2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Inequality*** › #2 Extension – UBI can’t solve inequality
Sculos, Florida International University, Political Science Professor, 18
[Bryant W. Sculos, 2018, Creative Commons, “Socialism and Universal Basic Income,” , 6/27/2023, EJ]
First, it is quite true that not all UBI programs would be worth supporting. Any UBI program that would have the likelihood of leaving the poor and vulnerable worse off should certainly be opposed by any socialist or progressive. This kind of welfare-state replacement UBI is the kind that white supremacist and conservative thought-leader Charles Murray and other libertarians often support. 3 However, simply because not all UBI programs are worth supporting, does not mean that there are not thick or expansive conceptions of UBI that absolutely are. An example of a conception of UBI that socialists should support would be one that is—as the acronym requires—universal and also set at or above subsistence. This means that all people, regardless of their ability or willingness to work, would at least be much more likely to live a life without lacking any fundamental necessities. A subsistence (or higher) UBI would likely only be able to achieve the goal of eradicating extreme poverty if it was also combined with a universal health care and tuition-free public higher education system. If the poor still had to pay or go into massive debt to afford basic health care and education, a subsistence UBI would be nearly functionally irrelevant—or worse.
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Inequality*** › #2 Extension – UBI can’t solve inequality
Kelly 22
Kelly, Lauren. Re-politicising the future of work: Automation anxieties, universal basic income, and the end of techno-optimism. Journal of Sociology, 0(0). . October 9, 2022. Accessed: 06/15/23. AR.
For automation theorists across the political spectrum, UBI smooths the transition from a reliance on wages, to an era of technological unemployment in which human labour is largely obsolete. Even if such assumptions are unfounded, the UBI proposals advanced by progressive automation theorists are worthy of consideration. They highlight the urgent need to provide baseline security for all workers (both employed and unemployed), to ensure one's ability to live a decent life is not determined by employment status, and to weaken the coercive wage labour relationship. However, by understanding UBI as ‘ambivalent yet biased’ towards the preferences of the dominant class, and a site of ‘contested terrain’, it becomes clear that radical UBI proposals put the cart before the horse. That is, to obtain the kind of UBI capable of fundamentally transforming the balance of power between workers and employers would require a degree of bargaining power and collective organising among progressive coalitions that does not currently exist. Instead, many progressive UBI proposals are put forward precisely because, it is argued, collective action is no longer able to deliver transformative change for workers. From this weakened position of desperation, a socially transformative UBI will not be gifted from conservative governments. Such a gain can only be collectively fought for and won by broad community and worker movements. Just as actually existing workplace automation reproduces capitalist imperatives, so too will UBI reflect the political context of its implementation. That is, it is more likely to serve the interests of anti-welfare, anti-worker neoliberal states, and a market logic wherein essential basic services are privatised and often unaffordable.
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Inequality*** › #1 Extension – Automation overstated
Hughes, Bull Oak Capital Founder, 23
[Ryan A. Hughes, Jan 27 2023, Bull Oak Capital, “Universal Basic Income is a Bad Idea,” , 6/24/23, EJ]
As stated earlier, Andrew Yang believes that robots and automation will purge America of countless jobs. Will automation replace some jobs? Yes. It is almost guaranteed that some jobs will be phased out. But other, more meaningful jobs will be created in its place. This has been the case since the rise of humanity.
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Inequality*** › 1NC Inequality frontline
Louis F. Cooper 16, Ph.D. from the School of International Service at American University, “WPTPN: Will Populist Nationalism Lead to Great-Power War?”, The Duck of Minerva, 12/6/2016, https://www.duckofminerva.com/2016/12/wptpn-will-populist-nationalism-lead-to-great-power-war.html
Several reasons present themselves. First, nuclear weapons have given the prospect of a global war, or any great-power war, a possibility of civilization-ending finality that it did not have in the past. Second, the security architecture created under U.S. leadership after World War II has arguably worked to reduce the likelihood of major armed conflict among the great powers. Third, the existence of a network of international institutions, both inside and outside the UN system, has pushed in the same direction. Fourth, it is very possible that, as John Mueller and Christopher Fettweis have argued, decision-makers have to come see great-power war as “subrationally unthinkable, or not even part of the option set for the great powers.”[ii] The extreme destructiveness of the twentieth century’s world wars, fueled partly by developments in technology, might well have produced long-term effects on how leaders and publics think about global or great-power war, in a way, for instance, that the Napoleonic Wars, for all their horror and bloodiness, did not.
Phil Arena’s recent contribution to this series argues that if the U.S. under a Trump administration signals an unwillingness to defend its allies, then Putin might be tempted to gamble on an invasion of the Baltics or Kim Jong-Un similarly might gamble on an invasion of South Korea (and that would drag in China). Putting aside Kim Jong-Un for the moment as a special case, let’s consider Putin. As long as NATO exists---and Trump, despite his statements about the unfairness of the distribution of cost burdens, has not suggested, as far as I’m aware, that he wants to dissolve the alliance---then Putin would have to assume that an attack on the Baltics would trigger a NATO response. Even if Putin does not see great-power war as unthinkable or outside his “option set,” one would assume that for reasons of pure self-interest he would not want to risk a nuclear war. Nor, one might think, would he want to jeopardize the prospect of better (from his standpoint) relations with a U.S. administration less concerned with, among other things, his commission of war crimes in Syria or his annexation of Crimea than the Obama administration has been.
