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2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › 2ac – TL

Democracy solves extinction.

Twining 21, PhD, president of the International Republican Institute, former director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund. (Daniel, 10-10-2021, "America must double down on democracy", The Hill, ) *language edited

The hard truth is that a world that is less free is one that is less secure, stable and prosperous. The greatest dangers to the American way of life emanate from hostile autocracies. There are no quick fixes, but the best antidotes to the challenges of great-power conflict, terrorism and mass migration of desperate refugees lie in the building of inclusive democratic institutions — and working with allied democracies to sustain the free and open order that China, in particular, wishes to replace with a world that’s safe for autocracy. The conventional wisdom that authoritarianism has popular momentum is wrong. No one anywhere is taking to the street to demand more corrupt governance, the adoption of one-man rule, a stronger surveillance state, or greater intervention by malign foreign powers. Democratic freedoms are unquestionably under assault in many nations. Autocrats are aggressive precisely because of the growing demands for change in their more modern, connected societies — and the rising risk that middle classes in nations such as China and Russia will not be willing forever to forfeit political rights for prosperity. American retrenchment and isolationism compound the danger. It would be nice to live in a world where failed states and dictatorships were a problem for someone else to worry about. But rather than producing stability, Western retreat only emboldens autocrats in ways that amplify dangers to American national security. We know that violent extremism flourishes under state failure and dictatorship. Broken states become breeding grounds for extremist groups because they leave vacuums that terrorists are only too happy to fill. In nations without democratic accountability, citizens become drawn to the only forms of expression available to them, which are often violent and extreme. The good news is that we have billions of allies around the world: citizens on every continent chafing for greater freedom and dignity. They do not want U.S. military-led nation-building. They want peaceful support for their independent efforts to create democratic space in systems distorted by overweening government control, dangerous governance gaps and foreign malign influence. The free world cannot be neutral in the face of autocracy’s resurgence. Rather, it should play to its strengths. The appeal of democratic opportunity is a strategic asset for the United States — despite our own shortcomings — because people around the world similarly aspire to live in societies that guarantee justice, rights and dignity. America’s closest allies are democracies. Democracies don’t fight each other, export violent extremism, or produce the conflicts that drive mass migration. Democracies are better partners in fighting terrorism, human trafficking and poverty, as well as establishing reliable trading relationships. Open societies incubate the technologies that will help solve the world’s most pressing problems, including climate change. Citizens can hold leaders accountable when they fall short, and democratic institutions are stronger than any [individual] man — as America itself witnessed after the assault on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › ATs Demo Good T/s › AT: Authoritarian AI

Thousands of years off, if possible

Daniel C. Dennett 19. University Professor and Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy and director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University. “Is Superintelligence Impossible? On Possible Minds: Philosophy and AI.” The Edge. 4-10-2019. https://www.edge.org/conversation/david_chalmers-daniel_c_dennett-is-superintelligence-impossible

Let’s talk about "possible" for the moment. There are lots of things that are possible, and philosophers love to talk about what’s possible, but many things that are obviously possible are never going to be actual. It’s possible to build a bridge across the Atlantic. We’re not going to do it, not now, not in a hundred years, not in a thousand years. It would cost too much money and would be a foolish endeavor. A lot of the imagined AI projects that are perfectly possible in principle are not worth doing. In fact, some of them are definitely things that we shouldn’t do because they’ll make more problems for us than they'll solve. Just bear that in mind. Somebody said that the philosopher is the one who says, "We know it’s possible in practice, we’re trying to figure out if it’s possible in principle." Unfortunately, philosophers sometimes spend too much time worrying about logical possibilities that are importantly negligible in every other regard. So, let me go on the record as saying, yes, I think that conscious AI is possible because, after all, what are we? We’re conscious. We’re robots made of robots made of robots. We’re actual. In principle, you could make us out of other materials. Some of your best friends in the future could be robots. Possible in principle, absolutely no secret ingredients, but we’re not going to see it. We’re not going to see it for various reasons. One is, if you want a conscious agent, we’ve got plenty of them around and they’re quite wonderful, whereas the ones that we would make would be not so wonderful.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › ATs Demo Good T/s › AT: Authoritarian AI

Chinese AI leadership is fine

Kai-Fu Lee and Paul Triolo 17, Kai-Fu Lee, Ph.D., is a Co-Founder, Chairman, President, Chief Executive Officer, and Managing Partner of Sinovation Ventures, Paul Triolo is a China Digital Economy Fellow at New America and the geo-technology practice head at the Eurasia Group, “China’s Artificial Intelligence Revolution: Understanding Beijing’s Structural Advantages”, //AP

Beijing’s AI policy priorities are clear. The “Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” announced by China’s State Council in July 2017, called for China to catch up on AI technology and applications by 2020, and to become a global AI innovation hub by 2030. Chinese President Xi Jinping hammered the point home in his 19th Party Congress speech in October, when he mentioned the development of advanced manufacturing and the promotion of further integration of the Internet, big data and artificial intelligence with the real-world economy. Beijing has placed huge bets on AI for a host of political and economic reasons, from improving governance capacity to improving policy development and surveillance. The plan calls for China to lead the way in developing a regulatory environment to both encourage AI development and to mitigate the potential downsides of AI. A few months after the national plan’s announcement in July, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) designated Baidu to lead the autonomous vehicle platform, Tencent for medical, Alibaba for Smart Cities, and iFlyTek for speech interfaces. These plans should be taken seriously, as the Chinese government has shown a strong track record in delivering results. For example, Beijing announced in 2010 that China would become the world’s leader in adopting high-speed rail (HSR). Today it has 60% of the world’s HSR market. In 2014, the Chinese government announced the “Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation Plan.” Today there are business 8000 incubators in China, compared to 1400 in 2014. These plans have teeth, both due to the deadlines and metrics set out at the national level, as well as the local companies that are likely to take these directions as top priorities. We can expect a similar trajectory for China’s AI policies. Historically, the Chinese government has been open-minded towards technology development. When a new technology comes out, the government will give it the benefit of doubt and let it grow, rather than stifle it with policy or endless debates. Also, the environment in China is more conducive to fast launch and iteration. There is a general belief that it is better to launch something and then get it approved later. This allows Chinese businesses to generate real data at scale, which in turn allows technology to improve over a shorter period of time, particularly once AI is introduced into the equation. For example, while in the US, truckers’ unions are petitioning the Department of Transportation to delay autonomous truck testing, in China, the Xiong’an New Area, a planned smart city development southwest of Beijing, is being designed from the ground up with full autonomy in mind. Various highway authorities are willing to develop road augmentation, special lanes, or move warehouses near highway exits, all to facilitate faster deployment of autonomous trucks. We also see major initiatives in cities, following the central government’s call to action. Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, and Tianjin are but a few of the cities coming out with their own AI initiatives. As with past policies, much of the resources will be applied at the provincial and city government levels. The types of resources may include subsidies for top talent (especially overseas talent); guidance for top VC funds, with the government playing the role of limited partner (LP) but offering some of its upside to the general partners (GPs) of the funds; special programs for top AI companies and start-ups (free rent, subsidy for local hiring, housing and private school for top talents); and technical awards for companies and individuals. Finally, the US, EU, and China will also compete to be out in front on developing a regulatory regime around AI technologies and applications. The National Plan’s explicit recognition of the need for regulatory, legal, and ethical principles for AI development and use represents an uncommonly foresighted approach. Of course, the government’s approach to AI regulation, ethics, and economic adjustment will reflect Beijing’s broader model of governance and ideology. Given its preference for a state-centric approach to international issues, for example, it is possible China will launch an initiative via the UN to establish first an automation/AI-related “code of conduct,” or basic regulatory approach, followed by a special committee on the topic and eventually an oversight body operating within a UN framework. Such an initiative would put China at the forefront of developing a global approach to these issues. Beijing has attempted a similar approach on cybersecurity issues, which it argues have a global impact and require a global regulatory response.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › ATs Demo Good T/s › AT: Authoritarian AI

No unregulated tech impact

Michael Shermer 17. Publisher of Skeptic magazine, a monthly columnist for Scientific American, and a Presidential Fellow at Chapman University. “Why Artificial Intelligence Is Not an Existential Threat” April 2017. Skeptic. Vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 29-35.

