2022
Michigan
Counterplan
AT: DSCA DA › 2AC – No Tradeoff – Aid Inevitable
Cochrane and Edmondson ’22 (Emily Cochran, reporter in the Washington bureau of the New York times, University of Florida graduate. Catie Edmondson, reporter in the Washington bureau of The New York Times. “House Passes $40 Billion More in Ukraine Aid, With Few Questions Asked“ 05/10/22 )
The escalating brutality of the war in Ukraine has dampened voices on both the right and left skeptical of the United States’ involving itself in armed conflict overseas, fueling a rush by Congress to pour huge amounts of money into a potentially lengthy and costly offensive against Russia with few questions or reservations raised.
Under pressure to present a united front as President Vladimir V. Putin’s forces carry out a campaign of atrocities across Ukraine, lawmakers in both political parties who have previously railed against skyrocketing military budgets and entanglements in intractable conflicts abroad have gone largely silent about what is fast becoming a major military effort drawing on American resources.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
AT: DSCA DA › 2AC – No Impact – DIB
Halcrow and Jones ’22 [Stephanie and Nicholas; 9 June; Senior Fellow for Defense Industrial Base Health & Resiliency; National Defense, “Some Prescriptions for Ailing Defense Industrial Base,” https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/6/9/some-prescriptions-for-ailing-defense-industrial-base]
Earlier this year, the National Defense Industrial Association released Vital Signs 2022: The Health and Readiness of the Defense Industrial Base, the third edition of the flagship study. For the first time, the report scored the health of the industrial base business environment below a passing level.
The score does not reflect upon individual companies. Vital Signs measures the defense industry’s health through eight conditions that describe the defense business environment over the past year: demand, production inputs, innovation, supply chain, competition, industrial security, political and regulatory environment and productive capacity; and surge readiness.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
AT: DSCA DA › 1AR – Aid Bad – War
Faulconbridge ’22 (Guy Faulconbridge, reporter for Reuters. “Russia warns United States against sending more arms to Ukraine” 04/25/22 )
Russia told the United States to stop sending more arms to Ukraine, warning that large Western deliveries of weapons were inflaming the conflict and would lead to more losses, Moscow's ambassador to Washington said.
Russia's Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine has killed thousands of people, displaced millions more and raised fears of a wider confrontation between Russia and the United States - by far the world's two biggest nuclear powers.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
AT: DSCA DA › 2AC – Aid Bad – War
Hirsh ’22 [Michael; 29 Apr; co-winner of the Overseas Press Club award for best magazine reporting from abroad in 2001 for "prescience in identifying the al Qaeda threat half a year before the September 11 attacks" and for Newsweek's coverage of the global war on terrorism, which also won two National Magazine Awards for General Excellence; Foreign Policy, “Biden’s Dangerous New Ukraine Endgame: No Endgame,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/29/russia-ukraine-war-biden-endgame/]
In a dramatic series of shifts this week, U.S. President Joe Biden and his NATO allies have escalated their policy of helping to defend Ukraine against Russian aggression into a policy of undermining the power and influence of Russia itself. In so doing, some observers fear, they are leaving Russian President Vladimir Putin little choice but to surrender or double down militarily, raising the possibility of widening his war beyond Ukraine.
On Thursday, Biden urged Congress to provide $33 billion in additional military, economic, and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine—more than double the previous amount—and said he was sending a clear message to Putin: “You will never succeed in dominating Ukraine.” Beyond that, Biden said in remarks at the White House, the new policy was intended “to punish Russian aggression, to lessen the risk of future conflicts.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
AT: DSCA DA › 2AC – Aid Bad – War
Desiderio et al ’22 [Andrew; 2 June; Studied journalism @ GW; POLITICO, “Pentagon vs. Congress tension builds over monitoring billions in Ukraine aid,” ]
The Pentagon was already struggling to keep up with Congress’ demands for oversight of its spending. Then, lawmakers earmarked an extra $40 billion for Ukraine.
