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2023 GDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Links › 2ac- perm- do both

Perm do both- alt shields the link to the aff – view it as an eco-socialist GND

Abbott- philosophy professor at Federation University- 21.

MATHEW ABBOTT- lecturer in philosophy at Federation University Australia. STEVEN CHANG- n academic librarian at La Trobe University. Jacobin. The Victorian “Green New Deal” Is Really an Exercise in Greenwashing. . 02.04.2021. DOA: 06/17/23. AR.

Instead of subsidizing “green” industry with public money, comprehensive decarbonization will require a direct confrontation with fossil fuel and extractive capital. In other words, a GND is only as good as its class politics. In Australia, the urgency of the environmental crisis is already being used as a pretext to ramp up job insecurity and unsafe working conditions. On a global scale, co-opted GNDs could easily dovetail with imperialism, as states guarantee corporations the ability to profitably extract rare earth metals from the global South. In a similar fashion, neoliberal environmental policies like carbon credits could have disastrous consequences for Indigenous peoples, as companies buy up land to claim offsets. An ecosocialist GND, on the other hand, could stand in solidarity with less developed countries while bolstering First Nations’ sovereignty by funding land management, regeneration, and rewilding programs, under Indigenous control. Rather than constituting a static set of policies, the GND should be viewed as a high-stakes site of contestation. As the Climate Justice Collective has argued, any successful GND must be founded on the “four Ds”: decolonization, decarbonization, decommodification, and democratization. Anything less may fail to halt climate change. Strengthening “green” capital will weaken our side politically, while intensifying the exploitation of the poor and vulnerable. For Victorians, it is crucial to keep holding Andrews and the ALP to account for their destructive environmental policies, including their recent renewal of two dirty brown coal mines and return to deforestation. We should also take aim at this latest attempt to subsidize private capital with public wealth. An effective GND will need more than parliamentary motions of sentiment, set-piece marches, mild policy tweaks, and center-left governments. It will require strikes, blockades, occupations, and mass civil disobedience. As radical climate researchers Natasha Heenan and Anna Sturman have argued, a transformative GND “needs the full weight of a critique of capitalism behind it”.

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › AT Cap Solves X ! › 2nc- at- cap solves inequality

Industrialization will always fail to solve inequality- divisions of labor reproduce capitalist contradictions at the heart of the market

ROBERT NEUWIRTH- author of two books on the street life of the developing world, “Stealth of Nations” and “Shadow Cities.” He was a 2020-21 Berggruen Institute fellow. NOEMA. Capitalism Subverts Community. https://www.noemamag.com/capitalism-subverts-community/. Accessed 3.25.23. MARCH 10, 2022. AR.

Our economic system promises what it can’t deliver. It vows to provide wealth and equality. That’s what the entrancing metaphor of the invisible hand, coined by Adam Smith in 1759 in “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” (and restated in somewhat abbreviated form in 1776 in “The Wealth of Nations”), is all about: “[The rich] consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity … they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the Earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.” Smith anointed the division of labor — in which production is split into individual tasks — as the driving force of this process. At the start of “The Wealth of Nations,” he labeled it “the greatest improvement” in “the general business of society” in human history. But in what should be a “How it started … How it’s going” meme in every economics class around the world, here’s what Smith wrote of the same subject some 700 pages later: “The progress of the division of labor” makes a person “as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for any human creature to become. … In every improved and civilized society this is the state into which the laboring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessarily fall.” Despite the magical metaphor, there’s a cancer at the heart of the market system. If it is true, as Smith wrote, that “no society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable,” then it is impossible to say that any society on our market-mad planet is flourishing and happy. For sure, Smith was not alone in being flummoxed by the incompatibility of individual profit and general welfare. This conundrum has dogged philosophers and economists for thousands of years. More than 2,000 years ago, Aristotle saw the solution as a combination of restraint and oppression: “The beginning of reform,” he wrote in “Politics,” “is not so much to equalize property as to train the nobler sort of natures not to desire more, and to prevent the lower from getting more; that is to say, they must be kept down, but not ill-treated.” A few decades on from Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill returned to this Aristotelian view that the problem of poverty is the problem of the poor: The poor, Ricardo wrote, “have rendered restraint superfluous, and have invited imprudence.” “Poverty, like most social evils, exists because men follow their brute instincts,” Mill echoed. Both proposed Aristotelian solutions, though without the ancient philosopher’s faith that the rich can be reined in: “Impressing on the poor the value of independence … that they must look … to their own exertions for support,” was Ricardo’s way of putting it. “Altering the habits of the laboring people” was Mill’s. John Maynard Keynes diagnosed the same problem in his 1936 opus “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”: “The outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live are its failure to provide full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes.” But Keynes feared reining in the rich, seeming to suggest that if you strip wealthy people of their money, they will go on a rampage against everyone poorer. “It is better that a man should tyrannize over his bank balance than over his fellow citizens,” he opined. Writing less than a decade later, Joseph Schumpeter was also clear-eyed about the failures of the system: “Capitalism does not merely mean that the housewife may influence production by her choice between peas and beans; or that the youngster may choose whether he wants to work in a factory or on a farm,” he wrote in “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.” “[I]t means a scheme of values, an attitude toward life, a civilization — the civilization of inequality and of the family fortune.” Schumpeter foresaw a government-controlled socialist future — but with an elitist authoritarian twist: “There is little reason to believe that this socialism will mean the advent of the civilization of which orthodox socialists dream. It is much more likely to present fascist features.” Simon Kuznets, who won a Nobel Prize in 1971 for developing what has come to be known as the Kuznets curve — a pictogram purporting to show that inequality increases after industrial development but then falls as society adapts to modern realities — admitted in his prize lecture that his graph actually failed to describe much of the world: “Concurrent with the remarkable positive achievements of modern economic growth are unexpected negative results even within the developed countries; while the less developed countries are struggling in the attempt to use the large potential of modern technology in order to assume an adequate role in the one and interdependent world (from which they cannot withdraw even if they wished to do so).” Even in wealthy nations, he asserted, political struggles and tensions “will become more intensive and acute as the perceived gap widens between what has been attained and what is attainable with modern economic growth.”

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › AT Cap Solves X ! › 2nc- at- decoupling

Decoupling is impossible – interests of capital are too intrinsically tied to fossil fuel assets

Foster 19 [John, Prof of Sociology at the Univ of Oregon, “Capitalism Has Failed – What Next?” Monthly Review, 02/01/19, , accessed 08/22/21, JCR]

A characteristic of this new era of financialized accumulation is that it is progressively removed from the realities of production and use value, heightening the conflict between exchange value (the value form) and use value (the natural form) within the overall production and accumulation process.71 The result is “a social and ecological planetary emergency.”72 This is most evident in the rapid destruction of the natural environment. Fossil fuels are entered as financial assets on the books of corporations, even when they exist only in the form of reserves buried in the ground. In this way, they are integral to the entire financialized accumulation process of monopoly capitalism. Trillions of dollars of Wall Street assets are thus tied up in fossil capital.73 This has made it doubly difficult to shift away from the extraction and use of fossil fuels to more sustainable alternatives, such as solar and wind power. No one owns the sun’s rays or the wind. Hence, there is less of a vested interest in these forms of energy. In today’s capitalism, more than ever before, current and potential future profits dictate all, at the expense of people and the planet. The human population stands by, seemingly helpless, watching the destruction of the climate and the loss of innumerable species, all imposed by the ostensibly overwhelming force of market society.

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › AT Cap Solves X ! › 2nc- at- decoupling

Dematerialized capital is a house of cards – it fuels extreme class division and makes economic meltdown inevitable

Foster et al 21 [John, Prof of Sociology at the Univ of Oregon, “The Contagion of Capital,” Monthly Review, 01/01/21, , accessed 08/21/21]

