2022
HDC
Affirmative
1AC—Plan + Russia Advantage
Arts 18—Program coordinator supporting The German Marshall Fund of the United States’ (GMF) security and defense policy work in Washington DC, strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan (Sophie, December 2018, “Offense as the New Defense: New Life for NATO’s Cyber Policy,” GMF Policy Brief, No. 039, )
Perhaps most importantly, as NATO stands ready to integrate defensive and offensive cyber operations, it should further clarify how these relate to its collective defense provision. Although NATO holds that Article 5 could be invoked following a “significant” cyberattack against one or more of the allies,46 officials have remained deliberately ambiguous when it comes to defining the parameters of a qualifying attack so as to discourage hostile operations that would fall just below such a specific threshold.47 Without a clear line, allies have more room to maneuver in a cyber crisis short of invoking Article 5. However, recent experience across the alliance has yielded little proof that the strategic ambiguity in this domain is effective in preventing hostile operations.
As NATO seeks to address this challenge, it will need to assess how to develop an effective cyber policy that balances deterrence with the potential risk for escalation. With this in mind, it should establish more precise thresholds for cyber-attacks and define proportional response scenarios.48 Without these, it will likely remain very challenging to mobilize allies to invoke Article 5 in a cyber crisis. This could be particularly difficult if a crisis were to be triggered or exacerbated by offensive cyber operations under the command of a NATO ally or if such operation on the part of NATO were used as a pretext for crisis. Considering the potential escalatory nature of a more forward-leaning posture – within NATO and driven by its largest member, the United States – these questions should be urgently addressed.
2022
HDC
Affirmative
1AC—Plan + Russia Advantage
Dr. Owen Cotton-Barratt 17, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford and Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, et al, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” 2/3/2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf
The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter.
According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns.
2022
HDC
Affirmative
1AC—Plan + Russia Advantage
Weiss 19—National Sales Director at United Medical Instruments, UMI and Research assistant at the American Jewish University (Matthew and Martin Weiss, Neurosurgeon at UCLA-Olive View Medical Center, 5/29/2019, “An assessment of threats to the American power grid”, Energy, Sustainability and Society, Volume 9, Article number: 18, )
Consequences of a sustained power outage The EMP Commission states “Should significant parts of the electrical power infrastructure be lost for any substantial period of time, the Commission believes that the consequences are likely to be catastrophic, and many people will die for the lack of the basic elements necessary to sustain life in dense urban and suburban communities.” [67]. Space constraints preclude discussion on how the loss of the grid would render synthesis and distribution of oil and gas inoperative. Telecommunications would collapse, as would finance and banking. Virtually all technology, infrastructure, and services require electricity. An EMP attack that collapses the electric power grid will collapse the water infrastructure—the delivery and purification of water and the removal and treatment of wastewater and sewage. Outbreaks that would result from the failure of these systems include cholera. It is problematic if fuel will be available to boil water. Lack of water will cause death in 3 to 4 days [68]. Food production would also collapse. Crops and livestock require water delivered by electronically powered pumps. Tractors, harvesters, and other farm equipment run on petroleum products supplied by an infrastructure (pumps, pipelines) that require electricity. The plants that make fertilizer, insecticides, and feed also require electricity. Gas pumps that fuel the trucks that distribute food require electricity. Food processing requires electricity. In 1900, nearly 40% of the population lived on farms. That percentage is now less than 2% [69]. It is through technology that 2% of the population can feed the other 98% [68]. The acreage under cultivation today is only 6% more than in 1900, yet productivity has increased 50 fold [69]. As stated by Dr. Lowell L Wood in Congressional testimony: “If we were no longer able to fuel our agricultural machine in the country, the food production of the country would simply stop, because we do not have the horses and mules that used to tow agricultural gear around in the 1880s and 1890s”. “So the situation would be exceedingly adverse if both electricity and the fuel that electricity moves around the country……… stayed away for a substantial period of time, we would miss the harvest, and we would starve the following winter” [70]. People can live for 1–2 months without food, but after 5 days, they have difficulty thinking and at 2 weeks they are incapacitated [68]. There is typically a 30-day perishable food supply at regional warehouses but most would be destroyed with the loss of refrigeration [69]. The EMP Commission has suggested food be stockpiled for a possible EMP event. A prescription for failure Even if all the recommendations of the Congressional EMP Commission were implemented, there is no guarantee that the grid will not sustain a prolonged collapse. There should therefore be contingency plans for such a failure. There is also another consideration. The foundational pillars of prior American nuclear defense policy, in today’s climate, are of uncertain validity. Mutual assured destruction is the Maginot line of the 21st century. Nonproliferation will prove difficult to resurrect. The consequences of a widespread nuclear attack have been positioned to the public as massive deaths from blast effects, and then further lingering deaths from the effects of radiation. We suspect there will be no electricity, and there will be no electricity for a very long time. There should be an actionable plan in anticipation of a possible prolonged collapse of the grid—a retro-structure and a skill set to provide a framework for survival. Our sense is there is no plan.
