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2022 Michigan Disadvantage

2AC---Oversight Fails---AI

Without massive reforms congressional oversight of AI fails

Engler 20 [Alex C. Engler is a Fellow in Governance Studies at The Brookings Institution, where he studies the implications of artificial intelligence and emerging data technologies on society and governance. Engler also teaches classes on data science and visualization at Georgetown’s McCourt School of Public Policy, where he is an adjunct professor and affiliated scholar. https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-the-biden-administration-should-tackle-ai-oversight/]//LP

Had Democrats decisively won control of the White House and the Senate, there would be a robust conversation around legislatively expanding the federal government’s authority for technology oversight. While this conversation would take a backseat to issues like fighting the COVID-19 pandemic and shoring up the economy, legislation on new data privacy and algorithmic consumer protections could have had a chance in the first term of the Biden administration. Even a technology oversight agency would have been possible, and perhaps still is, pending the results from the Georgia special elections. Yet, even without a Democratic majority in the Senate, there are meaningful steps that the Biden administration can take to further reasonable oversight of the technology sector, and specifically the largely unregulated use of artificial intelligence (AI) and algorithmic decision-making. The Biden administration can reverse Trump-era executive orders and agency regulations, instead requiring federal agencies to enforce existing discrimination laws on algorithmic systems and expanding their regulatory capacity to do so. President-elect Biden should push Congress to enact new algorithmic consumer protections in any new legislative compromises on privacy or antitrust, and further support the revival of the Office of Technology Assessment. These efforts are likely not sufficient in the long term. The digital economy accounts for over 9% of GDP–larger than the finance sector–and was growing at 6.8% per year before the pandemic. Since the rise of the modern regulatory state in the 1970s, perhaps no other segment of the overall economy has experienced such growth while remaining largely unregulated. Even that framing understates the importance of data systems and algorithms, which are affecting nearly every part of our society. While the economic growth is undeniable, the mass proliferation of data systems and algorithms—especially in the form of permissionless innovation—has enabled extensive societal harms. A new regulatory agency, or expanded capacity of an existing agency such as the Federal Trade Commission, is necessary. For now, however, the Biden administration should take the available steps to curtail the direct harms, especially algorithmic discrimination, enabled by AI. EXECUTIVE ACTIONS TO ENFORCE EXISTING LAWS The use of algorithmic decision-making in many industries poses serious challenges for regulatory enforcement of existing laws. Health insurance companies implement risk prediction tools that are likely prioritizing care in racially biased ways, which is illegal for any providers receiving federal funds from programs like CHIP and Medicaid or insurers participating in the Affordable Care Act exchanges. AI systems used to perform automated video interviews are undoubtedly deeply flawed as well, and there is cause for investigation to see if they discriminate against people with disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The algorithms that manage Uber and Lyft drivers can make decisions that obscure the lines between employee and independent contractor for purposes of enforcing the Fair Labor Standards Act. However, the Office of Civil Rights within the Department of Health and Human Services, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, and the Department of Labor, respectively, may not be equipped to handle these questions. The Biden administration should be more proactive than the Trump White House, which took minimal action to avoid problems associated with the use of algorithms. Following a February 2019 executive order, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued its final guidance on the regulation of artificial intelligence on Nov. 17, 2020. While there are serious and reasonsed aspects of the document, it makes clear that AI innovation, and not regulatory protection, is the foremost priority of the Trump administration. For instance, while it seems encouraging that the guidance includes mention of “fairness and non-discrimination” as well as “disclosure and transparency,” these were part of a long list of required considerations before implementing new regulations. A careful reading of this document—such as the section offering a series of non-regulatory interventions—suggests it is meant to deter, not encourage or enable, new regulatory safeguards for AI applications. It is possible that this is an overly critical reading of the White House guidance—to its credit, it does prompt agencies to think more about AI regulation. However, the status quo is untenable, as it functionally inoculates companies from anti-discrimination laws when they use algorithms. Since this guidance from OMB Director Russell Vought downplays the well-documented discriminatory harms from some AI systems, the Biden administration should amend this guidance to ensure that current law is appropriately enforced on algorithmic systems. Specific agency-level guidance needs reversal as well, such as a rule from the Department of Housing and Urban Development that places an insurmountable burden of proof on claims of discrimination against algorithms used for mortgage loan or rental applications. In order to execute on this guidance, federal agencies will need the capacity to investigate algorithmic systems. These ex-post audits should focus on highly impactful, large-scale AI systems, and especially those that have already been implicated by nonprofits and academic evaluations. While it may seem as though this would require the models themselves, this is far less important than access to the underlying datasets and model outputs. Therefore, regulatory agencies should use available administrative subpoena powers to gain access to the relevant corporate datasets. There are already about 335 of these authorities across the federal government. The auditing of these massive data systems may be a daunting task for many agencies. In order to support this new responsibility, the Biden administration should direct the United States Digital Service (USDS) to hire a line of data scientists and engineers to support the algorithmic regulatory capacity of federal agencies. USDS has been a successful initiative to bring technical talent into the federal government to modernize services, and it is well-positioned to bring in the talent needed to build secure data environments and conduct algorithmic audits. The Biden administration should make this endeavor a policy priority, using hiring authority within the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and Presidential Innovation Fellowships to bring in more expertise. Lastly, Biden should also endorse the revival of the Office of Technology Assessment, which seeks to provide Congress with additional capacity and more informed technology sector oversight. The fast pace of technological development and proliferation has left Congress behind, especially since the defunding of the original Office of Technology Assessment in 1995. Further, congressional offices have reduced staff funding in their Washington offices, leading to younger, less-experienced staff working on a larger number of policy issues. This is hardly an ideal outcome for handling the novel and complex challenges posed for AI and technology governance. Of course, this is not to argue that the Biden administration should only work to rein in the use of AI. The administration should continue the extensive new funding streams from the National Science Foundation for National AI Institutes. The administration should also keep engaging the Global Partnership on AI, working toward democratic norms for AI’s role in the world. Investing in AI research and working toward global consensus on AI are both critically important. However, it is AI oversight that needs a course correction. To keep citizens safe from the overuse and abuse of algorithmic systems, the Biden administration has much work to do—but it also has the tools to get started.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

