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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › DOS Link---2NC

Jurisdictional conflicts independently take out solvency

Matthew E Dunham 15, Major, USAF. He holds a Bachelors of Arts degree in Political Science from Messiah College; a Juris Doctor from The Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law; and an Masters of Law in International and Operational Law from The Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. Worked for the Office of Military Cooperation in Kuwait. 1. ARTICLE: A MOST "IRREGULAR" ASSIGNMENT: A VIEW INTO THE INNER WORKINGS OF A SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION, 42 The Reporter 34 NEXIS //pipk

Another challenge is working with interagency partners. Being able to work with other agencies, especially [*37] Department of State Foreign Service officers, is paramount to success. Dr. Catherine Sweet, currently the Political/Economic Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, is a career diplomat and has been posted at a variety of locations with a large military presence. She notes that in as much as SCO personnel have to cope with cultural differences in adapting to the host nation, they must also adjust to the very different institutional cultures within various U.S. government agencies. 7

According to Dr. Sweet, SCO personnel are most effective when they keep the mission's overall strategic objectives at the forefront, recognizing that each agency brings its own strengths (and blind spots) to the table. Once identified, these strengths can be amplified -- and relative weaknesses mitigated -- by working together as a cohesive team in service of the mission's goals. 8 This is, in effect, the interagency version of the DoD's "one team, one mission" principle. On the other hand, interagency squabbling and turf wars can hinder the ability to accomplish the greater U.S. mission in the host nation. When there is cohesion, working with DoS can be one the most rewarding parts of working at a SCO, both personally and professionally -- something Dr. Sweet states is also true for State Department personnel working with DoD. 9

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › DOS Link---2NC

State Department magnifies the link. Forces a trade-off with other priorities and generates jurisdictional conflicts with Defense

Albert Zaccor 5, Colonel, US Army, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow. Director for Southern Europe in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy – NATO/Europe. "Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy" August. //pipk

Moreover, executive branch departments and agencies lack a common set of regional and country-specific Security Cooperation objectives and do not operate according to the same set of priorities. For example, State and Defense are two of the most significant players in Security Cooperation. DOS controls Security Assistance -- including Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the largest sources of funds DOD uses to execute its Security Cooperation activities. DOS requests funds from Congress and allocates resources to DOD based on its own assessment of foreign policy requirements, which do not always agree with DOD’s. OSD carefully lays out the strategic rationale for its Security Cooperation plans in its Security Cooperation guidance, but DOS officials are free to ignore or accept the contents of this guidance as they like.119 Likewise, DOD and its subordinate organizations painstakingly prioritize countries and regions to guide allocation of Security Cooperation resources, but the Department of State has its own priorities, which do not always coincide.120

The lack of baseline strategic guidance to govern the planning, programming, and execution of Security Cooperation activities has resulted in the classic failures of an “administered policy.” According to Barry Posen, administered policies prevail in democracies as political leaders trade off initiatives that might be effective in one area against costs measured in terms of other agendas, values, and policies.121 The result is bureaucratic politics and competition for resources and policy attention. To avoid the pitfalls of an administered policy the USG must develop a combined approach that brings together all the stakeholders, assigns responsibilities, and requires integrated planning.122 A document or set of documents, under the signature of the President or the National Security Council will be required to provide sufficient authority to require and compel interagency cooperation in crafting and implementing integrated Security Cooperation strategies.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Agent Link---2NC

Only fiating one agency results in stove-piped implementation that hurts partnerships necessary for security cooperation

Bilal Y. Saab 19, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense and Security Program. In addition, he is an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service. Saab served as Senior Advisor for Security Cooperation (SC) in the Pentagon’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, with oversight responsibilities for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). In his capacity as the Department of Defense’s lead on security cooperation in the broader Middle East, Saab supported the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’s responsibility for SC oversight by leading prioritization and strategic integration of SC resources and activities for the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility. "Broken Partnerships: Can Washington Get Security Cooperation Right?" October 11. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1663120 //pipk

It is convenient, and in many cases justifiable, to assign blame to US partners for the deficiencies of security cooperation, including their hesitancy to take on more responsibilities and their failure to spend more on defense to improve military capabilities. But the unpopular truth is that a major ailment of security cooperation is internal to the United States. This sizeable and exponentially growing enterprise is malfunctioning because the US national security bureaucracy has been in great disorder since the end of the Cold War. If foreign policy starts at home, so does security cooperation.

