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2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › Perm Do CP

“The” allows particulars

Random House 6 Unabridged Dictionary, T File

(used, esp. before a noun, with a specifying or particularizing effect, as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of the indefinite article a or an): the book you gave me; Come into the house.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › AT Expulsion Bad---Prolif

Turkey prolif now—NATO isn’t key

Spacapan 20- the Wohlstetter Public Affairs Fellow at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Previously, he worked on Middle Eastern Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Prior to work at AEI, he served as a foreign policy legislative aide on the staff of US Senator Mark Kirk. He holds a BA from Vanderbilt University and an MA from the University of Chicago. (John Spacapan “Conventional wisdom says Turkey won’t go nuclear. That might be wrong.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 7, 2020, )//mcu

Ask 10 experts on Turkish politics whether the United States should worry about Ankara’s nuclear weapons ambitions and you’ll likely hear 10 denials. Get beyond the Washington Beltway and you’ll get something different. The Israelis worry Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is getting all too close to a nuclear-armed Pakistan that likes to share nuclear technology. Turkish environmentalists spotlight that Erdogan’s uneconomic and unnecessary nuclear power program may pose proliferation risks. The Greeks whisper about Erdogan’s nuclear bomb posturing. Any sound US approach to Turkey demands that American officials listen to these foreign voices. There are popular reasons to think Turkey won’t acquire nuclear weapons. It’s in NATO and already has 50 American B61 nuclear bombs at a joint US–Turkish airbase. It also forswore acquiring its own nuclear weapons, is party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and has ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. So, what suggests Turkey may want to go nuclear in the not too distant future? Three things. First, President Erdogan says he wants the bomb. Last fall, he complained before the UN General Assembly that the NPT bars states like Turkey from developing nuclear weapons but ignores that other states have them. Earlier, he told members of his Justice and Development Party that “some countries have missiles with nuclear warheads, not one or two. But [they tell us] we can’t have them. This, I cannot accept.” He then said nuclear weapons are an enormous source of power for Israel. Second, Erdogan is often bombastic, but on nuclear energy he’s taking action. Along Turkey’s Mediterranean coastline, the Russians are building four large civilian nuclear power reactors at the Akkuyu Nuclear Facility. Erdogan hopes the Russians will complete the first reactor by 2023, in time for the centenary celebrations of the founding of modern Turkey. Ankara says it needs nuclear energy to decrease its dependence on natural gas imports from unreliable partners—Russia and Iran—and to meet electricity demand. This demand has grown at the highest rate of all OECD countries since 2005. But Ankara’s case for nuclear power doesn’t add up. The Akkuyu facility doesn’t make Turkey less dependent on foreign powers. Russia will own and operate the facility, and it is well-established that Moscow uses all of its energy assets—not just fossil fuels—for coercion. Actually, the Akkuyu plant is a bad investment. While Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation, is footing the bill for the first reactor, it will not do the same for Akkuyu’s other three reactors. Despite years of searching, the Russians haven’t found a single private investor for the project. To finish Akkuyu, the Turkish government will have to finance it through public debt or secure increasingly scarce foreign investment. If President Erdogan were paying attention to the market, he would know that natural gas and renewables beat nuclear. Even before the pandemic, Turkey was importing natural gas for a fraction of the Akkuyu plant’s market electricity price—an uneconomic 12.35 cents per kilowatt hour. And Turkish access to gas will soon expand; by backing the interim government in Libya that enjoys UN support, Turkey scored cheap gas and drilling rights in Libya’s maritime zone. More natural gas will allow Turkey to meet electricity demand today. Cheap domestic renewables should help it tomorrow. As it stands, 10 percent of Turkish electricity comes from solar and wind. One of Turkey’s top universities recently reported that these sources could meet 30 percent of Turkey’s electricity demand by 2026, given proper investment. An objective observer must wonder why bad economics hasn’t dampened Erdogan’s nuclear ambitions. What’s worrisome is Turkey could exploit nuclear power as a cover to procure bomb-related technology and hardware. The technology transfer is already occurring. Since the Akkuyu project began, Turkish engineering students have become the second largest national group studying nuclear sciences in Russia, where hundreds of Iranian and North Korean scientists came before them. While Russia was building Iran’s civilian power facility at Bushehr, side agreements led to the transfer of equipment and exchange of scientists, which assisted Iran’s weapons program at other sites. These actions fooled US intelligence (who believed Iran had stopped its weapons program between 2003 and 2007) and international inspectors. Many experts doubt that Turkey would ever go nuclear. They emphasize that Turkey has signed an additional protocol agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, opening the country up to closer inspections than Iran had to prevent military diversions of nuclear fuel. The fuel, however, isn’t the only issue. As a major study of Iran and similar cases detailed a decade ago, the agency is disadvantaged in tracking the intangible technology and dual-use transfers that are critical to bomb making.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › AT Expulsion DA---Middle East

No Middle East war---states are too weak and deterrence solves

John Glaser 17, associate director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Master of Arts in International Security at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, "Withdrawing from Overseas Bases: Why a Forward-Deployed Military Posture Is Unnecessary, Outdated, and Dangerous," Cato Institute, 7-18-2017, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/withdrawing-overseas-bases-why-forward-deployed-military-posture

Regionally, the circumstances are similarly advantageous. According to Rovner, “the chance that a regional hegemon will emerge in the Persian Gulf during the next twenty years is slim to none. This is true even if the United States withdraws completely.” 134 There are only three potential major powers in the region: Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. None of them possesses the capabilities necessary to conquer neighboring territories or gain a controlling influence over Persian Gulf oil resources. In addition to being too weak to make a bid for regional dominance, all three are bogged down and distracted by internal problems. Overall, the region is in a state of defense dominance: the major states are too weak to project power beyond their borders, but they do have the capability to deter their neighbors. Deterrence works well in this environment because the costs of offensive action remain prohibitively high. 135

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › AT Expulsion DA---Middle East

No scenario for draw in, even with military presence.