2AC---Morale Turn

Congressional oversight is bad for policy implementation because it undermines agency morale

Marvel and McGrath 16 [John Marvel is an associate professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government, where he teaches courses on organization theory and public administration. Rob McGrath is an Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Programs at the Schar School, George Mason University. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Iowa and a BA from Saint Peter’s College in his native New Jersey and spent two years (2013-2015) as a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholar in Health Policy Research at the University of Michigan. “Congress as manager”{ Journal of Public Policy https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26775351.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae8b3afaa1639be3c927190917a3a1dd8&ab_segments=&origin=]//LP

Part of the job of any manager, in any organisational setting, is to motivate employees. Doing so involves cultivating employee work attitudes (e.g. job satisfaction, organisational commitment) and behaviours (e.g. arriving to work on time, aiding coworkers) that are thought to be associated with individual- and organisational-level performance. In exercising its oversight function, however, Congress is not necessarily interested in doing these things. Instead, it is primarily interested in ensuring federal agencies’ responsiveness to legislative preferences.4 However, in pursuing responsiveness, Congress can unwittingly harm agency morale. Before fully developing this argument below, we define the empirical focus of our study – agency morale – and discuss its importance for agency performance. We use the term “agency morale” to denote agency employees’ collective feelings of autonomy and job satisfaction. Theory and evidence from the organisational behaviour literature suggest that, at the individual level, both of these traits are positively related to job performance. In a meta-analysis of 312 independent samples, Judge et al. (2001) found a correlation between job satisfaction and job performance of 0.30. Similarly, in a meta-analysis of 101 independent samples, Spector (1986) found a correlation between autonomy and job performance of 0.26. In fact, these correlations likely underestimate the total impact of job satisfaction and autonomy on performance, given that both are associated with numerous other work attitudes and behaviours that are themselves related to performance. These include, for instance, organisational commitment, role conflict, role ambiguity, emotional distress, absenteeism, turnover intention and actual turnover (Spector 1986; Mathieu and Zajac 1990; Tett and Meyer 1993; Meyer et al. 2002; Riketta 2002). Theories of public sector organisational effectiveness and political control pay special attention to autonomy. The former typically emphasises autonomy’s salutary operational qualities: it allows agencies to use their expertise to solve pressing implementation problems, make and execute decisions quickly, and pursue their missions in an administratively rational manner (see, e.g. Wilson 1989; Wolf 1993; Meier 1997; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999; Brewer and Selden 2000). These theories also assume that autonomy has motivational benefits at the employee level. Individuals – particularly individuals with high levels of formal education and professional training – value autonomy and work harder when it is given to them (see, e.g. Gagné and Deci 2005). In contrast, theories of political control tend to view autonomy as necessary – bureaucracies have expertise that political actors lack, and so delegations of authority are sometimes unavoidable – but potentially problematic, given that bureaucracies are nonelectoral institutions. Yet, even political theories note the importance of autonomy for organisational performance. Gailmard and Patty (2007, 2012), for example, argue that congressional principals, who generally prefer informed to uninformed policymaking, proactively grant autonomy and policymaking discretion to bureaucratic agents in order to incentivise investments in expertise. Whatever their differences, both schools tend to agree that autonomy is systematically associated with organisational performance and the development of policy expertise. Consequently, we believe it is important to examine whether congressional oversight is associated with agency autonomy. Congressional oversight and its managerial consequences We expect that congressional oversight will be negatively associated with autonomy and job satisfaction when such oversight is primarily meant to monitor and control the bureaucracy for political reasons, rather than to aid it in the performance of agency duties (Weingast and Moran 1983; Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Shipan 2004). Congress is often unlike the manager or firm owner described in standard economic accounts of principal-agent theory. In these accounts, it is usually assumed that the principal is concerned with securing some outcome and is, moreover, happy to let the agent choose whatever means or behaviours best serve that end (for a review, see Eisenhardt 1989). The congressional impulse to control, however, often seeks to dictate the bureaucracy’s choice of means. This impulse is intensified in our separation of powers system, where Congress often competes with the president for agency influence (Shapiro 1994; Whitford 2005). Below, we identify three particular mechanisms through which congressional oversight can harm agency morale and conclude by arguing that oversight’s relationship with morale is ultimately conditional on whether it is adversarial or friendly. Mechanism I: micromanagement Consistent with the predilection of Congress to be interested in control rather than performance, scholars have long noted that its oversight relationship with the federal bureaucracy has been characterised by micromanagement, or “intervention by Congress in administrative details” (Gilmour and Halley 1994, 10). As early as 1885, Woodrow Wilson complained that Congress “has entered more and more into the details of the administration, until it has virtually taken into its own hands all the substantial powers of government” (Wilson 1896, cited in Beermann 2006). Similarly, Wilson wrote that “Congress is commonly criticized for ‘micromanaging’ government agencies; it does and it always has” (1989, 241). More recently, Behn identified political micromanagement as one of public administration’s most pressing problems and elucidated how it hampers agency performance: “The legislative branch is, for some reason, unhappy with the way an executive-branch agency is performing; so the legislators impose some rules on the agency … These new rules prevent, or at least constrain, the agency from doing what the legislature dislikes. Unfortunately, these rules also constrain the agency from producing the results for which it is responsible” (1995, 316). There is reason to believe that oversight has become increasingly driven by this impulse to micromanage and constrain bureaucratic discretion. Summarising a series of 10 case studies on oversight, Gilmour and Halley concluded: The cases show a “congressional co-manager” intervening directly in the details of policy development and management rather than enacting vague, wide-ranging, sweeping statutes to change fundamental policy directions … Gone almost without a trace is the post-New Deal Congress that optimistically delegated broad-scale public problems and policy questions for solution and resolution by the executive branch. Much diminished as well is an executive branch relied upon by Congress for neutral competence and specialized expertise. Instead, the story … is one of the retrieval of executive discretion and the highly specific redefinition—by Congress—of prior delegations of authority. (1994, 335–336) In the same vein, Aberbach (1990) showed that the average number of pages per statute enacted by Congress rose sharply between the 80th (1947–1948) and the 103rd (1993–1994) sessions of Congress, indicating an increased command-and-control orientation in legislative-bureaucratic relations. More recently, Balla and Deering (2013) coded a sample of all congressional hearings that occurred during the 96th (1979–1981), 100th (1987–1989), 104th (1995–1997) and 108th (2003–2004) sessions of Congress. They found that most hearings – over 80% in each session – are police patrols, as opposed to fire alarms, indicating that Congress has an abiding interest in monitoring what the federal bureaucracy is doing and in how it is doing it. As a recent illustration of this mechanism, scholarly research and witness testimony from administrators from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) attest that members of Congress are keen to micromanage policies governing provider payment (Pham et al. 2009). Besides this micromanagement mechanism, there are at least two more possible avenues by which oversight may harm agency morale. First, preparing for and participating in oversight hearings, especially high-profile ones, levies opportunity costs on agency employees. Rather than focussing on, say, fulfilling their missions, or competently implementing legislative policy, agency employees must respond to the priorities of a committee holding an oversight hearing. We call these opportunity costs short term to differentiate them from the more fundamental (and psychological) crowding-out of experienced meaning that congressional micromanagement entails. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that negative congressional attention whose aim is to publicly embarrass high-level agency managers would be demoralising to the agency as a whole. A recent example of this involves the General Services Administration (GSA) and the attention it received in 2012, after stories of wasteful spending at its Western Regions Conference surfaced in the media. The aftermath included many high-profile oversight hearings and numerous internal reports that sought to assign responsibility for the agency’s actions. As “fraud, waste and abuse” are anathema to both parties, Democrats as well as Republicans relentlessly attacked the GSA in hearings. In this instance, Congress can be seen to have had a genuine interest in improving GSA performance into the future. In other words, this was an ideal opportunity for Congress to act as a genuine performance manager – that is, to take a sincere interest in remedying whatever underlying organisational problems (e.g. issues with organisational culture, ineffective internal accountability structures, etc.) may have contributed to the GSA scandal. Instead, Congress appeared to be more interested in obtaining whatever political mileage it could by publicly scolding top-level GSA employees.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

