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2023 CNDI Negative
Single Payer Neg › AT: Health Care Adv › Turn – Private Equity – Tradeoff

Medicare for All threatens the private health care industry

Ohanian 19 (Lee Ohanian, Lee E. Ohanian is a senior fellow (adjunct) at the Hoover Institution and a professor of economics and director of the Ettinger Family Program in Macroeconomic Research at UCLA, “The Extremely Bad Economics Of Single-Payer Healthcare For California”, Hoover Institution, April 16, 2019, https://www.hoover.org/research/extremely-bad-economics-single-payer-healthcare-california)

These are some of the slogans that you will hear from politicians, including all current Democratic presidential candidates. In the most extreme versions of “Medicare for All” plans, such as that advocated by Bernie Sanders, private health insurance would be eliminated in favor of a government-run, single-payer plan. All of these presidential candidates are looking to California to see if the state implements a single-payer system. Governor Gavin Newsom, as well as many California Democratic lawmakers, support a single-payer plan as presented in 2017’s SB-562. This proposal would have eliminated private insurance and consolidated all existing health plans, including the state’s Medi-Cal plan, into a new state-run network. Under this plan, there would be no medical co-pays and no deductibles. Californians would then either be in the state-run program or need to pay purely out of pocket for medical care. Private insurance would be illegal. With the current Democratic supermajority, there are in principle more than enough votes to pass such a plan. And if a plan similar to SB-562 was implemented, it would lead to extremely costly healthcare and extremely low consumer satisfaction. High costs and low satisfaction are the entirely predictable outcomes of eliminating competition, eliminating consumer choice, and in particular, of doubling down on perhaps the biggest problem in US healthcare: that consumers have very little incentive to economize on medical spending. Analysts estimate that a single-payer plan would cost California between $330 and $400 billion per year. If this sounds like a lot, it is. In covering a population of roughly 40 million, this would amount to about $10,000 per person per year. To give you a relative idea of the cost, this would approximately double the entire state budget. The cost estimate is also understated, because such a plan would draw in new residents from other countries and other states who may have very expensive conditions. This could easily increase costs by 5 percent or more, for an additional $20 billion. Any sensible reform of US healthcare must confront the problem that the consumers of healthcare do not have sufficient incentives to control costs. A California single-payer plan doubles down on this issue because it would eliminate virtually all incentives for consumers to control costs. No co-pays and no deductibles mean increased demand for virtually all healthcare, and extraordinary rationing of healthcare. Ironically, one of the main sales pitches for single-payer healthcare—“You can’t be denied”—is false. Current and future procedures that are deemed by those running the state’s health board to be “too expensive” will indeed be denied or severely rationed. And you may need to wait in line a long time before receiving healthcare. The healthcare market does not magically avoid the economic realities of all other markets. If society provides a good at zero cost to the consumer, then the good will be allocated by rationing rather than price. No ifs, ands, or buts. If you think that the only restricted procedures will be extremely expensive, experimental procedures, then you need to think again. Britain has one of the oldest continuously operating nationalized healthcare systems, the National Health Service (NHS), and is now restricting one of the most common eye surgeries, cataract operations, because the NHS believes them to be of “limited clinical value.” Really? More broadly, recent statistics from Britain showcase just how significant these problems are in practice, and just how poorly the UK healthcare system functions. Data from the NHS shows that nearly a quarter of a million British patients have been waiting more than six months to receive medical treatment. And don’t think that grossly unreasonable waits only affect elective procedures. Only 84 percent of patients in British hospital emergency rooms are seen within four hours following admission. The country’s goal is to see 95 percent of patients within four hours, which is a goal that has not been achieved since 2015. It is now so obvious that the goal cannot be realistically met that the United Kingdom is considering to eliminate the goal. Young doctors in Britain, who make up nearly half of British physicians, are so fed up with working conditions that they are threatening to go on strike. Physicians in the United Kingdom complain that patient overcrowding within the system is tantamount to “third-world medical conditions” and remark that it is similar to “battlefield medicine.” Not surprisingly, some doctors who are being trained in England are choosing to practice medicine in other countries rather than facing the alternative of dealing with the remarkably deficient National Health Service. UK physician brain drain has been going on as long as the existence of their national healthcare system. This has now become so extreme that 35 percent of existing British doctors are imported from other countries, most from very poor countries. Staffing problems, which are obviously critical now, will become extreme in another decade. A recent report forecasts a shortfall of 250,000 medical staff by 2030. And keep in mind that predictions such as these are almost always too optimistic. This means that the current completely unacceptable waiting times for treatment will increase, and increase considerably. According to January NHS England data, almost 25% of cancer patients didn't start treatment on time despite an urgent referral by their primary-care doctor. If you are wondering what “on time” means, then think of how airlines pad travel times. For the NHS, “on time” already means 62 days after referral. Sadly, waiting times do matter. Only 81% of UK breast cancer patients survive at least five years after diagnosis, compared to 89% in the United States, and just 83% of patients in the United Kingdom live five years after a prostate cancer diagnosis, compared to 97% in the United States. For anyone thinking about how to reform health care—irrespective of your politics—think of all of the thousands of commodities and services that you and your family privately purchase within the marketplace. In how many of those markets are you restricted or denied the opportunity to make these purchases? How often do you need to wait six months to obtain the good or service that you would like to purchase? How often do you see the suppliers of the goods and services that you buy bailing en masse on the United States, moving to another country to set out their shingle and start over? Roughly never. Ever. Why never? Because markets work. It is that simple. The statistics summarized here from the United Kingdom are chilling. They should not be repeated in California or anywhere else. There are infinitely better ways to reform US healthcare. I’ll discuss those in a forthcoming COYM column.

2023 CNDI Negative
Single Payer Neg › AT: Health Care Adv › Turn - Private Equity - Uq

Private equity in medical treatment now

Abelson and Sanger-Katz 7-10 [Reed Abelson and Margot Sanger-Katz, Reed Abelson and Margot Sanger-Katz have both reported on the changing economics of medicine for more than a decade, “Who Employs Your Doctor? Increasingly, a Private Equity Firm,” The New York Times, 7-10-23, ] [ST]

In recent years, private equity firms have been gobbling up physician practices to form powerful medical groups across the country, according to a new report released Monday. In more than a quarter of local markets — in places like Tucson, Ariz.; Columbus, Ohio; and Providence, R.I. — a single private equity firm owned more than 30 percent of practices in a given specialty in 2021. In 13 percent of the markets, the firms owned groups employing more than half the local specialists. The medical groups were associated with higher prices in their respective markets, particularly when they controlled a dominant share, according to a paper by researchers at the Petris Center at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, a progressive think tank in Washington, D.C. When a firm controlled more than 30 percent of the market, the cost of care in three specialties — gastroenterology, dermatology, and obstetrics and gynecology — increased by double digits. The paper, published by the American Antitrust Institute, documented substantial private equity purchases across multiple medical specialties over the last decade. Urology, ophthalmology, cardiology, oncology, radiology and orthopedics have also been major targets for such deals. “It’s shocking when you look at it,” said Laura Alexander, director of markets and competition policy for the Washington Center, who said private equity firms dominated only a handful of markets a decade ago. By looking at individual markets, the researchers were able to document the local impact. “National rates mask this much more acute problem in local markets,” she said. The higher prices paid by private insurers contribute to high insurance premiums, and may increase out-of-pocket costs for patients. Private equity firms, which pool funds from institutional investors and individuals to form investment funds, tend to purchase companies using debt, with an eye to reselling them in a few years. The industry has turned to health care fairly recently, but it has begun purchasing doctors’ practices at a steady clip, combining smaller practices to form larger companies. When a private equity arm of a Canadian pension fund, OMERS Private Equity, bought Gastro Health, a large gastroenterology medical group, in 2021, it proceeded to acquire nearly a dozen smaller practices, according to the researchers, who say the group is now dominant in markets including the Miami area. The company now operates in seven states, employing over 390 doctors. The researchers saw similar patterns in other markets, where a firm would buy one large practice, then increase its market share by adding nearby smaller practices in the same medical specialty. Historically, doctors’ practices have been relatively small, and owned by doctors themselves. But that model has been rapidly declining as the business of medicine has become more complex and the insurance companies that negotiate with doctors over prices have become bigger. Nearly 70 percent of all doctors were employed by either a hospital or a corporation in 2021, according to a recent analysis from the Physicians Advocacy Institute. “We’re seeing a fundamental change in how medicine is being practiced in the U.S.,” said Richard Scheffler, a professor of health economics and public policy at Berkeley and director of the Petris Center. Hospitals and insurance companies have also bought out many independent physicians’ practices. Optum, an arm of the publicly traded UnitedHealth Group, which also owns one of the nation’s largest insurers, employs roughly 70,000 physicians. Studies have shown that these types of concentrated ownership of doctors in a given market are also associated with higher prices. Private equity is often viewed by physicians as an attractive alternative to having their practice bought by a hospital. In part, the doctors are “getting more scale and gaining efficiencies,” including help with office administration and technology, said Lisa Walkush, a national managing principal for the professional services firm Grant Thornton. “It can be a really good thing, but the private equity firms have to keep their promises and be held accountable,” she said. Michael Kroin, the founder and chief executive of Physician Growth Partners, a Chicago firm that advises independent practices, said the private equity firms “provide scale to allow independent practice groups to survive and maintain their autonomy.” If they could, given their rising costs and how squeezed they feel by insurers, “every independent group would want to increase its fees,” he said. The private equity industry has begun to attract particular scrutiny from researchers and policymakers. Lawmakers in the House are considering legislation to require more reporting when the firms buy health care companies. Currently, the acquisitions can be difficult to track. The authors of the new paper relied on data on deals from a company called PitchBook, which they then matched with doctors in a health care claims database to measure payments from private health insurers. The researchers couldn’t be sure whether the payment increases they measured happened because doctors were performing more complex procedures or just negotiating higher prices, but they suspected the prices explained most of the effect. Previous studies of private equity-acquired hospitals and physician practices from Zirui Song, an associate professor of health policy and medicine at Harvard Medical School, have also documented increasing revenue associated with the purchases. In an interview, Dr. Song said he expected the industry would continue to buy doctors’ practices in the coming years. “We still have a lot of small physician-owned specialty practices,” he said. “That’s an opportunity for consolidation. It’s an easy opportunity.” Critics of the industry, including Professor Scheffler, have also raised concerns about the medical care delivered by private equity-owned health care companies, arguing that the industry’s emphasis on profits could cause patient harm. Research on private equity ownership of nursing homes has shown evidence of lower staffing levels and higher rates of prescriptions for antipsychotic medicines. But little rigorous research has been published on patient care in the office-based medical specialties that the new paper focuses on. How the change in ownership and independence affects doctors and how they treat patients “has been very severely understudied,” said Barak Richman, a professor of law and business administration at Duke University, who reviewed the paper. But he said there is evidence that these firms are skilled at exploiting loopholes in existing regulations to maximize their profits. “Private equity is like the system on steroids,” said Sherry Glied, the dean of the Wagner School of Public Service at New York University. “Every time there’s an opportunity for making money, P.E. is going to move faster than everyone else. And consolidation is the way to do that.” While federal regulators are contemplating changes to how they oversee these deals, researchers say the report underscores the need to pay attention to what happens when a company makes a series of seemingly modest acquisitions. “This builds the case for strong antitrust tools for these incrementally small but collectively larger consolidation trends,” said Erin Fuse Brown, the director of the Center for Law, Health and Society at Georgia State University.

