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Consider retagging things. Many of the tags are probably longer than necessary; I aimed for explanation over efficiency. If you’re reading a lot of cards in the block, doing a lot of analytic work, and/or saving the K for the 1NR, cutting down on the tags is a good way to save time.

Think through how you want to go for the alt. I tried to write this K to facilitate both framework-centric 2NRs as well as 2NRs that go for a more substantive and material alt. It will be hard to do both at the same time, so consider writing multiple sets of blocks so you can adapt your 2NC (or 1NR) to set up either 2NR based on the 2AC.

If colonialism is understood to refer to conquest, subjugation and control of the colonies for the benefit of colonisers, and decolonisation 61 to a formal end to that process, ‘coloniality’ may be understood to signify a continuation of colonialism by different means:

Like colonialism, coloniality involves the expropriation of land and resources. Unlike traditional colonialism in which expropriation primarily takes place through direct forms of conquest of one group over another, under modernity/coloniality expropriation happens also through the logic of the market and of modern nation-states.62

Classical policy analysis, however absent from actual policy making, remains an important vehicle for teaching policy analysts the connections between their analysis and the policymaking world in which their recommendations would live. Even if it implies more power than analysts will ever have, classical policy analysis teaches that politics, law, implementation, social structures, organizational behavior, and other factors are critical to policy outcomes and must play key roles in thinking through possible ways to address policy problems. Bringing policy ideas to fruition, bridging the worlds of research and policy making, is a critical skill for analysts to develop. In addition, policy schools are instilling in prospective policy analysts the structure and habits of mind to engage successfully in the policy enterprise. 28 Teaching disciplined thinking for public service is important. Policy analysts not only have a problem-oriented, interdisciplinary approach to policy and the ability to synthesize and bring policy relevance to problems that social scientists are not trained for, but they understand the "rational lunacy of policy-making systems" (Weiss 2009). In the absence of written classical policy analyses, policy analysts become their human embodiment. Their training will provide a mental picture of how a classical policy analysis should be performed. They can derive elements of policy analysis from writing position papers, briefing policy makers, and controlling meetings. They anticipate counterarguments and frame their analyses recognizing alternative options. In short, the mental map of a policy analysis allows good policy analysts not only to be effective in their jobs but also to advance into the public debate the appropriate elements of a policy analysis. Further, the problem orientation of policy analysis focuses at least some attention on social problems, not just political expediency. The role of policy analysts is not merely to translate research for policy makers, but to use creative means to turn available knowledge about the implications of various policy options into actionable policy recommendations appropriate for their clients. This is a subtle skill requiring attention to both political realities and the best available research. Finally, prospective policy analysts are instructed repeatedly about the importance of their relationship to the client(s), yet far less attention is paid to the other part of the policy analyst's relationship: to the community of knowledge producers. Policy analysts play critical roles as intermediaries between "custodians of the knowable" and policy makers. Their training should include the ability to understand and interpret the academic literature on a topic at a far deeper level than most journalists have the time or, often, the analytic skill set to uncover. Identifying and connecting pertinent knowledge and analysis with policy makers should be a core principle of a public policy education. Policy analysts may offer the central means to provide policy makers with the key elements of classical policy analysis, though not in the way, through written reports, it was originally conceived. Creating a profession for committed, accomplished, and well-trained individuals to participate in the world of public policy may be among the most important contributions of policy analysis education.

But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, "So what!" To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.38 Contrary to Ashley's assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than analyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render an intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse.

Confucius grew up in a patriarchal society: men were the viewed as the head of the family, men completed rituals, and sacrifices were always made to patrilineal ancestors. Analects has a similar patriarchal view about the structure of society. Confucius defined social structure in terms of relationships and filial piety was his solution to restore stability in China after the Period of Warring States. In patriarchal societies men yield more authority than women in political and social relationships; thus, Confucius contributed to the subordination of women, because he emphasized the importance of understanding one’s place in relationships and not questioning nor attempting to alter it. Furthermore, Analects values men by advising children to serve their fathers and granting men authority to lead ancestral worship, however “the importance of the female is reduced to her success in perpetuating the family by producing a male heir”.7 Confucius’ sayings about women were demeaning and suggested that women were inferior. Book seventeen includes a quote from the master saying “It's women and small minded men that are impossible to nurture. If you're close and familiar with them they lose all humility. If you keep your distance, they're full of resentment”.8 Equating women to “small minded men” suggests that women are petty and difficult to interact with. The passage also suggests that men should be apprehensive of becoming close to women. Male dominance was also applied cultural practices. For example, sayings in Analects insisted that music must be proper and musicians must be virtuous; thus, men concluded they were more capable and assumed superiority in the realm of music.9 The patriarchy promoted and the roles assigned to women in Analects influenced the lives of women for over 2,000 years. Confucian traditions published in Analects established a distinct separation of genders and assigned different roles to men and women. When King Wu spoke of his satisfaction and pride in the work his ten ministers, Confucius replied “since one was his mother, Wu you really only had nine ministers”.10 This story from Analects proves that Confucius isolated women from the realm of government and civil service and indicates that women were not worthy of societal affairs nor capable of serving in important positions.11 This created a gender distinction where females were restricted to the inner sphere and males to the outer sphere: Women are assigned to handle the domestic affairs such as nurturing the children, cooking, weaving and other household work. Men, on the other hand, handle public and social affairs such as farming, commerce and, for some men, holding government office.12 The Confucian gender distinction has influenced the modern day expectation for women to have children and stop working once they get married. Women's domestic role fosters greater dependency on males, because women are confined to their homes and are reliant on the income of their husbands and fathers.13 This exclusion of women from the workforce remains a problem in modern day East Asia because most “working women are in secretarial or other minor posts that hold almost no chance of promotion into the higher ranks of the corporate world...only 9% of management positions in Japan and South Korea are held by women”.14 The discrimination of women in the teachings in Analects instituted a legacy of isolation of women from culture, politics, education, the workforce and more. Confucianism created a patriarchal society where women were powerless against their husbands and fathers, were not allowed to participate in public life, and could not inherit property nor carry on the family name.15 Therefore, society viewed women as a financial burden and the birth of baby girls was a source of grief and shame for families.

