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2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage – Cohesion

Diverse AI standards undermine military interoperability because it prevents different nations militaries from cooperating. NATO dialogue is key to coordinate ethical standards for military AI. Meaningful human control which respects human dignity is essential to political cohesion.

van der Merwe, 2021 - Fellow Center for European Policy Analysis Defense Tech Initiative [Joanna, Feb 17, “NATO Leadership on Ethical AI is Key to Future Interoperability” https://cepa.org/nato-leadership-on-ethical-ai-is-key-to-future-interoperability/ Acc 4/16/22 TA]

In October 2020, Deputy Secretary General of NATO Mircea Geoană highlighted the benefits of establishing a “transatlantic community cooperating on Artificial Intelligence (AI).” The Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit followed with a commitment to its responsible use. The US Department of Defense (DoD) adopted Ethical Principles for AI in 2020 and has committed to bringing together NATO member and partners to operationalize these principles. Despite these statements and developments, more work is required to tackle the very real challenge that ethical AI will pose to future interoperability within NATO. Without a NATO-led initiative focused on aligning these ethical principles across the Alliance, the interoperability risk of nations fielding AI-based systems that hinder joint operations is high. As the foremost security framework for Europe and North America, as well as the leading defense alliance for promoting and protecting democratic values, NATO is able to facilitate alignment on this issue. As part of a broader strategy on emerging and disruptive technologies, NATO must prioritize ethical AI if it wishes to promote the shared values upon which it was founded, play a key role in facilitating innovation across the Atlantic, and ultimately retain the ability of its members to undertake joint operations. Establishing NATO ethical AI principles is the first step toward both technical and political alignment, in turn enhancing and fostering interoperability, which is the foundation for NATO to respond to emerging threats as an Alliance, in a flexible and timely manner. A key challenge for NATO is raising awareness that the answers to ethical questions can no longer be left to later stages of the development and procurement cycle. Decisions made at the political and legal level will have a significant impact on the engineering practices used to develop AI, as well as the technical characteristics of the AI-based systems. The answers to questions such as respecting human dignity, human control, and accountability will be the foundation upon which many technical elements are programed. Systems developers need to make a number of calls throughout the development cycle informed by the answers to key questions, including: how to label data what data to use, and what is an acceptable outcome? These answers will also impact how AI systems are evaluated and ultimately deployed. If individual nations or groups are left to develop their own ethical principles without wider alignment to NATO, the result will be a number of AI-based systems with varying technical specifications based on the legal and policy decisions made by individual governments when answering the key questions. As has been demonstrated in areas such as facial recognition and policing algorithms, the assumptions made by those developing the tools and answering the key questions have a significant impact on the real-world functioning of the tool and societal acceptance of its ethics. The risk of tools failing to gain acceptance depends on the legal and ethical decisions made by governments. For the military, this may mean one state using an AI-based system that is seen as unacceptable by another, and in a joint operation one state fielding a system that cannot be used by another. Or worse yet, this could render a joint operation impossible. Without the ability to interoperate across NATO, the inability to effectively and efficiently respond to future threats would undermine the Alliance. The role of the private sector is another aspect of ethical AI development that has proved a challenge to governments and the transatlantic relationship. Within states, governments have struggled to adequately regulate Big Tech firms, which has led to these companies encroaching on government responsibilities to protect and uphold the public interest. This encroachment permeates all aspects of government, including defense and security. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks discussed during her confirmation hearings, the lack of competition is also a challenge to innovation in the private defense industry. This, along with a lack of regulation, feeds into the power imbalance between the sectors. Consequently, private sector companies building the AI and AI systems that are or will be deployed on the battlefield are deciding the ethics policies for themselves. The transatlantic partnership must focus on coordinating these core principles and systematic governance to ensure AI systems development aligns with the rule of law and democracy. In particular, this must ensure answering questions about human dignity, human control, and accountability. NATO is the ideal defense and security forum for this alignment. Given the US lead on adopting ethical principles for the entire DoD and the EU’s drive to assert checks and balances for private-sector tech companies, NATO remains the organization that can bring these two together and establishes the ethical bottom line. These will then ensure the diverging legal and ethical stances towards Big Tech do not lead to an interoperability barrier in the future. If developments surrounding the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the challenges it brought for U.S.-based, data-driven companies are any indication, a strong transatlantic led initiative is needed in order to ensure the same challenges do not hinder NATO. The solution to the challenge that ethical AI poses for the future of interoperability within NATO is for the Alliance to establish shared transatlantic ethical principles, informed by the US DoD, the EU, and others. Establishing these principles will not only strengthen transatlantic political relations; more technically, it will allow for the establishment of standardization agreements and inform training and education initiatives of the Alliance in the future.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage – Cohesion

NATO does not have a coordinated position on the ethics of AI – this undermines military and political cohesion, which undermines NATO militarily.

Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

At the same time, significant differences in ethical approaches to AI in defense could imperil political cohesion and undermine coalition success. Politically, alignment on ethics is important because shared values are at the foundation of U.S. alliances.3 This also trickles down to the operational level, where differing views on ethics could mean that allies field their systems with different legal authorizations and rules of engagement.4 If coalition partners deem each others’ capabilities to be based on different legal, ethical, and doctrinal assumptions, then forces may not be able to communicate and operate together.5 Further, if different ethical bases for capability development mean that some countries have higher thresholds for what they develop and contribute to coalition operations, then others may perceive them as not equally sharing risks to life.6 As such, political cohesion and policy considerations about ethics could directly influence operational effectiveness. In other words, failure to align allied perspectives on AI ethics in defense will inevitably undermine the ability of allied forces to understand each other and work together.7

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Inherency

NATO states have differing positions on responsible use for AI – the potential exists for agreement, but states are implementing their own policies.

Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

With more of a focus on norms and state responsibility, a broader definition of responsibility beyond the DOD “responsible AI” principle can also introduce new convergences for U.S. RAI implementation. The DOD RAI Strategy and Implementation Pathway recently tasked by Deputy Secretary Kathleen Hicks can incorporate these views and help allies refine their approaches to AI ethics in order to enable greater cooperation and allied AI adoption. This is because many allies see firm approaches to managing ethical risk as a prerequisite policy question before investing in AI-enabled capability development—including defensive systems and countermeasures. Overall, international engagement is mutually beneficial to responsible AI endeavors. The United States should look at how other countries are implementing their approaches, just as the United States can exert influence and maintain its leadership role in responsible and ethical AI for defense by helping its allies and partners form their own views in alignment with one another. Conclusion No single actor has a monopoly on the answers to implementing responsible AI in any high-risk area, let alone defense. Cooperation is therefore important to collectively navigate the difficulties of responsible governance of emerging technologies. For DOD, the focus has been predominantly on the transposition of safe and ethical AI principles into action. Rather than adopting principles for defense, some allies are moving straight into implementation. Thus far, this is borne out in tabletop exercises, outreach, ministerial committees, ethical reviews, education and certifications, exercises and trials, and defense programs of record. It is too early to judge these fledgling efforts, but tracking their evolution may prove useful to broader AI ethics implementation, be it for other defense ministries or even civilian actors. While jumping straight to implementation can mean a more pragmatic focus on tools, tracking how different AI stakeholders use those tools may be more difficult. In this way, principles can be seen as a helpful organizing force, as is the case for DOD. This said, the scale of the U.S. military bureaucracy and national security innovation base may require higher visibility relative to allied counterparts. Still, another key difference is precisely this visibility. The analysis here is based on information in the public domain, which may also partially explain its transatlantic tilt. The U.S. approach to responsible and ethical AI for defense also differs from other countries in that the consultation and process that led to its principles is far more transparent than is true for most allies. A possible Catch-22 could be at play here, with allies reticent to publicize approaches to such controversial issues, despite the fact that offering such inroads can build trust and confidence that governments are handling these high-stakes questions responsibly.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Inherency

Our military does not prioritize ethics in the deployment of AI.

Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

In recent months, Head of Global Governance, Regulation, Innovation and the Digital Economy at the Centre for European Policy Studies Andrea Renda pointed out that interests and political support for greater transatlantic coordination and collaboration on AI seems to be increasing. This is notably demonstrated by the visit in early 2020 of high-level officials on both sides of the Atlantic. The first, as already mentions in the Political collaboration section, was the visit in January from former Director of the JAIC Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan and then CTO Nand Mulchandani to Brussels. During their visit to the NATO headquarters and with EU leaders, Lt. Gen. Shanahan underlined the need for greater collaboration for AI, particularly within NATO, in order to counter revisionist states such as China and Russia that promote digital authoritarianism. As Acting Director of the JAIC Nand Mulchandani mentioned, Lt. Gen. Shanahan also underscored the need for the US and Europe to rally around common values and not allow technicalities around ethics to block collaboration. 279 The second high level visit was by a delegation from the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties Committee, which visited Washington D.C and Boston in February 2020. The delegation held meetings with US Congressional members and representatives across the US Administration, including the DOS, DOJ, DHS, FTA, FBI, and PCLOB. The Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) also held meetings with representatives from industry, universities, think-tank, start-ups, and NGOs. The discussions centered on a variety of AI topics, ranging from potential future US federal legislation on personal data protection, the use of artificial intelligence in law enforcement, and the visa waiver program.280

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Inherency

Contention One – Inherency – The Pentagon does not require Human Control for artificial intelligence in weapons.

Allen, 2022 - Director, AI Governance Project, Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS [Gregory C. June 6 “DOD Is Updating Its Decade-Old Autonomous Weapons Policy, but Confusion Remains Widespread” TA]

In November 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) released its policy on autonomy in weapons systems: DOD Directive 3000.09 (DODD 3000.09). Despite being nearly 10 years old, the policy remains frequently misunderstood, including by leaders in the U.S. military. For example, in February 2021, Colonel Marc E. Pelini, who at the time was the division chief for capabilities and requirements within the DOD’s Joint Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office, said, “Right now we don't have the authority to have a human out of the loop. Based on the existing Department of Defense policy, you have to have a human within the decision cycle at some point to authorize the engagement." He is simply wrong. No such requirement appears in DODD 3000.09, nor any other DOD policy. Misconceptions about DODD 3000.09 appear to extend even to high-ranking flag officers. In April 2021, General Mike Murray, the then-four-star commander of Army Futures Command, said, “Where I draw the line—and this is, I think well within our current policies—[is], if you’re talking about a lethal effect against another human, you have to have a human in that decision-making process.” Breaking Defense, a news outlet that reported on Murray’s remarks at the time, stated that the requirement to have a human in the decisionmaking process is “official Defense Department policy.” It is not. DODD 3000.09 does not ban autonomous weapons or establish a requirement than U.S. weapons have a “human in the loop.” In fact, that latter phrase never appears in DOD policy. Instead, DODD 3000.09 formally defines what an autonomous weapon system is and requires any DOD organization proposing to develop one to either go through an incredibly rigorous senior review process or meet a qualifying exemption. Regarding the latter, cyber weapons systems, for example, are exempted. The DOD recently announced that it is planning to update DODD 3000.09 this year. Michael Horowitz, director of the DOD’s Emerging Capabilities Policy Office and the Pentagon official with responsibility for shepherding the policy, praised DODD 3000.09 in a recent interview, stating that “the fundamental approach in the directive remains sound, that the directive laid out a very responsible approach to the incorporation of autonomy and weapons systems.” While not making any firm predictions, Horowitz suggested that major revisions to DODD 3000.09 were unlikely.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Starter Notes

