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2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 2NC -- AT: Invasion

Their regional force posture is a joke and they’ll focus on Ukraine and Belarus instead.

Kofman ’16 [Michael; May 12; Analyst at CNA Corporation and fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, M.A. in International Security from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; War On The Rocks, “Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia,” ; RP]

Ironically, contrary to many of the assertions by “the Russians are coming” camp, during the period of military reforms between 2009 and 2012 the Russian military moved,  many of the formations in the Western Military District facing NATO’s borders. Since 2013, some of the military strength has been trickling back near Moscow, but there’s no sudden militarization on NATO’s borders. Russia announced the creation of the 1st Tank Army , though the unit has yet to form, and like NATO’s very high readiness task force, is aspirationally named. Since 2014, Russia’s General Staff has focused on preparing for another possible war with Ukraine and a color revolution in Belarus, and still lacks permanently stationed units on either country’s borders. Russia’s Minister of Defense has announced the formation of three new divisions ( over the past two years). Two will be  on Ukraine’s eastern most borders, and one between Ukraine and Belarus. We can discern in Russian force posture and organization where Moscow sees the need for permanently based forces, a division level command staff, and the ability to attack on short notice. It’s Ukraine, not NATO. In essence, these will be expanded brigades formed from existing units with division-level command staffs. While NATO has Russia on its mind, Moscow is instead thinking about contingencies in Ukraine and Belarus.

This is one of the clearest examples where the “more deterrence” arguments seem factually divorced from changes in Russian force posture and perhaps the Russian military analysis community as a whole.  While the field of Russian military analysis is busily studying the layout of Russian forces and their capabilities, large parts of the policy community are akin to a plane flying above it, detached and unencumbered by the facts on the ground. Yes, Russia’s brigades can generate battalions to invade the Baltics, but everything about Russia’s force posture indicates a country ill-prepared for war with NATO. The reserve and mobilization system has been  ever since the military reforms launched in 2008. The Russian army is simply not setup to occupy an invaded country, particularly one likely to resist. There are few permanent units based on NATO’s borders and no higher tier command structures to organize a fight using units pieced together from other districts.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 2NC -- AT: Invasion

Russia doesn’t plan an invasion now.

Frederick et al. 17 – Bryan Frederick, Political Science PhD from Johns Hopkins University. Matthew Povlock. Stephen Watts, Government PhD from Cornell University, formerly in the State Department's Office of Policy Planning. Miranda Priebe, Political Science PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Edward Geist, History PhD from the University of North Carolina. [Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements, RAND Corporation, RR-1879-AF, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1879.html?adbsc=social_20171018_1878401&adbid=920665026620301317&adbpl=tw&adbpr=22545453]//BPS

• Limited Russian strategic interest in the Baltics. Our review of Russian documents and recent Russian strategic literature found very little discussion of the Baltic States as an important strategic area. To be sure, Russia has taken and is continuing to take limited aggressive actions toward the Baltic States through political, media, intelligence, and cyber efforts. But we could identify no serious discussion of the strategic value of retaking part or all of the Baltic States, either for their intrinsic value or as a way of weakening NATO. This lack of discussion of the Baltics was in sharp contrast to some other former Soviet states, such as Ukraine and Georgia, which represent a much greater focus. Any Russian decision to confront NATO militarily over the Baltics would not appear to come from any existing vein of Russian strategic thinking.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 2NC -- AT: Invasion

No Baltics invasion AND other areas thump.

Rostoks and Vanaga ’18 [Toms and Nora; November 2018; Senior Researcher at the Centre for Security and Strategic Research at the National Defence Academy of Latvia, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Latvia; Senior Researcher at the Centre for Security and Strategic Research at the National Defence Academy of Latvia; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, “Creating an effective deterrent against Russia in Europe: Military and Non-Military Aspects of Deterrence,” https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/baltikum/14866.pdf]

