2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › 1AC › 1AC – Techno-Orientalism
Bahng 15 (Aimee Bahng is an American academic. She is a professor of gender and women's studies at Pomona College in Claremont, California. Her previous denial of tenure at Dartmouth College sparked widespread protests about discrimination against racial minorities in academia. 2015, Techno-Orientalism, p164-166, “The Cruel Optimism of Asian Futurity and the Reparative Practices of Sonny Liew’s Malinky Robot,” ; accessed 7/20/2022) ng
Published amid the financial crisis of 2008, Mahbubani’s book, as well as his Financial Times declaration of a realizable Asian Century that serves as this essay’s epigraph, excite what Alan Greenspan once called “irrational exuberance.” Uttered in a speech Greenspan gave in 1996, in his capacity as chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, the phrase characterized the “unduly escalated asset values” of Japan’s economic bubble. The next day, Tokyo’s stock market fell sharply, closing 3 percent down, and Greenspan’s speech largely presaged the Asian financial crash a year later. The extent to which economic projections hang on the words of figureheads like Alan Greenspan demonstrates how such speculations work as performative speech acts that call the future into being. Similarly, the optimism Mahbubani announces in forward-looking, prophetic tones (“optimism will deliver the Asian Century”), affectively structures speculative investment in Asian futures. This vision of the new Asian hemisphere, colonized by empty high-rises reaching toward limitless horizons and built by deterritorialized workers, projects a future of automated speculative building, fueled by investment hungry banks. If Greenspan and Mahbubani both grasp how their respective declarations of pessimism and optimism will affect the global economy, they do so with two different Asias in mind: Japan of the late 1990s and Singapore at the dawn of a “new Asia” in 2008. 2 The so-called Asian Century, toward which Mahbubani’s optimism strains, functions as a largescale speculative fiction spawned from neoliberal fantasies that capitalize on a literary genre’s already problematic investments in techno-Orientalism. In their 1995 examination of techno-Orientalism, David Morley and Kevin Robins call attention to U.S. and European fantasies of Japan and its shift in those imaginaries in the 1980s from an exotic playground to a land of emotionless automatons. Perhaps epitomized by Western dystopian cyberpunk such as Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982) and William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984), techno-Orientalism figures the Japanese as “unfeeling aliens; they are cyborgs and replicants. But there is also the sense that these mutants are now better adapted to survive in the future”(170). While Morley and Robins understand techno-Orientalism as primarily born out of Western anxieties about Japan’s challenge to U.S. economic hegemony, they also suggest more specifically how techno-Orientalism arises just as Japan emerges as “the largest creditor and the largest net investor in the world” (153). What Morley and Robins never fully develop, and what I want to explore in more depth here, is this coordinated turn toward Asian futures in both financial and cultural forms of speculation. Mathematical models of probability and investment strategies based on extrapolation are forms of speculative fiction that project finance capitalism’s visions of futurity onto the world. Interdisciplinary scholarship from the past two decades has pointed to the performative aspects of economic speculation (MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu), the sociological systems of financial markets (Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger), the impact on subjectivity of financial instruments such as derivatives and debt bundling (LiPuma and Lee), and the “financialization of daily life” (Martin). Because speculative economies rely ever more on rhetorical tools and narrative strategies to explain and market the practice of trading on futures and securities, financial speculation and speculative fiction both participate in the cultural production of futurity, and futurity becomes the arena in which new subject formations emerge. Does techno-Orientalism register anxieties about finance capitalism, or does finance capitalism use techno-Orientalism as a basis for its extrapolations of futurity? I emphasize the co-constitutive relationship between the cultural production and financial worlding of Asian futurity. A peculiar question arises then, when Asian economic and political architects themselves participate in the projection of Asian futurity, all the while drawing on a techno-Orientalist toolkit. I argue that critical analysis of the discursive site of Asian futurity reveals points of contradiction in American neoliberalism as it travels that have to do with earlier forms of racial and colonial subjugation providing the scaffolding for the architecture of neoliberalism itself.3 As Asia develops its own neoliberal rhetoric, articulating its own futurity poses certain problems that necessitate a disavowal of the racism of techno-Orientalism. What stands in to “smooth” that difficulty is the heteronormativity techno-Orientalism always espoused that Asian futurity posits anew as part of its road map, capitalizing on aspirational teleologies, valuations of privatized worth, and nationalisms consolidated through processes of racialization. I focus my investigation on techno-Orientalism’s role in the production ofa global neoliberal subject in contemporary Singapore, where a tech economy adopts and adapts localized versions of seemingly universalized notions of “the good life.” Building on Lauren Berlant’s theorization of “cruel optimism,” this essay levies a critique of “the Asian Century” as imagined by economists around the world. It argues that a revisionist Asian futurity needs to intervene in the neoliberal orientations of “the good life” and, in the face of foreclosed futures, open possibilities of what Eve Sedgwick has called “reparative practices.” For an inspiring glimpse of what reparative practice sin the context of techno-Orientalism