John Glaser 17, Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute., 1-9-2017, "Does the U.S. Military Actually Protect Middle East Oil?," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/does-the-us-military-actually-protect-middle-east-oil-18995?page=0%2C1

In addition, the balance of power globally and in the region today is favorable for energy security. First, an external power gaining a stranglehold over the Persian Gulf region is implausible. The Soviet Union is long gone and today’s Russia suffers from systemic economic problems that hinder its potential to project power in the Middle East. China, while increasingly powerful in its own sphere, lacks the political will to dominate the Gulf . The regional balance of power is also favorable. According to Joshua Rovner , “the chance that a regional hegemon will emerge in the Persian Gulf during the next twenty years is slim to none. This is true even if the United States withdraws completely.” No state in the region possesses the capabilities necessary to conquer neighboring territories or gain a controlling influence over oil resources, and most are bogged down and distracted by internal problems. Overall the region is in a state of defense dominance: while too weak to project power beyond their borders, the major states do have the capability to deter their neighbors, making the costs of offensive action prohibitively high. So, three of the major scenarios that have traditionally justified a forward deployed military presence in the Persian Gulf—the entrance of a hostile external power, the rise of a regional hegemon and a military clash among the major states—are exceedingly unlikely even absent the U.S. military presence.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › AT Expulsion DA---Middle East

No great power involvement in Middle East war---every external actor will limit damage from regional instability rather than get involved

Ekaterina Stepanova 16, researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Summer 2016, “Russia in the Middle East: Back to a “Grand Strategy” – or Enforcing Multilateralism?” http://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_PE_162_0023--russia-in-the-middle-east.htm

In contrast to the 20th century and the early years of the 21st century, the regional crisis in the 2010s developed at a time when, overall, the role and leverage of major powers external to the Middle East, as either active meddlers or security guarantors in the region, or both, actually declined rather than increased. The United States serves as the most evident case in point: the “post-interventionist” US administration has clearly become “tired of the Middle East”, struggling and often failing to keep pace with the dynamically changing situation and unable to alter or decisively affect the course of events. The same even more strongly applies to the European powers. In terms of activity and impact, regional actors (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Turkey) increasingly appeared to outplay external powers and influence.

For external powers, however, that did not remove a number of risks and threats connected to, or emanating from, the Middle East. The increase and diversification of global energy supply and the latest crisis in energy prices made the region less central to the global economy than it had been in the past. At the same time, the fundamental socio-political, statehood and security crisis in the Middle East brought with it new security concerns and implications. They mostly stemmed from reinforced perceptions about the long-term nature of regional instability, the continuing potential for further destabilization, and the related consequences and implications beyond the region, ranging from terrorist connections to migration flows. These challenges affect external powers unevenly. For instance, the role of the Iraq-Syria area as the main focal point for global terrorism activity and magnet for transnational flows of violent extremists in the mid-2010s poses a threat to everyone (but mostly to the countries of the region itself, as well as to those in Europe and Eurasia). In contrast, the avalanche of refugee and migrant flows from the Middle East primarily targets Europe (rather than North America, Eurasia, or other regions).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › AT Expulsion DA---Middle East

No Middle East escalation

Imran 19- writer for The News International (Myra Imranz Citing the international seminar on “Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in South Asia and the Middle East”. Seminar on ‘Strategic dimensions of peace and conflict in South Asia, Middle East’. 2/6/19,

