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2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDCP---SC Requires DoD

It’s the DoD

Watts and Biegon 17, *PhD candidate in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent, **associate lecturer and research administrator in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent(Tom and Rubrick, “Defining Remote Warfare: Security Cooperation,” )//BB

This briefing paper provides an overview of a central, but often overlooked, instrument of US remote warfare: security cooperation. In the briefing, security cooperation is defined as Department of Defense-managed programmes to train, equip and advise foreign security forces to fight alongside, or as surrogates for, American ‘boots on the ground’. Since the final years of the Bush administration, this feature of remote warfare has emerged as a central instrument in the US counterterrorism toolbox. In comparison to the kinetic face of remote warfare, however, it remains poorly understood. This briefing paper demonstrates the significance of security cooperation to remote warfare. It focuses on the use of security cooperation in US counterterrorism operations during the Obama presidency, with examples drawn from efforts to combat Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al-Shabaab. It concludes by briefly considering the future of security cooperation under the Trump administration.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDCP---SC Requires DoD

Security Cooperation is military-to-military activity

Finkelstein 10, PhD, Vice President of the CNA Corporation, an independent, non-profit research institution in Arlington, Virginia (David, “The Military Dimensions of U.S.-China Security Cooperation: Retrospective and Future Prospects,” Center for Naval Analyses, )//BB

The United States and China have engaged in security cooperation on a variety of international issues since the normalization of relations in 1979. In fact, security cooperation began even before the formal establishment of state-to-state relations. We recall that during the height of the Cold War the two nations demonstrated that when a pressing and shared security concern in that case, the former Soviet Union presented itself, Washington and Beijing were capable of working together, extant differences notwithstanding. Security consultations and sometime security cooperation between the two countries continue today. But as the record of security cooperation is reviewed, one comes to the conclusion that, for the most part, U.S.-China security cooperation has been mainly of a political nature and operationalized at a high level of strategic policy coordination. Security cooperation between the two nations has been largely the purview of U.S. and Chinese civilian officials and diplomats, not generals and admirals. In other words, over the course of 30 years of relations, security cooperation between the defense-military establishments of the United States and China -- the uniformed services -- has been the exception rather than the rule. If a serious discussion about future security cooperation between the U.S. Navy and the PLA Navy is to take place -- a leitmotif of this series of conferences as described by the sponsors -- then some of the issues, challenges, and problems from the past need to be confronted even as we look over the horizon. For the purposes of this paper, security cooperation is defined as the two militaries working together to achieve a common objective -- not high-level visits, exchanges, port calls, or other activities that are mainly symbolic or representational in nature.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDCP---SC Requires DoD

Budget classification proves it’s military-to-military

Van Eerden 20, Captain (James, “Seeking Alpha in the Security Cooperation Enterprise A New Approach to Assessments and Evaluations,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies, 11.1)//BB

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget: Security Cooperation Consolidated Budget Display outlines seven categories of security cooperation activity, including military-to-military engagements, support to operations, and humanitarian and assistance activities, among others.6 The security cooperation framework traditionally includes security assistance (SA), security force assistance (SFA), and some aspects of foreign internal defense (FID).7 In the context of this article, the term security cooperation refers primarily to military-to-military engagements, where the U.S. military engages in training partner forces under the auspices of Title 10 and Title 22 authorities.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDCP---SC Requires DoD

The most clear and specific definition conclusively requires the DoD

Reighard 6, Lt Col in USAF (Robert, “SECURITY COOPERATION: INTEGRATING STRATEGIES TO SECURE NATIONAL GOALS,” USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA449543.pdf)//BB

Security cooperation has been a part of the U.S. Armed Forces for many years. In fact, historians reveal that the U.S. military has always engaged in security cooperation with other countries and their military forces. However, the term used to designate such activities is now “Security Cooperation,” a term that has evolved conceptually through various programs over the years. During the 1990s, the terms “engagement” and “shaping” were used without sufficient specificity; they were often used interchangeably, resulting in confusion that led to problems in both planning and execution. DOD thus adopted “Security Cooperation” in 2001. It included a broad range of military-to-military activities, but it also clarified roles and responsibilities. The term Security Cooperation thus describes a broad range of activities used by the Department of Defense in peacetime operations. These activities refer to all DOD interactions that are carried out with foreign defense establishments, such as combined exercises, combined training, combined education, military-to-military contacts, humanitarian assistance, and information operations.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDCP---SC Requires DoD

Security Cooperation requires the DoD to be the source of funding

Fenell 11, Captain, US Marine Corps, In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS in INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, at the UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO (Nathan, “Security Cooperation Poorly Defined” December, )//BB