Government spending absorbs some of the economic surplus, as does waste in the business process. However, government deficit spending also increases corporate profits after taxes above the level determined by capitalist spending on consumption and investment.8 Hence, with both the growth of the federal deficit and the stagnation of investment, the amount of free cash in corporate coffers has dramatically expanded. This free cash plays a central role in the financialization of capital and the resulting extreme polarization of society.9 As stipulated by Craig Medlen in Free Cash, Capital Accumulation and Inequality, free cash equals corporate profits after taxes plus depreciation minus investment. (In national income accounting, corporate profits after taxes plus depreciation is known as corporate cash flow. The funds associated with depreciation [or capital consumption] are part of the gross surplus available to corporations.)10 A wider conception of free cash, utilized in this article, also includes net interest. Hence, in the wide version, Free Cash = Corporate Profits After Taxes + Depreciation + Net Interest – Investment.11 This free cash is held by corporations or is distributed to stockholders through dividend payouts and/or stock buybacks.12 Building on the research of Michał Kalecki, Medlen demonstrates that the amount of free cash is identical to the federal government deficit minus the excess of savings over investment of the noncorporate sector (now usually negative) plus the current account balance. The three factors of (1) the federal deficit, (2) the country’s current account balance (or the trade deficit), and (3) the deficit spending of the noncorporate sector (encompassing noncorporate business, housing, and personal finance) can therefore be seen as underpinning free cash.13 Chart 1 shows the growth of corporate free cash in the U.S. economy from the period immediately after the Second World War to the present. Free cash, as non-invested surplus, became a much bigger and bigger factor in the U.S. economy beginning in the 1980s due mainly to the combined effects of a long-term decline in corporate taxation, the increasing federal deficit, and the atrophy of net investment.14 Free cash falls in recessions (due to lower business activity and income), but then rockets up soon afterward due to investment not keeping up with increasing economic activity, freeing up more cash after investment. This sudden rebound in cash is also a product of the fact that the Federal Reserve Board now steps in during every recession, at precisely such “Minsky Moments” when the prospects for investment are at their worst, with lavish provision of low-interest credit. Another way of looking at this phenomenon is to chart the total cash or liquid funds that corporations actually have ready at hand, if they were to choose to invest (or otherwise productively use) the surplus at their disposal. Of course, corporate investment is not dependent on the prior availability of savings/surplus, since capitalism, as Joseph Schumpeter long ago explained, is a system that creates “credit ad hoc”; while John Maynard Keynes and Kalecki taught that investment determines savings, not the other way around.15 Nevertheless, it is significant that the cash funds of corporations in the current phase of monopoly-finance capital far exceed profitable investment outlets. At the beginning of 2020, nonfinancial corporations were sitting on over $4 trillion dollars in cash; before the end of 2020 this had risen to over $5 trillion.16 According to the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data, shown in Chart 2, total cash held by U.S. nonfinancial corporations as a share of gross domestic product (GDP)—much of it parked abroad in tax havens—has almost tripled between the early 1990s and the present.17 The total cash holdings of nonfinancial corporations on hand at any given time are not to be confused with free cash, which is that part of the corporate cash flow left over after investment in a given year—much of which is not held as cash deposits but instead spent on mergers and acquisitions, stock buybacks, and other financial instruments. Rather, total cash on hand, as defined by the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, simply measures the actual cash deposits sitting in the accounts of nonfinancial corporations presented as annual averages based on quarterly data. Still, the rapid growth of total cash currently held by nonfinancial corporations in the form of ready monies, both absolutely and as a proportion of GDP (as shown in Chart 2), is a further indication of an economy that has shifted from capital formation to speculation. As we have seen, when corporations do not invest their economic surplus in new capital formation—primarily due to vanishing investment opportunities in an economy characterized by excess capacity—they are left with abundant free cash that is partly returned to the shareholders through share buybacks and, to a lesser degree, dividends. It is also used for speculation, including mergers, acquisitions, and the panoply of corporate “cash management” techniques that amount to the leveraging of free cash to enhance returns.18 This gives rise to a whole alphabet soup of financial instruments, in which corporations use the cash at their disposal partly as collateral for debt leverage, with nonfinancial corporate debt rising rapidly as a share of national income. Predictably recurring internal corporate funds in the form of free cash constitute a “flow collateral” allowing for further leverage, feeding speculation. A speculative economy relies on borrowed funds for leverage, backed up in part by cash. Expanding cash reserves are also needed as hedges in case of financial defaults. The whole system is a house of cards. The progressive financialization of the capitalist economy, whereby the financial superstructure continues to expand as a share of the underlying productive economy, has led to ever-greater asset price bubbles and growing threats of world economic meltdown. So far, a complete meltdown has been headed off by central banks, as in the 2000 and 2008 financial crashes. At every major recurring disturbance, and with serious economic repercussions, the monetary authorities pump massive amounts of cash into the financial superstructure of the economy only to give rise to greater bubbles in the future. Theoretically, stock values represent future expected streams of earnings arising primarily from production.19 Nowadays, however, finance has become increasingly autonomous from production (or the “real economy”), relying on its own speculative “self-financing,” leading to financial bubbles, contagions, and crashes, with the monetary authorities intervening to keep the whole house of cards from collapsing. This serves to reduce the risk to speculators, thereby keeping the value of stocks and other financial assets rising on a long-term basis, along with the overall wealth/income ratio. In these circumstances, so-called asset accumulation by speculative means has replaced actual accumulation or productive investment as a route to the increase of wealth, generating a condition of “profits without production.”20 In order to grasp the full significance of the financialization of the economy, it is useful to look at the two conceptions of capital (relative to national income) depicted in Chart 3.21 One of these, the numerator of the lower line, is the traditional conception of capital as fixed investment stock (physical structures and equipment) at historical cost minus depreciation. This is called the fixed capital stock of the nation and is tied directly to economic growth.22 It represents what economic theorists from Adam Smith to Karl Marx to Keynes have referred to as the accumulation of capital. Capital formation and national income are closely related, generally rising and falling together, producing the relatively flat line, representing the ratio of fixed capital stock to national income, shown in Chart 3. Yet, capital, as Marx noted very early in the process, has more and more taken on the “duplicate” form of “fictitious capital,” that is, the structure of financial claims (in monetary values) produced by the formal title to this real capital. Insofar as economic activity is directed to the appreciation of such financial claims to wealth relatively independently of the accumulation of capital at the level of production, it has metamorphosed into a largely speculative form.23 This can be seen by looking again at Chart 3. In contrast to the lower line, the upper line depicts what is traditionally seen as the wealth/income ratio (which some economic theorists, such as Thomas Piketty, conflate with the capital/income ratio, treating wealth as capital).24 The numerator here is the value of corporate stocks. Since the mid–1980s, the ratio of stock value to national income has increased more than 300 percent. This marks an enormous growth of financial wealth, with speculation-induced asset growth sidelining the role of productive investment or capital accumulation as such in the amassing of wealth. This is associated with a massive redistribution of wealth to the top of society. The top 10 percent of the U.S. population owns 88 percent of the value of stocks, while the top 1 percent owns 56 percent.25 Rising stock values relative to national income thus mean, all other things being equal, rapidly rising wealth (and income) inequality.26 The existence of the two conceptions of capital (and of capital/income ratios) presented here—one representing historical investment cost minus depreciation, and conforming to the notion of accumulated capital stock, the other the monetary value of stock equities (in economics traditionally treated as wealth rather than capital)—is often downplayed within establishment economics under the assumption that in the long run they will simply fall in line with each other, and with national income. As leading mainstream economic growth theorist Robert Solow writes: “Stock market values, the financial counterpart of corporate productive capital, can fluctuate violently, more violently than national income. In a recession the wealth-income ratio may fall noticeably, although the stock of productive capital, and even its expected future earning power, may have changed very little or not at all. But as long as we stick to longer-run trends…this difficulty can safely be disregarded.”27 But can the divergence of stock values from income (and from fixed capital stock) in reality be so easily disregarded? Chart 3 depicts a sharp increase in stock values relative to national income, which has now continued for over a third of a century, with decreases in total stock values as a ratio of national income (output) occurring during recessions, then rebounding during recoveries.28 The overall movement is clearly in the direction of compounded financial hyperextension. This conforms to the general pattern of the financialization of the capitalist economy, constituting a structural change in the system associated with the growth of monopoly-finance capital. This has gone hand in hand with a bubblier economy, with financial bubbles bursting in 1987, 1991, 2001, and 2008, but ultimately shored up by the Federal Reserve and other central banks. Today, vast amounts of free cash are spilling over into waves of mergers and acquisitions, typically aimed at acquiring megamonopoly positions in the economy. A major focus is the tech sector, much of which is directed at commodifying all information in society, in the form of a ubiquitous surveillance capitalism.29 All financial bubbles derive their animus from some common rationale, which claims that this time is different, discounting the reality of a bubble. In the present case, the rationale is that the advance of the FAANG stocks (Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, and Google), which now comprise almost a quarter of the value of Standard and Poor 500’s total capitalization, is unstoppable, reflecting the dominance of technology. Apple alone has reached a stock market valuation of $2 trillion. All of this is feeding a massive increase in income and wealth inequality in the United States, as the gains from financial assets rise relative to income. Yet, like all previous bubbles, this one too will burst.30

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › AT Cap Solves X ! › 2nc- at- decoupling

Decoupling is a myth. Multiple meta-analyses of all empirical research prove that there’s no evidence for it. Arguments for decoupling ignore the effects of trade and industrial offshoring.

Sorman 23 [Alevgul, Ikerbasque Research Fellow at the Basque Centre for Climate Change, “Deceitful Decoupling: Misconceptions of a Persistent Myth,” in The Barcelona School of Ecological Economics and Political Ecology, ed. Villamayor-Tomas & Muradian]