The core problem, as I see it, is a lack of creativity and personal initiative. This is a cultural issue that has plagued the area for much of recorded history. The most likely reason I can find for this is Confucianism. I have been a teacher in Korea and Cambodia, and it was impossible not to notice the Confucian influence in Korea, although it is much less apparent in Cambodia. Here is a map of the early spread of Confucianism. It now includes all of Vietnam, since the Vietnamese expansion consumed Champa and the Khmer territories in the Mekong Delta. It’s influence can also be seen, in a slightly diminished form, in Japan due to cultural exchange, and also other Southeast Asian countries due to Chinese migration. Confucianism preaches a rigid adherence to hierarchies and a reactionary attitude towards social institutions. In this ideology, everyone has roles to play, relative to those around them. It is considered honorable to submit to the wills of your parents, husbands and rulers. The doctrine of filial piety has had its advantages and disadvantages. While honoring your parents is generally a good thing, there is a time and place for a little civil disobedience. Before I lived in Korea, I often wondered how North Koreans could be so malleable as to allow themselves to be fully indoctrinated by the state. But Koreans, north and south, are a very conformist, go-with-the-flow, don’t-rock-the-boat type of people. I know it’s not PC to generalize societies in this way, but sometimes, when there is a serious problem, difficult conversations need to be had. I seriously don’t believe a North Korean type state would be possible in the West. And it’s not because Westerners are smarter; if anything, the opposite is true. So how can this nationwide hostage crisis (which is what it is) be going on decade after decade? I think the same thing could be possible in South Korea if they were shielded from outside influence; the default is to trust your superiors. I’ve heard Chinese people argue that democracy is bad. “It leads to disharmony and social unrest. People don’t really know what is best for them like the experts do,” they say. Some of this thinking can no doubt be blamed on Communist Party indoctrination. But can that really be the full picture? Confucianism also leads to misogyny and patriarchy. Women are expected to be subservient to their husbands to an extent. This type of thinking is on the decline but is still very much alive. Feminism is almost unheard of in East Asia. While I’m not normally one to criticize traditional gender roles, I strongly believe all human beings deserve an equal amount of social autonomy regardless of gender. The Confucian focus on education has mixed results for me. I’m passionate about education. I think it is one of the most rewarding endeavors a person can undertake, but it needs to be done right. I strongly disagree with the methodology in many Asian schools, especially in China and South Korea. In China, education focuses almost entirely on preparation for national exams. There is little room for creativity. Children learn to play musical instruments but don’t write songs. Art is not prioritized. Children are overworked and often learn to hate education. Many of them deal with extreme stress and depression. There is an epidemic of child suicides in China. My experience in Korea was very similar. I taught night classes to exhausted kids who had been at school all day. Many Korean children spend twelve hours a day in school. They are mostly unenthusiastic towards learning. By the time they reach college, most Koreans binge drink to an extent that your average Irish alcoholic would find excessive. South Korea also has the highest suicide rate in the developed world. All in all, these are not healthy societies where people feel comfortable to break the mold. There are not entrepreneurs in China coming up with creative new business schemes. Most rich people just choose to build and sell high-rise apartment towers. Many of these towers will never be occupied, but they have value just because everyone agrees that they do. This is one of the biggest market bubbles in world history. Very few important scientific advances have come from East Asia, despite it having a massive population of high-IQ people. This is because thinking outside the box and problem solving are not valued skills. Fitting into society and not causing trouble are much more important. Many scientific geniuses are not socially well-adjusted. Einstein wasn’t known as a captivating party guest or an obedient employee, so he likely wouldn’t have rose to the top in Korea or China. People have no problem criticizing Western ideologies like Islam and Christianity, and for good reason, but it seems as though East Asian ideologies are over-exoticized and viewed through rose-colored glasses. The influence of Confucianism has not all been bad, but its harmful effects should not be overlooked. This opinion was trendy in Chinese intellectual circles in the early 20th century, but is not often discussed nowadays. In the hyper-PC West, it is almost never discussed. Mostly people have probably never even thought about it.

有強執有命以說議曰：「壽夭貧富，安危治亂，固有天命，不可損益。窮達賞罰幸否有極，人之知力，不能為焉。」群吏信之，則怠於分職；庶人信之，則怠於從事。吏1不治則亂，農事緩則貧，貧且亂政之本，而儒者以為道教，是賊天下之人者也。

Further, he holds tenaciously to the dogma of fate and argues: "Old age or early death, poverty or wealth, safety or danger, order or chaos are destined by the fate of Heaven and cannot be modified. Failure or success, reward or punishment, luck or adversity, are all settled; the wisdom and power of man can do nothing." When the different officers believe this they will neglect their several duties. When the common people believe this they will neglect their work. Lax government will lead to disorder; inefficient agriculture will lead to poverty. And poverty is the root of disorder and insurrections. Yet the Confucianists take this teaching about fate to be the Dao and the principle of life. This is to destroy the people of the empire.

儒者曰：「親親有術，尊賢有等。」言親疏尊卑之異也。其禮曰：「喪父母三年，妻，後子三年，伯父叔父弟兄庶子其，戚族人五月。」若以親疏為歲月之數，則親者多而疏者少矣，是妻後子與父同也。若以尊卑為歲月數，則是尊其妻子與父母同，而親伯父宗兄而卑子也，逆孰大焉。其親死，列尸弗斂1，登屋窺井，挑鼠穴，探滌器，而求其人矣。以為實在則贛愚甚矣；如其亡也必求焉，偽亦大矣！取妻，身迎，袨端為僕，秉轡授綏，如仰嚴親，昏禮威儀，如承祭祀。顛覆上下，悖逆父母，下則妻子，妻子上侵事親，若此可謂孝乎？儒者：「迎妻，妻之奉祭祀，子將守宗廟，故重之。」應之曰：「此誣言也，其宗兄守其先宗廟數十年，死喪之其，兄弟之妻奉其先之祭祀弗散，則喪妻子三年，必非以守奉祭祀也。夫憂妻子以大負絫，有曰『所以重親也』，為欲厚所至私，輕所至重，豈非大姦也哉！」