Why AI is not an Existential Threat First, most AI doomsday prophecies are grounded in the false analogy between human nature and computer nature, or natural intelligence and artificial intelligence. We are thinking machines, but natural selection also designed into us emotions to shortcut the thinking process because natural intelligences are limited in speed and capacity by the number of neurons that can be crammed into a skull that has to pass through a pelvic opening at birth, whereas artificial intelligence need not be so restricted. We don't need to compute the caloric value of foods, for example, we just feel hungry. We don't need to calculate the waist-to-hip ratio of women or the shoulder-to-waist ratio of men in our quest for genetically healthy potential mates; we just feel attracted to someone and mate with them. We don't need to work out the genetic cost of raising someone else's offspring if our mate is unfaithful; we just feel jealous. We don't need to figure the damage of an unfair or non-reciprocal exchange with someone else; we just feel injustice and desire revenge. Emotions are proxies for getting us to act in ways that lead to an increase in reproductive success, particularly in response to threats faced by our Paleolithic ancestors. Anger leads us to strike out, fight back, and defend ourselves against danger. Fear causes us to pull back, retreat, and escape from risks. Disgust directs us to push out, eject, and expel that which is bad for us. Computing the odds of danger in any given situation takes too long. We need to react instantly. Emotions shortcut the information processing power needed by brains that would otherwise become bogged down with all the computations necessary for survival. Their purpose, in an ultimate causal sense, is to drive behaviors toward goals selected by evolution to enhance survival and reproduction. AIs -- even AGIs and ASIs -- will have no need of such emotions and so there would be no reason to program them in unless, say, terrorists chose to do so for their own evil purposes. But that's a human nature problem, not a computer nature issue. To believe that an ASI would be "evil" in any emotional sense is to assume a computer cognition that includes such psychological traits as acquisitiveness, competitiveness, vengeance, and bellicosity, which seem to be projections coming from the mostly male writers who concoct such dystopias, not features any programmer would bother including, assuming that it could even be done. What would it mean to program an emotion into a computer? When IBM's Deep Blue defeated chess master Garry Kasparov in 1997, did it feel triumphant, vengeful, or bellicose? Of course not. It wasn't even "aware" -- in the human sense of self-conscious knowledge -- that it was playing chess, much less feeling nervous about possibly losing to the reigning world champion (which it did in the first tournament played in 1996). In fact, toward the end of the first game of the second tournament, on the 44th move, Deep Blue made a legal but incomprehensible move of pushing its rook all the way to the last row of the opposition side. It accomplished nothing offensively or defensively, leading Kasparov to puzzle over it out of concern that he was missing something in the computer's strategy. It turned out to be an error in Deep Blue's programming that led to this fail-safe default move. It was a bug that Kasparov mistook as a feature, and as a result some chess experts contend it led him to be less confident in his strategizing and to second-guess his responses in the subsequent games. It even led him to suspect foul play and human intervention behind Deep Blue, and this paranoia ultimately cost him the tournamentt.[ 13] Computers don't get paranoid, the HAL 9000 computer in 2001 notwithstanding. Or consider Watson, the IBM computer built by David Ferrucci and his team of IBM research scientists tasked with designing an AI that could rival human champions at the game of Jeopardy! This was a far more formidable challenge than Deep Blue faced because of the prerequisite to understand language and the often multiple meanings of words, not to mention needing an encyclopedic knowledge of trivia (Watson had access to Wikipedia for this). After beating the all-time greatest Jeopardy! champions Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter in 2011, did Watson feel flushed with pride after its victory? Did Watson even know that it won Jeopardy!? I put the question to none other than Ferrucci himself at a dinner party in New York in conjunction with the 2011 Singularity Summit. His answer surprised me: "Yes, Watson knows it won Jeopardy!" I was skeptical. How could that be, since such self-awareness is not yet possible in computers? "Because I told it that it won," he replied with a wry smile. Sure, and you could even program Watson or Deep Blue to vocalize a Howard Dean-like victory scream when it wins, but that is still a far cry from a computer feeling triumphant. This brings to mind the "hard problem" of consciousness -- if we don't understand how this happens in humans, how could we program it into computers? As Steven Pinker elucidated in his answer to the 2015 Edge Question on what to think about machines that think, "AI dystopias project a parochial alpha-male psychology onto the concept of intelligence. They assume that superhumanly intelligent robots would develop goals like deposing their masters or taking over the world." It is equally possible, Pinker suggests, that "artificial intelligence will naturally develop along female lines: fully capable of solving problems, but with no desire to annihilate innocents or dominate the civilization."[ 14] So the fear that computers will become emotionally evil are unfounded, because without the suite of these evolved emotions it will never occur to AIs to take such actions against us. What about an ASI inadvertently causing our extinction by turning us into paperclips, or tiling the entire Earth's surface with solar panels? Such scenarios imply yet another emotion -- the feeling of valuing or wanting something. As the science writer Michael Chorost adroitly notes, when humans resist an AI from undertaking any form of global tiling, it "will have to be able to imagine counteractions and want to carry them out." Yet, "until an AI has feelings, it's going to be unable to want to do anything at all, let alone act counter to humanity's interests and fight off human resistance." Further, Chorost notes, "the minute an A.I. wants anything, it will live in a universe with rewards and punishments -- including punishments from us for behaving badly. In order to survive in a world dominated by humans, a nascent A.I. will have to develop a humanlike moral sense that certain things are right and others are wrong. By the time it's in a position to imagine tiling the Earth with solar panels, it'll know that it would be morally wrong to do so."[ 15] From here Chorost builds on an argument made by Peter Singer in The Expanding Circle (and Steven Pinker in The Better Angels of Our Nature[ 16] that I also developed in The Moral Arc[ 17] and Robert Wright explored in Nonzero[ 18]), and that is the propensity for natural intelligence to evolve moral emotions that include reciprocity, cooperativeness, and even altruism. Natural intelligences such as ours also includes the capacity to reason, and once you are on Singer's metaphor of the "escalator of reason" it can carry you upward to genuine morality and concerns about harming others. "Reasoning is inherently expansionist. It seeks universal application," Singer notes.[ 19] Chorost draws the implication: "AIs will have to step on the escalator of reason just like humans have, because they will need to bargain for goods in a human-dominated economy and they will face human resistance to bad behavior."[ 20] Finally, for an AI to get around this problem it would need to evolve emotions on its own, but the only way for this to happen in a world dominated by the natural intelligence called humans would be for us to allow it to happen, which we wouldn't because there's time enough to see it coming. Bostrom's "treacherous turn" will come with road signs ahead warning us that there's a sharp bend in the highway with enough time for us to grab the wheel. Incremental progress is what we see in most technologies, including and especially AI, which will continue to serve us in the manner we desire and need. Instead of Great Leap Forward or Giant Fall Backward, think Small Steps Upward. As I proposed in The Moral Arc, instead of Utopia or dystopia, think protopia, a term coined by the futurist Kevin Kelly, who described it in an Edge conversation this way: "I call myself a protopian, not a Utopian. I believe in progress in an incremental way where every year it's better than the year before but not by very much -- just a micro amount."[ 21] Almost all progress in science and technology, including computers and AI, is of a protopian nature. Rarely, if ever, do technologies lead to either Utopian or dystopian societies. Pinker agrees that there is plenty of time to plan for all conceivable contingencies and build safeguards into our AI systems. "They would not need any ponderous 'rules of robotics' or some newfangled moral philosophy to do this, just the same common sense that went into the design of food processors, table saws, space heaters, and automobiles." Sure, an ASI would be many orders of magnitude smarter than these machines, but Pinker reminds us of the AI hyperbole we've been fed for decades: "The worry that an AI system would be so clever at attaining one of the goals programmed into it (like commandeering energy) that it would run roughshod over the others (like human safety) assumes that AI will descend upon us faster than we can design fail-safe precautions. The reality is that progress in AI is hype-defyingly slow, and there will be plenty of time for feedback from incremental implementations, with humans wielding the screwdriver at every stage."[ 22] Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt agrees, responding to the fears expressed by Hawking and Musk this way: "Don't you think the humans would notice this, and start turning off the computers?" He also noted the irony in the fact that Musk has invested $1 billion into a company called OpenAI that is "promoting precisely AI of the kind we are describing."[ 23] Google's own DeepMind has developed the concept of an AI off-switch, playfully described as a "big red button" to be pushed in the event of an attempted AI takeover. "We have proposed a framework to allow a human operator to repeatedly safely interrupt a reinforcement learning agent while making sure the agent will not learn to prevent or induce these interruptions," write the authors Laurent Orseau from DeepMind and Stuart Armstrong from the Future of Humanity Institute, in a paper titled "Safely Interruptible Agents." They even suggest a precautionary scheduled shutdown every night at 2 AM for an hour so that both humans and AI are accustomed to the idea. "Safe interruptibility can be useful to take control of a robot that is misbehaving and may lead to irreversible consequences, or to take it out of a delicate situation, or even to temporarily use it to achieve a task it did not learn to perform or would not normally receive rewards for this."[ 24] As well, it is good to keep in mind that artificial intelligence is not the same as artificial consciousness. Thinking machines may not be sentient machines. Finally, Andrew Ng of Baidu responded to Elon Musk's ASI concerns by noting (in a jab at the entrepreneur's ambitions for colonizing the red planet) it would be "like worrying about overpopulation on Mars when we have not even set foot on the planet yet."[ 25] Both Utopian and dystopian visions of AI are based on a projection of the future quite unlike anything history has given us. Yet, even Ray Kurzweil's "law of accelerating returns," as remarkable as it has been has nevertheless advanced at a pace that has allowed for considerable ethical deliberation with appropriate checks and balances applied to various technologies along the way. With time, even if an unforeseen motive somehow began to emerge in an AI we would have the time to reprogram it before it got out of control. That is also the judgment of Alan Winfield, an engineering professor and co-author of the Principles of Robotics, a list of rules for regulating robots in the real world that goes far beyond Isaac Asimov's famous three laws of robotics (which were, in any case, designed to fail as plot devices for science fictional narratives).26 Winfield points out that all of these doomsday scenarios depend on a long sequence of big ifs to unroll sequentially: "If we succeed in building human equivalent AI and if that AI acquires a full understanding of how it works, and if it then succeeds in improving itself to produce super-intelligent AI, and if that super-AI, accidentally or maliciously, starts to consume resources, and if we fail to pull the plug, then, yes, we may well have a problem. The risk, while not impossible, is improbable."[ 27]

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › ATs Demo Good T/s › AT: Terrorism !

No nuke terror.