Concerns are mounting on Capitol Hill about the Biden administration’s ability to properly account for the unprecedented wave of cash and to track the thousands of U.S. weapons heading to Ukraine for its war with Russia. And given the Pentagon’s recent track record concerning congressional oversight, it’s coming under increased scrutiny from members of both parties — from progressive Elizabeth Warren to libertarian Rand Paul.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
AT: DSCA DA › 2AC – Aid Bad – War
Hirsh ’22 (Michael Hirsh, senior correspondent at Foreign Policy, co-winner of the Overseas Press Club award for best magazine reporting from abroad in 2001 for "prescience in identifying the al Qaeda threat half a year before the September 11 attacks" and for his coverage of the global war on terrorism, which also won two National Magazine Awards for General Excellence. “Biden’s Dangerous New Ukraine Endgame: No Endgame” 04/29/22 )
In a dramatic series of shifts this week, U.S. President Joe Biden and his NATO allies have escalated their policy of helping to defend Ukraine against Russian aggression into a policy of undermining the power and influence of Russia itself. In so doing, some observers fear, they are leaving Russian President Vladimir Putin little choice but to surrender or double down militarily, raising the possibility of widening his war beyond Ukraine.
On Thursday, Biden urged Congress to provide $33 billion in additional military, economic, and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine—more than double the previous amount—and said he was sending a clear message to Putin: “You will never succeed in dominating Ukraine.” Beyond that, Biden said in remarks at the White House, the new policy was intended “to punish Russian aggression, to lessen the risk of future conflicts.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
AT: DSCA DA › 2AC – Aid Fails
Boston and Charap ’22 (Scott Boston, senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, received a master’s degree in International Relations from Yale and a bachelor’s degree in military history from West Point. Samuel Charap, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, holds a Ph.D. in political science and an M.Phil. in Russian and East European studies from the University of Oxford, where he was a Marshall Scholar, received a B.A. in Russian and political science from Amherst College, is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations, served at the U.S. Department of State as senior advisor to the undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security and on the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff. “U.S. Military Aid to Ukraine: A Silver Bullet?” 01/21/22 )
The justification for the aid has varied. Some have made the that U.S. military assistance to Ukraine can change Russia's calculus now, possibly deterring Moscow from launching an attack. Others claim that aid to the Ukrainian military can have a real impact on a possible fight with the Russians, making it meaningfully more challenging for the Kremlin to achieve victory and ruling out certain military options Russia might be considering. And there are also voices who call for additional capabilities merely to raise costs for Moscow—that is, to kill more Russian soldiers—so as to create political problems for President Vladimir Putin at home, although without much expectation that Ukraine would prevail.
None of these arguments is convincing. That does not mean security cooperation with Kyiv should cease. It does mean that military assistance is not an effective lever for resolving this crisis.
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGMs › 2NC – Aid Bad – Ukraine
Michael E. O’Hanlon, 6-21-2022, He is an adjunct professor at Columbia, Georgetown, and George Washington universities, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He also serves as a member of the Defense Policy Board at the U.S. Department of Defense. O’Hanlon was a member of the external advisory board at the Central Intelligence Agency from 2011-12.["Strengthening the US and NATO defense postures in Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strengthening-the-us-and-nato-defense-postures-in-europe-after-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/]//EZAY
Washington should also attempt to persuade other NATO nations to make increases in combat capability in the Baltic region comparable to its own increases. Collectively, the rest of NATO has a larger GDP and larger armed forces than the United States. Admittedly, it only spends in aggregate about half as much on national defense. But because the countries of Europe do not in general share the global burdens of the United States, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, they should in principle be capable of the kind of additional efforts proposed here — to wit, the equivalent of a combat brigade, with combat aviation and air support, and a plan to surge more forces into the Baltics if need be. It will take time for Europe, and Canada, to respond in this way, but the goal should be established now. Other changes, such as expedited procedures for NATO to gain priority access to central Europe’s rail network in a crisis, can perhaps be made sooner and should be pursued promptly.
The American changes would however be enough to deny current Russian force dispositions more than a three-to-one force advantage in normal peacetime conditions or in the early days of any crisis response — as by U.S. Army officers Colonel John B. Gilliam and Major Ryan C. Van Wie. (My recommendations are similar to those of Gilliam and Van Wie, as developed before February 24, 2022, except that in response to the Russian invasion, I would add U.S. combat forces in the Baltics themselves rather than Germany, and would add forward air power as well.) That 3:1 ratio is not an ironclad law of force planning; far from it, as former Brookings scholar Joshua Epstein convincingly argued in rigorous work several decades ago. But it is popular enough among militaries that it has some perceptual significance in its own right. My own simple modeling suggests that if NATO has engaged forces that are one-third the size of Russia’s, it would have a good chance — though hardly a guarantee — of stymieing the Russian attack long enough to flow reinforcements into theater. Thus, as an interim capability, it makes sense. It strikes a balance reflecting, on the one hand, a much tenser European security environment, but on the other a rather mediocre and weakened Russian military.