The Confucianist says: Love among relations should depend upon the degree of relationship, and honour to the virtuous should be graded. This is to advocate a discrimination among the near and the distant relations and among the respectable and the humble. But, according to his code of propriety: Mourning for the death of the parent should be three years; for the wife or the eldest son three years; for an uncle, a brother, or one of the other sons, a year; and for a near relative, five months. If the periods are based on the degree of relationship, evidently mourning for the closer relative should be longer and for the more distant shorter. Thus the wife and the eldest son are the same as the parents (in nearness). If the periods are based on degrees of respect which are severally due then it means that the wife and the eldest son are respected as much as the parents, and the uncles and brothers are placed on the same level with the other sons. What perversity can be greater than this? When his parent dies he first lets him lie there without dressing him for burial. He climbs on the roof, looks into the well, reaches into the rat holes, and searches in the washing basins to look for the dead man. Assuming that the man still exists this procedure is certainly stupid. If he does not exist this insistent search is the height of hypocrisy. When a Confucianist takes a wife, he has to escort her in person, dressed in ceremonial garments as a servant. He drives the cart himself, as if waiting on a revered parent. The dignity and solemnity of the marriage ceremony compare with that of sacrifice and worship. High and low are turned upside down. Father and mother are disobeyed. Parents are brought down to the level of the wife and the wife is exalted to interfere with service to parents. Can such conduct be called filial? The Confucianist tells us: "A wife is taken to share in continuing the worship and sacrifice (to ancestors) and the son will attend to the ancestral temple, therefore they are highly regarded." We answer him: This is all false representation. For, his brothers attend to the ancestral temple for tens of years. Yet when they die he will mourn for them only one year. The brothers' wives continue the worship and sacrifice of his ancestors. Yet, there is no mourning (upon their death) whatsoever. Then the three years' mourning for the death of his wife and eldest son is evidently not for the reason of their attending to the ancestral temple and continuing the worship and sacrifice. Now, to be partial to one's wife and son is already quite wayward. Yet the Confucianist pretends it to be for the sake of the parents. This is partiality to the most favourite but neglect of the most important. Isn't this great perversity?

儒者曰：「君子必服古言然後仁。」應之曰：「所謂古之言服1者，皆嘗新矣，而古人言之，2服之，則非3君子也。然則必服非君子之服，言非君子之言，而後仁乎？」

The Confucianist says: "The superior man must be ancient in mode of speech and in dress before be can be magnanimous." We answer him: The so-called ancient speech and dress were all modern once. When the ancients first used that speech and wore that dress they would not be superior men (according to the Confucianists' criteria). Do you therefore mean to say that one has to wear the dress of the non-superior man and speak the speech of the non-superior man before he can be magnanimous?

Nowadays, he who makes certain to avenge any wrong done to his brother is called an upright man, and he who joins his friend in attacking the perpetrator of an insult is called a man of honor. Such a man performs deeds that are regarded as upright and honorable, and in doing so violates the laws and prohibitions of the ruler. But the ruler, lost in admiration for such upright and honorable deeds, forgets to punish the violation of his laws, and hence the people outdo each other in shows of valor and the magistrates can no longer control them. Likewise, he who manages to get clothing and food without working for them is called an able man, and he who wins esteem without having achieved any merit in battle is called a worthy man. But the deeds of such able and worthy men actually weaken the army and bring waste to the land. If the ruler rejoices in the deeds of such men, and forgets the harm they do by weakening the army and bringing waste to the land, then private interests will prevail and public profit will come to naught. The Confucians with their learning bring confusion to the law; the knights with their military prowess violate the prohibitions. Yet the ruler treats both groups with respect, and so we have disorder. People who deviate from the law should be treated as criminals, and yet the scholars actually attain posts in the government because of their literary accomplishments. People who violate the prohibitions ought to be punished, and yet the bands of knights are able to make a living by wielding their swords in a private cause. Hence, those whom the law condemns, the ruler accepts, and those whom the magistrates seek to punish, the higher officials patronize. Thus law and practice, high official and lowly magistrate, are all set at odds, and there is no fixed standard. Under such circumstances even ten Yellow Emperors could not bring the state to order. Those who practice benevolence and righteousness should not be praised, for to praise them is to cast aspersion on military achievements; men of literary accomplishment should not be employed in the government, for to employ them is to bring confusion to the law. In the state of Chu there was a man named Honest Gong. When his father stole a sheep, he reported the theft to the authorities. But the local magistrate, considering that the man was honest in the service of his sovereign but a villain to his own father, replied, “Put him to death!”, and the man was accordingly sentenced and executed. Thus we see that a man who is an honest subject of his sovereign may be an infamous son to his father. There was a man of Lu who accompanied his sovereign to war. Three times he went into battle, and three times he ran away. When Confucius asked him the reason, he replied, “I have an aged father and, if I should die, there would be no one to take care of him.” Confucius, considering the man filial, recommended him and had him promoted to a post in the government. Thus we see that a man who is a filial son to his father may be a traitorous subject to his lord. The magistrate of Chu executed a man, and as a result the felonies of the state were never reported to the authorities; Confucius rewarded a man, and as a result the people of Lu thought nothing of surrendering or running away in battle. Since the interests of superior and inferior are as disparate as all this, it is hopeless for the ruler to praise the actions of the private individual and at the same time try to insure blessing to the state’s altars of the soil and grain.

當魏之方明立辟、從憲令行之時，有功者必賞，有罪者必誅，強匡天下，威行四鄰；及法慢，妄予，而國日削矣。當趙之方明國律、從大軍之時，人眾兵強，辟地齊、燕；及國律慢，用者弱，而國日削矣。當燕之方明奉法、審官斷之時，東縣齊國，南盡中山之地；及奉法已亡，官斷不用，左右交爭，論從其下，則兵弱而地削，國制於鄰敵矣。故曰：明法者強，慢法者弱。強弱如是其明矣，而世主弗為，國亡宜矣。語曰：「家有常業，雖饑不餓。國有常法，雖危不亡。」夫舍常法而從私意，則臣下飾於智能，臣下飾於智能則法禁不立矣。是妄意之道行，治國之道廢也。治國之道，去害法者，則不惑於智能、不矯於名譽矣。昔者舜使吏決鴻水，先令有功而舜殺之；禹朝諸侯之君會稽之上，防風之君後至而禹斬之。以此觀之，先令者殺，後令者斬，則古者先貴如令矣。故鏡執清而無事，美惡從而比焉；衡執正而無事，輕重從而載焉。夫搖鏡則不得為明，搖衡則不得為正，法之謂也。故先王以道為常，以法為本，本治者名尊，本亂者名絕。凡智能明通，有以則行，無以則止。故智能單道，不可傳於人。而道法萬全，智能多失。夫懸衡而知平，設規而知圓，萬全之道也。明主使民飾於道之故，故佚而則功。釋規而任巧，釋法而任智，惑亂之道也。亂主使民飾於智，不知道之故，故勞而無功。