2AC---Polarization Turn

Polarization makes congressional oversight ineffective

Friedrichs and Tama 3/11/22 [Gordon Friedrichs, postdoctoral researcher at the Chair for Multi-Level Governance at the Department of Political Science at Freiburg University AND Jordan Tama, Provost Assoc Professor at School of International Service at American University; March 11, 2022; DOA: 6/23/22; “Polarization and US foreign policy: key debates and new findings” ; Lowell-ES]

Domestic polarization not only affects the policymaking process but also the way policies become implemented. Scholars of US foreign policy have shown that over time, the highly contentious forces of domestic politics in some policy areas, such as international economics, have incentivized the president to rely more heavily on other instruments, such as military deployments and defense procurement (Milner and Tingley 2015). Others have shown that partisan incentives have reduced presi- dents’ use of force abroad and influenced how presidents carry out military operations (Howell and Pevehouse, 2007; Kriner 2010). Meanwhile, others have found that greater prospects for legislative success incline the president to engage in more high-risk military interventions and fewer humanitarian interventions (Marshall and Prins 2016). In addition, studies on presidential use of executive agreements suggest that domestic polarization inclines presidents to advance their agenda unilaterally (Caruson and Farrar-Myers 2007; Amirfar and Singh 2018).

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

2AC---Military Turn

The best diplomacy is a strong military. Oversight destroys US leadership. Extinction.

O’Rourke 22 [Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs; "Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress"; Congressional Research Service; Published: 2-10-2022; Accessed: 6-23-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1159700.pdf; KL]

Maintaining U.S. Superiority in Conventional Weapon Technologies

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

2AC---No Link

Normal means involves Congressional oversight.

Committee on Armed Services 19 [Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives; "Oversight Plan for the 116th Congress"; Published: 2019; Accessed: 6-25-2022; https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/b/2/b236a61e-6d45-40cd-9ad8-bc99b83dfa3b/AE1FC7A607C9432146B32AF84E99181B.hasc-oversight-plan-for-the-116th-congress.pdf; KL]

Emerging Threats and Security Cooperation

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

2AC---Ukraine Thumper

Ukraine thumps.

Yousif 22 [Elias Yousif, TLDR. Research Analyst, Conventional Defense, Stimson. More quals. Research Analyst with the Stimson Center’s Conventional Defense Program. His research focuses on the global arms trade and arms control, issues related to remote warfare and use of force, and international security cooperation and child soldiers prevention. Prior to joining the Stimson Center, Elias was the Deputy Director of the Security Assistance Monitor at the Center for International Policy where he analyzed the impact of U.S. arms transfer and security assistance programs on international security, U.S. foreign policy, and global human rights practices. Elias was previously a Campaigns and Research Officer with Crisis Action in Beirut, Lebanon, where he worked on advocacy and policy proposals to improve civilian protection, humanitarian access, and conflict resolution in Syria, Yemen, and South Sudan. He also worked with Crisis Action in Washington, D.C. as a Campaigns and Advocacy Associate, where he advised on U.S. policy related to civilian harm in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Elias received his BA from American University; "Ukraine to Set Record for U.S. Security Assistance • Stimson Center"; Stimson Center; Published: 5-23-2022; Accessed: 6-25-2022; https://www.stimson.org/2022/ukraine-to-set-record-for-u-s-security-assistance/; KL]

Less than halfway through the year, the May 19, 2022 passage of more than $41 billion in emergency funding for Ukraine positions the country to become the largest single recipient of U.S. security sector assistance in 2022. The latest funding includes at least $6 billion in direct military aid to Ukraine, and billions more for Ukraine and other European partners. Altogether, even a conservative estimate places the value of the military assistance Ukraine will receive in 2022 as equivalent to what the U.S. provided Afghanistan, Israel, and Egypt in FY2020 combined.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

2AC---CMR Uniqueness

CMR collapsed. Military’s prestige is inevitable.