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Inequality*** › 1NC Inequality frontline
Sawhill, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies, 16
(Isabel V. Sawhill, is a senior fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution, working in the Center on Children and Families and on the Future of the Middle Class Initiative, “Money for nothing: Why a universal basic income is a step too far” https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/2016/06/15/money-for-nothing-why-a-universal-basic-income-is-a-step-too-far/)
Liberals have been less willing to openly acknowledge that a little paternalism in social policy may not be such a bad thing. In fact, progressives and libertarians alike are loath to admit that many of the poor and jobless are lacking more than just cash. They may be addicted to drugs or alcohol, suffer from mental health issues, have criminal records, or have difficulty functioning in a complex society. Money may be needed but money by itself does not cure such ills.
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Inequality*** › 1NC Inequality frontline
Dorn, University of South Carolina Honors College International Business and Finance Student, 23
[Chase, May 2023, University of South Carolina, “Free Money: The Feasibility of Implementing a Universal Basic Income in the United States”, https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/senior_theses/587/, accessed 6/27/2023, S.P.]
The possibility of two thirds of the workforce having their job restructured and salaries cut is extremely unlikely, as is the threat of mass unemployment. After all, automation is supposed to help, not hurt, us, right? In the highly influential essay, Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace, David Autor argues that worry over the threat of automation as a substitute for human labor is often exacerbated by overstatement from journalists and commentators (2015). Meanwhile, the manners in which human labor and automation complement each other are often glossed over, leaving the increases in productivity and creation of more labor demand largely understated. It is not the loss of jobs that is cause for concern, as prior studies have found no significant long run increase in unemployment, and the labor market has proven to be historically adaptable through centuries of innovation and automation moving demand to different sectors. Instead, it is how this trend disproportionately affects the population that is most worrisome
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Innovation*** › #4 Extension – Russia kills ILO
John J. Mearsheimer, ’19, April 1, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” International Security (2019) 43 (4): 7–50. https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/43/4/7/12221/Bound-to-Fail-The-Rise-and-Fall-of-the-Liberal
Finally, the crusader mentality that underpins the attempts to build a liberal international order leads to the poisoning of relations between the unipole and any major power in the system that is not a liberal democracy. Although the dominant state will be strongly inclined to make war on minor powers to promote liberal democracy, it will rarely ever attack major powers for that purpose, especially if they possess nuclear weapons.56 The costs would be too great, and the likelihood of success would be especially low. Hence, U.S. policymakers in the post–Cold War period have never seriously considered invading China or Russia, even though the United States is far more powerful than either of those countries.
Nevertheless, the United States has been committed to turning China and Russia into liberal democracies and absorbing them into the U.S.-dominated liberal world order. U.S. leaders have not only made their intentions clear, but they have also relied on nongovernmental organizations and various subtle strategies to push Beijing and Moscow toward embracing liberal democracy. In effect, the aim is peaceful regime change. Predictably, China and Russia have resisted the unipole's efforts for the same reason that minor powers have contested U.S. efforts to shape their domestic politics, and indeed for the same reason that Americans now recoil at the idea of Russia interfering in their country's politics. In a world in which nationalism is the most powerful political ideology, self-determination and sovereignty matter hugely for all countries.
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Innovation*** › #3 Extension – No China impact
Sutter 14 (Robert Sutter, Prof @ George Washington University, China-U.S. Focus, Why China Avoids Confronting the U.S. in Asia, 3/19/14, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/why-china-avoids-confronting-the-u-s-in-asia-2/)
Forecasts talk of U.S. retreat from domineering China or an inevitable U.S.-China conflict. However, enduring circumstances hold back Chinese leaders from confronting America, the regional leader.¶ Domestic preoccupations¶ Chinese economic growth and one-party rule require stability. And protecting Chinese security and sovereignty remains a top concern. Though China also has regional and global ambitions, domestic concerns get overall priority.¶ President Xi Jinping is preoccupied with uncertain leadership legitimacy, pervasive corruption, widespread mass protests, and unsustainable economic practices. Beijing’s reform agenda requires strong leadership for many years. Under these circumstances, Xi was unusually accommodating in meeting President Obama in California in 2013; he seeks a new kind of major power relationship. Xi also presides over China’s greater assertiveness on territorial issues that involve the United States, but thus far Chinese probes avoid direct confrontation with the superpower.¶ Mutual interdependence ¶ Growing economic and other U.S.-China interdependence reinforces constructive relations. Respective “Gulliver strategies” tie down aggressive, assertive, or other negative policy tendencies through webs of interdependence in bilateral and multilateral relationships. ¶ China’s insecurity in Asia ¶ Nearby Asia is China’s top foreign priority. It contains security and sovereignty issues (e.g. Taiwan) of highest importance. It is the main arena of interaction with the United States. Its economic importance far surpasses the rest of world (China is Africa’s biggest trader but it does more trade with South Korea). Asian stability is essential for China’s economic growth—the lynch pin of Communist rule. Facing formidable American presence and influence and lacking a secure periphery, China almost certainly calculates that seriously confronting the United States poses grave dangers. ¶ Chinese strengths in Asia include extensive trade and investment; webs of road, rail, river, electric power, pipeline and other linkages; leadership attention and active diplomacy; and expanding military capabilities. Weaknesses are:¶ 1. Chinese practices alienate near-by governments, which broadly favor key aspects of U.S. regional leadership. Leadership involves costly and risky efforts to support common goods involving regional security and development. China avoids such efforts unless there is a payoff for a narrow Chinese win-set. It “cheap rides,” hoarding resources to deal with serious domestic challenges. ¶ 2. Chinese assertiveness toward neighbors puts nearby