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGMs › 2NC – Aid Bad – Ukraine
Barbara Salera, 7-18-2022, Recent recipient of the National Security Education Program (NSEP) Boren Fellowship with Schedule A and NDAA 10 special hiring authority for a position with the US government. Current doctoral candidate with six years experience in the analysis of US foreign policy,."The Case Against Security Cooperation in Fragile States," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2022/07/the-case-against-security-cooperation-in-fragile-states//EZAY
A dark cloud hangs over the Department of Defense. After the “strategic failure” that was Afghanistan, the department is struggling to figure out how not to repeat it. In particular, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the lead agency for advising, training, and equipping foreign governments, has taken a number of key steps to prevent this from reoccurring. My fellow colleagues in the agency, whose key mission is to build the military capacity of foreign partners, took the collapse in Afghanistan particularly hard. After the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act the agency established certification programs for its workforce and introduced new concepts such as “building capacity” and “full-spectrum capability.” This is in addition to various other initiatives, such as changing security cooperation planning methods and requiring the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of outcomes. Though these initiatives predate the recent events in Afghanistan, they symbolize a widespread recognition of a problem with how the United States conducts military assistance, a recognition grimly underscored by the collapse of the Afghan security forces in August 2021 and the failures of Iraqi reconstruction.
For years, the United States has struggled with how best to build foreign militaries, with minor successes here and there but nothing substantial over the long term. These noted difficulties have led to what Jahara Matisek has called the “Faberge Egg army problem, an expensively built military … easily broken by insurgents.” Some have argued that to address these poor outcomes the United States should consolidate and simplify the complicated domestic processes used to execute security cooperation, in addition to augmenting programs by building the capacity of formal defense institutions. However, military assistance outcomes will not improve simply by making the foreign military sales process faster or by improving a country’s defense institutions, as argued by Jeremy Gwinn. Many past articles on security cooperation focused on the minutiae of how to improve the process as opposed to asking whether security cooperation is the best means by which to accomplish national security objectives. Security cooperation analyses have a tendency to focus on the “tactical” level of security cooperation and concentrate on how to get the equipment to countries faster, or what other augmentations or incentives the United States should add to make it work. My argument focuses on the strategic use of security cooperation to accomplish wider American interests in fragile states. By fragile states, I specifically reference those countries that are dealing with
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGMs › 2NC – Aid Bad – Ukraine
Mark Cancian, 6-17-2022, Mark Cancian worked on force structure and acquisition issues in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and ran research and executive programs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government "Aid to Ukraine Requires Increased Oversight," CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/aid-ukraine-requires-increased-oversight//EZAY
The size and scope of U.S. aid to Ukraine is increasing—and with it, the need for oversight and accountability. The Ukrainians are heroically defending their country, and, in support of that struggle, the United States has committed $53 billion through September 30, the end of this fiscal year. Early aid packages included mainly weapons and supplies, but the most recent package has billions of dollars of economic aid. Stronger oversight and controls are needed to ensure the funds are used as intended. Any corruption in handling this aid would undermine the bipartisan support that the aid has received and thereby impair the ability of the Ukrainian people to continue their struggle.
Aid related to the war totals $53 billion: $13 billion in supplemental funding passed in March and $40 billion in the package passed in May. The military component provides thousands of weapons to arm the Ukrainians, from rifles, night-vision goggles, rockets, and artillery pieces to antitank weapons like Javelins. Humanitarian aid covers a wide variety of activities, from global food relief to refugee resettlement.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › 2AC---AT: I/L---Forward Defense Fails
Mengelkamp et al 7/27 [Lukas Mengelkamp, historian based at the University of Marburg / Alexander Graef, Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy / Ulrich Kuhn, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; “A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING DEFENSE FOR NATO”; JUNE 27, 2022; ; Accessed 7/23/22; Lowell-ES]
The problem with forward defense, however, is that while it sounds good, it is not clear what it would mean in practice, or how it would play out against the many divergences and disagreements between NATO members. Instead, allies should embrace a strategy of confidence-building defense. To revive this late Cold War concept, NATO’s eastern members would create a highly mobile net of dispersed artillery, while more powerful European allies would build and supply heavy weapons depots in those countries, then prepare to rapidly deploy significant forces in case of a crisis. This approach would enable European allies to contribute to their own security, lessen first-strike pressures, and avoid deepening a dangerous new security dilemma with Russia.