Brooks et al. 21 [RISA BROOKS is Allis Chalmers Associate Professor of Political Science at Marquette University, a Nonresident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and an Adjunct Scholar at West Point’s Modern War Institute; JIM GOLBY is a Senior Fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and a co-host of the podcast Thank You for Your Service. He is a retired U.S. Army officer; HEIDI URBEN is an Adjunct Associate Professor in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, a Nonresident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and an Adjunct Scholar at West Point’s Modern War Institute. She is a retired U.S. Army officer; Published: May/June 2021; Accessed: 4-13-2021; "Crisis of Command"; Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-09/national-security-crisis-command; KL]

PARADISE LOST

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

2AC---Oversight Uniqueness

Oversight is dead.

Khan 21 [Alyssa Khan, Research Associate at Digital Forensic Research Lab; "Rethinking War Powers: Options for Reestablishing Congressional Authority Over US Foreign Policy"; Marcellus Policy Analysis; Published: Fall 2021; Accessed: 6-23-2022; https://jqas.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Kann-Analysis1.pdf; KL]

American military actions—most not subject to public scrutiny or congressional accountability—have occurred in at least 20 countries in 20 years. These military operations have been made possible through increasingly broad presidential war powers, despite the fact that the Constitution reserved most war powers for Congress. In addition to over half a million lives lost in these military operations and trillions spent, this executive encroachment on war powers has eroded governmental accountability, civil rights, democratic institutions, and the role of the public and Congress in war making.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › poll stuff › Five-thirty-eight polls good

Five-thirty-eight polls good

Nate Silver 22, 6-30-2022, Silver is the founder and editor in chief of FiveThirtyEight."Why Republicans Are Favored To Win The House, But Not The Senate," FiveThirtyEight, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-republicans-are-favored-to-win-the-house-but-not-the-senate/

Changes to the model Overall, we’re happy with our congressional and gubernatorial forecasts, which last underwent a major revision before the 2018 elections. They performed very well in 2018 and fairly well in 2020 (despite a challenging year for the polls in 2020; it helped that our model also considers a number of other factors in addition to the polling). Therefore, the overall methodology is largely the same. However, after assessing the performance of the models, we did make a few changes around the margins: In evaluating fundraising for congressional candidates, the model now places more emphasis on contributions received within the candidate’s state. Fundraising is a highly nationalized activity these days; Democrats in California and New York regularly contribute to Senate campaigns like that of Democrat Jaime Harrison of South Carolina, who raised a record amount of money in 2020 but nonetheless lost to Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham by 10 percentage points. As such, our analysis finds that a dollar received from within a candidate’s state is about five times as valuable as a dollar received outside of it in predicting the eventual election outcome.5 That’s why the model now applies that ratio, multiplying any funds raised from voters within the candidate’s state by 5, when assessing which candidate has the fundraising edge. The model now puts more emphasis on basic partisanship as opposed to other fundamentals. The fundamentals component of our model, used in the Classic and Deluxe versions, evaluates a series of variables such as fundraising, incumbency, candidate experience, congressional voting records and even scandals to make a forecast. The formula is fairly complicated, so we tested a simple alternative in an era of high partisanship. Specifically, we looked at what would happen if you made a forecast based solely on the partisan lean of a state or district, plus generic-ballot results. For instance, if the generic ballot favors Republicans by 4 percentage points, and a state leans Republican by 3 points, you might expect the Republican to win there by 7 points. In testing this on 2018 and 2020 races, we found that the more complicated version of our fundamentals formula does outperform this simple alternative. But it’s pretty close, and a blend of the complicated and simple formulas does better than either one taken alone.6 What this means is that state partisanship and the generic ballot will have more influence on our model going forward and the other fundamentals factors less, although they certainly matter some. We assume errors are more correlated from race to race. In presidential races, forecast and polling errors are highly correlated from state to state. It wasn’t a surprise that Trump won Wisconsin and Pennsylvania in 2016 given that he also won Michigan, for example, since the states are fairly similar demographically. (Accounting for this properly was a big reason that FiveThirtyEight’s model gave Trump a better chance than others in 2016.) This also holds in congressional races, though to a considerably lesser degree since there are different candidates on the ballot in each state. A scandal affecting the Republican candidate in Georgia won’t necessarily have any impact in Arizona, for instance. However, our analysis suggests that polling errors are becoming more correlated in congressional races, too. Certainly, 2020 was a prominent example given that Republicans won nearly every toss-up race for the House and that polls for Congress had a strong overall bias toward Democrats. Therefore, we’ve increased the degree to which race-by-race errors are assumed to be correlated in the model.7 We’ve reduced the emphasis on sample size when weighting polls. This is consistent with a change in our pollster ratings methodology and is explained in more detail there. We’ve removed a series of changes in the 2020 model that were specific to the COVID-19 pandemic. Yes, I know the pandemic isn’t over yet, but voting will take place under far more normal conditions than in 2020.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT !---Econ › no runaway inflation

No risk of runaway inflation

La Monica 21 (Paul, digital correspondent for CNN Business. He writes daily about the markets and blue chip companies. May 20. "The Fed needs to get real about inflation" )]

But does the Fed risk losing Wall Street credibility if Powell continues to put on blinders and stick his fingers in his ears whenever someone mentions inflation? Not necessarily.

"How much inflation actually sticks?" Foster wondered. She noted that many companies are using more automation and are spending to boost productivity. That could be an "antidote to runaway inflation."

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT !---Econ

No econ decline impact.