governments on guard and weakens Chinese regional influence. It revives the PRC’s justified Cold War reputation for disruption, domination and intimidation. ¶ 3. China achievements in advancing influence in Asia since the Cold War are mediocre. China promotes an image of consistent and righteous behavior in foreign affairs; this is believed in China but is so far from reality that it grossly impedes effectively dealing with disputes. The PRC has the truly exceptional position among major powers as having never acknowledged making a mistake in foreign policy. When China encounters a dispute with neighbors, the fault never lies with China. If Beijing chooses not to blame the neighbor, it blames larger forces usually involving the United States. The noxious mix also emphasizes China’s historic victimization. In sum, Beijing is quick to take offense and impervious to recognizing China’s fault and needed change. ¶ State relationships vacillate and remain encumbered. Relations with Japan are at their lowest point. India is more wary of China today than ten years ago. Russian and Chinese alignment waxes and wanes; it’s waning over Ukraine and Crimea. Taiwan moves closer to China, but its political opposition remains opposed. ¶ South Korean opinion of China declined sharply from a high point a decade ago and struggles to recover. Disputed claims in the South China Sea seriously complicate often close economic relations with Southeast Asian countries. China’s remarkable military modernization seriously concerns major trading partners; Australia is much more wary of China than ten years ago. ¶ Trade in Asia remains heavily interdependent. Half of Chinese trade is conducted by foreign invested enterprises in China. 60 percent of the goods that are exported from China and ASEAN are ultimately manufactures that go to the United States, Europe and Japan. Only 22 percent of these goods stay in the China-ASEAN region. Actual Chinese aid (as opposed to financing that will be repaid in money or commodities) to Asia is very small, with the exception of Chinese aid to North Korea. ¶ China has shown no viable way of dealing North Korea, perhaps the largest foreign insecurity for the Xi Jinping government. ¶ Chinese insecurities are reinforced by U.S. strengths as America influences and leads in Asia: ¶ Security guarantor. Most Asian governments stress development that requires a stable and secure environment. Unfortunately, Asia is not particularly stable and Asian governments tend to distrust one another. They rely on the United States to maintain regional stability. The U.S. security role is very expensive and involves great risk, including many casualties if necessary. Neither China nor any other Asian power or coalition of powers is able or willing to undertake even a fraction of these risks and costs. ¶ Essential economic partner. Most Asian governments depend importantly on export oriented growth. Growing Asian trade relies on the United States. Most notably, Asian exports lead to a massive trade surplus with the open U.S. market. China consistently avoids such costs that nonetheless are very important for Asian governments. ¶ Government engagement. Apart from China, the Obama government’s rebalance has been broadly welcomed in Asia. U.S. military, other security and intelligence organizations have developed unprecedented wide ranging relationships with almost all regional governments, a posture strongly shaping Asian security. ¶ Non-government engagement. America is extraordinary in longstanding business, religious, educational, media and other non-government interchange which is widespread, uniquely influential and strongly reinforces overall U.S. sway. Generally color-blind U.S. immigration policy since 1965 means that millions of Asian migrants call America home and interact with their countries of origin in ways that undergird U.S. interests. ¶ Asian hedging. As China’s rises, Asian governments seek to work pragmatically with China, but they also seek the reassurance of close security, intelligence, and other ties with the United States, especially as China becomes more assertive. ¶ Bottom line. The Obama government rebalance seeks stability while fostering economic growth and overlaps constructively with the priorities of the vast majority of regional governments. China seeks advantageous economic interchange, but its remains insecure as its ambitions, coercion, intimidation and gross manipulation come at neighbors’ expense.
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Innovation*** › #1 Alt – China unbeatable
REUTERS. China holds 'stunning lead' over US in competition for key technology. . MARCH 2, 2023. AR.
China has a "stunning lead" in 37 out of 44 critical and emerging technologies as Western democracies lose a global competition for research output, a security think tank said on Thursday after tracking defense, space, energy and biotechnology. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) said its study showed that, in some fields, all of the world's top 10 research institutions are based in China. The study, funded by the United States State Department, found the United States was often second-ranked, although it led global research in high-performance the most-cited scientific papers, which it said are the most likely to result in patents. China's surprise breakthrough in hypersonic missiles in 2021 would have been identified earlier if China's strong research had been detected, it said. "Over the past five years, China generated 48.49% of the world's high-impact research papers into advanced aircraft engines, including hypersonics, and it hosts seven of the world's top 10 research institutions," it said. In the fields of photonic sensors and quantum communication, China's research strength could result in it "going dark" to the surveillance of western intelligence, including the "Five Eyes" of Britain, United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, it said. National talent flows of researchers were also tracked and monopoly risks were identified. China was likely to emerge with a monopoly in 10 fields including synthetic biology, where it produces one-third of all research, as well as electric batteries, 5G, and nano manufacturing. The Chinese Academy of Sciences, a government research body, ranked first or second in most of the 44 technologies tracked, which spanned defence, space, robotics, energy, the environment, biotechnology, artificial intelligence (AI), advanced materials and quantum technology. China was bolstering its research with knowledge gained overseas, and the data showed one-fifth of the top Chinese researchers were trained in a Five Eyes country, it said. The study recommended visa screening programs to limit illegal technology transfers and instead favour international collaboration with security allies.
computing, quantum computing, small satellites and vaccines. "Western democracies are losing the global technological competition, including the race for scientific and research breakthroughs," the report said, urging greater research investment by governments. China had established a "stunning lead in high-impact research" under government programs. The report called for democratic nations to collaborate more often to create secure supply chains and "rapidly pursue a strategic critical technology step-up".
