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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AT: Midterms DA › UQ---Dems Win

Dems set to win Senate, but it’s still a toss-up

Silver 6-30 (Nate Silver is the founder and editor in chief of FiveThirtyEight and the author of “The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail — But Some Don’t.” “Why Republicans Are Favored To Win The House, But Not The Senate”, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-republicans-are-favored-to-win-the-house-but-not-the-senate/)LR

Republicans are substantial favorites to take over the U.S. House of Representatives following this November’s midterm elections, but the U.S. Senate is much more competitive, according to FiveThirtyEight’s 2022 midterm election forecast, which launched today. Democrats are also favored to hang on to the governorships in a trio of swing states in the Rust Belt — Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan — although they are significant underdogs to win high-profile gubernatorial races in Georgia and Texas against Republican incumbents. The split diagnosis reflects the difference between macro- and micro-level conditions. The national environment is quite poor for Democrats. Of course, this is typical for the president’s party, which has lost seats in the House in all but two of the past 21 midterm elections. But Democrats are also saddled with an unpopular President Biden and a series of challenges for the country, including inflation levels that haven’t been seen in decades, the lingering effects of the still-ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and fraying trust in civic institutions — caused, in part, by Republican efforts to overturn the results of the 2020 election. Democrats, as a predominantly urban party, also face a longstanding problem in the Senate, where every state has equal representation regardless of its population, resulting in a substantial built-in bias toward white, rural states. And although Democrats are very slightly better off following the redistricting process in the House than they were under the 2020 maps, there are still more Republican-leaning seats than Democratic-leaning ones. True, the political environment is dynamic. The Supreme Court’s decision last week to overturn Roe v. Wade is too recent to be fully reflected in polls, but there are reasons to think it will help Democrats. Roe, which granted the constitutional right to abortion, was a popular precedent, and Democratic voters are more likely than Republican ones to say the decision will encourage them to vote at the midterms. Moreover, in striking down Roe and other popular laws like restrictions against the concealed carry of firearms, the Supreme Court has in some ways undermined one of the traditional reasons that the president’s party tends to lose seats at the midterms. Typically, voters like some degree of balance: They do not want one party to have unfettered control of all levers of government. But the Supreme Court, with its 6-3 conservative majority, is a reminder of how much power Republicans have even if they don’t control the White House. The insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6 can also serve as a reminder to voters about what might happen if the Electoral College certification process takes place in 2024 amid Republican control of both chambers of Congress.1 Democrats have had trouble getting the public to treat threats to democracy as a high priority, but polls do show that the public is sympathetic to the Democrats’ case, especially after the recent congressional hearings on the events of Jan. 6. So, this is not a typical, low-stakes midterm election. On the contrary, there are strong forces tugging at each side of the rope, some of which are potentially of existential importance. But Democrats’ majorities in both chambers of Congress are narrow, the historical precedent toward the president’s party losing seats is strong, and polls so far — such as the generic congressional ballot, which asks voters which party they would support in an election — suggest that voters slightly prefer Republican control of Congress. In the Senate and gubernatorial races, by contrast, individual factors can matter more. And the GOP has nominated — or is poised to nominate — candidates who might significantly underperform a “generic” Republican based on some combination of inexperience, personal scandals or having articulated unpopular conservative positions. This is not a new problem for Republicans: underqualified or fringy candidates have cost them seats in the Senate in other recent cycles. So let’s briefly run through the model’s forecast for House, Senate and gubernatorial races. Then I’ll describe some changes to the model since 2020 — which are modest this year but reflect how congressional races are changing in an increasingly polarized political environment. Democratic hopes of keeping the Senate are much more viable, however. Part of this, as I mentioned, is because they appear to have stronger candidates in a handful of key races. Pennsylvania, for instance — which is an open seat after the retirement of Republican Sen. Pat Toomey — is ordinarily the sort of seat that you’d expect Republicans to win since Pennsylvania is a purple state in a Republican year. However, the Democratic candidate, Lt. Gov. John Fetterman, is ahead of Republican Mehmet Oz, the doctor and TV personality, in every poll conducted so far. The model, though, is trained to be a bit skeptical given the fundamentals of the race, so it hedges against those polls and, at this point, has determined that Pennsylvania is best thought of as a toss-up. Still, that means Democrats have roughly a 50-50 chance of gaining a GOP-held Senate seat, offsetting potential losses elsewhere. Indeed, our forecast sees the overall Senate landscape to be about as competitive as it gets. The Deluxe forecast literally has Senate control as a 50-50 tossup. The Classic and Lite forecasts show Democrats as very slight favorites to keep the Senate, meanwhile, with a 59 and a 62 percent chance, respectively. It’s a toss-up for the Senate. Part of this is because Senate terms last for six years, and so most of these seats were last contested in 2016,3 a mediocre year for Democrats in which they lost the popular vote for the House and also lost Senate races in swing states such as Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Arizona. Of the 35 Senate seats up for grabs in November, 21 are currently held by Republicans. True, most of these are not competitive, but in addition to their chances to gain a GOP-held seat in Pennsylvania, Democrats also have credible chances in Wisconsin and North Carolina (and outside chances in Ohio and Florida, although those are a stretch given how GOP-leaning both states have become). Republicans don’t have any surefire pickups, meanwhile. Our model regards their best chances as being in Georgia, but that race is rated as a toss-up. And the races in Arizona and New Hampshire merely lean toward the Democratic incumbent, meaning they are still highly plausible GOP pickup opportunities. Still, the picture isn’t as bad as you might expect for Democrats. If the political environment really deteriorates for them, they’ll be in trouble, lose most of the competitive races and even blue states like Colorado could come into play. But if things are merely pretty bad for Democrats instead of catastrophic, the outcome of the Senate will remain uncertain enough that stronger candidates could make the difference for them.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms DA › 2NC---UQ---Can’t Predict