Islamabad : There is a need to study the causes of proxy wars, and what are the potential impacts of such wars on the overall conflict. These thoughts in a daylong international seminar on ‘Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in South Asia and the Middle East,’ organised by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), an Islamabad-based think tank, participated by prominent national and international scholars. Prof. Shahram Akbarzadeh, Deakin University, Australia, argued there is significant gap in the literature on non-state actors. He called for empirical research, along with concrete policy suggestions, on the topic, so as to mitigate the conflicts in the region, in particular South Asia and Middle East. Speakers grappled at the notion of non-state actors and proxy wars: PIPS director Muhammad Amir Rana said non-state actors often evoke memories of violent elements. This despite that as per definition, non-state actors include organizations working for human rights. Prof. Syed Rifaat Hussain, Department of Government and Public Policy, NUST, said the term “proxy wars” is a contested notion. There is no universal agreement on its definition, nor on the set of circumstances behind such wars. Interestingly, he said, proxy wars are as old as the phenomena of conventional war itself. Speakers noted proxy wars are instruments of state power. As to why states go for it, it was argued, it is because they are often cheap undertaking to change the status quo. Participants noted over the decades, much of the conflict involves non-state actors. Interstate conflict, on the other hand, has declined. In recent times, he said tit-for-tat tactics on behalf of such actors have reduced their appeal. Dr. Ibrahim Fraihat, Doha Institute of Graduate Studies, Doha, termed proxy war as an arms conflict between two parties, though one of them is not directly involved. This way, domestic conflicts are escalated by external power intervention. At the same time, proxy war, if unresolved, can take the shape of conventional war, the most significant example was of Vietnam War. In contemporary times, he lamented, the Middle East has been rendered a stock market of proxy organizations. William Gueriache, Associate Professor American University in the Emirates Dubai, said on surface, all states support open diplomacy and multilateralism. Yet the survival of patronage has paved the way for foreign intervention during conflicts in the whole Middle East. Dr. Marwan Kablan, Director Policy Analysis at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Doha, also hinted multiplicity of actors involved in Syrian conflict, calling it as mother of conflicts in the region. It was said that wars cannot be ended unless patron states achieve their interests. Dr. Shaheen Akhtar, Professor National Defence University Islamabad focused on the apprehension of Pakistan about India’s involvement in Afghanistan. She said Pakistan’s uneasy relationship with Kabul reinforces a perception of encirclement while growing US-India strategic cooperation further aggravates these apprehensions. Dr. Muhammad Riaz Shad, National University of Modern Languages (NUML) Islamabad, said fighting through proxies gives states an opportunity of deniability.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › AT Expulsion Bad---Afghanistan

Turkey won’t stabilize the economy---that makes instability inevitable

UN 6/23- (“Talking to the Taliban ‘only way forward’ in Afghanistan,” United Nations, 6/23/2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/06/1121122)//mcu

The economic crisis is perhaps the single most important issue in Afghanistan, and a potential driver of conflict and misery. It is estimated the economy contracted by up to 40 per cent since August. Unemployment could reach 40 per cent this year, up from 13 per cent in 2021, while the official poverty rate could climb as high as 97 per cent. “If the economy is not able to recover and grow meaningfully and sustainably, then the Afghan people will face repeated humanitarian crises; potentially spurring mass migration and making conditions ripe for radicalization and renewed armed conflict,” he warned.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › AT Expulsion Bad---Countering Russia

Turkey is actively working to help Russia and Iran, against US interests

Rubin 21 - is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (Michael Rubin, “To Use Turkey as a Bulwark Against Russia and Iran Is Wishful Thinking,” July 12 2021,