Some Comments

The 1AC is WAY too long to read all three advantages – it is impossible to run them all. DON’T destroy the quality of the evidence by trying to highlight it down to read all three. Instead, choose two, or maybe even one, advantage to read, and cut out cards before highlighting into incoherence. For instance, if you want to run Human Dignity, that works pretty well all by itself.

I know that there are three inherency cards and like 8 extension or AT blocks on inherency, and that is too much. In fairness, this case is probably not inherent, so “Be Prepared!”

A lot of the literature and international debate is about LAWs. It’s more exciting to talk about Killer Robots. However, that is only a small fraction of the military uses for AI in NATO, so don’t get hung up on that. On the other hand, “human control” means that weapons are no longer “autonomous” – at least not fully autonomous. So the plan does de facto ban LAWs.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Starter Notes

Brief Explanation

The militaries of the world are incorporating Artificial Intelligence into their weapons, planning, operations, logistics – pretty much everywhere. Some countries are going all-in – developing Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs - killer robots) and nano-drone swarms, known charmingly as Genocide Swarms. Others are more cautious and are limiting their AI use to wargame simulations, or targeting mods. Perhaps the biggest issue in controversy is the level of Autonomy. Fully autonomous weapons exclude humans from the kill chain – search, target acquisition, engagement, execution. Low Autonomy weapons might be an AI adversary in a simulated attack against Russian forces in Ukraine. Very few states have (allegedly) developed or deployed fully autonomous weapons, but as the technology improves exponentially, that is a possible future.

This affirmative plan calls for human control – a “human in the loop” who has final say over AI functions. It has the US engage NATO in establishing ethical principles, known as RAI (responsible AI use), for all NATO operations and weapons. There are three reasons for this:

Cohesion. If everyone in NATO is on the same page and coordinated on technology and tactics, that is called Interoperability. The command, political, and public will to get coordinated is called Cohesion. Interoperability and Cohesion are the foundation of effective coalition military forces and operations. AI threatens to disrupt that cohesion and interoperability. If the US has Fully Autonomous weapons, and Italy does not, then those weapon systems will have trouble interoperating (not sure if that is a word). If the US is using mostly automated systems, and France is sending mostly human troops, then France might ask why they should risk French lives when the US is not. If the US spends A Lot on Fully Autonomous weapons, but Lithuania doesn’t have that technology, then the US might feel that other nations are not sharing the burden. If the British public opposes LAWs, and they are in a conflict allied with the US, who is using LAWs, then the British public might demand that their government stop supporting the operation. Or the US might perceive that the UK would stop supporting it. Dialogue to cooperate to establish norms for AI throughout the alliance would improve cohesion and interoperability, which makes for a more effective and credible NATO, which stops a nuclear war.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › 2AC---Specific Scenarios D › 2AC---AT: Nanotech

Nanotech takes decades to develop – usage will be low-level.

Nasu ‘15 (Hitoshi Nasu; Lecturer, The Australian National University College of Law, Australia “Nanotechnology and the Future of the Law of Weaponry,” 2015, http://stockton.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1408&context=ils, accessed 10/25/16)

In order to avoid unnecessary academic discussion of unlikely hypotheticals for the purpose of pure academic interest, this article proceeds with two important limitations on the premise upon which the analysis is developed: technological feasibility (at least in a foreseeable future) and practical utility. There are many wild speculations about what nanotechnology may enable us to produce—such as autonomous, self-replicating “nano-bots” (nano-scale machines) and micro-fusion nuclear weapons— however, it is doubtful whether these are technologically feasible within the period addressed in this article. 9 Scientists are indeed working towards miniaturization of unmanned aerial vehicles, as demonstrated by the United States’ Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s “nano air vehicles” program,10 yet further miniaturization to micro- or nano-sized robots is at least a few decades away. The development of artificial intelligence is making parallel progress, yet it will take decades before autonomous weapon systems will be capable of compliance with targeting law requirements,11 and even longer for it to be miniaturized to a size that is sufficiently small to be installed on “nano-bots” to enable their autonomous operation Even if these were technologically feasible options, the actual employment of those weapons in the way that commentators are speculating may not be practically viable. For example, weaponization of artificial intelligence with the capacity to operate beyond pre-programmed parameters through autonomous learning now appears to be feasible. 12 However, employing autonomous weapon systems that independently operate beyond pre-programmed parameters may not practically serve the interest of the commanders, who would rather use them to gather high fidelity information in order to permit reassessment of constantly changing situations, and in a manner that ensures they operate exactly as commanders direct to support the achievement of specific military objectives.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › 2AC---Specific Scenarios D › 2AC---AT: AI

AI won’t cause extinction

Shermer ’17 [Michael; April; Publisher of Skeptic magazine, a monthly columnist for Scientific American, and a Presidential Fellow at Chapman University; “Why Artificial Intelligence Is Not an Existential Threat,” Skeptic, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 29–35]