Up to now, when Russia has used force in its own territory or against other countries, it has been in the name of protecting important interests. In the case of the war in Chechnya, it was the territorial integrity of the country. Regarding Georgia and Ukraine, Russia wanted to prevent the expansion of NATO, and in Syria it was to extend help to an important ally and affirmation of Russia’s return on the world stage as a player with a global reach (Lukyanov 2016). None of this is the case with the Baltic countries. They have long since become EU and NATO member states, and it is important to remember that in international politics it is easier to prevent something from happening than to undo a done deal. With regard to the question of protecting the rights of Russian speakers, both Russia’s intentions to resolve the issue in keeping with its interests and the legitimacy of putting pressure on the Baltic countries from the point of view of the current context of international rules and regulations are doubtful. In other words, the Baltic countries are accorded such an insignificant space in Russia’s foreign policy that it is difficult to imagine a reason that would be important enough to use military force against them. Since the results of using force usually come at a cost, it is difficult to find arguments for launching such an aggression, for the gains would be unlikely to counterbalance the costs. Authors who have been writing about Russian foreign policy and have tried to explain it in recent years are therefore quite certain that the Baltic countries have little reason to be concerned about their security. Dmitry Trenin writes that ‘Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are safe, however, even if they do not feel that way: the Kremlin has no interest in risking nuclear war by attacking a NATO member state, and the sphere of Russian control to which Putin aspires certainly excludes these countries’ (Trenin 2016, 29). Stephen Kotkin is of a similar opinion: he thinks that Russia’s interest in its sphere of infl uence in the post-Soviet space does not include the Baltic countries (Kotkin 2016, 8). Researchers are not always right, yet in this case their opinions clearly point to Russia having no serious interests vis-à-vis the Baltic region. Since countries usually use force to protect important interests, the nonexistence of such interests in the Baltic region allows us to speculate that a military conflict in this region is unlikely. Russia is deterred by its lack of significant interests in the Baltic region. Before we analyse other elements of deterrence it is worth looking at one argument in favour of Russia’s threat to the Baltic countries turning out to be rather important after all. The idea is that Russia may want to do to the West what it experienced at the beginning of the 1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union turned the hitherto bipolar world into a unipolar one. In the current situation, where Europe has become bipolar, Russia may attempt to split the NATO alliance, thus becoming the ruling country in the European security system and reclaiming its sphere of infl uence that was lost when the USSR collapsed. In this scenario the Baltic countries would be accorded an important role, whereas Russian actions would be based on the assumption that NATO is nothing but a ‘paper tiger’, i.e. it looks dangerous but will collapse like a house of cards if Russia is to act quickly and decisively. Russia might try to split NATO if it were to assume that the military preparations of alliance members is inadequate to extend a helping hand if one were needed by one or more member states. In such a case an attack on the Baltic countries would exacerbate the existing disagreements among NATO members, cause lack of unanimity, delay decision making and make timely arrival of help impossible. Russia would thus kill two birds with one stone: it would destroy NATO (for there would be no point in its existence if the members cannot help each other when facing dangerous threats) and reclaim the Baltic countries, which were lost with the collapse of the USSR. NATO would cease to exist because for the fi rst time in its history, as a member faced an existential threat, the alliance would prove ineffective and incapable of providing the necessary help. The other member states would conclude that there is no point to NATO and consequently NATO would cease to exist. On the one hand, such an argument seems convincing, because the essence of defensive alliances is to make a positive contribution to the security of member states. If it’s not done, then other countries have to reckon with the possibility that they will not receive help if the need arises. By joining an alliance, countries have made the decision that they will generate only a part of the necessary military capability because the other members will take care of the rest. If other allies cannot be trusted, then the point of the existence of the alliance is lost and countries must generate the lacking military capability themselves or change their relationship to the adversary, i.e., bandwagon with the source of threat. Mutual distrust and differing interests can thus bring the alliance to collapse. On the other hand, the argument that alliances unravel when facing decisive action on the part of the adversary does not seem convincing. Aggressive behaviour by the adversary undoubtedly increases the feeling of threat, thus it is equally possible that countries will try to deepen their cooperation when external threat is on the rise. With the level of threat rising in the international system, countries will try to find collective solutions. Under such circumstances, cooperation will be possible not only among countries which are already on friendly terms, but also countries whose relations have been neutral or even hostile. The alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States (and Great Britain) during the Second World War is evidence that, when facing an external threat, cooperation between countries increases and not vice versa. Thus Russia has to realize that in case it engages in military aggression against the Baltic countries, the threat it represents will only act to consolidate the ranks of the NATO member states and heighten US interest in strengthening European security. NATO has taken steps to deepen the cooperation, both after the Russian-Georgian war and after Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine in 2014, supporting the argument that the increase in the intensity of external threat causes balancing attempts on the part of the countries under threat (Walt 1990). It can be concluded that the possibility of military aggression on the part of Russia is diminished both by its lack of interest in the Baltic countries and by its disinclination to consolidate NATO even more by launching an aggression against one of the alliance members.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 1NC -- AT: Invasion

Russia won’t invade -- deterrence AND alternatives.

Majumdar 17 – Dave Majumdar, Defense Editor at The National Interest, former Legislative Fellow for US House of Representatives, American University School of International Service EPGA, citing Olya Oliker, a senior adviser and director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Vasily Kashin, a senior fellow at the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, and Center for Naval Analyses research scientist Mike Kofman. [This Is What a NATO vs. Russia War over the Baltics Would Look Like, 10-24-2017, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-nato-vs-russia-war-over-the-baltics-would-look-22885?page=0%2C1]//BPS

Chances of a Russian invasion of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia appear fairly remote. Even the RAND Corporation, which has been particularly hawkish, suggests that a Russian attack on a NATO member-state is low even though the alliance faces a conventional imbalance. “Our analysis suggests that NATO’s deterrent against a conventional attack by Russia on a NATO member is currently strong,” a recent RAND report states. “While we assess that a Russian attack on NATO in the near term is highly unlikely, it also seems probable that Russia will explore other avenues to signal its displeasure with ongoing U.S. and NATO posture enhancements.”

Other analysts agree that Russia does not have any desire to invade the Baltic States, all three of which were once part of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire before it. “The Russians do not seem to have any designs on the Baltic countries,” Olya Oliker, a senior adviser and director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at Center for Strategic and International Studies told the National Interest. “They are, however, increasingly aware that the United States and many of the other NATO allies think they do. While they take pains to deny this, they do see strategic advantage in keeping NATO on edge, and they are certainly not above saber rattling, including in the Baltic Sea region.”