2023 CNDI Negative
Single Payer Neg › AT: Health Care Adv › Turn - Private Equity - Uq

Private Equity investment is increasing, and it helps create more effective healthcare

Whoriskey 7-10 (Peter Whoriskey has been a staff writer for The Washington Post since 2001, covering an array of subjects, including financial inequality, the pharmaceutical industry, hospice care, organic food fraud and private equity, “Private equity investors raising U.S. medical prices, study says,” The Washington Post, July 10, 2023, )

Private equity firms are rapidly acquiring physician practices, gaining significant market share in many cities and boosting medical prices in an array of specialties, according to an academic study released Monday. The study focused on private equity “roll ups” of physician practices, in which investors buy up several doctor groups in a city, consolidating a significant share of the market which they can use to raise prices. The report found that “PE acquisitions are associated with price increases in 8 of 10 specialties, and that these price increases are particularly high in [metropolitan areas] where a single PE firm controls more than 30% of the market.” For example, prices for gastroenterologists jumped 14 percent, for oncologists they rose 16 percent and for ophthalmologists it was 9 percent, according to the research, a project from the University of California at Berkeley, the Washington Center for Equitable Growth and the American Antitrust Institute. Price hikes were higher when a private equity-owned practice controlled a large share of the market. The study found that the number of metropolitan areas in which a private equity firm served half or more of a market rose from a handful in 2012 to 50 in 2021. A recent Washington Post story chronicled the price hikes that followed a private equity venture into anesthesia. The study authors urged federal regulators to more closely examine the effects of private equity investments in medical groups. “The vast majority of [private equity] acquisitions in this report took place without federal antitrust scrutiny and with limited state antitrust scrutiny,” the authors wrote. In recent months, antitrust enforcers at the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have talked of applying more scrutiny to private equity acquisitions of physician practices. “To the extent that private equity transactions and conduct are focused on short-term gains and aggressive cost-cutting in the health care space, they can lead to disastrous patient outcomes,” Deputy Assistant Attorney General Andrew Forman, said in a speech last year. Private equity firms say that their investments in physician practices have created more efficient systems of billing and medical records, enabling doctors to focus on patients. “Private equity investment is helping improve patient care and ensuring that residents have high quality facilities in their local communities,” Drew Maloney, president of the American Investment Council, a private equity industry group, said in a statement for this story. “By partnering with private equity firms, physicians have more time to focus on caring for patients and benefit from experienced management teams, better technology, and stronger networks.” The economics of practicing medicine have undergone a profound change in recent decades, with many doctors shifting from small practices that they owned to working for larger practices that are owned by corporations, hospitals, insurers and, more recently, private equity firms. The study reported that private equity firms have shown increasing interest in acquiring physician practices, with the number of deals studied rising from 75 in 2012 to 484 in 2021. The largest number of deals occurred in dermatology, ophthalmology, gastroenterology and primary care. The other specialties considered in the study were cardiology, oncology, obstetrics and gynecology, orthopedics, urology, and radiology.

2023 CNDI Negative
Single Payer Neg › AT: Health Care Adv › AT: US Unprepared

The US is already responding to the risk of bioterrorism – smallpox vaccines prove

Keown 18 [Alex Keown, Chicago-based professional reporter and editor, “With Looming Bioterrorism Threats, FDA Approves First Smallpox Therapeutic,” BioSpace, 7-16-18, ]

Shares of SIGA Technologies soared more than 11 percent late Friday after the company announced that its smallpox treatment Tpoxx was approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). This is the first approved treatment for the disease that at one time was believed to have been eradicated, but due to the threat of bioterrorism has become an increased concern for the world. Because of the bioterrorism threats, the government pushed for the development of medical countermeasures to the dreaded disease. While vaccines are important, the government believed there should be a therapeutic available to reduce the chance of mass deaths should a bioweapon be used. After the prevalence of the smallpox vaccine, the last outbreak of the deadly disease that occurred in the United States was in 1949. The disease had been declared eradicated by the World Health Organization in 1980 The FDA greenlit Tpoxx based on data from six different trials involving animals. Four trials involved primates and two involved rabbits. The primates were infected with monkeypox virus and the rabbits were infected with rabbitpox. The trials demonstrated that Tpoxx “significantly reduced both mortality and viral load” in the animals. The results of these studies were published in the July 5, 2018 issue of the New England Journal of Medicine. Siga said that the FDA’s approval came two months after the agency’s Antimicrobial Drugs Advisory Committee voted unanimously, 17 to 0, in support of the medication. Siga used a Priority Review Voucher in order to gain an accelerated review of its medicine. The accelerated review marked the first time that was used under the Material Threat Countermeasure PRV program enacted by the 2016 21st Century Cures Act, Siga said in its announcement. Tpoxx (tecovirimat) was approved in order to mitigate the impact of a potential outbreak, the company said. “The FDA approval of TPOXX achieves an important objective for both SIGA and our lead partner in the U.S. Government, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA). The approval validates this novel smallpox therapy as an important medical countermeasure in response to a potential smallpox outbreak,” Siga Chief Executive Officer Phil Gomez said in a statement. Siga’s Tpoxx was developed with support from the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA). With the FDA approval, Siga said it will ask BARDA to exercise an option for a $50 million payment to the company based on this extended shelf-life determination. With the approval, SIGA is entitled to a $41 million holdback payment under the existing contract with BARDA, provided that BARDA confirms that there is no difference between the approved product and the courses of TPOXX that have already been delivered to the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), the company said in its announcement. Tpoxx will be available for use through the U.S. government’s Strategic National Stockpile. There have been about two million doses of the treatment delivered to the stockpile, the company said. Siga said some members of the Antimicrobial Drugs Advisory Committee suggested that there could be additional uses for Tpoxx, including prophylactic use in individuals exposed to smallpox and other orthopoxviruses, such as monkeypox, which can jump that species barrier. Siga said it will examine these potential markets and the feasibility of expanding the TPOXX label to include these indications.