For decades, Turkey was a staunch Cold War ally. One of only two NATO members to border the Soviet Union, Turkey went above and beyond in its partnership with the United States: Turkey contributed more men under arms to NATO than Germany and France combined. Turkey subsequently joined the Baghdad Pact and Turks fought alongside the United States in the Korean War. Behind the scenes, Turkey proved crucial to numerous intelligence and counter-terror operations. With the end of the Cold War, bilateral relations remained strong, at least until the rise of Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Slowly but deliberately, Erdoğan turned away from the West. He picked fights like a master tactician, confident that he could find former ambassadors and others in the State Department, White House, or pay-to-play think tanks. He artfully played and rewarded those inclined to apologize for any Turkish outrage or desperate to preserve the alliance. The frequency of U.S. elections and new U.S. administrations—at least in comparison to the last two decades in Turkey—meant Erdoğan could always find an American official eager for a reset. Often, those seeking to promote rapprochement with Turkey argue that repairing the relationship is necessary given the broader strategic imperative of checking Russia’s and Iran’s geopolitical ambitions. The idea that Turkey can be a bulwark against either is magical thinking. It rests upon an embrace of an Istanbul bubble not representative of broader Turkish thinking, a wholescale embrace of the notion that Turkey’s depiction of its enemies and its narrative of history is accurate, and an anachronistic idea that Turkey has not changed over the decades. The idea that it is possible to ignore the ideology and volatility in Erdoğan is analogous to embracing Iranian reformists in the hope that they will somehow nullify the influence of the supreme leader. Likewise, to believe that nearly two decades of Erdoğanism has not changed Turkish society is to believe that twenty years of Khomeinism did not change Iran. Both are foolish delusions. Consider, for example, the notion that Turkey checks Russia’s interests. In May 2010, Russia and Turkey signed energy cooperation agreements to give Turkey its first nuclear power plant, with help from Russian energy companies. Earlier this year, Russian president Vladimir Putin and Erdoğan jointly celebrated the start of the construction of the new Akkuyu power plant. Such cooperation has become the rule rather than the exception. Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia has made headlines not because it represents a lucrative contract for Russia, but because the integration of S-400s into Turkey’s air defense would require compromising NATO electronics and computer codes to Russian engineers. Even if Turkey kept the S-400s on a separate system, they might be used to track and gather data on NATO air platforms. In 2016, the two counties signed an agreement on the TurkStream gas pipeline and, on January 8, 2020, they launched the pipeline. To suggest Germany’s pursuit of Nord Stream 2 is pro-Putin (it is) but, by omission, bless Turkey’s involvement in the TurkStream pipeline defies logic. Syria has become a flashpoint for Turkey’s Islamist ambitions. The reason why American officials from both parties ignore Turkish complaints about U.S. partnership with pro-PKK groups is not because of some conspiracy to promote Russian or Iranian interest as some suggest, but rather because Turkey’s partnership with the Islamic State forced that cooperation in the first place. Given how Turkey and Russia often appear on separate sides in the Syria conflict, it might be possible to argue that Turkey’s involvement checks Russian ambitions. The problem, however, is that Turkey’s approach to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad is inconsistent. In May 2007, the PKK derailed a train in Turkey that was carrying rocket launchers, mortar shells, and light arms to Syria, likely destined to Hezbollah. For example, in 2008 and 2009 Erdoğan was hosting joint cabinet meetings with Assad and vacationing with the Syrian dictator on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Certainly, the Syrian civil war changed perspectives but, on January 24, 2017, Russia, Turkey, and Iran signed an agreement to establish de-escalation zones and essentially cooperate to create spheres of influence in Syria. Damascus and Ankara replicated the same model in Libya and in Nagorno-Karabakh as well. Officials in both Armenia and Artsakh—as the self-styled Armenian state in Nagorno-Karabakh calls itself—openly speculate that Turkey traded influence in Idlib to Russia in exchange for the Kremlin agreeing to greater Turkish involvement in the South Caucasus. It is true that Turkey’s relationship with Russia has not always gone smoothly. In October 2012, Turkey forced a Syrian passenger plane to land, accusing it of carrying Russian munitions leading Russian officials to accuse Turkey of endangering Russian passengers. Three years later, Turkey shot down a Russian military jet close to the Syrian border. Putin called the move a “stab in the back.” Russia suspended military contracts, instituted a travel ban against Turkey, and implemented sanctions in response. After Erdoğan apologized, however, Russo-Turkish relations resumed where they had left off. Erdoğan’s use of the Gülen bogeyman to deflect blame from the consequences from his own policy choices proved useful in papering over other crises, such as when an off-duty Turkish police officer assassinated the Russian ambassador to Turkey. Certainly, tensions remain and the Kremlin is not afraid to play hardball with Erdoğan but whether out of ideological symbiosis or trade, neither Erdoğan nor Putin appears willing to break their embrace. The two leaders have met nearly two dozen times in either Turkey or Russia since 2012, and that figure does not include phone calls, video conferences, or mutual attendance at multiparty summits in third countries. Nor does it factor in Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan’s frequent travels to Moscow. The money at stake is significant. In 2019, Turkey’s exports to Russia totaled $4.15 billion, and Russian exports to Turkey were five times that amount. It is likewise farcical to believe Turkey can be a bulwark against Iranian influence. When, in 2010, Erdoğan appointed Fidan to be his intelligence chief, alarm bells sounded in Western capitals where his Western counterparts knew him as an Iran sympathizer if not an asset. To couch a renewed Turkish alliance as good for Israel or Jews is absurd. Fidan not only personally supervised efforts to unravel Turkey-Israel ties but also ordered Turkish intelligence actively to monitor Jews. He killed two birds with one stone when he allegedly exposed an Israeli spy ring targeting Iran’s nuclear program and has also betrayed intelligence to Hamas and China. Under Fidan, Turkey also endangered American forces by exposing the locations and supplies of U.S. forces operating in Syria. To suggest, in each case, that Turkey is simply acting in pique toward some sleight or following its own interests misses the point. Strong allies share not only short-term interests but also a broader ideological base. This has been the key to ensuring the stability of the post–World War II liberal order. The Turkish government, however, no longer shares common values with the United States or the West. Nor after two decades bombarded by vile anti-Western, anti-Semitic propaganda does a Turkish public, at least that beyond a few central Istanbul neighborhoods, some more cosmopolitan areas in Ankara, and the Mediterranean coast. Forty percent of the Turkish population has lived the entirety of their conscious lives under Erdoğan’s domination. To excuse Erdoğan as transactional is equally bizarre. In times of crises, allies do not seek to engage both sides in a bidding war for Turkey’s affection but that is at best what Erdoğan now tries to do. Turkey is skilled at caviar diplomacy; I know. While I never solicited nor received Turkish money (or that of any other foreign state), I was a frequent guest at Turkish conferences until the Erdoğan regime grew frustrated with both my refusal to promote its party line and my willingness to talk directly in the spirit of independent research to those it deemed enemies. Turkey continues to throw out the red carpet for those who amplify its narrative and offers golden parachutes for diplomats who amplify Turkish interests. Conversely, it restricts access to academics and policy analysts who do not tow its party line. Such enticement, however, is not only intellectually dishonest but also makes for buffoonish policy prescriptions, the notion that Turkey today can be a bulwark against Russia and Iran chief among them.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › AT Expulsion Bad---Top-Shelf

The alliance is over. Any benefit to Turkish membership is long-dead. Kicking them out just formalizes it.