Why AI is not an Existential Threat First, most AI doomsday prophecies are grounded in the false analogy between human nature and computer nature, or natural intelligence and artificial intelligence. We are thinking machines, but natural selection also designed into us emotions to shortcut the thinking process because natural intelligences are limited in speed and capacity by the number of neurons that can be crammed into a skull that has to pass through a pelvic opening at birth, whereas artificial intelligence need not be so restricted. We don't need to compute the caloric value of foods, for example, we just feel hungry. We don't need to calculate the waist-to-hip ratio of women or the shoulder-to-waist ratio of men in our quest for genetically healthy potential mates; we just feel attracted to someone and mate with them. We don't need to work out the genetic cost of raising someone else's offspring if our mate is unfaithful; we just feel jealous. We don't need to figure the damage of an unfair or non-reciprocal exchange with someone else; we just feel injustice and desire revenge. Emotions are proxies for getting us to act in ways that lead to an increase in reproductive success, particularly in response to threats faced by our Paleolithic ancestors. Anger leads us to strike out, fight back, and defend ourselves against danger. Fear causes us to pull back, retreat, and escape from risks. Disgust directs us to push out, eject, and expel that which is bad for us. Computing the odds of danger in any given situation takes too long. We need to react instantly. Emotions shortcut the information processing power needed by brains that would otherwise become bogged down with all the computations necessary for survival. Their purpose, in an ultimate causal sense, is to drive behaviors toward goals selected by evolution to enhance survival and reproduction. AIs -- even AGIs and ASIs -- will have no need of such emotions and so there would be no reason to program them in unless, say, terrorists chose to do so for their own evil purposes. But that's a human nature problem, not a computer nature issue. To believe that an ASI would be "evil" in any emotional sense is to assume a computer cognition that includes such psychological traits as acquisitiveness, competitiveness, vengeance, and bellicosity, which seem to be projections coming from the mostly male writers who concoct such dystopias, not features any programmer would bother including, assuming that it could even be done. What would it mean to program an emotion into a computer? When IBM's Deep Blue defeated chess master Garry Kasparov in 1997, did it feel triumphant, vengeful, or bellicose? Of course not. It wasn't even "aware" -- in the human sense of self-conscious knowledge -- that it was playing chess, much less feeling nervous about possibly losing to the reigning world champion (which it did in the first tournament played in 1996). In fact, toward the end of the first game of the second tournament, on the 44th move, Deep Blue made a legal but incomprehensible move of pushing its rook all the way to the last row of the opposition side. It accomplished nothing offensively or defensively, leading Kasparov to puzzle over it out of concern that he was missing something in the computer's strategy. It turned out to be an error in Deep Blue's programming that led to this fail-safe default move. It was a bug that Kasparov mistook as a feature, and as a result some chess experts contend it led him to be less confident in his strategizing and to second-guess his responses in the subsequent games. It even led him to suspect foul play and human intervention behind Deep Blue, and this paranoia ultimately cost him the tournamentt.[ 13] Computers don't get paranoid, the HAL 9000 computer in 2001 notwithstanding. Or consider Watson, the IBM computer built by David Ferrucci and his team of IBM research scientists tasked with designing an AI that could rival human champions at the game of Jeopardy! This was a far more formidable challenge than Deep Blue faced because of the prerequisite to understand language and the often multiple meanings of words, not to mention needing an encyclopedic knowledge of trivia (Watson had access to Wikipedia for this). After beating the all-time greatest Jeopardy! champions Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter in 2011, did Watson feel flushed with pride after its victory? Did Watson even know that it won Jeopardy!? I put the question to none other than Ferrucci himself at a dinner party in New York in conjunction with the 2011 Singularity Summit. His answer surprised me: "Yes, Watson knows it won Jeopardy!" I was skeptical. How could that be, since such self-awareness is not yet possible in computers? "Because I told it that it won," he replied with a wry smile. Sure, and you could even program Watson or Deep Blue to vocalize a Howard Dean-like victory scream when it wins, but that is still a far cry from a computer feeling triumphant. This brings to mind the "hard problem" of consciousness -- if we don't understand how this happens in humans, how could we program it into computers? As Steven Pinker elucidated in his answer to the 2015 Edge Question on what to think about machines that think, "AI dystopias project a parochial alpha-male psychology onto the concept of intelligence. They assume that superhumanly intelligent robots would develop goals like deposing their masters or taking over the world." It is equally possible, Pinker suggests, that "artificial intelligence will naturally develop along female lines: fully capable of solving problems, but with no desire to annihilate innocents or dominate the civilization."[ 14] So the fear that computers will become emotionally evil are unfounded, because without the suite of these evolved emotions it will never occur to AIs to take such actions against us. What about an ASI inadvertently causing our extinction by turning us into paperclips, or tiling the entire Earth's surface with solar panels? Such scenarios imply yet another emotion -- the feeling of valuing or wanting something. As the science writer Michael Chorost adroitly notes, when humans resist an AI from undertaking any form of global tiling, it "will have to be able to imagine counteractions and want to carry them out." Yet, "until an AI has feelings, it's going to be unable to want to do anything at all, let alone act counter to humanity's interests and fight off human resistance." Further, Chorost notes, "the minute an A.I. wants anything, it will live in a universe with rewards and punishments -- including punishments from us for behaving badly. In order to survive in a world dominated by humans, a nascent A.I. will have to develop a humanlike moral sense that certain things are right and others are wrong. By the time it's in a position to imagine tiling the Earth with solar panels, it'll know that it would be morally wrong to do so."