Security cooperation is a compilation of financial, educational, and material resources, that at their foundation are supported by the United States, in particular the Department of Defense, and are used to support the peaceful development of democracies in foreign countries. The resources provided by the Department of Defense are available to foreign countries after the host nation requests the peaceful assistance of the U.S. military in response to systemic deficiencies in the bureaucratic management of a nation state or when a nation state recognizes that its military limitations prevent it from properly defending its geographic borders. The host nation’s request for support from the U.S. is typically an effort by the foreign country to develop its internal capacity to protect its people and limit internal or external threats. The security cooperation exercise Baltic Operation, held in Estonia, is an example of a foreign country using the resources 9 provided by the United States to improve its national defense capabilities in direct response to a perceived threat to its sovereign borders. In this scenario Estonia is attempting to develop its military capabilities and project an image of strength in an effort to maintain the freedom it earned, from Russia, at the conclusion of the Singing Revolution in 1992 and prevent a future Russian incursion across its borders. In contrast to this appropriate use and definition of security cooperation as a strategy to prevent conflict, the Obama Administration is using the term security cooperation as a way to define a national exit strategy from a two front war, a strategy that at its heart is based on the reconstruction of a damaged infrastructure. The false labeling of reconstruction operations as security cooperation is the foci of this thesis project.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDCP---SC vs SA

The State Department implements Assistance, the Department of Defense implements Security Cooperation

Tankel 20, associate professor at American University, and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Tommy Ross, non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020, (“RETOOLING U.S. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE,” War on the Rocks, , (accessed 5-21-2022)//BB

The United States provides security sector assistance to foreign civilian and military forces, agencies, and institutions ranging from local law enforcement and judicial systems to standing militaries. This assistance is intended to strengthen U.S. access to key territories and facilities, shape partners’ national security decision-making and governance, and build their capacity and capabilities for use against shared threats and adversaries. It also promotes the U.S. defense industry via arms transfers, supports the infrastructure and operations of multilateral organizations such as NATO, and increases military interoperability. The State Department implements assistance across the entire security sector, including organizations responsible for defense, law enforcement, and security of key assets like ports and borders. The Department of Defense has a narrower mandate, and provides assistance to partner militaries under the umbrella of security cooperation. The Pentagon also engages in a range of other activities — combined exercises, staff talks, port visits, and officer exchanges — that fall under security cooperation as well. We use the term security sector assistance for simplicity, and distinguish where these additional security cooperation activities are relevant. The U.S. government does not typically define Foreign Military Sales as assistance, but we believe it should, and that it ought to factor Direct Commercial Sales into its assistance planning as well. Both types of sales can lead to sustained U.S. engagement with a partner in the form of training, maintenance, and sustainment for the purchased items.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDCP---SC vs SA

Any other interpretation is derived from, and causes, confusion

Tecott 21, PhD in Political Science @ MIT (Rachel, “The Cult of the Persuasive: The U.S. Military’s Aversion to Coercion in Security Assistance,” Proquest Dissertations)//BB

There is confusion in the lexicon around Security Force Assistance (SFA). SFA, security assistance, security cooperation (SC), building partner capacity (BPC), foreign internal defense (FID), defense institution building (DIB), train-and-equip, advise-and-assist, and by-with-andthrough all refer to efforts by one nation to improve the capacity of another nation’s security sector. Within the United States government, these terms are attached to different legal authorities, different funding sources, and different strictures with respect to the agencies— civilian or military—responsible for implementation. The terms refer to an eclectic set of activities, ranging from educational programs like the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), to personnel exchanges, to unit-level training, to unit-level advising, to wholesale efforts to build militaries from scratch. The byzantine nature of security assistance and security cooperation terminology, authorities, agencies, and activities has caused confusion and sparked criticism among the growing community of policymakers and scholars trying to better track it, understand it, and improve it.17 This study uses interchangeably the terms security assistance and Security Force Assistance (SFA), defined by U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07.1 as “the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.”18 SFA technically refers to efforts to build the entire security sector of a partner— including their police, National Guard, and gendarme. This study focuses, however, exclusively on efforts by the United States to build the partner’s military (the largest subset of SFA activities), and excludes analysis of efforts to build non-military security forces.19 SFA, in turn, is the largest subset of SC, which refers to “all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote U.S. security interests.”20

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDCP---SC vs SA

Security Cooperation is administered by the DoD, Security Assistance is DoS

McLaren 14, US Air Force Captain (McKay, “Enhancing the Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of International Pilot Training (IPT) Within the U.S. Air Force: Is It Worth It?,” RAND Dissertations)//BB

U.S. Code Title 22 provides congressional authority to conduct DoS Security Assistance programs. The programs are carried out through two basic laws, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA).24 AECA enacted congressional legislative controls over export of defense articles and services. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee are responsible for foreign assistance and Security Assistance program authorization legislation. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees are responsible for defense programs authorization legislation. The term security cooperation is used within DoD, whereas the term security assistance is used within the DoS. It is important to note that these congressional committees play a role only in FMS authorization. Although Congress maintains legislative control over exports, FMS is a nonappropriated program, external to the U.S. budget, and the president is charged with signing off on spending for the program. Through Executive Order 11958, as amended, the President delegates selected functions in the AECA to the secretaries of State and Defense. They are required to provide reports to Congress and obtain specific congressional approval on certain exports or transfers. The DoS has responsibilities relating to security assistance, which include managing the export of defense articles, services, training, and military technology.25 DoD has responsibilities relating to security cooperation, which include activities to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.26 The military departments and other DoD agencies involved in managing FMS programs are collectively called implementing agencies (IAs). The Army, Navy, and Air Force usually have the responsibility of being the IA in the process of FMS.27 The Air Force agency for all security cooperation programs is the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA). The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition has oversight in the execution by virtue of having responsibility for Air Force acquisition. SAF/IA is supported by the Air Force Security Assistance Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, for most FMS and other logistics functions. The Air Force Security Assistance Training (AFSAT) squadron at Randolph Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, is in charge of planning and, with AETC, managing the Air Force international military training. It is organized under the authority of AETC.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › 1NC › 1NC [With Internal Net-Benefit]