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › AT: Ukraine War – Won’t Escalate

Ukraine war won’t go nuclear – no motivation

Finel 22 - professor of national security strategy at the National War College, where has also served as a course director, department chair, and associate dean for academic programs (Bernard I., “WAR TERMINATION AND ESCALATION IN UKRAINE,” Modern War Institute, , Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

Russian President Vladimir Putin has, indeed, threatened escalation. This is most likely a bluff for the simple reason that Russia does not benefit from further escalation. Russian declaratory nuclear doctrine does include a concept of nuclear escalation, even in response to nonnuclear threats. This “escalate to deescalate concept,” however is designed to confront threats to Russian national security that Russia cannot defeat otherwise. It does not seem to be a doctrine of nuclear coercion to achieve positive goals. Certainly, facing a foreign invasion or a direct threat to the Putin regime, nuclear escalation seems quite possible, but this is not the dynamic Russia faces today in Ukraine. It is trying to secure foreign policy gains, not stave off defeat. In that context, if anything, escalation works against Russian interests because the more outside powers are drawn into the fight, the greater the likelihood that Russian forces will be not just bogged down on the ground, but obliterated. Russia simply does not have the military capacity to take on NATO. With the force Moscow has shown itself willing to commit to the conflict, it is struggling to maintain operational capacity just facing the Ukrainians. If any NATO country were to become involved, it would dramatically tip the balance against Russia. It may take some time for forces to be deployed and effectively used in theater, but the difference in numbers of key weapons systems would become decisive relatively quickly. As discussed earlier, Russia could escalate to nuclear weapons, of course. But to what end? Can Russia win a nuclear exchange? It is difficult to construct a plausible argument regarding that. There is no nuclear option, whether tactical or general, that provides Russia with a war-winning solution, except in the case that a Russian use of nuclear weapons induces the rest of the world to surrender to Russia’s demands. But this would be a choice, and a bad one. Instead, the United States and other European powers should make clear that any use of nuclear weapons—not just strategic weapons, but lower-yield, tactical weapons, as well—will result in prompt and overwhelming retaliation. The alternative is to hand the Russians—and potentially other states—a powerful coercive tool that can be used in virtually any context or dispute. Signaling that the threat of nuclear use, in the absence of a threat to state survival, is a viable strategy for revisionist states is to open the world to an endless cycle of nuclear blackmail. Deterrence functions in both directions. Nuclear deterrence is likely quite stable. It held for the entirety of the Cold War, even in the midst of severe crises, and has also held in South Asia despite some quite severe provocations. If true, this suggests we ought not self-deter on the assumption that the Russians would be willing to risk a nuclear exchange. They almost certainly don’t. But the risk is not zero either. For decision makers who see Ukraine as strategically unimportant or, indeed, a distraction from the more important challenge posed by China, even that level of risk might be seen as too high. As with all foreign policy and strategic debates, there is room for disagreement, but it is important to specify the arguments as clearly as possible.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › AT: Ukraine War – 2NC

Continued militarization spurs aggressive Russian response – turns the aff

Menon 22 - Director of the Grand Strategy Program at Defense Priorities and Senior Research Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University

Hence their confidence that more Javelins will improve Ukraine’s ability to destroy Russia’s tanks, that additional Stinger anti-aircraft missiles will cause even more Russian warplanes to fall from the skies, and that counter-battery radars will locate and demolish deadly Russian artillery. Yet amid the moral outrage and depth of animosity toward Putin, the risks of pouring arms into Ukraine should be considered carefully and dispassionately. Providing Ukraine even more arms may well produce the results its proponents anticipate. It could, on the other hand, impel Russian commanders to subject Ukrainians to even greater pain. They have already experienced enormous suffering because Russia, as the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has noted, routinely hits civilian buildings. If the war becomes even more brutal, Ukraine may keep resisting, but then the number of Ukrainians seeking refuge in other countries, now 2.6 million (the largest proportion is in Poland), will soar. With Warsaw and Kraków, its two largest cities, overwhelmed by the influx, Poland has already appealed for help. A continuing exodus from Ukraine could strain the economies and social fabric of its neighbors, especially if the war drags on, preventing refugees from returning home. Furthermore, Russia may not stand by, allowing the west to fortify Ukraine’s army. Putin might order his generals to bomb the supply routes from Poland and Romania, the Nato countries that have the longest borders with Ukraine. On 11 March, after not having bombed them since 24 February, the day the war started, Russian aircraft took aim at military airfields in Lutsk and Ivano-Frankivsk in western Ukraine. Lutsk lies about 60 miles from Poland’s border, in Volyn province, which adjoins it. The city of Ivano-Frankivsk is located north of the Romania’s border, and the eponymous province of which it is part adjoins Romania. On 13 March, a barrage of Russian cruise missiles hit the Yavoriv military base, which is in Lviv province and less than 30 miles from the Polish border. These attacks are a signal from Putin that he won’t stand by while the west beefs up Ukraine’s army, which has already proved a tougher nut to crack than he anticipated, and were accompanied by the warning from the deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov warning to the United States that Russia would regard arms “convoys” into Ukraine as “legitimate targets”. The United States and its allies may face unexpected countermoves from Russia and what they do in response could widen the war if Putin, in turn, raises the stakes. If the tit-for-tat spills over into Poland or Romania, whether intentionally or not, the stage could be set for a Nato-Russia confrontation, with nuclear weapons lurking in the background. Some experts are confident that arming Ukraine won’t widen the war, but if they’re wrong the consequences could prove catastrophic.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › AT: Ukraine War – 2NC

Ukraine is terminally screwed – Russian forces outclass Ukraine on all levels even with new military tech

Charap and Boston 22 - a senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation, a senior defense analyst at the Rand Corp (Samuel and Scott, “The West’s Weapons Won’t Make Any Difference to Ukraine,” ForeignPolicy, 1-21-22, , Accessed 6-23-22, LASA-AH)