When the Wei dynasty clearly established and obeyed the constitution, those who made meritorious contributions would be rewarded, and those who were guilty would be punished. When Zhao Zhifang was clear about the national law and the army, the people were strong, and the land was Qi and Yan, and when the national law was weak, the people were weak, and the country was cut down. When Yan Zhifang clearly obeyed the law and judged the judges, the eastern county Qi country, the south ended in the middle mountains; and the law was dead, the officials did not use it, and the left and right were fighting, and the troops were weak and the ground was cut down, and the country was controlled by the neighboring enemy. Therefore, it is said: Those who abide by the law are strong, and those who do not are weak. The strength and weakness are clear, and the lord of the world is the one, and the country should die. The saying goes: "The family has a permanent business, even if it is hungry. The country has permanent laws, even if it is in danger, it will not perish.” If the husband is always in the law and follows his own will, then the subordinate is decorated with wisdom, and the subordinate is decorated with wisdom, the law is not followed. It is the way of vain will, and the way of governing the country is also abolished. The way to govern the country is that those who harm the law are not rewarded with intelligence and reputation. In the past, Shun made the officials decide on the Hongshui, and the shilling was meritorious and Shun killed him; the prince of the princes of the Yu Dynasty would be above, and the king of the wind would come and Yu beheaded him. From this point of view, the shilling is killed, and the latter is killed, and the ancients are as valuable as the order. Therefore, if a mirror is clear and clean, good and evil can be compared; If the one shakes the mirror, you cannot see clearly, and if one shakes the balance, they cannot be righteous, and the law is the same. Therefore, the first king took the Tao as the norm, the law as the foundation, the name of the ruler, and the name of the chaotic. If there is wisdom and clarity, it will work, and if it does not, it will stop. Therefore, wisdom is a path that cannot be passed on to others. However, the Tao method is perfect, but the wisdom is often lost. Hang the balance and know the balance, set the rules and know the circle, this is the perfect way. The Lord of the Ming Dynasty ordered the people to follow the Dao, so the merits were achieved by losing sight of them. Interpret rules and rely on skill, interpret laws and rely on wisdom, and confuse chaos. The leader of chaos makes the people show off their wisdom, but they don't know why, so they work in vain.

Finally, our use of labels such as ‘West’ or ‘Western’ throughout the volume warrants a final introductory consideration. First of all, ‘Western political thought’ is here understood as a “body of political, legal and social theory developed by European, American, Australian and New Zealand authors and practitioners from the beginning of the modern period in Europe to the pres- ent” (Ivison et al., 2000: 2). While it seems undeniable that Western political thought has been dominated by some form or variation of modern liberalism for some centuries now, it is however a varied and contested body. Neither is it diametrically opposed to non-Western forms of thought. The development of both Western and non-Western political thought has rarely – if ever – been hermetically sealed processes, especially in contexts where colonisation processes led (or forced) to mutual influence. The aim of this volume is definitely not to condemn theories and authors that can be considered ‘Western’, but to critically question them and to profitably introduce them into decolonisation debates. Some of our contributors’ chapters actually advance a decolonisation of political concepts through discussions of theories and scholars that shaped the so-called ‘Western’ canon. In doing so, the contributions draw on different theoretical strands emerging from/within it, such as French Theory, the Frank- furt School or US-American Critical Race scholarship. In their discussion, it is shown that the particular theoretical frameworks developed by Western authors may also provide productive and emancipatory answers to the prevailing power structures. Thus, Western political thought should not be treated as a homogeneous corpus.

The same occurs with the ‘West’. Throughout this introduction and this collection, our use of such a label does not stand for a particular geographical place or a specific site of knowledge production. Instead, it encapsulates a set of particular ontologies, epistemologies, worldviews, and subjectivities that are deeply intertwined with modernity/coloniality. The ideological West can thus be challenged from inside the geographical West or instead be predominant and defended outside of it. Borrowing from Yarimar Bonilla, the West is a project, not a place (2017: 334). A project in that it pursues the actualisation of a particular mode of being, of knowing, of deciding, of living collectively, etc. But also a project in the sense that it has never been totally and purely realised, it remains an aspiration. Much of this continued incompleteness rises from its constitutive relation with what would be the non-West, and from the continued existence of alternative modes of existence to those of the West. Indeed, as Hesse points out, “we should […] consider the West as always already creolized by virtue of its modernity and coloniality” (2011: 41). However, ‘West’ and ‘non-West’ are still useful “short-hand for constellations of sources, issues, and methods of argumentation that […] produce family resemblances and recognizable attributes” and thus “cannot be dispensed with, since they are forms of representation embedded in mythologies that anchor our understandings” (Gordon, 2014: 205). They are nonetheless terminologies to be adopted critically. The very least, as we did here, is to maintain an explicit acknowledgement of their intrinsic limitations, the main one being their obfuscation of the often intertwined constitution of what falls under these denominations.