2023 CNDI Negative
Single Payer Neg › AT: Health Care Adv › AT: US Public Health Weak

Enrollment in healthcare programs at an all-time high

Lagasse FEB ‘23

Jeff Lagasse, Associate Editor Healthcare Finance, “Medicare Advantage still growing, but the growth is slowing”, Healthcare Finance, July 12, 2023, https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/medicare-advantage-still-growing-growth-slowing LE

Medicare Advantage continues to grow, hitting record enrollment this year and increasing overall program participation by 5.5%, while adding 1.5 million beneficiaries. But according to data from Chartis, the pace of this growth is slowing. In 2020, 2021 and 2022, Medicare Advantage enrollment grew by 1.9 million, 2.2 million and 2.3 million beneficiaries, respectively. This year, Medicare Advantage enrollment grew by just 1.5 million. While that's still significant growth, it does show evidence of a deceleration. At the same time, original Medicare continues to decline, losing 339,000 enrollees this year – a significant but smaller loss than previous years. Special Needs Plans (SNP) enrollment accounted for two-thirds of total market growth. SNP enrollment is up 20% from 2022, driven by considerable D-SNP enrollment gains. A total of 29.5 million beneficiaries are now enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan, according to Chartis. This year, for-profit insurers account for 72.6% of all Medicare Advantage enrollment, up from 71.8% the year prior and 67.9% in 2019. This marks a 4.7 percentage point share increase over that period, and annual growth of 10.1%, found Chartis. Meanwhile, nonprofit plans continue to see share declines, although their enrollment is still growing. For the first time in many years, nonprofit Blues plans notched a market share gain of 0.2 percentage point. While modest, this increase sits in stark contrast to remaining nonprofit plans, which saw a 0.8 percentage point share decline, continuing prior years' losses. Conversely, for-profit United accounted for 55% of all new enrollment. In prior years, this hovered in the 30% to 40% range. Humana accounted for 23% of all new enrollment, meaning the two health plans combined represent four in five new enrollees nationally. Start-up plans continue to grow, although their advances have slowed. Overall, start-up plans participating in Medicare Advantage notched 7% growth this year. This growth exceeds the market average, but pales in comparison to their prior years' annual membership growth of +25%. Their current share of the market now sits at 1.7%. Three states and Washington D.C. saw enrollment declines. This is the first time in recent history that Chartis has seen enrollment declines in key states. Meanwhile, 15 states now boast Medicare Advantage enrollment rates at or exceeding 50%. Plan options have reached an all-time high, but health plan competition is limited, data showed. Plan options for consumers have been growing more than 11% per year. This year, the average member had access to 43 different plan options, up from 24 in 2019 – a growth of nearly 80%. Despite this, at the county level competition in the market continues to deteriorate. Nearly 85% of counties are considered "highly concentrated." Meanwhile, quality performance correlates to enrollment performance. Seventy-three percent of Medicare Advantage beneficiaries are enrolled in health plans receiving four-plus stars this year, down from 89% the year prior. Health plans that saw their quality rating increase realized 9.6% enrollment gains, despite only 3.5% growth for health plans that saw their ratings decline this year. On February 1, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services released the 2024 Advance Notice for the Medicare Advantage and Part D Prescription Drug Programs, in which CMS said MA plans are expected to receive a 1.03% increase in revenue. However, three changes in the rate notice would, on average, cut MA rates in 2024 by 2.27%, AHIP president and CEO Matt Eyles said in a statement last week. These three changes include: a 3.12% reduction, due to the MA risk model that accounts for the health status and demographic characteristics of enrollees; 1.24% lower quality bonus payments under the Medicare Star Ratings program; and increase benchmarks used to set maximum payment rates on average by 2.09%, which is less than half the growth rate in 2023 (4.88%) and well below the projected growth in per-enrollee Medicare costs (5%). Eyles was responding to a Department of Health and Human Services statement called "Fact v. Fiction: Biden-Harris Administration is Strengthening Medicare; Private Industry Must Share Obligation to Deliver Quality Health Care for America's Seniors."

2023 CNDI Topicality
T – USFG / Framework › 2NC Reminders › Other Definitions

‘Should’ recommends a course of action.

David Trager 2k, Federal District Judge, 9/29/2000, Westlaw, United States v. Maria, 186 F.3d 65

8 Webster's Dictionary defines the phrase “should be” as something “that ought to be.” Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2104 (1st ed.1993). See also Black's Law Dictionary 1379 (6th ed. 1990) (“[The word ‘should’] ordinarily impl[ies] duty or obligation; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency.”) (emphasis added). In contrast, the word “shall” is “used to express a command or exhortation,” and is “used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory.” Webster's Dictionary, at 2085. See also Black's Law Dictionary, at 1375 (“As used in statutes, contracts, or the like, this word is generally imperative or mandatory.”). Thus, the common meaning of “should” suggests or recommends a course of action, while the ordinary understanding of “shall” describes a course of action that is mandatory. In the absence of a clear manifestation of intent on the part of the Sentencing Commission to attribute to “should” a meaning contrary to the common one, the term should be given its usual meaning. See Kirvan, 86 F.3d at 311.

2023 CNDI Topicality
T – USFG / Framework › 2NC Reminders › Other Definitions

‘The USFG’ denotes the three branches.

U.S. Legal 16, organization offering legal assistance and attorney access, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,”

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

2023 CNDI Topicality
T – USFG / Framework › 1NC › 1nc – Humility

Putting our positions up for debate and studying their flaws best breaks down our neural bias towards intellectual arrogance, and fosters a culture of better scholarship---our brains are terrible at knowing when we’re wrong and updating our beliefs. The impact is intellectual humility---this solves dogmatism and reverses social extremism where we criticize without accepting criticism

Resnick 19 [Brian Resnick is a science reporter at Vox.com, covering social and behavioral sciences, space, medicine, the environment, and anything that makes you think "whoa that's cool." Before Vox, he was a staff correspondent at National Journal where he wrote two cover stories for the (now defunct) weekly print magazine, and reported on breaking news and politics. Intellectual humility: the importance of knowing you might be wrong. January 4, 2019. https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2019/1/4/17989224/intellectual-humility-explained-psychology-replication]