GM 19 (Geopolitical Monitor, “Point Counterpoint: Turkey Should Be Expelled from NATO,”

As such, many claim that ousting Ankara from NATO is an option to be seriously considered. In principle, this raises costs in the form of losing a powerful partner in a strategic position, but in practice the problem may be less serious than it appears. The assets currently based on Turkish territory can be moved to more trustworthy partners, even though this would have some operational consequences. Most importantly, Turkey’s own uncooperative, if not outright abrasive, attitude already offsets the advantages its membership is supposed to bring. At the same time, expelling Turkey would allow the Organization and its members to simply counter Ankara whenever the latter’s actions go against its common interests, and NATO would be freed from any obligation to protect an untrustworthy ally that does little to promote the common interest and often acts openly against it in a manner that undermines NATO’s cohesion and policies. As such, Ankara’s exit from NATO would put an end to the numerous problems linked to its membership. And, arguably, it’s the Turkish government itself that is choosing this path. Ankara’s recent tilts toward rival powers like Russia and Iran seems to indicate that it is already drifting away from its trans-Atlantic commitments; therefore, expelling the country from NATO would simply make official the de facto break-up that Turkey has been actively seeking over the past decade.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › AT Turkey Doesn’t Leave

Even if Turkey doesn’t formally leave, the CP still solves Turkish aggression. Punishment forces Erdogan to stop external aggression

Ellis 20, analyst @ Ekathimerini (Tom, “Time for the West to punish Turkey,” Ekathimerini, )

If Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan achieves his maximalist goals, it will be a huge defeat – not just for Greece, Cyprus and other countries in the region, but for the Western system of stability and peace. To those high-ranking US diplomats and officials from both parties who cite the “risk” of losing Turkey and see it evolve into a new Pakistan or Iran, the answer is that the country is not behaving as if it is part of the Euro-Atlantic project and should not be treated with subtlety and criticism limited to mere rhetoric. Not after Ankara purchased the Russian S-400, invaded Syria with the aim of attacking the Kurds, got involved in Libya with forces and military equipment and plays a negative role in the hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh. Not to mention past allegations of dealings with Islamic State. All this is before we mention the numerous provocations that affect Hellenism, such as consecutive navtexes near Kastellorizo’s territorial water, surveying inside the Cypriot exclusive economic zone, opening Varosha despite the international outcry and UN resolutions, but also converting Hagia Sophia into a mosque. Turkey’s complete impunity undermines the West’s credibility. Erdogan has crossed every line. He denounced the joint military exercises of Greek and American forces in Thrace. Lately he is even turning against Turkish-Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci because he dares to refuse to align with Ankara’s appetites, and openly undermined him in order to make him lose the elections in the occupied north of the island. The Erdogan regime insults everyone, from French President Emmanuel Macron to US presidential nominee Joe Biden, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Republicans in Congress who are critical of him. He invests exclusively in his personal relationship with President Donald Trump – whatever the motives behind it. But even Trump has limits and priorities. When Erdogan jailed pastor Andrew Brunson, angering the Evangelicals, a key part of the US president’s electoral pool, Trump threatened to “destroy” the Turkish economy if the pastor was not released. The Turkish president complied. To return to the issues that concern us, it is obvious that other countries, no matter how friendly and supportive they are to Greece, are not going to get involved in a military confrontation on our account. Our allies and partners can, however, do enough damage to Turkey to force it to stop its aggression. It is in this light that, at last, the imposition of severe and substantial sanctions that will really hurt the Turkish economy must be seriously considered, both by the EU and the US. It is a fact that we have witnessed direct criticism from the US State Department against Turkey rarely seen in the past. It was preceded by France, while Germany is also starting to raise – slowly and belatedly – its voice. Strong statements by the powerful players that Erdogan counts on are a first step. They send clear messages that are difficult for the Turkish ruler to ignore. Athens is always reaching out to Ankara for friendship and dialogue, proposing that we delimit our maritime zones, stop the tension and reap the benefits that will result. If Erdogan continues the “calculated provocations” – which is how the Americans described them and not the Greeks or Cypriots – the next step should be targeted sanctions that will seriously affect Turkey. At the same time, the readiness of the Greek armed forces completes the puzzle of the potential cost that Erdogan is called upon to bear. As Turkish forces are spread too thin and on so many fronts, he must realize that in the event of a conflict, Turkey will pay a heavy price too. The West must punish the Turkish leader. He has turned his country into a pariah and he must be made to understand that he is not invincible – before it’s too late.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › AT Turkey Doesn’t Leave

The US can force a break in Turkey

Dr. Nicholas Danforth 21. Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow, Turkey Program, ELIAMEP. "Turkey and the West: A Hostile Dance." Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy. https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Policy-paper-60-Nick-Danforth-final-1.pdf. accessed 6-24-2022 //ART

There are also a number of observers who believe that Turkey and the West are moving steadily, even inexorably, toward a more formal, definitive and acrimonious break. Like Tolstoy’s unhappy families, these scenarios are all disastrous in their own unique way. Some imagine Turkey formally leaving NATO, launching a nuclear program or going to war with one of its neighbors. Some picture Turkey going rogue like Iran, becoming indebted to China or entering into an alliance with Russia. In many cases these scenarios are accompanied by a more nakedly authoritarian turn in Turkey’s domestic politics, with Erdoğan forcibly overturning elections and violently crushing protests.