No matter how confident allies seem to be about NATO’s current unity, there are a number of key uncertainties that could make forward defense difficult to implement effectively. If Russia’s military continues to struggle in Ukraine, or if America’s commitment to European security falters again, NATO would benefit from a more flexible, less forward strategy.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › 2AC---N/L---Pressure
Schnaufer 21 [Tad, doctoral candidate in Security Studies at the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida ; “The US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure on Allies”; January 15, 2021; DOA: 7/18/22; ; Lowell-ES]
It may seem that these tensions and fears will only lead to negative outcomes, but some disunity within an alliance can yield positive results. Several articles researching the implications of free-riding and burdening-sharing in alliances have supported this notion. In Olson and Zeckhauser’s seminal article on burden-sharing, they wrote, “This fact leads to the paradoxical conclusion that a decline in the amity, unity, and community of interest among allies need not necessarily reduce the effectiveness of an alliance…” and “The United States, at least, should perhaps not hope for too much unity in common ventures with other nations. It might prove extremely expensive.” Similarly, Plumper and Neumayer note in reference to the smaller allies (non-US allies), “Unless the interests of alliance members are independent, the existence of NATO allows the smaller allies to free-ride to some extent.”
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › 2AC---N/L---AI Logistics
Franke 21 [Ulrike, Senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations; “ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI”; January 2021; DOA: 7/23/22; ; Lowell-ES]
However, military AI includes many non-controversial uses, such as ‘sustainment’, which encompasses logistics as well as support activities such as financial management, personnel services, and health care. AI helps make these services more efficient and cost-effective; for example, predictive maintenance helps in monitoring a system, such as an aircraft, and can do things such as use various sensory inputs and data analysis to predict when parts of a system will need to be replaced. Equally, AI can help improve logistics’ efficiency by, for instance, ensuring that supplies are delivered in appropriate quantities and at the right time. Transatlantic cooperation in this field is uncontroversial, but extremely useful – especially when carried out within NATO, as this could help bring allies closer together, establish joint procedures, and thereby ensure interoperability.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › 2AC --- N/L --- Stratcon
NATO 6/29/22 [North Atlantic Treaty Organization; “NATO 2022 STRATEGIC CONCEPT”; June 29, 2022; DOA: 7/1/22; ; Lowell-ES]
25. Maintaining secure use of and unfettered access to space and cyberspace are key to effective deterrence and defence. We will enhance our ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace to prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, using all available tools. A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space; could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We recognise the applicability of international law and will promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace and space. We will also boost the resilience of the space and cyber capabilities upon which we depend for our collective defence and security.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › 2AC --- N/L --- Spending
Miller 6/29/22 [Maggie, cybersecurity reporter for POLITICO; “NATO establishes program to coordinate rapid response to cyberattacks”; 06/29/2022; DOA: 7/5/22; ; Lowell-ES]
NATO member countries on Wednesday agreed in Madrid to create a new program to quickly respond to cyberattacks.
Russian threat: The “virtual rapid response cyber capability” comes after months of Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine as part of the war and amid concerns that Moscow may target the United States and other NATO countries in retaliation for assistance to Ukraine.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › 2AC --- Aff Solves Cyber OStretch
Maigre 4/6/22
(Merle, senior cybersecurity expert at e-Governance Academy in Estonia. In 2017–2018, she served as director of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (CCDCOE)in Tallinn; in 2012–2017 as the security policy adviser to Estonian Presidents Kersti Kaljulaid and Thoomas Hendrik Ilves; and in 2010–2012 in the Policy Planning Unit of the Private Office of NATO Security General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. She is a member of the Executive Board of the Cyber Peace Institute in Geneva and the International Advisory Board of NATO CCDCOE, “NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security,” pg online @ //um-ef)
More operational- and technical-level joint activities should be practiced among allies and with like-minded partners in order to contribute to imposing costs to malicious actors in cyberspace. Given that NATO’s cyber response teams are stretched thin due to protecting NATO’s own networks, bi- and multilateral collaboration enables countries to share best practices and, in the event of an emergency, provide mutual rapid assistance in crisis response.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › 2AC --- Unity = Fake
Lee 7/1/22 [James, reporter for Express UK; “NATO cracks exposed: Call for members to be KICKED OUT as alliance 'only inch deep'”; July 1, 2022; DOA: 7/4/22; ; Lowell-ES]