In essence, decoupling has a foundational role within the Barcelona School of Ecological Economics and Political Ecology. First, due to the lack of evidence in absolute decoupling between resource and energy dependency and growth (Parrique et al., 2019), there is a crucial need to look at “how the world operates” and rethink alternative pathways of living within planetary boundaries. This calls for new ways of doing economics which interrogates economic processes limited by biophysical constraints both on the supply side in terms of resources and the sink side recognising environmental limits from the local to the global. Second, decoupling (and its lack thereof) calls for scrutinising embedded societal relations that interrogate “why we do what we do” that cover socio-political factors such as power dynamics, institutional arrangements, cultural variables, and economic and fnancial drivers. These questions also explore the unequal access to and distribution of goods and services, benefts, and burdens (Robbins, 2011) while inquiring into participation and decision-making mechanisms over how the world’s resources are (un)used. Third, the absence of decoupling also calls for deliberation over individual and collective action on “how we envision alternative imaginaries” in post normal times (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). This means creating spaces and opening up the discussion for new actors and different futures departing from the business as usual growth-based scenarios. Along my academic journey – deeply rooted in the Barcelona school Ecological Economics and Political Ecology – I try to scrutinise these notions of decoupling, having closely worked on energy metabolism, the study of energy fows that are required to sustain societies; energy justice calling for a re-evaluation of ethical and gender concerns in energy decision making and my research on energy cultures, delving deeper on role individual and collective behaviour toward energy in transformational research and action. In the remainder of this chapter, Sect. 15.2 focuses on the different concepts of decoupling and system boundaries; Sect. 15.3 reviews and synthesises further empirical evidence that analyses trends of decoupling both in terms of resources and emissions; Sect. 15.4 dissects claims for a circular economy and rebound effects, a phenomenon closely observed during the COVID-19 global pandemic that goes hand in hand with the decoupling narrative; Sect. 15.5 wraps up the discussion of decoupling as a deceitful narrative that is prolonged as a persistent myth hindering genuine systemic and transformative change. Decoupling is typically categorised based on environmental pressures stemming from the production side, referring to resource decoupling including materials, energy, and the less obvious water; and the impact side of our actions framed around impact decoupling including greenhouse gasses, land, water pollutants, and biodiversity loss (Parrique et al., 2019). Relative (or weak) decoupling indicates that the rate at which materials, energy use, or emissions increase is lower than the rate at which GDP increases (Burton, 2015), or in other terms that the economic growth outpaces environmental impact. Although this may seem like a favourable veneer, it still maps out as extractivism or greenhouse gases accumulating in the atmosphere, beating our overall target to tackle climate change and live within our ecological boundaries in the long run. Already, the UNEP emissions gap report indicates (UNEP, 2019) that now in 2020, we need to reduce emissions by 7.6% per annum globally every year until 2030; otherwise, limiting global warming to 1.5 °C will be a missed chance (see also (Patterson et al., 2018)). Similarly, the Production Gap Report (SEI et al., 2019), assessing the world’s current pace of fossil fuel extraction to align with Paris Agreement goals, indicates that the world is to produce far more coal, oil, and gas than is consistent with limiting warming to 1.5 °C or 2 °C, creating a "production gap" that makes climate goals much harder to reach. Absolute (or strong) decoupling, on the other hand, claims that economic performance behaves independently from material or energy extraction or emissions. Newer terms extending the potential boundaries and glossary defnitions of decoupling have also been defned such as “virtual decoupling” (Moreau & Vuille, 2018) referring to developed countries outsourcing intensive industrial production chains to lesser developed countries, also known as the carbon leakage phenomena. The role of increased “tertiarisation” (or dematerialisation through services) (Heiskanen & Jalas, 2000) as a complementary angle also shifts attention given to emissions, with the know-how (immaterial) sectors occupying a greater weight in the composition of the more "developed" economies. Vadén et al. (2020) also argue that relationships between resources and emissions decoupling might not be so straightforward and linear; such that there may be instances of material effciency (Schandl et al., 2016) or a boost in “fnancialisation” (the role and weight of the fnancial sphere within the economy) (Kovacic et al., 2018), which may all lead to somewhat decoupling with very different implications. In terms of accounting for impact, discussions center around shifting current accounting mechanisms5 from one based on territorial emissions (production-based accounting with GHG emissions assigned based on the source localisation) to one based on a consumption-based accounting (CBA) (Lininger, 2015; Davis & Caldeira, 2010; Peters, 2008; Munksgaard & Pedersen, 2001). CBA, initially used for Carbon Footprint measurements (Ireland, 2018), takes into account the outsourcing effect (Bastianoni et al., 2014); somewhat6 internalising responsibilities based on re-integrating externalities. It is often argued that CBA should be mainstreamed in climate policy for disclosing “real” corresponding emissions per country as it will serve for constructing policies with a holistic perspective for crucial innovations (Wiedenhofer et al., 2020) for tackling the global climate emergency and ecological crisis. Approximate numbers indicate that production-based emissions in the Global South are 10–15% higher than consumption-based emissions, and vice versa for the Global North (Fuhr, 2019). Similarly, research illustrates (Wood et al., 2018) that approximately one-quarter of the global land use (Weinzettel et al., 2013), 40% of materials (Wiedmann et al., 2015), 20–30% of global water use (Lenzen et al., 2013), and over 20% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Peters & Hertwich, 2008) reside embodied in trade. In terms of “truth-ful” accounting and defning adequate policy mechanisms based on political realities (Afonis et al., 2017) for tackling issues of equity and justice appropriately and for proposing alternative exit strategies, such realities must urgently be confronted Recent literature argues that there is little or no evidence in terms of absolute decoupling looking into embodied energy in trade, material consumption, resource use, and emissions. Akizu-Gardoki et al. (2018) devise an alternative “Decoupling Index” that uses 126 countries’ total primary energy footprints (rather than total primary energy supplies), taking into account embodied energy imported with goods and services. Within a 14-year period of analysis (2000–2014), the authors empirically show that 93 countries7 disprove decoupling; while 27 show absolute decoupling for the analysis period, with only 6 countries (ESP, ITA, HUN, GBR, JPN, and FRA) with a Human Development Index of 0.8 above maintain absolute decoupling over time (ibid.). Regarding global material flows covering over half a century of analysis (1950–2010) Schaffartzik et al. (2014) reveal that although industrial metabolic profiles stabilise over time with equal shares of biomass, fossil energy, and construction minerals; they are surpassed by other regions like Asia, replicating patterns of industrial growth engines. However, this does not translate into "per capita" affluence or material consumption and instead adds to the growing bubble of global resource use and extraction (ibid.). On a similar note, after an analysis of 40 years of resource productivity analysis Krausmann et al. (2017) summarise that although some countries may be decoupling in absolute terms, this value is cancelled out when trade is taken into account. Wood et al. (2018) confirm that impacts embodied in trade, especially regarding material goods, led by clothing and footwear, are growing tremendously, with energy and GHG emissions following in a less pronounced manner. Wu et al. (2018) highlight the differences in a decoupling index, where “developed countries” primarily continue to develop high-tech and high-efficiency GDP growth drivers, whereas “developing countries” have not undergone a transformation to absolute decoupling due to a lack in energy efficiency measures, disorganised industrial structures, and absence of Information Technologies (IT) in capital investment. These studies highlight a threefold causality: (1) we have lengthened commodity supply chains due to the abundance of readily available transport fuel; (2) this has been made possible by notably shifting and outsourcing more significant impacts to developing regions that take on primary extractive and secondary industries; (3) meanwhile, we have bought into the promise of circularity regarding the reuse of materials. Hass et al. (2015) illustrate that circularity is low mainly because most materials are not available for recycling in the first place and that the growth of materials injection into our systems outpaces any potential recycling attempt (See Sect. 15.4 for more details). Similarly, recently conducted reviews of empirical research conclude no robust evidence regarding decoupling. (For an exhaustive literature review of decoupling literature, see Parrique et al., 2019; Koirala et al., 2011; Mardani et al., 2019 among others). The Decoupling Debunked document (Parrique et al., 2019) concludes that there is no indication of decoupling that is absolute, global, permanent, and sufficiently fast and large enough both in terms of resources or impacts. Likewise, a review of 179 decoupling articles (Vadén et al., 2020) that appeared between 1990 and 2019 concluded with no evidence of economy-wide, national/international absolute resource decoupling and reckons that “the goal of decoupling rests partly on faith.” A recent exhaustive review, composed of a bibliometric mapping of 835 peer-reviewed articles (published in two parts, part I (Wiedenhofer et al., 2020) and part II (Haberl et al., 2020)) also highlight the need for substantial advances in both theoretical and empirical research required while also being complemented by alternative goals and ambitions. With unsuccessful robust and systemic evidence, reaffirming the findings of Hickel and Kallis (2020), absolute decoupling from resource use cannot be achieved on a global scale against a global scale backdrop of continued economic growth. In terms of accounting for emissions decoupling, a recent study by the Breakthrough Institute (Hausfather, 2021) highlights that 32 countries have managed to demonstrate economic growth while CO2 emissions declined since 2005, even when accounting for emissions embodied in the goods consumed in a country. However, they note with caution that these economies are already wealthy-service driven economies and that very few examples are present from low- or middle-income countries based on extractive industries and energy-intensive manufacturing to date. While this study can present a departure narrative of consumption-based emissions and absolute decoupling as we switch to clearer technologies, we must not forget that extraction and resource dependence remain intact on the supply side – supplies and sinks being the two sides of the same coin of the decoupling phenomena

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › AT Cap Solves X ! › 2nc- at- decoupling

Decoupling is an ecoliberal lie

Boyer, anthropology professor at Rice, 22

Dominic Boyer- anthropologist at Rice University; founding Director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Research in the Human Sciences; Berggruen Institute fellow. NOEMA. “Why We Have To Give Up On Endless Economic Growth”. . MARCH 3, 2022. AR.

One could argue that the whole promise of ecoliberalism lives or dies on the term “decoupled.” Unfortunately, there is scant evidence thus far that decoupling economic growth from resource use is both possible and sustainable. A major study published in 2021 that looked at both production- and consumption-based emissions from 2015 to 2018 in 116 mostly high-carbon national economies found that only 14 of them had been able to decouple GDP growth from both types of carbon emissions growth. That might seem like progress, since a similar study published in 2012 found that zero countries had achieved decoupling. But the 2021 study also found that 22 countries that had managed to decouple between 2010 and 2015 had actually recoupled again after 2015. In other words, decoupling requires both pressure and vigilance. Worse yet, the study found, “Even countries that have achieved absolute decoupling are still adding emissions to the atmosphere thus showing the limits of ‘green growth’ and the growth paradigm.” This is the ecoliberal dilemma in a nutshell. Legislation like the European Climate Law and the stalled Build Back Better plan in the U.S. show that sustainability efforts are scaling and speeding up — but the treadmill of global economic growth is still faster. The global supply of renewable energy will increase by about 35 gigawatts from 2021 to 2022. That would be marvelous news, if not for the fact that the world’s power demand is projected to increase by 100 gigawatts during the same year. The U.S. Energy Information Administration projects a 50% increase in world energy use by 2050, which renewables will only be able to partly cover, thus leaving the world in still worse emissions shape than it is today. The EIA growth data is more convincing than its prediction that the energy mix will still be predominantly made up of fossil fuels in 2050. Still, it underscores a genuine problem. We are working harder and better at sustainability but finding ourselves falling still further behind.