Once deterrence fails and a war begins, the Ukrainian armed forces will find themselves in desperate circumstances almost immediately. Ukraine does not have anywhere near enough forces to credibly defend against all the potential avenues of attack, which means it would have to choose between defending a select set of fixed strong points—ceding control of other areas—or maneuvering to engage Russian forces that outnumber them. The line of conflict in the Donbass will be but one of many fronts. The Ukrainian fortifications there may well look like a modern-day Maginot Line: prepared for a frontal attack that may never come and bypassed by the mobile forces of an adversary with more advanced aircraft and more mobile land forces. Ukraine’s great size means that the land forces operating there will be required to move to cover large areas of rural terrain. Mobile engagements would benefit Russian forces, which are far better trained and equipped to conduct coordinated air and land maneuver warfare than their Ukrainian opponents. The Russian military has repeatedly practiced the use of long-range strike and tactical fires cued by drones as well as other means of reconnaissance, both in training and in combat operations in Syria. Russia’s combat aircraft and strategic air defenses give Moscow many more options to control the air and to strike Ukrainian forces, and most Russian pilots have recent real-world experience in Syria. The Ukrainian military also largely operates legacy Soviet weapons; Russian forces have a deep familiarity with the limitations of these systems and know what tactics to employ to further reduce their effectiveness. In short, the military balance between Russia and Ukraine is so lopsided in Moscow’s favor that any assistance Washington might provide in coming weeks would be largely irrelevant in determining the outcome of a conflict should it begin. Russia’s advantages in capacity, capability, and geography combine to pose insurmountable challenges for Ukrainian forces tasked with defending their country. The second argument for aid—changing the course of the war— thus does not hold water.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › AT: Ukraine War – 1NC

Deterrence fails – a Russian invasion would mobilize rebel groups to have plausible deniability AND new US weapons don’t change the calculus for invasion

Charap and Boston 22 - a senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation, a senior defense analyst at the Rand Corp (Samuel and Scott, “The West’s Weapons Won’t Make Any Difference to Ukraine,” ForeignPolicy, 1-21-22, , Accessed 6-23-22, LASA-AH)

With Russian forces massed on Ukraine’s borders, the policy discussion in Washington increasingly has focused on what the United States can do to help its Ukrainian partners defend their country. Just this week, the Biden administration has approved deliveries of U.S.-made Stinger shoulder- launched anti-aircraft missiles to Kyiv, in addition to upping provision of other military equipment. Allies, including the United Kingdom, are providing their own assistance, too. The justification for the aid has varied. Some have made the case that U.S. military assistance to Ukraine can change Russia’s calculus now, possibly deterring Moscow from launching an attack. Others claim that aid to the Ukrainian military can have a real impact on a possible fight with the Russians, making it meaningfully more challenging for the Kremlin to achieve victory and ruling out certain military options Russia might be considering. And there are also voices who call for additional capabilities merely to raise costs for Moscow—that is, to kill more Russian soldiers—so as to create political problems for President Vladimir Putin at home, although without much expectation that Ukraine would prevail. None of these arguments is convincing. That does not mean security cooperation with Kyiv should cease. It does mean that military assistance is not an effective lever for resolving this crisis. Since 2014, the United States has provided over $2.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine, following the Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbass. U.S. assistance to Ukraine has included the provision of trainers, selected defensive systems (such as counter-mortar radars), and, more recently, Javelin anti-tank missiles. This assistance has principally aimed to improve Ukrainian effectiveness in the relatively static conflict against Russian-backed separatist forces in the Donbass, who are mainly armed with small arms and light weapons, along with some artillery and Soviet-era armor. Crucially, however, Ukraine has mainly not been fighting Russia’s armed forces in the Donbass. Yes, Russia has armed, trained, and led the separatist forces. But even by Kyiv’s own estimates, the vast majority of rebel forces consist of locals—not soldiers of the regular Russian military. Indeed, the Russian armed forces engaged directly in the fighting only twice—in August-September 2014 and January-February 2015—and with limited capabilities, although both episodes ended in crushing Ukrainian defeats. Moscow has sought to retain some veil of deniability about its involvement in the conflict, which meant the Russian military never used more than a tiny fraction of its capabilities against the Ukrainians. It applied just enough force to get the job done while avoiding protracted, overt interventions. A wide variety of signature Russian capabilities—including its air force and ballistic and cruise missiles—have not been involved in the fighting at all, even as they have been repeatedly demonstrated in combat operations in Syria. The nature of the reported Russian buildup suggests the expanded war, if it happens, will differ fundamentally from the past seven years of simmering stalemate. Russia has the ability to carry out a large-scale joint offensive operation involving tens of thousands of personnel, thousands of armored vehicles, and hundreds of combat aircraft. It would likely begin with devastating air and missile strikes from land, air, and naval forces, striking deep into Ukraine to attack headquarters, airfields, and logistics points. Ukrainian forces would begin the conflict nearly surrounded from the very start, with Russian forces arrayed along the eastern border, naval and amphibious forces threatening from the Black Sea in the south, and the potential (increasingly real) for additional Russian forces to deploy into Belarus and threaten from the north, where the border is less than 65 miles from Kyiv itself. In short, this war will look nothing like the status quo ante of conflict in Ukraine, and that undermines the first justification for U.S. aid: deterring Russia. The Ukrainian military has been shaped to fight the conflict in the Donbass and thus poses little deterrent threat to Russia; provision of U.S. weapons can do nothing to change that. If Moscow is willing to launch a major war, invading the second-largest country in Europe with a population of over 40 million, all while absorbing tremendous economic punishment from the West, then it is unlikely to be deterred by whatever U.S. military assistance can be delivered in the coming weeks. The only weapons systems that could plausibly impose costs that could change Russia’s calculus, such as surface-to- air missiles and combat aircraft, are ones that the United States would be highly unlikely to provide the Ukrainians. And, regardless, they could not be procured, delivered, and be made operational—to say nothing of getting the Ukrainian operators trained up to use them—in time to have an impact on this crisis. Large, modern systems require extensive training and material support.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: HR Impact