However, the cracks are beginning to show with one commentator suggesting the thinly veiled family photo may not be one of a happy alliance. Matthew Karnitschnig, Politico's chief European correspondent who was at the summit, said: “Look beyond the staged backslapping, bonhomie and self-congratulation in Madrid, however, and one can see that while the alliance’s unity might be a mile wide, it’s also only an inch deep, its collective sense of purpose as varied as its 30 members.” Much discussion has arisen over the financial commitment seen by NATO members. In fact, at one point, Mr Trump threatened to pull out of the alliance as a matter of point, resulting in a quick pledge by members to increase their spending. Germany, France and the UK have all hinted at increasing defence spending over the next decade, with the UK aiming to hit 2.5 percent of GDP following pressure by Defence Secretary Ben Wallace to increase the budget. The US is still by far the largest contributor to the alliance, with around 3.5 percent of its GDP dedicated to defence.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › 2AC --- L/T --- NATO Solves Disagreements
Koegler et al ‘18
(Torsten Gojowsky, Sebastian Koegler, Bernardus Haspels, Flemming Haar, and Sverre Wetteland,Torsten Gojowsky is a U.S. Army officer. Ben Haspels is a Royal Netherlands Army officer. Flemming Haar is a Danish Navy officer. Sebastian Koegle is a German officer. Sverre Wetteland is a Norwegian officer. All are students at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, “Resistance to Innovation in NATO,” pg online @ https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/8/16/resistance-to-innovation-in-nato)
Innovative technologies face the dilemma of military leaders who are uncertain of their possible benefits versus their potential risks. Yet the pacing gap has kept military leadership from confronting this dilemma in a timely manner. Tactical Assault Kit can form the base of a future communication platform for NATO SOF. However, this vision for the future will only be feasible if the need for connectivity among NATO special operations forces is persistently socialized and eventually accepted. NATO Special Operations Headquarters can function as a key hub of this socialization process. As a premier NATO special operations schoolhouse, it trains and educates member states special operations soldiers in areas including communication technology. Such education can focus on learning the basics of emerging technology and how to employ those unique technical capabilities. By creating a consensus for a way ahead and also facilitating basic courses via their schoolhouse in Belgium, NATO special operations forces as a whole might be able to step into the future outfitted with the best possible means of fighting in an increasingly complex world of near-peer competitors and hostile networks.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › 2AC---NUQ
RANE 6-30-2022. Risk Assistance Network + Exchange, risk intelligence company used by 400 corporations, government agencies, academic institutions and over 1.5M members. "Placing NATO’s New Strategic Concept in Context". Stratfor. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/placing-nato-s-new-strategic-concept-context. DL
The 2022 Strategic Concept highlights new cybersecurity, climate change, authoritarian governance and other non-military threats as well. Climate change was mentioned only once in the 2010 Strategic Concept. But in the 2022 version, it is mentioned 11 times, including the ambitious statement that NATO should “become the leading international organization when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security.” Additional attention is also given to cyberattacks. The alliance reaffirmed its longstanding policy that a “single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space” could prompt NATO to trigger its Article 5 mutual defense clause — another measure directed first and foremost toward Russia and China and intended to deter cyberattacks causing physical damage, as otherwise the alliance would be skeptical of triggering Article 5 because of a cyberattack. Finally, the 2022 Strategic Concept on several occasions notes the challenge to the alliance’s interests and values posed by advancing authoritarianism — a threat not acknowledged directly in 2010.
NATO’s updated Strategic Concept acknowledges non-military threats such as identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, including with respect to critical infrastructure, supply chains and health systems. These new threats underscore the increasing importance of reliable partners in geographies outside the NATO alliance such as in Asia, from where the alliance must ensure the stability and security of supplies of critical components and resources.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › 2AC---NUQ
NATO 6-30-2022. "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept". https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/. DL
24. We will expedite our digital transformation, adapt the NATO Command Structure for the information age and enhance our cyber defences, networks and infrastructure. We will promote innovation and increase our investments in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability and military edge. We will work together to adopt and integrate new technologies, cooperate with the private sector, protect our innovation ecosystems, shape standards and commit to principles of responsible use that reflect our democratic values and human rights.
25. Maintaining secure use of and unfettered access to space and cyberspace are key to effective deterrence and defence. We will enhance our ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace to prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, using all available tools. A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space; could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We recognise the applicability of international law and will promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace and space. We will also boost the resilience of the space and cyber capabilities upon which we depend for our collective defence and security.