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › AT Cap Solves X ! › 2nc- at- renewables good

Technology cant solve- only commitment to slowing DOWN industrialization solves

DOMINIC BOYER- an anthropologist who teaches at Rice University, where he also served as Founding Director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Research in the Human Sciences (2013-2019). He is a 2021-2022 Berggruen Institute fellow. NOEMA. Why We Have To Give Up On Endless Economic Growth. . Accessed 3.25.23. MARCH 3, 2022. AR.

Mainstream liberals, and many ecoliberals, continue to laugh them off. But the laughter is increasingly nervous, a recognition that degrowth is likely on the horizon one way or another: either through collapse of the current civilizational trajectory or through some of kind of managed transition to widespread industrial and economic downscaling. In a fundamental way, liberalism finds it difficult to imagine, let alone to embrace, such a future. Liberalism has historically always been about the quest for “more.” It has no idea what to do with “less” as a rallying cry. Instead, at the moment, ecoliberalism (as well as the “green capitalism” that is its symbiotic companion) is betting the only hand it really knows how to play: technology. From massive investments in speculative technologies like nuclear fusion and deep geothermal, to the serial boondoggles of nuclear fission renaissance and carbon capture and humbler options like solar photovoltaic technology, everywhere ecoliberalism seeks the cure for several centuries of rampant industrialism in the emergence of new forms of industry. It imagines that it can beat out the worst scenarios of environmental collapse by coming up with a technological solution that allows us to have it all: that is, a universal so-called “middle class standard” predicated on massive energy and resource use that can center a global ecoliberal dispensation. But the truth is that it hasn’t yet found an ensemble of technological solutions that are adequate to take on even one of the several hyperobject-level environmental dilemmas facing us (e.g. global warming, plastic and toxic pollution, species extinction) let alone all of them together. And the solutions that is has found so far are not keeping pace with the rising global demand for “middle class” lifestyles. The problem is less the technologies themselves than the expectation that they must combine efficiently with a model of endless capital development. The more foresighted among contemporary ecoliberals — let’s say Elon Musk — combine a fabulous technological inventiveness with a clear thirst for the extraplanetary as the only way to keep the current ecological Ponzi scheme going more than another few decades. The truth is that if we stay on just this one planet, degrowth needs to be taken more seriously. Degrowth is not a new idea and urtexts like Gorz’s “Ecology as Politics”deserve reevaluation today. In it, Gorz argues that sustainability will never be attained in a capitalist economy because of a dynamic he calls the “poverty of affluence.” Like Marx, Gorz doesn’t doubt that capitalism is very effective at producing useful things through its constant innovation of technology. What also remains constant, however, is that new technology emerges in a context of scarcity that preserves class inequality and hierarchy. According to Gorz, new technological achievements and luxuries enjoyed first only by the elite attract the desires of the masses toward them. As the masses gain access to old luxuries, new unattainable luxuries develop to replace them. This dynamic is intrinsically growth-oriented: “the mainspring of growth is this generalized forward flight, stimulated by a deliberately sustained system of inequalities.” Even if capitalism can lift the floor of poverty as measured by consumption, it also raises the ceiling of luxury just as quickly. Technologies may themselves be helpful, but the dynamic of constant innovation and consumption is intrinsically unsustainable. Gorz imagines the world of degrowth as defined instead by universally available highly durable goods, beautiful public dwellings and transportation and a 20-hour work week focused on providing essential needs for all, with the remaining time left over for creative self-realization. Contemporary degrowth thinking is not simply Gorzian — it is an experimental space for many ideas including ecofeminist and Indigenous interventions like the Red Deal. But it tends to be at least loosely anti-capitalist in its orientation and critical of the luxury consumption trends of the global North. Degrowthers, generally speaking, do not wish to deprive the global South of the opportunity for material development. They want to see the degrowth of Northern high energy consumption, creating the opportunity for a more equitable planetary modernity. The core reasoning that the global economy needs to slow down — if only to buy ecoliberalism more time to solidify its consensus and improve its technology — is solid. And, in an ambitious way, degrowth synthesizes certain Keynesian and ecoliberal ideas into a worldview that seeks to remediate both social inequality and environmental destabilization at the same time. Contemporary degrowth theorists tend to share a Pikettyian sensibility that the world does not lack sufficient capital development to address human misery; rather, the problem is resource hoarding by wealthy nations and classes, meaning that the world distributes its abundant existing capital poorly. Here’s how Jason Hickel puts it in “Less is More: How Degrowth Will Save The World,” one of the more comprehensive and persuasive texts in the emerging degrowth canon: “Capitalism is a giant energy-sucking machine. In order to reduce energy use, we need to slow it all down. Slow down the mad pace of extraction, production and waste, and slow down the mad pace of our lives. This is what we mean by ‘degrowth’. Again, degrowth is not about reducing GDP. It is about reducing the material and energy throughput of the economy to bring it back into balance with the living world, while distributing income and resources more fairly, liberating people from needless work, and investing in the public goods that people need to thrive. It is the first step toward a more ecological civilisation.” Hickel joins ecoliberals in fierce opposition to obvious scandals like ongoing fossil fuel subsidies and the massive energy waste associated with speculative instruments like crypto. He also offers a rough list of intermediary objectives for making this new civilization, including: ending planned obsolescence, limiting advertising, shifting from ownership to usership, ending food waste, downscaling ecologically destructive industries (industrial beef for example), redistributing labor to avoid unemployment, and reskilling labor toward low carbon industries. Still, Hickel openly acknowledges that “we don’t yet have all the answers. No one can give us a simple recipe for a post-capitalist economy; ultimately it has to be a collective project. All I’ve done here is offer a few possibilities that I hope will nourish the imagination. As for how to make it happen — that will require a movement, as with every struggle for social and ecological justice in history.” The pivot away from degrowth governance and toward movement politics inevitably raises questions such as “degrowth by whom?” But I don’t think Hickel and others are trying to be evasive, so much as realistic that talking best practices of governance before a strong social movement emerges is a cart-horse reversal. And where the movements are already vigorous enough to impact governance — for example, Barcelona — the early results of experiments in creating a “solidarity economy” are encouraging. Cooperatives like Som Energíaand Som Mobilitatare more than conventional service providers offering electricity and EV ride sharing, respectively. They are active agents of energy literacy and degrowth ethics who are helping their customers learn to use less power and to drive only when truly necessary. Som Mobilitat even found a way to make degrowth less about denial by sponsoring a lively energy efficiency race, in which the objective was to see who could travel the farthest on a set charge. With all due respect to good governance, there’s nothing wrong with pursuing a creative, experimental and joyful approach to remaking civilization. Together with Cymene Howe and Daniel Aldana Cohen, I led a public event in Austin, Texas, a few years ago called “Low Carbon Leisure, Low Carbon Pleasure,” the point of which was to remind us high-carbon Northerners that much of what is truly enjoyable in life is either already low carbon or could find a low-carbon substitute with relative ease.

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › AT Cap Solves X ! › 2nc- at- renewables good

Capitalist renewables increase emissions.

Parrique et al. 19

Centre for Studies and Research in International Development (CERDI), University of Clermont Auvergne, France; Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC), Stockholm University, Sweden, Barth J., Briens F., C. Kerschner, Kraus-Polk A., Kuokkanen A., Spangenberg J.H. (Timothee, July, Decoupling Debunked: Evidence and arguments against green growth as a sole strategy for sustainability, European Environmental Bureau, https://mk0eeborgicuypctuf7e.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Decoupling-Debunked.pdf)

Not leading to relevant innovations

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › AT Cap Solves X ! › 2nc- at- cap/tech solves environment

even if green growth was good, the imperial core won’t give up fossil fuels.

Brand and Wissen, 21

[Ulrich, PhD Poly Sci @ Goethe University, Prof. Int’l Politics @ U Vienna; and Markus, Prof. Social Sciences specialising on socio-ecological transformation @ Berlin School of Economies and Law: “False Alternatives: From the Green Economy to a Green Capitalism?” Chapter 7 in The Imperial Mode of Living: Everyday Life and the Ecological Crisis of Capitalism (2021) published by Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78873-936-8]

Green capitalism is anything but inevitable. In many places, the creation of a green economy has encountered resistance from the fossil factions of capital and from people’s everyday practices. In the US especially, these forces have received an additional boost with the presidency of Donald Trump. There is a boom in the extraction of oil and gas through fracking, in tar sand oil extraction and in the exploration and exploitation of deep sea fossil energy sources. 42 In the EU, the transition to a renewable energy regime is slowed down by the Visegrád Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary). And even in places where green capital factions and practices are becoming socially relevant, they are in constant conflict with retrograde social forces. This description even applies to the ‘pioneer’ in renewable energies, Germany, where powerful social forces from industry, energy suppliers and trade unions are increasingly aggressive in articulating their resistance to the energy transition and find political advocates in state apparatus such as the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › AT Cap Solves X ! › 2nc- at- cap/tech solves environment

Absolute decoupling impossible with growth – can’t scale, and outsourcing and digitalization increase emissions.