Christopher J. Fettweis 19. Associate professor of political science at Tulane University. “Pessimism and Nostalgia in the Second Nuclear Age.” Strategic Studies Quarterly 13.1

Finally, despite the string of bleak and terrifying projections from a variety of experts, nuclear weapons have remained well beyond the capabilities of the modern apocalyptic terrorist. The great fear of the SNA literature, that scientific knowledge and technology would gradually become more accessible to nonstate actors, has remained only a dream. Nor does there appear to be a great reservoir of fissile material in the world’s various black markets waiting to be weaponized.58 Just because something has not yet occurred does not mean that it cannot or will not occur eventually. However, it is worth noting that the world has not experienced any close calls regarding nuclear terrorism. Forecasting future unique events is a necessarily dicey enterprise, but one way to improve accuracy is to examine events that have already or almost happened. Given the many complexities involved with nuclear weapons, especially for amateurs as any terrorists would almost certainly be, it is not unreasonable to expect a few failures, or near misses, to precede success. While it is possible that we might not know about all the plots disrupted by international law enforcement, keeping the lid on nuclear near misses would presumably be no small task. As of this writing, the public is aware of no serious attempts to construct, steal, or purchase nuclear weapons, much less smuggle and detonate one. “Leakage” does not seem to be a problem, yet.59 The uniformly pessimistic projections about the second nuclear era have not, at least thus far, been borne out by events. Post–Cold War trends have instead been generally moving in directions opposite to these expectations, with fewer nuclear weapons in the hands of the same number of countries and none pursuing more. Why, then, doesnuclear pessimism persist? What are the roots of the current fashionable unwillingness—or even inability—to detect positive patterns in nuclear security?

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › ATs Demo Good T/s › AT: Demo Good---Idiocracy

We literally don’t have the brainpower for democracy anymore---its try or die for authoritatianism to prevent existential threats

Cribb 22 — Julian Cribb is a distinguished science writer with more than thirty awards for journalism Julian Cribb "Idiocracy: is the decline in human intelligence undermining democracy?," MAHB, 2-24-2022, https://mahb.stanford.edu/blog/idiocracy-is-the-decline-in-human-intelligence-undermining-democracy/, accessed 7-9-2022, WMK

The early 21st Century has been noteworthy for a marked increase in the number of governments willing to act against the interests of their electors – and the number of electors prepared to vote against their own best interests and choose such governments. Since an educated, thoughtful and responsible electorate is indispensable to any democracy that wishes to choose a safe, rational and, healthy future for itself it is fair to conclude that, if this trend persists, the three-century-long worldwide democratic experiment will fail. Whether the failure is attributable to large-scale corruption of the democratic process by global corporates of rising wealth and power, to increased selfishness in politics and society, or to rising stupidity on the part of 21st Century Homo sapiens both in politics and in the general community is still open to debate. In Earth Detox, (Cambridge University Press 2021) I explore evidence for the latter hypothesis – that humans are, in fact, becoming progressively less intelligent. So dumb, in fact, that most do not grasp we are in mortal danger from ten vast, interconnected mega threats. Consequently, voters now frequently choose governments that either increase these threats – or which are too slothful or corrupt to abate them. The missing piece of information is that all humanity is now engulfed, 24/7, in a flooding tide of toxic chemistry – a tide five or six times larger than our climate emissions, and more deadly than any previous threat to human existence. An environmental threat that, according to WHO, kills over thirteen million people every year – the worst death toll from a single cause in human history – and disables 600 million more. Why electors should vote for such an outcome for themselves and their children demands explanation. One explanation may be that our intelligence, the quality that humans have most prided themselves on down the ages, is in decline. After a marked increase in human intelligence during the first three-quarters of the twentieth century – a phenomenon known as the Flynn Effect, after the NZ psychologist who discovered it – recent scientific research points to a clear downturn in human brainpower since 1975. The average rate of decline has been around three IQ points a decade, amounting to the loss of about 13.5 percent in average intelligence between 1975 and 2020. Results from separate studies carried out in seven different countries describe a general loss of intelligence. So far, researchers have been unable to confidently assign a cause to this noteworthy decline, saying only that it is not genetic and must therefore be due to something in society’s living environment. The great question is: what has changed so much in society’s living conditions as to cause such extensive brain damage during the past 45 years in particular? Increasingly, science suspects the 2.3 billion tonnes per year of man-made chemicals – many of them nerve poisons – which industrial society has unleashed on itself during this period and which now permeate our air, our food, our water, our homes, workplaces, our bodies, and our genes on a daily basis. Substances to which, such is their universal distribution around the planet, almost all humans are now exposed every moment of their existence from conception to expiry and which are, for the most part, unavoidable. The impact of these nerve poisons is compounded by a second, related, chemical flood – the endocrine disruptors (EDCs), industrial chemicals which affect basic processes like our growth, development, gender, ability to reproduce, obesity, and cancer risk. Nerve poisons are now thought by medical scientists to play a significant role in the pandemic of brain diseases that have become more prevalent in recent decades – conditions such as autism and ADHD, Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s, depression, and other mental disorders, retarded development and the loss of intelligence. According to various studies, mental conditions now affect 800 million human beings – one in ten – imposing a vast and growing cost on the world economy for the care of the disabled. Brain damage caused by nerve poisons has been known since ancient Rome and well understood by science for decades. Lead and mercury used to be the chief offenders, but in recent times they have been supplanted by certain pesticides and domestic chemicals, such as flame retardants and plastics. These are now found in the blood and brains of unborn babies as well as much of the population. A decline of seven IQ points translates the average citizen to the intelligence level of the average juvenile delinquent. It is therefore probable that the decline in human intelligence is being accompanied by an increase in rates of murder, rape, and violent assault – as well as a lack of forethought at the ballot box. Proving that nerve poisons are responsible for the decline in democracy is no easier than proving that cigarettes cause cancer – but the connections are now evident for all who care to look. William of Occam would note that human IQ is falling at the same time as the toxic load on society is redoubling – and we are witnessing tens of millions of voters without the ability to grasp their responsibility, the needs of their society, or even themselves. Voters who may, on occasion, incoherently seek to overthrow or sabotage through misinformation the very system they do not comprehend. Voters who are increasingly susceptible to the misinformation circulated by vested interests, such as the petro lobby. Occam would advise us to look a lot more carefully at the most likely explanation, first – a task that science has yet to undertake. Democracies have long asserted a moral as well as governmental superiority over autocracies, but with the decay in voter intelligence, that advantage is becoming far less clear. If democracy is to endure as a form of self-governance, then the need to remedy the dumbing-down of democracy by ceasing to poison the minds that uphold it is both imperative and urgent.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › TERRORISM › I/L Terrorism

Prefer our stats – theirs are based on all democracies – ours assume the unique vulnerabilities created by transitioning regimes which is what we are impact turning

Lutz, Poli Sci Prof @ Indiana, 10

(James, Democracy and Terrorism, Perspectives on Terrorism 4.1 p. online)

A number of factors may help to explain these mixed results. Somewhat limited number of international incidents, compared to domestic attacks (which outnumber international incidents by a factor of seven or more), has meant that singular events with high casualties are statistical outliers that could have affected the results. In addition, if regimes in transition are actually more vulnerable, the presence of changes in the political system could be a confounding factor. A transition from one authoritarian regime to another (military regime to a one-party system or vice versa) could increase opportunities for terrorism that would not necessarily be associated with democratization. Iran, for example, underwent a period of terrorism initiated by secular and leftist groups that lasted for 18 months. The clerical regime of the new Islamic Republic was vulnerable since it was making the transition from the partial authoritarianism of the old monarchy to the totalitarianism of the new theocracy. [30] Similarly, if new democracies are indeed more prone to terrorism, the association between terrorism and democracy could be more variable since not all democracies are equally vulnerable.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › TERRORISM › I/L Terrorism

Democracy causes terrorism

Savun, Poli Sci Prof @ Pitt, 9

(Burcu, Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism, Journal of Conflict Resolution Volume XX Number X, pp. online)

Many scholars, particularly within the past decade, have argued that democratic states are more likely to be targets of transnational terrorism. According to this camp, there are various aspects of the democratic regimes that facilitate terrorism. First, democracies, by providing freedom of organization, expression, and movement for their citizens, enable terrorist groups to undertake their illegal activities with relative ease (Engene 2004; Hamilton and Hamilton 1983). The commitment to civil liberties in democratic societies can be used by terrorist groups to organize and carry out their attacks without being noticed (Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 2001). Repressive regimes reduce the ability of terrorist groups to organize and carry out their activities, whereas democracies provide a permissive environment. Second, institutional constraints imposed on democratic governments are usually higher than the ones on other types of regimes. Although these constraints are intended to protect the citizens of democracies from the undue exercise of power by their leaders, they also limit the actions and ability of democratic governments to fight terrorism (Schmid 1992; Li 2005; Wilkinson 1986, 2006). Terrorist groups perceive democracies as soft targets that can be pressured to give into their demands due to the sensitivity of democracies to costs. Pape (2003, 2005) shows that terrorist groups tend to target democracies more frequently because they know that liberal democracies usually accede to their demands. Freedom of press is another factor that is argued to encourage transnational terrorism in democracies. A free press serves the interests of terrorist groups whose main goal is to advertise their cause to a wide audience and gain publicity and recognition (Crenshaw 1981). Unlike in repressive regimes, terrorist incidents are more likely to be reported in detail by the free press in democratic societies. Therefore, press freedom in democracies gives a valuable opportunity to publicity-hungry terrorists to create widespread fear (Li 2005; Nacos 1994).

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › TERRORISM › 1nc – Terrorism

Terrorism goes nuclear.