[ 15] From here Chorost builds on an argument made by Peter Singer in The Expanding Circle (and Steven Pinker in The Better Angels of Our Nature[ 16] that I also developed in The Moral Arc[ 17] and Robert Wright explored in Nonzero[ 18]), and that is the propensity for natural intelligence to evolve moral emotions that include reciprocity, cooperativeness, and even altruism. Natural intelligences such as ours also includes the capacity to reason, and once you are on Singer's metaphor of the "escalator of reason" it can carry you upward to genuine morality and concerns about harming others. "Reasoning is inherently expansionist. It seeks universal application," Singer notes.[ 19] Chorost draws the implication: "AIs will have to step on the escalator of reason just like humans have, because they will need to bargain for goods in a human-dominated economy and they will face human resistance to bad behavior."[ 20] Finally, for an AI to get around this problem it would need to evolve emotions on its own, but the only way for this to happen in a world dominated by the natural intelligence called humans would be for us to allow it to happen, which we wouldn't because there's time enough to see it coming. Bostrom's "treacherous turn" will come with road signs ahead warning us that there's a sharp bend in the highway with enough time for us to grab the wheel. Incremental progress is what we see in most technologies, including and especially AI, which will continue to serve us in the manner we desire and need. Instead of Great Leap Forward or Giant Fall Backward, think Small Steps Upward. As I proposed in The Moral Arc, instead of Utopia or dystopia, think protopia, a term coined by the futurist Kevin Kelly, who described it in an Edge conversation this way: "I call myself a protopian, not a Utopian. I believe in progress in an incremental way where every year it's better than the year before but not by very much -- just a micro amount."[ 21] Almost all progress in science and technology, including computers and AI, is of a protopian nature. Rarely, if ever, do technologies lead to either Utopian or dystopian societies. Pinker agrees that there is plenty of time to plan for all conceivable contingencies and build safeguards into our AI systems. "They would not need any ponderous 'rules of robotics' or some newfangled moral philosophy to do this, just the same common sense that went into the design of food processors, table saws, space heaters, and automobiles." Sure, an ASI would be many orders of magnitude smarter than these machines, but Pinker reminds us of the AI hyperbole we've been fed for decades: "The worry that an AI system would be so clever at attaining one of the goals programmed into it (like commandeering energy) that it would run roughshod over the others (like human safety) assumes that AI will descend upon us faster than we can design fail-safe precautions. The reality is that progress in AI is hype-defyingly slow, and there will be plenty of time for feedback from incremental implementations, with humans wielding the screwdriver at every stage."[ 22] Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt agrees, responding to the fears expressed by Hawking and Musk this way: "Don't you think the humans would notice this, and start turning off the computers?" He also noted the irony in the fact that Musk has invested $1 billion into a company called OpenAI that is "promoting precisely AI of the kind we are describing."[ 23] Google's own DeepMind has developed the concept of an AI off-switch, playfully described as a "big red button" to be pushed in the event of an attempted AI takeover. "We have proposed a framework to allow a human operator to repeatedly safely interrupt a reinforcement learning agent while making sure the agent will not learn to prevent or induce these interruptions," write the authors Laurent Orseau from DeepMind and Stuart Armstrong from the Future of Humanity Institute, in a paper titled "Safely Interruptible Agents." They even suggest a precautionary scheduled shutdown every night at 2 AM for an hour so that both humans and AI are accustomed to the idea. "Safe interruptibility can be useful to take control of a robot that is misbehaving and may lead to irreversible consequences, or to take it out of a delicate situation, or even to temporarily use it to achieve a task it did not learn to perform or would not normally receive rewards for this."[ 24] As well, it is good to keep in mind that artificial intelligence is not the same as artificial consciousness. Thinking machines may not be sentient machines. Finally, Andrew Ng of Baidu responded to Elon Musk's ASI concerns by noting (in a jab at the entrepreneur's ambitions for colonizing the red planet) it would be "like worrying about overpopulation on Mars when we have not even set foot on the planet yet."[ 25] Both Utopian and dystopian visions of AI are based on a projection of the future quite unlike anything history has given us. Yet, even Ray Kurzweil's "law of accelerating returns," as remarkable as it has been has nevertheless advanced at a pace that has allowed for considerable ethical deliberation with appropriate checks and balances applied to various technologies along the way. With time, even if an unforeseen motive somehow began to emerge in an AI we would have the time to reprogram it before it got out of control. That is also the judgment of Alan Winfield, an engineering professor and co-author of the Principles of Robotics, a list of rules for regulating robots in the real world that goes far beyond Isaac Asimov's famous three laws of robotics (which were, in any case, designed to fail as plot devices for science fictional narratives).26 Winfield points out that all of these doomsday scenarios depend on a long sequence of big ifs to unroll sequentially: "If we succeed in building human equivalent AI and if that AI acquires a full understanding of how it works, and if it then succeeds in improving itself to produce super-intelligent AI, and if that super-AI, accidentally or maliciously, starts to consume resources, and if we fail to pull the plug, then, yes, we may well have a problem. The risk, while not impossible, is improbable."[ 27