might look like, I turn to Sonny Liew’s graphic story collection Malinky Robot (Figure12.1), which fabulates an alternative imagining of Asian futurity, as told from the perspective of the global South. Malinky Robot, a title that translated serendipitously from Russian as “odd jobs,” or “little work” (Villarica), depicts a multiethnic Asian futurity burdened with precarious living conditions, precipitous divides in wealth, and ecological as well as economic fallout propagated by global capitalist greed. Liew, born in Malaysia but working mostly out of Singapore, offers gritty, agitated aesthetics and sparse storylines that restore texture, abrasion, and friction to the slick, polished surfaces and epic narrative scales of techno-Orientalist futures. Liew’s personal trajectories map a complex history of Singapore as a site of multiple layers of European (Portuguese, Dutch, British) and Japanese imperialism. In its turn toward self-governance, Singapore has also been the scene of ethnic and class-based tensions among exploited Malaysian workers and a predominantly Chinese ethnic majority population who constitute the managerial class. With particular attention to Singapore’s own aspirations to become a “technopreneurial” city-state of the future (Ong, Neoliberalism 181), this essay looks to Malinky Robot as a crucial counternarrative to techno-Orientalism as it is deployed not only by Western fantasies of a docile East but also by Asian aspirations to challenge U.S. global hegemony.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › 1AC › 1AC – Techno-Orientalism
Kouch and Wang 18, *June Kuoch is a queer and trans Southeast Asian American. They are a senior at the University of Minnesota majoring in Sociology with a focus in policy analysis and minoring in Asian American Studies, Gender Women and Sexuality Studies, and Comparative Race and Ethnicity in the United States. Kuoch is a local community organizer focusing on abolition through a queer and trans of color lens. Their work has been inspired the activist Yuri Kochiyama. Their current research focuses on haunting brought by United States empire building as it intersects with critical refugee studies, Asian American studies, critical archival studies, and queer of color critic. **Allegro Wang is a queer, trans Chinese-American and an undergraduate at the University of Minnesota. They are currently a sophomore in the U of MN’s College of Science and Engineering and double-majoring in Computer Sciences and Gender, Women’s, and Sexuality Studies. Allegro’s primary area of interest in research is in how technology emerges as a site of both subjugation and resistance in its intersection with whiteness, queerness, and transness., (June and Allegro, “Cyber Fantasies: Rina Sawayama, Asian Feminism, and TechnoOrientalism in the Age of Neoliberalism” in Sprinkle: An Undergraduate Journal of Feminist and Queer Studies, Vol. 11, ) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
Kim (2010) articulates a methodological praxis to challenge these systems of domination through her theorization of Asian American cultural production:
Asian American culture as also engaging in a politics of refusal. In refusing the seductive will to total knowledge or revelation of the “truth” of the “Asian American experience,” what it means to be Asian American, or what the United States “really did” in Asia during the Cold War, Asian American culture enact what in anthropological term has been called “ethnographic refusal” (Kim, 2010, p. 6)
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › 1AC › 1AC – Techno-Orientalism
Yeats 15 (Dylan Yeats recently earned a doctorate in U.S. History from NYU. He works on how the politics of “culture war” have shaped Americans’ understandings of religion, race, class, gender, and sexuality from the Illuminati Controversy at the founding of the nation to the Islamophobia of today. Yeats co-edited Yellow Peril! An Archive of Anti-Asian Fear (Verso Press, 2014) with John Kuo Wei Tchen and is currently writing Benevolent Empire: Evangelical Politics in the Early Republic, 1790-1840, based on his dissertation. 2015, “Home Is Where the War Is: Remaking Techno-Orientalist Militarism on the Homefront,” Techno-Orientalism, ; accessed 7/18/2022) ng
Homefront illustrates the ongoing mass-market cultural work of reproducing and repackaging aggressive U.S. policy objectives into feel-good defenses of the “American Way.” Many analysts claim that wealthy, industrialized, and technologically innovative South Korea can protect itself, but that tensions with the North provide a convenient rationale for permanently stationing fifty thousand U.S. troops there (Cumings). Aggressive American war games in the Yellow Sea use the supposed threat of North Korea as a stand-in for China, the true target of such military posturing in the region. Homefront’s developers initially sought to cast China as its invading force (Totilo, “China Is Both Too Scary and Not Scary Enough”), but also found in North Korea an easy enemy against which players can justly, and safely, act out their aggression. However, Homefront is also a remake of the 1984 film Red Dawn, where a patriotic band of American teenagers rebel against an occupying Soviet army. MGM Studios literally remade Red Dawn in 2010 with the Chinese in place of the Soviets—but studio executives decided to shelve the project after it was filmed in order to digitally remake the Chinese invaders into North Koreans (Fritz and Horn), releasing a heavily reedited version in November 2012. The “original” Red Dawn was itself something of a remake as part of a broader campaign to fancifully revive the Cold War hysteria of the 1950s. By hailing the perpetual war-(re)making at the heart of the “America” they seem to celebrate, this family of texts expresses a deep ambivalence about the role of screen enemies in this process. Rather than distract from this ideological work, such ambivalence animates their cultural power and political resonance. Excavating the genealogy of Homefront and its imaginative reworking of U.S. foreign policy rhetoric can help elucidate the “techno” in the term “techno-Orientalism.” Techno-Orientalism describes texts that produce visions of the purportedly