Arguello 18, founder and chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation, and head of the secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. She holds a degree in physics, a Master’s in business administration, and completed graduate studies in defense and security. Arguello previously worked on nuclear projects for the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission. (Irma, “The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)

Though hard to accept, the detonation of a nuclear device – by states or non-state actors – is today a plausible scenario. And while much of the world’s focus has been on the current nuclear weapons arsenals possessed by states – about 14,550 warheads, all of which carry the risk of intentional or unintentional use – the threat of nuclear terrorism is here and increasing. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and other terrorist groups have expressed their desire to acquire fissile material to build and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb. None of them could fulfill that goal – so far. But that does not mean that they will not succeed in the future. Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the post-Cold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › TERRORISM › 1nc – Terrorism

Democracy promotion causes terrorism---prefer a holistic analysic of US counter terror policy

Morris et al. 20 — Morris, N. A., LaFree, G., & Karlidag, E. (2020). Counter‐terrorism policies in the Middle East: Why democracy has failed to reduce terrorism in the Middle East and why protecting human rights might be more successful. Criminology & Public Policy, 20(1), 153–175. WMK

Much of US foreign policy aimed at reducing terrorism in the Middle East following the 9/11 attacks emphasized increasing the strength of democratic institutions in the region. In particular, this was a cornerstone of President George W. Bush's policy in the Middle East. By contrast, while state-based human rights violations sometimes provoke a negative response from US officials, they are rarely seen as an important avenue for achieving regional stability and decreasing terrorism. In several speeches President Barack Obama pointed out the importance of state-based human rights violations, but did not provide a systematic policy advancing the reduction of human rights violations as a counter terrorism measure in the Middle East. President Donald Trump has shown little interest in the records of Middle Eastern countries in terms of either democracy or state-based human rights violations (Washington Post, 2020). Indeed, the Trump administration has generally seen enforcing sanctions against Middle Eastern countries for human rights violations as a barrier to trade and therefor inadvisable (New York Times, 2017).

Although a growing number of worldwide studies examine the relationship between democracy, human rights violations and terrorist attacks, few studies focus exclusively on the countries of the Middle East. Based on prior research we hypothesized that because the Middle East is characterized by exceptionally weak democracies, within-country increases in the strength of democracy in the Middle East will lead to increases in terrorist attacks (Hypothesis 1). We also hypothesized that because Middle Eastern countries are concentrated in the lower half of strength of democracy measures, we will not find a curvilinear effect of democracy on country-level terrorist attacks for this region (Hypothesis 2). Furthermore, we hypothesized that state-based human rights violations in the Middle East may well be more important than strength of democracy and hypothesized that human rights violations will be associated with increases in terrorist attacks in that region (Hypothesis 3). Our results show consistent support for all three hypotheses.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DRONES › ! Drones– Qualitatively Worse

Capital intensive wars will be more qualitatively worse – Jevons paradox

Shay 16 - Christopher Shay is a PhD student at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies., The Jevons Paradox and the Economy of Drone Strikes,

William Stanley Jevons first described his dilemma (also referred to as the Jevons Paradox) in 1865 at a time when many British scholars feared the exhaustion of natural coal reserves, a strategic resource on which the British Navy depended. Some industrialists argued that advances in coal-burning technology would progressively diminish coal consumption, and thereby increase effective reserves. Jevons, however, observed that demand for coal was elastic: as technology made coal consumption more efficient, demand for coal increased drastically, and so did absolute levels of consumption. Since 1865, economists have creatively applied Jevons’ logic to environmental economics. For example, they show that staggering advances in lighting technology since the Stone Age have resulted in even greater total energy consumption. A similar pattern has been studied in the automotive industry. This same logic shows that drone technology, though increasingly discriminate, may nevertheless increase total civilian fatalities in the long run. The advantage of drone strikes lies in their accuracy and precision – just as coal-burning engines were made to produce more energy with less coal, drones produce more militant deaths at the expense of fewer civilian deaths. In other words, as strikes kill fewer civilians per militant, they become more efficient and less costly. Conventional wisdom on terrorism suggests that insurgencies like the Taliban use terror tactics to provoke a violent, indiscriminate overreaction on the part of governments they attack. This violent overreaction is expected by militants to disproportionately affect civilians, who will subsequently mobilize to support the insurgency. This provocation trap would, of course, undermine the counter-insurgency and support insurgents’ long-term goals. The conventional view on drone warfare is that the efficiency of drone strikes offers policymakers a means of punishing insurgents without producing a disproportionate effect on civilians. That is, drones supposedly help US counter-insurgency efforts to evade the provocation trap. Do they? The Jevons Dilemma subjects this claim to some skepticism by suggesting that the increasing efficiency of drone technology makes policymakers disproportionately more likely to employ it. This could be problematic from a strategic standpoint. Just as decreases in the cost of coal consumption increased consumption of coal, the reduced cost of counter-terror strikes may increase their perceived utility and, subsequently, the readiness with which American policymakers and commanders use them. In essence, because the tactic now appears more efficient, leaders will be tempted to utilize it with excessive regularity. To use an example, a hypothetical cruise missile strike may kill a high-profile militant leader at the cost of 20 civilian lives. A drone strike would kill the same militant at the cost of only 10 civilians. US leaders therefore use the drone, rather than the missile, and kill the target while sparing 10 civilians. However, because the drone renders individual militants less costly to kill, US leaders decide to kill the original target and additional, lower-profile militants who they would not previously have targeted. This is the (postulated) elasticity of demand amongst US leaders for strikes against militants. This elasticity exerts a system-level effect: leaders are tempted to authorize more and more strikes until the original savings in civilian lives become more than offset by costs incurred from additional (at least three, in this case) strikes — strikes that would not have been launched in the first place without drone technology. Presumably, civilian populations do not care that drones increase the efficiency of counter-insurgency operations per strike; rather, they care that civilian deaths have occurred as a result of those strikes. As the absolute number of civilian deaths rises — and insurgents will ensure civilians are aware of this rise — drone strikes will eventually exhaust the forbearance of the public and increase mobilization into the insurgency. In countries where civilians resent drone strikes as assaults on their national sovereignty, the sheer number of strikes may also work to exhaust the public’s forbearance.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DRONES › ! Drones – Escalates – No Checks

Drone proliferation is rapid and escalates without checks

Altmann & Sauer 17 – (Jürgen Altmann, lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures, Frank Sauer, senior research fellow and lecturer in international relations at Bundeswehr University in Munich, working on international security and arms control, “Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability,” Global Politics and Strategy, Volume 59, 2017, Iss. 5, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263?journalCode=tsur20)