Hickel et. al, 21

[Jason, Barcelona Autonomous University Environmental Science and Technology Institute Professor; Aljoša Slameršak, ICTA, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain; Paul Brockway, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, UK; Giorgos Kallis, ICREA and ICTA, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain; Lorenz Keyßer, Institute for Environmental Decisions, D-USYS, ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland; Manfred Lenzen, ISA, School of Physics, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia; Julia Steinberger, Institute of Geography and Sustainability, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland; and Diana Ürge-Vorsatz, Department of Environmental Sciences and Policy, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary: “Urgent need for post-growth climate mitigation scenarios,” Nat Energy 6, 766–768 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-021-00884-9]/

Several studies have raised questions about the feasibility of achieving absolute decoupling on the scale required by these scenarios. Empirical evidence demonstrates a strong relationship between GDP and energy use18. Relative decoupling has been occurring for most countries, particularly high-income countries, but we must be mindful of the extent to which the latter is an effect of the geographical disjuncture between where production takes place and where GDP is captured. At regional and global levels, there is no evidence of absolute decoupling18, and modelled projections indicate that with existing growth trajectories, absolute reductions in energy use are unlikely to be achieved19. One possible reason for this is that in a growth-oriented system, productivity improvements are leveraged to expand production and consumption20, often leading to large rebound effects that are not accounted for in existing scenarios17,21. These conclusions hold despite a significant shift to services and digitalization over the past decades. In fact, tertiarization in industrialized countries22, as well as the efficiency improvements achieved through digitalization23, have led to increases in energy use and CO2 emissions. The same is true when it comes to resource use. The empirical record demonstrates a strong relationship between GDP and material footprint18, and modelled scenarios show that under growth-as-usual conditions absolute reductions in resource use are unlikely to be achieved at a global level even with dramatic efficiency improvements, in large part because of rebound effects3.

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › AT Cap Solves X ! › 2nc- at- cap/tech solves environment

The affs attachment to liberalism kills us in the end- technology is what allowed for capitalist colonial occupation

Boyer, professor of anthropology at Rice, 22

DOMINIC BOYER- an anthropologist who teaches at Rice University, where he also served as Founding Director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Research in the Human Sciences (2013-2019). He is a 2021-2022 Berggruen Institute fellow. NOEMA. Why We Have To Give Up On Endless Economic Growth. . Accessed 6.17.23. MARCH 3, 2022. AR.

Of the three core concerns of liberalism — liberty, private property and industry — the attachment to industry is strongest. Liberalism champions freedom and liberty relentlessly, but it has always quietly tolerated dispossessing and even enslaving some as the cost of enabling others. The private property commitment is more resolute, but certain variants of liberalism, notably Keynesianism, have displayed strong commitments to redistributive mechanisms in the name of public goods and national welfare. Industry, meanwhile, is liberalism’s one true love, a connection that dates back to the dawn of liberal political philosophy. In his “Second Treatise,” John Locke, for example, describes labor as intrinsic to the establishment of property: “As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property.” But not even all hard work is created equal. Much as Adam Smith would later echo in this theory of opulence, technology combined with labor (in other words, industry) was the decisive formula for creating value out of the natural resources God gifted humanity. Technology functioned, according to the philosophy of the time, as a sign of grace dividing the world into those with the rational wherewithal to make the most of divine gifts (European men mostly) and those who allowed their gifts to lie fallow and go to waste. How this equation functioned as a pretext for global colonial occupations and dispossessions for several centuries is the subject for another essay. My point here is that there is an ancient symbiotic relationship between liberal political ideology and the industrial growth orientation that is usually glossed as the internal logic of capitalism. Buried in growth is the pursuit not just of profit, but also of grace, and above all the moral right to accumulate resources and exert dominion. I believe this history sheds light on why ecoliberalism hasn’t yet proved itself capable of fully acknowledging, let alone remediating, the problems (ecological but not only ecological) created by its centuries-long legacy of relentlessly expanding industrialization. These problems are constantly discounted and marginalized in mainstream liberal politics. Back in the 1970s, when the unsustainability of the current global trajectory first came into clear focus, the few, like André Gorz, who were brave enough to talk about the obvious need for “degrowth” were laughed out of the political sphere.

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › AT Cap Solves X ! › 2nc- at- cap/tech solves environment

Magdoff 12

Fred Magdoff, Professor emeritus of plant and soil science at the Unviersity of Vermont, “Harmony and Ecological Civilization,” Monthly Review, June 2012, Vol. 64, Issue 2, p. 1-9

The growth imperative of capitalism deserves special attention because it is one of the major stumbling blocks with respect to harmony between humans and the environment. Accumulation without end means using ever greater quantities of resources—without end—even as we find ways to use resources more efficiently. An economy growing at the very meager rate of 1 percent a year will double in about seventy-two years, but one growing at 2 percent a year, still a low rate, will double in size in thirty-six years. And when growing at 3 and 4 percent, economies will double in twenty-four and eighteen years respectively. China recently has seen recorded growth rates of up to 10 percent, meaning economic output doubles at a rate of approximately every seven years! Yet, we are already using up resources far too fast from the one planet we have—depleting the stocks of nonrenewable resources rapidly and misusing and overusing resources that are theoretically “renewable.” If the world’s economy doubles within the next twenty to thirty years this can only hasten the descent into ecological, and probably societal, chaos and destruction. Thus capitalism promotes the processes, relationships, and outcomes that are precisely the opposite of those needed for an ecologically sound, just, harmonious society. In the alienated ideology and practice of bourgeois society, Marx and Engels noted in The German Ideology, “the relation of man to nature is excluded from history and hence the antithesis of man to nature is created.” Proletarians thus had the historical task of bringing their “‘existence’ into harmony with their ‘essence’ in a practical way, by means of a revolution” (italics added).3 Only in this way could they reestablish a harmonious connection to nature and to their own production. That Marx and Engels were referring directly to the early stages of what we now call the ecological crisis is indicated by the following: “The ‘essence’ of the fish is its ‘being,’ water—to go no further than this one proposition. The ‘essence’ of the freshwater fish is the water of a river. But the latter ceases to be the ‘essence’ of the fish and is no longer a suitable medium of existence as soon as the river is made to serve industry, as soon as it is polluted by dyes and other waste products and navigated by steamboats, or as soon as its water is diverted into canals where simple drainage can deprive the fish of its medium of existence.”4

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › Alternative › 2nc- alt solves- dual power / base building good

Base-building and dual power organizing with the aim of supplanting the state through revolution to impose a monopoly of the working class is the only hope for resolving the contradictions of capitalism.

Burns, 18

Sophia Burns, communist and devotional polytheist: "Revolution Is Not a Metaphor: A Response to Critics," GODS & RADICALS, published June 15, 2018.

This week, two people have published critiques of my work, using it as a stand-in for the political tendency I’m part of: revolutionary base-building, exemplified by the Marxist Center network, Cooperation Jackson, and parts of DSA Refoundation. Revolutionary base-building means rejecting “activist networking” in favor of organizing the unorganized outside of elections. It involves independent workplace organizations, tenant unions, community self-defense, and mutual aid. Antonio Balmer argues that base-building is just empty populism. He compares it to the Narodnik movement of 19th-century Russia, which saw middle-class anti-monarchists “go to the people” by moving to peasant villages and occasionally assassinating aristocrats. Balmer contrasts them with the Bolsheviks, who built an organized political party capable of leading a revolution, and suggests that base-builders pay too little attention to Marxist theory and revolutionary leadership. Shamus Cooke takes a different angle. He quotes Lenin’s pamphlet “Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder to claim that I reject class struggle in favor of a depoliticized mutualism. (Mutualism is a flavor of anarchism that calls for worker-owned co-ops to peacefully replace capitalism by out-competing traditional firms in the marketplace.) According to Cooke: Burns’ gradualist approach ignores the fact that revolutionary situations are often brief, requiring a battle for power at all levels of society. Nearly all revolutions begin as massive, mostly-spontaneous mobilizations, so it would behoove a revolutionary to understand the abc’s of organizing mobilizations. Mass mobilization, however, barely registers as an activity that Burns believes a revolutionary should engage in. The term class war implies there is an open struggle between the classes. Burns wants us to only engage in guerrilla tactics that don’t attract the attention of the establishment. But if ever such tactics actually succeed in challenging power, the ruling class would aggressively respond, since their economic and political power would actually be threatened, at which point Burns’ approach would be rendered useless, requiring a completely different strategy. The “completely different strategy” he advocates involves combining base-building methods, electoral work, and conventional activism to shift “the balance of forces” against “the establishment.” What does that look like concretely? Cooke repeatedly cites the city-level electoral and lobbying efforts of his own organization, Portland Tenants United. Balmer and Cooke agree: revolutionary base-builders are anti-theory, anti-political, don’t believe in party-building, don’t believe in class confrontation, and don’t have a vision for socialism or revolution. Base-building means mutual aid, and mutual aid is another word for depoliticized charity work. Base-builders say they want socialism, but don’t have the stomach to fight for it. Now, if you reduce revolutionary base-building to mutual aid, you’re misrepresenting it. Workplace and tenant organizing (along with community self-defense) account for much more of what base-builders actually do than mutual aid. But, it’s true that “base-building” is itself not a political strategy; it’s a set of techniques. So, what defines revolutionary base-building? Is it just methods? Are Balmer and Cooke right – do base-builders really expect to win socialism without a strategy, without the bother of class struggle? MEANS AND ENDS Anyone can base-build. How does any organization develop a base of support? It organizes previously-unorganized people. It campaigns against their enemies while offering mutual-aid, cultural, and social activities. It puts its own work above networking with the already-converted. Churches, businesses, political parties, and fan clubs all use some variant of the formula. Base-building methods, in that sense, are just how you build an effective organization. Since revolutionary base-builders use those techniques and most of the activist Left doesn’t, they provide the tendency’s form. They don’t provide its content. Base-building is a tool, nothing more. A hammer can help you make a table; it can also smash a flowerpot. “Youth organizing” can mean the March for Our Lives. It can also mean the Black Panther Party. Without the methodology of base-building, you can’t organize a constituency capable of exercising social power. But who are you organizing? What is that social power for? We are revolutionaries. That’s literal. We seek “the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions.” That includes the private ownership of economically productive property; the division of labor and benefits according to white supremacy, patriarchy, and empire; and the existence of the capitalist government. That won’t happen by winning elections or voting for socialism. It won’t happen through one-cooperative-at-a-time mutualism, either. Rather, it means building up revolutionary capacity by cultivating a mass base within the working class. When the conditions are right, it will mean launching a revolutionary uprising to establish a monopoly on the legitimate use of force by participatory-democratic organs of the working class. It will mean restructuring the economy according to a democratic, ecological, and scientific plan based on production for human use, not private profit. Our ideas don’t make us revolutionary. Ideology runs deeper than the things you think. What’s the long-term trajectory implied by what you’re actually doing? That’s your ideology. We build institutions of class confrontation and mutual aid outside of the state, against the state, and in order displace the state. That trajectory makes us revolutionary – what we are, not what we say. Electioneering, lobbying, and waving signs may well involve revolutionary slogans, taking the form of radical politics. But, they lack the content. What happens when activist leftists have a mass movement? They tie it institutionally to the state, cutting off its ability to exercise social power directly, on its own terms. That road doesn’t lead to collective power – just brokerage within the existing order. We don’t base-build for the sake of base-building. Our practice flows from and, in turn, shapes our revolutionary agenda. We are not cultivating an electorate for “movement” politicians. Revolutionary base-building is a process of preparation for collective self-government, for the seizure of power by the working class. Sure, delivering here-and-now gains does matter, but it’s never the point. Socialism means more than “a chicken in every pot.” DRAWING LINES Government socialism can’t end capitalism. Structurally speaking, the capitalist state can’t be separated from its function; it serves the ruling class, bottom to top. Expanding it doesn’t advance socialism. At best, it just rearranges exploitation (while institutionally tying the Left to the survival and success of the state). The impulse to deliver real gains, even if they’re small, make sense, but government socialists squeeze the revolutionary essence, the political content, out of socialism. Protest militancy isn’t up to the task either. Small-group heroics don’t make history. Organized power does. Confrontational protests feel “more revolutionary” to their participants because they’re more disruptive. But do they lead to oppressed people becoming organized in a durable way? Do they increase their long-term capacity to exercise collective power? Government socialists want tangible benefits and ignore or defer revolutionary ideas. Protest militants treat their ideas as a substitute for mass organization. Revolutionary base-builders, though, synthesize organizing for tangible gains with the long-game commitment to literal revolution. That synthesis doesn’t mean talking like protest militants and behaving like government socialists, though. Rather, it’s built into the process of organizing the unorganized to change their own conditions and confront their enemies themselves, rather than mediating it through the nonprofits or the state. (Indeed, the Marxist Center network takes its name from the course between those two possible distortions.) Base-building methods aren’t conventional activism. That matters, if only because “base-building” is another word for “organizational techniques that actually work” – but revolutionary base-builders are after more than just a social base. No matter what Bernie Sanders says, political revolution means replacing the government, not reforming it. The point is to create organizational structures through which power can be transferred from the few to the many, from the ownership class to the dispossessed. That transfer doesn’t happen piecemeal. It isn’t a gradual process where reforms (or mutualist co-ops!) stack on top of each other until one morning, you wake up to find that capitalism is gone. The capitalist state can’t not uphold the rule of the capitalist class. Base-building just to create another electoral or activist constituency, without that revolutionary goal and opposition to the state, has nothing to do with socialism. It doesn’t weaken capitalism. It just creates another avenue for capitalist politics, even if you call it “socialism,” even if it takes the form of base-building.

