequalities, the lack of adequate data series with sufficient historical and comparative breadth has limited the ability to evaluate and compare the long-term impact of various public policy options on inequality.
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › Fiscal Redistribution › Taxes and Transfers
IMF in 2020
International Monetary Fund; IMF Working Paper Fiscal Affairs Department Designing Fiscal Redistribution: The Role of Universal and Targeted Transfers Prepared by David Coady and Nghia-Piotr Le; https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WP/2020/English/wpiea2020105-print-pdf
Although increasing income inequality has been observed in many countries, the varying experiences across countries, with inequality even decreasing in a sizeable share of countries, suggests that public policy and institutions play and important role in determining such outcomes.2 In this respect, fiscal redistribution (i.e., the transfer of income from higher to lower income households via tax and transfer schemes) has a key role to play in addressing income inequality. For instance, evidence from studies of fiscal redistribution shows that over threequarters of the difference in average disposable income inequality between advanced and Latin American countries (with the lowest and highest average disposable income inequality, respectively) is accounted for by differences in the extent of fiscal redistribution rather than by differences in market incomes (Bastagli, Coady and Gupta, 2015). This paper focuses on the design of fiscal redistribution through income taxes and transfers in advanced and developing countries.3 In particular, it focuses on the growing debate on the relative merits of universal and targeted social assistance transfers in achieving income redistribution objectives (Atkinson, 2015; Brown, Ravallion, and van de Walle, 2017; Gentilini et al., 2020). It argues that the fixation of the policy debate on the narrow targeting of transfers to lower-income groups (i.e., avoiding leakage of transfers to higher-income groups) in large part reflects an unbalanced framing of the issue with an undesirably narrow focus on the transfer side of fiscal redistribution neglecting the potential redistributive role of taxes. It also reflects an overly narrow focus on incentive (or efficiency) costs with insufficient attention to the administrative, social and political costs of targeting that in practice affect the feasible set of redistributive taxes and transfers available to governments and which need to be balanced against efficiency costs.
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › Fiscal Redistribution › 1NC – Taxes and Transfers
Malte Luebker, 2015, (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI) Dr. rer. Pol, January 2015, Redistribution policies, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/298075483_Redistribution_policies)
In dictionaries, redistribution is defined as “to alter the distribution of” something. This is a useful starting point: what follows is that income redistribution policies encompass all government interventions that alter the distribution of incomes, including those that affect the primary distribution of incomes. As argued in Part II of this volume, granting collective bargaining rights (or denying them) has consequences for the functional distribution of incomes and for wage inequality, as do minimum wages. However, governments alter the primary distribution of incomes in other, often even less visible ways. For instance, the liberalization of financial markets since the 1980s is widely believed to have contributed to a concentration of incomes at the top, and to a shift away from wages and towards profits (see Stiglitz, 2012; ILO, 2012). Likewise, trade liberalization has differential impacts on the incomes of various groups in society (see Jansen and Lee, 2007). Such a broad definition of redistribution underlines the fact that most government action has redistributive consequences. To gain support for unpopular decisions such as the opening of trade, governments sometimes try to compensate the losers and impose a corresponding tax on the winners (ibid.). At this stage, redistribution becomes more apparent since it directly alters the primary distribution of incomes. This direct intervention in the form of taxes and transfers is commonly at the heart of public debates over redistribution, simply because it is more visible, even though the impact can be minuscule when compared the original policy decision. For example, trade compensation schemes are commonly thought to redistribute less than 5 per cent of the gains from trade (ibid.: 75). The concept of fiscal redistribution captures these direct interventions that governments make through taxes and transfers. A key policy concern is often their net effect on income inequality, usually expressed as the change in a summary measure such as the Gini coefficient between the primary and secondary distribution. The impact can be further disaggregated into the direct effect of taxes and mandatory social contributions and the contribution of transfers (see section 