Proliferation and arms-race instability As early as 2007, the US Department of Defense wrote in its Unmanned Systems Roadmap that for processor technology ‘the ultimate goal is to replace the operators with a mechanical facsimile [of] equal or superior thinking speed, memory capacity, and responses gained from training and experience’. The document also stated that the ‘primary technical challenges for weapon release from unmanned systems include the ability to reliably target the right objective’.17 The goal of weapon autonomy pervades all subsequent road maps.18 Autonomous weapon-system functions have since been tested on land, under water, on the sea and, most notably, in the air. In fact, current trends with respect to unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs or ‘combat drones’) provide indicators for what to expect with regard to AWS. Unlike today’s high-profile UCAVs, such as the Reaper, which are propeller driven, slow, carry comparably small payloads and have few to no capabilities for operating in contested airspace, future systems will be less dependent on human control, faster, stealthy and capable of delivering bigger payloads. The X-47B, for instance, has demonstrated autonomous take-off from and landing on an aircraft-carrier deck, as well as autonomous aerial refuelling. This technology demonstrator was developed by the US Navy’s Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike programme (UCLASS). Similarly, the British Taranis UCAV was described by the UK Ministry of Defence as ‘fully autonomous’ and able to ‘defend itself against manned and other unmanned enemy aircraft’ with ‘almost no need for operator input’.19 However, the ministry also stated that ‘the operation of weapons systems will always be under human control’.20 While AWS test beds such as Taranis and the X-47B rely on familiar designs, in this case the airframes of a fast, stealthy, next-generation drone with substantial payload capabilities, future systems will display an autonomous swarming capability, and thus AWS will also come in much smaller sizes. In October 2016, for instance, the US Department of Defense demonstrated a swarm of 103 Perdix micro drones capable of ‘advanced swarm behaviors such as collective decision-making, adaptive formation flying, and self-healing’.21 In the future, such micro drones are to be 3D printed in large batches and deployed from (manned) flying systems. This dispensing method has already been successfully tested at Mach 0.6 speed by two F/A-18 Super Hornets releasing a Perdix drone swarm. The US Navy’s LOCUST programme is also seeking to develop swarming, disposable unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).22 The overall goal for this new ecosystem of flying assets is to replace not just the old generation of drones but also manned aircraft, thus continuing the trend towards keeping human pilots out of harm’s way and providing superior unmanned air-to-ground and air-to-air capabilities across the board.23 In air-to-air combat, the big, fast autonomous drones currently envisioned will be able to fly high-g manoeuvres no human pilot would be able to endure. More importantly, they would ensure much shorter reaction times. On-board sensors combined with artificial ‘intelligence’ – either located onboard or distributed in the swarm and based on decision-making algorithms endowed with the authority to initiate an attack without awaiting human input – are to make these weapons autonomous and hence provide a decisive edge over remotely controlled and human-piloted adversary systems alike. While the development of AWS is currently most advanced in the air and under water – that is, in less cluttered environments – the example of autonomous (swarms of) UCAVs demonstrates the generally valid proposition that for future unmanned systems, operational speed will reign supreme, regardless of the domain. In that sense, technological developments in AI and robotics, as well as current expectations regarding future armed conflict (and the need for speed), jointly point towards AWS. In fact, US deputy secretary of defense Bob Work stated in March 2016 that even the final delegation of lethal authority to autonomous systems will inexorably happen as a result of this race for speed.24 According to Work, the United States ‘will not delegate lethal authority for a machine to make a decision … The only time we’ll delegate authority is in things that go faster than human reaction time, like cyber or electronic warfare.’ Yet, he conceded that such self-restraint may be unsustainable if an authoritarian rival acts differently. ‘We might be going up against a competitor who is more willing to delegate authority to machines than we are and, as that competition unfolds, we’ll have to make decisions on how we can best compete’, Work said. ‘It’s not something that we have fully figured out, but we spend a lot of time thinking about it.’25 To further deepen our understanding of AWS, it is useful to take a step back and underline that they need not necessarily take the shape of a specific weapon system akin to, for instance, a drone or a missile. AWS also do not require a specific military-technology development path, the way nuclear weapons do, for example. As AI, autonomous systems and robot technologies mature and begin to pervade the civilian sphere, militaries will increasingly be able to make use of them for their own purposes, as the development of information and communication technology suggests. Naturally, any military adaptation of a dual-use technology will need to fulfil specific military requirements that do not exist in a civilian environment, or are less relevant for mass markets. Nevertheless, AWS development will profit from the implementation or mirroring of a variety of civilian technologies (or derivatives thereof) and their adoption for military purposes, technologies which are currently either already available or on the cusp of becoming ready for series production in the private sector. This trend is already observable in the case of armed drones. Light detection and ranging (LIDAR) systems are another example. These are the optical sensors used by the automotive industry to give self-driving cars a 360-degree picture of their surroundings. LIDAR prices have recently dropped from five figures to a few hundred dollars. The units have also become more rugged and much smaller.26 Given that these components, which are necessary for endowing mobile systems with autonomy, are now cheaply and readily available off the shelf, there is every reason to expect the military to adapt, and, if required, adjust and refine, them for their own purposes.27 It is clear that the research and development for AWS-relevant technology is well under way and distributed across countless university laboratories and, especially, commercial enterprises that are making use of economies of scale and the forces of the free market to spur competition, lower prices and shorten innovation cycles. This renders the military research and development effort in the case of AWS different from those of past high-tech conventional weapon systems (the F-35 comes to mind), let alone nuclear weapons. So while the impact of AWS might be revolutionary in terms of their implications for warfare, their development within the context of the military is best described as evolutionary: the military is merely continuing and, with outside help and technology lifted from the private sector, accelerating an already existing trend to replace labour with capital and automate dull, dirty and dangerous military tasks.28 For example, former secretary of defense Ashton Carter sought closer ties with Silicon Valley to hasten the incorporation of technological innovations into the US military after the US officially declared AI and robotics cornerstones of its new ‘third offset’ strategy to counter rising powers.29 Thus, AWS are easy to obtain compared with other paradigm-shifting weapons, such as nuclear weapons, which even now require the Herculean effort of a state-run, focused politico-military effort to produce. AWS do not require ores, centrifuges, high-speed fuses or other comparably ‘exotic’ components to be assembled and tested in a clandestine manner. Consequently, while nuclear technologies can be – and are – proliferation controlled, AWS are much harder to regulate. With comparatively fewer choke points that might be targeted by non-proliferation policies, AWS are potentially available to a wide range of state and non-state actors, not just those nation-states that are willing and able to muster the considerable resources needed for the robotic equivalent of the Manhattan Project. 30 This carries significant implications for arms control. There will of course be differences in quality. Sophisticated AWS will have to meet the same or similar military standards that current weapon systems, such as main battle tanks or combat aircraft, do. Moreover, technologically leading nations such as the US and Israel are carrying out research to produce autonomous systems that comply with international humanitarian law. Less scrupulous actors, however, will find AWS development much easier. Comparably crude AWS which do not live up to the standards of a professional military in terms of reliability, compliance with international humanitarian law or the ability to go head-to-head with systems of a near-peer competitor could, in fact, be put together with technology available today by second- or third-tier state actors, and perhaps even non-state actors. Converting a remotely controlled combat drone to autonomously fire a weapon in response to a simple pattern-recognising algorithm is already doable. Even the technological edge displayed by sophisticated AWS is unlikely to be maintained over the longer term. While sensor and weapon packages to a large degree determine the overall capabilities of a system, implementing autonomy ultimately comes down to software, which is effortlessly copied and uniquely vulnerable to being stolen via computernetwork operations. Thus, while the development of AWS clearly presents a challenge to less technologically advanced actors, obtaining AWS with some degree of military capability is a feasible goal for any country already developing, for example, remotely controlled armed UAVs – the number of which rose from two to ten between 2001 and 2016.31 Admittedly, the US and Israel are still in the lead with regard to developing unmanned systems and implementing autonomous-weapon functionality – China only recently test-fired a guided missile from a drone via satellite link for the first time.32 But considering that drone programmes can draw from the vibrant global market for unmanned aerial vehicles of all shapes and sizes, the hurdles regarding AWS are much lower than those of other potentially game-changing weapons of the past. Proliferation of AWS could of course also occur via exports, including to the grey and black markets. In this way, autonomous systems could fall not only into the hands of technologically inferior state actors, but also those of non-state actors, including extremist groups. Hamas, Hezbollah and the Islamic State have already deployed and used armed drones. As sensors and electronics are increasingly miniaturised, small and easily transportable systems could be made autonomous with respect to navigation, target recognition, precision and unusual modes of attack.33 Terrorist groups could also gain access to comparably sophisticated systems that they could never develop on their own. Again, autonomy in this context does not necessarily require military-grade precision – a quick and dirty approach would suffice for these actors. In fact, it stands to reason that terrorist groups would use autonomous killing capabilities indiscriminately in addition to using them, if possible, in a precise fashion for targeted assassinations. It is still unclear how the development of unmanned systems on the one hand and specific countermeasures on the other will play out. Traditional aircraft-sized drones such as the X-47B or Taranis, to stick with these examples, are obviously susceptible to existing anti-aircraft systems. As for smaller-sized systems, various tools, from microwaves to lasers to rifle-sized radio jammers for disrupting the control link, are currently being developed as countermeasures. Simpler, less exotic methods such as nets, fences or even trained hunting birds might also prove effective for remotely controlled and autonomous systems alike. It is clear, however, that saturation attacks have been identified as a key future capability for defeating a wide range of existing and upcoming defensive systems – both human-operated and automatic.34 The latter are a particular focus of research into swarming as a potential solution.35 And military systems operating at very high speeds and in great numbers or swarms are bound to generate new instabilities, to which we will turn in our next section. To first sum up our argument so far, there are obvious dual-use problems and an unusually high risk of proliferation when it comes to AWS. Should one of the technologically leading nation-states go forward with the deployment of AWS, it would be comparably easy – and thus very likely – that others would follow suit.36 In that sense, the development of AWS could well trigger a destabilising arms race. Crisis instability and escalation Increasing operational speeds mean that human involvement in AWS would be limited to, at best, general oversight and decision-making in instances where communication delays of up to a few seconds – and thinking and deliberation times of a few minutes – could be deemed acceptable, meaning they would not result in defeat or the loss of systems. Many situations would not allow for the luxury of human pondering, however. In such cases, the actions and reactions of individual AWS, as well as AWS swarms, would have to be controlled autonomously by algorithms – in other words determined only by programming software in advance and possibly through the adaptation and learning of the systems themselves. After all, as Paul Scharre put it, ‘winning in swarm combat may depend upon having the best algorithms to enable better coordination and faster reaction times, rather than simply the best platforms’.37 One such swarm-combat situation could be a severe political crisis in which adversaries believe that war could break out. With swarms deployed in close proximity to each other, control software would have to react to signs of an attack within a split-second time frame – by evading or, possibly, counter-attacking in a use-them-or-lose-them situation. Even false indications of an attack – sun glint interpreted as a rocket flame, sudden and unexpected moves of the adversary, or a simple malfunction – could trigger escalation. The nature of military conflict is such that these kinds of interactions could not be tested or trained for beforehand. In addition, it is, technically speaking, impossible to fathom all possible outcomes in advance. Clearly, the interaction of swarms, if fully autonomous, would be unpredictable, and could potentially result in an escalation from crisis to war, or, within armed conflict, to higher levels of violence. This is not a theoretical proposition deduced solely from systems theory and the argument of unavoidable ‘normal accidents’.38 On the contrary, comparable runaway interactions between algorithms are already happening in the civilian sphere on a regular basis. In April 2011, the price of an out-of-print biology textbook rose within weeks to $23.7 million on the Amazon marketplace due to the price-setting algorithms of two vendors interacting with each other.39 Eventually one of the vendors intervened; no damage was done because nobody purchased the book at this absurd price. Greater havoc was caused in the New York Stock Exchange ‘flash crash’ of 6 May 2010 in which computerised highfrequency trading played an essential role, and during which stock indices and important industry stocks collapsed.40 In this case ‘circuit breakers’ established by monitoring authorities set in, suspending high-speed trading and preventing further avalanche effects. These oversight and intervention mechanisms have been improved since then, but debate continues as to whether they are sufficient to prevent another significant flash crash; minicrashes and interventions occur daily.41 During the Cold War, and even afterwards, both the US and the Soviet Union received erroneous indications of nuclear attack on multiple occasions.42 These varied from sunlight reflected off clouds to magnetic training tapes fed into the early-warning system by accident. In all these cases, human reasoning led to restraint instead of escalation; double checks revealed that the alarm had been false. At the time, double checking and reconsideration were possible due to flight times of between several hours (in the case of bombers and cruise missiles) and 10–30 minutes (for ballistic missiles launched from submarines or those covering intercontinental ranges), as well as systems for preventing unwanted crisis escalation, such as the ‘hotline’ for communication between Moscow and Washington established after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Humans, or rapid-reaction mechanisms preprogrammed by humans, can also act as a fail-safe in instances where an overarching authority exists to enforce a shared set of rules, as in the stockexchange example – unlike in international politics. With the goal of improved military effectiveness providing a strong incentive to increase operational speeds, and thus to allow AWS to operate without further human intervention, tried and tested mechanisms for double-checking and reconsideration that allow humans to function as fail-safes or circuit-breakers are discarded. This, in combination with unforeseeable algorithm interactions producing unforeseeable military outcomes, increases crisis instability and is unpleasantly reminiscent of Cold War scenarios of accidental war. Setting aside the increasing risk of unwanted escalation, AWS are also bound to introduce stronger incentives for premeditated (including surprise) attacks. This is because of a combination of three factors: casualty avoidance, cost reduction and, once again, swarming. Firstly, unmanned systems, generally speaking, keep soldiers out of harm’s way – which is positive, but which also reduces the political risk of military endeavours, especially in democracies.43 Referring to the current generation of combat drones, Christof Heyns, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, put it this way: ‘[Drones] make it easier for States to deploy deadly and targeted force on the territories of other States.’44 As unmanned systems become faster and smaller, as well as, eventually, autonomous – which will also make them stealthier due to radio silence, and allow them to become ‘swarmier’ – the resulting room for manoeuvre in political and military terms increases. Secondly, the example of Perdix demonstrates that AWS need not be big, costly or high-tech. Instead, such systems can be cheap and disposable, produced using 3D printers and gaining strength from numbers, their ‘intelligence’ residing in a distributed fashion in the swarm or, if external communication is an option, at some higher level within the military ‘system of systems’ at large. A closely related third consideration is that swarms would make mounting a successful defence especially difficult due to their resilience and their ability to attack from many directions, simultaneously, in an overwhelming fashion. Small and very small AWS (those measuring tens of centimetres at most) would suffer from limited power supply on board, but could be brought closer to the target by riding along on ‘motherships’, as has been demonstrated with Perdix. With payloads weighing a few hundred grams at most, the amount of destructive power of small drones would be limited too. But if directed at political or military leaders or sensitive military infrastructure, they would produce relevant damage and provide entirely new means for carrying out assassinations and decapitation strikes.45 None of these points in isolation would introduce a radically novel element to military decision-making. After all, the fact that a weapon is cheap does not necessarily render it more likely to be used.46 However, the combination of these three factors – brought about mainly by the development of hard-to-defend-against autonomous swarms – presents a strong incentive to seize the advantage of being the first on the offensive. Considering the current climate between Russia and NATO, it stands to reason that old mechanisms of threat perception and worst-case thinking might see a comeback in the wake of AWS deployment.47 Russia was reportedly alarmed when the idea of using stealthy drones for missile defence was floated in the US.48 Swarms of AWS could be used to attack nuclear-weapon delivery systems, command and control systems, and sensitive infrastructure components such as antennas, sensors or air intakes. Even though an attacker might have little interest or confidence in the success of a disarming first strike of this type, the fact that such strikes were now possible would in itself increase nervousness and distrust between nuclear-armed adversaries. This overlap between the conventional and the nuclear realm is not new, of course. It emerged with precision munitions and bunker-busting (or possibly electromagnetic-pulse) warheads during the 1990s and 2000s,49 and is also documented in the New START treaty, the preamble of which states that the US and Russia are ‘mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability’.50 But AWS will likely perpetuate and intensify this trend, not least by opening up new possibilities for holding nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles at risk.51 Thus, when nuclear weapons or strategic command and control systems are, or are perceived to be, at greater risk, conventional capabilities end up increasing instability at the strategic level. Today’s unmanned systems have already increased the risk that military force will be used in scenarios where manned systems would previously have presented decision-makers with bigger, caution-inducing hurdles – a connection recently confirmed in war-gaming exercises.52 Of course, swarming AWS need not necessarily lead to escalation under all conditions. In asymmetric scenarios involving adversaries who lack AWS capabilities, the escalatory mechanisms developed above would not take effect. In symmetric settings, by contrast, they would certainly exacerbate the overall development toward an increased risk of crisis instability and escalation.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DRONES › ! Drones – Escalates – No Checks

