2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 2AC---Data-Sharing
Erik Lin-Greenberg 20, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. Texas National Security Review, Vol 3, Iss 2. Spring. "Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making" //pipk
Although the proliferation of military AI technology has the potential to frustrate alliance military operations and decision-making, these obstacles are not insurmountable. Allies have previously worked together on missions that involved new technology, shared highly sensitive information, and learned to cope with compressed decision-making timelines. Drawing lessons from historical exemplar cases where allies have wrestled with new technology, coupled with guidance from emerging national AI policies and analysis of new technologies, I identify ways that alliances can overcome the pitfalls of AI integration in an environment in which AI is increasingly common.
Increasing AI Interoperability and Data Sharing
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 2AC---Now Key
Andrea Gilli et al 20, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College where he works on issues related to technological change and military innovation. He has been visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University as well as Stanford University (where he remains an Affiliate) and Harvard University. Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETHZurich. Before joining CSS, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Dickey Center, Dartmouth College. Ann-Sophie Leonard is a former Mercator Fellow on International Affairs, focusing on the intersection of international security and technology. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome from September to December 2019. Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. NDC Research Paper No.15 – December 2020 //pipk
For any country, and in particular for Great Powers, being at the forefront of science and technology is a priority, as it represents a key asset for both national security and prosperity. This is even more acute in an age of accelerating technological change. Many modern sectors of the economy as well as the defence realm require an advanced industrial, scientific and technological base that is extremely demanding to create.224 For countries that do not keep up with progress and are forced to exit some sectors, re-entry tends to be very difficult because of the need to recruit qualified people, acquire material capabilities, and – most daunting of all – develop the necessary organizational and technical experience.225 In other words, lagging behind today can create path dependencies that will then be extremely difficult to overcome in the future.226 This is particularly the case for AI, ML and BD, given that distinctive features such as decreasing marginal costs tending to zero, increasing return of scales and demand-side economies of scale (network externalities) make it difficult, if not impossible, to make up lost ground. Hence, for NATO countries it is of utmost importance to take proactive measures to avoid such a risk.227
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 2AC---Pilot Project Solvency---NATO Key
Andrea Gilli et al 20, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College where he works on issues related to technological change and military innovation. He has been visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University as well as Stanford University (where he remains an Affiliate) and Harvard University. Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETHZurich. Before joining CSS, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Dickey Center, Dartmouth College. Ann-Sophie Leonard is a former Mercator Fellow on International Affairs, focusing on the intersection of international security and technology. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome from September to December 2019. Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. NDC Research Paper No.15 – December 2020 //pipk
According to many observers, artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML) and big data (BD) are going to promote a dramatic technological transformation affecting every aspect of our lives, every industry and profession, every layer of our societies, with major implications also for international politics.5 The consequences for military affairs and international security are still not fully appreciated or understood.6 Nonetheless, building on previous cases, as well as historical experience with other major technological revolutions, we can reasonably conjecture that the fallout will likely be massive. Countries – and alliances – unable to adapt quickly and thoroughly will be left by the wayside.7 Understanding, preparing for and exploiting this technological transition is thus of utmost importance for NATO and for its Allies.8
The Atlantic Alliance as a whole has an obligation to preserve and extend its military power, maintain its level of prosperity and internal cohesion, lay the conditions for future wealth creation, and make its action more efficient and effective, starting from its core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.9 The technological transformation triggered by AI, ML and BD will, however, challenge many of the assumptions, procedures, capabilities, skills as well as doctrines and strategies underpinning NATO’s current activities.10 There can be no substitute for understanding, preparing and exploiting this AI-centred technological transition, but it will require significant effort.11 The first Industrial Revolution – driven by the combined employment of new mechanical devices – was ultimately about increasing the power of natural energy, and it brought about a dramatically different international system.12 Similarly, the second Industrial Revolution, which allowed for large production runs and thus brought economies of scale centre stage, made “mass” a central tenet of military power, with tragic consequences for international politics due to the emergence of industrial and total war.13 The third Industrial Revolution, with its focus on computation, allowed for much higher levels of precision; and precision came to dominate the battlefield – through long-range guided munitions, real-time intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets and stealth, among others.14 Some define our new era as the fourth Industrial Revolution.15 Others speak of the Second Machine Age.16 Regardless of the name, in the age of intelligent machines, machine speed will likely prove one of the defining features of future warfare.17