The key actors involved in security cooperation—the White House, Congress, Department of Defense, and Department of State—do not have a unified understanding of security cooperation: what it’s supposed to achieve, how to use and improve it, and how to tell if it’s working. Moreover, they have failed to coordinate their efforts on various matters including oversight and accountability. Security cooperation relies on bureaucratic partnerships. Yet, these partnerships are broken, and the enterprise is awfully stove-piped as a result of anemic leadership.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › SC key to Ukraine---2NC

US arms are key to Ukraine winning

Eric Schmitt & John Ismay 7/1, New York Times reporters. "Advanced U.S. Arms Make a Mark in Ukraine War, Officials Say" //pipk

The most advanced weapons that the United States has so far supplied Ukraine are making an impact in their first several days on the battlefield, destroying Russian ammunition depots and command centers, American and Ukrainian officials say.

Ukraine’s military had eagerly awaited the arrival of the first batch of truck-mounted, multiple-rocket launchers, whose satellite-guided rockets have a range of more than 40 miles, greater than anything Ukraine had possessed. The weapons have even won grudging respect from some Russians for their accuracy and power, analysts said.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › SC key to Ukraine---2NC

Assistance to Ukraine is key to them winning

David Leonhardt 7/6, senior writer for The New York Times. "Three War Scenarios" //pipk

Avril Haines, the U.S. director of national intelligence, recently outlined three plausible scenarios in Ukraine.

In the first, Russia’s continuing progress in eastern Ukraine would break Ukrainians’ will to fight and allow the Russian military to take over even more of the country. This outcome is Vladimir Putin’s new goal after being defeated in his initial attempt to oust Ukraine’s government.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › DSCA key to Ukraine---2NC

Defense Security Cooperation Agency key to Ukrainian arms transfers but they’re on the brink of overstretch now. Worsening performance risks transfers and triggers Congressional cuts due to lack of oversight

Valerie Insinna 7/1, “DoD agency wants to put weapons monitors on the ground in Ukraine” //pipk

The Defense Department agency responsible for overseeing foreign arms sales would like to have a presence on the ground to monitor the use of US weapons in Ukraine, but when that will happen is still unclear, its deputy director said Thursday.

“We do think that over time, we would like to be able to extend our insights with a greater presence on the ground going forward,” Jed Royal, deputy director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, told reporters during a roundtable.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › DSCA Effective Now---2NC

DSCA is effective now but is facing a post-COVID spike in demand. Gradual reforms are in progress but the overall process is currently efficient

Colin Clark 22, founding editor of Breaking Defense, also started DoDBuzz.com, the world’s first all-online defense news website. "New DSCA director eschews big changes; ‘continuous reform’ instead" Feburary 16. //pipk

In his first interview, the new director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency said he plans to pursue incremental and targeted improvements to the agency’s primary responsibility of coordinating the export of American weapons.

America’s defense industry, along with the allies and partners who buy US made weapons, have complained for decades that the US government moves too slowly in approving sales and implementing policies. The State Department has primary responsibility for approving arms exports, with DSCA, a Pentagon agency, having oversight once a deal has been approved.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › AT: Ukraine Support Inev---2NC

Support is not inevitable

Dan Sabbagh 6/12, Guardian's defence and security editor. "Ukraine fears western support will fade as media loses interest in the war" //pipk

Ukraine’s war with Russia is heading towards its fifth month amid increasing local concern that dwindling media attention could lead to a gradual loss of western support just as Moscow is making slow but steady gains on the frontline.

The anxiety reflects a growing normalisation of the conflict in which large parts of the country feel distant from the war in eastern Donbas – as it becomes clear that casualties are mounting and economic costs soaring. “It’s a very real threat, that people get tired psychologically,” said Lesia Vasylenko, an opposition MP with the liberal Holos party.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Ukraine Aid High---2NC

Ukraine aid coming. It’s key to victory

Joe Gould 6/15, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News. "US sending Ukraine new $1 billion arms package amid grinding Donbas fight" //pipk

The U.S. will send Ukraine another $1 billion in weapons to fight Russia, including Harpoon anti-ship launchers for the first time, and more ammunition for high-tech, medium-range rocket launchers, the Biden administration announced Wednesday.