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › Alternative › 2nc- alt solves- climate

The alternatives movement is capable of solving the crises generated by capitalism via socialist innovation

Foster 19

(John Foster, Prof of Sociology at the Univ of Oregon, “Capitalism Has Failed – What Next?” Monthly Review, , 02/01/19, DOA: 06/19/2023, AR)

It is capitalism’s undermining of the very basis of human existence that will eventually compel the world’s workers and peoples to seek new roads forward. An inclusive, class-based movement toward socialism in this century will open up the possibility of qualitative new developments that the anarchy of the capitalist-market society with its monopolistic competition, extreme inequality, and institutionalized greed cannot possibly offer.99 This includes the development of a socialist technology, in which both the forms of technology utilized and the purposes to which they are put are channeled in social directions, as opposed to individual and class gain.100 It introduces the prospect of long-term democratic planning at all levels of society, allowing decisions to be made and distributions to occur outside the logic of the cash nexus.101 Socialism, in its most radical form, is about substantive equality, community solidarity, and ecological sustainability; it is aimed at the unification—not simply division—of labor. Once sustainable human development, rooted not in exchange values, but in use values and genuine human needs, comes to define historical advance, the future, which now seems closed, will open up in a myriad ways, allowing for entirely new, more qualitative, and collective forms of development.102 This can be seen in the kinds of needed practical measures that could be taken up, but which are completely excluded under the present mode of production. It is not physical impossibility, or lack of economic surplus, most of which is currently squandered, that stands in the way of the democratic control of investment, or the satisfaction of basic needs—clean air and water, food, clothing, housing, education, health care, transportation, and useful work—for all. It is not the shortage of technological know-how or of material means that prevents the necessary ecological conversion to more sustainable forms of energy.103 It is not some inherent division of humanity that obstructs the construction of a New International of workers and peoples directed against capitalism, imperialism, and war.104 All of this is within our reach, but requires pursuing a logic that runs counter to that of capitalism. Humanity, Karl Marx wrote, “inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation.”105 The very waste and excess of today’s monopoly-finance capitalism, together with the development of new means of communication that allow for greater human coordination, planning, and democratic action than ever before, suggest that there are countless paths forward to a world of substantive equality and ecological sustainability once the world is freed from the fetters of capital.106 The answers to the crises before us are both social and ecological. They require the rational regulation of the metabolism between human beings and nature under the control of associated humanity—regenerating and maintaining the flows, cycles, and other vital processes of healthy, local, regional, and global ecosystems (and species habitats)—in accord with the needs of the entire chain of human generations. The mainsprings of human action throughout history lie in the drive for human freedom and the struggle to master our relation to the world. The first of these ultimately demands equality and community; the second, human development and sustainability. It is on these struggles for collective advancement that we must ultimately rely if humanity is to have a future at all.

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › Alternative › 2nc- alt solves- climate

Only the alternative can solve climate change and ensure climate justice – capitalism will lead to further exploitation and sacrifice of poor and non-white people

Molyneux 19

(John Molyneux, a leading member of the Socialist Workers Party, lecturer at the Univ of Portsmouth, “Socialism is the only realistic solution to climate change,” Capitalism & Climate, , 10/01/19, accessed 06/19/23, JCR]