Second, we need a political theory that does not narrowly focus on defending the negative liberties of the self-reliant individual. This can be done by providing an enduring social mechanism, such as li, to render the self ever more porous and other-regarding so that the self becomes increasingly socially responsive as the self becomes increasingly ritually competent. Li has a moderating and transformative effect on the self, since in performing li, the self must be in tune with others—the subject of one’s reverence—and must be circumspect in each unique situation in an effort to harmonize the myriad things in the world. Unlike the Hobbesian man of nature, a Confucian self sees her existential interdependency, not as a lesser evil she tolerates out of the fear of mutual destruction, but as a strength. This strength is characteristic of human society in which the secured, meaningful, and flourishing life of each individual is made possible only in the midst of the continuous stream of human ecology and is sustained by ritualized mutual obligations that are measured, refined, and responsive to the changing human condition intra and intergenerationally. Li is the ritual knot that binds us all to the past, present, and future. Hence, in Confucianism, dependency care is not seen as oppositional to one’s civic competency or outside the realm of political discourse but instead forms an integral part of civil society. Indeed, in order to foster a shared sense of dependency care, not just in the personal realm but also in the social and political realm, we will have to reconceptualize what constitutes the self, citizenry, and political authority. The liberal model of individual rights and limited government that has carried us this far is no longer conceptually adequate to carry us forward into this ever more interdependent and globalized world where emerging environmental/economic/social/political problems oftentimes crisscross multiple boundaries. The modern state must be more than an empty container for disparate individuals limited only by reactive, punitive laws. In facing the rise of national isolationism and xenophobia, not just in the United States but also across Europe, a shift in our conceptual paradigm of what constitutes a wellfunctioning state and a flourishing citizenry is sorely needed so that complex social/political problems, such as climate change, income inequality, criminal justice reform, and refugee crises, can be addressed and solved. In contrast to the individually inclined Western political theory, where civic obligations and relations are contract-based and considered external to the core concerns of one’s own self-interests, the Confucian utopia of datong epitomizes the ideal society in which all are cared for. This idyllic community represents the highest political aspiration for the Confucian, and its realization, in part, is premised on our willingness to go beyond the narrow concerns of our own selves or our immediate families to also care for others, especially the socially vulnerable, so that the old, the young, the sick, and the disabled are not just left out in the cold without proper care. An inclusive, caring political community is quintessentially, if not uniquely, Confucian. This provides a stark contrast when compared with the Western political theories that hinge largely on rational self-centric concerns. In other words, datong offers a genuine care-based state whose political legitimacy is derived, first and foremost, from its capacities to care for all, especially the socially vulnerable. As Mencius puts it, caring for the socially vulnerable is the political priority of a kingly state9 . This Confucian model, as I see it, is the proper way for us to move forward into an ever more compassionate and inclusive future for humanity. In the end, this inventive Confucian-feminist project is intended to provide women of all colors viable conceptual alternatives to think through their own lives in this increasingly globalized, hybridized world. To draw feminist inspirations solely from Western scholarship, making feminist theorizing synonymous with the West, is an unnecessary self-imposed impoverishment, and -more importantly, it is self-defeating for feminists, since the aim of feminist liberation is to foster a truly inclusive world in which all are accounted for. Just as feminist scholarship is striving to be counted as genuinely philosophical, non-Western traditions are striving to be noted as intellectual equals capable of informing all sorts of contemporary progressive projects, including feminism. Feminist liberation must be transnational in scope, and so must be its theorizing. An inclusive feminist future cannot be built based on a Western monopoly on theoretical space. A non-Western tradition, such as Confucianism, must be seen as capable of providing viable conceptual alternatives for achieving the feminist liberatory end. Hall and Ames’s normalization of the topic of gender in the “regular” study of Confucianism opens up a constructive path for feminists like me to engage Confucianism philosophically and to envision a progressive and inclusive future for humanity that is feminist and Confucian at the same time.

Inequality and Oligarchy: Wealth and political inequality can be central drivers of social disintegration, as can oligarchy and centralisation of power among leaders. This not only causes social distress, but handicaps a society’s ability to respond to ecological, social and economic problems.

The field of cliodynamics models how factors such as equality and demography correlate with political violence. Statistical analysis of previous societies suggests that this happens in cycles. As population increases, the supply of labour outstrips demand, workers become cheap and society becomes top-heavy. This inequality undermines collective solidarity and political turbulence follows.

Referencing Dennis Prager’s , “America's Second Civil War,” Gingrich added, “What you’re seeing with Antifa, what you’re seeing on college campuses, what you’re seeing, to some extent, in the bureaucracy, is a real division of the country. …I wish we could all sing Kumbaya and come together but I don’t think that’s what’s gonna happen. …As a historian, my view is pretty straightforward: one side or the other wins.”

And not just in the U.S. A civil war in America will not end in America. If the country plunges into battle, many will be vying for the loot. China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and others will destroy whatever the war doesn’t, the American empire will become history, and a third world war, with multiple nuclear powers, will follow. There will be no winners because, to quote Machiavelli, “Wars begin when you will, but they do not end when you please.”

For Confucianism, as the proof of one's humanity lays in the empirical proof of evidencing culture, humaneness is not an unobservable quality prior to its physical manifestation (in culture). Under this view, there is no substance behind appearance; there is appearance, and that is all. The truth about the self is not some hidden essence behind the welter of its expressions, the expressions of the self (through cultural media) is the truth about the self. It is precisely because the Confucian view only cares about one's actions/work, that it does not commit the same fallacies as that of racial theorists like Gobineau. Given this empiricism which makes no statements about qualities prior to their manifestation, this philosophy assumes the equal potential of all human beings for taking up culture. The Confucian canon holds that embodying culture/performing actions according to social norms is constitutive of the self. Humaneness is thus a moral category to be achieved as opposed to a natural kind that one is born under. That throughout history “Chinese” 3 identity was a cultural one as opposed to what would be called a “racial” one is conventional knowledge among sinologists.4 As American historian Herrlee Creel writes, The fundamental criterion of “Chinese-ness,” anciently and throughout history, has been cultural. The Chinese have had a particular way of life, a particular complex of usages, sometimes characterised as li [礼]. Groups that conformed to this way of life were, generally speaking, considered Chinese. (Creel, 1970: 197) The “Chinese” people—a fifth of humanity—are not a single stock of people, they are the hybrid result of a coalescing of originally different peoples from the geographical region of present-day China and its environs through the process of adopting similar cultures, that is, acculturation. As Creel writes, “It was the process of acculturation, transforming barbarians5 into Chinese, that created the great bulk of the Chinese people” (Creel, 1970: 197). This process of acculturation is testified to first-hand by an English army officer's account of Yunnan in 1909. Major H. R. Davis (1865–1950) writes of how once the indigenous tribes of Yunnan have learnt to speak the Chinese language and adopted “to some extent Chinese customs” an “idea gets hold of them” whereby they are “Chinamen” and so “A race of Chinese thus grows up who have really no Chinese blood in them” (Davis, 1909: 367–68). This process of “acculturation” which Creel and Davis describes is the hallmark of a Confucian conception of personhood and stands in contrast to the essentialist conception of personhood in the Western tradition (which is implicit in Davis' assumption that it is defined by blood). In the Confucian conception, what most defines humans is that there is no fixed essence. What is intrinsic to the person are her a posteriori, extrinsic actions, and behaviours which cannot be determined a priori.6 The only thing that can be defined a priori about human beings is the fact that they have potential for becoming human through acculturation. Human-ness—understood as embodying culture and moral behaviour through acculturation—is thus not a given; it is a potential which requires formation to be realised. Transformation through cultural education, or acculturation, takes ontological primacy before any “substance” or any fixed essence that could be assigned to a person.7 The Confucian idea of acculturation closely approximates that of the German Bildung, for which, it is precisely the “essence” of mankind not to have an essence since it is able to surpass any fixed essence one could assign to it. […] If man never ceases to learn, then there is nothing fixed about his essence. […] one has to “build” or “form” oneself through Bildung. (Grondin, 1995: 119) Likewise, in the Confucian tradition, one does not speculate about a final essence which determines what one is, one concentrates merely on the process of learning and thus growth itself. One does not focus on some reality behind appearances; one focuses on the phenomena itself. Lee Yearley provides a helpful summary of the difference between the acculturation (Confucian) and essentialist (Western) conception of personhood: In a discovery [i.e., essentialist] model, however, human nature exists as a permanent set of dispositions that are obscured but that can be contacted or discovered. People do not cultivate inchoate capacities. Rather they discover a hidden ontological reality that defines them. […] An ontological reality, the true self, always is present no matter what specific humans, particular instances of it, are or do.” (Yearley, 1990: 60) The essentialist model of personhood which Yearley describes is the dominant model of personhood in the Western tradition. As we saw in the previous section, this essentialist model of personhood is based on a substance ontology. Under this substance ontology, as Yearley writes, “the true self”—her substance or essence—is a “permanent set of dispositions” that defines her, irrespective of what she does. This is because her actions are not necessarily manifestations of her essence. Her (accidental/nonessential) actions are merely secondary properties that “obscure” her essence. For another example of how Bildung or “transformative education” (教) makes the human being please see Xiang, 2015: 390–392, where I use a famous story, Nie Xiaqian (), to example how for this “acculturation” tradition, even a ghost can become a human through the embodiment of cultural acts.