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Innovation*** › #1&2 Extension – U.S. winning on AI now
Toner, Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology Director of Strategy and Foundational Research Grants, et al., 23
[Helen Toner, Jenny Xiao, AI venture capitalist, Jeffrey Ding, George Washington University Political Science Assistant Professor, 2 June 2023, Foreign Affairs, “The Illusion of China’s AI Prowess,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/illusion-chinas-ai-prowess-regulation?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20230629 , 6/2923, EJ]
Take, for instance, the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence’s WuDao 2.0 model. After its release in the summer of 2021, Forbes thrilled at the model as an example of “bigger, stronger, faster AI,” largely because WuDao 2.0 boasted ten times more parameters—the numbers inside an AI model that determine how it processes information—than GPT-3. But this assessment was misleading in several ways. Merely having more parameters does not make one AI system better than another, especially if not matched by corresponding increases in data and computing power. In this case, comparing parameter counts was especially unwarranted given that WuDao 2.0 worked by combining predictions from a series of models rather than as a single language model, a design that artificially inflated the parameter count. What’s more, the way researchers posed questions to the model helped its performance in certain trials appear stronger than it actually was.
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Innovation*** › #1&2 Extension – U.S. winning on AI now
Toner, Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology Director of Strategy and Foundational Research Grants, et al., 23
[Helen Toner, Jenny Xiao, AI venture capitalist, Jeffrey Ding, George Washington University Political Science Assistant Professor, 2 June 2023, Foreign Affairs, “The Illusion of China’s AI Prowess,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/illusion-chinas-ai-prowess-regulation?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20230629 , 6/2923, EJ]
Over the past three years, Chinese labs have rapidly followed in the footsteps of U.S. and British companies, building AI systems similar to OpenAI’s GPT-3 (the forerunner to ChatGPT), Google’s PaLM, and DeepMind’s Chinchilla. But in many cases, the hype surrounding Chinese models has masked a lack of real substance. Chinese AI researchers we have spoken with believe that Chinese LLMs are at least two or three years behind their state-of-the-art counterparts in the United States—perhaps even more. Worse, AI advances in China rely a great deal on reproducing and tweaking research published abroad, a dependence that could make it hard for Chinese companies to assume a leading role in the field. If the pace of innovation slackened elsewhere, China’s efforts to build LLMs—like a slower cyclist coasting in the leaders’ slipstream—would likely decelerate.
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Innovation*** › #1&2 Extension – U.S. winning on AI now
Toner, Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology Director of Strategy and Foundational Research Grants, et al., 23
[Helen Toner, Jenny Xiao, AI venture capitalist, Jeffrey Ding, George Washington University Political Science Assistant Professor, 2 June 2023, Foreign Affairs, “The Illusion of China’s AI Prowess,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/illusion-chinas-ai-prowess-regulation?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20230629 , 6/2923, EJ]
In the abstract, these concerns make sense. It would not serve U.S. interests if a regulatory crackdown crippled the domestic AI industry while Chinese AI companies, unshackled, could flourish. But a closer look at the development of AI in China—especially that of large language models (LLMs), the text generation systems that underlie applications such as ChatGPT—shows that such fears are overblown. Chinese LLMs lag behind their U.S. counterparts and still depend in large part on American research and technology. Moreover, Chinese AI developers already face a far more stringent and limiting political, regulatory, and economic environment than do their U.S. counterparts. Even if it were true that new regulations would slow innovation in the United States—and it very well may not be—China does not appear poised to surge ahead.
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Innovation*** › #1&2 Extension – U.S. winning on AI now
Wolf ’21 [Martin; April 27; Chief Economics Commentator, M.A. in Economics from Oxford University; Financial Times, “China is wrong to think the US faces inevitable decline,” ]
The Chinese elite are convinced that the US is in irreversible decline. So reports Jude Blanchette of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a respected Washington-based think-tank. What has been happening in the US in recent years, particularly in politics, supports this perspective. A stable liberal democracy would not elect Donald Trump — a man lacking all necessary qualities and abilities — to national leadership. Nevertheless, the notion of US decline is exaggerated. The US retains big assets, notably in economics.
For one and half centuries, the US has been the world’s most innovative economy. That has been the basis of its global power and influence. So how does its innovative power look today? The answer is: rather good, despite competition from China.
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Innovation*** › 1NC AI frontline
John J. Mearsheimer, ’19, April 1, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” International Security (2019) 43 (4): 7–50. https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/43/4/7/12221/Bound-to-Fail-The-Rise-and-Fall-of-the-Liberal
The fall of the liberal international order horrifies the Western elites who built it and who have benefited from it in many ways.1 These elites fervently believe that this order was and remains an important force for promoting peace and prosperity around the globe. Many of them blame President Donald Trump for its demise. After all, he expressed contempt for the liberal order when campaigning for president in 2016; and since taking office, he has pursued policies that seem designed to tear it down.
It would be a mistake, however, to think that the liberal international order is in trouble solely because of Trump's rhetoric or policies. In fact, more fundamental problems are at play, which account for why Trump has been able to successfully challenge an order that enjoys almost universal support among the foreign policy elites in the West. The aim of this article is to determine why the liberal world order is in big trouble and to identify the kind of international order that will replace it.