Enhanced diplomatic credibility solves every transnational risk

Burns 20, Goodman Family professor of the practice of diplomacy and international relations, is chair of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Program on Transatlantic Relations, director of the Future of Diplomacy Project, and a co-leader of the American Secretaries of State Project (Nicholas, “The Indispensable Power,” Harvard Magazine, https://www.harvardmagazine.com/2020/07/features-forum-indispensable-power)//BB

DIPLOMACY has never been so important as now, when we are confronting the most serious crises since the Second World War: the global pandemic and economic collapse. When we emerge finally from the grip of the coronavirus, Americans will need to account for a public-health disaster that has killed well over 100,000 people to date and shuttered nearly every institution in our society (including Harvard) for much of the spring and into the summer. But we’ll also need to look beyond our borders to assess what went wrong globally. Why did the World Health Organization—its long and continuing record of expertise in matters of global health notwithstanding—not press China more aggressively to tell the truth about the virus in early January? How should nations be better prepared for a possible second wave? Can they agree to share a vaccine equitably among the world’s 7.7 billion people? Will the major economies collaborate to prevent the current recession from turning into another Great Depression? The answer to these questions will depend in large measure on our ability to work diplomatically across the world in this multi-front struggle. As a former career Foreign Service officer, I have spent four decades of my professional life representing the United States overseas and teaching about America’s role as the indispensable power in the international arena. For much of that time, the nation leaned heavily on its unmatched military might—during the Cold War, after 9/11, and in the Afghan and Iraq wars. Now, with the spread of the coronavirus to every inhabited continent, diplomacy’s time has come in the reconstruction of a more stable and better world. Unfortunately, restoring the role of U.S. diplomacy won’t be easy. One early casualty of the pandemic is our plummeting credibility as the unmatched global power. For the first time since World War II, America has chosen not to lead in confronting a quintessentially global threat. With American energy and confidence in short supply, President Donald Trump is a spectral figure on the world stage as nations struggle to contain the virus. Instead of leading the G-20 major economies against the contagion, the world has watched an American president castigate China for birthing the “Wuhan Virus,” pin the blame for the failed response on the World Health Organization, and—as one of my European students lamented—fail even to offer a simple word of sympathy in all those endless news conferences to those dying in Italy and Spain and other bedrock allies. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell has long maintained that America should place its diplomats out in front (“on point” in the military vernacular), with the armed forces in reserve, to be used only when diplomacy fails. Powell’s dictum is an important reminder of how the United States should seek to lead in this time of pandemic, for the coronavirus is only one of many among a new type of threat that requires us to lead as much through the power of diplomacy as through that of the military. Many of the students I teach point to transnational threats that affect every nation and person on earth as our greatest challenges: climate change, food and water shortages, narcotics and crime cartels, the lack of cyber security, and pandemics top the list. We cannot succeed in containing them without forming diplomatic alliances among governments, universities, foundations, businesses, and citizens. This new brand of diplomacy is not an alternative to the military but its logical partner in the twenty-first century American arsenal. The military remains essential to fight terrorists, and to counter rivals Russia and China and outlaw governments in North Korea and Iran, but even in these cases we have to have robust diplomacy to achieve our aims. Even if we deployed the full might of the U.S. military to eliminate the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, and the regimes that support them, does anyone believe that would, by itself, “solve” the problem? Even in those cases, deft, multilateral diplomacy will have to play a lead role—as recent experience has shown. We can no longer default to force alone, as we have done so often since 9/11. A Foreign Service for 2030 AMERICA’S DIPLOMATIC EFFECTIVENESS rests, in large part, on the women and men of the U.S. Foreign Service—more than 11,000 career officials in more than 280 embassies and consulates and at the State Department in Washington, D.C. They are our primary interface with foreign governments, businesses, and citizens. They adjudicate immigrant and non-immigrant visas and refugee admissions to the United States. They help American businesses overcome barriers to foreign trade and investment. They manage difficult war and peace challenges in every corner of the world—from daily challenges to the most intricate, strategic matters vital to our national security and prosperity. Diplomatic collaboration also underpins our ability to advance the more positive scientific, technological, and societal trends that can sustain the historic alleviation of poverty worldwide, promote women’s rights, and realize the promise of a carbon-free economy. Just when we need to turn to diplomacy, however, the Foreign Service is experiencing one of the greatest crises in its long history. Some of the damage has been caused by prior Democratic as well as Republican administrations. The United States is the only major country that fills a third or more of its ambassadorial assignments with political appointees, often poorly qualified, from outside the career ranks—often depriving the country of the advantages it could secure with expert, professional, nonpartisan diplomatic representation around the world. That mistake has only accelerated, with the current administration appointing the lowest percentage of career ambassadors in more than half a century. Former