The U.S. aid will include two Harpoon launchers and an unspecified number of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, or GMLRS, rockets for previously committed M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced in Brussels. Also included are 18 M777 howitzers, 36,000 rounds of 155mm ammunition and thousands of secure radios.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Ukraine Aid High---2NC

Big new package is coming

VOA News 7/2, "US Announces $820 Million Military Aid Package for Ukraine" //pipk

The United States announced details Friday of $820 million in additional military aid for Ukraine, including new surface-to-air missile systems and counter-artillery radar.

The latest aid package is designed to help Ukraine counter Russia's use of long-range missiles and follows calls by Ukrainian officials for Western countries to send more advanced weapons systems that can better match Moscow's equipment.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Link Wall---2NC

Security cooperation coordination is hard. It has to be approved by senior-most echelons, which means even small things like the plan are cumbersome and time-intensive. That takes out solvency but not the link.

Andrew S. Bowne 18, Major, Judge Advocate, USAF. Presently assigned as a Contract and Fiscal Law Professor, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army. 1. ARTICLE: DEFENDING THE NEW FULDA GAP: DETERRING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE BALTIC STATES THROUGH FISCAL LEGISLATION, 226 Mil. L. Rev. 147. Nexis //pipk

2. Provide Exemptions from DoS Coordination Another way Congress can help streamline the security cooperation process is to legislate exemptions for certain activities from prior coordination between DoD and DoS. There is the potential for relatively low-cost, high-reward activities that may not be possible if the planning takes too long. Congress recognized the process for coordination between the two departments on security cooperation programs "is too ad-hoc in nature and often elevates responsibility for such coordination, particularly those requiring concurrence, to the senior-most echelons of the respective organizations--to include the Deputy Secretary or Secretary level--resulting in a cumbersome and time-intensive process." 195 Although the legislative history is clear, Congress intended for the secretaries to "designate individuals at the lowest level in their respective organizations with responsibility for such coordination," 196 the new laws still require concurrence and coordination at the secretary level. 197

[*187] Foreign assistance and security cooperation are traditionally diplomatic functions; however, the nature of coalition defense requires a singular voice, and in many cases, that voice should come from the Secretary of Defense. Thus, for small-scale projects that support the mission essential tasks of the combatant commander, Congress should limit the requirements for pre-coordination and concurrence. Rather than require additional levels of bureaucratic red tape that limit the utility and effectiveness of an otherwise useful security cooperation authorization, Congress could exempt logistic support, loans of military equipment, and certain small-scale construction projects from the requirement of prior DoS concurrence for each activity. By shifting the focus from prior coordination to reporting, the DoS and Congress will maintain oversight while allowing the DoD the necessary flexibility to provide support when and where it is needed. The exemption from inter-agency concurrence could be for specified equipment, dollar thresholds, as well as for properly vetted and approved recipient countries, such as the Baltic States and Poland, that have supported the United States in its operations in Afghanistan, meet the NATO defense spending thresholds, support democracy, human rights and civilian control of the military, and have a clear connection to the United States' security interests.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Link Wall---2NC

The brink is low. Each increase in security cooperation risks other priorities. Congress has sufficiently streamlined now but continuing to avoid patchwork security cooperation is key to deterrence. Fiscal year restrictions means even minor delays can spillover

Andrew S. Bowne 18, Major, Judge Advocate, USAF. Presently assigned as a Contract and Fiscal Law Professor, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army. 1. ARTICLE: DEFENDING THE NEW FULDA GAP: DETERRING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE BALTIC STATES THROUGH FISCAL LEGISLATION, 226 Mil. L. Rev. 147. Nexis //pipk