Human rights frameworks are extremely complex and difficult to execute

Vandenhole and Gready 14 (Wouter Vandenhole, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Antwerp, Belgium; Paul Gready, Professor, Centre for Applied Human Rights, University of New York, USA; “Failures and Successes of Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development: Towards a Change Perspective,” Nordic Journal of Human Rights, , October 2014)//sposten

III. HRBADs and Organisational Change Logically preceding a solid understanding of the complexity of social change is the need to better understand what it takes for an organisation to introduce an HRBAD with a view to bring about social change successfully in the first place. Both in change theory and organisations theory, it has been emphasised that views on change and on how organisations change are very often based on implicit assumptions. Both sets of theories also point out the complexity of (organisational) change, and the existence of many different and often competing approaches or “schools”, with some emphasising structural constraints (i.e. constraints based on durable social structures) and others individual agency. Both dimensions are important and often operate in tandem.33 Moreover, a distinction is to be made between formal structure and actual day-to-day activities, for the assumption that organisations function according to formal blueprints is not supported by empirical research,34 hence the emphasis again on the need for much more empirical work. In the case example of UNICEF that follows, we look in particular into internal reflection and planning, and leadership and true believers as explanatory entry points for the (lack of) organisational change accompanying the introduction of an HRBAD. In addition to these drivers of change, we shall pay attention to the spoilers of change, such as lack of capacity or staff turnover, and to the tension between HRBAD and RBM. Attempts at introducing HRBAD by the UN at the country level by states and by non-governmental organisations seem to show similar trends at first sight, though much more research is needed before firm conclusions can be reached.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Europe Free Speech Bad

Europe’s free speech measures are good, and the US has to change its policies---prefer evidence from social media insiders

Haugen 22 (Frances Haugen, former Facebook product manager who focused on combating misinformation and espionage; "Europe Is Making Social Media Better Without Curtailing Free Speech. The U.S. Should, Too", 4-28-2022, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/28/opinion/social-media-facebook-transparency.html, DOA: 7-16-2022)//sposten

Elon Musk’s deal to take Twitter private, which has spurred questions about power, censorship and safety for the future of the platform, happened just days after the European Union reached a landmark agreement to make social media less toxic for users. The new E.U. standards, and the ethic of transparency on which they are based, will for the first time pull back the curtain on the algorithms that choose what we see and when we see it in our feeds.

In Europe’s case, the dryly named Digital Services Act is the most significant piece of social media legislation in history. It goes to the heart of what I’ve tried to do as a whistle-blower who worked inside Facebook: make social media far better without impinging on free speech. Today, Facebook’s poorly implemented content moderation strategies leave those most at risk of real-world violence unprotected and consistently succeed at only one thing: angering everyone.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › 2AC – Aff Solves

Open-source intel solves---only a risk of decreasing misinformation since the truth is already there

Glover 22 (Claudia Glover; "Open-source intelligence key to fighting Russian disinformation during Ukraine war", 6-7-2022, Tech Monitor, https://techmonitor.ai/technology/emerging-technology/open-source-intelligence-ukraine-war, DOA: 7-16-2022)//sposten

Open source intelligence can be vital in the fight against disinformation, according to a study released today which assesses the impact of novel and emerging technologies on the spread of false information during the Ukraine war. While open data can be harnessed positively to fight disinformation, those deploying it must also be aware of the risks, security experts say.

The report, entitled ‘The Information Battlefield: Disinformation, declassification and deepfakes‘ was released today to mark the launch of the Centre for Emerging Technology and Security (CfETS), a new research centre at the Alan Turing Institute for artificial intelligence which aims to boost the UK’s security by giving policy makers better information about emerging technologies.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › 2AC – Aff Solves

Any information from Russia still leads to inaction---triggers our impacts and means they cannot solve

Grimes 22 (David Robert Grimes, scientist and author of Good Thinking: Why Flawed Logic Puts Us All at Risk and How Critical Thinking Can Save the World (The Experiment). His work focuses on health disinformation and conspiracy theory, and he is an international advocate for the public understanding of science. He is a recipient of the Nature/Sense about Science Maddox Prize, and a fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry; "Russian Misinformation Seeks to Confound, Not Convince: Rather than take a side, these campaigns create decision paralysis that leads to inaction", 3-28-2022, Scientific American, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/russian-misinformation-seeks-to-confound-not-convince/, DOA: 7-16-2022)//sposten

As war envelops Ukraine, Russian sources have strived to create a miasma of disinformation about the invasion. Among ample efforts to distort reality, the Russian Ministry of Defense asserted recently that U.S.-backed labs in Ukraine have been developing bioweapons. Outlandish as this falsehood may be, Fox’s Tucker Carlson gave it credence by arguing that the U.S. government’s response was a “cover-up.”