generals and admirals have been appointed to ambassadorships that would otherwise be filled—as they should be—by civilian officers. The politicization and militarization of our foreign policy by both parties is a genuine problem. More broadly, the Foreign Service has been substantially weakened and is in need of major repair. Even as the Trump administration’s budget requests for the Department of Defense rose from $686 billion to as high as $718 billion during its first two years, it sought to slash the State Department’s budget by up to a third. The administration fired several of America’s most senior and experienced diplomats early in 2017 and sidelined countless others, triggering an exodus of officers of every rank. The president himself has castigated career diplomats as the “Deep State.” Unsurprisingly, morale has crashed and young Americans’ applications for the Foreign Service have fallen to just under 10,000 from a high of 31,000 in 2003—a worrisome indicator that our nation’s ability to attract superb diplomatic talent is being eroded. Re-Imagining American Diplomacy THE KENNEDY SCHOOL launched an ambitious, nonpartisan initiative this winter—A New American Diplomacy for the 21st Century—to address these concerns and spark a national conversation about the future of the Foreign Service. I am working with former Foreign Service colleagues, Ambassadors Nancy McEldowney, Marc Grossman, and Marcie Ries, to issue a major public report after the November presidential election. We have organized online meetings with hundreds of current and former officials, business and nonprofit leaders, and everyday citizens to discuss ways to strengthen the career service. American diplomacy needs a major generational update. Since 9/11, Congress and three administrations have reformed the U.S. military and intelligence services and created the Department of Homeland Security. But collectively, they did little to re-imagine diplomacy’s role in the American arsenal. During the last century, there have been just three efforts to modernize the U.S. diplomatic corps: in 1924, 1946, and 1980 (when Congress passed the last major State Department Authorization Act). In our vastly altered geo-strategic environment, 40 years later, it is time to renew the mission of the Foreign Service. Barack Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Mahmoud Abbas, September 22, 2009, at the Waldorf Astoria, New York City Photograph by John Angelillo-Pool/Getty Images We can mine America’s long diplomatic history for inspiration. Drawing on my own experience, I recall, as a young intern at the U.S. embassy in Mauritania, seeing first-hand the respect and influence President Jimmy Carter earned as the first U.S. leader to make Africa a priority. A decade later, when I served at the National Security Council with responsibility for the Soviet Union, I witnessed President George H.W. Bush negotiate the peaceful end of the Cold War and Bill Clinton consolidate the triumph of democracy over communism. President George W. Bush launched the bipartisan PEPFAR initiative to help in the fight against HIV/AIDs, polio, malaria, and other deadly diseases in Africa, the Caribbean, and elsewhere (a useful precedent when thinking about what it will really take to combat the coronavirus, not only in the developed nations, but in those with far fewer economic and healthcare resources). It was on 9/11, however, as U.S. ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, that I learned one of the most powerful lessons about diplomacy. Just a few hours after Al Qaida terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon, my phone started to ring at NATO headquarters outside Brussels. My Canadian colleague, David Wright, called first—followed by the ambassadors of the United Kingdom, France, Poland, Germany, Italy, and many others. Each asked, “What can we do to help?” Those were very welcome words on the single darkest day in recent American history. By the next morning, invoking Article 5 of the 1949 NATO Treaty for the first time in history, all of the NATO-allied countries came to the rescue of the United States—lending mighty political and diplomatic support to the military response that would come later. Our allies considered Osama Bin Laden’s attacks on New York and Washington as an attack on them as well. Their militaries all went into Afghanistan with us (the majority remain 19 years later—and they and other partner nations have suffered more than 1,000 combat deaths; we owe them a lot). Contrary to such evidence, the current president believes the United States is strongest when it acts alone—unburdened of allies and partners whom he views as relics of our Cold War past. I lived the history of 9/11 and draw a very different lesson about the value of allies to the United States. Why would we want to live alone in a troubled and dangerous world, without the benefit of friends and allies by our side? Our NATO allies, as well as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, act as multipliers of American power in the world. They provide a lifeline of military, economic, and political support when we often need it most. They represent the great power differential between the United States and our rivals Russia and China, who can count on no such allies when the chips are down. As we recover from two decades of war and COVID-19’s assault on our society and economy, we will need to look at our global role in a new way. The era when America could run the world by fiat has vanished. We are still the strongest economic, military, and technological power—but China, India, and others are gaining on us. We can no longer overpower our adversaries in every crisis. And although we will need to call on the military to defend us in the future, we will more often than not need to outwit and outmaneuver adversaries through the strength of our diplomats and our alliances—not to mention mustering support for those broader, nonmilitary crises we now face, from pandemics to climate change.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › 1NC › 1NC [With Internal Net-Benefit]

Department of State assistance solves best AND revitalizes US diplomacy

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, *senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, **senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, )//BB