I’ve come to appreciate what a crucial tool it is for learning, especially in an increasingly interconnected and complicated world. As technology makes it easier to lie and spread false information incredibly quickly, we need intellectually humble, curious people. I’ve also realized how difficult it is to foster intellectual humility. In my reporting on this, I’ve learned there are three main challenges on the path to humility: 1. In order for us to acquire more intellectual humility, we all, even the smartest among us, need to better appreciate our cognitive blind spots. Our minds are more imperfect and imprecise than we’d often like to admit. Our ignorance can be invisible. 2. Even when we overcome that immense challenge and figure out our errors, we need to remember we won’t necessarily be punished for saying, “I was wrong.” And we need to be braver about saying it. We need a culture that celebrates those words. 3. We’ll never achieve perfect intellectual humility. So we need to choose our convictions thoughtfully. This is all to say: Intellectual humility isn’t easy. But damn, it’s a virtue worth striving for, and failing for, in this new year. Intellectual humility, explained Intellectual humility is simply “the recognition that the things you believe in might in fact be wrong,” as Mark Leary, a social and personality psychologist at Duke University, tells me. But don’t confuse it with overall humility or bashfulness. It’s not about being a pushover; it’s not about lacking confidence, or self-esteem. The intellectually humble don’t cave every time their thoughts are challenged. Instead, it’s a method of thinking. It’s about entertaining the possibility that you may be wrong and being open to learning from the experience of others. Intellectual humility is about being actively curious about your blind spots. One illustration is in the ideal of the scientific method, where a scientist actively works against her own hypothesis, attempting to rule out any other alternative explanations for a phenomenon before settling on a conclusion. It’s about asking: What am I missing here? It doesn’t require a high IQ or a particular skill set. It does, however, require making a habit of thinking about your limits, which can be painful. “It’s a process of monitoring your own confidence,” Leary says. This idea is older than social psychology. Philosophers from the earliest days have grappled with the limits of human knowledge. Michel de Montaigne, the 16th-century French philosopher credited with inventing the essay, wrote that “the plague of man is boasting of his knowledge.” Social psychologists have learned that humility is associated with other valuable character traits: People who score higher on intellectual humility questionnaires are more open to hearing opposing views. They more readily seek out information that conflicts with their worldview. They pay more attention to evidence and have a stronger self-awareness when they answer a question incorrectly. When you ask the intellectually arrogant if they’ve heard of bogus historical events like “Hamrick’s Rebellion,” they’ll say, “Sure.” The intellectually humble are less likely to do so. Studies have found that cognitive reflection — i.e., analytic thinking — is correlated with being better able to discern fake news stories from real ones. These studies haven’t looked at intellectual humility per se, but it’s plausible there’s an overlap. Most important of all, the intellectually humble are more likely to admit it when they are wrong. When we admit we’re wrong, we can grow closer to the truth. One reason I’ve been thinking about the virtue of humility recently is because our president, Donald Trump, is one of the least humble people on the planet. It was Trump who said on the night of his nomination, “I alone can fix it,” with the “it” being our entire political system. It was Trump who once said, “I have one of the great memories of all time.” More recently, Trump told the Associated Press, “I have a natural instinct for science,” in dodging a question on climate change. A frustration I feel about Trump and the era of history he represents is that his pride and his success — he is among the most powerful people on earth — seem to be related. He exemplifies how our society rewards confidence and bluster, not truthfulness. Yet we’ve also seen some very high-profile examples lately of how overconfident leadership can be ruinous for companies. Look at what happened to Theranos, a company that promised to change the way blood samples are drawn. It was all hype, all bluster, and it collapsed. Or consider Enron’s overconfident executives, who were often hailed for their intellectual brilliance — they ran the company into the ground with risky, suspect financial decisions. The problem with arrogance is that the truth always catches up. Trump may be president and confident in his denials of climate change, but the changes to our environment will still ruin so many things in the future. Why it’s so hard to see our blind spots: “Our ignorance is invisible to us” As I’ve been reading the psychological research on intellectual humility and the character traits it correlates with, I can’t help but fume: Why can’t more people be like this? We need more intellectual humility for two reasons. One is that our culture promotes and rewards overconfidence and arrogance (think Trump and Theranos, or the advice your career counselor gave you when going into job interviews). At the same time, when we are wrong — out of ignorance or error — and realize it, our culture doesn’t make it easy to admit it. Humbling moments too easily can turn into moments of humiliation. So how can we promote intellectual humility for both of these conditions? In asking that question of researchers and scholars, I’ve learned to appreciate how hard a challenge it is to foster intellectual humility. First off, I think it’s helpful to remember how flawed the human brain can be and how prone we all are to intellectual blind spots. When you learn about how the brain actually works, how it actually perceives the world, it’s hard not to be a bit horrified, and a bit humbled. We often can’t see — or even sense — what we don’t know. It helps to realize that it’s normal and human to be wrong. It’s rare that a viral meme also provides a surprisingly deep lesson on the imperfect nature of the human mind. But believe it or not, the great “Yanny or Laurel” debate of 2018 fits the bill. For the very few of you who didn’t catch it — I hope you’re recovering nicely from that coma — here’s what happened. An audio clip (you can hear it below) says the name “Laurel” in a robotic voice. Or does it? Some people hear the clip and immediately hear “Yanny.” And both sets of people — Team Yanny and Team Laurel — are indeed hearing the same thing. Hearing, the perception of sound, ought to be a simple thing for our brains to do. That so many people can listen to the same clip and hear such different things should give us humbling pause. Hearing “Yanny” or “Laurel” in any given moment ultimately depends on a whole host of factors: the quality of the speakers you’re using, whether you have hearing loss, your expectations. Here’s the deep lesson to draw from all of this: Much as we might tell ourselves our experience of the world is the truth, our reality will always be an interpretation. Light enters our eyes, sound waves enter our ears, chemicals waft into our noses, and it’s up to our brains to make a guess about what it all is. Perceptual tricks like this (“the dress” is another one) reveal that our perceptions are not the absolute truth, that the physical phenomena of the universe are indifferent to whether our feeble sensory organs can perceive them correctly. We’re just guessing. Yet these phenomena leave us indignant: How could it be that our perception of the world isn’t the only one? That sense of indignation is called naive realism: the feeling that our perception of the world is the truth. “I think we sometimes confuse effortlessness with accuracy,” Chris Chabris, a psychological researcher who co-authored a book on the challenges of human perception, tells me. When something is so immediate and effortless to us — hearing the sound of “Yanny” — it just feels true. (Similarly, psychologists find when a lie is repeated, it’s more likely to be misremembered as being true, and for a similar reason: When you’re hearing something for the second or third time, your brain becomes faster to respond to it. And that fluency is confused with truth.) Our interpretations of reality are often arbitrary, but we’re still stubborn about them. Nonetheless, the same observations can lead to wildly different conclusions. (Here’s that same sentence in GIF form.) For every sense and every component of human judgment, there are illusions and ambiguities we interpret arbitrarily. Some are gravely serious. White people often perceive black men to be bigger, taller, and more muscular (and therefore more threatening) than they really are. That’s racial bias — but it’s also a socially constructed illusion. When we’re taught or learn to fear other people, our brains distort their potential threat. They seem more menacing, and we want to build walls around them. When we learn or are taught that other people are less than human, we’re less likely to look upon them kindly and more likely to be okay when violence is committed against them. Not only are our interpretations of the world often arbitrary, but we’re often overconfident in them. “Our ignorance is invisible to us,” David Dunning, an expert on human blind spots, says. You might recognize his name as half of the psychological phenomenon that bears his name: the Dunning-Kruger effect. That’s where people of low ability — let’s say, those who fail to understand logic puzzles — tend to unduly overestimate their abilities. Inexperience masquerades as expertise. An irony of the Dunning-Kruger effect is that so many people misinterpret it, are overconfident in their understanding of it, and get it wrong. When people talk or write about the Dunning-Kruger effect, it’s almost always in reference to other people. “The fact is this is a phenomenon that visits all of us sooner or later,” Dunning says. We’re all overconfident in our ignorance from time to time. (Perhaps related: Some 65 percent of Americans believe they’re more intelligent than average, which is wishful thinking.) Similarly, we’re overconfident in our ability to remember. Human memory is extremely malleable, prone to small changes. When we remember, we don’t wind back our minds to a certain time and relive that exact moment, yet many of us think our memories work like a videotape. Dunning hopes his work helps people understand that “not knowing the scope of your own ignorance is part of the human condition,” he says. “But the problem with it is we see it in other people, and we don’t see it in ourselves. The first rule of the Dunning-Kruger club is you don’t know you’re a member of the Dunning-Kruger club.” People are unlikely to judge you harshly for admitting you’re wrong In 2012, psychologist Will Gervais scored an honor any PhD science student would covet: a co-authored paper in the journal Science, one of the top interdisciplinary scientific journals in the world. Publishing in Science doesn’t just help a researcher rise up in academic circles; it often gets them a lot of media attention too. One of the experiments in the paper tried to see if getting people to think more rationally would make them less willing to report religious beliefs. They had people look at a picture of Rodin’s The Thinker or another statue. They thought The Thinker would nudge people to think harder, more analytically. In this more rational frame of mind, then, the participants would be less likely to endorse believing in something as faith-based and invisible as religion, and that’s what the study found. It was catnip for science journalists: one small trick to change the way we think. But it was a tiny, small-sample study, the exact type that is prone to yielding false positives. Several years later, another lab attempted to replicate the findings with a much larger sample size, and failed to find any evidence for the effect. And while Gervais knew that the original study wasn’t rigorous, he couldn’t help but feel a twinge of discomfort. “Intellectually, I could say the original data weren’t strong,” he says. “That’s very different from the human, personal reaction to it. Which is like, ‘Oh, shit, there’s going to be a published failure to replicate my most cited finding that’s gotten the most media attention.’ You start worrying about stuff like, ‘Are there going to be career repercussions? Are people going to think less of my other work and stuff I’ve done?’” Gervais’s story is familiar: Many of us fear we’ll be seen as less competent, less trustworthy, if we admit wrongness. Even when we can see our own errors — which, as outlined above, is not easy to do — we’re hesitant to admit it. But turns out this assumption is false. As Adam Fetterman, a social psychologist at the University of Texas El Paso, has found in a few studies, wrongness admission isn’t usually judged harshly. “When we do see someone admit that they are wrong, the wrongness admitter is seen as more communal, more friendly,” he says. It’s almost never the case, in his studies, “that when you admit you’re wrong, people think you are less competent.” Sure, there might be some people who will troll you for your mistakes. There might be a mob on Twitter that converges in order to shame you. Some moments of humility could be humiliating. But this fear must be vanquished if we are to become less intellectually arrogant and more intellectually humble. Humility can’t just come from within — we need environments where it can thrive But even if you’re motivated to be more intellectually humble, our culture doesn’t always reward it. The field of psychology, overall, has been reckoning with a “replication crisis” where many classic findings in the science don’t hold up under rigorous scrutiny. Incredibly influential textbook findings in psychology — like the “ego depletion” theory of willpower or the “marshmallow test” — have been bending or breaking. I’ve found it fascinating to watch the field of psychology deal with this. For some researchers, the reckoning has been personally unsettling. “I’m in a dark place,” Michael Inzlicht, a University of Toronto psychologist, wrote in a 2016 blog post after seeing the theory of ego depletion crumble before his eyes. “Have I been chasing puffs of smoke for all these years?” What I’ve learned from reporting on the “replication crisis” is that intellectual humility requires support from peers and institutions. And that environment is hard to build. “What we teach undergrads is that scientists want to prove themselves wrong,” says Simine Vazire, a psychologist and journal editor who often writes and speaks about replication issues. “But, ‘How would I know if I was wrong?’ is actually a really, really hard question to answer. It involves things like having critics yell at you and telling you that you did things wrong and reanalyze your data.” And that’s not fun. Again: Even among scientists — people who ought to question everything — intellectual humility is hard. In some cases, researchers have refused to concede their original conclusions despite the unveiling of new evidence. (One famous psychologist under fire recently told me angrily, “I will stand by that conclusion for the rest of my life, no matter what anyone says.”) Psychologists are human. When they reach a conclusion, it becomes hard to see things another way. Plus, the incentives for a successful career in science push researchers to publish as many positive findings as possible. There are two solutions — among many — to make psychological science more humble, and I think we can learn from them. One is that humility needs to be built into the standard practices of the science. And that happens through transparency. It’s becoming more commonplace for scientists to preregister — i.e., commit to — a study design before even embarking on an experiment. That way, it’s harder for them to deviate from the plan and cherry-pick results. It also makes sure all data is open and accessible to anyone who wants to conduct a reanalysis. That “sort of builds humility into the structure of the scientific enterprise,” Chabris says. “We’re not all-knowing and all-seeing and perfect at our jobs, so we put [the data] out there for other people to check out, to improve upon it, come up with new ideas from and so on.” To be more intellectually humble, we need to be more transparent about our knowledge. We need to show others what we know and what we don’t. And two, there needs to be more celebration of failure, and a culture that accepts it. That includes building safe places for people to admit they were wrong, like the Loss of Confidence Project. But it’s clear this cultural change won’t come easily. “In the end,” Rohrer says, after getting a lot of positive feedback on the project, “we ended up with just a handful of statements.” We need a balance between convictions and humility There’s a personal cost to an intellectually humble outlook. For me, at least, it’s anxiety. When I open myself up to the vastness of my own ignorance, I can’t help but feel a sudden suffocating feeling. I have just one small mind, a tiny, leaky boat upon which to go exploring knowledge in a vast and knotty sea of which I carry no clear map. Why is it that some people never seem to wrestle with those waters? That they stand on the shore, squint their eyes, and transform that sea into a puddle in their minds and then get awarded for their false certainty? “I don’t know if I can tell you that humility will get you farther than arrogance,” says Tenelle Porter, a University of California Davis psychologist who has studied intellectual humility. Of course, following humility to an extreme end isn’t enough. You don’t need to be humble about your belief that the world is round. I just think more humility, sprinkled here and there, would be quite nice. “It’s bad to think of problems like this like a Rubik’s cube: a puzzle that has a neat and satisfying solution that you can put on your desk,” says Michael Lynch, a University of Connecticut philosophy professor. Instead, it’s a problem “you can make progress at a moment in time, and make things better. And that we can do — that we can definitely do.” For a democracy to flourish, Lynch argues, we need a balance between convictions — our firmly held beliefs — and humility. We need convictions, because “an apathetic electorate is no electorate at all,” he says. And we need humility because we need to listen to one another. Those two things will always be in tension. The Trump presidency suggests there’s too much conviction and not enough humility in our current culture. “The personal question, the existential question that faces you and I and every thinking human being, is, ‘How do you maintain an open mind toward others and yet, at the same time, keep your strong moral convictions?’” Lynch says. “That’s an issue for all of us.” To be intellectually humble doesn’t mean giving up on the ideas we love and believe in. It just means we need to be thoughtful in choosing our convictions, be open to adjusting them, seek out their flaws, and never stop being curious about why we believe what we believe. Again, that’s not easy.