PoliAnalysis---even if the specifics are unclear---early data shows it’s possible to identify the direction of an election cycle

Nathan Gonzales, 21 (Nathan L. Gonzales, elections analyst for CQ Roll Call, 11-10-2021, accessed on 7-23-2022, Roll Call, "It’s not too early to say GOP is well positioned to take Congress", https://www.rollcall.com/2021/11/10/its-not-too-early-to-say-gop-is-well-positioned-to-take-congress/, HBisevac)

So it’s fair to ask: How helpful is analysis a year away from the midterms? As it turns out, quite a bit.

A look back at political analysis over the last couple of decades shows that, even a year out from the election, it’s possible to accurately identify the direction of an election cycle, even if the magnitude or specifics are unclear.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms DA › 2NC---UQ---AT: Overwhelms

It’s not inevitable---Republicans could still fumble the lead.

Stuart Rothenberg, 6-28 (Stuart Rothenberg is an American editor, publisher, and political analyst, 6-28-2022, accessed on 7-24-2022, Roll Call, “A handful of voters will decide Senate control in 2022”, , HBisevac)

The midterm dynamic tends to be far stronger in the House than in Senate contests, where individual candidates matter more. So, the focus for 2022 is very much still on the midterm Senate races.

Voters in seven states will decide who controls the U.S. Senate in 2023-24: Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. If Republicans net even one seat in the fall midterms, they can block President Joe Biden’s judicial, diplomatic and executive branch appointees for the rest of his term.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms DA › 2NC---Link---AT: Republican Turnout

Republicans hate NATO expansion.

Isaac Stanley-Becker, 22 (Isaac Stanley-Becker, National political reporter, Yale University, BA in History from University of Oxford, MA in History from University of Oxford, DPhil in History; Marianna Sotomayor, Congressional reporter covering the House of Representatives, George Washington University, BA in political communications from George Washington University, MA in strategic communications; Ashley Parker, White House Bureau Chief, University of Pennsylvania, BA in English, 4-29-2022, accessed on 7-25-2022, The Washington Post, “Inside the Republican drift away from supporting the NATO alliance”, , HBisevac)