2022
HDC
Affirmative
1AC—Plan + Russia Advantage
O’Hanlon 19—Senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy. He is also director of research for the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. He is an adjunct professor at Columbia, Princeton, and Syracuse universities and University of Denver (Michael E., April 2019, The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes, Chapter 2: Plausible Scenarios, pgs 34-6, Brookings Institution Press, ProQuest Ebook)
If any initial conventional engagements went against its interests, Russia might also consider limited nuclear employment options. Indeed, some of its strategists currently entertain an “escalate to de-escalate” concept that would attempt to intimidate NATO allies into reversing their plans. Russia might detonate a nuclear weapon high in the atmosphere to create a powerful nuclear-induced electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that could prove lethal to air defense radars, military communications systems, and much civilian infrastructure over a region many hundreds of kilometers in radius. A Russian EMP burst using a high-altitude nuclear weapon would be an extremely provocative and risky move, to be sure. 57 But some Russian leaders could argue that it was not strictly speaking a nuclear attack, since no humans would be killed by the direct explosive effects of such a weapon—and thus might delude themselves into thinking it was a relatively low-risk option. In fact, the risks could be very high. Some types of EMP attacks (or even cyberattacks) by Russia could disable [shut down] large chunks of the U.S. or European electricity grids for many months.58 A severe attack of this type might even lead to a U.S. nuclear response, in light of the new nuclear doctrine of the Trump administration. 59 Beyond the EMP option, Russia could use nuclear weapons directly against ships that carried military equipment, missile defense radars, or other capabilities. Indeed, it threatened to target nuclear missiles at any Danish ships joining the U.S.-led missile defense effort in 2015. Again, the provocation would be enormous— but the direct human stakes might be fairly limited, since only dozens of sailors, or at most a couple hundred, might be on a given naval vessel. 60 Moscow might, perhaps delusionally, think the risks were acceptable. Of course, there would be enormous significance and risk to crossing the nuclear threshold in any way. But if weapons were used against isolated military targets (as both sides contemplated in various ways during the Cold War), Moscow again might convince itself, rightly or wrongly, that escalation risks could be tolerated and managed. That might be particularly true for attacks limited to the kinds of target sets that posed disproportionate vulnerability and dependence for NATO. These could include cargo ships at sea, rail marshaling yards where train tracks change gauge (necessitating unloading and reloading) at the Poland- Lithuania border, or particularly weak bridges without nearby alternative routes. 61 If Russia could limit NATO fatalities to hundreds of sailors and not itself present any target sets that were characterized by a similar combination of relatively high military importance and relatively great separation from vulnerable civilian populations, NATO might not have a good recourse. Moscow might hope as much, at least—and so elect to roll the dice. Such a decision would be reckless and foolish, but perhaps not beyond the pale of how human beings have behaved historically in wars they felt they were otherwise likely to lose.