2023 CNDI Topicality
T – USFG / Framework › 1NC › 1nc – Movements

The impact is movements – Debate is valuable because it iteratively teaches the skills of persuasive organizing and relationality through face-to-face dialogue over what is at stake and how to solve it—this is the foundation of successful movement organizing, which outweighs and turns the aff.

Battistoni, 19—editor at Jacobin, Department of Political Science, Yale University (Alyssa, “Spadework: On political organizing,” , dml)

By the time I started organizing so much that it felt like a full-time job, it was the spring of 2016, and I had plenty of company. Around the country there were high-profile efforts to organize magazines, fast-food places, and nursing homes. Erstwhile Occupiers became involved in the Bernie Sanders campaign and joined the exploding Democratic Socialists of America, whose members receive shabby business cards proclaiming them an “official socialist organizer.” Today’s organizers — not activists, thank you — make clear that they are not black bloc participants brawling with police or hippies plotting a love-in. They are inspired by a tradition of professional revolutionaries, by Lenin’s exhortation that “unless the masses are organized, the proletariat is nothing. Organized — it is everything.” Organizing, in other words, is unembarrassed about power. It recognizes that to wield it you need to persuade untold numbers of people to join a cause, and to begin organizing themselves. Organizing means being in it to win.

But how do you win? Historical materialism holds that crises of capitalism spark revolts, perhaps even revolutions, as witnessed in the eruption of Occupy and Black Lives Matter; uprisings in Spain, Greece, and Egypt; and the British student movement against tuition fees. But there’s no guide for what happens in the long aftermath, as the left has often learned the hard way.

2023 CNDI Topicality
T – USFG / Framework › 1NC › 1nc – Clash

The impact is clash – authentic disagreement produced by the labor of the negative is the only unique feature of debate – that requires limits and ground. Their model can’t explain why we switch sides and why there has to be a winner and a loser.

Poscher, 16—director at the Institute for Staatswissenschaft and Philosophy of Law at the University of Freiburg (Ralf, “Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement”, Metaphilosophy of Law, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki/Adam Dyrda/Pawel Banas (eds.), Hart Publishing, forthcoming, dml)

Hegel’s dialectical thinking powerfully exploits the idea of negation. It is a central feature of spirit and consciousness that they have the power to negate. The spirit “is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it. This […] is the magical power that converts it into being.”102 The tarrying with the negative is part of what Hegel calls the “labour of the negative”103. In a loose reference to this Hegelian notion Gerald Postema points to yet another feature of disagreements as a necessary ingredient of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our reasoning is exposed to contrary arguments can we test its merits. We must go through the “labor of the negative” to have trust in our deliberative processes.104

This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be deceptive in various ways. The first phenomenon Postema draws attention to is the group polarization effect. When a group of like‐minded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme views in the process of their deliberations.105 The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups106 can be countered at least in some settings by the inclusion of dissenting voices. In these scenarios, disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases.107 A second deliberative dysfunction mitigated by disagreement is superficial agreement, which can even be manipulatively used in the sense of a “presumptuous ‘We’”108. Disagreement can help to police such distortions of deliberative processes by challenging superficial agreements. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms. Each of the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received “by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it”.

2023 CNDI Topicality
T – USFG / Framework › 1NC › 1nc – Topic Specific Education

Tax reform is an essential vector for progressive politics – it’s an inescapable necessity for post-neoliberal politics and the bedrock for every possible progressive goal regardless of your political alignment.

Wong 20 [Felicia Wong is the President and CEO of the Roosevelt Institute. She holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. "Taxes Are Key to the New Progressivism." https://www.bostonreview.net/forum_response/felicia-wong-taxes-are-key-new-progressivism/]

Some have argued that Saez and Zucman claim too much for wealth taxation. One of the most interesting critics comes not from the right but from the left. In his review of Saez and Zucman’s new book The Triumph of Justice, Liam Murphy, in these very pages, argues that tax justice cannot be separated from just economic outcomes as a whole. But this is an unfair, or perhaps misplaced, critique, because taxing wealth is at the heart of an emergent progressive worldview and a new progressive politics.

This new progressivism rests on four related arguments about the possibility of a wholly new political economy, inverting today’s power relationship between the private and the public sector, and focusing on the power of public institutions and the centrality of government.

2023 CNDI Topicality
T – USFG / Framework › 1NC › 1nc – Topic Specific Education

Nuanced debates about tax policy are essential for progressive work BUT require rejecting binary conceptualizations of politics in favor of detailed advocacy and pragmatic coalition building.

Renzo & Lakin 20 [Paolo de Renzio and Jason Lakin. Jason Lakin is a writer, researcher, and teacher. He has been the head of research for the International Budget Partnership (IBP) since 2017. Paolo de Renzio is 2021/22 Policy Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. "A Taxing Journey: How civic actors influence tax policy." https://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/tax-synthesis-december-2020.pdf]

Regular citizens and civic actors have historically played a very limited role in the formulation of tax policies. In recent years, however, interest in the role that civil society can play in tax reform has been growing steadily, driven by the domestic resource mobilization (DRM) agenda linked to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and by recent efforts of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—in collaboration with country-level groups—to reform the rules of international taxation.

To document successful examples of civic tax advocacy and generate useful lessons for other organizations interested in this work, we commissioned in-depth case studies of the Yellow Vests movement in France, tax administration reforms in Guatemala, the invalidation of a double taxation agreement between Kenya and Mauritius, the fight against opacity of tax amnesties in Mexico, the increasing of “sin taxes” and oil excise taxes in the Philippines, opposition to new taxes on mobile money transfers and social media in Uganda, and advocacy of higher income taxes on wealthy individuals in three US states. Evidence from these case studies also help fill a gap in the existing literature on the political economy of tax reform, which does not cover the role of civic actors in any level of detail.

2023 CNDI Topicality
T – USFG / Framework › 1NC › 1nc – Fairness Impact

3. Debate is a game and we’re both here to win – this means procedural questions like T come first. The role of the ballot is to vote for whoever does the better debating over the resolutional question.