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Innovation*** › 1NC AI frontline
Dougherty global fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute and Jay chief digital officer at the University of Washington's Evans School of Public Policy, 2018
[Jill Dougherty (@jillrussia) is a global fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute and a CNN contributor. and Molly Jay is chief digital officer at the University of Washington's Evans School of Public Policy and Governance., 5/23/18, The Wilson Quarterly, “Russia Tries to Get Smart about Artificial Intelligence ” https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA551651574&sid=googleScholar&v=2.1&it=r&linkaccess=abs&issn=03633276&p=AONE&sw=w&userGroupName=gonzagaufoley&aty=ip, 6/29/23, PE]
Lying with AI Artifical intelligence, in Russia and elsewhere, has the potential not only to help expose the truth--as in revealing shopping patterns or uncovering criminals--but to deceive as well. A study by Harvard University's Belfer Center warns that AI will "dramatically enhance capabilities for the collection and analysis of data, but also the creation of data." In intelligence operations, there will be more sources from which to discern the truth, the paper argues, but "it will also be much easier to lie persuasively." Russia already used machine learning--a subset of AI that enables machine to improve at tasks with experience--to deploy armies of bots, targeted ads, and more during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. Since the vote, post-mortems have revealed the specifics of how Russian intelligence exploited social media platforms like Facebook to create fake user accounts and, from those, spread disinformation, disseminate divisive content on issues like racial justice and gay rights, and sway support. In a prime example of the dual nature of AI, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg told Congress last month that AI would help win the cyber "arms race" with Moscow. In contrast to China, Russia rarely uses propaganda in the West to tout its own achievements. Instead, Moscow seeks to undermine Western democracy and exploit failures and weaknesses in Western institutions. Its approach to AI sometimes mirrors that strategy. "Right now, Russia does not have the means to compete with the United States and China, which have both marshalled more significant human capital and strategic investment," says Eleonore Pauwels, director of the AI Lab at the Wilson Center. "Yet, the AI know-how that Russia has can be used for creating chaos on the international scene. Creating chaos is cheap, but comes at a cost for other actors." (In a prime example of the dual nature of AI, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg told Congress last month that AI would help win the cyber "arms race" with Moscow.) There are more sophisticated AI-powered disinformation applications on the way. One striking example is machine learning technology recently developed by researchers at the University of Washington that can literally put words in the mouth of a political leader. The Seattle-based team took audio of former President Barack Obama speaking about terrorism and other subjects, converted that audio into mouth shapes using a mouth synthesis technique, then joined that with video of Obama recorded at another time. Could a lip-synching president "declare" war on another country? It's among the more hypotheticals of a new, AI-quipped world. A Military Focus For now, Russia's drive for AI parity is concentrated primarily on its military. In Syria, Moscow uses AI-equipped drones as well as an AI-equipped unmanned underwater vehicle that seeks out unexploded ordnance. The Russian armed forces also have ambitious plans to implement AI technology in combat aircraft, missiles, and electronic warfare systems, an area in which they already have formidable expertise. To develop new, Russian-made technology, however, requires unleashing a new generation of developers--and a new philosophical approach--says the American Foreign Policy Council's Bendett. "A lot of young scientists, and young Russians in the Russian military, grew up in the digital age, just like their American and Chinese counterparts," he says. "Many of these young people probably went and studied overseas and brought that experience home, so the Russian military will probably build on that." But can it keep that talent home? In 2010, the Kremlin broke ground on its much-hyped Skolkovo Innovation Center, a sprawling tech campus on the outskirts of Moscow, which aimed to foment start-up culture and ignite venture capitalism. Results have been paltry and some critics blame the top-down approach. "The MOD is trying to install the American-style culture of flexibility to certain military innovations and developments," says Bendett. But translating Silicon Valley into Russian won't be easy: "Russia lacks that type of infrastructure right now and is trying to re-create it almost from scratch." In March, at the Defense Ministry's first conference on artificial intelligence, Minister Sergey Shoigu urged military and civilian scientists to join forces in developing AI technology which, he said, was crucial for countering "possible threats to the technological and economic security of Russia." That stated approach is similar to the Pentagon's DIUx program, which provides capital to fund pilot contracts for commercial innovation with military applications. The Russian government also has created the Foundation for Promising Research, which supports high-tech innovation for the country's defense and national security. It's modeled on the U.S. government's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, which works with innovators inside and outside of government to invest in breakthrough technologies. The Defense Ministry is even planning to build an entire city for military innovation. An article on the website Red Star, the Ministry's Soviet-born official publication, describes "Era" as a "military innovation technopolis." Located in Anapa, a picturesque town on Black Sea, it would provide more than 2,000 young military scientists the opportunity to pursue research in eight fields, including AI, robotics, and super-computing. While the project sounds reminiscent of the "closed" military-industrial cities in which scientists lived and worked during the Cold War, the plan is to build Era in cooperation with the private sector.