2022
HDC
Affirmative
1AC—Plan + Russia Advantage
Emilio Iasiello 17, cyber intelligence expert, leading teams at the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Department of State in strategic cyber intelligence production supporting national-level decision makers to include the Executive Office, the U.S. Congress, and senior civilian and military policymakers. NATO’s Cyber Operations Center – Will Russia Feel Threatened? , language edited change denoted by brackets
According to recent reporting, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) announced that its Cyber Operations Center (COC) is expected to be fully staffed and functional by 2023. The new COC marks NATO’s understanding of the importance that cyberspace plays in conflict, particularly in times of political tensions that has resulted in cyber malfeasance that has targeted elections and critical infrastructure. The establishment of the COC is a natural evolution in how to address cyber attacks in a more timely manner by integrating cyber actions with more conventional military capabilities. In early 2014, after notable cyber incidents were a part of international incidents that occurred in Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008, the Alliance updated its cyber defense policy to classify digital attacks as the equivalent of kinetic attacks under its collective security arrangement under Article 5 of the treaty. In those particular instances, Russia was suspected in orchestrating or at least tacitly supporting the cyber attacks that afflicted both states. Since then, Russia’s alleged cyber activities have only become more brazen in their scale and aggressiveness. From suspected involvement in launching cyber attacks against Ukrainian critical infrastructure to launching a variety of cyber operations to meddle in the elections of foreign governments, Russia has taken advantage of the uncertainty of cyberspace where there is little consensus on key issues such as Internet governance, cyber norms of state behavior, or the criteria by which cyber attacks escalate to a point of war.
NATO has always provided a strong military counterpoint to Russian influence in the European region and projecting a credible threat in cyberspace is an important complement to NATO capabilities. However, previously, NATO didn’t have any of its own cyber weapons, a significant problem given Russia’s perceived position of a near-peer level adversary of the United States. With the establishment of the cyber command, the United States, United Kingdom, and Estonia have offered the Alliance their cyber capabilities. As described in one news article, the alliance hopes to integrate individual nations’ cyber capabilities into alliance operations, coordinated through the COC and under the command of NATO’s top general. With this in hand, it will be interesting to see if this will serve as the deterrent it’s intended to be and how Russia may adjust their cyber activities, particularly against NATO member countries.
2022
HDC
Affirmative
1AC—Plan + Russia Advantage
Fisher 15—Foreign policy editor at Vox (Max, 6/29/2015, “How World War III became possible”, Vox, )
This poll is even worse than it looks. It assumes that Russia would launch an overt military invasion of the Baltics. What would actually happen is something far murkier, and far more likely to leverage European hesitation: the playbook from Ukraine, where Russia deployed its newly developed concepts of postmodern "hybrid war," designed to blur the distinction between war and not-war, to make it as difficult as possible to differentiate grassroots unrest or vigilante cyberattacks from Russian military aggression.
Putin may already be laying the groundwork.
2022
HDC
Affirmative
1AC—Plan + Russia Advantage
Jackson 16—Received his juris doctor degree from George Mason University School of Law and is currently a Research Associate at the Center for Infrastructure and Protection at the George Mason University School of Business (Stephen, 8/16/2016, “NATO Article 5 and Cyber Warfare: NATO’s Ambiguous and Outdated Procedure for Determining When Cyber Aggression Qualifies as an Armed Attack”, George Mason Center for Infrastructure Protection & Homeland Security, )
Article 5 is useful for assessing state and non-state actions used in traditional warfare. However, the NATO allies drafted Article 5 in light of the technology and tactics of the World War II era. While NATO continued to successfully adapt Article 5 to the evolving challenges post-Soviet Union, it cannot properly invoke the principle of collective self-defense against cyber attacks without at least new definitions for the various forms of cyber events. In particular, without unambiguous guidelines for identifying from where a cyber attack originated, NATO will face difficulty in both locating the origin of a cyber attack and determining whether the cyber attack was sanctioned by the host nation. Also, without proper definitions for the various forms of cyber attacks, NATO will likely encounter unnecessary debate between NATO allies over any cyber attack against a NATO country. Furthermore, without removing ambiguity in identifying cyber events that equate to a traditional armed attack, the North Atlantic Council will face difficulty in deciding upon a proper and proportionate armed response in accord with the principles of jus in bello.