A lot has been written, including by myself, on why capitalism, by its very nature, cannot tackle or stop climate change. The purpose of this article is not to repeat those arguments but to make the positive case for socialism as necessary to deal with this existential crisis for humanity. By socialism I mean simply the combination of two things: public ownership and democratic control of production and society. By public ownership I mean not the elimination of personal private property or the nationalization of every small business and corner shop but of the main banks, corporations, industries, services and utilities. For example, public ownership of bus and transport networks, of the health service, of one main state bank and one main state insurance company, of social housing, of waste management, of water, electricity, gas, wind and solar power production, of Larry Goodman’s ABF Food Group, of Denis O’Brien’s Communicorp and so on. By democratic control I mean that each major workplace — each hospital, factory, train station, school, university, construction company etc. — should be run by the elected and re-callable representatives of its workforce, within the context of a democratic plan for the economy and society as a whole. That would need to be proposed by government based on and accountable to democratically elected popular assemblies. Without large scale public ownership, capitalism and the laws of the capitalist market will continue to dominate and this will have disastrous consequences for the environment as it has done already. Without democratic control you have not got socialism but state capitalism[1] with a new ruling class of state bureaucrats which, as has been seen in Stalinist Russia and in China, also has terrible ecological consequences because it subordinates the needs of the people and nature to accumulation for accumulation’s sake in competition with other states. Only through socialism will it be possible to generate both the political will at the top and the genuine popular support and collaboration to achieve the immense coordinated transformation of the national and international economy necessary in the current emergency. Only public ownership and democratic planning can coordinate the establishment and expansion of free public transport, the urgent transition to renewal energy, the mass retrofitting of homes and a vast program of aforestation and rewilding. A Just Transition Most of the climate and environmental movement support the idea of a just transition but only socialism with its commitment to ending class privilege and inequality can actually deliver this. In any society where there are billionaires alongside homeless people, and immense divisions between rich countries and poor countries as a result of imperialism and globalized capitalism, all attempts at transition to ending carbon emissions, even where they are made, will inevitably be structured and blighted by this inequality. The rich will look to protect themselves and their life styles in gated communities in the uplands while trying to shift the burden of paying for the transition onto ordinary people. Take the example of transport. If, as is absolutely essential, we get people out of the private car and onto free public transport, what will be the consequences of this? Under capitalism it will mean the bosses of the giant auto companies (Volkswagen, Toyota, General Motors etc) will see which way the wind is blowing, loot their own companies and put the proceeds in their Swiss bank accounts, while throwing their hundreds of thousands of workers on the scrap heap. Under socialism the auto industry CEOs and big shareholders could be relieved of their ill-gotten gains while the rundown of the industry is managed in a way that retrains and re-employs the workers in socially useful work, e.g. building wind turbines or buses. The same applies to flying. If air travel were to be reduced, as it must be to save the planet,[2] under capitalism this would most likely be done by a price mechanism so that executives would continue to jet round the world to their conferences while ordinary people had to give up their holidays to Spain and the Greek Islands. That in turn would mean redundancy for airline workers and crisis in the Spanish and Greek tourist industry. Again only socialist planning could solve this. And it would be the same for the utterly deadly coal industry. When Margaret Thatcher destroyed the British coal industry in 1984-5 she did it for entirely capitalist ‘economic’ reasons — there wasn’t an ounce of environmentalism in it — but the effect on mining communities and villages was devastating; many have still not recovered. Avoiding such communal destruction on a vastly greater scale requires socialist planning. Thinking Globally Climate justice on a global scale is totally unthinkable without socialism. Five hundred years ago the different continents and regions of the world were roughly at the same level of economic development; for example China was every bit as economically advanced as Europe and India was seen as a rich country. Centuries of capitalism, slavery and imperialism, with the latter growing out of the former, created an immensely uneven world; industrial production, wealth and power became concentrated in the so-called advanced ‘West’ — essentially Europe and North America—with poverty, starvation and lack of industrial development concentrated in Asia, Africa and Latin America, now usually called the Global South. This pattern has changed somewhat in recent decades with massive capitalist development in China and other parts of South and East Asia but it is still a massive reality across much of the world. Historically and still today the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America have contributed least to climate change but will be hugely disproportionately affected by it. For example a 1.5-2 C global temperature increase will be a death sentence for much of Africa because it will destroy their agriculture; melting Himalayan glaciers and rising sea levels will utterly devastate the deeply impoverished Bangladesh. This cannot be challenged or dealt with without socialist redistribution of wealth and socialist planning internationally. Only socialist internationalism based on the common interests of the world’s working people could achieve such international cooperation; any capitalist option, no matter how ‘green’ its intentions, would degenerate into national and international rivalries which would destroy any coherent international planning. Then there is the question of overall economic growth. There is a growing view in the environmental movement that the idea of continuous economic growth is completely unsustainable. Greta Thunberg, in her speech to the UN, spoke of “fairy tales of eternal economic growth.” But under capitalism stagnation or, even more so, de-growth is an immediate crisis, a recession when it is short and a ‘great depression’ when it is extended, spelling mass unemployment, poverty and austerity (with the risk of fascism thrown in). This is because capitalism has a drive to growth built into its very fabric. Achieving a non-growth economy (measured in terms of GDP) or, should it prove essential, a de-growth in certain areas would also only be possible on the basis of socialist planning combined with the popular consent that would come from mass involvement in the democratic planning process. Escalating Natural Disasters Then there is the fact that the proliferation of extreme weather events associated with climate change has already begun, as is evident from the numerous disasters currently observable round the world. This is clearly going to intensify in the years ahead. Even in the event of a Damascene conversion by the world’s rulers — of which there is no sign — it is unavoidable, due to the climate change already built into the system, that we will see a dramatic escalation of ‘natural’ catastrophes — storms, floods, droughts, fires etc — over the next 5-10 years. But we know from abundant experience that the way capitalism responds to such events is through a combination of crocodile tears (for a very short while), followed by callous indifference and abandonment. This pattern has repeated itself through the Bush Administration’s response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005, to Superstorm Sandy in 2012 under Obama and Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico in 2017. In all of these cases all sorts of pledges of aid and reconstruction were made in the immediate aftermath of disaster only for them to disappear into thin air when it came to delivery. Years later people who lost their homes and everything in them were still unable to return. The case of Hurricane Maria was particularly atrocious. Initially the death toll was officially claimed to be 64. A year later it was admitted to be 2,975[3] and many critics argue that it was really much higher. Bitterness at the appalling response to the Hurricane, by both the Trump administration and the local governor, was a significant factor in the great revolt of the Puerto Rican people earlier this year. On a lesser scale similar scenarios were played out over the Grenfell Fire and in relation to flood victims in Ireland. Moreover, class and racial privileges will continue to operate even within the extreme weather events as happened with Katrina in New Orleans and the more frequent and extensive these are the more this will be the case. The rich and white will be saved, while the poor and black will be sacrificed and demonized as ‘dangerous looters’. When we grasp the fact that escalating climate change will make events like the California fires, Hurricane Dorian in the Bahamas and flooding in Bangladesh a regular and ongoing occurrence — regardless of what is done to stop it now — it is clear that a socialist response at governmental and societal level is necessary to cope with them and minimize the death toll and human suffering. In other words we will need huge state intervention resting on popular participation and solidarity to rescue the victims, feed the hungry and house the homeless. Speaking of housing the homeless it is worth noting that rich societies such as the US, Britain and Ireland, operating on a capitalist basis, cannot even do this in normal times: what will they be like in time of catastrophe? Moreover, rising temperatures and extreme weather will inevitably increase the flow of refugees — probably massively so — because swathes of the planet will cease to be habitable, and in the next decade, not the end of the century. How will the better placed countries respond? On the basis of a capitalist economy, an economy based on the profit motive, it’s hard to see how there will be any even moderately humane response. Again, only a socialist economy and society — which harnesses the collective labor and talents of all and understands that with every new person comes a new and equal contributor to society regardless of nationality, color or ethnicity — will respond with dignity and humanity.

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › Alternative › 2nc- alt solve- ov

The alternative’s structural analysis is key to interrogate political action within its framework of political reference and attends to the systemic dynamics of the capitalist social order. This is the only method that can guide emancipatory political strategy.

Azmanova 20 [Albena, Prof of Political and Social Science at the University of Kent, Capitalism on the Edge: How Fighting Precarity Can Achieve Radical Change without Crisis or Utopia, p.57-9]

This leads me to the final element of the theoretical model that guides my analysis: the notions of emancipatory and radical practices. I noted in tenet 4 that social practice is the main unit of analysis, referring to intersubjective action through which people both create their social reality and make sense of it. As Marx observed, herein lies the potential for radical emancipatory transformation, for “revolutionary” or “practical- critical” activity (Marx [1845] 1969, theses I and III). In light of the three forms of domination delineated above, I propose to define emancipatory social practices as ones that target these forms of domination. The term radical practice, however, I reserve for practices that aim to eradicate systemic domination. Successful radical change would therefore not necessitate a political revolution, a terminal crisis of capitalism, or a utopia to steer us toward transformation. Radical change would be a matter of mobilizing a broad coalition of social forces to engage in radical practices meant to eliminate injustices rooted in the systemic dynamics of capitalism, namely the competitive production of profit. As to the vocation of intellectual critique, I have averred that the purpose of critique is not to spell out principles of justice or features of the good life, but to bring to light the sociostructural origin of experiences of injustice in order to articulate a path for emancipation by reducing oppression (Azmanova 2011c, 117; 2012b, 50– 52, 228– 36; 2012c). However, only by targeting systemic domination can there be radical change. To be truly radical, therefore, a critical theorist needs at minimum to identify and signal the danger of deepening systemic domination while fighting successfully other forms of domination— to alert against the “paradox of emancipation.” The ultimate goal of the critical enterprise is to illuminate possible alliances (beyond animosities over the unfair distribution of resources and opportunities) that are capable of delivering such radical change. It is time to attempt to put the above elements of analysis into a formula of critique and ask what it would mean to conduct a normative and diagnostic analysis of our contemporary social and political order from the perspective of critical social theory. Such analysis would proceed from a specific grievance, preferably one perceived largely as a social pathology, and use it as an empirical entry point. It would then trace the manner in which grievances of injustice, expressed by civil society, affect the framework of political reference by making these concerns politically salient in a particular way, namely, having to do with the fair distribution of life- chances as specified by the dominant legitimation matrix. It would scrutinize the terms in which grievances are politicized— that is, how they obtain political significance as claims to justice and appeals for policy action— and how they eventually alter the legitimacy deal between citizens and public authority. Further, the inquiry would direct attention to the structural and systemic dynamics of the social order: the three forms of domination and patterns of injustice related to them. It would seek to identify those antinomies (contradictions) of contemporary capitalism that foster historically particular, but structurally general experiences of injustice from which normatively generalizable notions of justice can be derived. Such an analysis should be guided by the following questions: What are the key dynamics at work within the political economy of contemporary capitalism? In other words, what are the drivers in the formation and distribution of life- chances in the globally integrated capitalism of the early twenty- first century? How do these dynamics trigger structural antinomies that in turn translate into historical patterns of social injustice within the trajectories of relational, structural, and systemic domination? What is the common denominator behind the various, often conflicting grievances? What places them in an agonistic dialogue of a meaningful disagreement about injustice? This will eventually allow us to derive normatively generalizable notions of justice that can guide progressive politics as strategies of emancipation befitting the historical circumstances of our times. These strategies will take shape as emancipatory practices that target relational, structural, and systemic forms of domination.

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › Links › 2nc- link- environmental crisis

The aff’s mobilization of eco-crisis rhetoric is to maintain the authority of neoliberal institutions and disavow class antagonism

Nikula, PhD Researcher in Social and Economic Geography, 17

Ilari Nikula, PhD Researcher in Social and Economic Geography at the University of Lapland. Neoliberal Environmentalism, , 08/06/17, DOA: 06/19/23. AR

The language of environmentalism is full of talk of ‘necessities’ and ‘imperatives’, and often rests on the idea of impending catastrophe. Ferry (1993, 140) argues that fear is a fundamental political ambition and the foundation pillar of the political programme of environmentalism. Instead of argument, the sheer force of necessity and urgency seems to be the grounds for actualizing the environmental prescriptions without consideration of wider social scenarios. Thus, while politics is the art of contingent, it cannot operate in a field of necessity. Furthermore, speeded by this urgency and the global nature of the issue, ecological crisis reduces the sphere of democratic political deliberation and debate as issues are centralized under technocratic management and consensual policymaking of global institutions, like Kyoto protocol. In this process fundamental ideological disputes and disagreements are denied, as the current presentation of the ecological crisis as a “supra-national and non-class-specific global crisis” transcends all social differences. Swyngedouw (2010, 219) furthermore argues that sustaining and nurturing catastrophic imaginaries is an integral and vital part of the new cultural politics of capitalism for which the management of fear is a central leitmotif. At the symbolic level, catastrophic imaginaries are extraordinarily powerful in disavowing or displacing social conflict and antagonisms. As such, catastrophic imaginations are decidedly populist and foreclose a proper political framing (ibid.). It is argued that the environmental problematique is moving us towards a post-political, or post-democratic state. The writers such as Chantal Mouffe, Slavoj Žižek, and Jascues Rancière have written about this post-political world. Post-politics emphasizes the need to leave old ideological visions behind, we are persuaded to confront new issues, armed, not with democratic decision making processes, but with the necessary expert knowledge of enlightened cosmopolitan technocrats. Post-politics is marked by the predominance of a managerial logic in all aspects of life. The political is reduced to administration where decision-making is increasingly considered to be a question of expert knowledge and not of political position. The political as the space of litigation in which the excluded can protest the injustice done to them is, thus, foreclosed. Proper political choice between competing visions of a different social order is slowly reduced by totalizing threats that permit only one direction. (Swyngedouw 2010.) This post-political world eludes choice and freedom, other than those tolerated by the consensus.