U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system. Under the current security assistance system, the returns on America’s security investments are limited, inconsistent, and not strategic. The consequences of today’s broken system include increased reliance on the military to solve foreign policy challenges; a perpetuated status quo whereby nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where human rights abuses are ignored; and an ineffective and unwieldy bureaucracy. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but the current system is not suited to the task. A new administration can change this by embracing wholesale reform of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a Biden-Harris administration must move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to rebuild and revive U.S. diplomacy. This will require talking not only about security assistance authorities, but fundamentally about money and resources as well. Any reform efforts intending to bolster the role of the State Department must start by examining how funding is oriented and balanced between the departments. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill. There must be a dramatic realignment of U.S. security assistance. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how transferring resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance U.S. interests and address the current geopolitical challenges America confronts. It calls for reviving the centrality of diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role, as originally intended under U.S. law, as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance. It also offers recommendations for expanding and training the security assistance workforce, improving interagency coordination, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy, and adapting best practices from the DOD. Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department: The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy. Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency. The DOD has done an admirable job in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. However, officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the system is not working. Tommy Ross, a former DOD official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that U.S. security assistance is “not fit for purpose” and is “out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners.”1 Indeed, throughout much of the last decade, it has been DOD officials who publicly argued for increased funding for the State Department.2 Ultimately, the current bifurcated security assistance system is suboptimal and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department relative to the military considerations of the DOD. Transferring resources and responsibility to the State Department would centralize responsibility for foreign aid under diplomatic control, while improving interagency cooperation, as DOD would remain the primary implementer of U.S. assistance. Some of these ideas will likely be met with innate skepticism from a generation of security professionals whose experience in Washington has been characterized by an ever-withering State Department and an ever-strengthening Pentagon. This report anticipates and rebuts likely arguments against reform, including the capacity of the State Department to take on this responsibility, the benefits of the Pentagon’s current management, or the unnecessary disruption that would result from significant bureaucratic change laid out in this proposal. Failing to reform security assistance not only leaves the United States with a wasteful and inefficient status quo, it also perpetuates the marginalization of diplomacy and locks in the military’s newly found dominance in driving U.S. foreign policy. The current security assistance system evolved to address the threats posed by the post-9/11 era and is now outdated and ill-suited for a new geopolitical environment characterized by competition. If the next administration is to revive U.S. diplomacy and rebuild the State Department, it must empower the agency to oversee and direct foreign assistance. The Biden-Harris administration should seize the opportunity to work with a new Congress to reform the system from its first days in office and restore an effective tool in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. A new security assistance system, centralized and coordinated within the State Department, would allow the United States to wield its security assistance more effectively and responsibly in today’s competitive geopolitical environment. Arms transfers, training, and support could also better support U.S. foreign policy goals, in particular bolstering democratic partners and emerging democracies, making them stronger U.S. partners to counter threats from authoritarian actors. Empowering the State Department to oversee and manage security assistance would also ensure that aid is used to advance a values-based foreign policy that respects and supports human rights.3 It would also give U.S. diplomats greater clout and leverage and potentially create greater coherence to the provision of foreign assistance overall. The result would be to strengthen a key tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox and increase the clout and authority of America’s diplomats, which is badly needed in this new era of geopolitical competition.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › 1NC › 1NC [With Internal Net-Benefit]

The counterplan competes. The plan’s “security cooperation” requires the Department of Defense. The counterplan’s “security assistance” is administered by the Department of State.

Kerr 18, Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University (NDU) in the Center for Complex Operations (Alexandra, “Defense Institution Building in the U.S. Context,” Connections, 17.3)//BB

Finally, in the U.S. government, “security cooperation” and “security assistance”—which are the chief lines of effort in the U.S. toolkit to help partners bolster their security and work with the United States to support common security objectives—are overlapping but not necessarily interchangeable. The distinction between “security cooperation” and “security assistance” activities has to do with the agency administering the program: in simplest terms, it is either an activity of the Department of Defense (security cooperation) or the Department of State (security assistance). DOD and the Department of State (DOS) have shared responsibility for engaging with foreign partner militaries since the mid-twentieth century, with the bulk of congressional security assistance funding allocated to DOS. Any security assistance administered by DOD—whether funded under Title 10 (Armed Services) or Title 22 (Foreign Affairs) of the U.S. Code—is a “security cooperation” activity.[21] After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the legal framework for the funding and administration of such activities evolved in response to emerging threats. Congress increasingly granted funding and authorities directly to DOD under Title 10 for security cooperation.[22] Therefore, while DOS security assistance programs can include DIB components, the majority of DIB-specific programming is currently funded under and implemented by the Department of Defense and is thus considered security cooperation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › 1NC › 1NC [No Internal Net-Benefit]

Department of State assistance solves best

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, *senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, **senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, )//BB