Drones collapse democratic checks against war AND cause foreign policy failures.

Singer, 1-22-2012 - Peter W., strategist and senior fellow at New America, director of the Center for 21st Century Security, and Intelligence and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings; "Do Drones Undermine Democracy?," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/do-drones-undermine-democracy/

For the first 200 years of American democracy, engaging in combat and bearing risk — both personal and political — went hand in hand. In the age of drones, that is no longer the case. Today’s unmanned systems are only the beginning. The original Predator, which went into service in 1995, lacked even GPS and was initially unarmed; newer models can take off and land on their own, and carry smart sensors that can detect a disruption in the dirt a mile below the plane and trace footprints back to an enemy hide-out. There is not a single new manned combat aircraft under research and development at any major Western aerospace company, and the Air Force is training more operators of unmanned aerial systems than fighter and bomber pilots combined. In 2011, unmanned systems carried out strikes from Afghanistan to Yemen. The most notable of these continuing operations is the not-so-covert war in Pakistan, where the United States has carried out more than 300 drone strikes since 2004. Yet this operation has never been debated in Congress; more than seven years after it began, there has not even been a single vote for or against it. This campaign is not carried out by the Air Force; it is being conducted by the C.I.A. This shift affects everything from the strategy that guides it to the individuals who oversee it (civilian political appointees) and the lawyers who advise them (civilians rather than military officers). It also affects how we and our politicians view such operations. President Obama’s decision to send a small, brave Navy Seal team into Pakistan for 40 minutes was described by one of his advisers as “the gutsiest call of any president in recent history.” Yet few even talk about the decision to carry out more than 300 drone strikes in the very same country. I do not condemn these strikes; I support most of them. What troubles me, though, is how a new technology is short-circuiting the decision-making process for what used to be the most important choice a democracy could make. Something that would have previously been viewed as a war is simply not being treated like a war. The change is not limited to covert action. Last spring, America launched airstrikes on Libya as part of a NATO operation to prevent Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s government from massacring civilians. In late March, the White House announced that the American military was handing over combat operations to its European partners and would thereafter play only a supporting role. The distinction was crucial. The operation’s goals quickly evolved from a limited humanitarian intervention into an air war supporting local insurgents’ efforts at regime change. But it had limited public support and no Congressional approval. When the administration was asked to explain why continuing military action would not be a violation of the War Powers Resolution — a Vietnam-era law that requires notifying Congress of military operations within 48 hours and getting its authorization after 60 days — the White House argued that American operations did not “involve the presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof.” But they did involve something we used to think of as war: blowing up stuff, lots of it.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DRONES › ! Drones – Escalates – No Checks

Drones circumvent institutional checks---takes out all of their democracy restrains arguments

Potter, 16 - Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia (Philip B.K. Potter, "Four Trends That Could Put the Democratic Peace at Risk," Political Violence at a Glance, 10-14-2016,

The point is that it’s not democracy alone that matters. Rather it is the limits that these regimes can put on their leaders to force them to be careful and selective when doing things like making threats and starting fights. This also means it’s not a baked-in advantage that a democracy can take lightly – even well-meaning leaders in democracies have every incentive to figure out how to slip these constraints. Limits yield long-term advantages, but in the immediate term they tie leaders’ hands, preventing them from engaging with the international problems or opportunities that they feel they should. There are four trends that indicate this process is well under way and is putting the “democratic advantage” at risk. Militaries are less closely tied to voters Democratic advantages in conflict are commonly traced to the nature of democratic militaries and their relationship with political power. Going all the way back to Kant, there has been the notion that societies with citizen soldiers and the vote are not going to support unnecessary wars when they are going to bear the costs. The problem is that Kant’s vision isn’t what modern armies look like, and they’re intentionally moving away from the target rather than toward it. In the US, military service is all-volunteer, and the recruits are increasingly drawn from concentrated segments of society. This divorces the consequences of fighting from the day-to-day experience of most voters. Increasingly, this is a limited force supplemented by private sector contractors, placing even more distance between the individual with the gun and the democratic process. The emphases on covert operations, Special Forces, and technological superiority further water down the link between society and soldiers. This was, in fact, part of the point of moving to an all-volunteer force and one of the rationales for investments in stealth, information technology, and precision guided munitions, e.g. the precision strike complex. By replacing bodies with dollars, planners have consistently sought to increase the flexibility that the US has in its use of force. In the immediate term, that goal makes sense – it allows policy makers to do what they believe needs to be done without having to worry about a fickle public. But over the long term, it has the potential to lead to less caution and selectivity when engaging in conflicts. Adversaries are proliferating and changing The emergence of non-state actors as a primary threat has further loosened constraints on leaders. The shift from the possibility of total war with the Soviet Union to myriad smaller-scale challenges accelerated the transition from a mass military to an elite, highly specialized force more isolated from society. Compounding the challenge, this type of adversary and conflict leads to more significant informational advantages for leaders, which make democratic constraints less binding. Citizens and political opposition are always playing catch-up with the executive when it comes to foreign policy information, but the challenge is harder when the adversaries are less familiar, the engagements shorter, and the issues more complex. Technology is reducing constraint New technologies are driving citizens and political opposition ever further out of the loop. The extraordinary rise of unmanned vehicles in combat reduces the risk of casualties and extends the range for projecting force. This has undeniable strategic advantages, but there is less visibility and, accordingly, less accountability associated with the use of this technology. This means leaders worry less about the ex-post constraints and costs that typically come with casualties. Institutions and practices increasingly favor the president The recent nuclear agreement with Iran was an executive agreement rather than a treaty. This is the norm – most international agreements are now unilateral actions of the president. A polarized Congress is ever more cautious in its exercise of what little foreign policy power it has; two years into the campaign against Islamic State and Congress still hasn’t weighed in one way or the other. In the US this is an expansion of the widely accepted argument that there are two presidencies – a constrained one in domestic politics and a relatively autonomous one abroad. What’s unappreciated is that this growing presidential autonomy (which may well be needed to run a Superpower) also decreases constraint and with it the foreign policy “advantages” we associate with democracy. While these advantages are real, they are also fragile. Key institutional constraints – such as a robust political opposition and a knowledgeable citizenry – are susceptible to seemingly minor changes in institutions and/or practices that loosen the limits of leaders’ foreign policy decisions. As technologies advance, threats shift, and institutional constraints wax and wane, the foreign policy advantages embedded within democratic systems may begin to erode. The potential for such a shift is a possibility that should not be taken lightly.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DRONES › I/L Drones