As the Russia-Ukraine war intensifies, so too will the flow of disinformation. This is an age-old strategy Russia has long history of employing, and a playbook that others, most notably anti-vaccine activists, have borrowed from liberally. Yet, rather than focusing effort on convincing people of a falsehood, the Russian strategy takes a tack reminiscent of a strategy long employed by the tobacco industry: to sow so much doubt about what is true that it sends people into decision paralysis. Faced with a cacophony of wild and conflicting claims, people do nothing, unsure of what is right.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Framework Core—Wave 1—FMPS › High Theory Helpers › AT: Literal Meaning Impossible

Literal meanings are dicey, but intersubjective agreement is possible based on reasonable interpretation. Their arg just proves topicality solves their offense because we can debate about suitable definitions—hence the limits DA

Kemerling 97 (Garth, professor of philosophy at Newberry College, http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm)

We've seen that sloppy or misleading use of ordinary language can seriously limit our ability to create and communicate correct reasoning. As philosopher John Locke pointed out three centuries ago, the achievement of human knowledge is often hampered by the use of words without fixed signification. Needless controversy is sometimes produced and perpetuated by an unacknowledged ambiguity in the application of key terms. We can distinguish disputes of three sorts: Genuine disputes involve disagreement about whether or not some specific proposition is true. Since the people engaged in a genuine dispute agree on the meaning of the words by means of which they convey their respective positions, each of them can propose and assess logical arguments that might eventually lead to a resolution of their differences. Merely verbal disputes, on the other hand, arise entirely from ambiguities in the language used to express the positions of the disputants. A verbal dispute disappears entirely once the people involved arrive at an agreement on the meaning of their terms, since doing so reveals their underlying agreement in belief. Apparently verbal but really genuine disputes can also occur, of course. In cases of this sort, the resolution of every ambiguity only reveals an underlying genuine dispute. Once that's been discovered, it can be addressed fruitfully by appropriate methods of reasoning. We can save a lot of time, sharpen our reasoning abilities, and communicate with each other more effectively if we watch for disagreements about the meaning of words and try to resolve them whenever we can. Kinds of Definition The most common way of preventing or eliminating differences in the use of languages is by agreeing on the definition of our terms. Since these explicit accounts of the meaning of a word or phrase can be offered in distinct contexts and employed in the service of different goals, it's useful to distinguish definitions of several kinds: A lexical definition simply reports the way in which a term is already used within a language community. The goal here is to inform someone else of the accepted meaning of the term, so the definition is more or less correct depending upon the accuracy with which it captures that usage. In these pages, my definitions of technical terms of logic are lexical because they are intended to inform you about the way in which these terms are actually employed within the discipline of logic. At the other extreme, a stipulative definition freely assigns meaning to a completely new term, creating a usage that had never previously existed. Since the goal in this case is to propose the adoption of shared use of a novel term, there are no existing standards against which to compare it, and the definition is always correct (though it might fail to win acceptance if it turns out to be inapt or useless). If I now decree that we will henceforth refer to Presidential speeches delivered in French as "glorsherfs," I have made a (probably pointless) stipulative definition. Combining these two techniques is often an effective way to reduce the vagueness of a word or phrase. These precising definitions begin with the lexical definition of a term but then propose to sharpen it by stipulating more narrow limits on its use. Here, the lexical part must be correct and the stipulative portion should appropriately reduce the troublesome vagueness. If the USPS announces that "proper notification of a change of address" means that an official form containing the relevant information must be received by the local post office no later than four days prior to the effective date of the change, it has offered a (possibly useful) precising definition.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Framework Core—Wave 1—FMPS › High Theory Helpers › AT: Deliberation Excludes Affect

They have sequencing backwards—it’s not that we have to make deliberation affective, we have to make affect deliberative—affective redescriptions are only useful insofar as they facilitate deliberative testing based on shared understanding—this straight turns their offense

Livingston, 12—Assistant prof of Government @ Cornell (Alexander, “Avoiding Deliberative Democracy? Micropolitics, Manipulation, and the Public Sphere”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2012), pp. 269-294, dml)

To put this in the language of Deleuze, deliberative redescription can function as a war machine. The experimenting with resonating reasons in a public on the part of activists is an exercise in “plugging in” a resonance machine into the public sphere. The transformative power of the resonance machine, understood as an inventive redescription of our received practices, has the power to transform the way citizens see their shared world, their own interests, and the suffering of others. The work of counterpublics is to “smooth” the striated space of public political culture so as to displace old prejudices and allow new identities and claims to flourish.

But if this is so, then deliberative democracy does not stop here. This “weaponry” of redescription is of value only insofar as it opens up conceptual spaces for reason giving. It is here, along this destratified plane, that citizens and spectators have to make use of what Deleuze calls “tools” to build up reasoned but revisable agreements about what causes to pursue, what practices to quash, or which candidates to elect or kick out. Indeed, the creative work of redescription is only the mise-en-scène of a democratic praxis through which ordinary people offer and contest what they think to be good arguments and reasons about political issues. It is only through the reflective pursuit of overlapping agreement that collective action becomes possible. [End Page 287]

2022 Michigan Topicality
Framework Core—Wave 1—FMPS › High Theory Helpers › Negarestani/Engineering

Debate should be a site of engineering in which we adhere by shared norms of communication to experiment with concrete political visions—you should reject explanations of metaphysical totalities that can’t account for the reverberating effects of individual experiments. Communication and rationality are inevitable—trying to subvert them fizzles out at best and is proto-fascist bad faith at worst—only proactively engineering political visions within the constraints of the world we live in can prevent extinction.