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Innovation*** › 1NC AI frontline
Lu 21 (Jie Lu is Head of Investments China in the Asia Pacific team. Before joining Robeco in 2015, he worked at Norges Bank Investment Management as a Portfolio Manager in Shanghai from 2011 to 2015, and as an Analyst in Hong Kong from 2009 to 2011. Prior to that, he worked at the M&A department of Morgan Stanley Asia. Jie started his career at Motorola in 2000 and is a native Mandarin Chinese speaker. He holds an MBA with Distinction in Finance and Marketing from Northwestern University in the US. He also holds a Master’s in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from the University of Illinois and a Bachelor's in Biochemistry from Fudan University in China. “China: navigating the push towards technology leadership”, May 10th 2021, https://www.robeco.com/us/insights/2021/10/china-navigating-the-push-towards-technology-leadership.html)
After more than three decades of accelerated catchup with more advanced economies, China is now engaged in a race for global technology leadership. Having turned into ‘the world’s factory’, China now aspires to become the planet’s innovation barycenter too. Research and development (R&D) statistics illustrate this ambition. Supported by higher economic growth, China is actually expected to take global R&D leadership this year, and outspend the US for the very first time.1 China now leads the pack in many areas, such as artificial intelligence (AI), 5G telecommunication networks, ultra-high voltage electricity networks or high-speed rail. While China’s technology push is hardly news, rising tensions with the West, in particular with the US, have put it under the spotlight. Over the past few years, Chinese officials have increased their emphasis on the need to become less dependent on foreign technology. Some have even theorized a so-called ‘technology decoupling’, advocating self-sufficiency in a number of critical industries. However, one key consideration to bear in mind is that China’s technology push amid rising tensions with the US does not necessarily herald a full economic decoupling, nor an era of deglobalization, as some have argued.2 For now, US restrictions on exports to China issued in 2020 remain essentially focused on a few select technologies, where non-US alternatives are difficult to find. Meanwhile, China's main policy goal remains to improve the country’s manufacturing capability to produce higher value-added goods and services, and keep the economic growth engine roaring. Policy makers acknowledge that this will be impossible without importing advanced technologies from the US, Europe, Japan, or South Korea. China’s technology ambitions were formally articulated in 2015 with the ‘Made in China 2025’ (MIC 2025) initiative, a ten-year comprehensive blueprint aiming to modernize further the country’s industrial base. MIC 2025 identifies ten strategic sectors, including aerospace equipment, medical devices, or high-tech ships, in which China intends to excel and secure a leading position. Focus on a few selected technologies Even under the MIC 2025 umbrella, the designated ten core industries are clearly not all being pursued with the same intensity. In recent years, China has been prioritizing efforts in a small number of emerging technologies, including AI, semiconductors, robotics, and new energy vehicles (NEVs), 3 with colossal efforts being deployed from a human and a financial perspective. AI, for instance, is perhaps the area in which China has achieved the most spectacular results and secured a clear leading position at global level.4 The Chinese AI-related ecosystem benefits from various supporting factors, including the country’s gigantic market size which provided a unique opportunity to assemble large datasets, and a long-standing friendly policy environment. AI is perhaps the area in which China has achieved the most spectacular results and secured a clear leading position at global level China seems therefore poised to become a leader in AI-empowered businesses, like speech and image recognition applications. At global level, the main AI services providers remain large US technology giants, but Chinese firms are catching up fast. China already employs the world’s largest cohort, by far, of AI professionals, with over 12,000 AI jobs in 2019, versus roughly 7,500 for the US.5 Another area where strong progress has been made NEVs. China has the world’s largest fleet of NEVs in circulation, far ahead of Europe and the US, as well as the world’s largest battery-charging network. And although the country’s NEV car registrations were overtaken by European ones last year, it remains one of the most dynamic markets, largely dominated by local manufacturers. Figure 3: Market share of top five battery makers China has also managed to secure a leading position in various areas of the NEV supply chain. This is especially the case for electric battery production, where the largest Chinese manufacturers have emerged as global leaders along with their South Korean and Japanese competitors. Altogether, China accounts for over 70% of global battery cell production capacity. 6 Three investment themes China’s technology push is offering opportunities in many industries, but finding these is not always straightforward. Not all initiatives have lived up to expectations, so far, and political will does not warrant success. Yet that does not mean opportunities in areas where results have been mixed are entirely absent, nor that policy success will necessarily lead to attractive returns for investors. From this perspective, we have identified three major investment themes worth considering: the relentless rise of NEVs, the advent of ‘industry 4.0’ in China, and an increased focus on the localization of supply chains. Given the bright prospects these three trends offer, we believe this is where some of the most interesting opportunities are to be found
2023
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NEG › ***NEG – Innovation*** › 1NC AI frontline
Scharre, PhD in war studies from King's College London and an MA in political economy , 2021
[Paul, 6/28/21, Texas National Security Review, “Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory, , 6/29/23, PE]
There is no AI arms race. However, military competition in AI does still pose certain risks. These include losing human control and the acceleration of warfare, as well as the risk that perceptions of an arms race will cause competitors to cut corners on testing, leading to the deployment of unsafe AI systems. In 2015, a group of prominent AI and robotics researchers signed an open letter warning of the dangers of autonomous weapons. “The key question for humanity today,” they wrote, “is whether to start a global AI arms race or to prevent it from starting. If any major military power pushes ahead with AI weapon development, a global arms race is virtually inevitable.”1 Today, many nations are working to apply AI for military advantage, and the term “AI arms race” has become a catchphrase used by both critics and proponents of AI militarization. In 2018, then-Under Secretary of Defense Michael Griffin, calling for the United States to invest more in AI, stated, “There might be an artificial intelligence arms race, but we’re not yet in it.”2 In a 2020 Wired article, Will Roper, then chief acquisition officer for the U.S. Air Force, warned of the risks