While engagement with foreign states is typically within the purview of the DoS, 179 the last fifteen years has seen a growing emphasis on the role of the DoD in security cooperation activities. 180 Corresponding to that [*184] increased role, Congress enabled the DoD to respond to threats and build partner capacity through a myriad of authorities and associated funding. 181 The increase in the number of authorities permitting the DoD to engage with foreign militaries, though instrumental in commanders' efforts to improve interoperability in combined operations, resulted in a security cooperation enterprise that is incredibly cumbersome, complicating the ability of the DoD to effectively prioritize, plan, execute, and oversee these activities. 182

The FY17 NDAA attempted to streamline the security cooperation enterprise by consolidating various train and equip authorities into one statute and codifying other security cooperation authorities into one chapter of Title 10 of the U.S. Code. 183 While this reform represented a vast improvement to the previous patchwork of legal authorities and assist DoD efforts to build capacity in the Baltic States under EDI, Congress can and should continue to improve security cooperation laws to maximize its impact in deterring Russian aggression against NATO allies. 184 Two courses of action Congress can take to improve efforts in accordance with the intent of EDI is to 1) authorize multi-year appropriations for EDI activities and 2) exempt certain expenditures of jointly procured equipment and military construction with certain allies, such as the Baltic States and Poland, from DoS concurrence.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Link Wall---2NC

Security cooperation resources are limited. The plan drains money, time, and policy attention from other priorities. Even small distruptions have magnified effect because it hurts our leverage to mobilize other resources

Albert Zaccor 5, Colonel, US Army, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow. Director for Southern Europe in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy – NATO/Europe. "Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy" August. //pipk

This list of capabilities may strike the reader as either entirely too large to focus U.S. Security Cooperation, or woefully incomplete. As to the first objection, the USG already conducts a large number of programs to address virtually all the items on this list and many more, though in a fragmented and non-synchronized manner. Regarding the second objection, while there are many worthwhile capabilities that could be added to the list, limited resources -- not just money, but also time and policy attention -- require us to focus primarily on those capabilities that directly support the fight against strategic crime. The capabilities listed, in many cases, contribute to satisfying more than one American strategic priority (see Figure 1). It is not be possible, of course, for the U.S. to assist all of its partners with every capability on this list, which is why prioritization is essential. Whether or not you agree with all of the items on the list or believe that others should be added, the important thing is to develop a unified interagency position concerning which capabilities deserve focus by country and region in order to craft integrated strategies for applying U.S. Security Cooperation resources.

Identification of Resources A strategic approach to building partner capabilities requires the identification and mobilization of resources. U.S. assistance programs alone cannot and should not bear the burden for building all of the capabilities in the worldwide NOFS. U.S. leadership, enabled by a vision for increased cooperation, strategic planning, and carefully targeted incentives to prompt partner nations to support U.S. priorities, can set the conditions for success. Resources to build partner capabilities are available at the national, intermediate or regional, and global levels.106

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Link Wall---2NC

Requests for security cooperation generate hidden conflicts that collide with other issues

Matthew E Dunham 15, Major, USAF. He holds a Bachelors of Arts degree in Political Science from Messiah College; a Juris Doctor from The Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law; and an Masters of Law in International and Operational Law from The Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. Worked for the Office of Military Cooperation in Kuwait. 1. ARTICLE: A MOST "IRREGULAR" ASSIGNMENT: A VIEW INTO THE INNER WORKINGS OF A SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION, 42 The Reporter 34 NEXIS //pipk

In addition to host nation and interagency relationships, a SCO may face challenges working within the joint DoD community. Mission sets, agendas, priorities, personalities and egos abound in foreign countries where there is a sizable DoD presence. At the very least, there are instances when DoD commanders lean far forward to get a particular mission accomplished without full appreciation for the implications. This is understandable, especially if local commanders rotate frequently. SCO personnel, who are more permanent, should anticipate and mitigate these issues through strong working relationships.

To illustrate how varying mission sets among DoD components operating in a host nation can create challenges, consider the following scenario: the Army requests "X" from the host nation to accomplish "Y", while the Air Force needs "A" from the host nation to accomplish "B." The Air Force's request for "A" will make it difficult for the host nation to grant the Army's request for "X." Meanwhile, off the coast the Navy is routinely doing "Z" near host nation territorial waters. The host nation has declared it will not answer any request from the U.S. military until the Navy stops doing "Z." In this scenario, the SCO is the narrow part of the funnel where these issues collide. The Army and Air Force may not know or care [*38] about the Navy doing "Z," and they each are likely to hold their respective requests as paramount. Meanwhile, the Navy's "Z" operations may be entirely legitimate (it also may not know or care about the Air Force and Army needs).