Shively 2K – Professor of Political Science, Texas A & M (Ruth, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 181-2)

The requirements thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say “no” to—they must reject and limit—some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say “yes” to some things. In particular, they must say “yes” to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no agreement except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one’s target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Registers, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator’s audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.∂ The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert.∂ But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest. It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implications, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion.∂ Yet difficulties remain. For agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to successfully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agreements. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements.∂ Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.',∂ Imagine, then, that our two discussants have the following kind of exchange:∂ Mary Cuns don't kill people; people kill people.∂ Tom: Yes, but guns make it a lot easier for people to kill one another.∂ Mary: That's not necessarily true. There are lots of other murder weapons—knives or rat poison, for instance—that may be just as handy and lethal.∂ At this point, the argument reaches an impasse. Tom has presented i claim that Mary does not accept. Thus, if the argument is to continue, Tom must either find a way to convince Mary oi this claim or he must go on to a different line of argument. Let us say that, in this case, lorn backs up his initial claim with further evidence. Perhaps he has some evidence to show that people are less apt to survive a gunshot wound than they are to survive being stabbed or poisoned. Mary then relents on this point:∂ ∂ Mary: All right, I'll grant you that gun shot wounds an? more apt to kill people. But that's exactly the reason I want lo own a gun—so I can effectively protect myself and my family.∂ Tom: Well I sympathize with that motive, but 1 don't think owning a gun is the best way to protect yourself. In fact, I've heard that people who own guns are more apt to get injured or killed them¬selves than to protect themselves against an intruder.∂ Mary: What?! I find that very difficult to believe.∂ Here, again, our discussants reach an impasse. If the argument is to go further, they must either find a way to agree on the disputed claim, or move on to another claim (if there is one). Thus, if Tom has some further evidence that Mary will find convincing, they can continue this line of reasoning; if he does not, then they must move on to something else or give up the argument completely.∂ This is the ordinary ebb and flow of debate. Argument continues .is long as there is some hope of progress in coming to agreement or as long as there are other lines of argument to be explored. But if there∂ ∂ comes a point a I which the two sides run out of new claims or cannot igree about the facts supporting claims already made, the argument is effectively over. The participants may continue to shout at one an¬other, as they often do, but there is no longer anything positive or informative that can come from their interaction. There is nothing more to be learned and nothing that either side will find convincing.∂ The point here is that in arguing—and the point holds equally for other forms of contest—we assume that it is possible to educate or persuade one another. We assume that it is possible to come to more mutual understandings of an issue and that the participants in an argument are open to this possibility. Otherwise, there is no point to the exercise; we are simply talking at or past one another.∂ At this point, the ambiguists might respond that, even if there are such rules of argument, they do not apply to the more subversive or radical activities they have in mind. Subversion is, after all, about questioning and undermining such seemingly "necessary" or universal rules of behavior.∂ But, again, the response to the ambiguist must be that the practice of questioning and undermining rules, like all other social practices, needs a certain order. The subversive needs rules to protect subversion. And when we look more closely at the rules protective of subversion, we find that they are roughly the rules of argument discussed above. In fact, the rules of argument are roughly the rules of democracy or civility: the delineation of boundaries necessary to protect speech and action from violence, manipulation and other forms of tyranny.

2023 CNDI Topicality
T – USFG / Framework › 1NC › 1nc – Interp

And, “Fiscal” redistribution is done by the government.

Hicks 86, Researcher, Northwestern University (Alexander Hicks, 1986, “CLASS INFLUENCE ON REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY: THE CASE OF U.S. STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1951-1961,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 14)//BB

The present redistributive policy focus is on a particular type of government redistribution that may be called direct fiscal redistribution to the poor (hereafter DFRP). Fiscal redistribution refers here to redistribution of money and in-kind income among strata of households by means of both government spending and taxing (i.e., fiscal) activities. For example, increased generosity in public assistance payment levels and reliance upon progressive income as opposed to regressive sales taxes can provide positive fiscal redistribution. Direct fiscal redistribution refers to that part of such redistribution that can be accounted for in terms of government's relatively direct and immediate give-and-take of expenditures and taxes to and from income strata of households. Current evidence suggests that such redistribution is considerable in advanced capitalist political democracies, especially vis-à-vis the poor (e.g., Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977; Hicks and Swank, 1984b). During the 1970s DFRP apparently augmented the "pre-fisc" income share of poor households in the U.S. by over 100 percent (see Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977: 74 on the U.S.; and Hicks and Swank, 1984b on advanced capitalism).

2023 CNDI Topicality
T – USFG / Framework › 1NC › 1nc – Interp

The text of the resolution calls for debate on hypothetical government action

Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › Impact Answers › Warming Impact

CO2 increases global temperatures + leads to ocean acidification.

Lindsey, 23 - (Rebecca Lindsey Public Affairs Specialist and Climate Scientist at NOAA."Climate Change: Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide," NOAA Climate.gov, 5-12-2023, accessed 7-15-2023, https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-atmospheric-carbon-dioxide)//SK

Based on the annual report from NOAA’s Global Monitoring Lab, global average atmospheric carbon dioxide was 417.06 parts per million (“ppm” for short) in 2022, setting a new record high. The increase between 2021 and 2022 was 2.13 ppm—the 11th year in a row where the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere increased by more than 2 ppm. At Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii, where the modern carbon dioxide record began in 1958, the annual average carbon dioxide in 2022 was 418.56. Carbon Dioxide graph for the Global Climate Dashboard The modern record of atmospheric carbon dioxide levels began with observations recorded at Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii. This graph shows the station's monthly average carbon dioxide measurements since 1958 in parts per million (ppm). The seasonal cycle of highs and lows (small peaks and valleys) is driven by Northern Hemisphere summer vegetation growth, which reduces atmospheric carbon dioxide, and winter decay, which increases it. The long-term trend of rising carbon dioxide levels is driven by human activities. At Mauna Loa, the highest monthly value each year occurs in May. In May 2023, carbon dioxide hit 424 ppm—a new record. NOAA Climate.gov image, based on Mauna Loa monthly mean data from NOAA Global Monitoring Lab. Carbon dioxide concentrations are rising mostly because of the fossil fuels that people are burning for energy. Fossil fuels like coal and oil contain carbon that plants pulled out of the atmosphere through photosynthesis over many millions of years; we are returning that carbon to the atmosphere in just a few hundred. Since the middle of the 20th century, annual emissions from burning fossil fuels have increased every decade, from close to 11 billion tons of carbon dioxide per year in the 1960s to an estimated 36.6 billion tons in 2022 according to the Global Carbon Budget 2022. Carbon cycle experts estimate that natural “sinks”—processes that remove carbon from the atmosphere—on land and in the ocean absorbed the equivalent of about half of the carbon dioxide we emitted each year in the 2011-2020 decade. Because we put more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere than natural sinks can remove, the total amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere increases every year. The more we overshoot what natural processes can remove in a given year, the faster the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide rises. In the 1960s, the global growth rate of atmospheric carbon dioxide was roughly 0.8± 0.1 ppm per year. Over the next half century, the annual growth rate tripled, reaching 2.4 ppm per year during the 2010s. The annual rate of increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide over the past 60 years is about 100 times faster than previous natural increases, such as those that occurred at the end of the last ice age 11,000-17,000 years ago. Line graphs showing how atmospheric carbon dioxide amounts have risen at roughly the same pace as carbon dioxide emissions The amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (blue line) has increased along with human emissions (gray line) since the start of the Industrial Revolution in 1750. Emissions rose slowly to about 5 billion tons per year in the mid-20th century before skyrocketing to more than 35 billion tons per year by the end of the century. NOAA Climate.gov graph, adapted from original by Dr. Howard Diamond (NOAA ARL). Atmospheric CO2 data from NOAA and ETHZ. CO2 emissions data from Our World in Data and the Global Carbon Project. Why carbon dioxide matters Carbon dioxide is Earth’s most important greenhouse gas: a gas that absorbs and radiates heat. Unlike oxygen or nitrogen (which make up most of our atmosphere), greenhouse gases absorb heat radiating from the Earth’s surface and re-release it in all directions—including back toward Earth’s surface. Without carbon dioxide, Earth’s natural greenhouse effect would be too weak to keep the average global surface temperature above freezing. By adding more carbon dioxide to the atmosphere, people are supercharging the natural greenhouse effect, causing global temperature to rise. According to observations by the NOAA Global Monitoring Lab, in 2021 carbon dioxide alone was responsible for about two-thirds of the total heating influence of all human-produced greenhouse gases. Another reason carbon dioxide is important in the Earth system is that it dissolves into the ocean like the fizz in a can of soda. It reacts with water molecules, producing carbonic acid and lowering the ocean's pH (raising its acidity). Since the start of the Industrial Revolution, the pH of the ocean's surface waters has dropped from 8.21 to 8.10. This drop in pH is called ocean acidification. macro photo of tiny ocean snail shells showing a healthy snail shell compared to one damaged by ocean acidification (left) A healthy ocean snail has a transparent shell with smoothly contoured ridges. (right) A shell exposed to more acidic, corrosive waters is cloudy, ragged, and pockmarked with ‘kinks’ and weak spots. Photos courtesy Nina Bednarsek, NOAA PMEL. Past and future carbon dioxide Natural increases in carbon dioxide concentrations have periodically warmed Earth’s temperature during ice age cycles over the past million years or more. The warm episodes (interglacials) began with a small increase in incoming sunlight in the Northern Hemisphere due to variations in Earth’s orbit around the Sun and its axis of rotation. (For more details, see the “Milankovitch cycles and ice ages” section of our Climate change: incoming sunlight article.) That little bit of extra sunlight caused a little bit of warming. As the oceans warmed, they outgassed carbon dioxide—like a can of soda going flat in the heat of a summer day. The extra carbon dioxide in the atmosphere greatly amplified the initial, solar-driven warming. Based on air bubbles trapped in mile-thick ice cores and other paleoclimate evidence, we know that during the ice age cycles of the past million years or so, atmospheric carbon dioxide never exceeded 300 ppm. Before the Industrial Revolution started in the mid-1700s, atmospheric carbon dioxide was 280 ppm or less. paleo-carbon dioxide graph - large Global atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) in parts per million (ppm) for the past 800,000 years based on ice-core data (purple line) compared to 2021 concentration (dark purple dot). The peaks and valleys in the line track ice ages (low CO2) and warmer interglacials (higher CO2). Throughout that time, CO2 was never higher than 300 ppm (light purple dot, between 300,000 and 400,000 years ago). The increase over the last 60 years is 100 times faster than previous natural increases. In fact, on the geologic time scale, the increase from the end of the last ice age to the present looks virtually instantaneous. Graph by NOAA Climate.gov based on data from Lüthi, et al., 2008, via NOAA NCEI Paleoclimatology Program. By the time continuous observations began at Mauna Loa Volcanic Observatory in 1958, global atmospheric carbon dioxide was already 315 ppm. Carbon dioxide levels today are higher than at any point in human history. In fact, the last time atmospheric carbon dioxide amounts were this high was more than 3 million years ago, during the Mid-Pliocene Warm Period, when global surface temperature was 4.5–7.2 degrees Fahrenheit (2.5–4 degrees Celsius) warmer than during the pre-industrial era. Sea level was at least 16 feet higher than it was in 1900 and possibly as much as 82 feet higher. If global energy demand continues to grow rapidly and we meet it mostly with fossil fuels, human emissions of carbon dioxide could reach 75 billion tons per year or more by the end of the century. Atmospheric carbon dioxide could be 800 ppm or higher—conditions not seen on Earth for close to 50 million years.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › Impact Answers › AT: CCUs