technologically sophisticated economies and peoples of East Asia as foils for Western anxieties about the digital or information age. Homefront and the 2012 remake of Red Dawn register these anxieties quite precisely. In both texts North Koreans use an electromagnetic pulse to disable the communication systems upon which the U.S. military depends, and the invaders quickly take much of America. This techno-Orientalist peril is reminiscent of James Hevia’s reading of the early twentieth-century Dr. Fu Manchu novels. Hevia argues that the “Devil Doctor’s” ability to repurpose the knowledge infrastructure underpinning the British Empire for his own nefarious plots is what makes the character so scary. Homefront and Red Dawn continue this tradition of reworking anxieties about the reliance on a fetishized notion of information dominance by fixating on Oriental villains who upset the fantasy of Western technological supremacy. In the context of mounting media fixation on cyber-security, driven in part by political projects to depict China (I mean, North Korea) as trying to hack America out of its role as military-technology leader (Singel), the fears expressed in the 2012 Red Dawn in particular illustrate the anxious stakes of techno-dominance. The occupying North Koreans have their own communications network, and the film’s plot is driven by a hunt to retrieve one of the invaders’ radios, so the forces regrouping in Free America can reverse engineer it. However, the film explores the ramifications of this technological upset through the ambivalent specter of the U.S. war in Iraq. Without computer guidance systems or satellite telecommunications, the occupied Americans are reduced to the status of Iraqis, dependent upon a technologically superior invading force that claims to be their friend. The invading North Koreans tout that they have come to liberate Americans from their own failed leaders, but they will not tolerate insurrection. This won’t do for the Wolverines who launch the resistance using the moniker of their high school mascot. Jed, a veteran who has just returned from Iraq, convinces his budding guerrilla troops that they have an advantage. The occupiers, he knows from experience, don’t really want to be there, whereas the Wolverines are fighting for their home and freedom. Jed claims that both the Viet Cong and America’s Founding Fathers knew that guerrilla tactics could drive imperialists away by wearing them down. In this way, the 2012 Red Dawn seems to suggest a deeply ambivalent circular logic. The North Koreans serve as a harbinger for America. Should American military technology fail, America will be occupied the way it has occupied others. But in the hands of the film’s enemy Orientals, America’s own strategy is revealed to be terrifying and immoral; and given the U.S. experience in Iraq (and Vietnam) we know that this occupying technology cannot succeed. The overlapping and contradictory identifications expressed in Red Dawn and Homefront between Iraqis, North Koreans, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Russians (and the list could, and does, go on) illustrate the polymorphous Orientalism at play in these texts. This displacement of enmity reflects a broader tradition of American war-gaming. Red Dawn (2012) producer Tripp Vinson stated he was interested in remaking the 1984 original because he had enjoyed it as a kid and thought “the idea of an invading army is something that speaks to the American psyche” (Hasan). However, the American psyche is not static, but continually reproduced, remade, and cultivated by image makers backed by the power of the state. Since World War II, politicians and pundits have used the specter of “Oriental” enemy invasions to scare Americans into defending themselves against a succession of intractable foes by embracing the emancipatory promise of military technology. Defenders and definers of America have replaced Soviet communism with new archenemies across East Asia and the Middle East. Cyberwar has replaced the Space Race. The ease of this transition suggests how the shifting goals of U.S. policy, not any overarching immutable cultural or geostrategic affinity across the “Orient,” shape how Americans understand the implicit “Eastern” threats to an imagined “West.” This complements Edward Said’s central contention that the Orient is not a real place that experts in the West analyze: the Orient is a fantasy, produced by analysts with the power to assert its existence. Adding “techno” to Orientalism registers the embeddedness of such civilizational logic within the sixty-year American struggle for military industrial techno-dominance in the supposedly epic contest over the fate of the world. As remakes, Red Dawn and Homefront hint at their participation in the ongoing reproduction of techno-Orientalist militarism at the heart of the U.S. political culture. These texts hail a tradition of attacking Americans in order to convince them they are, or could be, under attack from so-called Orientals. Key to this tradition of making and remaking techno-Orientalist militarism were a succession of groups named the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD). In 1950, a group of establishment elites founded the first CPD to promote the military to foster an “American Century” rooted in free trade by challenging Soviet attempts to close off global markets. To do so, this CPD depicted the Soviet threat to America as a zero-sum game. Behind closed doors in Washington, the CPD stewarded the adoption of the secret NSC-68 memoranda shortly before the Korean War. NSC-68 was the ultimate techno-Orientalist document, describing the Soviet Union as a “fanatical,” “intractable,” “inescapably militant” enemy “antithetical” to the existence of freedom and Western “civilization” (Pietz). NSC-68 advocated removing Cold War strategy from congressional oversight and placing it squarely in the charge of a vastly expanded military to develop a technological supremacy that could bolster freedom and counter communism any- and everywhere. Under the banner of anticommunism Americans launched a program of mutually assured destruction and the development of brutal countersubversive campaigns at home and abroad (Sanders 23–50).
But by the 1970s this techno-Orientalist vision began to crumble under its own weight (Englehardt). All the sophisticated surveillance and targeting seemed unable to win in Vietnam or America. Revelations about the existence of NSC-68 and the extra-legal activities it fostered provoked widespread distrust in the military establishment. The growing sense at that time that the desperate pursuit of anticommunism was neither possible nor healthy for American society led to the embrace of détente with first China and then the Soviet Union. However, hawkish politicians and defense analysts who were being pushed out of the military establishment founded a second CPD in 1976 to remake Orientalist fears, and revive the promise that technology could defend against them, in order to reassert their declining influence (Cahn). This is the all-too-real backstory to Homefront and the Red Dawns.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › 1AC › 1AC – Techno-Orientalism
Kouch and Wang 18, *June Kuoch is a queer and trans Southeast Asian American. They are a senior at the University of Minnesota majoring in Sociology with a focus in policy analysis and minoring in Asian American Studies, Gender Women and Sexuality Studies, and Comparative Race and Ethnicity in the United States. Kuoch is a local community organizer focusing on abolition through a queer and trans of color lens. Their work has been inspired the activist Yuri Kochiyama. Their current research focuses on haunting brought by United States empire building as it intersects with critical refugee studies, Asian American studies, critical archival studies, and queer of color critic. **Allegro Wang is a queer, trans Chinese-American and an undergraduate at the University of Minnesota. They are currently a sophomore in the U of MN’s College of Science and Engineering and double-majoring in Computer Sciences and Gender, Women’s, and Sexuality Studies. Allegro’s primary area of interest in research is in how technology emerges as a site of both subjugation and resistance in its intersection with whiteness, queerness, and transness., (June and Allegro, “Cyber Fantasies: Rina Sawayama, Asian Feminism, and TechnoOrientalism in the Age of Neoliberalism” in Sprinkle: An Undergraduate Journal of Feminist and Queer Studies, Vol. 11, ) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
The ways in which techno-Orientalism manifests in Asia are predicated on Cold War logics, a kind of Western militarized violence. Jodi Kim (2010) finds in Ends of Empire that the Cold War brought spatial and temporal distinctions for racialized Asian bodies via proxy wars. The United States’ relationship with Asian nations is overdetermined by the events of that era: “The Cold War, as a geopolitical, cultural, and epistemological project of gendered racial formation and imperialism undergirding U.S. global hegemony” (Kim, 2010, p. 4). The United States’ investment in nations like South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam is predicated on Western interests in the geopolitical sphere. The United States rebuilt Japan after World War II as a means of gaining capital and hegemonic power, which is a neo-imperialist and gendered project that undergirds U.S.-Japan relations. Okinawa is a focal point for empires to collide—Japan’s settlement and the US military occupation—both of which have brought genderbased violence to indigenous Okinawans (Yoneyama, 2015). The racialized, gendered dynamic produces a taxonomy of Asian subjectivity in that Asians are tools for the West. Within hegemonic systems, Asian women are pushed to the periphery of Empire. Their subservience and domination are used to further neo-colonial, white, hegemonic, masculine interests, which is evident in the advent of comfort women and the military sex industry (Yoneyama, 2015). Western nations, specifically white men, are invested in Asia because they perceive themselves as “saving” Asian women from an Orientalized depiction of violent Asian men, which propagates a racialized and heteronormative notion of Asia (Park, 2012). The political and economic rise of Asian principalities such as China, Japan, and India transform Oriental epistemologies via a disruption of white hegemonic power. In the attempt of Asian nations to secure capital, security anxieties manifest from white fears of emasculation or the loss of power. In a discursive response to maintain international white supremacy, a new form of othering occurs (Park, 2012; Agathangelou, 2016).
Thus, Cold War logics spectrally transform, haunt, and underlie techno-Orientalism. Asian subjectivity is always within a state of flux or being and exists in nonlinear spatiotemporalities as a result of Western modernities:
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › 1AC › 1AC – Techno-Orientalism
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Technologizing Orientalism”, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
From the earliest era of Asian peoples in the United States, their technical abilities were both lauded and erased. An exemplar is the Chinese men who composed more than half of the labor force that completed the transcontinental railroad’s western portion over the high Sierra Nevada mountains to Promontory, Utah, in 1869. In the campaign to extend the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the American Federation of Labor argued in their publication, Some Reasons for Chinese Exclusion, Meat vs. Rice, American Manhood against Asiatic Coolieism: Which Shall Survive? (1902), that the Chinese male body differed radically from the American male body. The publication argued that the Chinese laborer could withstand physical deprivations that American and European laborers could not (American Federation of Labor et al. 5, 14, 16, 18). This constructed difference rationalized discriminatory policies against Chinese railroad workers. Meat vs. Rice did not argue the Chinese had particular technical skills that were valuable for constructing the transcontinental railroad. On the contrary, the publication claimed the Chinese body simply did not require the conditions of safety, sustenance, and shelter that bodies of European descendents required. Implicit in their argument is a threat to the superior European laborer’s way of life or culture by a kind of unfeeling superhuman antithetical to the West’s liberal humanist credo.
The U.S. techno-Orientalist imagination is thus rooted in this view of the Asian body as a form of expendable technology—a view that emerged in the discourse of early U.S. industrialization and continued to evolve in the twentieth century. In 1982, a twenty-seven-year-old Chinese American named Vincent Chin was beaten to death by two white men in Detroit. The attackers, Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz, were autoworkers in a U.S. auto industry that was losing market share to Japanese cars. Though Chin, a drafter, did not work in automobiles, Ebens and Nitz viewed him as representative—indeed, an embodiment—of Japanese auto manufacturing as they beat him with a baseball bat, reminiscent of Americans smashing Japanese-made cars in reaction to increasing auto imports in the early 1980s.9 The callous brutality of Chin’s death evinces something more than racial hatred; Chin not only was perceived as a convenient stand-in for the Japanese automotive industry, but embodied its traits—unfeeling, efficient, and inhuman. In Ebens and Nitz’s eyes, they were Luddites striking down the automatons that had been sent in to replace them. Techno-Orientalist discourse completed the project of dehumanizing Vincent Chin by rendering him as not only a racialized Other, but a factory machine that had to be dismantled by Ebens and Nitz to reclaim their personhood, subjectivity, and masculinity.10 The shock and outrage over Chin’s murder served as a critical rallying cry under which a coalition of ethnic-specific groups joined as Asian Americans.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › 1AC › 1AC – Techno-Orientalism
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Technologizing Orientalism”, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
These examples perfectly illustrate our definition of techno-Orientalism: the phenomenon of imagining Asia and Asians in hypo- or hypertechnological terms in cultural productions and political discourse.4 Techno-Orientalist imaginations are infused with the languages and codes of the technological and the futuristic. These developed alongside industrial advances in the West and have become part of the West’s project of securing dominance as architects of the future, a project that requires configurations of the East as the very technology with which to shape it. Techno-Orientalist speculations of an Asianized future have become ever more prevalent in the wake of neoliberal trade policies that enabled greater flow of information and capital between the East and the West. Substantial criticism of techno-Orientalism emerged in the mid-1990s when cultural theorists began to trace its manifestations and theorize its causes and implications. Kevin Morley and David Robins, Toshiya Ueno, and Kumiko Sato, principal trailblazers of the field, laid much of the valuable groundwork. Morley and Robins’s Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes, and Cultural Boundaries (Routledge, 1995), in which a definition of “techno-Orientalism” first saw print, remains the most cited in critical assessments of technological and Orientalist discourses; however, Ueno has probably written most extensively about techno-Orientalism as a discursive cultural phenomenon in the era of what he identifies as the “post-Fordist social environment of globalization” (223). “The basis of Orientalism and xenophobia is the subordination of Others through a sort of ‘mirror of cultural conceit,’” Ueno explains. “The Orient exists in so far as the West needs it, because it brings the project of the West into focus” (223).
Whereas Orientalism, as a strategy of representational containment, arrests Asia in traditional, and often premodern imagery, techno-Orientalism presents a broader, dynamic, and often contradictory spectrum of images, constructed by the East and West alike, of an “Orient” undergoing rapid economic and cultural transformations. Techno-Orientalism, like Orientalism, places great emphasis on the project of modernity—cultures privilege modernity and fear losing their perceived “edge” over others. Stretching beyond Orientalism’s premise of a hegemonic West’s representational authority over the East, techno-Orientalism’s scope is much more expansive and bidirectional, its discourses mutually constituted by the flow of trade and capital across the hemispheres. As Ueno observes, techno-Orientalism is first and foremost an effect of globalism. “If the Orient was invented by the West,” he writes, “then the Techno-Orient was also invented by the world of information capitalism” (228). Technological developments, driven by the imperial aspirations and the appetites of consumerist societies on both sides of the Pacific, propel the engines of invention and production. In its wake, Western nations vying for cultural and economic dominance with Asian nations find in technoOrientalism an expressive vehicle for their aspirations and fears. Our volume, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, documents past and current constructions of the role of Asia in a technologized future and critically examines this proliferating phenomenon.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AT: Turkey Politics › 1AR – AT: Election Ploy
Ghosh 22 [Bobby Ghosh, Washington Post, "Analysis", 7-4-2022, accessed 7-21-2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/erdogan-missed-a-big-opportunity-with-nato/2022/07/01/3f1c90b6-f90c-11ec-81db-ac07a394a86b_story.html] Lex IT
In the weeks and months ahead, Erdogan will talk up his success in Spain as he ratchets up his re-election campaign. With less than a year to go before he faces an electorate in severe economic distress, the president will take any opportunity for chest-thumping he can get.
But Turks paying close attention to the 11th-hour machinations in Madrid will know Erdogan gained very little — and may have lost a lot. If he got a few talking points for his campaign speeches, the president gave up a chance to return Turkey to the high table of international affairs.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AT: Turkey Politics › 1AR – AT: Election Ploy
Turak 6/29 [Natasha Turak, CNBC, “NATO deal between Turkey, Sweden and Finland brings home wins for Erdogan — and a possible F-16 breakthrough”, 6-29-2021, accessed 7-21-2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/29/nato-deal-between-turkey-sweden-and-finland-brings-wins-for-erdogan.html] Lex IT
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was staunch in his demands of Sweden and Finland, which centered on their relationships with groups that Turkey’s government deems a terrorist threat.
What is a big win for NATO is also a victory for Erdogan, analysts say, and one that the president needed in order to shore up domestic support as his economy flounders and Turks struggle with inflation that’s exceeded 70%.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AT: Turkey Politics › 2AC – Turkey PTX
Morgan 7/22 [Benjamin Tomas Morgan, studying IR at University of Indiana, The Chicago Council, "Is Turkey Coming to a Crossroads?", 7-22-2022, accessed 7-23-2022, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/commentary-and-analysis/blogs/turkey-coming-crossroads] Lex IT
With general elections scheduled for June 2023, the Turkish public will have its biggest opportunity since 2018 to set the course for their domestic and foreign policies. The election comes at an unsettled time for Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s ongoing financial crisis has made it more dependent on Chinese imports and Russian gas. The Russia-Ukraine war has increased concerns about Russia among the Turkish public, but the recent spat with NATO and a looming conflict with the US over a possible Turkish offensive in Syria could limit how much Turkish views of NATO and the West improve.
Keen observers of Turkish politics will know that negative Turkish views of the United States, NATO, and the EU are, to an extent, nothing new. What is new is the emergence of Russia and China as a viable foreign policy alternative within the Turkish public consciousness. With significant numbers of Turks unsatisfied with the state of their Western foreign alliances and general elections coming up next year, whether more Turks will favor a reorientation eastward is something to watch.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AT: Turkey Politics › 2AC – Turkey PTX
Macias 6/28 [Amanda Macias, a Knight-Bagehot Fellow in Economics and Business Journalism at Columbia University, covers national security and foreign policy for CNBC, studied Broadcast Journalism and Finance at the University of Missouri, CNBC, “NATO reaches a deal with Turkey to admit Sweden and Finland, secretary-general says”, 06-28-2022, accessed 7-20-2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/28/nato-reaches-deal-with-turkey-to-admit-sweden-and-finland-secretary-general-says.html] Lex IT
WASHINGTON — NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said Tuesday that the world’s most powerful military alliance reached a deal to admit Sweden and Finland after resolving the concerns of holdout Turkey.
The three countries’ foreign ministers signed a memorandum to confirm that Turkey will back Sweden and Finland’s NATO bids during a summit in Madrid this week, Finnish President Sauli Niinisto said in a statement.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › AT Hegemony Impact
Kupchan 20, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Charles A., 10-21-2020, "America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President", Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/21/election-2020-smart-retrenchment/)
As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner.
Much of the debate surrounding the next administration’s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world. And it’s true: Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement. What’s been largely missing from this debate, however, are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation’s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › AT Hegemony Impact
Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security, )
Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.
Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › AT Diplomatic Cred N-B---Militarization Good
Reveron 15, chair of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval War College and is a faculty affiliate at the Belfer Center (Derek, “Security Cooperation: A Key Pillar of Defense Policy,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, BB
The preventive and cooperative approach to foreign policy is visible in today’s military, which has undergone dramatic change over the last three decades. Defense strategy embraces the notion that the U.S. military does much more than fight wars. The military trains, equips, and deploys peacekeepers; provides humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and supports other militaries to reduce security deficits throughout the world. With national security focused on weak states and regional challengers, the U.S. military has been evolving from a force of confrontation to one of cooperation. The rationale for security cooperation has been based on the assumption that instability breeds chaos, which would make it more likely that the US or the international community would face pressure to intervene in the future. Given America’s global foreign policy, many countries have large expectations for assistance from the United States, but the US also derives benefits from security cooperation. Among these are: Obtaining base access as a quid pro quo Augmenting U.S. force structure by providing logistics and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to coalition partners in the Middle East Promoting a favorable balance of power by selling weapon systems and training programs to Gulf Cooperation Council countries to balance Iran Harmonizing areas of cooperation by working with Japan and Israel on missile defense Promoting self-defense through the Georgia Train and Equip program Reinforcing sovereignty through programs like Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative with Mexico Supporting the US industrial base and creating interoperable air forces through the F-35 program As these reasons suggest, security cooperation is much bigger than train and equip forces in combat zones. Given the scope of these programs and diversity of the partners, one can develop measurable objectives. These include: the strength of regional security agreements, the types of regional cooperation (e.g., participation in U.S.-led air, maritime, or land operations), willingness of foreign governments to counter threats the U.S. identifies (e.g. terrorism), and the relative receptivity of U.S. forces within the partner country. Internal to countries, one can measure how well partners combat security challenges, the strength of civil–military relations, and the levels of respect for human rights. Measurement can include the extent to which international commerce flows freely, levels of cooperation between military and international relief organizations, and support for international initiatives to combat disease, illicit activity, and weapons proliferation.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › AT Diplomatic Cred N-B---Militarization Good
Reveron 15, chair of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval War College and is a faculty affiliate at the Belfer Center (Derek, “Security Cooperation: A Key Pillar of Defense Policy,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, BB
As the United States looks ahead, the country is sure to follow the tradition in defense strategy that prioritizes enabling partners through training and equipping their forces. Over the last 15 years, the number of status of forces agreements (SOFAs) increased from 40 to 117. This is due, in part, to the fact that while administrations may change, fundamental U.S. interests have not. These include: protecting the US homeland from catastrophic attack, sustaining a global system marked by open lines of communication to facilitate commerce, promoting international security, and preventing powers hostile to the United States from being able to dominate important areas of the world.[4] The United States aspires to create true partners who can confront their own threats to internal stability, which organized crime, violent actors, and regional rivals exploit. Known as the “indirect approach,” the U.S. helps countries fill security deficits that exist when a country cannot independently protect its own national security. American generosity helps explain this, but U.S. national security benefits too. For example, by providing radars and surveillance technology, Central American countries can control their airspace and can interdict drug-filled planes bound for the US; by providing logistic support, Pakistan can lead a maritime coalition promoting maritime security in the Indian Ocean; and by selling AEGIS destroyers, Japan can counter North Korean missiles and provide early warning of missile threats to the United States. Through security cooperation programs like these, the United States helps other countries meet their immediate national security needs, but there is also an effort to foster independence so states can contribute to global security. This is most visible in a program such as the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative that trains and equips foreign militaries to participate in peacekeeping operations. While the United States does not want to deploy ground forces under the United Nations flag, it does play a key role in peacekeeping by training and equipping over 250,000 peacekeepers since 2005. Programs like GPOI enabled Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda to participate in an African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia. An officer from Chad seemed to capture the rationale for other countries’ efforts to contribute to global security: “When your neighbor’s house is burning, you have to put it out, because if not, yours is next.”[5] U.S. security cooperation often provides the tools countries need when their national security demands exceed their security capacities.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › AT Diplomatic Cred N-B---Militarization Good
Sadler 21, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at Heritage, and Janae Diaz, Fall 2020 member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation (“Don’t Shift Security Cooperation to State Department,” The Heritage Foundation,
Another report published this month by the Center for a New American Security rightly suggests that security assistance in the Middle East should be guided by strategy and applied narrowly to military effects. However, the report’s recommendations are limited to counterterrorism activities and a strategy of deprioritizing the Middle East in favor of the Indo-Pacific. If limiting security assistance to military purposes would make programs more effective in a region of waning emphasis, it stands to reason that this should be the formative basis for all security assistance programs, especially when strategy calls for increased investment in the security capacities of partner nations. Reforms to security assistance should push the agencies in this direction, encouraging—or compelling—State to design its programs in closer coordination with the Pentagon and in support of Defense Department’s operational needs, such as improving military forward presence, wartime resilience and interoperability.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › AT Diplomatic Cred N-B---Military Solves
Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute,