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › DSCA Disad---1NC

Weapons and security assistance are key to beating Russia. That prevents Putin from future escalatory actions that risk war crimes, nuclear war, global famine, and European energy crisis

The Economist 6/30, "How to win Ukraine's long war" //pipk

Ukraine won the short war. Mobile and resourceful, its troops inflicted terrible losses and confounded Russian plans to take Kyiv. Now comes the long war. It will drain weapons, lives and money until one side loses the will to fight on. So far, this is a war that Russia is winning.

In recent days its forces have taken the eastern city of Severodonetsk. They are advancing on Lysychansk and may soon control all of Luhansk province. They also threaten Slovyansk, in the north of next-door Donetsk. Ukrainian leaders say they are outgunned and lack ammunition. Their government reckons as many as 200 of its troops are dying each day.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › DSCA Disad---1NC

Security cooperation resources are limited. Plan trades off

Gregory Dykeman 7, Colonel in the U.S. Army, Chief of Effects Assessment and Targeting in the Strategic Operations Directorate, MultiNational Force Iraq. "Security Cooperation: A Key to the Challenges of the 21st Century" //pipk

Despite successes in execution, as a strategy, security cooperation still faces numerous challenges. Both the international and domestic strategic environments will test our abilities to implement a cooperative strategy framework for the foreseeable future. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, domestic entitlement programs, and outdated legislative authorities will leave DoD struggling to properly resource the activities necessary to meet our objectives. DoD must also address program effectiveness and improve coordination across the U.S. Government and with our allies.

Resource challenges to security cooperation derive from fiscal constraints, Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), Global Force Posturing, and outdated authorities. From a fiscal standpoint, the strategic environment will make the task of addressing our security challenges problematic for the foreseeable future. DoD’s 2007 budget is projected to be 3.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). As a percentage of GDP, DoD outlays are historically low and have not kept pace with the growth of GDP over the last 40 years.31 However, the rising costs of mandatory government entitlement spending associated with Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security are projected to account for 11 percent of the U.S. GDP by 2016 and will exert pressures on a budget that economic growth alone is unlikely to alleviate.32 Entitlement obligations will likely result in political pressure to further reduce defense discretionary spending in order to forestall greater budget deficits. Despite the constrained fiscal environment, DoD outlays must continue to grow to meet our global engagement requirements. This should be a continuous strategic communication message implemented by DoD senior leadership to Congress and the American people to counter a growing view that the federal government already spends too much on national defense.33

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › DSCA Disad---1NC

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is stream-lining now to get weapons to Ukraine but they’re on the brink of being over-stretched by new demands from NATO and the rest of the world. Now is the critical time to lock-in security relationships but reliability is key.

Joe Gould 6/30, "Senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry." //pipk

The changed security environment in Europe will mean increased demand from its allies for integrated missile defenses, early warning systems, air-to-air missiles and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, a senior U.S. defense official said Thursday.

The assessment comes as rattled European countries are committing to boost their militaries in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. U.S. government officials, while racing to send weapons to Ukraine, are also working to backfill allies who have sent arms to Ukraine or are keen to strengthen their conventional defenses.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Topicality › Yes DSCA---2NC

The aff must go through DSCA. It’s the only limit on the topic and is normal means for all security cooperation.

Anthony V. Lenze 17, Major, Judge Advocate, United States Army. Presently assigned as Associate Professor, Contract and Fiscal Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia. ARTICLE: TRADITIONAL COMBATANT COMMANDER ACTIVITIES: ACKNOWLEDGING AND ANALYZING COMBATANT COMMANDERS' AUTHORITY TO INTERACT WITH FOREIGN MILITARIES, 225 Mil. L. Rev. 641. Nexis //pipk