AFF: Cutting GHG emissions alone won’t solve – we need the plan

IEA (2020),

The Oil and Gas Industry in Energy Transitions, IEA, Paris https://www.iea.org/reports/the-oil-and-gas-industry-in-energy-transitions, License: CC BY 4.0

This section discusses the way that the outlook for oil and natural gas could be affected by an accelerated pace of energy transitions. There is a huge range of possible futures depending, for example, on the pace of technological innovation, the ambition of energy policies, market dynamics, societal trends and many other factors. The analysis refers to two scenarios included in the IEA WEO, but focuses mainly on the [Sustainable Development Scenario] SDS and some sensitivity cases around this Scenario. The SDS charts a pathway for the global energy sector fully aligned with the Paris Agreement by holding the rise in global temperatures to “well below 2°C … and pursuing efforts to limit [it] to 1.5°C”. This requires rapid and widespread changes across all parts of the energy system. The world is not on track to meet this Scenario. The IEA’s assessment, based on the policies in place today as well as those that have been announced (the STEPS), is that the momentum behind clean energy transitions is not enough to offset the effects of an expanding global economy and growing population. The STEPS does not see a peak in global energy-related CO2 emissions by 2040 – obviously far from the early peak and rapid subsequent decline in emissions targeted by the Paris Agreement. This disparity between the direction in which the world appears to be heading, on the one hand, and the wealth of scientific evidence highlighting the need for ever-more-rapid cuts in GHG emissions, on the other, is a crucial fault line in global energy. The projections in the STEPS suggest that, in the absence of more concerted policy action, demand for oil and (especially) gas would continue to grow to 2040, while coal demand would remain where it is today. However, the emissions trends in the STEPS would imply a 50% probability of a 2.7°C stabilisation (or a 66% chance of limiting warming to 3.2°C) – not nearly enough to avoid severe effects from climate change. Something has to give, and the pressure to act more forcefully on emissions is growing, visible in a groundswell of opinion in many countries in favour of aligning policy and investment decisions with a low-emissions future. This includes an increasing number of national and corporate commitments to net-zero emissions, typically by mid-century. In some sectors, notably electricity, this is enabled by everlower costs of some key renewable technologies. The SDS provides a way to explore the consequences of these types of rapid transitions across the energy sector as a whole. While emissions reductions are central to its design, it is not solely a climate scenario. It reflects a broader range of imperatives facing policy makers by also meeting objectives related to universal energy access and cleaner air, while retaining a strong focus on energy security and affordability.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › Impact Answers › AT: Gas k2 Grids

Gas plants are either worse than batteries or too slow to complement, but no middle ground – competing decks bridging.

Roberts 19

David Roberts – VOX writer for energy and climate change; May 30, 2019; More natural gas isn’t a “middle ground” — it’s a climate disaster; ; //[TMS—GK]

4) Gas isn’t needed for grid reliability Renewable energy skeptics like to claim that natural gas power plants are required on the grid to balance out variable renewable energy, which comes and goes with the wind and sun. OCI responds with three arguments. First, most natural gas plants being built these days are combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants, which produce the cheapest power. “In the United States alone, around 24 gigawatts (GW) of CCGT capacity was commissioned in 2017 and 2018, and more than 14 GW was under construction at the beginning of 2019,” writes OCI. “There is more than 425 GW of CCGT capacity in operation globally.” But CCGT plants are not the plants that can ramp up and down quickly to balance renewables. They are big and relatively slow, meant to run at high utilization rates and provide bulk power. In other words, they compete with, rather than complement, renewables. Second, the faster natural gas plants — gas reciprocating engines (GRE) and open cycle gas turbines (OCGT), or “peakers,” named for their function of spinning up during peaks of energy demand — are increasingly being beat out by batteries, which respond even quicker. Wind and solar plants coupled with battery storage — which can compete directly with peakers — are getting cheaper. OCI cites a BNEF report showing that they “are already able to compete with new coal or gas plants on an LCOE basis in Germany, the United Kingdom, China, Australia, and the United States.” For now, most utility-scale battery storage is in the four-hour range. Those battery installations are expected to get cheaper than natural gas peakers in the early 2020s. But they still have somewhat limited application. However, OCI notes, “a study by Wood Mackenzie in 2018 found that six- and eight-hour battery storage systems, which are beginning to enter commercial operation today, can address 74 percent and 90 percent of peaking demand, respectively.” Once batteries get more sophisticated and cheaper, there won’t be much left for natural gas peakers to do. (For a longer look at how natural gas is getting displaced, see my article here.) Third, OCI argues that the key to stable, reliable grids is not any individual technology but the design of power markets and power systems. Today, in dozens of sometimes subtle and technical ways, they are designed around large, centralized power plants and one-way power flows. To keep grids reliable during the energy transition, policymakers need to redesign markets to encourage diverse portfolios of energy technologies, from distributed generation to storage and demand response. (The report contains some policy suggestions.) OCI doesn’t address the thorny question of whether getting to 100 percent clean electricity requires some form of dispatchable power (power that can be turned on and off), including nuclear and possibly natural gas or biomass with carbon capture and storage. (See here and here for more on that debate.) Regardless, it’s been fairly well demonstrated that we know how to get to 80 percent renewables — if there’s a modest role for gas in getting to 100, it certainly won’t look anything like the modern gas industry.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › Impact Answers › No Energy Insecurity

No energy wars.

Meierding 16 Emily Meierding, PhD, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School. [Oil wars: Why nations aren’t battling over resources, 5-19-2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/19/oil-wars-why-nations-arent-battling-over-petroleum-resources/]//BPS

However, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the risk of international oil wars is slim. Although oil is an exceptionally valuable strategic and economic resource, fighting for it does not pay. The belief that countries fight for oil rests on a flawed foundational assumption: Countries reap the same benefits from foreign oil resources as from domestic oil resources. In reality, profiting from oil wars is hard. Countries face at least four sets of obstacles that discourage them from fighting for oil: invasion costs, occupation costs, international costs and investment costs. Invasion costs are the damage that wars inflict on oil fields and infrastructure. Occupation costs arise from local resistance to foreign occupation, which can target oil industry infrastructure and personnel. International costs are imposed by the international community, which can respond to oil grabs with economic sanctions and military interventions. Investment costs are the challenges of attracting foreign capital and technical expertise to occupied oil fields. Collectively, these four sets of costs dramatically reduce the payoffs of fighting for oil and the appeal of oil wars. When the many other costs of war, including manpower and materiel, are taken into account, fighting for oil becomes even less attractive. From a purely rational standpoint, countries shouldn’t launch oil wars. But, countries don’t always act rationally. To test the oil war hypothesis, we have to take another look at historical so-called oil wars. Closer examination shows that oil has not been the fundamental cause of any international wars. The Falklands War in 1982 was triggered by national pride and Argentine officials’ fear that their window of opportunity for retaking the islands was closing. Rather than fight over oil, Britain and Argentina tried to use it as a catalyst for cooperation. In the 1970s and 1990s, they tried to jointly develop the Falklands’ oil resources. The Iran-Iraq War, from 1980 to 1988, was also not an oil war. Iraq initially aimed only to gain control over the Shatt al-Arab waterway and 130 square miles of contested territory. In the early stages of the war, Iraq repeatedly offered to withdraw from Iran, if Tehran would accept those demands. However, Iranian officials accused the Iraqis of fighting for oil in order to discredit them internationally. The Chaco War, from 1932 to 1935, was also launched for other reasons. Bolivia and Paraguay knew that oil discoveries in the Chaco region were unlikely. They fought because of national pride and to avoid further territorial dismemberment, after major losses in the 19th century. The oil explanation didn’t appear until the war bogged down, when leaders tried to transfer responsibility for the devastating conflict onto international oil companies. On three occasions, countries have launched major military campaigns targeting oil resources. However, these were fundamentally wars for survival, not for oil. In World War II, Japan invaded the Dutch East Indies and Germany attacked the Russian Caucasus because leaders realized that, without more oil, their regimes would collapse. Japan would have to withdraw from China, which was “tantamount to telling us to commit suicide,” as Japanese Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori put it. Hitler was even more succinct: “Unless we get the Baku oil,” he stated, “the war is lost.” Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was a war for survival. Contrary to popular beliefs, Saddam Hussein was not attempting to greedily grab more oil resources. Instead, he was afraid that the United States was trying to overthrow his regime. The United States had supported the Kurds’ rebellion in the 1970s, perpetrated the Iran-Contra scandal in the 1980s, and by 1990, seemed to be squeezing Iraq economically. According to Hussein, the United States was driving down oil prices by directing Kuwait to exceed its OPEC production quota. Hussein believed that seizing Kuwait offered the only means of eluding the United States’ hostile designs. By controlling his neighbor, Hussein could raise oil prices, escape his economic crisis and regain domestic support. He knew that the maneuver was a long shot. Regime records show that Hussein expected the United States would try to force him out of Kuwait. Still, it was either that or regime collapse. As Hussein’s deputy, Tariq Aziz, said after the war, “You will either be hit inside your house and destroyed, economically and militarily. Or you go outside and attack…” Japanese, German and Iraqi leaders believed that they were fighting wars for survival. Participants in other so-called oil wars were fighting for additional reasons, like national pride. None of the conflicts were driven by oil ambitions. This is good news for contemporary international relations. Oil competition in areas like the South China Sea is not a serious threat to international security. Countries may engage in minor oil spats, like China and Vietnam’s rig confrontation, to reinforce their resource claims. However, these incidents will not escalate into international wars. There is also little risk of oil imperialism. Countries like China will not satisfy their oil needs by seizing foreign oil fields. Historically, leaders have only initiated oil grabs when they believed that their survival depended on it. This condition is exceedingly rare, even in wartime. And, it’s unrelated to the price of oil. The United States considered grabbing Middle Eastern oil in 1975, after the first energy crisis drove up prices. However, the Ford administration refrained, because the costs of aggression were too high. Lastly, oil won’t inspire great power wars. The United States and China may eventually come to blows. Some of their military campaigns may target oil resources, if controlling them seems necessary for regime survival. However, oil will not be the fundamental cause of a Sino-American conflict. It’s not worth fighting for.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › Impact Answers › Russian Dependence Good

Reestablishing economic relations with Russia could be strategically viable for the EU- creates leverage over a dangerous, volatile actor.

Pawel ‘23

Zerka, Pawel. “The Power of Interdependence: Europe’s under-Rated Influence over Russia.” ECFR, 21 Feb. 2023, ecfr.eu/article/the-power-of-interdependence-europes-under-rated-influence-over-russia/. NT Bruno Diaz

It still seems a distant prospect, but Europeans need already to consider what form their future relationship with Russia may take. A major question to confront is how, with regard to its largest neighbour, Europe can ensure it is influential, but not vulnerable; sovereign, but not an island. Just last week, Germany’s foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, observed that “interdependence … harbours risks”, stating that the country should “rid itself of [Russian] fossil dependency once and for all”. The European Union, meanwhile, plans to wean itself off Russian gas and oil by 2030. Given Gazprom’s decisions to limit and then suspend most of its natural gas deliveries to the EU, Europeans have no other choice than to prepare for a future without Russian gas. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its economic and energy warfare may therefore have hastened a gathering backlash against interdependence – and against the once almost-unassailable idea that commerce begets peace, which events have now discredited. In many ways, the West has indeed been (wilfully) naive in its approach to Russia since 1991. But it would be wrong to conclude that, once this war is over, Europe should eliminate all economic interdependence with Russia. As well as being economically inefficient, this would be a strategic mistake. A diversity of relationships will always be to Europe’s benefit and help make it more resilient. For example, while Russia undoubtedly wields the greatest influence over Europe in energy terms, the efforts Europeans are now making to source gas from round the world are leading them to closer relationships with some similarly problematic regimes. A Europe dependent on these states may be less able to exert influence over these their own abuses. In addition, through the fog of war it is still possible to discern that Moscow will not want to end up dependent on Beijing. If a future Russia, ideally under new management, can conclude that it would draw advantage from a functioning economic and political relationship with Europe, this would be in Europeans’ strategic interest too. But, even if Europe could undertake a full fossil fuel decoupling from Russia, and even if for the moment it excluded any ‘grand chessboard’ consideration of a rapprochement with the country, it would still be unwise to give up completely on interdependence. Europe needs to nurture some future leverage over Russia – even if that means accepting some degree of vulnerability in return. Leverage in action Europeans have already shown Russia that economic blackmail is a double-edged sword. Europe’s and the United States’ economic links with Russia enable them to disrupt its economy. The West does this mostly through export controls – by obstructing access to products and technologies on which Russia relies heavily (for example, microchips and other high-tech parts). These controls should significantly limit Russia’s capacity to wage a long and costly war. Furthermore, once it becomes operational in the coming months, the impact of the EU’s oil embargo will also make itself felt. Oil export revenues last year contributed 36 per cent to Russia’s federal budget, and European OECD countries accounted for 60 per cent of those exports – three times more than China. Russia can sell oil on other markets, but so far it has been forced to do so at a significantly lower price. So, when the EU stops buying Russia’s crude oil and refined petroleum, it should inflict considerable financial loss on it. Indeed, recent data from the Russian Ministry of Finance indicate a significant fall in Moscow’s revenue from oil and gas exports, despite exorbitant gas prices – and before the oil embargo has even come in. On natural gas, Europe cannot yet rule out the prospect of a bleak winter. But even this interdependence with Russia may prove to be much less potent leverage in Moscow’s hands than many Europeans previously feared. The Russian authorities likely hoped to use gas to create such intense price volatility and supply uncertainty that European publics and governments alike would re-evaluate their stances on Ukraine. This strategy has some potential, as a recent demonstration in Prague suggested. But things seem broadly to be shifting in a different direction. Germany has made enormous progress in refilling its gas storage facilities, negotiating new deals around the world, and quickly building new LNG terminals. The EU may even achieve independence from Russian gas as early as next year, assuming Europeans succeed in limiting demand too. Gas prices might still be high – but they should be much lower than during the panic in August. Russia remains relatively reliant on gas export revenue. Gas accounted for around 10 per cent of the Kremlin’s revenue last year, which is still a sum Russia can scarcely afford to do without. And, given that more than 80 per cent of Russia’s gas exports in 2021 went to the EU, Moscow’s “pivot to Asia” is a pipe(line) dream. So, Russia might have overplayed its hand – by not just scaring Europeans (especially Germany), but also forcing them to rethink their approach to energy dependence altogether. Such an important customer will be very hard for Moscow to replace, leaving it with limited options. The Kremlin’s halting of gas supplies to the EU through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline could therefore prove to be “Putin’s last throw of dice”. Principles for engagement: Proportion and prudence European leaders seem eager to conclude that they should reduce or even eliminate their reliance on energy sources from the east. But, in doing so, they fail to consider the important lesson of interdependence as leverage – which can be easy to forget right now as Europeans look fearfully at the coming winter. To be sure, this does not mean that Europe’s future interdependence with Russia should continue to be chiefly in the realm of fossil fuels (not least because of the green transition); nor does it mean that Berlin and some other member state capitals should escape criticism for the years of myopia on their energy relationship with Russia. Instead, policymakers should ensure that any future interdependence with Russia strengthens European security rather than undermines it. In doing so, proportions will matter. China is believed to have an unofficial rule that it should not rely on any one foreign partner for more than 15 per cent of its supplies of a single commodity. Just before the war, the EU was importing more than 40 per cent of its natural gas from Russia – and almost a third of its crude oil. These proportions may be perfectly acceptable with a partner such as, say, Norway. But, in future, the EU will need to establish ways to better monitor its vulnerabilities and keep them in check. It will need to learn to make ‘Goldilocks’ judgments about how much exposure is ‘just right’. In short, too much interdependence with imprudently chosen partners can be dangerous. But too little – especially when it comes to Europe’s most powerful neighbour – can also be perilous, leading to constraints on the European ability to act. Without due consideration of this in this round, interdependence risks being misunderstood for the second time since the end of the cold war.