Interestingly, pessimistic predictions vary in the degree to which they see this geopolitical break as the fulfillment of Erdoğan’s own ideological agenda or the result of circumstances escalating beyond his control. Erdoğan has made it clear how committed he is to a more “independent” Turkish foreign policy, one that would make his country a civilizational and geopolitical center in its own right, rather than a part of any other great power’s sphere of influence. He has also made it clear that he expects to have to achieve this in the face of sustained Western resistance. Yet, as laid out in the previous scenario, Erdoğan seems convinced that Turkey’s success in this venture will eventually bring Western powers around. Thus, while there is good reason to think Erdoğan’s worldview or domestic political needs might lead him to take provocative measures that could trigger a break, it seems unlikely that he would see the break as a goal in itself.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › AT Turkey Doesn’t Leave

If NATO humiliates Turkey, they’ll leave

Pandey 6-22 (Ansh Pandey, Associate Editor at TFIGlobal News, TFIGlobal, June 22, 2022, “Turkey could quit NATO,” ; accessed 6/25/2022) ng

Everything is not okay between NATO and Turkey, as NATO wants to induct Finland and Sweden into NATO. Turkey is quite adamant to oppose the motion. Erdogan stated that his opposition to Sweden and Finland joining NATO is the Kurdish insurgency, which Turkey views as a security danger.

But, this is not the first time that Turkey and NATO have sparred with each other. There have been many more reasons earlier as well where Turkey has disagreed with NATO allies. A famous case is Jamal Khashoggi when Turkey started softening its stance with Saudi Arabia ditching NATO’s efforts.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › Swinland !---Arctic

Doctrine and deployments mean Arctic War goes nuclear.

Féron, 18—Postdoctoral Research Associate at Columbia University School of Law (Henri, “A New Ocean: The Legal Challenges of the Artic Thaw,” 45 Ecology L. Q. 83 (2018), dml)

The Arctic is at risk of becoming a military flashpoint. The likelihood of military tensions over control of newly accessible natural resources should not be overstated, as most Arctic resources are clearly in the EEZs or continental shelves of this or that Arctic State.270 Yet the Arctic thaw inevitably opens new invasion routes that Arctic States must take into account when planning their defense—be it through the Arctic Ocean, the Bering Sea, or the RussoScandinavian borders.271 Loud calls on all sides against the militarization of the Arctic have been followed by quiet improvements in Arctic military capabilities, especially by Russia.272 The central concern here is the deep fracture between the seven Arctic NATO states and Russia, the geographically largest Arctic state. Russia was not represented at Arctic security forums following the Ukraine crisis, increasing the room for distrust, misunderstanding, and overreaction in the Arctic context.273 Indeed, key Russian security documents such as the 2014 Military Doctrine, the 2015 Maritime Doctrine, and the 2015 National Security Strategy identify NATO’s expanding influence as being among the top security threats to Russia, and highlight the need to defend Russian Arctic interests.274 Security tensions are already having economic implications, as anti-Russia sanctions in the wake of the Ukraine crisis have blocked a number of Russian Arctic resource development projects by preventing U.S. and EU companies from contributing equipment, technology, and financing.275

These outcomes appear to have been wholly preventable—a product of mutual fear rather than necessity. Four periods can be distinguished in Russian Arctic security policy in the post-Cold War era, with none clearly directed at threatening the interests of other Arctic states. Ekaterina Klimenko, writing for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, first notes an almost complete disbanding of Russian Arctic forces in the 1990s, as the country was reeling from the Soviet collapse.276 The 2000s then ushered a period of national power restoration, notably through the State Rearmament Program, which unsettled neighbors despite the spending targets remaining much more modest than in the Soviet era.277 Klimenko notes for instance that while the Program paid particular attention to the overhaul of Russia’s northern fleet, in particular for submarine patrols in the Arctic, the number of operational submarines at Moscow’s disposal actually fell by three-quarters from 1986 to 2010.278 Klimenko then highlights a period of attempted cooperation beginning in 2008, as a key Russian policy document insisted that it was a top strategic priority for Russia to keep the Arctic a “zone of peace and cooperation.”279 This posture presumably reflected the fact that Russia simply cannot afford to substantially fortify its extremely long northern coastline, especially considering that the Russian military budget is only about a seventh of America’s, and that the country’s economy was hit hard by plunging oil prices.280 In any case, this period was marked by Arctic advances such as the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, the Norway-Russia Agreement on the Barents Sea in 2010, and the setting up of Arctic security roundtables.281 Note also that Russia’s 2013 Arctic Strategy outlines exclusively defensive goals for Russian armed forces in the region, such as safeguarding sovereign rights, providing strategic deterrence, and repelling aggression.282 Finally, the 2014 Ukraine crisis began a period of rapidly deteriorating Russo-Western relations and a strengthening of Russia’s Arctic posture, for instance through large military exercises mirroring those of NATO and the setting up of a Joint Strategic Command for Russia’s northern forces.283 Klimenko notes, however, that many Russian military developments in the region since 2013 are products of plans that were announced long before the Ukraine crisis, such as the State Rearmament Program.284 So while it may be expected that other Arctic States would seek, like Russia, to proportionately protect their Arctic interests, there does not yet appear to have been any particular event making Arctic militarization an ineluctable necessity.285

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › Swinland !---Arctic

Adding Sweden & Finland bolsters NATO credibility, deterrence, and military capabilities.

WP 22. Washington Post. "Why NATO Should Welcome Finland and Sweden.” 4-27-2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/why-nato-should-welcome-finland-and-sweden/2022/04/26/9958d532-c561-11ec-8cff-33b059f4c1b7_story.html. accessed 6-22-2022 //ART

As for NATO, the Finnish bid would certainly make sense militarily. Although it has a small standing army, Finland’s reserve force is Europe’s largest; some 900,000 Finns have military training. The country’s air force and intelligence services are among the most advanced in Europe. If Sweden joins, its military’s air-defense and submarine prowess would bolster NATO’s ability to counter hostile Russian activity in the Baltic Sea and the Arctic.