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 2AC---Pilot Project Solvency---Logistics
Andrea Gilli et al 20, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College where he works on issues related to technological change and military innovation. He has been visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University as well as Stanford University (where he remains an Affiliate) and Harvard University. Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETHZurich. Before joining CSS, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Dickey Center, Dartmouth College. Ann-Sophie Leonard is a former Mercator Fellow on International Affairs, focusing on the intersection of international security and technology. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome from September to December 2019. Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. NDC Research Paper No.15 – December 2020 //pipk
The increasing power of processors, accuracy of algorithms, and availability of digital data are driving the dramatic artificial intelligence (AI)-centred technological transformation now in progress. These changes have already turned companies, industries and markets upside down, and we are also starting to see their effects on the battlefield. The employment of unmanned vehicles, reliance on big data for target detection, identification and acquisition, as well as the potentials of machine learning in other critical functions such as logistics and maintenance are only some of the possible examples of how warfare will evolve in the near future. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its Allies cannot be bystanders during this technological transition. Some countries and organizations have already taken important steps. Others are more hesitant. The Atlantic Alliance has a moral obligation to act, both to preserve and extend its military leadership – and thus the wealth and security of its citizens – and to shape this process in keeping with its democratic principles, freedom-inspired values and commitment to fundamental human rights. As NATO works on its Artificial Intelligence Strategy, which could be published in 2021, this Research Paper aims at contributing to both the policy debate and the public discussion about AI and its implications for the Alliance. The paper offers a series of analyses, lessons learned, proposals, and recommendations, that build on best practices and solutions adopted in the civilian and military fields, on perspectives drawn from the academic literature as well as on ideas generated in the broader AI community. The various parts of the paper are all linked to the single overarching concept of “NATO-mation”, or the idea that NATO has an important role to play so as to prepare for and to shape this technological transformation. NATO Allies need to be proactive: without common, coordinated, cooperative or joint solutions, they will not be able to achieve all their goals effectively and efficiently. The paper thus elaborates on the concept of “NATO-mation” in 11 different building blocks, as summarized below:
Ethical purpose: first and foremost, NATO’s strength comes from its values, which give meaning to its military capabilities and represent the bond between the Allies. As technological progress demands answers to major ethical questions regarding the development, employment and purpose of intelligent machines, NATO and its Allies have the opportunity to shape international norms and behaviour in this respect while simultaneously strengthening their commitment to the Alliance’s founding principles. Setting up an ethical board of experts and adopting some common ethical principles are two starting points.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 2AC---Pilot Project Solvency---Logistics
Andrea Gilli et al 20, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College where he works on issues related to technological change and military innovation. He has been visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University as well as Stanford University (where he remains an Affiliate) and Harvard University. Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETHZurich. Before joining CSS, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Dickey Center, Dartmouth College. Ann-Sophie Leonard is a former Mercator Fellow on International Affairs, focusing on the intersection of international security and technology. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome from September to December 2019. Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. NDC Research Paper No.15 – December 2020 //pipk
NATO and its Allies have strong reasons to adopt a pragmatic approach, which can be conveniently defined as 3S: small + secure = success. The rationale is as follows: • Small: small projects are unlikely to generate internal opposition or face major challenges; • Secure: secure projects are also at lower risks of technical or organizational failure; • Success: success is thus more readily within reach.
According to Google Brain’s co-founder Andrew Ng, for instance, it “is important for [the] first few AI project to succeed rather than be the most valuable AI projects”. This means they should be “technically feasible” and have “a clearly defined and measurable objective that creates business value”.134 Greg Allen, now at the US Department of Defense’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, reiterates this message from a different angle. He considers that many “AI projects fail not because of the technology, but because of a failure to properly set expectations, integrate with legacy systems, and train operational personnel”.135 Militaries have learned these lesson in previous instances of technological change: historically, many breakthrough technologies generated opposition, they did not deliver on their promises, and the increases in costs and time requirements further undermined their acceptance.136 As such, a pragmatic approach to small and feasible projects minimizes the chance that political or technical failure might slow down the Alliance’s adoption of AI.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2AC---AT: Democracy Bad
Matt Kroenig 20, Professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown. 4/3 “Why the U.S. Will Outcompete China”
National-security analysts see China as one of the greatest threats facing the United States and its allies. According to an emerging conventional wisdom, China has the leg up on the U.S. in part because its authoritarian government can strategically plan for the long term, unencumbered by competing branches of government, regular elections, and public opinion. Yet this faith in autocratic ascendance and democratic decline is contrary to historical fact. China may be able to put forth big, bold plans—the kinds of projects that analysts think of as long term—but the visionary projects of autocrats don’t usually pan out. Watch White Noise, the inside story of the alt-right The Atlantic’s first feature documentary ventures into the underbelly of the far-right movement to explore the seductive power of extremism. Stream Now Yes, democratic governments are obligated to answer to their citizens on regular intervals and are sensitive to public opinion—that’s actually democracies’ greatest source of strength. Democratic leaders have a harder time advancing big, bold agendas, but the upside of that difficulty is that the plans that do make it through the system have been carefully considered and enjoy domestic support. Historically speaking, once a democracy comes up with a successful strategy, it sticks with the plan, even through a succession of leadership. Washington has arguably followed the same basic, three-step geopolitical plan since 1945. First, the United States built the current, rules-based international system by providing security in important geopolitical regions, constructing international institutions, and promoting free markets and democratic politics within its sphere of influence. Second, it welcomed into the club any country that played by the rules, even former adversaries, like Germany and Japan. And, third, the U.S. worked with its allies to defend the system from those countries or groups that would challenge it, including competitors such as Russia and China, rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, and terrorist networks. America can pursue long-term strategy in part because it enjoys domestic political stability. While new politicians seek to improve on their predecessor’s policies, the United States is unlikely to see the drastic shifts in strategy that come from the fall of one political system and the rise of another. Democratic elections may be messy, but they’re not as messy as coups or civil wars. Daniel Blumenthal: The Unpredictable Rise of China Open societies have many other advantages as well. They facilitate innovation, trust in financial markets, and economic growth. Because democracies tend to be more reliable partners, they are typically skillful alliance builders, and they can accumulate resources without frightening their neighbors. They tend to make thoughtful, informed decisions on matters of war and peace, and to focus their security forces on external enemies, not their own populations. Autocratic systems simply cannot match this impressive array of economic, diplomatic, and military attributes. David Leonhardt recently wrote in The New York Times, “Chinese leaders stretching back to Deng Xiaoping have often thought in terms of decades.” Commonly cited examples of that long-term thinking include the Belt and Road Initiative, a program that invests in infrastructure overseas; Made in China 2025, an effort to subsidize China’s giant tech companies to become world leaders in 21st-century technologies, such as artificial intelligence; and Beijing’s promise to be a global superpower by 2049. Since putting in place sound economic reforms in the 1970s, China has seen its economy expand at eye-popping rates, to become the world’s second largest. Many economists predict that China could even surpass the United States within the decade, and some have suggested that China’s model of state-led capitalism will prove more successful, in terms of economic growth, than the U.S. template of free markets and open politics. I doubt these predictions. Because autocratic leaders are unconstrained and do not have to contend with a legislature or courts, they have an easier time taking their countries in new and radically different directions. Then, when the dictator changes his mind, he can do it again. Mao’s autocratic China ricocheted from one failed policy to another: the Great Leap Forward, then the Hundred Flowers Campaign, then the Cultural Revolution. Mao aligned with the Soviet Union in 1950 only to nearly fight a nuclear war with Moscow in the next decade. Beginning in the time of Deng Xiaoping, China pursued a fairly constant strategy of liberalizing its economy at home and “hiding its capabilities and biding its time” abroad. But President Xi Jinping abandoned these dictums when he took over. As the most powerful leader since Mao—he has changed China’s constitution to set himself up as dictator for life—he could once again jerk China in several new directions, according to his whims, and back again. According to the Asia Society, he has stalled or reversed course on eight of 10 categories of economic reform promised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. Moreover, Xi is baring China’s teeth militarily, taking contested territory from neighbors in the South China Sea and conducting military exercises with Russia in Europe. The problem for Beijing is that stalled reforms will stymie its economic potential and its confrontational policies are provoking an international coalition to contain them. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy declared great-power competition with China the foremost security threat to the U.S.; the European Union labeled China a “systemic rival”; and Japan, Australia, India, and the United States have formed a new “quad” of powers to balance China in the Pacific. Furthermore, the plans often cited as evidence of China’s farsighted vision, the Belt and Road Initiative and Made in China 2025, were announced by Xi only in 2013 and 2015, respectively. Both are way too recent to be celebrated as brilliant examples of successful, long-term strategic planning. A certain level of domestic political stability is a prerequisite for charting a steady strategic course in foreign and domestic affairs. But autocratic regimes are notoriously brittle. While institutionalized political successions in democracies typically lead to changes of policy, political successions in autocracies are likely to result in regime collapse and war. China’s “5,000 years of history” were pockmarked by rebellion, revolution, and new dynasties. Fearing internal threats to domestic political stability—consider the protests this year in Hong Kong and Xinjiang—the CCP spends more on domestic security than on its national defense. If you follow the money, the CCP is demonstrating that the government is more afraid of its own people than of the Pentagon. This domestic fragility will frustrate China’s efforts to design and execute farsighted plans. If threats to Chinese domestic stability were to materialize and the CCP were to collapse tomorrow, for example, Chinese grand strategy could undergo another seismic shift, including possibly opting out of competition with the United States altogether. Shadi Hamid: China Is Avoiding Blame by Trolling the World Autocracies have other vulnerabilities as well. State-led planning has never produced high rates of economic growth over the long term. Autocrats are poor alliance builders who fight with their supposed allies more than with their enemies. And the highest priority of autocratic security forces is repressing their own people, not defending the country. The world has undergone drastic changes in just the past few years, but these enduring patterns of international affairs have not. Some fear that Trump’s nationalist tendencies will erode the U.S. position, but the momentum of America’s successful grand strategy has kept the country on a fairly steady course. Despite Trump’s criticism of NATO, for example, two new countries have joined the alliance on his watch, including North Macedonia this week. The coronavirus has upended a sense of security in the U.S., leading many people into the familiar trap of lauding autocratic China’s firm response in contrast to the halting and patchwork measures in the United States. But there is good reason to believe that this assessment will be updated in America’s favor with the benefit of hindsight. Already we are seeing evidence that conditions are much worse in China than CCP officials are letting on and that China’s attempts at international “disaster diplomacy” are backfiring. It has been revealed that the CCP has continually misrepresented the numbers of COVID-19 infections and deaths in China, and European nations have rejected and returned faulty Chinese coronavirus testing kits.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2AC---Turns Growth
Daron Acemoglu et al 19, Professor of Economics at MIT. Suresh Naidu Columbia University Pascual Restrepo Boston University James A. Robinson University of Chicago. Journal of Political Economy "Democracy Does Cause Growth" //pipk
We provide evidence that democracy has a positive effect on GDP per capita. Our dynamic panel strategy controls for country fixed effects and the rich dynamics of GDP, which otherwise confound the effect of democracy. To reduce measurement error, we introduce a new indicator of democracy that consolidates previous measures. Our baseline results show that democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20 percent in the long run. We find similar effects using a propensity score reweighting strategy as well as an instrumental-variables strategy using regional waves of democratization. The effects are similar across different levels of development and appear to be driven by greater investments in capital, schooling, and health.
I. Introduction With the spectacular economic growth under nondemocracy in China, the eclipse of the Arab Spring, and the recent rise of populist politics in Europe and the United States, the view that democratic institutions are at best irrelevant and at worst a hindrance for economic growth has become increasingly popular in both academia and policy discourse. For example, the prominent New York Times columnist Tom Friedman (2009) argues that “one-party nondemocracy certainly has its drawbacks. But when it is led by a reasonably enlightened group of people, as China is today, it can also have great advantages. That one party can just impose the politically difficult but critically important policies needed to move a society forward in the 21st century.” Robert Barro (1997, 1) states this view even more boldly: “More political rights do not have an effect on growth.”
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2AC---Authoritarianism !---Democracy
Tom Barnes & Marie Davidsen Buhl 21. Visiting Fellow & Research Intern at Rethink Priorities. PhD student in the Environmental Systems (ES) program at the University of California, Merced. //pipk
Preventing the risk of societies coming under the control of a single group/leader, who hold exclusive political power. At its extreme, this could include totalitarianism. Taking preventative measures to stop democratic backsliding may help to prevent authoritarianism.
What are some ways authoritarianism might affect the long-term future?
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2AC---Warming !---Democracy
Daniel J. Fiorino 19, Director of the Center for Environmental Policy at American University in Washington DC. Former Associate Director of the Office of Policy Analysis, EPA. "Improving Democracy for the Future: Why Democracy Can Handle Climate Change" June 24.
Democracy critics often point to recent experience in the United States, where the Trump administration has reversed nearly every climate initiative of the Obama administration and announced its intent to withdraw from the 2015 Paris agreement. Here is a long-standing, highly consolidated democracy moving, at least nationally, in an entirely wrong direction. To be sure, these policy reversals do not bode well for democratic arguments about climate change. Yet the United States also illustrates the strengths of democracies: pluralism, innovation, open flows of information, and political accountability. In particular, federalism enables states—California, New York, Washington, and Hawaii, among them—to act as innovative clean energy and climate leaders (Roberts 2019).
Why the Democracy Issue Matters
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2AC---Warming !---Democracy
Daniel J. Fiorino 19, Director of the Center for Environmental Policy at American University in Washington DC. Former Associate Director of the Office of Policy Analysis, EPA. "Improving Democracy for the Future: Why Democracy Can Handle Climate Change" June 24. //pipk
The world seems to be following a pattern in which the more we learn about the rate and effects of climate change, the more there is to worry about. With every new scientific assessment, it appears that sea levels are rising more than anticipated, more species are being lost, glaciers are melting at surprising rates, droughts and floods are more severe, and extreme weather is on the rise. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warned that limiting average global temperatures to 1.5°C, as governments agreed to aim for in the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, “would require rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society” (IPCC 2018). The expert consensus in these reports is that emissions must fall dramatically by 2030 and the world should achieve a version of carbon neutrality by 2050.
The existential magnitude of the effects of a changing climate and modest progress in dealing with the causes (largely related to energy, transportation, agriculture, and forestry) so far leads critics to call for dramatic changes in governance. James Lovelock, prominent scientist and founder of the Gaia theory, argues, “Even the best democracies agree that when a major war approaches, democracy must be put on hold for the time being. I have a feeling that climate change may be an issue as severe as a war. It may be necessary to put democracy on hold for a while” (Hickman 2010). Other critics go even further, arguing that “humanity will have to trade its liberty to live as it wishes in favor of a system where survival is paramount” (Shearman and Smith 2007). Even restrained critics have concluded “it is not entirely clear that democracy is up to the challenge of climate change” (Jamieson 2014, 100).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2AC---Extinction !---Democracy
Kaushik Basu 21, former chief economist of the World Bank and chief economic adviser to the government of India, professor of economics at Cornell University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. 12/24/21. //pipk
NEW YORK – U.S. President Joe Biden’s recent Summit for Democracy was an important global event, but it slipped by almost unnoticed.
With democratic norms fraying from Southeast Asia to Central Europe, Biden was right to warn of “the sustained and alarming challenges to democracy and universal human rights.” But too few acknowledge that rising authoritarianism around the world, like climate change and the evolution of lethal viruses, can pose an existential risk to humanity.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2AC---Disease
Kavanagh '20 - directs Georgetown University's Global Health Policy & Politics Initiative at the O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health [Matthew, "Authoritarianism, outbreaks, and information politics," The Lanet, VOLUME 5, ISSUE 3, E135-E136, MARCH 01, 2020]
For Amartya Sen, authoritarian states face serious challenges in information and accountability.6 Governments in closed political systems, without open media and opposition parties, struggle to receive accurate information in a timely manner and to convey urgent information to the public. Governments can be the victims of their own propaganda, because the country's political institutions provide incentives to local officials to avoid sharing bad news with their central bosses and await instructions before acting.
Information politics in China undermined a rapid response to the 2019-nCoV outbreak. Health-care workers suspected an outbreak in early December, 2019,7 but information with which the public might have taken preventive measures was suppressed, and communication channels that might have alerted senior officials to the growing threat were shut down.8 Police detained a clinician and seven other people posting reports on 2019-nCoV, threatening punishment for spreading so-called rumors. Social media was censored; a preliminary analysis of Weibo and WeChat published on China's biggest online platform9 showed outbreak discussions were nearly non-existent through much of January, 2020, until the Chinese Government changed its official stance on Jan 20, 2020.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2AC---AT: Lu
Midlarsky 2018 - Rutgers University Moses and Annuta Back Professor of Political Science
Manus, "Democracy and the Environment" in Environmental Conflict, p. 175
The first and most obvious conclusion is that there is no uniform relationship between democracy and the environment. Three of our indicators, deforestation, C02 emissions, and soil erosion by water, demonstrated significant negative relationships between democracy and environmental preservation. Protected land area showed a positive relationship, and freshwater availability and soil erosion by chemicals demonstrated no significant relationship. Of even greater interest, perhaps, is the fact that these relationships ran counter to expectation (Gleditsch and Sverdrup, 1996; Payne, 1995a). Instead of positive relationships between the extent of democracy and environmental protection, as much popular and recent scholarly writings have suggested, the associations found here are principally negative or nonexistent. This should give pause to political leaders such as President Clinton and Vice President Gore who have trumpeted the virtues of democracy in protecting the environment.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2AC---AT: Lu
Hamid '22 - Senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and assistant research professor of Islamic studies at Fuller Seminary [Shadi, 3/6/22, "There Are Many Things Worse Than American Power," https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/putin-kremlin-imperialism-ukraine-american-power/624180/]
If there was any doubt before, the answer is now clear. Vladimir Putin is showing that a world without American power—or, for that matter, Western power—is not a better world.
For the generation of Americans who came of age in the shadow of the September 11 attacks, the world America had made came with a question mark. Their formative experiences were the ones in which American power had been used for ill, in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the Middle East more broadly, and for much longer, the United States had built a security architecture around some of the world’s most repressive regimes. For those on the left, this was nothing new, and it was all too obvious. I spent my college years reading Noam Chomsky and other leftist critics of U.S. foreign policy, and they weren’t entirely wrong. On balance, the U.S. may have been a force for good, but in particular regions and at particular times, it had been anything but.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2AC---AT: Lu
Dr. Chien-Yi Lu 21, PhD and MA in Government from the University of Texas, Austin, Visiting Scholar at Harvard University, Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies of Academia Sinica, Surviving Democracy: Mitigating Climate Change in a Neoliberalized World, Paperback Edition, 12/13/2021, p. 9
Where democracy remains trapped in its neoliberalized form—“more rather than less democracy”—is a guarantee for annihilation. Embracing authoritarianism, however, does not yield a different result for reasons that Passmore, Paehlke, Dryzek, and Stehr have explained. The only options left, therefore, are to sort out how democracy became neoliberalized, the mechanisms through which it took place, and to devise ways to bypass neoliberal controls in practicing democracy so that effective climate mitigation becomes possible and survival becomes attainable, even for the non-rich and non-powerful. The next chapter traces the neoliberalization of democracy to the Keynes-Hayek “debate,” demonstrating that the decadence of democracy was the intended consequence of a painstakingly designed economic-political order rather than the mere sum of mindlessness and sloppiness scattered here and there.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2AC---Warming
Butler '21 - history graduate and postgraduate student of International Relations at Leeds University [Alexander, 7/30/21, "Authoritarianism Can’t Beat Climate Change," https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/authoritarianism-cant-beat-climate-change/]
In some commentaries, authoritarianism and one-party rule, particularly China’s model of governance, is often portrayed as a magic bullet solution to the ostensible impending doom of climate change. In lieu of impotent governance, electoral cycles, short term policies, and hot-air promises of economic and environmental solutions, top-down authoritarian governance is touted as possessing the ability to implement the prudent and long-term policy capable of mitigating the worst effects of climate change.
This type of rhetoric is especially salient in authoritarian state-owned media around the world. Liberal democracies and the West, in particular, are portrayed as decadent, inefficient, dysfunctional, and archaic. Western governance models are seen as unable to meet the needs of the 21st century; they are ill-equipped to meet the social and economic needs of a growing population while mitigating the worst effects of climate change. Chinese state news agency Xinhua recently wrote of the United States’ “four deficits in climate action,” detailing the way in which inconsistency and “flip-flopping” has been the hallmark of U.S. climate policy. This view was further reaffirmed with the dramatic reversal of the Biden administration in re-joining the 2015 Paris Agreement after Donald Trump’s tumultuous exit in 2016. How are we to rely on capricious democracies when dealing with such a time-sensitive issue? Instead, China’s leadership is supposed to offer a decisive system of governance that is committed to “harmony between man and nature” and “green development.”
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 1AR---Boko Haram
Al Jazeera '3/24 ["Nigeria: 7,000 Boko Haram, other fighters surrender in a week," https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/24/nigeria-7000-boko-haram-other-terrorists-surrender-in-a-week]
Some 7,000 members of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram have surrendered in northeast Nigeria in the past week, according to local media reports.