Currently, almost every NATO ally has an individual national security and defense strategy related to cybersecurity.[12] These strategies vary in detail and scope, and lack uniformity in defining the elements of which cyber attacks warrant an aggressive response. Some scholars argue that the International Court of Justice accurately determined that collective self-defense is triggered when an act “inflicts substantial destruction upon important elements of the target state,” even if the attackers used non-traditional weaponry like airplanes or cyber attacks.[13] For instance, this “scale and effects” test does not adequately address the technical differences between using cyberspace to create either a kinetic disruption to a power plant or the potential to dismantle an entire financial infrastructure with zero physical effects. The potential for a single cyber attack to result in major disturbance, with or without any physical element, is sufficient to warrant specific guidelines. However, as long as the North Atlantic Council assesses individual cyber attacks on a case-by-case basis without predetermined specialized rules, the various interests of all 28 NATO nations will pose obstacles for a swift and efficient NATO response.
2022
HDC
Affirmative
1AC—Plan + Russia Advantage
Dina Aldanova 5/30—Master’s Candidate at Georgetown University’s Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies Program. ("Will Russia Launch a New Cyber Attack on America?" May 30, 2022, from National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/techland-when-great-power-competition-meets-digital-world/will-russia-launch-new-cyber-attack)
Nevertheless, cybersecurity experts speculate on a range of consequences in a worst-case cyber scenario: Russia might attempt to attack U.S. critical infrastructure, turn off the lights, target the operation of ATMs and credit card systems, attack Amazon’s cloud, disrupt the transportation and supply of clean water, and target pharmaceuticals companies’ manufacturing facilities, power grids, and colonial pipelines. But will such a threat manifest?
Not only would a cyberattack against the United States contradict the historically peripheral nature of Russian cyber warfare, but Russia’s cyber capacity would be insufficient for the task. For the past several years, the West has largely overestimated Russian military capabilities in conventional warfare. U.S. intelligence agencies predicted the 2022 war in Ukraine would be the most destructive the European continent has seen since the end of World War II, expecting the fall of Kyiv to come within days. However, the still ongoing, drawn-out war has revealed weaknesses in the Russian armed forces, its military arsenal, and strategic leadership. Russian officials, for their part, underestimated the strength of the Ukrainian resistance and the united position of the international community. Spending slightly more than 4 percent of the country’s GDP on the military, the Russian president mobilizes domestic support for the military budget by articulating the external threat of NATO. In a relatively undigitized society like Russia, lobbying to spend more on the cyber budget would prove less effective. Taking this into account, it seems possible the West could be overestimating Russian cyber competence as well.
2022
HDC
Affirmative
1AC—Plan + Russia Advantage
Erica D. Lonergan & Sara B. Moller 4/27—Assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute and a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; former Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College. ("NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with its Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea." March 27, 2022, from POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/27/nato-credibility-cyber-defense-pledge-russia-ukraine-00027829)
President Joe Biden has issued grave warnings that Russia might launch a cyberattack against the United States in retaliation for the punishing sanctions levied after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. He’s advised American companies to “accelerate efforts to lock their digital doors,” and many officials expect an attack against critical U.S. infrastructure to be inevitable.
One way Biden and other Western leaders are attempting to deter potential Russian cyber retaliation during the Ukraine crisis is through NATO’s Article 5 collective defense pledge — that an attack on one is an attack against all. That’s because since the 2014 NATO summit in Wales (which, coincidentally, took place following another Russia-Ukraine crisis), the alliance has affirmed that Article 5 extends to cyberspace. In other words, a cyberattack against any NATO member could conceivably represent an attack against the entire alliance. The pledge is the embodiment of the allies’ security guarantee to each other and the beating heart of NATO.
2022
HDC
Kritik
AFF---Cap K---Perm
Mazzucato ’21 [Mariana; Jan 28; Professor in the Economics of Innovation and Public Value at University College London where she is the founding director of the UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose; “Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism,” p. 204-10]
This book has applied what I believe is the immensely powerful idea of a mission to solving the ‘wicked’ problems we face today. In it, I have argued that tackling grand challenges will only happen if we reimagine government as a prerequisite for restructuring capitalism in a way that is inclusive, sustainable and driven by innovation.
First and foremost, this means reinventing government for the twenty-first century – equipping it with the tools, organization and culture it needs to drive a mission-oriented approach. It also means bringing purpose to the core of corporate governance and taking a very broad stakeholder position across the economy. It means changing the relationship between public and private sectors, and between them and civil society, so they all work symbiotically for a common goal. The reason for the emphasis on rethinking government is simple: only government has the capacity to bring about transformation on the scale needed. The relationship between economic actors and civil society shows our problems at their most profound, and this is what we must unravel.