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › 2AC---Specific Scenarios D › 2AC---AT: Warming

The overall environment is resilient---‘existential’ threats are false

Ronald Bailey 20, Science Correspondent at Reason, Member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, “The Global Environmental Apocalypse Has Been Canceled”, Reason Magazine, 8/1/2020, [grammar edit]

According to these activists and politicians, humanity is beset on all sides by catastrophes that could kill off civilization, and maybe even our species. Are they right?

Absolutely not, answers the longtime environmental activist Michael Shellenberger in an engaging new book, Apocalypse Never: Why Environmental Alarmism Hurts Us All. "Much of what people are being told about the environment, including the climate, is wrong, and we desperately need to get it right," he writes. "I decided to write Apocalypse Never after getting fed up with the exaggeration, alarmism, and extremism that are the enemy of positive, humanistic, and rational environmentalism." While fully acknowledging that significant global environmental problems exist, Shellenberger argues that they do not constitute inexorable existential threats. Economic growth and technological progress, he says, can ameliorate them.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › 2AC---Specific Scenarios D › 2AC---AT: Warming

Growth and innovation solve warming.

Ogutonye, 21—Policy Lead, Science & Innovation Unit, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (Olamide, “Should Tech Make Us Optimistic About Climate Change?,” , dml)

In the middle of a climate emergency, it is challenging to stay upbeat. Yet the good news is that investment in climate technology has continued to grow since the early 2010s. US-listed companies involved with providing technology solutions that support global decarbonisation have consistently outperformed the average since 2019 (Figure 7). Venture capital (VC) investment in the sector grew tenfold between 2013 and 2018, representing five times the growth rate of the overall VC market. By comparison, the growth rate of VC investment in Artificial Intelligence was a third of climate tech between 2013 and 2018 although AI is renowned for its uptick within the same timeframe. Beyond VC, public investment in climate technology research has continued to grow too. In 2019, government research and development funding for energy technologies alone stood at $30 billion, with around 80 per cent of it aimed at low-carbon solutions.

In addition to the positive role of technology, political leaders are increasingly showing a willingness to make ambitious commitments on climate. The Paris Agreement is a case in point. The international treaty was adopted in 2015 and ratified internationally within a year – a much quicker pace than its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol, which took eight years. The Paris deal grew into a political snowball, galvanising further commitment from most of the world’s leading emitters and arguably becoming the most symbolic climate event of the 21st century. The US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2019 dealt a political blow to the global pact although the decision, since reversed by President Biden, did not resonate or last long enough to have any major impact.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › 2AC---Specific Scenarios D › 2AC---AT: Warming

Their own card says to could have the OPPOSITE effect---Insert yelow

1NC 19, 1-4-2019, Samuel Miller McDonald is a writer and geography PhD student at University of Oxford studying the intersection of grassroots movements and energy transition. "Deathly Salvation — THE TROUBLE.," *edited for ableist language

The global economy is hurtling humanity toward extinction. Greenhouse gas emissions are on track to warm the planet by six degrees Celsius above preindustrial averages. A six-degree increase risks killing most life on earth, as global warming did during the Late Permian when volcanoes burned a bunch of fossilized carbon (e.g., coal, oil, and gas). Called the , that event was, according to New York Magazine, “The most notorious [extinction event…]; it began when carbon warmed the planet by five degrees, accelerated when that warming triggered the release of methane in the Arctic, and ended with 97 percent of all life on Earth dead.”

Mainstream science that we’re on our way there. During the winter of 2017, the Arctic grew warmer than Europe, sending snow to the Mediterranean and Sahara. The planet may have already passed irreversible thresholds that could accelerate further feedback loops like permafrost melt and loss of polar ice. Patches of permafrost even during winter, necessitating a rename (may I suggest ‘nevafrost’?). In the summer of 2018, forests north of the Arctic Circle broke 90 degrees Fahrenheit and in vast wildfires. We’re reaching milestones far faster than scientists have even recently predicted. As Guardian columnist George Monbiot , “The Arctic meltdown […] is the kind of event scientists warned we could face by 2050. Not by 2018.” Mass marine death that rapidly emits uncontrollable greenhouse gasses is another feedback loop that seems ready to strike. The ocean is now than any time in the last 14 million years, killing everything from snails to whales. It’s growing rapidly more acidic. Meanwhile, from the global South to wealthier industrialized countries, people are already dying and being displaced from the impacts of extreme climate change via extreme droughts, floods, wildfires, storms, and conflicts like the Syrian civil war. Authoritarianism is due directly to these climate emergencies and migrations.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › 2AC---EMP D › 2AC---No Impact

No impact to EMP

Schwellenbach 5, Nick, AlterNet, cites individuals on the Council of Foreign Relations, “The Next Fake Threat,”

Perhaps the most controversial of the EMP Commission's claims is their insistence that a Hiroshima-sized nuclear detonation (10-20 kilotons) could produce enough EMP to fry circuits across a continent. The EMP Commission points to one of the few case studies available -- the Starfish Prime atmospheric nuclear test of 1962. A 1.4 megaton thermonuclear weapon detonated 250 miles above Johnston Island in the Pacific affected street lamps, circuit breakers, cars and radio stations in Hawaiian, 800 miles to the north. Still, even there the effect was far from comprehensive. Los Alamos National Laboratory physicist Michael P. Bernardin said that "the 30 strings of failed streetlights [from Starfish Prime's EMP] represented only about one percent of the streetlamps on Oahu at the time." And noted physicist Richard Garwin said the Starfish detonation "had barely noticeable effects on military systems." But Starfish Prime was a thermonuclear device with a yield over a hundred times that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Experts including Garwin and Philip Coyle, former Pentagon director of operational test and evaluation, have expressed skepticism about the EMP Commission's claim that a 10-20 kiloton nuclear device could produce EMP on par with that of a thermonuclear weapon. Both have extensive experience studying EMP.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › 2AC---EMP D › 2AC---Evidence indict

Their authors fabricate the threat for BMD funding

Crowley 9 - Michael Crowley, senior correspondent and deputy Washington bureau chief for Time magazine, 6-3-09, “The Newt Bomb” The New Republic,

The EMP commission actually had a point. There is a scientific basis for fears about widespread electric outages, and there is evidence that other countries, possibly including Iran, have studied the technique. "EMP is real," agrees Joe Cirincione, a nuclear weapons expert who now runs a pro-disarmament think tank, the Ploughshares Fund. But, as Cirincione notes, few analysts take the threat very seriously. The odds that Iran or North Korea would prefer a technologically untested Rube Goldberg scheme to merely nuking us seem slim. And any terrorist group able to execute such a plan was probably capable enough to get us one way or another anyhow. Those realities argue overwhelmingly for prudent but unsexy infrastructure protections, not preemptive attacks or advanced technology. "It's horror theater," says Cirincione, "trying to scare Americans into doing something which a rational analysis would stop them from doing." Charles Ferguson, a nuclear engineer at the Council on Foreign Relations, agrees. "[T]here are some important things we can be doing that won't cost much, but that can serve as a vital backup," he says. For instance, Ferguson has advised the New York City Fire Department to keep some backup communications equipment and extra ignition switches for its trucks in electromagnetic pulse-resistant steel cages. The hawkish right, however, has much bigger things in mind. Although Bartlett himself seems to lack a sub-rosa strategic agenda, he has found common cause among national-security conservatives, about whom the same can't be said. Take, for instance, the spin of Frank Gaffney, perhaps the right's main missile-defense zealot: "[T]he United States must now make a redoubled effort to deploy effective, comprehensive defenses against ballistic missiles that might be used for EMP and other attacks," Gaffney wrote in a 2006 National Review article. Republican Senator Jon Kyl, a key missile-defense champion on Capitol Hill, has held hearings and published a Washington Post op-ed on the EMP threat. The like-minded Wall Street Journal opinion pages have repeatedly flogged the EMP commission's findings. "The only solution to this [EMP] problem," Brian T. Kennedy of the Claremont Institute wrote in an op-ed in the pages last November, "is a robust, multilayered missile-defense system."

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › 2AC---EMP D › 2AC---Evidence indict

Their reports are scare tactics

Farley 9 – Robert Farley, assistant professor at the University of Kentucky’s Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, 10-22-09, “Neocons Salivating Over Their Next Great Exaggerated "Threat": Electromagnetic Pulse Attack”

The fact that EMP is poorly researched and not well understood works in its favor as a scare tactic. Since evidence of EMP’s allegedly lasting impact is purely theoretical EMP awareness advocates can make outlandish claims regarding the threat that even the smallest nuclear arsenal poses. They can also point to allegations made by the official EMP Commission, ignoring the fact that many outside experts dispute its findings. The Niagara conference’s emphasis on strategic and policy considerations shows that alarmist predictions about EMP attacks serve as fodder for promotion of a larger nuclear weapons stockpile, for missile defense, and for preventive attacks.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › 2AC---EMP D › 2AC---Evidence indict

Their authors lie for political benefit

Farley 9 – Robert Farley, assistant professor at the University of Kentucky’s Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, 10-22-09, “Neocons Salivating Over Their Next Great Exaggerated "Threat": Electromagnetic Pulse Attack”

The central political purpose of the EMP awareness movement appears to be advancement of the cause of missile defense. The most extreme estimates of the effect of EMP restore the Cold War-era existential fears of nuclear war. Schwellenbach argues "what's driving it is the political global context—it gives the right an issue that allows them to justify hawkish behavior. It is almost a perfect solution to any argument against missile defense—North Korea and Iran.” The 90 percent casualty estimate advanced by EMP awareness advocates hypes the notion that the United States faces potential annihilation at the hands of its enemies, and goes a step farther: even the smallest nuclear power can destroy the United States with a small number of warheads. This, in turn, reaffirms the need for both a secure missile defense shield (including space-based interceptor weapons) and a grand strategy of preventive war against potential nuclear and ballistic missile proliferators. Almost all EMP awareness advocates—including Gaffney, Gingrich, and Huckabee—call for increased spending on missile defense. Gaffney and Gingrich have also called for a “robust” policy of preemptive war, including attacks on Iranian and North Korean missiles on their launching pads

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › 2AC---EMP D › 2AC---No Probability

Won’t launch EMP attacks- most benefit in direct attacks

Butt 10, Yousaf Butt is a staff scientist at the Center for Astrophysics at Harvard University, where he worked on NASA’s orbiting Chandra X-ray Observatory project from 1999–2004. He was a research fellow at the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Global Security Program from 2005–2007. He holds BSc degrees in physics and in mechanical engineering from MIT and a PhD in experimental nuclear astrophysics from Yale University. “The EMP threat: fact, fiction, and response (part 2),”

If a terrorist cell miraculously built such a weapon, they are likely to explode their “crown jewel” in a simple spectacular ground-burst that will destroy a large part of a city, and not risk the complications—and likely failure—of a lofted EMP strike that will, if all goes according to their plan, cause casualties via unpredictable secondary effects upon a limited part of some of the nation’s infrastructure. The risk versus reward calculation for both terrorists cells and so-called “rogue” states would almost certainly force their hand to a spectacular and direct ground burst in preference to a unreliable and uncertain EMP strike. A weapon of mass destruction is preferable to a weapon of mass disruption.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › 2AC---EMP D › 2AC---No Probability