Walt 20 [Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, May 13th, ]

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”

Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT ! – Filibuster › Filibuster good

Removing the filibuster would be short-sighted and disastrous for a democratic future

Geraghty 6/30 [Jim Geraghty, Geraghty is the senior political correspondent of National Review, “What Happens If Democrats Start Creating Exceptions to the Filibuster?”, National Review, June 30 2022, https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/what-happens-if-democrats-start-creating-exceptions-to-the-filibuster/]//RA

 that Senate Democrats should eliminate the filibuster for abortion legislation, as well as for his preferred election reform legislation: “If the filibuster gets in the way, it’s like voting rights, it should be provided an exception for this…to the filibuster.”

In other words, the minority party in the Senate should be able to block legislation with 41 votes, unless Joe Biden thinks the legislation is really important.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT ! – Filibuster › Filibuster good

Maintaining the filibuster is integral to democrats’ long term goals – removal would be detrimental

Hohmann 7/6 [James Hohmann, Education: Stanford University, B.A. in History. Hohmann writes an opinion column for The Washington Post. In his previous role as a national political correspondent, he was the author of The Daily 202, The Post's flagship political newsletter; the voice of The Big Idea podcast, the paper's premier morning news audio briefing; and the anchor of PowerPost, a vertical focused on the intersection of politics and policy. Hohmann covered local news for The Post in the aughts and returned in 2015 after six years at Politico. He has also written for the Los Angeles Times, Dallas Morning News and San Jose Mercury News, “Busting the filibuster for abortion now is madness”, Washington Post, July 6 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/06/busting-filibuster-abortion-crazy/]//RA

Democrats hoping to change the rules of the Senate in a futile bid to pass a federal law protecting abortion rights are displaying the most myopic political thinking since liberals called for defunding the police.

Then, as now, their anger was righteous and raw. Millions of Americans took to the streets in the spring of 2020 to protest systemic racism after the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis. But the shortsighted demands to divert resources from law enforcement continue to hobble Democrats who never even embraced the idea. Revising the filibuster will hurt even more in the long term.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT !---China

No great power war with China.

Stashiwick 20 (Steven Stashwick is an independent writer and researcher focused on East Asian security and maritime issues.; “A Cold War Movie’s (Wrong) Lessons About US-China Competition”; The Diplomat; March 6, 2020; ) Accessed 6/25/21//eleanor

This helps move the film’s plot along, but gets the logic behind nuclear missile submarines backwards. A first strike only works if the majority of an adversary’s nuclear arsenal can be destroyed because whatever survives will be launched in retaliation. That’s what makes missile submarines important, their function isn’t to conduct first strikes but to survive them by being at sea where they are less easily targeted than fixed missile silos on land. This makes them “survivable second strike” platforms that guarantee retaliation in response to an attack, thereby removing the incentive to conduct a “first strike.” The Red October wasn’t, as one on-screen admiral laments, “built to start a war,” but to more effectively deter one. Unspoken in the concern of all the American admirals and generals in the movie, is that the Red October wasn’t a threat to mutual nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union, it was a guarantor of it; what it really threatened was the ability of the United States to survive a Soviet nuclear retaliation and “win” a potential nuclear war. This is an understandable advantage to seek, but one that actually raises the risk of the disaster trying to be averted. The Cold War is often described as a condition of mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union – “M.A.D.” – but this was never quite the United States’ strategy, which sought to deter its rivals but avoid being deterred itself if it could be helped. Now the United States, which already enjoys an enormous nuclear advantage over China, is working to ensure it has sufficient conventional advantage against it. For more than a decade the United States has sought new strategies and technologies to defeat China’s anti-access and area denial capabilities – thousands of long-range land attack and anti-ship missiles intended to keep U.S. fleets and warplanes far away from its coasts. This restriction on its freedom of action is broadly unacceptable to the United States, motivating research into a host of advanced weapons to respond to China’s missile arsenal. These include new long-range missiles that had been banned under the Cold War-era INF Treaty that the United States exited last year, a range of hypersonic missiles that can travel at five times the speed of sound or more, and the U.S. Army’s Strategic Long Range Cannon, a super gun designed to fire rocket-assisted artillery shells to ranges of at least 1,000 miles. From the outside, the argument that China’s efforts to thwart the United States’ ability to conduct attacks against China is sign of malign intention might appear to be bad faith, or at least obtuse. The United States contends that this situation would give China a free hand to take advantage of partners and allies, and potentially seize the island of Taiwan by force. If China’s capabilities all work as planned, and at the outset of a war against Taiwan it sinks a U.S. fleet sent to deter it, would China really expect that the United States would not retaliate, and potentially with nuclear weapons? During the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, a PLA general implicitly threatened that China might use its nuclear deterrent to prevent the United States from coming to Taiwan’s aid, reportedly telling a senior U.S. official that Americans “care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan.” But even if true, China could not be confident that it could issue a nuclear threat against the United States without a response. The question then isn’t only whether the United States cares more about its cities than keeping Taiwan free, but simultaneously whether China cares more about Shanghai, for example, than it does about seizing Taiwan. For the architects of the Trump administration’s defense strategy, the Pentagon’s new weapons programs are a way to fight a major war against China without having to resort to using nuclear weapons. This is true as far as it goes, that the United States needs a credible conventional deterrent against Chinese aggression, but sidesteps how a war that would lead to conventional strikes against targets on China’s mainland on the one hand, and against U.S. territories and allies on the other, doesn’t rush precipitously towards nuclear use anyway. And in trying to figure out how to fight a major war against China without nuclear weapons, dismisses the idea that a credible risk of that war going nuclear is a much surer deterrent against it breaking out in the first place. Since both the United States and China have nuclear weapons, and especially in light of China’s efforts to improve the survivability of its nuclear missile submarines, a major armed conflict between the two should be deterred by the threat of mutual nuclear attack. The possibility of a non-nuclear conflict between them rests on the logic of the stability-instability paradox. This theory posits that two nuclear-armed countries both desire to avoid total destruction and therefore will avoid conflicts that risk escalating to that level of force. But as a result of that strategic-level stability, each feels secure in engaging in lower-intensity conflict, confident that the other would not risk nuclear escalation over comparatively minor provocations. This is likely part of the reason that Chinese planes and ships, like the Soviets before them, have felt secure to engage in “games of chicken” with U.S. planes and ships resulting in incidents from the 2001 EP-3 collision in which a Chinese pilot died to near-collisions between warships in 2013 and 2018. The Hunt for Red October also suggests, incorrectly (or at least exaggeratedly), that dangerous incidents like these might lead to cataclysm. In a scene where the National Security Advisor admonishes the Soviet Ambassador, he warns that U.S. and Soviet warships and planes operating close together was highly dangerous, and that “wars have begun that way.” It’s a concern both the United States and China have invoked about interactions between their navies when operating in the South China Sea, on the theory that an unintended incident might spark an armed clash and escalate from there. But as straightforward as the logic seems, the worry that incidents like these might lead to miscalculation and escalation appears unfounded, and historically, wars haven’t ever begun that way. Still, the fear of unintended escalation has motivated some positive steps, such as a series of agreements between the Chinese and U.S. militaries to define safe behavior between their units, mirroring similar Cold War agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. But China and Russia appear to have figured out a strategic asymmetry that the United States still struggles with. At the low-end, both China and (now) Russia still repeatedly violate those agreements, variously in letter and spirit, recognizing that these incidents, dangerous as they are, lack the potential for escalation the United States often asserts they do, leaving it with mostly unsatisfactory responses. But at the high-end, the United States is working feverishly to figure out how to fight major wars under the assumption that they would not go nuclear, one that the implicated adversaries may not share. If it is going to succeed in great power competition, the United States has to figure out how to flip both scripts.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT !---Climate › No !