2022
HDC
Kritik
AFF---Cap K---!---Cap Good/Transition Bad
Polychroniou et al. '20 [CJ; 9/16/20; PhD in Political Science from the University of Delaware; Noam Chomsky, Professor & Professor of Linguistics emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Robert Pollin, Professor of Economics and Co-Director of the Political Economy Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts; "The Political Economy of Saving the Planet," https://bostonreview.net/science-nature-global-justice/noam-chomsky-robert-pollin-c-j-polychroniou-political-economy-saving]
There are important elements of truth in such views, but we should also be careful to not push this point too far. Some commentators have argued that one silver lining outcome of the pandemic was that, because of the economic lockdown, fossil fuel consumption and CO2 emissions plunged alongside overall economic activity during the recession. While this is true, I do not see any positive lessons here with respect to advancing a viable emissions program that can get us to net zero emissions by 2050. Rather, the experience demonstrates why a degrowth approach to emissions reduction is unworkable. Emissions did indeed fall sharply because of the pandemic and the recession. But that is only because incomes collapsed and unemployment spiked over this same period. This only reinforces the conclusion that the only effective climate stabilization path is the Green New Deal, as it is the only one that does not require a drastic contraction (or “degrowth”) of jobs and incomes to drive down emissions.
A genuinely positive development of the pandemic and recession is that progressive activists around the world have fought to include Green New Deal investments in their countries’ economic stimulus programs. It is critical to keep pushing the development and success of these initiatives.
2022
HDC
Kritik
AFF---Cap K---!---Cap Good/Transition Bad
Smith '19 [Noah; 4/5/19; Bloomberg Opinion columnist, former assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University; "Dumping Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet," https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-05/capitalism-is-more-likely-to-limit-climate-change-than-socialism]
It has become fashionable on social media and in certain publications to argue that capitalism is killing the planet. Even renowned investor Jeremy Grantham, hardly a radical, made that assertion last year. The basic idea is that the profit motive drives the private sector to spew carbon into the air with reckless abandon. Though many economists and some climate activists believe that the problem is best addressed by modifying market incentives with a carbon tax, many activists believe that the problem can’t be addressed without rebuilding the economy along centrally planned lines.
The climate threat is certainly dire, and carbon taxes are unlikely to be enough to solve the problem. But eco-socialism is probably not going to be an effective method of addressing that threat. Dismantling an entire economic system is never easy, and probably would touch off armed conflict and major asdasd upheaval. In the scramble to win those battles, even the socialists would almost certainly abandon their limitation on fossil-fuel use — either to support military efforts, or to keep the population from turning against them. The precedent here is the Soviet Union, whose multidecade effort to reshape its economy by force amid confrontation with the West led to profound environmental degradation. The world's climate does not have several decades to spare.
2022
HDC
Kritik
AFF---Cap K---!---Cap Good/Transition Bad
Rhonheimer, 20—teaching professor at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross (Martin, “Capitalism is Good for the Poor – and for the Environment,” , dml)
It is not social policy but capitalism that has created today’s prosperity.
What is important is that what made today’s mass prosperity possible – a phenomenon unprecedented in history – was not social policy or social legislation, organised trade union pressure, or corrective interventions in the capitalist economy, but rather market capitalism itself, due to its enormous potential for innovation and the ever-increasing productivity of human labour that resulted from it.