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › Links › 2nc- link- environmental crisis

Environmentalism is the newest neoliberal mechanism used entrench neoliberal governance

Nikula, PhD Researcher in Social and Economic Geography, 17

Ilari Nikula, PhD Researcher in Social and Economic Geography at the University of Lapland. Neoliberal Environmentalism, , 08/06/17, DOA: 06/19/23. AR

In the public discourse it is generally viewed that environmentalism acts as a counterforce to neoliberalism, or as a limiting force to capitalism. Adopting the global environmental discourse is often seen as opposing the injustices created by the current capitalist system and the only alternative to accepting the logic of current neoliberal system. The global environmental cause, and primarily the climate change, is to be understood as a weapon to use in an ideological struggle. Naomi Klein’s book ‘This Changes Everything: Climate versus Capitalism’ (Klein 2014) is a good illustration of this position. Klein makes explicit this instrumental role that climate change plays for her: “I realized the science of global warming … could be a catalyst for forms of social and economic justice in which I already believed” [p.59]. In this manner, as Hulme (2015) has noted, climate change thus becomes a synedoche for the evils of global capitalism. This paper examines this relation of environmentalism to neoliberalism. But, on the contrary, the aim of this paper is to offer a rebuttal, contrary arguments to the above-mentioned understanding. The paper presents a perspective that sees the concern for global environmental degradation as a source on which new neoliberal governance structures have been created and which strengthens the underpinnings of the current neoliberal frameworks of power. Since the birth of modern environmental discourse some scholars have pointed out the implicit consequences of global environmental concerns that are complicit with and supportive of the growth neoliberal systems of governance (Golub and Townsend 1977). Today, there is an established academic discussion on neoliberal environment. It is discussed from different perspectives and in different contexts by, for example, Heynen et al. (2007), McCarthy & Prudham (2004), Robertson (2004), Mueller and Passadakis (2009; 2010), Hajer (1995), Crawford (2009), Swyngedouw (2010), Escobar (1996), Luke (1997), Shantz (2003), and Bachram (2004), Spehr 1999, and Reid (2012a). This literature considers the ways in which environmental governance, and environmentalism as a set of political movements, coincide, articulate, and even constitute the emergence of global neoliberal frameworks. A central theme in the literature is that the primary response of the global environmental regime to the environmental crisis during the last few decades has been marked by a massive expansion in ‘environmental finance’. From ‘carbon markets’ to ‘pollution permits’, ‘climate derivatives’ and ‘catastrophe bonds’, we are seeing a proliferation of nature-related financial products. The past few decades have witnessed a rapid increase in the involvement of private corporations in resource ownership, and the provision of ‘ecosystem services’. Simultaneously, markets and market proxies have been deployed as mechanisms of environmental governance at multiple scales. The concept of nature as capital has gained visibility in policies and practices in both the public and private sectors. The environmentalism this regime is pushing forward is certainly not limiting neoliberalism. Here the conception of ‘global environment’ and its crisis, has by itself been the argument why all aspects if nature need to be marketisized. Today, the real or presumed environmental crisis can be seen as an engine of neoliberalization of our world. Invoking environmental crisis has strategically functioned in the global expansion of neoliberalism by naturalising its frameworks of governance. In this sense, the arguments presented in this paper are putting the ecological crisis upside-down: environmentalism that appears a threat to the system now becomes a vehicle for its very innovation.

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › Links › 2nc- link- redistribution

Redistributive policies reinforce the legitimacy of the capitalist system

Azmanova 20 [Albena, Prof of Political and Social Science at the University of Kent, Capitalism on the Edge: How Fighting Precarity Can Achieve Radical Change without Crisis or Utopia, p.7-8]

The unfairness of inequality has become the dominant frame of social protest since the Occupy movement proudly stated, “We are the 99 percent.” I take this indignation, which I address in the first chapter, to be a symptom not of the crisis of capitalism but rather of its unfailing good health. This is the case because remonstrations against inequality present the matter of capitalism’s numerous and grave failures as issues that can be easily tackled with a dose of redistributive policies and strengthened oversight. Thus, what appears to be a radical challenge to neoliberal capitalism is instead a reinforcement of it, as we inevitably validate the model of life into which we seek equal inclusion— what I describe as “the paradox of emancipation.” Public protests thus unwittingly relegitimize the social system they purport to challenge as they seek to diminish the inequalities neoliberalism has engendered without addressing the root causes of the economic and social crisis. (Note that the growth of inequality was an outcome of this crisis, not a cause of it.) Thus, capitalism has continued to prosper despite growing public dissatisfaction. Its economic engine is having considerable difficulties with delivering growth and prosperity for all, yet the legitimacy deal in Western societies has been altered so as to endow it with renewed authority. There is no crisis of capitalism. We inhabit, instead, a crisis of the crisis of capitalism, as I shall suggest.

2023 GDI Kritik
Capitalism K › Links › 2nc- link- redistribution

Calls for redistribution protect capitalism from a legitimation crisis by diverting attention from the social order itself, coopting emancipatory politics

Azmanova 20 [Albena, Prof of Political and Social Science at the University of Kent, Capitalism on the Edge: How Fighting Precarity Can Achieve Radical Change without Crisis or Utopia, p.131-4]

It is not simply the alliance of center- left and center- right party elites and the electorates that propel them to public office who are the culprits for imposing “socially irresponsible rule.” The radical Left and the Far Right have done their share in contracting the space of political contestation. Calls against inequality (from the left) and for safeguarding societies from troublesome incomers (from the right) share a particular logic: they help to politicize the social evils that globally integrated capitalism incurs in the terms of distribution of membership within a given social order. This prevents questioning the social order within which equality and inclusion are being sought. When social harm is thematized in terms of inclusion and equality, it misrepresents instances of what I labeled as systemic injustice in chapter 2 as relational injustice instead. In other words, problems of the model of well- being generated by the sociopolitical system are translated as problems of one’s place or inclusion within it. This invites remedial policies of redistribution or inclusion/exclusion rather than radically altering the rules of the game. The most disturbing example of the fallacious politicization of otherwise valid social grievances is the recourse to xenophobia, where political actors have used the most easily available language of political mobilization— that of hatred— to cash in on social discontent. With the exception of environmental protest, which does indeed target the overall logic of capital accumulation (the way goods are produced, distributed and consumed), the shared myopia across forms of social protest and intellectual critique involves focusing attention on instances of injustice rooted in the asymmetrical distribution of economic, political, or symbolic power among actors, a practice engendering inequalities and exclusion. The logical solution, then, is to equalize power relations through redistribution and inclusion, rather than alter the very logic of social reproduction. This inability to question the political economy of capitalism and the democratic framework of politics in terms other than distribution and inclusion persists. It is well illustrated by the Occupy movement and what are now considered radical calls for justice, such as “We Are the 99 Percent” and “Tax the Rich.” While anger is rightly and poignantly mobilized against the uneven distribution of advantage in our societies, it leaves the mechanisms that produce advantage unquestioned— and the whole way of life sodden with injustice for all. The elimination of power inequalities within a system of social relations is valuable in its own right, but such efforts have tended to divert attention away from forms of domination rooted in the operative logic of the social system beyond a concern with equality and inclusion within that system. This is not an unfortunate oversight that can be remedied easily. It is driven by a compelling logic: the insistence on inclusion and equality within a certain model of well- being gives that model validity and vigor. We have to value the world within which we seek inclusion and equality; the harder the struggle to achieve access and status within that world, the more we value it. In chapter 2, I referred to this conundrum as the “paradox of emancipation.” By falling into the trap of the emancipation paradox, social protest and intellectual criticism inadvertently fortify the legitimacy of capitalism, without solving the social crisis. We remain trapped in the inflammatory condition I called “crisis of the crisis.” It is in this metamorphosis of the legitimacy relationship of current- day capitalist democracies that we find the key to the two paradoxes of the missing crisis of capitalism that I laid out in chapter 1. Capitalism avoids its legitimation crisis, even as it has violated the ground rule in its legitimation matrix of correlating social opportunities and risks. This is the case because the legitimacy deal— not despite, but through social protests— has gradually altered to exclude a robust social safety net. Social safety, even as it remains highly desirable, is no longer among the “political deliverables”— services public authority is required to deliver. By politicizing the roots of the crisis (e.g., a political economy that produces massive precariousness) into the frames of inequality and the menace of immigration, struggles against injustice are enabling the system not only to escape a legitimation crisis, but also to successfully co- opt the emancipatory energies of protest and thus regenerate itself. The pleading cry of the young Spanish Indignados— “We are not against the system, the system is against us”— was hardly a call for a revolution.