There would be political benefits as well. It’s true that previous rounds of expansion, particularly to less-developed democracies in southeastern Europe, have strained the alliance’s resources and forced it to do business with illiberal governments. But adding Finland and Sweden, both prosperous democracies, would only bolster NATO’s credibility as a defender of liberal values. It would also help distribute the long-term costs of maintaining European security, allowing the U.S. to devote more attention to the Pacific. Despite Putin’s repeated threats, history shows that a larger alliance provides greater deterrence against Russian aggression in Europe, not less.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › Swinland !---Baltics

That’s the most likely nuclear risk--- limiting commitment solves

Thompson 16 [Loren B. Thompson is Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy. Prior to holding his present positions, he was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, “Why The Baltic States Are Where Nuclear War Is Most Likely To Begin”, July 20th, ]

While nuclear weapons could potentially be used in any number of future warfighting scenarios, there are multiple reasons to suspect that the greatest danger exists with regard to the three Baltic states. Here are eight of those reasons.

First, both Washington and Moscow assign high strategic significance to the future disposition of the Baltic states. From Moscow's perspective, the three states are located close to the centers of Russian political and military power, and therefore are a potential base for devastating attacks. For instance, the distance between Lithuania's capital of Vilnius and Moscow is less than 500 miles -- a short trip for a supersonic aircraft. From Washington's perspective, failure to protect the Baltic states from Russian aggression could lead to the unraveling of America's most important alliance.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › Swinland !---Baltics

Swinland integration aves the Baltics

The Economist 22 (“Why NATO should swiftly admit Sweden and Finland,” The Economist,

For finland and Sweden to join NATO is a rebuke to the anti-NATO arguments of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. Two countries that are proud of their long history of military non-alignment think the risk of antagonising their neighbour to the east is outweighed by the security they will gain. It is the direct result of the invasion of Ukraine, which Mr Putin ordered ostensibly to forestall nato’s expansion.

Finland and Sweden submitted their applications on May 18th. Despite Turkey’s stalling tactics, over Kurdish militants and possibly American fighter planes, their admission is likely. They will bring formidable capabilities in Arctic warfare and, in Finland’s case, the largest artillery force in Europe. Membership will more than double the length of NATO’s border with Russia. It will also make the Baltic states easier to defend. Mr Putin’s regime has responded by cutting electricity supplies to Finland and threatening “military-technical” action, whatever that is supposed to mean. He is not the first Russian leader to object to enlargement. In the 1990s Boris Yeltsin complained when members of the old Warsaw Pact applied to join the alliance. Over the years this hardened into the line of argument cited by Mr Putin as justification for invading Ukraine. Russia’s president says that enlargement breaks an undertaking that James Baker, then America’s secretary of state, gave the Soviet Union in February 1990. Many Western commentators argued that enlargement was unwise, because Russia would feel threatened. The West had other ways to enhance security, such as the Partnership for Peace, which sets out to strengthen relations between the alliance and non-members. These arguments do not stand up. Mr Baker was speaking about eastern Germany. His words were overtaken by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact nearly 18 months later. nato and Russia signed an agreement in 1997 that did not contain any restriction on new members, though enlargement had been discussed. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined almost two years later. The undertaking that has been violated is Russia’s pledge to Ukraine not to use economic or military coercion, given in 1994 when it surrendered the nuclear weapons based on its soil. In fact NATO has every right to expand. Under the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, signed by the Soviet Union, countries are free to choose their own allies. The Warsaw Pact suffered grievously under Soviet rule. Why would its ex-members not seek a haven? For many years Finns and Swedes mostly opposed joining nato. This shifted after the invasion of Ukraine in February. Indeed, the right for sovereign countries to determine their own destinies is one of the many things currently at stake in Ukraine. But was nato expansion wise? A spiral of mutual suspicion between Russia and nato clearly exists, but to blame nato expansion for triggering it is scarcely credible. Mr Putin has increasingly used nationalism and Orthodox religion to shore up his rule. He needs enemies abroad to persuade his people that they and their civilisation are under threat. That is why he seized territory in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014. Besides, Russia has a long history as an imperial power. Like most declining empires, it was likely to resist as its periphery drifted off, regardless of nato expansion. Finland and Sweden are both long-term members of the Partnership for Peace. If one of them were attacked, nato would have no commitment to intervene. Nor would American and British nuclear weapons cover them. Their choice to join NATO suggests that the partnership was not able to cope with Russian aggression. Likewise, denying central and eastern Europe membership of nato would have created a security vacuum that Russia may very well have been tempted to fill. Finland and Sweden are right to have concluded that Mr Putin is dangerous and unpredictable—not because of NATO, but in the way he governs Russia. Their applications should be rapidly approved. ■

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › Swinland !---NATO

Swindland extends Russian deterrence and upgrades defense capabilities.