of falling behind in a “digital arms race with China.”3 The so-called AI arms race has become a common feature in news headlines,4 but the arms race framing fails to match reality. While nations are clearly competing to develop and adopt AI technology for military use, the character of that competition does not meet the traditional definition of an arms race. Military AI competition nevertheless does pose risks. The widespread adoption of military AI could cause warfare to evolve in a manner that leads to less human control and to warfare becoming faster, more violent, and more challenging in terms of being able to manage escalation and bring a war to an end. Additionally, perceptions of a “race” to field AI systems before competitors do could cause nations to cut corners on testing, leading to the deployment of unsafe AI systems that are at risk of accidents that could cause unintended escalation or destruction. Even if fears of an “AI arms race” are overblown, military AI competition brings real risks to which nations should attend. There are concrete steps nations can take to mitigate some of these dangers. Current Military AI Competition Is Not an “Arms Race” As Heather Roff has written, the arms race framing “misrepresents the competition going on among countries.”5 To begin with, AI is not a weapon. AI is a general-purpose enabling technology with myriad applications. It is not like a missile or a tank. It is more like electricity, the internal combustion engine, or computer networks.6 General-purpose technologies like AI have applications across a range of industries. Wired magazine co-founder Kevin Kelly has argued that it “will enliven inert objects, much as electricity did more than a century ago. Everything that we formerly electrified we will now cognitize.”7 Nations may very well be in a technology race to adopt AI across a range of industries. AI will help to improve economic productivity and, by extension, economic and military power. During the industrial revolution, early adopters of industrial technology significantly increased their national power. From 1830 to 1890, Britain and Germany, which were both early industrializers, more than doubled their per capita gross national product while Russia, which lagged in industrialization, increased its per capita gross national product by a mere 7 percent over that 60-year period.8 These technological advantages led to increased economic and military power, most notably for Europe relative to the rest of the world. In 1790, Europe (collectively), China, and India (including what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh) held roughly the same shares of global manufacturing output, with Europe and India each holding about one-quarter of global manufacturing output and China holding roughly one-third. They all had approximately equivalent levels of per capita industrialization at that time. But the industrial revolution skyrocketed European economic productivity. By 1900, Europe collectively controlled 62 percent of global manufacturing output, while China held only six percent and India less than two percent. These economic advantages translated into military power. By 1914, Europeans occupied or controlled over 80 percent of the world’s land surface.9 Being ahead of the curve in adopting AI is likely to lead to significant national advantages. Although AI can increase military capabilities, the more consequential advantages over the long term may come from non-military AI applications across society. Long-term benefits from AI could include increased productivity, improved healthcare outcomes, economic growth, and other indicators of national well-being. Increasing productivity is especially significant because it has a compounding effect on economic growth. Over the long term, technological progress is the main driver of economic growth.10 Of course, AI can also be used for weapons. Militaries around the world are actively working to adopt AI to improve their military capabilities. Yet the militarization of AI does not, at present, meet the traditional definition of an arms race, despite the rhetorical urgency of many national leaders. Michael D. Wallace, in his 1979 article “Arms Races and Escalation,” defined an arms race as “involving simultaneous abnormal rates of growth in the military outlays of two or more nations” resulting from “the competitive pressure of the military itself, and not from domestic forces exogenous to this rivalry.” Wallace further stated that the concept of an arms race only applied “between nations whose foreign and defense policies are heavily interdependent” and who have “roughly comparable” capabilities.11 AI is being adopted by many countries around the globe.12 Arguably at least some of the dyads, such as the United States and China, meet Wallace’s definition in terms of being nations with “roughly comparable” capabilities, locked in competition, “whose foreign and defense policies are heavily interdependent.” However, AI fails the arms race test in the critical area of spending. Wallace distinguished arms races from the normal behavior of states to improve their military forces. A state that adopts a new technology and modernizes its military forces is not automatically in an arms race, under Wallace’s definition, even if the modernization is aimed at competition with another country. The decisive factor in qualifying as an arms race, according to Wallace, is the rate of growth in defense spending. Wallace characterized arms races as resulting in abnormally large growth rates in defense spending, beyond the historical average of 4 to 5 percent annual growth (in real dollars). In an arms race, annual growth rates are above 10 percent or even as high as 20 to 25 percent.13 Other scholars define arms races using different quantitative thresholds — and some definitions lack clear quantitative thresholds at all — but the existence of rapid increases in defense spending or military forces above normal levels is a common criterion in the scholarly literature on arms races.14 Arms races result in situations in which two or more countries are locked in spiraling defense spending, grabbing ever-greater shares of national treasure often with little to no net gain in relative advantage over the other. Classic historical examples include the Anglo-German naval arms race prior to World War I and the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Military AI spending today clearly does not meet these criteria of abnormally large growth rates in defense spending. AI defense spending is difficult to calculate due to the general-purpose nature of AI technology. Unlike ships or ballistic missiles, AI systems cannot be easily counted. Nevertheless, even crude estimates of defense spending show that military AI investments are nowhere near large enough to constitute an arms race. An independent estimate by Bloomberg Government of U.S. defense spending on AI identified $5 billion in AI-related research and development in fiscal year 2020, or roughly 0.7 percent of the Department of Defense’s over $700 billion budget.15 The scale of military AI spending, at least at present, is nowhere near large enough to warrant the title of “arms race.” (Adding in private sector spending, which constitutes the bulk of AI investment, would lead to larger figures but would further belie the claim of an “arms” race since most private sector AI investment is not in weapons.)