U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system. Under the current security assistance system, the returns on America’s security investments are limited, inconsistent, and not strategic. The consequences of today’s broken system include increased reliance on the military to solve foreign policy challenges; a perpetuated status quo whereby nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where human rights abuses are ignored; and an ineffective and unwieldy bureaucracy. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but the current system is not suited to the task. A new administration can change this by embracing wholesale reform of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a Biden-Harris administration must move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to rebuild and revive U.S. diplomacy. This will require talking not only about security assistance authorities, but fundamentally about money and resources as well. Any reform efforts intending to bolster the role of the State Department must start by examining how funding is oriented and balanced between the departments. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill. There must be a dramatic realignment of U.S. security assistance. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how transferring resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance U.S. interests and address the current geopolitical challenges America confronts. It calls for reviving the centrality of diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role, as originally intended under U.S. law, as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance. It also offers recommendations for expanding and training the security assistance workforce, improving interagency coordination, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy, and adapting best practices from the DOD. Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department: The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy. Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency. The DOD has done an admirable job in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. However, officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the system is not working. Tommy Ross, a former DOD official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that U.S. security assistance is “not fit for purpose” and is “out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners.”1 Indeed, throughout much of the last decade, it has been DOD officials who publicly argued for increased funding for the State Department.2 Ultimately, the current bifurcated security assistance system is suboptimal and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department relative to the military considerations of the DOD. Transferring resources and responsibility to the State Department would centralize responsibility for foreign aid under diplomatic control, while improving interagency cooperation, as DOD would remain the primary implementer of U.S. assistance. Some of these ideas will likely be met with innate skepticism from a generation of security professionals whose experience in Washington has been characterized by an ever-withering State Department and an ever-strengthening Pentagon. This report anticipates and rebuts likely arguments against reform, including the capacity of the State Department to take on this responsibility, the benefits of the Pentagon’s current management, or the unnecessary disruption that would result from significant bureaucratic change laid out in this proposal. Failing to reform security assistance not only leaves the United States with a wasteful and inefficient status quo, it also perpetuates the marginalization of diplomacy and locks in the military’s newly found dominance in driving U.S. foreign policy. The current security assistance system evolved to address the threats posed by the post-9/11 era and is now outdated and ill-suited for a new geopolitical environment characterized by competition. If the next administration is to revive U.S. diplomacy and rebuild the State Department, it must empower the agency to oversee and direct foreign assistance. The Biden-Harris administration should seize the opportunity to work with a new Congress to reform the system from its first days in office and restore an effective tool in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. A new security assistance system, centralized and coordinated within the State Department, would allow the United States to wield its security assistance more effectively and responsibly in today’s competitive geopolitical environment. Arms transfers, training, and support could also better support U.S. foreign policy goals, in particular bolstering democratic partners and emerging democracies, making them stronger U.S. partners to counter threats from authoritarian actors. Empowering the State Department to oversee and manage security assistance would also ensure that aid is used to advance a values-based foreign policy that respects and supports human rights.3 It would also give U.S. diplomats greater clout and leverage and potentially create greater coherence to the provision of foreign assistance overall. The result would be to strengthen a key tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox and increase the clout and authority of America’s diplomats, which is badly needed in this new era of geopolitical competition.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › 1NC › 1NC [No Internal Net-Benefit]

The counterplan competes. The plan’s “security cooperation” requires the Department of Defense. The counterplan’s “security assistance” is administered by the Department of State.

Kerr 18, Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University (NDU) in the Center for Complex Operations (Alexandra, “Defense Institution Building in the U.S. Context,” Connections, 17.3)//BB

Finally, in the U.S. government, “security cooperation” and “security assistance”—which are the chief lines of effort in the U.S. toolkit to help partners bolster their security and work with the United States to support common security objectives—are overlapping but not necessarily interchangeable. The distinction between “security cooperation” and “security assistance” activities has to do with the agency administering the program: in simplest terms, it is either an activity of the Department of Defense (security cooperation) or the Department of State (security assistance). DOD and the Department of State (DOS) have shared responsibility for engaging with foreign partner militaries since the mid-twentieth century, with the bulk of congressional security assistance funding allocated to DOS. Any security assistance administered by DOD—whether funded under Title 10 (Armed Services) or Title 22 (Foreign Affairs) of the U.S. Code—is a “security cooperation” activity.[21] After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the legal framework for the funding and administration of such activities evolved in response to emerging threats. Congress increasingly granted funding and authorities directly to DOD under Title 10 for security cooperation.[22] Therefore, while DOS security assistance programs can include DIB components, the majority of DIB-specific programming is currently funded under and implemented by the Department of Defense and is thus considered security cooperation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

PRISM Supplement 1 --- CPWW

Apathy is a feature of our time – time governance has created a simulation where it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. Change is possible, but not in the current framework which twists us dry

Fisher 9 (Mark Fisher, experiencing the world, writer, theorist, teacher, k-punk. 2009, Zero Books, "Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?", Chapter 1: It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism)//gideon