Bundt 22, Secretary General of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee. She is also Chair of the Board of the Norwegian Institute of International Relations (NUPI), a board member of the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF) and a member of the CSIS Stuart Center Advisory Council (Kate, “A strong northern deterrence: Sweden and Finland want to join NATO,” IPS Journal, https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/a-strong-northern-deterrence-sweden-and-finland-want-to-join-nato-5996/)//BB

Both Sweden and Finland are politically stable democracies, well-entrenched constitutional states and militarily strong. A united North in NATO increases the Alliance's military capacity and collective defense readiness. The membership of the two countries will strengthen NATO as a community of values and increase the political weight of the North in the Alliance. The two countries' defense capability extends NATO's deterrence and its defense capability in a region of strategic importance to the Alliance. Intelligence cooperation will also be greatly facilitated and a better understanding of the situation will be possible.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › Swinland !---NATO

Adding Sweden and Finland would bolster NATOs deterrence to Russian aggression BUT Turkish opposition prevents it.

Cropsey 22, founder and president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy (Seth, “The Turkish Question on NATO: A larger strategic opportunity in the Black Sea,” The Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3497038-the-turkish-question-on-nato-a-larger-strategic-opportunity-in-the-black-sea/)//BB

Swedish and Finnish NATO membership would be a strategic gain for the Atlantic Alliance and the United States, both to counter Russian aggression and to ensure a united front on Eurasian policy. However, there is dissent within NATO about whether Sweden and Finland should be accepted, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan opposing both states’ participation in the alliance.

President Biden must act swiftly, recognize Erdogan’s incentives, and court Turkey properly to strengthen NATO’s long-term position. His response should involve inducements and concessions — Erdogan receiving desired Western military technology, and in return giving NATO warships access to the Black Sea.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › Swinland !---NATO

Sweden and Finland provide vital deterrence, technological, and perceptual boosts to NATO.

Erik Brattberg 22. Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. "Finland and Sweden Would Make NATO Stronger." National Interest. 4-22-2022. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/finland-and-sweden-would-make-nato-stronger-201951. accessed 6-22-2022 //ART

For starters, Finnish and Swedish NATO membership would serve as a powerful rejoinder to Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked war in Ukraine. It would underscore what a colossal strategic mistake the invasion is for Russia by tipping Finland and Sweden over the edge, thus bringing NATO closer to Russia’s own border. While Russia has repeatedly warned of “military and political consequences” should the two countries join NATO—including recent threats by Dmitry Medvedev to deploy nuclear weapons to the area—their membership would demonstrate that Russia cannot rule by intimidation or deny European nations the right to make sovereign decisions about their own security. This is ultimately what the war in Ukraine is all about. By granting them membership, NATO would also signal that its open-door policy remains vibrant. For aspiring countries like Ukraine and Georgia—both of whom view Finland and Sweden as key partners—this should be welcome news.

Second, NATO deterrence and collective security efforts in the Baltic Sea region would get a boost, reducing the likelihood that the war in Ukraine would ever spill over into NATO territory. While Finland and Sweden already cooperate closely with NATO on regional security matters, becoming full members of the alliance would help NATO defend the Baltic states in the event of an Article V contingency. As NATO is planning additional steps to enhance the security of its eastern flank at its upcoming summit in Madrid in June, Finland and Sweden are well-positioned to make vital contributions. Stronger Nordic defense cooperation with members Denmark and Norway would also benefit the wider region, as would closer EU-NATO collaboration.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › EXPULSION N-B › Asia Pivot Terminals

Solves Chinese deterrence.

Mira Rapp-Hooper 20. Senior fellow for Asia Security at the Council on Foreign Relations. PhD in Political Science, Columbia University. "From Primacy to Openness: U.S. Strategic Objectives in Asia." CFR. 1-25-2020. https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Rapp-Hooper.pdf. accessed 6-24-2022 //ART

While the United States cannot avoid a stronger China able to exert significant regional influence, it can nonetheless secure its longstanding political, security, and economic interests in the region and avert the conditions that would most directly threaten them. Since the late nineteenth century, the United States has sought to prevent a hostile hegemon from dominating Eurasia, as this condition would impede commercial interests and potentially expose the U.S. homeland to military threats.19 Potential domination may come in novel forms, but the same objective remains worthy today. The United States should seek to avert the hostile domination of Asia. We cannot envision the precise form it will take, but Xi Jinping is seeking some form of a sphere of influence in Asia. And while a state’s domestic regime preferences do not neatly predict its regional behavior, Xi’s affection for a closed Chinese information environment already has a foreign policy analogue. Other international governance attempts may have similar features. For several years, strategists have argued that the United States must oppose a Chinese regional sphere—a geographic area in which China exercises predominate influence in military, diplomatic, or economic terms. Chinese influence in parts of Southeast or Central Asia, however, is not a prima facie threat to American interests. Nonetheless, U.S. strategy must hedge against the possibility that China’s regional aspirations are fundamentally irreconcilable with its own objectives.

Washington should seek to prevent China from establishing a closed sphere of influence—a bloc that would allow it to dominate part or all of Asia in a manner that displaces U.S. political, economic, or military power. An exclusive zone could leave the United States unable to access vital markets and strip it of its forward defensive position, thereby threatening U.S. prosperity and national security and, by extension, domestic freedom. This grave condition would occur if China co-opted the political, economic, or military independence of other states, preventing them from making free choices through coercion. Closure of the global commons could have similarly grievous effects.