Security cooperation is now a term that encompasses "any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the [DoD] with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a [strategic] purpose . . . [.]" 85 [85 10 U.S.C. § 301(7) (2017). Congress articulates three purposes for security cooperation: "to build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; to provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation; to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests. Id.] The DoD assigns such strategic importance to security cooperation that, with the help of Congress, it created the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to direct and guide the execution of all DoD security cooperation programs. 86 [86 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-84, SECURITY ASSISTANCE: DOD'S ONGOING REFORMS ADDRESS SOME CHALLENGES, BUT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS NEEDED TO FURTHER ENHANCE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 4 (2012) (The "[Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)] oversees program administration for both traditional programs and newer [building partner capacity] programs. [The] DSCA establishes security assistance procedures and systems, provides training, and guides the activities of implementing agencies."). ] The DSCA helps administer security cooperation, now a multi-billion dollar industry within the annual Defense appropriation. 87 With all the money and strategic brainpower pouring into security cooperation, newcomers to the field may presume fully-vetted, standardized terms and definitions. However, this could not be further [*656] from reality.

Members of the DoD frequently mischaracterize security cooperation or outright disagree with respect to its doctrinal definition. 88 For example, the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) used the term security cooperation to include rebuilding damaged infrastructure and establishing conditions necessary to end military operations in Afghanistan. 89 With the exception of combat operations, it would seem that almost any military action could fit under the 2010 NSS's version of security cooperation. 90 Nevertheless, if security cooperation is in fact an evolving term in the DoD, making sense of the authorities under which the military executes security cooperation events is even more troublesome. 91 This is especially true when authorities are based upon a set of specific terms. Hence, with doctrine lagging behind and accompanied by undefined terminology, no authority in the realm of security cooperation is more ambiguous than the authority for military-to-military contacts. 92 With ambiguity surrounding military-to-military contacts, planners and lawyers should defer to commanders to decide the best way to employ these strategic interaction events. The fate of 10 U.S.C. § 168 and its ultimate repeal is illustrative of this point.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Topicality › T-DSCA---1NC

A---Interpretation---the aff must go through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency---security cooperation is very broad, but so is the DSCA’s jurisdiction---prefer our evidence, it takes into account recent legal changes, has intent to define, and reconciles the DOD/DOS question

---not just descriptive of DOD security cooperation. It’s about security cooperation as a topic of interest within Congress generally, describes broader legislative authorities titled “security cooperation”, explicitly includes and accounts for DOS authority, explains the origins of the term “security cooperation” as being rooted in the creation of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and is descriptive of all security cooperation that takes place in a country as falling within the DSCA’s purview

Colonel Luisa Santiago et al 19, Captain Harry Parent, Captain Reed Lorch, Major Deidre Baker, Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Litka, Colonel Luisa Santiago, U.S. Army Reserve Command staff judge advocate; Colonel Anthony Adolph, General Counsel (Staff Judge Advocate) - United States Forces Korea; and Colonel William Smoot, Chief, Criminal Law Division, U.S. Army OTJAG. FEATURE: No. 3 Fostering Enduring Partnerships: An Overview of Security Cooperation Offices Through the Lens of Iraq, 2019 Army Law. 49, Nexis //pipk

Security cooperation (SC) is clearly a topic of current interest to Congress and the Defense community. In recent years, several changes to the regulatory and statutory guidance have taken place that include the publication of a RAND Report reviewing Title 10 authorities for security cooperation in 2016, 2 issuance of revisions to at least seven key joint references in 2017, 3 the publication of a Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report on Building Partner Capacity in March 2017, 4 the designation of a new chapter under Title 10--Chapter 16 Security Cooperation--and the push to professionalize and develop the security cooperation workforce under the newly formed Department of Defense Security Cooperation Workforce Development Program (SCWD) within the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). 5

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › NEG

China’s a threat now – They’ve increased their activity in the South East Asia area and their intention to invade Taiwan is clear

AP, 7/24/22 – Politico , Politico, known originally as The Politico, is a political journalism company based in Arlington County, Virginia, that covers politics and policy in the United States and internationally. It primarily distributes content online but also with printed newspapers, radio, and podcasts