Since military people know better than anyone the true cost of waging war, the U.S. military has a vested interest in working to build capabilities and partnerships to maintain worldwide peace and stability. Although the lines between what are doctrinally military or diplomatic missions may blur, it is to the advantage of both the State Department and the military to capitalize on any opportunity to advance the policy and security of the United States. The military, known as a hard-power tool, can also be used as a soft-power one. Military members serving overseas in any capacity are already often the forefront of American diplomacy, moving their mission set beyond traditional warfighting to an extended role in support of the National Security Strategy of the United States, with great success. The fact that China is increasingly involved in regions like Africa and Latin America—giving Beijing influence there—is further reason for the United States to take a more active approach and mitigate vulnerabilities. China has learned from our greatest strategic achievement, the Marshall Plan, and has formulated a long-term strategy to, among other things, undermine U.S. influence. We need a coordinated, long-term plan of military diplomacy and economic support in response.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › AT Diplomatic Cred N-B---Non-Unique
Quainton 17, Distinguished Diplomat in Residence at American University (Anthony, “Militarization and Marginalization of American Diplomacy and Foreign Policy,” American Diplomacy,
The issue of militarization of foreign policy is a common theme. One of the New York Times 100 notable books of 2016 was Rosa Brooks How Everything became War and the Military Became Everything. In the spring of 2016 Georgetown University Press published a collection of essays entitled Mission Creep designed to explore the Militarization of US Foreign Policy. As far back as 2003 Dana Priest, a journalist for the Washington Post, wrote a book entitled The Mission which asserted that American diplomacy was being outgunned by the military and that the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on the military to manage its role in world affairs. She claimed that “on (president Bill) Clinton’s watch the military slowly, without public scrutiny or debate came to surpass its civilian leaders in resources and influence around the world”. Specifically she identified the regional combatant commanders. (In Europe the Supreme Allied Commander Europe—SACEUR) as sources of increasing diplomatic influence. In the introduction to her book she assets that “U.S. leaders have been turning more and more to the military to solve problems that are often, at their root, political and economic.” This shift she argues “has been going on for more than a decade without much public discussion or debate.” Ms. Priest describes a world in which four star generals and admirals fly around the world in large jet aircraft, accompanied by substantial staffs to engage in diplomatic contacts not just with ministers of defense and force commanders but with heads of state and government as well. She asserts that they were eclipsing the role of hapless Ambassadors who lacked both resources and access.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › AT HR Solvency Deficit
Karlin 22, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (Mara, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)//BB
We continue to invest in the professionalization of our security cooperation workforce by requiring increasingly rigorous training. We are investing in the concept of institutionalizing the defense diplomacy role the Department’s representatives in embassies play, ensuring that the partnerships they promote are consistent with our national security interests and values. What ultimately sets apart the United States in an environment of strategic competition are the values we represent. Our ability to maintain and continue to set a high bar for human rights, humanitarian affairs, and rule of law—including our civilian oversight of the military—is a critical tool we can leverage to help our partners meet their goals and advance those shared values. Doing so is both a moral and strategic imperative. We also take our responsibility in the humanitarian sector very seriously, as we play an important supporting role in the interagency in supporting civil authorities in countries facing crises. Whether it is managing crisis response capacity building under the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account, employing Foreign Disaster Relief, or maintaining Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), the Department is committed to supporting our partners’ efforts to provide humanitarian services to their civilian populace. During our recent reorganization within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), we have merged the offices of Stability and Humanitarian Affairs and Security Cooperation to form a new Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships. This shift deliberately integrated humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and human rights with the existing processes related to security cooperation to emphasize the centrality of these areas of defense cooperation that benefit allies and partners in need. Women, Peace and Security; civilian protection; and respect for the rule of law also fall into this issue set. This integration will help us look more holistically at the needs and challenges our partners and their diverse populations face, particularly when those needs can spiral into crises that spill outside the country’s borders.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › No Solvency---AT Bergmann
1NC Bergmann and Schmitt 21, *senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, **senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)//BB
Moreover, due to personnel and resource shortages, former U.S. officials found that the State Department is “not equipped to coordinate across the increasingly complex and unwieldy” security assistance system.80 Senior policymakers, who often lack adequate staff or extensive training on security assistance, are not well equipped to effectively guide the bureaucracy on who should receive security assistance and how it fits into broader foreign policy decision-making.81 The State Department’s lack of resources also naturally hampers dual-key provisions that seek to fix coordination gaps between the State Department and the DOD. This leads to a system where security assistance policy varies country by country, depending on the personnel in place and the agency that takes charge. The added bureaucracy can make efficient, cost-conscious decisions impossible, and it opens the process up to political influence.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › No Solvency---AT Bergmann
Sadler 21, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at Heritage, and Janae Diaz, Fall 2020 member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation (“Don’t Shift Security Cooperation to State Department,” The Heritage Foundation,
America spends billions each year on security cooperation and assistance programs, but the results do not match the investment. To help improve efficiencies, the Center for American Progress recently proposed consolidating all these programs within the State Department. That would be a big mistake, because it would minimize the Pentagon’s role in shaping and directing security assistance and, ultimately, the program’s military objectives would be subordinated to State Department interests, such as judicial reform and humanitarian programs. Those are not the values by which such security assistance programs should be solely judged. Security sector assistance programs deliver arms, military training, and other defense-related services to allies and partner nation governments via grants, loans, credit, cash sales, or leasing. By definition, these programs should prioritize national security. To this end, reforms should enhance joint State and Defense authorities so programs are evaluated in terms of America’s national strategic goals.