No EMP attacks- China, Russia specific

Butt 10,, Yousaf Butt is a staff scientist at the Center for Astrophysics at Harvard University, where he worked on NASA’s orbiting Chandra X-ray Observatory project from 1999–2004. He was a research fellow at the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Global Security Program from 2005–2007. He holds BSc degrees in physics and in mechanical engineering from MIT and a PhD in experimental nuclear astrophysics from Yale University. “The EMP threat: fact, fiction, and response (part 2),”

Though they possess the technological know-how to fabricate a powerful EMP device, the possibility of China or Russia carrying out such an attack is virtually nil. Not only for the regular military deterrent reasons but also, post-Cold War, our economies are intimately linked, which amounts to an inherent economic deterrent. The latter is likely the more relevant deterrent [Ref. 22, p. 65]. We owe China tremendous sums of money, they need us as a market, and both the US and China require Russian oil via intertwined world markets. Although the EMP commissioners have offered a Chinese-language PowerPoint presentation outlining the effects of EMP devices as evidence that China has an interest in such weapons, this presentation is actually of Taiwanese origin [“Electromagnetic Pulse Attack and Defense”, by Dr. Chien Chung], and it is not pertinent to any official Chinese military doctrine. More importantly, the DoD itself has weighed in on the issue in its “Militarily Critical Technologies List”. This is a detailed compendium of the technologies the DoD assesses as critical to maintaining superior United States military capabilities. Part II, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies,” addresses those technologies required for development, integration, or employment of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons and their means of delivery against the US. This document states that “HEMP can pose a serious threat to U.S. military systems when even a single high-altitude nuclear explosion occurs. In principle, even a new nuclear proliferator could execute such a strike. In practice, however, it seems unlikely that such a state would use one of its scarce warheads to inflict damage which must be considered secondary to the primary effects of blast, shock, and thermal pulse. Furthermore, a HEMP attack must use a relatively large warhead to be effective (perhaps on the order of one megaton), and new proliferators are unlikely to be able to construct such a device, much less make it small enough to be lofted to high altitude by a ballistic missile or space launcher.”

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › 2AC---EMP D › 2AC---No Probability

Fear of retaliation solves

Butt 10, Yousaf Butt is a staff scientist at the Center for Astrophysics at Harvard University, where he worked on NASA’s orbiting Chandra X-ray Observatory project from 1999–2004. He was a research fellow at the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Global Security Program from 2005–2007. He holds BSc degrees in physics and in mechanical engineering from MIT and a PhD in experimental nuclear astrophysics from Yale University. “The EMP threat: fact, fiction, and response (part 2),”

A state would be highly unlikely to launch an EMP strike from their own territory because the rocket could be traced to the country of origin and would probably result in nuclear or massive conventional retaliation by the US. The EMP commission also considers adversarial nations carrying out a shipborne EMP attack that would be less traceable. However, even so, there would some small risk of trace-back that would give the leadership in such nations pause. While nuclear forensics are not well enough developed to assuredly ascribe the origin of a nuclear explosion, even their current state of development would, in some measure, dissuade the leaders of a nation from seriously contemplating such an attack. Furthermore, the US certainly has data, via its DSP satellites, on the infrared (IR) signatures of the rocket exhausts from the missiles of various countries. Though these signatures are probably virtually identical for the Scud/Shahab/No-dong family of missiles, the nations which may entertain such attacks do not necessarily know whether, e.g., the DSP data can discriminate between a NK Nodong versus an Iranian Shahabs, perhaps due to differences in fuel and/or subtle design idiosyncrasies. This is data only the US has, and it has an inherent deterrent value to nations thinking about launching an EMP strike via a ship-launched ballistic missile. This is almost certainly the case if, say, Iran were to use its solid rocket motor technology to launch such a strike—if and when Iran obtains nuclear weapons, of course. In such a case, the burn time-profile and solid-motor IR signatures could probably be used to tie the missile to a nation. Furthermore, the leaders of a nation contemplating such an attack would have to carefully consider what would happen in case the warhead was not delivered properly. If it fell short and/or did not explode, it may be possible for US engineers and scientists to ascribe a national origin given the forensic material. For the leadership of any nation to chance such an attack they must be almost suicidally optimistic: they would have to presume that everything would go perfectly. Even so, it may still be possible to identify the country of origin, which would invite massive US retribution.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › 2AC---EMP D › 2AC---No Probability

No impact or probability to EMP

Farley 9 – Robert Farley, assistant professor at the University of Kentucky’s Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, 10-22-09, “Neocons Salivating Over Their Next Great Exaggerated "Threat": Electromagnetic Pulse Attack”

Many weapons experts doubt that an EMP attack could cause lasting or irreversible damage. Stephen Younger, former senior fellow at Los Alamos National Lab and director at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, argues that while an EMP might create problems in the short term, it is unlikely to cause long-term devastation. Similarly, observers have questioned the capacity of North Korea or Iran, much less a terrorist organization, to develop a warhead sophisticated enough to cause widespread EMP damage. Nick Schwellenbach, a former researcher at Project on Government Oversight, suggests that the idea of a small, EMP-optimized warhead is absurd: "You have a lot of points of failure in order to get to a warhead that is EMP optimized. … [Y]ou need specialized machine tools, you need capital, but to create a weapon that creates the secondary effect that you're talking about, that's something even we can't do right now.”