No warming impact

Sandberg 18—James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford [Anders, February 2018, “Human Extinction from Natural Hazard Events”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science, DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780199389407.013.293, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library, language edited change denoted by brackets] AMarb

In the past climate change has likely threatened the early H. sapiens by long periods of drought or ecological change, typically driven by the glacial cycles. Cooling periods have been associated with population contractions and extinctions (Foley, 1994; Gamble et al., 2004). Still, given human survival through these cycles they have been insufficient to cause species extinction. Typical discussions of anthropogenic climate change focus on scenarios with a few °C of warming, because such scenarios are high probability, they are near-term and can be analyzed using current data and models. Such “normal” climate change (comparable to past temperature change during the Holocene [Marcott et al., 2013]) is expected to affect food security but not in a radical way. An increase in climate related extremes such as floods, droughts, cyclones, and wildfires can be expected but would do mainly localized damage. Reductions in agricultural productivity and water scarcity are to be expected. Effects depend on the vulnerability profile of different regions but are overall negative (Schmidhuber & Tubiello, 2007; IPCC, 2014). Still, despite serious local problems the overall situation appears to pose no major risk to the survival of the species. Large temperature increases (4+ °C) would affect ecosystems at the same level as human land-use changes, cause substantial increase in extinction of non-human species, and increase the probability of large-scale tipping points (when a smooth change of parameters leads to an abrupt qualitative change in behavior) such as disintegrating ice sheets, methane release from undersea deposits (clathrates), and long-term droughts in some areas that act as reinforcing feedbacks for a changed climate and ecosystem. At this point crop yields can be expected to drop on the order of 20% or more (depending on crop and location), outdoor activity in the tropics becomes [difficult] impaired, and global food security becomes less stable (IPCC, 2014). While this could seriously stress human societies or force a smaller population it is again not per se an extinction risk. However, little is known about tail risks corresponding to higher temperature increases; uncertainty about climate sensitivity and future emissions is compounded by the possibility of positive feedbacks producing significantly more warming. Wagner and Weitzman (2016) argued, based on IPCC data, that depending on emission scenario there is a 3% to 10% risk of a 6+ °C increase. At this point large regions would be too warm for unprotected humans to survive in, and beyond 11–12 °C warming this would encompass most currently inhabited regions (King et al., 2015; Sherwood & Huber, 2010). While this does not ensure extinction, the global population would have a constrained and vulnerable habitat. An even more extreme scenario would be causing a runaway greenhouse effect sterilizing earth. However, this is unlikely to be possible through adding greenhouse gases (Goldblatt & Watson, 2012). Conversely, triggering a snowball earth state (where the surface is nearly entirely frozen and the ice and snow maintains the low temperature by reflecting sunlight into space effectively) would require a 10% reduction in solar input, or a more modest reduction plus drastically lower CO2 levels (Yang, Peltier, & Hu, 2012). Although the biosphere is expected to destabilize eventually (dooming any terrestrial species) the expected lifespan is on the order of 1.6–2 billion years. The cause of extinction is thought to be the increasing solar luminosity, making conditions too hot, combined with CO2 levels becoming too low for photosynthesis, or water loss to space (Franck, Bounama, & von Bloh, 2006; Wolf & Toon, 2015).

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT !---Democracy › Democracy thumpers

Democracy is fricked – bipartisan perception proves democratic backsliding inev

Callie Patteson 22, 6-15-2022, "Most Democrats, Republicans say US ‘democracy’ won’t last, poll finds," New York Post, https://nypost.com/2022/06/15/most-democrats-republicans-say-us-democracy-wont-last-poll/