Democracies will increasingly rely on drone and cyber technologies to reap the political benefits from conflict and avert the costs

Ignatieff 12 – (Michael Ignatieff, Senior Resident of the University of Toronto’s Massey College, where he teaches courses in law and political science for the Munk School of Global Affairs, the School of Public Policy and Governance, and the Faculty of Law, “Drones give democracies no cause for war,” 6-12-2012, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/10a03278-b3b3-11e1-a3db-00144feabdc0)

Dictatorships and tyrannies may be casual about spilling their people’s blood, but not democracies. When the people get to decide whether to go to war, they rarely do so willingly. This was why Immanuel Kant said the spread of democracy was the best guarantee of world peace. As he wrote in 1795, “if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game”. When contemporary thinkers such as Michael Doyle have tested Kant’s intuition, they have had to add a significant caveat: democracies may not like fighting each other – which is why war has become unthinkable between EU and Nato countries – but they can be very warlike indeed towards tyrants and ethnic cleansers. Drones and cyberwarfare, the latest revolution in military technology, will force us to revise still further Kant’s connection between democracy, peace and war. Virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent. Virtual war in Kosovo meant piloted F-18s and precision air strikes. In Afghanistan, too, the Taliban was routed initially with precision air strikes guided by forward air controllers. Libya was the same story. Now democracies do not even have to put their pilots in harm’s way. Cyberwar and drones offer Nato democracies enticing prospects of cheap, risk-free warfare – and not just democracies. A new arms race is already under way. Before succumbing to these technologies, leaders should remember how little virtual war has actually accomplished. Kosovo is still a corrupt ethnic tyranny; Libya will take years to put itself back together; and no one can see a stable state in sight in Afghanistan. Virtual war turned out to be the easy part. Democracies have little staying power for the hard part. Looking at the options in Syria, drone attacks on regime tank formations and a cybercampaign to immobilise Bashar al-Assad’s command and control would be the easy part. Creating a Syria free of sectarian warfare and ethnic political domination would be very hard. If war is the continuation of politics by other means, the chief factor limiting the use of these new weapons will be whether they help leaders to attain their political ends. Where these ends seem unattainable or futile, as in Syria, the weapons will remain unused. The larger problem is that these new weapons are bound to escape political, and therefore democratic, control. Previous revolutions in military affairs, such as the coming of nuclear weapons, strengthened the hand of presidents and prime ministers. Drones and cyberwar technologies are so cheap that it will be impossible to keep them under the lock and key of the sovereign. The age of the super-empowered, and therefore super-dangerous, individual has arrived. In deciding how to control drone and cybertechnologies, it is worth remembering that democracies are resilient because they are free. Our cybersystems are now under constant attack and it is in responding to these attacks that they become more secure. States will have to allow the global community of coders and engineers who built and maintain the internet the freedom to keep the malware at bay and keep the system open for the rest of us. The new technologies are so easy and cheap to produce that the best international law and state action can hope for is to generate a limited set of shared norms to prohibit their most harmful uses. Even with these in place, drones and malware will fight our wars for us and serve our eternal human desire to inflict harm without consequences. They will be the mercenaries of the 21st century. In thinking about what can keep these technologies under control, we need to remember Kant’s original bet on human prudence. Kant’s insight was that human beings who can freely choose and reason know full well that if you inflict harm, it will come back to hurt you. Everything must be paid for. If you hit Iran with Stuxnet, you render your own nuclear systems vulnerable to the next hacker, individual or state. If you perfect the killing of individuals with drones, you had better confine your acts to bona fide enemies of your state; otherwise you expose your population as a whole to the same heaven-sent vengeance. These new technologies promise harm without consequence. Kant tells us there is no such thing. In this shared human understanding, even between adversaries, lies prudence, and in prudence – caution, care and restraint – lies hope.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DRONES › I/L Drones

Democratic strength drives aggressive drone development AND deployment.

Sauer and Schörnig, 12 - *Dr. Frank Sauer, Senior Researcher, Bundeswehr University Munich **Dr. Niklas Schörnig, Deputy Chairman of the Research Council Project Director Senior Researcher @ the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt; “Killer drones: The ‘silver bullet’ of democratic warfare?” Security Dialogue; 43(4); p. 363–380;

Today, it is commonly believed that 40 or more countries are developing military unmanned systems (Singer, 2009: 241). Much of the data behind such a claim is hearsay and quite tough to verify. However, the most recent edition of Military Balance, published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, can serve as a guidepost and a first handle on numbers. Here, 34 countries are listed as holding either medium- or heavy-sized UAVs (IISS, 2011: 24–6). The list of UAV holders reveals a peculiarity: two-thirds of these countries are democratic states. While the ‘drone hype’ is commonly said to be driven mainly by the United States and Israel, it seems that democracies in general have been the first to jump on the unmanned bandwagon. Democracy indices – such as Polity IV, on which we draw here – need to be taken with an appropriate grain of salt, yet they can be helpful in systemizing and corroborating this first impression. With Polity IV ranging from 10 (strongly democratic) to –10 (strongly autocratic), 24 of those 34 countries listed in Military Balance turn out to have a polity score of 6 or higher – in other words, they can safely be called democratic. So, why are democracies in the driving seat of this development? Some might point to a fairly obvious answer: because they can be. The financial and technological resources required for pursuing drone warfare are most readily available to wealthy states, the majority of which are democracies. Adhering to the ‘technological imperative’ (for a concise summary, see Reppy, 1990: 102–3), so this theoretical argument goes, they employ these superior resources to build the best technology and arm their militaries with it, simply because it is possible for them to do so. Yet, no country’s defense budget, not even that of the USA, is limitless. Consequently, political decisions about how to allocate resources have to be made, all while maintaining the technological edge. So, for instance, why did the US Army abandon its ‘Comanche’ advanced helicopter project in 2004, thereby swapping a fast and stealthy hi-tech helicopter for what were then technologically inferior, slow, and non-stealthy drones (Fulghum and Wall, 2004)? The simplistic argument according to which technology is the sole driver, while commonplace and not entirely implausible, obviously carries only so far. We are not the first scholars to raise the question of why democracies are so intrigued by unmanned weapon systems and particularly drones at the moment, but a review of the burgeoning literature on military use of unmanned systems shows that the issue has hitherto only been dealt with cursorily and in passing. There is currently no general, systematic, and theory-driven study seeking to probe the peculiar nexus of democracy and the use of unmanned systems.3

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DRONES › I/L Drones

Democracy causes drone warfare.

Kaag et al, 14 - *John Kaag, Ph.D. Chair of Philosophy, Professor @ Umass **Scott Pratt, Executive Vice Provost for Academic Affairs, Professor of Philosophy @ U of Oregon ***Sujata K. Bhatia, Former Associate, Science, Technology, and Globalization; “Democracy and the Necessity of Drones,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,

But a worry lingers in the back of our minds: perhaps, far from causing a disconnect, instead there might be a necessary connection between modern democracies and drone warfare. Most Americans hold that modern liberal democracies are worth defending. They are worth defending because these democracies, more than any other form of government, provide space for their individual citizens to pursue their own interests. Every citizen has the right to his or her own property, own form of worship, and own freedom of speech. And we recognize the intrinsic value of every individual in our democratic community. Such is the perk of being an American citizen—liberty and justice for all, each in our own particular way. In this ideal democracy, the interests of the individual are continuous with the interests of the nation as a whole. Every citizen also has the right to vote for leaders who are elected to protect the liberal democratic institutions that Americans, for good reason, hold so dear. And protection is, unfortunately, often required. There are, after all, countries and nonstate actors who have little respect for the joys of Western liberalism and who aim to undermine it at every turn. Protecting democracy has always been a tricky proposition. Leaders such as President Obama find themselves in a double bind. On the one hand, they must take defensive measures to guard the nation and its citizens' rights and interests from external threats. But on the other hand, leaders must develop and then adopt defensive military strategies that minimize, hopefully even eliminate, the costs that their citizens must face; it is impermissible to send [people] men and women off to die in wars that could be won without these citizens' direct and dangerous involvement. Every citizen, even soldiers, has intrinsic value. And so Obama and his predecessors ushered in the era drone warfare and a slew of other automated technologies that would both protect citizens and shield citizen-soldiers. Drone warfare—and its collateral damage—is a necessary consequent of a certain type of modern liberal democracy. If we are good liberal democrats, the development of drone warfare should neither surprise nor disturb us. Drones are democratic weapons. There are no other options. But drones do disturb us. The gruesome scenes of drone strikes—at funerals and birthdays and reunions half a world away—disturb us. When we have the rare misfortune of seeing these scenes, they keep us up at night. So why? Our intuition about the shortcomings and moral failings of drone strikes is not just a discomfort with robot warfare or carnage, but ought to be a sign that we are uncomfortable with a particular form of liberal democracy that necessitates drone warfare.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DRONES › 1nc – Drones

Drone prolif means every hotspot goes nuclear AND states will use bioweapons!