6). Tax policies play a crucial role for both aspects: They determine how much resources are at the disposal of governments for social policies, but the structure of the tax code by itself has an impact on inequality. At one extreme, income taxes can be regressive, i.e. the tax rates are lower for those with higher incomes. An example for a tax that widens inequality is the ‘poll tax’, an equal lump sum paid by every resident. However, although the top marginal tax rates have fallen substantially across the industrialized world since the 1970s, modern tax systems are still typically progressive and tax rates increase with incomes. The result is that the rich pay (or are expected to pay) a greater share of their income as taxes, and that inequality after taxes is lower than before taxes. Between these two models lie distribution-neutral regimes with flat tax rates, where everybody pays the same proportion of her or his income in tax. However, the structure of tax rates often given an incomplete picture of their redistributive impact since the rich, in particular, often take advantage of tax exemptions or find other ways to avoid paying taxes in full. This practice, euphemistically known as ‘tax optimization’ or ‘aggressive tax planning’, can undermine the intended redistributive effects of the tax code – and has re-ignited the public debate about the fairness of tax systems in many countries. Another facet of tax codes is that income from capital (be it in the form of interest, dividends or realized capital gains) is often taxed at a different, generally lower rate than income from labour (or is exempt from taxation altogether).5 To the extent that the capital incomes accrue to those at the top of the income pyramid, this further undermines the progressiveness of taxation (see also Atkinson et al., 2011). On the whole, the redistributive impact of direct taxes on income and wealth is relatively well understood, based on the analysis of household survey datasets or national accounts (see section 4 below). 6 However, countries have increasingly shifted towards indirect taxes such as a general sales tax (GST) or a value added tax (VAT).7 By taxing general consumption, these taxes have a bigger relative impact on those who consume a larger part of their incomes – generally the poor – and are hence often regressive (see Emran and Stiglitz, 2007). However, while households effectively pay these taxes, they affect prices (and not income) and their impact on income inequality is more difficult to assess than in the case of direct taxes. While the conventional analysis of fiscal redistribution has important insights to offer, it has some conceptual shortcomings. One important concern is that a snapshot taken at a single point in time (usually for a given year) focuses only on inter-personal redistribution, ignoring life-cycle redistribution. For instance, old-age pensions appear as if they were a transfer from the young (who pay contributions and/or taxes to fund them) to the old (who receive pensions). In reality, the young and the old are not two distinct groups, but young workers will grow old over time so that today’s contributors are tomorrow’s beneficiaries. There is of course no guarantee that an individual’s benefits will be equal to her or his contributions (those who die young will not receive anything in return, and those who are blessed with longevity will generally gain more). Pension systems therefore remain redistributive – albeit to different degrees, depending on their design (see Chapter 9 by C. Behrendt and J. Woodall).
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › Increase › Make Greater
Merriam-Webster, no date (“Increase.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/increase.)
increase 1 of 2 verb in·crease in-ˈkrēs ˈin-ˌkrēs increased; increasing Synonyms of increase intransitive verb 1 : to become progressively greater (as in size, amount, number, or intensity)
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › Should › Expresses Obligation
Merriam-Webster, no date (“Should.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/should.)
used in auxiliary function to express obligation, propriety, or expediency. 'tis commanded I should do so— William Shakespearethis is as it should be— H. L. Savageyou should brush your teeth after each meal
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › Federal Government › 3 Branches
White House, No Date, (“Our Government: The U.S. Federal Government is composed of three distinct branches”, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/our-government/)
The Federal Government is composed of three distinct branches: legislative, executive, and judicial, whose powers are vested by the U.S. Constitution in the Congress, the President, and the Federal courts, respectively. There are hundreds of Federal agencies and commissions charged with handling responsibilities as varied as managing America’s space program, protecting its forests, gathering intelligence, and advancing the general welfare of the American people. For a full listing of Federal Agencies, Departments, and Commissions, visit USA.gov.