More than half of self-identified Democrats and Republicans believe the US will no longer be a “democracy” at some point in the future, according to a new poll. The striking findings were reported in a Yahoo News/YouGov survey which found 55% of Democrats and 53% of Republicans said it was “likely” the US will “cease to be a democracy in the future.” It was unclear how the poll defined “democracy.” The US is officially a constitutional federal republic where states run direct elections for most high offices — though not, most notably, for president. When independents and the non-affiliated were factored in, the depressing notion was shared by 49% of all respondents — while only 25% said they consider the end of democracy to be “unlikely,” while another 25% said they were unsure. In addition, 60% of Democrats and 61% of Republicans believe America is becoming a “less democratic country.” Both political sides also believe they were treated more fairly “in the past” than now – 71% of Republicans and 50% of Democrats agreed with that statement. A new poll from Yahoo News/YouGov found that a majority of Republicans and Democrats believe the United States will “cease to be a democracy in the future.” A new poll from Yahoo News/YouGov found that a majority of Republicans and Democrats believe the United States will “cease to be a democracy in the future.” Photo by Michael Ciaglo/Getty Images Additionally, the poll found that 52% of Republicans, 50% of independents and 46% of Democrats believe “there will be a civil war in the United States in [their] lifetime.” While there appears to be bipartisan hopelessness for the future of America, respondents were quick to blame the other side for the present predicament. A plurality of Republicans — 30% — described Democrats as “out of touch with reality,” while 25% claimed they were a “threat to America.” Another 8% see the Democratic Party as “immoral” and 4% said it was a “threat to me personally.” The poll found that nearly half of Republicans, Democrats and independents believe there will be a civil war in the US in their lifetime. The poll found that nearly half of Republicans, Democrats and independents believe there will be a civil war in the US in their lifetime. Photo by ROBERTO SCHMIDT/AFP via Getty Images Democrats’ opinions of the GOP were similar, with 27% calling the Republican Party “out of touch with reality,” 23% saying they are a “threat to America,” 7% claiming the GOP is “immoral” and 4% calling it a “threat to me personally.” The Yahoo News/YouGov survey also polled voters on the ongoing hearings held by the House select committee investigating the Jan. 6 Capitol riot — and overall, Americans are not impressed. Only 24% of respondents said they watched the initial primetime session broadcast last week, while 27% said they followed news coverage after the fact. A whopping 49% said they have not followed the hearings at all. Just 24% of participants in the survey said they watched the initial coverage Jan. 6 Capitol riot hearings. Just 24% of participants in the survey said they watched the initial coverage of the Jan. 6 Capitol riot hearings. The committee is seeking to convince Americans that the Jan. 6, 2021, Capitol riot was part of a conspiracy to overturn the 2020 presidential election results. However, only 45% of Americans believe that claim, according to the survey. Another 35% said they did not believe it while 20% said they were unsure. Even fewer respondents — 37% — believe that “Donald Trump was at the center” of any plot to keep him in power. The survey of 1,541 US adults was conducted June 10 to 13 and carries a margin of error of approximately 2.9%.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT !---Democracy › No !

Multiple alt causes to democracy or it’s resilient

Shattuck 18

John Shattuck (a professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a senior fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School. He served as the president and rector of Central European University in Budapest from 2009 to 2016, assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor (1993-1998) and ambassador to the Czech Republic (1998-2000). Earlier, he was national staff counsel and Washington office director of the American Civil Liberties Union (1971-1984)). “How Democracy in America Can Survive Donald Trump.” The American Prospect. February 23, 2018. http://prospect.org/article/how-democracy-america-can-survive-donald-trump

WHAT LESSONS CAN BE drawn from the first year of the Trump administration about the potential resilience of liberal democracy in the United States? A key question going forward is whether the popular revulsion against Trump will focus on his assaults on democracy—or will spill over into even deeper distust of democratic politics and government. How Trump’s critics perform in defending democratic institutions and dispelling this distrust will determine whether post-Trump America brings an era of democratic renewal. Long before the election of Donald Trump, democratic institutions were in trouble and vulnerable to attack. For more than a decade, there has been growing discontent and a steady deterioration of public support for the U.S. system of democratic governance. Political polarization and differing partisan perceptions of government are the main contributors to this trend. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell famously announced in 2010 that his main legislative goal was to make Barack Obama a one-term president, signaling that Republican obstruction and legislative gridlock would hobble the Obama presidency. The electoral process has been weakened by the influence of unregulated campaign spending and an increase in state-level voting restrictions and legislative gerrymandering. The result has been a weakening of public belief in the ability of the courts, Congress, and the Constitution to be effective in checking and resisting abuses of power by the executive, and a drop in the percentage of people who agree that the United States fully or mostly lives up to democratic standards. Trump has exacerbated and accelerated the degradation of liberal democratic institutions. By repeatedly lying and manipulating factual reality, he has promoted the view that there is no objective truth. By attacking and insulting opponents, he has degraded public discussion of issues and politicized the institutions that are normally seen as nonpartisan guardrails of democracy. The federal courts, the media, law enforcement agencies, and the federal civil service have all been attacked by the president as partisan when they have resisted his agenda. The president’s attack on the FBI in its ongoing Russia investigation into potential collusion and obstruction of justice is a case study of how Trump politicizes nonpartisan institutions and undermines the rule of law. Trump’s attacks have been aimed at altering the public’s perception of an agency previously held in high regard as professional and nonpartisan. In response to these attacks, the institutions of American democracy have demonstrated varying degrees of resistance and potential for resilience. Those that have been most resilient, like civil society, are strong and innately capable of defense, while others, like the electoral process, have been weakened by partisan manipulation and are unlikely to be resilient unless reformed. The greatest resilience has been demonstrated by the strongest institutions, civil society and state and local government, and the greatest vulnerability by the weakest, the electoral process and norms of presidential conduct. Several institutions vulnerable to presidential attack, like the media, have shown significant levels of resistance, while others with inherent institutional strengths, like Congress, have exhibited little to none. What makes some liberal democratic institutions strong and others weak? The history of American political culture has shaped a broad and diverse civil society with a tradition of political activism, often in opposition to government. Tocqueville pointed out two centuries ago that Americans make up for their skepticism about government with their commitment to civic engagement. Political culture in the United States has created a system of state and local government which serves to check and balance federal power, sometimes constructively, as over the past year, and sometimes destructively, as during the post-Reconstruction period and the civil rights revolution. At the same time, American political culture has created a weak electoral process, plagued by historical anomalies such as the Electoral College, multiple state and local jurisdictions, unregulated campaign funding, legislative gerrymandering, and state restrictions on voting. Presidential norms are vulnerable because they are not written into law and are no match for a president who overrides them. Congress has been badly weakened by political polarization, despite its express constitutional powers. The most surprising resistance to presidential attack during the first year of the Trump presidency has come from four institutions with significant political vulnerabilities that make them ready targets for an anti-democratic president—the media, the federal judiciary, law enforcement, and the federal civil service. The mainstream media, as noted, have done surprisingly well, and could emerge stronger for Trump’s assaults. The federal judiciary is vulnerable because the president is reshaping the courts by exercising his power to appoint new judges, but parts of the judiciary have been resistant over the past year to the administration’s anti-pluralist agenda on immigration, minority rights, and partisan gerrymandering. Similar resistance to the president’s attack on the rule of law in seeking to end or control the special counsel’s investigation has come from within the Justice Department and the FBI. And the federal civil service, despite senior positions filled by political appointees or left empty, generally has maintained its professionalism and resisted the administration’s effort to denigrate its work. It is too soon to tell how the institutions of American democracy will perform beyond the first year of the Trump presidency. Flaws in these institutions predating the Trump presidency have been exacerbated by Trump’s attacks. But U.S. public opinion continues to reflect strong opposition to concentrations of authority in the presidency, and this should provide a basis for continuing resistance. There is an opening for Democrats to mobilize public support in defense of constitutional norms and the rule of law in the 2018 congressional elections, and a surge of new Democratic candidates and court-ordered cutbacks in gerrymandering make it possible to bring about change. The bottom line is that American democracy has shown a potential for resilience during Trump’s first year. When compared with other backsliding democracies where neo-authoritarian leaders—such as Orban in Hungary, Kaczyński in Poland, and Erdoğan in Turkey—have destroyed the independence and functioning of pluralist institutions, the situation in the United States is better.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › Link › AT L–Biotech