2022
HDC
Kritik
NEG---Cap K---Alt---Solvency
Foster '19 [John Bellamy; 2/1/19; Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon, PhD in Political Science from York University, President and Board Member of the Monthly Review; "Capitalism Has Failed—What Next?" https://monthlyreview.org/2019/02/01/capitalism-has-failed-what-next/]
Indeed, history has been unkind to all such attempts to provide detailed forecasts of the future, particularly if they simply extend current trends and leave the bulk of humanity and their struggles out of the picture. It is for this reason that a dialectical view is so important. The actual course of history can never be predicted. The only thing certain about historical change is the existence of the struggles that drive it forward and that guarantee its discontinuous character. Both implosions and explosions inevitably materialize, rendering the world for new generations different than that of the old. History points to numerous social systems that have reached the limits of their ability to adapt their social relations to allow for the rational and sustainable use of developing productive forces. Hence, the human past is dotted by periods of regression, followed by revolutionary accelerations that sweep all before them. As the conservative historian Jacob Burckhardt declared in the nineteenth century, “a historical crisis” occurs when “a crisis in the whole state of things is produced, involving whole epochs and all or many peoples of the same civilization.… The historical process is suddenly accelerated in terrifying fashion. Developments which otherwise take centuries seem to flit by like phantoms in months or weeks, and are fulfilled.” He called this the “acceleration of historical processes.”91
Burckhardt principally had in mind social revolutions, like the French Revolution of 1789. This was an acceleration of history that, as the modern French historian Georges Lefebvre explained, commenced as a series of widening revolutions, mutating with terrifying speed, from an aristocratic revolution to a bourgeois revolution to a popular revolution and then a peasant revolution—finally taking on the character of a historic “bloc, a single thing,” seemingly unconquerable, which reshaped much of world history.92
2022
HDC
Kritik
NEG---Cap K---Alt---Solvency
Tavan '21 [Luca; 3/7/21; writer for Red Flag; "Worldwide revolution is possible and necessary," ]
From the moment Marx and Engels urged workers of the world to unite at the climax of the Communist Manifesto, the goal of international revolution has been at the core of Marxist politics.
International revolution isn’t just a romantic dream, but an urgent necessity. It’s the only means by which capitalism can be permanently uprooted and replaced with socialism. This is because capitalism, unlike previous class societies, is a globally integrated system. “For the first time in history”, wrote British Marxist Colin Barker of this phenomenon, “capitalism has created a genuinely world society, where all our lives are entwined together in a common history and a common fate”.
2022
HDC
Kritik
NEG---Cap K---! T/---AT: Transition War
Hanappi '19 [Hardy; 1/7/19; PhD in Economics from the University of Vienna, chair for Political Economy at the European Commission and director of the Vienna Institute for Political Economy Research; "From Integrated Capitalism to Disintegrating Capitalism. Scenarios of a Third World War," ]
It should not come as a surprise that a change of the dominant mode of production of human society takes place by a clash of brute forces, of worldwide war. Limiting his attention to the aspect of equality of men the anthropologist Walter Scheidel describes in fascinating historical detail how wars always preceded the setup of large scale new organization of society, see [Scheidel, 2017]. To which extent such a war again is on the agenda today - contrary to the existence of DC - clearly is a question of forecasting. The previous section of this chapter used a scenario technique to sketch some contours of a possible third World War. These scenarios are not independent, mixtures of them are to be expected, e.g. a common strategy of a player in scenario 1 is to stir up national civil war (scenario 2) in a satellite country of its opponent (e.g. Yugoslavia); or to use the rhetoric of scenario 3 to support the fight of national class struggle (scenario 2). But will WW3 happen at all?
Not necessarily, but with a frightening high probability. Some counterstrategies already have been mentioned along the discussion of the scenarios. The immediate candidate, of course, is a global peace movement. This movement already played a pivotal role in ending the Vietnam War, being an incubator for the worldwide cultural revolution of 1968. As the short life and the macroeconomic impotence30 of this rebellion showed, any movement with durable impact needs not only roots in personal perceptions and feelings, it also needs a very sophisticated and well-developed blueprint of the overall working of a global democratic society. A mode of production is a complicated political economy entity, which needs a complicated system design. Fortunately, the explosive accumulation of human knowledge, of science, should be able to provide just that – if it were not handcuffed by the singular tasks tailored by Disintegrating Capitalism. The next best counteraction thus is to organize the carriers of this knowledge, e.g. scientists, in a progressive global class. Even if WW3 happens, chances are that a restart is possible and the blueprint of a better mode of production is needed. In this case Umberto Eco’s vision of an upcoming new Middle Ages31, with monasteries (today: universities?) preserving and developing secret knowledge, might become reality.