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NEG › ***NEG – Innovation*** › 1NC AI frontline
Cooper 22, professor of law and director of International Legal Studies at California Western School of Law in San Diego and a research fellow at Singapore University of Social Sciences with Kashyap Kompella (James, “No, China is not winning the AI race,” The Hill, )
The global competition between the United States and China continues apace. Technology is rightly seen as providing unique leverage to win this geopolitical race. The U.S. long has been the global technology powerhouse, but not surprisingly, we have heard much about the Chinese government’s high-tech industries such as 5G telecommunications, autonomous vehicles, blockchain, and semiconductor chips. In this light, as a horizontal technology that can be applied across all sectors, artificial intelligence (AI) has become a strategic priority and the on superiority in this field is touted as something about which the U.S. should be concerned. Some have gone so far as to conclude that . Don’t believe the hype. To be sure, the availability of large amounts of data is at the heart of AI success. It is tempting to think that less-democratic regimes that amass huge amounts of data about their citizens and have scant regard for privacy can develop better AI systems using that data. However, all other things being equal, better and higher quality AI systems emerge from countries with strong data privacy and data protection regulations because AI systems must undergo greater scrutiny during their development and deployment. of this can be seen in the United States regarding fair lending practices and consumer protection from credit bureaus. Further, the market for AI is global, and such high-quality AI systems find buyers in other countries as well. Around the globe, Big Tech’s rising power has resulted in calls for more oversight. In a drastic move that stunned the industry and analysts alike, the Chinese government the rulebook for the country’s technology industry. In effect, China is vacating entire swaths of digital and creative industries, arenas that serve as training grounds and talent factories for other industries. This more restrictive approach may not bode well for China’s AI industry in the long term. China may find itself constrained on the extent of automation and AI in its manufacturing sector — labor-intensive manufacturing remains China’s main strength, and a high degree of automation can result in job losses, labor unrest, and instability. Meanwhile, there is bipartisan support for AI in the United States. Former proposed for AI development through the National Science Foundation. The of 2020 signaled a sense of urgency and suggested that several federal agencies create a national strategy on artificial intelligence. The Biden administration has formed the to develop a roadmap to foment AI research and spark innovation nationwide. There is draft legislation, at both the state and federal level, to promote responsible use of AI and prevent its misuse. Strong objections to the use of facial recognition and other AI systems by law enforcement in the U.S., raised by civil liberties advocates, have led some local authorities, such as the City of San Francisco, to . To use a Silicon Valley phrase, these debates are “not a bug, but a feature.” They shine a light on the limitations of AI systems and help to set the “rules of the road” for proper use of AI. This will establish the U.S. as a global leader in AI regulation, once lawmakers and regulators do their work. China, meanwhile, has faced strong for using facial recognition software to in its Xinjiang region. China has outlined a set of , but the jury is still out on enforcement and how they function in practice. The increasing number of AI research papers and by Chinese researchers is often cited as proof that China has caught up with the United States in this field. The increased focus is good for the Chinese AI ecosystem, and it will help them solve China-specific problems. But dominance in this emerging strategic industry is not guaranteed. The U.S. has several strategic advantages, including: the strengths of its higher education and research institutes, which attract the best STEM talent from across the world; the ; and the largest number of technology unicorns (start-ups with private valuations greater than $1 billion). China is not overtaking the U.S. in artificial intelligence. The current evidence and trajectory paint a clear picture: The conditions for AI to flourish, such as incentives to experiment, freedom to pursue opportunities without restrictions, and the coming guardrails to prevent misuse, favor U.S. leadership. This is still the United States’s game to lose — though maybe both countries could win through collaboration. To solve planet-scale problems such as climate change, we are going to need AI solutions from both competitors.
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NEG › ***NEG – Solvency*** › #4 Extension – Welfare turn
Robert Greenstein ’19, June 13, “Commentary: Universal Basic Income May Sound Attractive But, If It Occurred, Would Likelier Increase Poverty Than Reduce It,” CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-opportunity/commentary-universal-basic-income-may-sound-attractive-but-if-it
If anything, means-tested programs have fared somewhat better than universal programs in the last several decades. Since 1980, policymakers in Washington and in a number of states have cut unemployment insurance, contributing to a substantial decline in the share of jobless Americans — now below 30 percent — who receive unemployment benefits. In addition, the 1983 Social Security deal raised the program’s retirement age from 65 to 67, ultimately generating a 14 percent benefit cut for all beneficiaries, regardless of the age at which someone begins drawing benefits. Meanwhile, means-tested benefits overall have substantially expanded despite periodic attacks from the right. The most recent expansion occurred in December of 2015 when policymakers made permanent significant expansions of the EITC and the low-income part of the Child Tax Credit that were due to expire after 2017.
In recent decades, conservatives generally have been more willing to accept expansions of means-tested programs than universal ones, largely due to the substantially lower costs they carry (which means they put less pressure on total government spending and taxes).
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NEG › ***NEG – Solvency*** › #4 Extension – Welfare turn
Simon Szreter, Professor of History and Public Policy at Cambridge University, ’22, July 11, “How Seriously Should we Take Universal Basic Income?” https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923X.13169
In light of all this, it is not possible to evaluate UBI's prioritisation of reducing absolute poverty simply on its own terms and without putting it in the context of the larger problem of runaway global inequality. This is because UBI is a large and expensive policy of fiscal transfers. To back it as the right national policy to deal with absolute poverty directly entails the opportunity cost of not implementing quite a range of alternative resource-using policies, which cannot be afforded at the same time. If it can be argued that those alternative policies would not only redress absolute poverty, but would also decelerate inequality, then advocates of UBI, though motivated by good intentions towards the world's poor, could in fact be viewed as unwitting handmaidens of the avaricious and of untaxed global capitalism's dynamic of ever-increasing inequality, as identified by Piketty and others.