Zenko and Kreps, 14 -- *Micah - Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, PhD in political science from Brandeis University; *Sarah - Stanton nuclear security fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor in the department of government and an adjunct professor at Cornell Law School, BA from Harvard University, MSc from Oxford University, and PhD from Georgetown University; “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation," Council on Foreign Relations, June 2014, http://aspheramedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Limiting_Armed_Drone_Proliferation_CSR69.pdf

The inherent advantages of drones will not alone make traditional interstate warfare more likely—such conflicts are relatively rare anyway, with only one active interstate conflict in both 2012 and 2013.20 Nor will the probable type, quantity, range, and lethality of armed drones that states possess in coming decades make a government more likely to attempt to defeat an opposing army, capture or control foreign territory, or remove a foreign leader from power. However, misperceptions over the use of armed drones increase the likelihood of militarized disputes with U.S. allies, as well as U.S. military forces, which could lead to an escalating crisis and deeper U.S. involvement. Though surveillance drones can be used to provide greater stability between countries by monitoring ceasefires or disputed borders, armed drones will have destabilizing consequences. Arming a drone, whether by design or by simply putting a crude payload on an unarmed drone, makes it a weapon, and thereby a direct national security threat for any state whose border it breaches. Increased Frequency of Interstate and Intrastate Force For the United States, drones have significantly reduced the political, diplomatic, and military risks and costs associated with the use of military force, which has led to a vast expansion of lethal operations that would not have been attempted with other weapons platforms. Aside from airstrikes in traditional conflicts such as Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan—where one-quarter of all International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) airstrikes in 2012 were conducted by drones—the United States has conducted hundreds in non-battlefield settings: Pakistan (approximately 369), Yemen (approximately 87), Somalia (an estimated 16), and the Philippines (at least 1, in 2006).21 Of the estimated 473 non-battlefield targeted killings undertaken by the United States since November 2002, approximately 98 percent were carried out by drones. Moreover, despite maintaining a “strong preference” for capturing over killing suspected terrorists since September 2011, there have been only 3 known capture attempts, compared with 194 drone strikes that have killed an estimated 1,014 people, 86 of whom were civilians.22 Senior U.S. civilian and military officials, whose careers span the pre– and post–armed drone era, overwhelmingly agree that the threshold for the authorization of force by civilian officials has been significantly reduced. Former secretary of defense Robert Gates asserted in October 2013, for example, that armed drones allow decision-makers to see war as a “bloodless, painless, and odorless” affair, with technology detaching leaders from the “inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain” consequences of war.23 President Barack Obama admitted in May 2013 that the United States has come to see armed drones “as a cure-all for terrorism,” because they are low risk and instrumental in “shielding the government” from criticisms “that a troop deployment invites.”24 Such admissions from leaders of a democratic country with a system of checks and balances point to the temptations that leaders with fewer institutional checks will face. President Obama and his senior aides have stated that the United States is setting precedents with drones that other states may emulate.25 If U.S. experience and Obama’s cautionary words are any guide, states that acquire armed drones will be more willing to threaten or use force in ways they might not otherwise, within both interstate and intrastate contexts. States might undertake cross-border, interstate actions less discriminately, especially in areas prone to tension. As is apparent in the East and South China Seas, nationalist sentiments and the discovery of untapped, valuable national resources can make disputes between countries more likely. In such contested areas, drones will enable governments to undertake strike missions or probe the responses of an adversary—actions they would be less inclined to take with manned platforms. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), there are approximately 430 bilateral maritime boundaries, most of which are not defined by formal agreements between the affected states.26 Beyond the cases of East Asia, other cross-border flashpoints for conflict where the low-risk proposition of drone strikes would be tempting include Russia in Georgia or Ukraine, Turkey in Syria, Sudan within its borders, and China on its western periphery. In 2013, a Chinese counternarcotics official revealed that his bureau had considered attempting to kill a drug kingpin named Naw Kham, who was hiding in a remote region in northeastern Myanmar, by using a drone carrying twenty kilograms of dynamite. “The plan was rejected, because the order was to catch him alive,” the official recalled.27 With armed drones, China might make the same calculation that the United States has made—that killing is more straightforward than capturing—in choosing to target ostensibly high-threat individuals with drone strikes. China’s demonstrated willingness to employ armed drones against terrorists or criminals outside its borders could directly threaten U.S. allies in the region, particularly if the criterion China uses to define a terrorist does not align with that of the United States or its allies. Domestically, governments may use armed drones to target their perceived internal enemies. Most emerging drone powers have experienced recent domestic unrest. Turkey, Russia, Pakistan, and China all have separatist or significant opposition movements (e.g., Kurds, Chechens, the Taliban, Tibetans, and Uighurs) that presented political and military challenges to their rule in recent history. These states already designate individuals from these groups as “terrorists,” and reserve the right to use force against them. States possessing the lower risk—compared with other weapons platforms—capability of armed drones could use them more frequently in the service of domestic pacification, especially against time-sensitive targets that reside in mountainous, jungle, or other inhospitable terrain. Compared with typical methods used by military and police forces to counter insurgencies, criminals, or terrorists—such as ground troops and manned aircraft— unmanned drones provide significantly greater real-time intelligence through their persistent loiter time and responsiveness to striking an identified target. Increased Risk of Misperception and Escalation Pushing limits in already unstable regions is complicated by questions raised regarding rules of engagement: how would states respond to an armed drone in what they contend is their sovereign airspace, and how would opposing sides respond to counter-drone tactics? Japanese defense officials claim that shooting down Chinese drones in what Japan contends is its airspace is more likely to occur than downing manned aircraft because drones are not as responsive to radio or pilot warnings, thereby raising the possibility of an escalatory response.28 Alternatively, Japan might misidentify a Chinese manned fighter as an advanced drone and fire on it, especially if the aircraft’s radar signature is not sufficiently distinctive or if combat drones routinely fly over the disputed area. Thus, the additional risks associated with drone strikes, combined with the lack of clarity on how two countries would react to an attempted downing of a drone, create the potential for miscalculation and subsequent escalation. As U.S. Air Force commanders in South Korea noted, a North Korean drone equipped with chemical agents would not have to kill many or even any people on the peninsula to terrorize the population and escalate tensions.29 This scenario points to the spiraling escalatory dynamic that could be repeated—likely intensified in the context of armed drones—in other tension-prone areas, such as the Middle East, South Asia, and Central and East Africa, where the mix of low-risk and ambiguous rules of engagement is a recipe for escalation. Not all of these contingencies directly affect U.S. interests, but they would affect treaty allies whose security the United States has an interest in maintaining. Compared with other weapons platforms, current practice repeatedly demonstrates that drones make militarized disputes more likely due to a decreased threshold for the use of force and an increased risk of miscalculation. Increased Risk of Lethality The proliferation of armed drones will increase the likelihood of destabilizing or devastating one-off, high-consequence attacks. In March 2013, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) observed of drones: “In some respects it’s a perfect assassination weapon. . . . Now we have a problem. There are all these nations that want to buy these armed drones. I’m strongly opposed to that.”30 The worst-case contingency for the use of armed drones, albeit an unlikely circumstance, would be to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Drones are, in many ways, the perfect vehicle for delivering biological and chemical agents.31 A WMD attack, or even the assassination of a political leader, another troubling though unlikely circumstance, would have tremendous consequences for regional and international stability. Deterring such drone-based attacks will depend on the ability of the United States and other governments to accurately detect and attribute them. Technical experts and intelligence analysts disagree about the extent to which this will be possible, but the difficulties lie in the challenges of detecting drones (they emit small radar, thermal, and electron signatures, and can fly low), determining who controlled it (they can be programmed to fly to a preset GPS coordinate), or assigning ownership to a downed system (they can be composed of commercial, off-the-shelf components).32 It is equally noteworthy that civilian officials or military commanders have almost always used armed drones in ways beyond their initially intended applications. Drones do not simply fulfill existing mission requirements; they create new and unforeseen ones, and will continue to do so in the future. Furthermore, U.S. officials would be misguided to view future uses of armed drones solely through the prism of how the United States has used them—for discrete military operations in relatively benign air-defense environments. The potential for misperception is compounded by the fact that few governments seeking or acquiring armed drones have publicly articulated any strategy for how they will likely use them. Conversely, the uncertainty about how other countries will use drones provides the United States with an opportunity to shape drone doctrines, especially for U.S. allies interested in procuring drones from U.S. manufacturers.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DRONES › 1nc – Drones

Democracy causes drone warfare.

Kaag et al, 14 - *John Kaag, Ph.D. Chair of Philosophy, Professor @ Umass **Scott Pratt, Executive Vice Provost for Academic Affairs, Professor of Philosophy @ U of Oregon ***Sujata K. Bhatia, Former Associate, Science, Technology, and Globalization; “Democracy and the Necessity of Drones,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/democracy-and-necessity-drones-0

But a worry lingers in the back of our minds: perhaps, far from causing a disconnect, instead there might be a necessary connection between modern democracies and drone warfare.

Most Americans hold that modern liberal democracies are worth defending. They are worth defending because these democracies, more than any other form of government, provide space for their individual citizens to pursue their own interests. Every citizen has the right to his or her own property, own form of worship, and own freedom of speech. And we recognize the intrinsic value of every individual in our democratic community. Such is the perk of being an American citizen—liberty and justice for all, each in our own particular way.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DISEASE › ! Disease

Pandemics risk extinction

Yaneer Bar-Yam 16, Founding President of the New England Complex Systems Institute, “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world,” NECSI (July 3, 2016), http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition

Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable.