2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT Europe Blocks Plan
Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
Advancing AI Founded on Shared Values The US and EU should collaborate to ensure their shared values set AI norms that ripple throughout the global AI ecosystem. Although ethics is mentioned as a potential source of divergence, we believe, as do Nand Mulchandani, Acting Director of the U.S. Department of Defense Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) and Ryan Budish, Assistant Research Director at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, that US and EU policymakers, academics, and industry experts are fundamentally aligned on ethical priorities and the importance of privacy, human rights and the rule of law.105 AI ethical principles and draft regulatory guidelines published by the European Commission, US Office of Management and Budget, and US Department of Defense all recognize the need for: AI systems to protect human rights and privacy; algorithms to be fair, transparent, safe, secure, and governable; and policymakers and AI developers to be responsible and accountable to the technologies (See Figure 2 below for an overview of common language found in US and EU policy documents). Furthermore, according to Acting Director Mulchandani and Andrea Renda, Head of Global Governance, Regulation, Innovation and the Digital Economy at the Centre for European Policy Studies, US policymakers have recognized the importance of an ethical, human-centered approach to AI for their European counterparts and endeavored to communicate alignment on AI principles.106 Differences could manifest in the implementation and operationalization of these values, but these discrepancies can be mitigated. The EU has positioned itself as a leader in trustworthy and human-centric AI107 while the US108 highlights the need for AI innovation to protect American values, civil liberties, and privacy.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT Europe Blocks Plan
Nadibaidze, 2021 - Ph.D. Student at the University of Southern Denmark [Anna Entry submitted for the Second OSCE-IFSH Essay Competition “Commitment to Control over Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/507341.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
Second, the discourses surrounding weaponised AI – the ways that OSCE participating States talk about LAWS – also have considerable impact on European security. Both a common definition of LAWS and an agreement on the appropriate level of human control over weapons systems are lacking, which gives way for misinterpretation and increases security risks. Let us examine the discourses of three major players in European security: France, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom. Their official positions converge on the importance of retaining human control. The Minister of the French Armed Forces, Florence Parly, said that “France refuses to entrust the decision of life or death to a machine that would act in a completely autonomous manner and would be beyond any human control” (Ministère des Armées 2019). Russia said it “is committed to the need to maintain human control over LAWS, no matter how ‘advanced’ these systems may be” (Russian Federation 2021, 3). The UK Ministry of Defence noted in January 2021, “the operation of our weapon systems will always be under human control and no UK weapons systems will be capable of attacking targets without this” (Ministry of Defence 2021). Nevertheless, autonomy and the concept of appropriate human control over weapons systems are perceived differently by these States. The Russian side remains opposed to a legally binding treaty that would ban LAWS, arguing that the definition of LAWS should “strike a balance between humanitarian concerns and legitimate defence interests of States” (Russian Federation 2021, 3). France has suggested a division between “fully” and “partially” lethal autonomous weapon systems and adopting different types of measures for these two categories. In the French perspective, only the “fully” autonomous weapons should be prohibited (French Republic 2021). Meanwhile, the UK has stated that “an autonomous system is capable of understanding higher-level intent and direction”, a definition that is more precise and constraining than those of other States (Ministry of Defence 2017, 13). A UK House of Lords Select Committee report said this definition is “clearly out of step with the definitions used by most other governments” and also “hamstrings attempts to arrive at an internationally agreed definition”(Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence 2018, 105). As a common denominator, these States agree on the principle that weapons systems should not function completely autonomously. However, the differences in their perceptions hinder the progress on understanding and preventing the security risks related to the use of weaponised AI. They create misperceptions about the uses of AI, specifically between the leaders in this sphere, who are all carefully watching each other’s technological developments. The NSCAI, for instance, warned the US government that “competitors are actively developing AI concepts and technologies for military use,” specifically focusing on China and Russia (2021, 22). The discrepancies in definitions and discourses create risks of misunderstanding when, for instance, one participating State is developing a certain weapons system considered to be LAWS by another State. Such communication issues can lead to a security dilemma in which “one state’s pursuit of greater automation and faster reaction times undermines other states’ security and leads them to similarly pursue more automation just to keep up,” and encourgages experts to speak of an ‘AI arms race’ (Scharre 2021).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT Countries won’t agree on Specifics
Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman, 2022 – prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Lena and Zoe, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA]
In this chapter, we explore a role for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the emerging military AI governance architecture. NATO (or the Alliance) is a military and political alliance among 30 contributing member states that are committed to collective security. Much of NATO’s original purpose and current core tasks arguably leave the Alliance’s role uncertain in international governance regimes contending with the impact of emerging technology on international politics.1 As global powers compete for the economic and military capabilities that AI can offer, the Alliance has the enormously challenging task of navigating varying political realities and capabilities of Allies, all while effectively recalibrating strategic relationships in the coming years. Recognizing technological change as a key variable, NATO has begun to adapt its organizational composition and strategic footing to increase the Alliance’s capacity to meet emerging security challenges for military capability development trends of both its own members and those of competitors or adversaries.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT Countries won’t agree on Specifics
Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
This legal and human-centric framing informs allies’ views on key questions related not only to responsibility, but also explainability, trust, and related concepts. These commonalities should be seen as a baseline for responsible democratic governance of military AI, which leaves room for nuance in how each country interprets and prioritizes these types of principles. These nuances are important because defense stakeholders in allied countries do not necessarily emphasize the same principles in their evolving approaches to military AI.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT No Definition of Human Control
International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2021 [(iPRAW) coordinated by: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July “Building Blocks for a Regulation on LAWS and Human Control Updated Recommendations to the GGE on LAWS” https://www.readkong.com/page/building-blocks-for-a-regulation-on-laws-and-human-control-8617434 Acc 2/27/22 TA]
Implications for a regulation: The requirements presented above remain quite abstract. The exact implementation of these factors depends primarily on the specific context of a military operation. Translated into a regulation, this calls for rather wide- ranging rules addressing human control in more general terms, ideally supplemented by a set of more specific documents to elucidate and further expound the concept of human control and to operationalize it.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT No Definition of Human Control
International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2021 [(iPRAW) coordinated by: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July “Building Blocks for a Regulation on LAWS and Human Control Updated Recommendations to the GGE on LAWS” https://www.readkong.com/page/building-blocks-for-a-regulation-on-laws-and-human-control-8617434 Acc 2/27/22 TA]
While it is possible to develop abstract minimum requirements for human control in the use of force, the appropriate level or implementation of human control depends on the details of the operational context. A ‘one-size- fits-all’ control solution that addresses all concerns raised by the use of LAWS will most likely not be achievable because it cannot account for the multitude of combinations of environmental factors, operational requirements, and weapons capabilities. Instead a regulation would be more useful if it included general approximations to be specified in each case along the lines of existing IHL considerations. iPRAW encourages CCW States Parties to develop and share specific examples of how control by design and control in use can be implemented in weapon systems used in different operational contexts.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT No Definition of Human Control
International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2021 [(iPRAW) coordinated by: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July “Building Blocks for a Regulation on LAWS and Human Control Updated Recommendations to the GGE on LAWS” https://www.readkong.com/page/building-blocks-for-a-regulation-on-laws-and-human-control-8617434 Acc 2/27/22 TA]
Block II – Human Control: The challenges discussed above are mostly caused by a lack of human control in the use of force. Accordingly, a regulation of LAWS should focus on that. iPRAW defines human control as situational understanding and options for intervention enabled both by design and in use. To account for the context- dependency of human control, a future regulation of LAWS (e.g. a CCW Protocol) will probably have to consist of rather abstract stipulations regarding the concept of human control. The supplementary adoption of further agreements – legally or politically binding – could be useful to delineate human control in further detail.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT No Definition of Human Dignity
Johnson and Axinn, 2013 - Prof of Philosophy at the Univ of South Florida and PhD Candidate in Engineering at Penn [Aaron and Sidney, Journal of Military Ethics, Volume 12, Issue 2, August “The Morality of Autonomous Robots” www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/15027570.2013.818399 Acc 12/27/20 TA]
The concept of human dignity is complicated and explained variously. As a minimum, although not without controversy, we may take the statement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1949), “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (article 1). Dignity is often taken as the property that makes humans eligible for the human rights listed in the Universal Declaration. Put another way, in Kant’s phrase, dignity means that the individual has “an intrinsic worth,” and has “no equivalent.” (1959: p. 435). This is to say that each human must be respected for his or her unique inherent or intrinsic value. It is widely accepted that all humans have a certain kind of equality, they are judged morally by the same rule. The American Declaration of Independence puts the attitude toward all humans in a vivid way. Near the end we find the statement, we hold our British brethren ‘as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.’ All humans are potentially our friends, and they all deserve to have us respect their inherent dignity. Is there a loss of dignity when a human fights with a machine, compared to fighting with another human? As a non-lethal game it is acceptable,9 but in a fight to the death the matter is different and far from trivial. To give a programmed machine the ability to ‘decide’ to kill a human is to abandon the concept of human dignity. Humans are sometimes accidentally killed by machines, but for an autonomous robot/drone to be programmed to kill a human is to treat a rational being as if it were merely an object.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT No Definition of Human Dignity
Rosert, 2019 - Professor for International Relations at Universität Hamburg [Elvira, with Frank Sauer Researcher at Bundeswehr, Global Policy, July 5 “Prohibiting Autonomous Weapons: Put Human Dignity First” https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12691 Acc 12/27/20 TA]
From a strategic communication point of view, adjusting the message toward the infringement on human dignity would have the general benefit of dampening the overall level of contention. After all, while the suggestion to rest the case against LAWS more firmly on human dignity has drawn some scrutiny itself (see the overview in Sharkey, 2018), the supposed ‘awkwardness’ (Baker, 2018) of this proposal is commonly substantiated by pointing out that several meanings of dignity exist and that there is no agreed‐upon definition of dignity. Yet, being vague but relevant and even crucially important is a characteristic of many normative and even legally codified concepts. The concepts of civilian‐ness, of proportionality, or of unnecessary suffering – cornerstones of IHL despite all their ambiguities – are just three examples. Moreover, what we argue specifically is that mobilizing human dignity would strengthen the stance against LAWS by making it more resilient against consequentialist challenges, at least when compared to legal claims. After all, the legal claim that LAWS are indiscriminate weapons violating the principle of distinction might, in fact, prove vulnerable due to (unlikely but not impossible) technological progress that increases their discriminatory capabilities and even equips them with the (equivalent of) ‘common sense’ and battlefield awareness that human commanders possess (Amoroso et al., 2018, p. 33). In fact, this exact point is already being invoked by opponents of a prohibition on LAWS, and it keeps forcing its proponents into (rather pointless) hypothetic legal and technological debates. In addition, the emphasis on the protection of civilians from LAWS might jeopardize the call for a comprehensive ban and instead end in mere restrictions on the use of LAWS (e.g. in pre‐specified ‘kill boxes’ or domains like the high seas where the presence of civilians is considered unlikely) (Anderson and Waxman, 2013; Schmitt and Thurnher, 2013; Schmitt, 2013; HRW, 2016).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT No Definition of Human Dignity
Sauer, 2021 - Senior Research Fellow at Bundeswehr University [Frank serves on the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons IRRC No. 913 March “Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible” https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/stepping-back-from-brink-regulation-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-913 Acc 4/5/22 TA]
Universal human dignity That the use of LAWS would be a violation of human dignity has been argued by various scholars of moral philosophy and technology.82 The notion was picked up by the KRC83 and lately has also been reiterated by the ICRC.84 Opposing weapon autonomy on grounds of human dignity has drawn some scrutiny,85 and the supposed “awkwardness”86 of this stance is commonly substantiated by pointing out that several meanings of dignity exist and that there is no commonly agreed-upon definition of dignity. However, being hard to define but relevant and even crucially important is a characteristic of many normative concepts, including many legally codified ones. Cornerstones of IHL such as civilian-ness, which is defined only ex negativo, or proportionality, which is not quantifiable and is assessable only on a case-by-case basis, are examples.87 Human dignity, too, is contained in various international legal documents. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers to it in its preamble, as does the UN Charter. It is also invoked in national bodies of law, as well as court decisions. The key example here is Germany's basic law Article 1(1), which states human dignity's inviolability and prohibits the treatment of humans as objects or means to an end, being referenced in a 2006 landmark decision by the German Constitutional Court. The judges struck down a federal law that would have allowed the German air force to shoot down a hijacked aeroplane that the hijackers may have intended to use as a weapon to kill people on the ground. The Court deemed it unconstitutional to use the aeroplane passengers as mere instruments to try to achieve another, albeit worthy, goal.88
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT No Definition of AI
Allen, 2022 - Director, AI Governance Project, Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS [Gregory C. June 6 “DOD Is Updating Its Decade-Old Autonomous Weapons Policy, but Confusion Remains Widespread” TA]
As it updates the policy, there are at least four key issues that DOD needs to address. The first two will require actual changes to the policy, while the latter two can be addressed simply by providing additional clarification and guidance, perhaps through publication of a policy handbook. Define how a system’s “AI-enabled” status does or does not affect the policy’s requirements. Define how retraining machine learning models will be handled in the senior review process. Clarify the specific features that formally define an autonomous weapon system. Clarify the types of weapons that are and are not required to go through the autonomous weapon senior review process. While the final word on these issues must come directly from DOD, the sections below attempt to shed some initial light. Define how a system’s “AI-enabled” status does or does not affect the policy’s requirements. The debate over what constitutes AI as opposed to mere mechanical computation and automation goes back at least as far as the 1830s, when Ada Lovelace worked with Charles Babbage to design and program the first mechanical computers. In recent decades, computer systems that in their heyday were routinely called “AI,” such as IBM’s chess-playing Deep Blue system in 1997, have higher-performing successors today that are merely called “software” or “apps.” Machine learning, a subfield of AI that has been responsible for extraordinary research and commercialization progress since 2012, is more often than not used as a synonym for AI—so much so that some argue that any system that does not use machine learning should not be referred to as AI. It is important to know whether a system claiming to be AI-enabled is using machine learning. Machine learning works differently from traditional software. It is better at some things, worse at others, requires different factors to enable success, and has different failure modes and risks that need to be addressed. When the U.S. military says that a given system is AI-enabled or that a given project is an “AI project,” it almost always means machine learning. While describing a military system as AI-enabled or machine learning-enabled provides useful information, it often remains unclear just what functionality is being provided by AI and how central AI is to the system overall. Suppose, hypothetically, that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program Office decided that it should use machine learning to improve the performance on one of the aircraft’s many different types of sensors. Does that mean that the entire F-35 program, with its more than $8.5 billion in annual spending, is building AI-enabled weapon systems? The DODD 3000.09 update is a good opportunity to formally define “AI-enabled” in DOD policy and to specify how using machine learning does or does not affect the autonomous weapon senior review process. Confusingly, common usage of these terms differs significantly in other countries. For example, Russian weapons manufacturers routinely refer to their automated and robotic military systems as using AI even if the system does not use machine learning, and they rarely make it clear when it does. Varied definitions complicate international diplomacy on these subjects.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT No Definition of AI
Shah, 2019 - Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies [Syed Sadam CISS Insight Vol.VII, No.2 “The Perils of AI for Nuclear Deterrence” https://journal.ciss.org.pk/index.php/ciss-insight/article/download/10/9 Acc 5/25/22 TA]
Defining artificial intelligence (AI) There are many definitions of AI given by researchers. However, it is essential first to differentiate between three overlapping concepts Machine Learning (ML), Deep Learning (DL), and Artificial Intelligence (AI). Although these concepts overlap in some domains, they are not the same. DL is a subset of ML, and ML is a subset of AI.3 ML can simply be defined as the algorithms that empower computers to learn by themselves based on the available data. DL is the next level of development of ML. It works like a human brain. Deep learning algorithms can be taught to do the same tasks for computers, which the human brain does for humans.4 However, the goal of AI is to make computers and machines learn from experience, think like a human brain and reason on their own. For this purpose, artificial neural networks use math and algorithms (computer programs) to impersonate the processes of the human brain to reason independently.5 There is not a single agreed definition of AI among researchers, but few definitions offer a better explanation. For instance, the US companion bill defined AI as “Any artificial system that performs tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstances, without significant human oversight, or that can learn from their experience and improve their performance...”6 William A. Carter from CSIS defines Machine Intelligence (MI) as “MI refers to machines’ ability to perform tasks that would normally require human intelligence. Computer scientists and mathematicians develop MI systems by imparting the ability to find patterns in large data sets to computers (machine learning).”7 Stanford’s Researcher, John McCarthy defines AI, as “Artificial Intelligence is the science and engineering of making intelligent machines, especially intelligent computer programs. Artificial Intelligence is related to the task of using computers to understand human intelligence, but AI does not have to confine itself to methods that are biologically observable.”8
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT No Definition of AI
Sprenger, 2021 - Europe editor for Defense News [Sebastian, Apr 27, “NATO tees up negotiations on artificial intelligence in weapons” https://www.c4isrnet.com/artificial-intelligence/2021/04/27/nato-tees-up-negotiations-on-artificial-intelligence-in-weapons/ Acc 4/22/22 TA]
Accountability and transparency are two more buzzwords expected to loom large in the debate. Accidents with autonomous vehicles, for example, will the raise the question of who is responsible — manufacturers or operators. The level of visibility into of how systems make decisions also will be crucial, according to van Weel. “Can you explain to me as an operator what your autonomous vehicle does, and why it does certain things? And if it does things that we didn’t expect, can we then turn it off?” he asked. NATO’s effort to hammer out common ground on artificial intelligence follows a push by the European Union to do the same, albeit without considering military applications. In addition, the United Nations has long been a forum for discussing the implications of weaponizing AI. Some of those organizations have essentially reinvented the wheel every time, according to Frank Sauer, a researcher at the Bundeswehr University in Munich. Regulators tend to focus too much on slicing and dicing through various definitions of autonomy and pairing them with potential use cases, he said. “You have to think about this in a technology-agnostic way,” Sauer argued, suggesting that officials place greater emphasis on the precise mechanics of human control. “Let’s just assume the machine can do everything it wants — what role are humans supposed to play?”
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT No Definition of AI
Hill and Marsan, 2018 - Director and Senior Assistant, NATO Office of Legal Affairs [Steven and Nadia, 7-18-18 “Artificial Intelligence and Accountability: A Multinational Legal Perspective” https://www.sto.nato.int/publications/STO%20Meeting%20Proceedings/STO-MP-IST-160/MP-IST-160-PP-4.pdf Acc 4/21/22 TA]
2.0 DEFINITIONS The first issue that arises in the context of AI which highlights the difficulty in setting a clear conceptual scope and applicable legal parameters, is a definitional one. There are no internationally agreed legal definitions for the core concept of AI. The lack of agreed legal definitions can hinder and stall discussions in part because Nations may rightfully be hesitant to commit to the regulation of a new technology when the scope and the evolution of that technology is not clear. While there might not be agreed legal definitions of AI, broader discussions on AI have identified a number of elements that can nevertheless provide some preliminary guidance. The first suggested definition of AI is, “the capability of a computer system to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition and decision-making.”6 The second definition of AI which is useful here is, “technologies that enable machine learning, natural language processing, deduction through vast data-computational power, and ultimately, automated decision-making in robotics or software that can substitute for tasks once performed exclusively by human action and judgement”. 7 Another term that is important to define is “autonomy”. The concept of autonomy is key to AI because it is precisely the technological edge provided by AI that enables autonomy or, expressed another way, enables the independent action of a machine. Autonomy itself can be defined as “the ability of a system, platform or software to complete a task without human intervention, using behaviours resulting from the interaction of computer programming with the external environment”.8 Although beyond the scope of this paper, other definitions incorporate key concepts in the military use and development of AI.9 These preliminary definitions suggest that AI is about replicating human perception, cognition and decision-making as well as introducing a certain element of independence to these systems. Although the modelling of human intelligence provides opportunities from a security perspective, these are also fraught with challenges that are only beginning to be understood: “there is now a broad consensus that AI research is progressing steadily, and that its impact on society is likely to increase. The potential benefits are huge, since everything that civilization has to offer is a product of human intelligence; we cannot predict what we might achieve when this intelligence is magnified by the tools AI may provide, but the eradication of disease and poverty are not unfathomable. Because of the great potential of AI, it is important to research how to reap its benefits while avoiding potential pitfalls”. 10 3.0 LEGAL IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM SPECIFIC USES OF AI There are already applications of AI that are of interest to a multilateral security organisation such as NATO. Acknowledging the absence of a clear consensus on the legal definition of AI, it is useful to highlight some concrete areas where AI has been and is currently being used with effects, both positive and negative, on Allied security.11 Three areas of AI-enabled technologies are worth mentioning here: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; the manipulation of personal data; and, disinformation.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT NATO solves now
Warrell, 2021 - Assistant Editor Financial Times [Helen, June 7, Financial Times “Nato allies need to speed up AI defence co-operation” TA]
Part of the problem is that western defence institutions have been slow to recognise the potential of innovation beyond their own industry. For decades, a lot of technological development would happen within the defence sector . . . and then shared with the civilian sector. Now, it goes the other way around “For decades, a lot of technological development would happen within the defence sector — the internet, nuclear, GPS, all of that was developed by the defence industry and then shared with the civilian sector,” Stoltenberg said. “Now, it goes the other way around. It’s a civilian sector which is leading in the development of artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and many of the new disruptive technologies.” Some Nato members are ahead of others. The US and France have published military AI strategies, while the UK announced this year that it is to establish a centre for defence AI. For the first time, Britain’s intelligence agency, MI6, is recruiting from the private sector for a new head of its “Q” branch — the technical lab made famous in the James Bond films.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT NATO solves now
van Weel, 2021 – Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, NATO [David, Dec 7, “Artificial intelligence: Can we go from chaos to cooperation?” AEI Panel Discussion - Moderator: Elisabeth Braw https://www.aei.org/events/artificial-intelligence-can-we-go-fromchaos-to-cooperation/ Acc 5/11/22 TA]
So we’ve adopted six principles of responsible use. I’ll just read them out here. They’re lawfulness, responsibility and accountability, “explainability” and traceability, reliability, governability, and bias mitigation. So all 30 NATO nations have signed up — including the US, I would say to Jonathan — to having any use of AI in the defense or security purpose adhere to these six principles. And principles are nice, but they need to be verifiable as well, and they need to be baked in from the moment of the first conception of an idea up until the delivery. And that’s where we will have a new initiative launched, where we have test centers across the alliance, based alongside universities — existing test centers with knowledge, where allies that are thinking about codeveloping AI for use in the defense sector can come in and verify with protocols, with certain standards that we’re setting, that this AI is actually verified. It’s not real standard yet. But if the 30 nations, Western democracies, start out by shaping industry to adhere by these standards, then I feel that we are making an impact — at least in the development of AI, and hopefully, also, in the larger world — setting standards. So we’re trying to contribute to a better world, but we need to be part of the game in order to be able to do so.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT EU Solves Now
Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
Although the US consistently sounds the alarm bells around China’s AI aspirations and the EU urges international efforts against AI that violates fundamental rights, increasingly noting China’s actions with concern,8 little concrete international action has taken place. The United States and the European Union’s ongoing reassessment of their respective AI strategies and legislation9 provides a window of opportunity to align and collaborate. Transatlantic AI cooperation is at a critical juncture and the United States and the European Union should seize this opportunity to take concrete actions. The Current State The United States and the European Union are separately assessing and updating their AI strategies. However, it is a myth to assume they are not collaborating at all to advance their AI-related goals. Transatlantic cooperation on AI norms, standards, research and development, and data sharing should increase, but the United States and the European Union can build upon an existing foundation for a stronger alliance.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT EU Solves Now
Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
Challenges to Collaboration & Recommendations Full US-EU collaboration faces five distinct, but interconnected obstacles (see Figure 1 below). At the highest level, the United States and European Union have some diverging geopolitical interests (section A) illustrated by: America’s increasing isolationism, the European Union’s rebalancing to become a third power, the European Union’s resistance to adversarial discourse about China, and domestic political demands to focus resources on COVID-19 responses. Flowing out of the geopolitical landscape and political interests are three overarching considerations that are bolstered by differing beliefs about the role and size of government and can fuel US-EU disagreements around AI. These US national interests and EU common priorities are (section B): AI’s impact on national security and economic interests, as well as the ethics and values that guide AI’s development and use. Finally, aspects of the AI operating environment (sections C, D, and E), such as regulation and governance (including standards and operationalizing principles), funding, data spaces, hardware, and computing resources, provide tactical areas for disagreement or misalignment.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT EU Solves Now
Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
Transatlantic Cooperation: Despite over 40 years of scientific relationships and projects between the United States and the European Union, AI-specific collaboration has been fraught with varying degrees of political and academic skepticism on both side of the Atlantic, notably within the European Commission and the governments of some Member States (e.g., France and Germany).31 Such a dynamic is aggravated, in part, by the ever-deteriorating transatlantic relationship spurred by policy and trade disagreements, public spats, and increasing American isolationism. Despite such explicit omissions and stand-offs at the highest levels, transatlantic collaboration for AI does happen, most notably in various multilateral forums working on standards (e.g., ISO, IEC, IEEE, G7, G20) or on ethics and norms (e.g., OECD, GPAI32).33
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT EU Solves Now
Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
While the EU has adopted a bullish approach to trustworthy AI in the civilian realm, European institutions have been slower to define the implications for safe and ethical AI beyond the tip of the spear. Key civilian policies and regulations, like the General Data Protection Regulation and more recent legislation instituting the European approach to “trustworthy” AI, have clear carveouts for public safety, security, and defense. Still, the EU approach to civilian AI policy is relevant to transatlantic defense because the dual-use, general-purpose nature of AI means that military adoption of AI will depend on the ethical frameworks that dominate civilian development, regardless of carveouts. More directly, some European countries also choose to apply EU legislation like the General Data Protection Regulation to their own defense sectors, even though they are not required to do so.167 With this overlap in mind, Appendix VIII overviews the applicability of the EU trustworthy AI principles for the defense realm. In addition to examples such as Airbus’ application of the ALTAI methodology to FCAS, it is notable that several European defense efforts mention the European Commission-supported guidelines for trustworthy AI as a positive step toward ensuring military uses of AI adhere to ethical standards. For example, in their co-authored food-for-thought paper on AI in defense, Finland, Estonia, France, Germany, and the Netherlands made explicit reference to the Trustworthy AI Principles, recognizing that the EU could leverage its normative power because of the centrality of ethical standards in AI for defense.168 The focus on safety and security in EU AI policy also promotes “convergence between the AI community and the security community” to enhance robustness.169 In sum, the emphasis on safety, security, and risk in EU AI policy is not only a natural overlap, but also one that European defense stakeholders are seeking out. However, it remains to be seen which EU body will take control of the responsible and ethical military AI agenda. There are various actors within the EU institutions that are largely beyond the scope of this paper.170 Instead, there are only inklings of how the EU will approach responsible and ethical military AI at present. In the future, this topic could also feature in EU-U.S. security and defense dialogues. For now, it is the European Parliament that plays the most visible role advancing ethics in European military R&D funding. This was seen in mid-2018, in its attempt to ban all military AI research using EU funds because of concerns about LAWS. The agreed upon final version explicitly prohibits funding for LAWS at the European level—a deal-breaker without which the Parliament would never have agreed to allow for any defense funding.171 But the final result was narrower because the EU does not have jurisdiction over its member states’ armaments development unless they use EU funds. As such, while important, especially for dualuse and open-source systems, its jurisdiction on mandating ethical reviews is still limited and likely to not affect the majority of national, bilateral, or minilateral capability development programs. More recently, the Parliament-issued Guidelines for military and non-military use of Artificial Intelligence in January 2021 could indicate a stronger ethical bent than seen in the other institutions.172