So far, I have described the Confucian paradigm of moral skill and virtue acquisition and the normative role of Confucian li in this paradigm. The Confucian paradigm and its attention to rituals offer a different picture of technology-driven moral deskilling. Instead of viewing it as a problem that arises from faulty or irresponsible choices of technology design and use by designers and users, the Confucian paradigm views the problem as an indication of a disfunction of Confucian li caused by new technology, which occurs when technology transforms or disrupts human practices in ways that prompt individuals and the society to neglect the rituals in their community and tradition. Recall Vallor’s case of robot caregivers: Robot caregivers are morally questionable when they reduce and remove the opportunity for individuals to exercise care and acquire the relevant virtues through care practice. Her response to the problem is to remind of the importance of not designing and implementing care robots in ways that replace human beings in tasks of care and related virtues and only in ways that complement them in performing these tasks. Similarly, the Confucian paradigm requires us to limit the design and implementation of care robots in ways that do not supersede the roles and responsibilities of human beings in caring. According to the Confucian paradigm, however, the problem with technology-driven moral deskilling is not simply an individual problem as per Vallor’s suggestion, i.e., that individuals lack opportunities to exercise moral skills and acquire virtues, which, of course, is also recognized by the Confucian paradigm, robot caregivers become morally problematic when they drive us to ignore the rituals of care in one’s community and tradition, i.e., the performance of specific behaviors and expression of specific attitudes of care in the care environment. Since rituals give human actions meaning and make them meaningful to us, the loss of the rituals of care entails the loss of meaning of care as well. So construed, the problem of technology-driven moral deskilling is a much broader shared and collective matter. In response to technology-driven moral deskilling, the Confucian paradigm can argue for the establishment of Confucian li as the normative standard for technology design and use. Here, a recent proposal of Confucian robot ethics from JeeLoo Liu [38] is instructive.10 Liu derives three moral rules for robot ethics from three Confucian virtues: Firstly, based on the virtue of loyalty (zhong) to one’s role, she asserts that (CR1) robots must first and foremost fulfill their assigned role; secondly, based on the virtue of reciprocity (shu), she argues that (CR2) robots should not act in ways that would afflict the highest displeasure or the lowest preference onto other human beings, when other options are available; and, finally, based on the virtue of humanity (ren), she claims that (CR3) robots must render assistance to human beings in their pursuit of moral improvement, unless doing so would violate (CR1) and (CR2), and they must also refuse assistance to human beings when their projects would bring out their evil qualities or produce immorality. While Liu formulates the three moral rules in terms of Confucian virtues, Confucian li can be readily incorporated into (CR1) and (CR3) and then be used as an answer to the problem of moral deskilling. For instance, Confucian li can specify and clarify the role(s) robots should be assigned in (CR1) and so, to avoid overstepping the relational and role responsibility, ought to be fulfilled by humans. Relatedly, Confucian li describes one means for individuals to achieve moral improvement, and thus to concretize the idea of moral improvement and moral degradation in (CR3). Using the case of robot caregivers as an illustration, (CR1) and (CR3) together should avoid the problem of technology-driven moral deskilling by preventing robot caregivers from overtaking the relational and role responsibility that is central in the rituals of care, i.e., (CR1), and by ensuring robot caregivers only facilitate the performance of the rituals of care, i.e., (CR3). Now, one may object that the Confucian response to technology-driven moral deskilling does not differ from Vallor’s proposal of positing the opportunity to acquire moral skills as a normative boundary for design and deployment of technology, as the Confucian response too suggests designing and using technology in ways that do not interfere with performance of Confucian li, which, in turn, includes performance of moral skills. It is indeed true that the Confucian response also takes into consideration people’s opportunity to acquire moral skills because exercising one’s moral skills is part and parcel of proper ritual performance. By attending to rituals, however, the Confucian response introduces a more holistic view of the problem of technology-driven moral deskilling and turns the focus from technology’s impacts on individuals’ values and virtues to its impacts on human practices. Notably, the Confucian response views the problem as stemming from technology’s transformative and disruptive impacts on the nature of human activities, including the manner in which the activities are carried out, e.g., how and why, when robot caregivers are implemented, some behaviors and attitudes are no longer deemed as valuable and meaningful in the care practice. In this respect, the Confucian response requires going beyond maintaining the opportunity to exercise moral skills and affirms the value and meaningfulness of moral skills qua part of rituals.11 In short, the Confucian response looks to (re)shape technologically mediated activities through the existing rituals (cf. [39]). Moreover, as Confucian li serves as a normative guidance in rethinking the technologically mediated activities, designers and users are required to consider the social, political, and cultural factors related to the activities, as these factors inform them what rituals are relevant and how the rituals ought to be enacted. The attention to rituals, therefore, helps dispel the indefensible hyper-rational and autonomous understanding of person. Furthermore, the Confucian response foregrounds the bodily-performative dimension in technologically mediated activities, as Confucian li aims to cultivate individuals’ effortless and spontaneous reactions to everyday ethical encounters by refining and modulating their emotional and physical experience. Accordingly, in rethinking the technologically mediated activities, the bodily influences of technology, in particular the possibility of structuring bodily movements through technology design and use [40,41], and the affective influences from different technologies [42] will be explicitly considered in the Confucian response. In fact, the Confucian response may even warrant proactively shaping individuals’ bodily and emotional states in accordance with Confucian li in technologically mediated activities, i.e., (CR3). Kristina Niedderer [43,44] has recently advanced the idea of “mindful design” and explored the possibility of raising users’ attentiveness to the relational, social, and environmental consequences of their actions through the design of objects. One of the examples she mentions is to design mobile phones to “shout back” at their users should they talk too loudly in public. Here, the design is intended to alert the users to the disrupting impacts they have on others around them and lead them to adjust the level of their voice [44]. “Mindful design” converges with the Confucian response in their concerns over people’s inattentiveness to social convention, etiquette, and other patterns of courteous behaviors and the resulting behaviors and attitudes. Hence, one can imagine that the Confucian response advocates designing technology that enables individuals to be more attentive to the rituals in various circumstances. In other words, the Confucian response shall defend a ritualization of technology to facilitate individual and societal flourishing.