Gironi and Negarestani, 18—IRC Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the School of Philosophy, University College Dublin AND Iranian philosopher (Fabio and Reza, “ENGINEERING THE WORLD, CRAFTING THE MIND,” , dml)

As long as, we are not willing to recognize education in the aforementioned sense as the scaffolding upon which any political movement should be built we are doomed to live in the status quo. Short of an unconditional prioritization of education, all we ever can hope for are quick fixes accompanied with phases of socio-political overexcitement which soon fizzle out, leading us to a position which was worse than before. Politics without education as its premise can never maintain its long-term traction. It effectively exempts itself from the concerns of the next generations. But what is a politics without the potential concerns for next generations—whoever or whatever they might be—if not an extension of our egotism and selfishness here and now? While I consider myself a leftist, I nevertheless think that my frustration with the left is precisely the issue of education. Look at something like left accelerationism: where is the acknowledgment of education or developmental psychology i.e. nurturing as the unconditional factor? Where is your logistical-financial and organizational plan for education? If you lack these then no matter how much you insist on egalitarian ends, you are not going to attain them. However, being the hopeless leftist that I am, I believe that left, has “in principle” more chance to concretely address the issue of education than the right.

I believe in something like a universalist paradigm of education or equality of minds. Here, the appellation universal does not mean a pre-conceived global paradigm that can be indiscriminately imposed upon everyone. Education is all about context sensitivity, fulfilling local exigencies. But at the same time, I think there are deep cognitive frameworks which are common to us all and can be augmented under a universal or global framework. I think Kant was onto something important. His hierarchies of faculties as elaborated under the rubric of transcendental psychology—i.e. the necessary conditions for the possibility for having a mind—are not merely a trivial or arbitrary list of faculties. They were as much a necessary list of abilities as they were an example of an epistemological inquiry into the specific modes of cognition required for critical and objective thinking. For example, what he calls sensibility, reproductive and productive imagination, understanding and reason are actually necessary “classes” or “types” for being a minded subject. If we believe in the equality of all minds then we ought to also believe in complex recipes that can universally augment such necessary classes, regardless of whether we belong to different geographic locations, ethnicities, or even species.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Framework Core—Wave 1—FMPS › High Theory Helpers › Caillois/Play

Second, this a unique case turn – the corruption of the principle of play fuels endless global warfare thru the justified destruction of all limits.

Caillois 61. Roger Caillois, famous French intellectual and sociologist, Bataille’s friend, Man, Play and Games, trans. Barash, University of Illinois Press, 1961, 54

What we set out to analyze was the corruption of the principles of play, or preferably, their free expansion without check or convention. It was shown that such corruption is produced in identical ways. It entails consequences which seem to be inordinately serious. Madness or intoxication may be sanctions that are disproportionate to the simple overflow of one of the play instincts out of the domain in which it can spread without irreparable harm. In contrast, the superstitions engendered by deviation from alea seem benign. Even more, when the spirit of competition freed from rules of equilibrium and loyalty is added to unchecked ambition, it seems to be profitable for the daring one who is abandoned to it. Moreover, the temptation to guide one’s behavior by resort to remote powers and magic symbols in automatically applying a system of imaginary correspondences does not aid man to exploit his basic abilities more efficiently. He becomes fatalistic. He becomes incapable of deep appreciation of relationships between phenomena. Perseverance and trying to succeed despite unfavorable circumstances are discouraged.

Transposed to reality, the only goal of agon is success. The rules of courteous rivalry are forgotten and scorned. They seem merely irksome and hypocritical conventions. Implacable competition becomes the rule. Winning even justifies foul blows. If the individual remains inhibited by fear of the law or public opinion, it nonetheless seems permissible, if not meritorious, for nations to wage unlimited ruthless warfare.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Framework Core—Wave 1—FMPS › High Theory Helpers › Caillois/Play

Their nihilistic depictions of the political present and its commitment to a ressentiment based politics can be true about the world, academia, or their own lives in the abstract – debate is DIFFERENT because it is a game – the space of play must remain unique as it carves out moments of play and joy despite the depleted condition of modern life and work. Play is different than work BECAUSE adherents agree to minimal consensus based work – this is a UNIQUE link turn to the aff value claims.

Caillois 61. Roger Caillois, famous French intellectual and sociologist, Bataille’s friend, Man, Play and Games, trans. Barash, University of Illinois Press, 1961, 54

In effect, play is essentially a separate occupation, carefully isolated from the rest of life, and generally is engaged in with precise limits of time and place. There is place for play: as needs dictate, the space for hopscotch, the board for checkers or chess, the stadium, the racetrack, the list, the ring, the stage, the arena, etc. Nothing that takes place outside this ideal frontier is relevant. To leave the enclosure by mistake, accident, or necessity, to send the ball out of bounds, may disqualify or entail a penalty.