On Wednesday, the News Agency of Nigeria quoted Major General Christopher Musa, a top commander in the region, as saying that an onslaught targeting ISWAP and Boko Haram fighters has continued to record significant success.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 1AR---Imai
Imai '21 - Professor of Government and of Statistics at Harvard University [Kosuke and James Lo, "Robustness of Empirical Evidence for the Democratic Peace: A Nonparametric Sensitivity Analysis," International Organization, Vol 75, Issue 3]
Unobserved confounding in observational research is one of the most fundamental methodological problems in social science. Although the randomization of treatments enables the identification of causal effects, such randomization is rarely feasible in many areas of social science, including political science. In such circumstances, different assumptions can yield conflicting results and yet it is impossible to assess the validity of competing assumptions. As a result, scholarly debates often end up in a scientific deadlock in which neither side is able to provide convincing evidence.
We believe that sensitivity analysis can play an essential role in making scientific progress in these difficult situations. While it cannot draw a definitive conclusion about causal relationships, sensitivity analysis allows researchers to evaluate the robustness of empirical findings by quantifying the minimum strength of unobserved confounding that must exist to explain away an observed association. An open-source software package, Evalue, is available for implementing the sensitivity analysis used here.Footnote58
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2AC---DPT True
Kosuke Imai and James Lo 21, Professor of Government and Statistics, Harvard. "Robustness of Empirical Evidence for the Democratic Peace: A Nonparametric Sensitivity Analysis" International Organization, Volume 75, Issue 3. April 5.. //pipk
The democratic peace—the idea that democracies rarely fight one another—has been called “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations.” Yet, some contend that this relationship is spurious and suggest alternative explanations. Unfortunately, in the absence of randomized experiments, we can never rule out the possible existence of such confounding biases. Rather than commonly used regression-based approaches, we apply a nonparametric sensitivity analysis. We show that overturning the negative association between democracy and conflict would require a confounder that is forty-seven times more prevalent in democratic dyads than in other dyads. To put this number in context, the relationship between democracy and peace is at least five times as robust as that between smoking and lung cancer. To explain away the democratic peace, therefore, scholars would have to find far more powerful confounders than those already identified in the literature.
The proposition that democratic states do not fight interstate wars against each other is one of the most enduring and influential ideas in international relations. The idea is theoretically rooted in the work of Immanuel Kant, who argued that interactions between states with a republican form of government give “a favorable prospect for the desired consequence, i.e., perpetual peace.”1 This has led to a large literature empirically documenting a negative association between democracy and conflict,2 leading one scholar to comment that the democratic peace is “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations.”3
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2AC---DPT True
Havard Hegre et al 19, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 64, Issue 1, 2020. "Civil Society and the Democratic Peace" //pipk
We theorize that three distinct structures of democratic constraint explain why more democratic dyads do not engage in military conflict with each other. We build on earlier theories that focused on electoral and horizontal accountability. We add a new dimension—the social accountability provided by an active civil society. Using several new measures from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data set, we stringently test these explanations. We find social accountability to be the strongest and most consistent predictor of nonbelligerence in dyads, that horizontal accountability is still important, but that the independent role of electoral accountability has been somewhat overstated. However, we do find that social and electoral accountability work strongly together, to make for an even greater effect. The finding is robust to a range of specifications and in the face of controls for contending theories that challenge the democratic peace (e.g., the capitalist and territorial peace theories).
The democratic peace has proved to be one of the most influential and durable findings in the history of international relations, if not political science as a whole. As with all influential findings, alternatives have been posed, for example, the “capitalist peace” (Gartzke 2007; Mousseau 2000, 2009, 2013), the “territorial peace” (Gibler 2012), or “political similarity” (Bennett 2006; Raknerud and Hegre 1997; Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002; Werner 2000). Beyond such empirical challenges, the finding has also been criticized for not providing a fully convincing causal logic that explains the empirical finding (Rosato 2003). This puzzle of what makes democracies less likely to engage in conflict with other democracies still remains subject to a lively and inconclusive debate (Hegre 2014). Our purpose here is to use the new Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data, with its ability to more precisely disaggregate the components of democracy, to reconsider its causal logic in a more precise fashion and with a fresh perspective.