JAKARTA, Indonesia — The Chinese military has become significantly more aggressive and dangerous over the past five years, the top U.S. military officer said during a trip to the Indo-Pacific that included a stop Sunday in Indonesia. Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the number of intercepts by Chinese aircraft and ships in the Pacific region with U.S. and other partner forces has increased significantly over that time, and the number of unsafe interactions has risen by similar proportions. “The message is the Chinese military, in the air and at sea, have become significantly more and noticeably more aggressive in this particular region,” said Milley, who recently asked his staff to compile details about interactions between China and the U.S. and others in the region. His comments came as the U.S. redoubles its efforts to strengthen its relationships with Pacific nations as a counterbalance to China, which is trying to expand its presence and influence in the region. The Biden administration considers China its “pacing threat” and America’s primary long-term security challenge. Milley’s trip to the region is sharply focused on the China threat. He will attend a meeting of Indo-Pacific chiefs of defense this week in Sydney, Australia, where key topics will be China’s escalating military growth and the need to maintain a free, open and peaceful Pacific. U.S. military officials have also raised alarms about the possibility that China could invade Taiwan, the democratic, self-ruled island that Beijing views as a breakaway province. China has stepped up its military provocations against Taiwan as it looks to intimidate it into unifying with the communist mainland. U.S. military officials have said Beijing wants to be ready to make a move on the island by 2027. The U.S. remains Taiwan’s chief ally and supplier of defense weapons. U.S. law requires the government to treat all threats to the island as matters of “grave concern,” but remains ambiguous on whether the U.S. military would defend Taiwan if it were attacked by China. China’s top military officer, Gen. Li Zuocheng told Milley in a July 7 call that Beijing had “no room for compromise” on issues such as Taiwan. He said he told Milley that the U.S. must “cease U.S.-Taiwan military collusion and avoid impacting China-U.S. ties and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” The U.S. and others are also worried that a recent security agreement that Beijing signed in April with the Solomon Islands could lead to the establishment of a Chinese naval base in the South Pacific. The U.S. and Australia have told the Solomon Islands that hosting a Chinese military base would not be tolerated. “This is an area in which China is trying to do outreach for their own purposes. And again, this is concerning because China is not doing it just for benign reasons,” Milley told reporters traveling with him. “They’re trying to expand their influence throughout the region. And that has potential consequences that are not necessarily favorable to our allies and partners in the region.” Milley’s visit to Indonesia is the first by a U.S. joint chiefs chairman since Adm. Mike Mullen in 2008. But U.S. leaders have crisscrossed the Asia-Pacific in recent months, including high-profile visits by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken. The Biden administration has been taking steps to expand its military and security relationship with Indo-Pacific nations as part of a campaign to build a stronger network of alliances in China’s backyard and counter China’s growing influence. Milley declined to provide specific numbers of unsafe Chinese interactions with U.S. and allied aircraft and ships. But Austin, in a speech in Singapore last month, referred to an “alarming increase” in the number of unsafe intercepts by People’s Liberation Army aircraft and vessels. Austin specifically pointed to a February incident where a PLA navy ship directed a laser at an Australian P-8 maritime patrol aircraft. But there have been a number of others. A surveillance aircraft controlled by Canada was recently intercepted by a Chinese fighter in international airspace. And U.S. ships are routinely dogged by Chinese aircraft and vessels during transits, particularly around manmade islands claimed by Beijing in the South China Sea. Milley said there have been Chinese intercepts with Japan, Canada, Australia, Philippines and Vietnam. They all, he said, have seen a “statistically significant” increase in intercepts, and the number of unsafe incidents has increased by an “equal proportion.” Milley, who will meet with Gen. Andika Perkasa, chief of the Indonesian National Defence Forces, said Pacific nations like Indonesia want the U.S. military involved and engaged in the region. “We want to work with them to develop interoperability and modernize our militaries collectively,” Milley said, in order to ensure they can “meet whatever challenge that China poses.” He said Indonesia is strategically critical to the region, and has long been a key U.S. partner. Earlier this year, the U.S approved a $13.9 billion sale of advanced fighter jets to Indonesia. And in Jakarta last December, Blinken signed agreements for enhanced joint naval exercises between the U.S. and Indonesia. China has condemned U.S. efforts to expand its outreach in the region, accusing America of trying to build an “Asian NATO.” During a speech in Singapore, Austin rejected that claim. “We do not seek a new Cold War, an Asian NATO or a region split into hostile blocs,” he said.