Mou distinguishes Chinese and Western modes of thought and associated models of governance. In politics, the Western mode of analysis meant distinguishing morality and politics, and a focus on developing political institutions which would be efficacious regardless of who occupied them. Hence the focus on rule of law, representation, and checks and balances, a method he terms “analytic.” Chinese philosophy, on the other hand, employed a “synthetic” approach which offered a moral solution to politics.2 The character of government depends on the character of the leader. And so the political goal was “sagely rulers and worthy ministers” (shengjun xianxiang 聖君賢相) (Mou 1988: 184). There were no concepts of political authority, freedom, or equality, and no thought of specifying rights (Mou 1991: 129–130). So the problem in Mou’s view is not that Confucianism is fundamentally antithetical to democratic values, but that the Chinese mode of reasoning was not conducive to developing actual democratic practices. Democracy, he claims, is in fact a natural extension of the ideals present in Confucian political thought (Mou 1991: 122), a view characteristic of New Confucians. Specifically, the ideals Mou refers to are equality, freedom, and respect for the individual as a moral subject. The ideas were there, but not the means to realize them effectively in an institutional structure. Mou discusses the relationship between ethics and politics in terms of the connection between inner sageliness and outer kingliness (neisheng waiwang 內聖外 王), calling democracy “the new outer kingliness.” Mou distinguishes two types of connections: direct (zhitong 直通) and indirect (qutong 曲通). Developing democracy requires an indirect connection (Mou 1991: 55–56). The problem was earlier Confucians attempted to make a direct connection between inner sageliness and outer kingliness, and this is what led to the focus on sagely rulers and wise ministers, not democracy. In politics, the direct connection is between a virtuous leader and moral politics: the belief that a morally good ruler is necessary and sufficient for good government. Indirect connection is “a sudden twisting change, and it is a twist because it has a kind of ‘contrary’ element to it.” Mou gives another clue when he mentions dialectic: “This is not something that logical inference can achieve. Here, we come to understand the necessity of dialectical development.” The dialectical move is called “self-restriction” (ziwo kanxian 自我坎陷) (Mou 1991: 57–58).3 Mou’s own gloss is self-negation (ziwo fouding 自我否定), and this is a common translation (Tang 2002: 328).4 This term also requires some explanation. What Mou means is that the moral reasoning at the foundation of Confucian thought must restrict itself to allow for the development of theoretical or constructive reason so politics can be partly separated from morality. Democracy is not essentially a moral system. People can vote as they choose and are not required to evaluate candidates morally—elections are not limited to the virtuous. Democracy is not essentially a system for choosing virtuous leaders. This is why there can be no direct logical connection between Confucian morality and democracy. In the ideal of sagely rulers and worthy ministers, government is not independent from morality, as the possibility of good government depends on moral rulers and officials. However, traditional Confucian thought had no system to transmit power reliably only to sages and worthies. Only democracy can achieve that (Mou 1991: 59). Realizing morality in politics thus demands moral reason restrict itself so theoretical reason can develop, as only theoretical reason can produce the value-neutral democratic institutions to make this possible (Mou 1991: 59, 136–137). The very requirements of morality demand that morality limit itself. This is not a complete or permanent negation of moral reasoning. Mou cautions against thinking that doing away with morality and depending only on theoretical reasoning can work. In his view, this is the flaw with Western democracy. Once moral reasoning is restricted so theoretical reasoning can develop, the moral element must be restored so both are present (Mou 1988: 38–39; Mou 1991: 58–59, 92). Government cannot rely on institutions alone, as institutions ultimately depend on those who participate in them. This is Mou’s response to liberals who advocated complete Westernization, and his claim for the significance of Chinese thought for the West: each side has its own style of reasoning, but neither is sufficient on its own (Yan 1991: 206). The attempt to completely sever politics from morality cannot work. The dialectical method of the self-restriction of moral reasoning can overcome some of the apparent difficulties of justifying democracy through Confucian thought since this justification is understood to be indirect; however, it remains to determine what in Confucian thought can actually lead to democracy even in an indirect manner. In Mou’s analysis, the fundamental ideas for democracy are equality, autonomy, and the primacy of the moral subject. Democracy is necessary to realize these ideals. Mou derives an idea of equality from Confucian sources. He begins with respect for the life of the individual (Mou 1991: 117–118). What deserves respect is the potential in each person to become a moral individual (Mou 1991: 28). In short, the basis for democracy is the doctrine that human nature is good, originally formulated by Mengzi. While there seems little reason to attribute to Mengzi himself a view that persons as such deserve respect due to their moral potential,5 if one concedes that human nature is good it does seem to imply a certain kind of equality which one could make a case for recognizing politically. This becomes the basis for the democratic ideas that Mou advocates. He argues that democracy is in fact necessary to realize the goal of Confucian morality, to allow each person to realize his or her good nature. However, we must be precise about the kind of necessity this is. It is not logical necessity. There is no logical contradiction in an autocratic government allowing people to realize the goodness of human nature. It simply does not often work out. The necessity Mou talks about is dialectical, or as his follower Lee Minghuei refers to it, practical necessity (Lee 1991: 8). It is a question of what kind of government is most likely to make possible the goal of realizing Confucian morality. Mou and Lee believe democratic government is. Mou’s democracy encompasses fairly standard liberal prescriptions on rights, rule of law, and political participation (elections). Where he begins to depart from liberalism is in his concept of freedom and his associated views on moral development. Furthermore, Mou’s democracy is explicitly metaphysical in character (and this is the source for much of the criticism directed against him). His commitments to a substantive view of human nature and its connection to heavenly pattern (tianli 天 理) are clear. When discussing the political structure, he spends most of his time on law. Though he recognizes the Confucian tradition has generally not endorsed law in favor of the transforming infuence of virtue (Mou 1991: 135), he claims this is no great obstacle. Confucianism does not object to administrative law. Criminal law is a bit more complicated, as Mou recognizes that in Confucianism criminal law is inferior to virtue, and is something to be overcome (Yan 1991: 137).