We do not need to wait for Children of Men's near-future to arrive to see this transformation of culture into museum pieces. The power of capitalist realism derives in part from the way that capitalism subsumes and consumes all of previous history: one effect of its 'system of equivalence' which can assign all cultural objects, whether they are religious iconography, pornography, or Das Kapital, a monetary value. Walk around the British Museum, where you see objects torn from their Iifeworlds and assembled as if on the deck of some Predator spacecraft, and you have a powerful image of this process at work. In the conversion of practices and rituals into merely aesthetic objects, the beliefs of previous cultures are objectively ironized, transformed into artifacts. Capitalist realism is therefore not a particular type of realism; it is more like realism in itself. As Marx and Engels themselves observed in The Communist Manifesto, [Capital] has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom - Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation. Capitalism is what is left when beliefs have collapsed at the level of ritual or symbolic elaboration, and all that is left is the consumer-spectator, trudging through the ruins and the relics. Yet this turn from belief to aesthetics, from engagement to spectatorship, is held to be one of the virtues of capitalist realism. In claiming, as Badiou puts it, to have' delivered us from the "fatal abstractions" inspired by the "ideologies of the past"', capitalist realism presents itself as a shield protecting us from the perils posed by belief itself. The attitude of ironic distance proper to postmodern capitalism is supposed to immunize us against the seductions of fanaticism. Lowering our expectations, we are told, is a small price to pay for being protected from terror and totalitarianism. 'We live in a contradiction,' Badiou has observed: a brutal state of affairs, profoundly inegalitarian - where all existence is evaluated in terms of money alone - is presented to us as ideal. To justify their conservatism, the partisans of the established order cannot really call it ideal or wonderful. So instead, they have decided to say that all the rest is horrible. Sure, they say, we may not live in a condition of perfect Goodness. But we're lucky that we don't live in a condition of Evil. Our democracy is not perfect. But it's better than the bloody dictatorships. Capitalism is unjust. But it's not criminal like Stalinism. We let millions of Africans die of AIDS, but we don't make racist nationalist declarations like Milosevic. We kill Iraqis with our airplanes, but we don't cut their throats with machetes like they do in Rwanda, etc. The 'realism' here is analogous to the deflationary perspective of a depreSSive who believes that any positive state, any hope, is a dangerous illusion. In their account of capitalism, surely the most impressive since Marx's, Deleuze and Guattari describe capitalism as a kind of dark potentiality which haunted all previous social systems. Capital, they argue, is the 'unnamable Thing', the abomination, which primitive and feudal societies 'warded off in advance'. When it actually arrives, capitalism brings with it a massive desacralization of culture. It is a system which is no longer governed by any transcendent Law; on the contrary, it dismantles all such codes, only to re-install them on an ad hoc basis. The limits of capitalism are not fixed by fiat, but defined (and redefined) pragmatically and improvisationally. This makes capitalism very much like the Thing in John Carpenter's film of the same name: a monstrous, infinitely plastic entity, capable of metabolizing and absorbing anything with which it comes into contact. Capital, Deleuze and Guattari says, is a 'motley painting of everything that ever was'; a strange hybrid of the ultra-modern and the archaic. In the years since Deleuze and Guattari wrote the two volumes of their Capitalism And Schizophrenia, it has seemed as if the deterritorializing impulses of capitalism have been confined to finance, leaving culture presided over by the forces of reterritorialization. This malaise, the feeling that there is nothing new, is itself nothing new of course. We find ourselves at the notorious 'end of history' trumpeted by Francis Fukuyama after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Fukuyama's thesis that history has climaxed with liberal capitalism may have been widely derided, but it is accepted, even assumed, at the level of the cultural unconscious. It should be remembered, though, that even when Fukuyama advanced it, the idea that history had reached a 'terminal beach' was not merely triumphalist. Fukuyama warned that his radiant city would be haunted, but he thought its specters would be Nietzschean rather than Marxian. Some of Nietzsche's most prescient pages are those in which he describes the 'oversaturation of an age with history'. 'It leads an age into a dangerous mood of irony in regard to itself', he wrote in Untimely Meditations, I and subsequently into the even more dangerous mood of cynicism', in which 'cosmopolitan fingering', a detached spectatorialism, replaces engagement and involvement. This is the condition of Nietzsche's Last Man, who has seen everything, but is decadently enfeebled precisely by this excess of (self) awareness.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K Answers › Imperialism K › 2AC---AT: Quantum Holography K

Predictions are good and true

Michael D. Ward 16, Michael was a Professor of Political Science @ Duke University, “Can We Predict Politics? Toward What End?”, Journal of Global Security Studies, Volume 1, Issue 1, 02/10/2016,

What Are the Pros and Cons of a Predictive Approach to Social Science?

The main pro is that the predictive enterprise helps us evaluate how well we are doing so that we can improve our understanding of the world. It is the gold standard of a scientific approach. We do not yet have an experimental framework for many important subjects. As a result, it is important to make sure we can get the same kind of results with new information that we got with the data we began investigating. That means we have to either save some data back (a great idea), use the future to see how well our modeled understandings perform, or preferably both. There are only nascent traditions of this in the social sciences at present. Keeping track of your success is not collecting significant coefficients. Keeping track matters. One consequence is that we cannot just keep using the same data over and over. And over. One reason that many hate predictions is that talking heads make many predictions in the media, but few of them ever keep track of how well they are doing. Their goal is somewhat akin to a venture capitalist’s make enough bets that eventually one of them is correct enough that you get to make a lot more bets. Ascher (1979) long ago showed that the talking heads were most often wrong. This is still true. You would think that they would get better over time, but there is little evidence that this is the case.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › AFF › AT Prolif---No Impact

Studies prove nuclear prolif has either no effect on the risk of interstate conflict or reverses it

Suzuki 15 (Akisato Suzuki - Adjunct Research Fellow at the School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, “Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests”, Research and Politics, 2015, , MG)

The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported:9 first, a larger number of nuclear states on average decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict; and second, there is no clear evidence that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer disputes in the system.

This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study’s findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states’ intervention, to the extent that these effects overwhelm the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear–asymmetrical dyads. Thus, dyadic-level empirics cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The systemic-level empirics deserve attention.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › AFF › AT Prolif---No Impact

Statistical modelling proves no nuke prolif impact

Cohen 16 (Michael D. Cohen PhD - convenor of the National Security College’s PhD program and Senior Lecturer at the Crawford School of Public Policy, “How nuclear proliferation causes conflict: the case for optimistic pessimism”, The Nonproliferation Review, 2016, , MG)

University of Pennsylvania’s Michael Horowitz conducted a statistical analysis and found that the probability of new nuclear states reciprocating disputes quickly increases and then decreases over time.