The game must be taken back within the agreed boundaries. The same is true for time: the game starts and ends at a given signal. Its duration is often fixed in advance. It is improper to abandon or interrupt the game without a major reason (in children’s games, crying “I give up,” for example). If there is occasion to do so, the game is prolonged, by agreement between the contestants or by decision of an umpire. In every case, the game’s domain is therefore a restricted, closed, protected universe: a pure space.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Framework Core—Wave 1—FMPS › High Theory Helpers › Bogost/Fun

Fun is an impact! It’s not just some vacuous sense of enjoyment, it’s an ethos of willfully enjoying a game shaped by arbitrary limits—this cultivates a joyous approach to the world that lets value to life flourish, but not one they can access through transgressing the rules

Bogost, 16—holds a joint professorship in the School of Literature, Media, and Communication and in Interactive Computing in the College of Computing at the Georgia Institute of Technology, where he is the Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts Distinguished Chair in Media Studies (Ian, Play Anything: The Pleasure of Limits, the Uses of Boredom, and the Secret of Games pg 77-84, kindle, dml)

An old aphorism about golf calls the game “a good walk spoiled.” That funny quip underscores a fundamental feature of games: games make no sense, and yet we take them seriously precisely because they make no sense. The philosopher Bernard Suits calls that seriousness “a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.” 15 Golf is a desirable experience because it distorts space and time in order to make the player’s experience of a landscape more deliberate. We seek out this deliberateness when we play.

Fun is not a feeling, it turns out. And it’s certainly not the feeling of enjoying ourselves by doing exactly what we want, by making something easy or by rewarding ourselves with points, as if life is some latent version of Space Invaders that turns chores into chortles. Instead, fun is a name for deliberately manipulating a familiar situation in a new way. We can only have fun once we have accepted the truth of a situation and treated it for what it is. When we’ve agreed to suspend our disbelief in its preposterousness. Golf isn’t a good walk spoiled, but a way to transform landscapes into a centuries-long hobby.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Framework Core—Wave 1—FMPS › High Theory Helpers › Bogost/Fun

The impact outweighs—adhering to limits isn’t uncritical faith in them, rather, it cultivates an ethos of play that breeds respect for the world outside us and helps navigate existence ethically

Bogost, 16—holds a joint professorship in the School of Literature, Media, and Communication and in Interactive Computing in the College of Computing at the Georgia Institute of Technology, where he is the Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts Distinguished Chair in Media Studies (Ian, Play Anything: The Pleasure of Limits, the Uses of Boredom, and the Secret of Games pg 115-120, kindle, dml)

Play entails a paradox: it is an activity of freedom and pleasure and openness and possibility, but it arises from limiting freedoms rather than expanding them. The boundaries of a playground, the contents contained within them. Their structures. Colloquial senses of game, play, and fun would hold that these activities amount to going outside the boundary of normal behavior, of doing whatever you want: “Don’t play with your food” or “stop fooling around.” But in fact the opposite is true: interesting play experiences arise from more constraints rather than fewer. Erecting barriers and boundaries more clearly delineates a system. As Bernard Suits puts it, play requires its participants to accomplish something “using only means permitted by rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in favor of less efficient means, and where such rules are accepted just because they make possible such activity.” 21

Normally, we address a play experience like my daughter’s either as if it were separate from the trip to the mall or as if it were perpetrated in the service of the errand I had dragged her along on. On the one hand, we could construe my daughter’s activity as a distraction from the “real” work of running errands and therefore existing outside the domain of mall going, a play activity meant to release the boredom and unrest of being somewhere unpleasant. On the other hand, we could see her improvised play as a welcome and even a necessary distraction to help facilitate the rest of the afternoon’s errands. The first interpretation assumes the work-play differential— that the work of chores exists nearby but orthogonal to the play that would divert a young child from boredom. The second interpretation invokes the productive repurposing of play as a means to pleasure or sanity, a resource to be put to use in the interest of “real” effort.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Framework Core—Wave 1—FMPS › High Theory Helpers › XT—Baudrillard Votes Neg

2. Their attempt at transgression of the rules of debate is the ultimate conformity. Not only is this a very clear reason to vote negative on presumption, they reify the rules of debate, which turns the case.

Baudrillard 79. Jean Baudrillard, Seduction, pg. 140-1

If games had a finality, the only true player would be the cheater. Now, if a certain amount of prestige can be acquired by transgressing the law, there is no prestige in cheating or transgressing a rule. In truth, the cheater cannot transgress the rules since the game, not being a system of interdictions, does not have lines one can cross. One does not "trangress" a rule, one fails to observe it . And non-observance does not lead to a state of transgression ; it brings one back under the jurisdiction of the law. This is the case with the cheater, who denies or, even better, profanes the game's ceremonial conventions for economic reasons (or psychological reasons, if he cheats simply for the pleasure of winning), and thereby restores the laws of the real world. By introducing factors of an individual nature, he destroys the game's "duel" enchantment . If cheating was once punished by death and is still condemned strongly, it is because, as a crime, it resembles incest : cultural rules being broken to the sole profit of the "laws of nature." For the cheater, there is no longer anything at stake. He confuses the stakes with surplus-value. But the stakes are what enables one to play, and to turn them into the game's purpose is to abuse one's position of trust. In a similar manner, the rules establish the very possibility of playing, the space within which the sides confront each other. To treat the rules as ends (or as laws or truths) is to destroy both the game and its stakes. The rules have no autonomy, that quality which, according to Marx, characterizes commodities, both individually and in general, and is the sacrosanct value of the economic domain. The cheater too is autonomous: he establishes a law, his own law, against the arbitrary rituals of the rule - this is what disqualifies him. And he is free -this explains his downfall . Moreover, he is rather dreary, because he no longer exposes himself to the seduction of games, because he refuses the vertigo of seduction. By way of hypothesis, one might postulate that personal advantage is only an alibi: in reality he cheats in order to escape seduction ; he cheats because he is afraid of being seduced.