2022
HDC
Kritik
NEG---Cap K---! T/---AT: Environment/Innovation
Tony Smith ’15, is a professor of philosophy at Iowa State University and the author of Technology and Capital in the Age of Lean Production., “Red Innovation”, Jacobin, 3/31/15, https://jacobinmag.com/2015/03/socialism-innovation-capitalism-smith
The technological dynamism of capitalism has always been a powerful argument in its defense. But one of its secrets is that at the heart of this change we find neither bold entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, nor established firms.
Investments pushing the frontiers of scientific knowledge are just too risky. The advances sought may not be forthcoming. Those that do occur may not ever be commercially viable. Any potentially profitable results that do arise may take decades to make any money. And when they finally do, there are no guarantees initial investors will appropriate most of the resulting windfall.
2022
HDC
Kritik
NEG---Cap K---! T/---AT: Environment/Innovation
Alexander, 15- lecturer at the Office for Environmental Programs at the University of Melbourne who wrote his PhD thesis on degrowth (Samuel Alexander, 2015, “Prosperous Descent: Crisis as Opportunity in an Age of Limits,” published by The Simplicity Institute, pg. 68-69)
This mainstream vision of how to achieve a sustainable world is coherent in theory, at best, but demonstrably it does not reflect empirical reality (see Alexander, 2014). Although many economies around the world are indeed getting better at producing commodities more cleanly and efficiently (a process known as ‘relative decoupling’), overall ecological impact is nevertheless still increasing, because every year increasing numbers of commodities are being produced, exchanged, and consumed as a result of growing economies (Jackson, 2009, Ch. 5). We might have more fuel-efficient cars, for example, but the rebound effect is that we are also driving more and buying more cars. This is but one example of the ‘Jevons paradox’ that permeates market societies and beyond (Polimeni et al., 2009) – a paradox, so-called, because a per unit reduction in the throughput of commodities does not always lead to reduced ecological impact, since those efficiency improvements are often outweighed by the increasing amounts of commodities that are consumed (Holm and Englund, 2009). The implication of this is that technology and efficiency improvements are not going to solve the ecological crisis, as their most optimistic advocates and popular consciousness seem to assume they can (Lovins, 1998) – at least, not unless the highly developed nations also transition away from growth economics. Efficiency without sufficiency is lost.
2022
HDC
Kritik
NEG---Cap K---Impact---Environment
Plested '20 [James; 2/17/20; editor of Red Flag; "Capitalist roots of the environment crisis," https://climateandcapitalism.com/2020/02/18/capitalist-roots-environment-crisis/]
Climate change is only one aspect of the problem. Everywhere we look, the natural systems that maintain our planet in its habitable state are rapidly deteriorating. Can we survive the destruction of the tropical rain forests of the Amazon – the lungs of Earth? Can we survive the spread of dead zones – areas too low in oxygen to sustain life – across our oceans? Can we make do without the bees and other insects we currently depend on to pollinate our crops?
Perhaps the scariest thing about the situation isn’t the vast scale of breakdown in natural systems but the fact that those entrusted with the leadership of our society appear determined to hasten us to our doom. Instead of listening to the advice of the scientists, firefighters, land managers and others who’ve been sounding the alarm about climate change for decades, Scott Morrison and Co. parrot propaganda points from the Murdoch press. Instead of agreeing, finally, to contribute more to global efforts to reduce carbon emissions, they double down on the expansion of Australia’s booming coal and gas industries, attempting all the while to distract the public with fairy tales about greenies preventing back-burning and the fires just being part of Australia’s natural cycle.
2022
HDC
Kritik
NEG---Cap K---Impact---War (General)
Hathaway '15 [William; 3/4/15; adjunct professor of American studies at the University of Oldenburg in Germany; "The root cause of war is oligarchic capitalism," https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/root-cause-war-oligarchic-capitalism/]
Capitalism is always at war. The violence, though, is often abstract: forcing us either to accept low-paying, exhausting jobs or starve; denying us adequate healthcare, education and economic security; convincing us that human beings are basically isolated, autonomous units seeking self gratification. But when this doesn't suffice to keep their profits growing, the violence becomes physical, the cannons roar, and the elite rallies us to war to defend "our" country and destroy the fiendish enemy. Motivating us to kill and die for them requires a massive propaganda campaign - America is under attack! - which we confront whenever we turn on their media.
Why do they do this? Are they monsters?