Innovative biotech investments have public support

Mark Strauss 18, 8-28-18, “A majority of Americans support using biotechnology to grow human organs in animals for transplants,” Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/20/a-majority-of-americans-support-using-biotechnology-to-grow-human-organs-in-animals-for-transplants/

Almost six-in-ten Americans (57%) consider it an appropriate use of technology to genetically engineer animals to grow organs or tissues that could be used for humans needing a transplant, while 41% say this would be going too far, according to a new survey by Pew Research Center. The findings are part of a larger pattern that reveals Americans are more likely to support the bioengineering of animals if it benefits human health. Demand for transplantable organs and tissues continues to grow in the United States. Last year saw the most organ transplants ever performed in the country. Organs were recovered from more than 10,000 donors – an increase of more than 25% over the past 10 years. Health experts attribute this increase, in part, to breakthroughs in medical technology that have made it possible to recover organs that previously would have been unsuitable for transplants. But, despite these advances, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reports that the gap between supply and demand remains wide. Researchers are hoping to close that gap through the development of new medical technologies. One such approach is 3D organ printing– a process that uses “bio-ink” to print layers of cells that grow to form transplantable tissue. Another method under development uses genetic engineering to grow human organs and tissues in animals. There was a breakthrough with this technique earlier this year, when scientists used gene editing to create hybrid embryos containing both human and sheep cells. When the survey – conducted April 23-May 6 – asked the 41% of respondents who opposed this application of genetic engineering to explain, in their own words, the main reason behind their view, the objections included concerns about the use of animals in this way for human benefit (21% of those asked) and the potential risks for human health (16% of those asked). The responses included: “In manufacturing organs, the existence of these animals would be miserable … I can’t ethically say that I would agree with such a practice.” “Factory farming already as an industry unethically treats animals. I imagine organ growing wouldn’t treat the animals any differently.” “When you mix human and non-human genetics I believe that will cause extreme problems down the road.” “Even human-to-human organ transplants often reject, so I can only imagine the bad side effects that an animal-to-human transplant would cause. Keep things simple and the way nature intended.”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › Link › AT L–Biotech

Global collaboration over regulating biotech popular

Val Giddings 21, 4-15, 2021, "How the Biden Administration can accelerate prosperity by fixing agricultural-biotech regulations," Genetic Literacy Project, https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2021/04/15/how-the-biden-administration-can-accelerate-prosperity-by-fixing-agricultural-biotech-regulations/

Key takeaways With bipartisan support, U.S. biotech regulations since 1986 have enabled innovation to flourish, leading a global revolution in agricultural productivity and sustainability that has benefitted farmers, consumers, and the environment. Yet regulations have not been modernized to keep pace with scientific innovation, and they have strayed from relying on science and data. This has impeded further biotech innovation that could improve safety and solve pressing societal problems. USDA has made some progress updating and streamlining regulations, but data and experience show it needs to move farther and faster. EPA and FDA have become obstacles to progress and safety advances and urgently need to correct course. The Office of Science and Technology Policy should work with the Office of Management and Budget to ensure updates take place quickly. This will stimulate innovations in agricultural biotechnology across multiple sectors of the economy

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › Link › AT L—NATO popular

US action with NATO popular

Kathy Frankovic 21, 6-14-2021, "Americans tend to favor NATO by 48% to 28%," No Publication, https://today.yougov.com/topics/international/articles-reports/2021/06/14/americans-favor-nato-poll

President Joe Biden’s trip to Europe has multiple goals. The president will meet with many world leaders, ranging from NATO, EU and G7 allies, to Turkish President Recip Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin. During the meetings, he will seek to reinforce the United States’ “shared democratic values” while bolstering key alliances. At least one ambition of Biden’s – to cement relations with NATO – has the support of Americans in the latest Economist/YouGov poll, although many Republicans remain skeptical of the organization. That skepticism increased during Donald Trump’s presidency, when he criticized NATO for not contributing enough to the group members’ mutual defense. Nearly half the public now has a favorable opinion of NATO (48% positive vs 28% negative), but that is up only slightly from two years ago (44% vs 25%), with Republicans today remaining negative (34% positive, 46% negative). While Republicans are negative toward NATO, they agree by better than two to one (52% to 24%) that the United States must maintain its commitment to defend any NATO member that has been attacked. Even in the middle of the Trump presidency, when as many Republicans wanted to withdraw from NATO as remain in the alliance, most Republicans believed the U.S. should keep that defense commitment to members of the alliance.