The probability that a nuclear state will reciprocate a dispute with a non-nuclear state drops from .53 one year after developing nuclear weapons to .23 in year 56. Two new nuclear powers are 67 percent more likely to reciprocate a dispute than two average non-nuclear states. Two experienced nuclear powers are 65 percent less likely to reciprocate than two average non-nuclear states. The probability of dispute reciprocation between an experienced and new nuclear power is 26 percent greater than two non-nuclear states, and the probability of a very experienced state and a somewhat experienced state reciprocating is 42 percent less than two non-nuclear states.86

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › AFF › AT Prolif---Turkey Specific

No middle east nuclear arms race impact – assumes literally every scenario

Cook 12 (Stephen A. Cook -  Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Don’t Fear a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East”, Foreign Policy, 2 April 2012, , MG)

Most important to understanding why the Middle East will not be a zone of unrestrained proliferation is the significant difference between desiring nukes and the actual capacity to acquire them. Of all three states that Shavit mentioned, the one on virtually everyone’s list for possible nuclear proliferation in response to Iran is Turkey. But the Turkish Republic is already under a nuclear umbrella: Ankara safeguards roughly 90 of the United States’ finest B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik airbase, near the city of Adana. These weapons are there because Turkey is a NATO member, and Washington’s extended deterrence can be expected to at least partially mitigate Turkey’s incentives for proliferation.

But even if the Turks wanted their own bomb, they have almost no capacity to develop nuclear weapons technology. Indeed, Turkey does not even possess the capability to deliver the 40 B61 bombs at Incirlik that are allocated to Turkish forces in the event of an attack, according to a report released by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › AFF › AT Prolif---Turkey Specific

Turkey isn’t going to prolif

Ülgen 12 (Sinan Ülgen - visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels where he researches the implications of Turkish foreign policy for Europe and the United States, “TURKEY AND THE BOMB”, The Carnegie Papers, February 2012, , MG)

Turkey has a stellar history of nonproliferation and has signed on to every relevant IAEA and international instrument governing the spread of nuclear technology. Moreover, it is a member of NATO and an EU candidate country. It is unlikely, absent a rupture in relations with its NATO allies, a significant change in its security environment, or a drastic reevaluation of Ankara’s immediate interests by the civilian leadership, that Turkey would consider developing nuclear weapons illicitly.

A Turkish decision to proliferate would seriously complicate its international standing, undermine its economic resurgence, and seriously damage relations with the United States and its other NATO allies. Moreover, any Turkish move toward weaponization would draw a harsh rebuke from the United States and would likely be met by an American proposal to strengthen security guarantees, as well as the threat of sanctions if Turkey were to continue its weapons efforts. Given Turkey’s nonnuclear history and its long-standing reliance on the NATO security guarantee, it is hard to imagine a scenario where Turkey would simply cast aside its policy in favor of an independent weapons capability.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › AFF › AT Prolif---Turkey Specific

No Turkey Prolif or inevitable – tons of alt causes

Eldridge 11 (William G. Eldridge – United States Air Force Commander, “The Credibility of America’s Extended Nuclear Deterrent The Case of the Republic of Turkey”, Air University Press, September 2011, , MG)

Turkey likely will “tip” if Middle East nuclear proliferation becomes widespread and NATO is perceived as ineffective and if US-Turkish relationships collapse. According to one Turkish diplomat, “things would have to get really bad” for Turkey to pursue its own nuclear weapons. Despite a rocky history, current NATO-Turkish and US-Turkish relations remain fundamentally sound, but leadership or regional security changes could strain those relationships. Factors working against Turkish nuclear weapons proliferation include the lack of support by senior Turkish leaders, the high value Turkey places on alliance relationships, the lack of funding for civilian or military nuclear programs, and Turkish treaty agreements forswearing nuclear weapons.

Despite these proliferation disincentives, Turkey will probably hedge against falling behind a potential Middle East nuclear energy (or nuclear arms) race by developing a civilian nuclear power program. As Iran continues pursuing nuclear enrichment and possibly a nuclear weapon, Turkey will likely begin to develop a nuclear power program beyond its current research stage. Turkish leaders do not fear an attack from Iran, but instead they are concerned with the shift in the regional balance of power that may result from a nuclear-armed Iran. Hedging with civilian nuclear power provides scientific and engineering expertise needed for an aggressive Turkish nuclear program if Iran’s regional influence increases or a broader Middle East nuclear arms race begins. Therefore, the United States should continue its involvement in Turkey’s emerging civilian nuclear programs utilizing the existing 2008 US-Turkish nuclear cooperation agreement (123 Agreement), develop additional cooperation agreements that encourage Turkey to forgo nuclear and spent fuel processing, encourage scientific exchanges, and consider financially supporting Turkey’s civilian nuclear energy program. The credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence for Turkey is best signaled not through US nuclear inventory types or numbers, but by demonstrations of US political, economic, and security relationships with Turkey. Turkey’s most important political and security concerns include