He says: ‘Now, the nature of man is such that he is born with a love of profit. Following this nature will cause its aggressiveness and greedy tendencies to grow and courtesy and deference to disappear. ... This being the case, when each person follows his inborn nature and indulges his natural inclinations, aggressiveness and greed are certain to develop. This is accomplished by violation of social class distinctions and throws the natural order into anarchy, resulting in a cruel tyranny.’40 It is interesting to note that the first of Hans Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism is also that of human nature: ‘Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature ... Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India and Greece endeavoured to discover these laws.’41 Xun Zi makes a specific analysis of human nature: ‘Mencius contended that ‘‘since man can learn, his nature is good.’’ I say that this is not so. It shows that Mencius did not reach any real understanding of what man’s inborn nature is and that he did not investigate the division between those things that are inborn in man and those that are acquired. As a general rule, ‘‘inborn nature’’ embraces what is spontaneous from Nature, what cannot be learned, and what required no application to master. Ritual principles and moral duty are creations of the sage. They are things that people must study to be able to follow them and to which they must apply themselves before they can fulfil their precepts. What cannot be gained by learning and cannot be mastered by application yet is found in man is properly termed ‘‘inborn nature’’. What must be learned before a man can do it and what he must apply himself to before he can master it yet is found in man is properly called ‘‘acquired nature’’. This is precisely the distinction between ‘‘inborn’’ and ‘‘acquired’’ natures.’42 Xun Zi also believed that man’s evil nature is the root cause of international conflict. Since man’s desires have no limits and it is impossible to satisfy unlimited desires by material means, he says: ‘Men are born with desires which, if not satisfied, cannot be lead men to seek to satisfy them. If in seeking to satisfy their desires men observe no measure and apportion things without limits, then it would be impossible for them not to contend over the means to satisfy their desire. Such contention leads to disorder. Disorder leads to poverty.’43 Xun Zi did not believe that increasing social wealth resolves the conflicts arising from human competitiveness. He defines human beings’ desires as a natural emotive reaction: ‘Inborn nature is the consequence of Heaven. Emotions are the substance of that nature. Desires are the resources of nature. Seeking what is desired is the responses of the emotions.’44 Xun Zi, based on this reasoning, believed that strengthening the ability to reason constrains desire and therefore avoids social disorder. He says: ‘What men desire most is life, and what they hate most is death. Be that it may, men sometimes [pursue life and end up with death? polisher] [give up?] the pursuit of life and end up with death. It is not that they do not really desire life and rather desire death; it is that it proved impossible to continue living and it was possible to die. Thus, when desires run to excess, actions do not reach that point because the mind stops them. If what the mind permits coincides with reason, then although the desires are not strong enough the mind has ordered them to do so. If what the mind permits conflicts with what is reasonable, then although the desire[s] be few, how could it stop at disorder! Thus, order and disorder lie in what the mind permits and not with the desires that belong to our essential natures. Although you claim to have succeeded in finding the cause of order and disorder, if you do not seek it where it lies but instead seek it where it does not lie, then you will miss the truth.’45 Xun Zi is thus convinced that strengthening mental reasoning is a way of establishing social norms, in particular, ritual principles. He makes a point of discussing the content of ritual: ‘Ritual principles are the guiding ropes that pull the government. Where the exercise of government does not make use of ritual principles, the government will not succeed ... The relationship of ritual principles to the correct governance of the nation is like that of suspended balance and steelyard to the determination of weight or that of the darkened marking line to straightness. Thus, a man without ritual will not live, an undertaking without ritual will not succeed, and a nation without ritual will not be tranquil.’46 He also says: ‘Now, since human nature is evil, it must await the instructions of a teacher and the model before it can be put aright, and it must obtain ritual principles and a sense of moral right before it can become orderly. Nowadays, since men lack both teacher and model, they are prejudiced, wicked, and not upright. Since they lack ritual principles and precepts of moral duty, they are perverse, rebellious, and disorderly.’47 Xun Zi explains, from a supply–demand balance perspective, how social norms constrain a state’s behaviour, avoid violent conflicts and maintain international order. He believed that norms make human desires reasonable and so help to achieve satisfaction. In other words, that they achieve the balance between decreased human desires and increased satisfaction. Xun Zi says: ‘The Ancient Kings abhorred such disorder; so they established the regulations contained within ritual and moral principles in order to apportion things, to nurture the desire of men, and to supply the means for their satisfaction .... In this way the two of them, desires and goods, sustained each other over the course of time. This is the origin of ritual principles.’48 Xun Zi’s ideas regarding norms as a means of preventing violent conflict between states shares certain common assumptions with modern institutionalism; both hold that certain norms exist in the human mind that in some way control and constrain the temptation to pursue individual selfinterest. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye say: ‘All these regimes were designed to resolve common problems in which the uncontrolled pursuit of individual self-interest by some governments could adversely affect the national interest of all the rest.’49 ‘Over time, governments develop reputations for compliance, not just to the letter of law but to the spirit as well. These reputations constitute one of their most important assets.

After all, as noted in the preface to a book on Confucian humanism, which collected views of more than two dozen leading scholars in the humanities and social sciences: [A key debate in this area concerned] the claim that Confucian ethics, as reflected in government leadership, competitive education, meritocratic elitism, social interaction, a disciplined work force, principles of equality and self-reliance, and self-cultivation, provides a necessary background and a powerful motivating force for the rise of industrial East Asia.105 It may also be useful to explore whether Confucianism could provide insight into solving some of the most treacherous problems in the international intellectual property regime. For example, would a Confucian system of intellectual property rights—which emphasizes harmony, balance, and social responsibility—strike a better balance between proprietary interests and public access needs? Would the Confucian approach to resolving disputes hold the key to the litigation explosion in the intellectual property field and the continuing problems concerning so called copyright, patent, and trademark trolls? Would the Confucian focus on virtue, benevolence, and familial values be conducive to reducing disagreements between developed and developing countries in the intellectual property arena? Finally, would Confucianism provide important insight into the growing popularity of open source, free culture, and access to knowledge movements?