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Topicality – CNDI 23 › United States › States and Territories
Dictionary.com, No Date (“United States”, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/united-states)
United States [ yoo-nahy-tid steyts ] noun(used with a singular verb) Official name United States of America . a federal republic in the northern Western Hemisphere comprising 48 contiguous states, the District of Columbia, Alaska in North America, and Hawaii in the North Pacific, and in some contexts considered along with its five inhabited island territories (Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, North Mariana Islands, American Samoa). Conterminous United States, 3,119,885 square miles (8,080,465 square kilometers); with Alaska and Hawaii, 3,796,742 square miles (9,833,517 square kilometers); all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the island territories, 3,805,927 square miles (9,857,306 square kilometers) Capital: Washington, D.C. Abbreviations: U.S., US
2023
CNDI
Negative
Off-Case › Politics DA › Link – Divisive
McIntire 19 (Marry Ellen McIntire, Reporter, “Senate Democrats skeptical of Warren’s ‘Medicare for All’ push,” Roll Call, November 7, 2019, https://rollcall.com/2019/11/07/senate-democrats-skeptical-of-warrens-medicare-for-all-push/) VQ
Sen. Elizabeth Warren’s colleagues aren’t exactly jumping to voice support for her plan to finance “Medicare for All.” The hesitation from rank-and-file Democrats across the political spectrum on backing the Massachusetts Democrat’s plan shows how fraught the issue is within the party – and how challenging it would be for a Democratic White House to shepherd a plan through Congress. Just 14 senators, including Warren, have co-sponsored Medicare for All legislation from Sen. Bernie Sanders, I-Vermont, another White House hopeful, while half of House Democrats back a similar measure. The bills do not include provisions to finance the system, but Warren’s proposal, which she spelled out under pressure from more moderate presidential candidates, did not appear to win over additional senators. “Assuming Democrats control the Senate, I think that we would look to build on the Affordable Care Act so you would not have to deal with the financing that Sen. Warren’s proposed,” said Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin, D-Maryland, referring to the 2010 health care law. Cardin has not signed on to the Sanders legislation. “There are different ways to get at this issue,” said Sen. Mark Warner, D-Virginia, adding that he did not think eliminating private insurance under a single-payer plan would be the right approach. Speaking to reporters in Iowa on Friday, Warren said she was confident Medicare for All could earn support in Congress. “Yes, I believe in democracy. I believe that when we dream big and fight hard, we win,” she said. History shows that Warren or Sanders would likely need new members of Congress who campaigned on Medicare for All to be elected alongside them for the best shot of getting a single-payer policy through Congress, said Robert Blendon, a Harvard University professor of public health and health politics. “If a House member didn’t run on it and they’re in some sort of mixed district, they’re not going to be convinced by a president saying, ‘I won, so therefore you have to do it,’” Blendon said. Medicare for All has been a controversial topic within the party since after the 2016 election, when it became somewhat of a litmus test among progressives. Many Democratic lawmakers say they would prefer to build on the 2010 law, President Barack Obama’s signature domestic policy.
2023
CNDI
Negative
Off-Case › Politics DA › Link – Divisive
Brenan 23 (Megan Brenan, Research Consultant at Gallup, “Majority in U.S. Still Say Gov't Should Ensure Healthcare” Gallup, January 23, 2023, https://news.gallup.com/poll/468401/majority-say-gov-ensure-healthcare.aspx) VQ
At the same time that Americans see a government role in ensuring universal U.S. healthcare coverage, they prefer that the nation’s healthcare system be based on private insurance rather than run by the government. Currently, 53% of U.S. adults prefer a private system, while 43% support a government-run system. Since 2010, when the measure was first tracked, the public has consistently favored private insurance, with just one exception: In 2017, U.S. adults were evenly divided in their preferences. Partisans’ preferences for the U.S. healthcare system differ sharply, with 72% of Democrats in favor of a government-run system and 83% of Republicans a private system. Independents tilt slightly toward a private (50%) rather than a government-run (46%) system. Over the past 13 years, the percentage of Republicans preferring private insurance has not fallen below 79%; it peaked at 91% in 2010, the year the ACA became law. At the same time, between 52% (in 2013) and 77% (in 2021) of Democrats have favored a government-run system. Majorities of independents backed a private system from 2010 through 2015, but they have been more divided since then, reaching a consensus only once -- in 2021, when 55% favored private insurance.
2023
CNDI
Negative
Off-Case › Politics DA › Link – Divisive
Korte et al. 23 (Lara Korte, reporter on state politic and co-author of POLITICO California Playbook, Jeremy B White, Matthew Brown, Ramon Castanos, “Single-payer and the long game,” POLITICO, February 16, 2023, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/california-playbook/2023/02/16/single-payer-and-the-long-game-00083179) VQ
Single payer health-care in California historically has been a hard sell. In the past, lawmakers have balked at the price tag and raised concerns about funding mechanisms. A report from the Legislative Analyst’s Office last year estimated the cost of such a system would be somewhere between $494 billion and $552 billion, and now California is facing the possibility of several years of dour revenue projections. Organizers say by spreading the efforts over two years, it’ll give supporters more time to talk with lawmakers and assuage concerns, but the opposition is likely to be fierce. California’s past single-payer health care efforts have faced heavy-hitting opponents, including the California Medical Association and California Chamber of Commerce, but they also have a tendency to pit moderate and progressive Democrats against one another. Left-wing members of the state party last year threatened to pull endorsements for lawmakers who voted against AB 1400. We can expect those same kinds of factions to emerge as pressure builds ahead of 2024. “That may seem far away,” Maharaj said. “But that’s going to go by faster than we think.“