In early 2019, several months after President Donald Trump threatened to upend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization during a trip to Brussels for the alliance’s annual summit, House lawmakers passed the NATO Support Act amid overwhelming bipartisan support, with only 22 Republicans voting against the measure. But this month, when a similar bill in support of NATO during the Russian invasion of Ukraine again faced a vote in the House, the support was far more polarized, with 63 Republicans — 30 percent of the party’s conference — voting against it. The vote underscores the Republican Party’s remarkable drift away from NATO in recent years, as positions once considered part of a libertarian fringe have become doctrine for a growing portion of the party. The isolationist posture of some Republicans is in line with the “America First” ethos of Trump, the GOP’s de facto leader, who has long railed against NATO. Last week, speaking at a Heritage Foundation event in Florida, Trump implied that as president he had threatened not to defend NATO allies from Russian attacks as a negotiating tactic to pressure them to contribute more money toward the organization’s shared defense. The vote also comes against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has catapulted NATO to its most prominent role in decades. And it comes as some hawkish Republicans seek to cast themselves as stronger opponents of Russia than Democrats. Metin Hakverdi, a German lawmaker who chairs the North America working group within the ruling Social Democratic Party, said the question that preoccupies him is, “Was Donald Trump the exception, or will Joe Biden be the exception?” Some two dozen House GOP lawmakers who voted for the 2019 NATO Support Act voted against the similar resolution this month, which reaffirmed support for the alliance and its principles. But in interviews, several of those House Republicans said they still support the organization and simply objected to what they viewed as problematic provisions that Democrats had added to the bill for perceived political purposes. Several who switched their votes since 2019 objected to measures they said did not specifically address strengthening NATO to help Ukraine. Rep. Barry Loudermilk (R-Ga.) found it particularly problematic that the resolution instructed NATO to be involved when a country has “internal threats from proponents on illiberalism,” which he says could be interpreted as conservatism. “I am a huge supporter of NATO — I served in the Air Force during the Cold War, worked with NATO during that time period,” he said. “These issues should be left to those individual nations.” Loudermilk argued that Democrats had inserted “poison pills” into the symbolic resolution, which could be used against Republicans in the 2022 midterms. “It was the Democrats trying to politicize something and add things in there that we have no business working on,” he said, explaining his vote against the bill. Similarly, from Rep. Robert B. Aderholt (R-Ala.): “I am wholeheartedly, unequivocally, without reservation, supportive on NATO.” But Aderholt said he worried that the resolution “had some language in that I thought went on the political side. And I don’t want to see NATO go political. I want to see NATO stand up for, you know, what’s going on in Ukraine — stand up for Ukraine against Russia.” The two bills are not exactly the same. The legislation in 2019 reaffirmed that federal money should not be used to remove the United States from NATO — which Trump was threatening at the time — while the bill from this month called on the government to “uphold the founding democratic principles of NATO,” as well for NATO “to continue to provide unwavering support to the people of Ukraine as they fight for their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and a democratic future.” Another sign of the party’s isolationist wing emerged Thursday, as the House passed an update to a World War II-era military bill creating a lend-lease program intended to make it easier for the United States to supply Ukraine with military aid. Only 10 lawmakers — all Republicans — voted against the measure. In an exchange earlier in the week between Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who was testifying before Congress, and Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), Paul pushed back on Blinken’s assertion that over the years Russia has shown a willingness to attack countries like Georgia that are not part of NATO, while giving wider berth to countries that are members of the alliance. “You could also argue the countries they’ve attacked were part of Russia, or were part of the Soviet Union,” said Paul, who was one of just two senators who voted against a 2018 bill reaffirming support for a NATO, in what was at the time a pointed rebuke of Trump. “Yes, and I firmly disagree with that proposition,” Blinken responded. For some foreign policy experts and international allies, the mere fact that nearly one-third of the Republican conference voted against a bill that fundamentally seeks to support both NATO and Ukraine highlights a marked foreign policy evolution in the Republican Party. “We now are really seeing the true impact of deep, deep political polarization, where it is better to harm the other side than do what’s right for the country,” said Heather Conley, president of the German Marshall Fund. “This deep domestic polarization has now crept into foreign and security policy. There has always been strong bipartisan support for NATO, but everything now has become polarized and can be weaponized against the other side, even if it supports U.S. national security interests.” Many European diplomats breathed a sigh of relief when President Biden, a staunch Atlanticist, denied Trump another term in 2020. Now, 16 months later, Biden’s role in marshaling Western allies behind Ukraine — and his recent vow to protect “every inch of NATO territory” — has alleviated doubt in Europe about U.S. commitments, at least in the short term. But Europeans who were heartened by the outcome of the last American election are beginning to eye upcoming contests, including this year’s midterms and the 2024 presidential race. Their apprehension about a Republican takeover of Congress, which could revive Trump’s brand of foreign policy, is offset by hope that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will strengthen the Republican Party’s internationalist wing and compel the party to lock arms with Europe. “I’m very concerned about the situation in America — the split of the society, the concentration on domestic issues, the underestimation of the importance of America’s international role,” said Thomas de Maizière, a former center-right lawmaker and high-ranking government minister in Germany who co-chaired a NATO working group convened in 2020. “But there are Republicans we work excellently with, and I would expect them to take on a larger role if their party takes power.” Whether that assessment reflects an accurate reading of Republican politics is an open question. The answer, however, is existential in Europe, where the fallout from the war in Ukraine has showcased the importance of the United States and the limits of aspirations for European autonomy on matters of technology and defense, according to lawmakers and diplomats. Flash points are already coming into view. In 2020, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg started a working group aimed at strengthening NATO. The group’s final product, “NATO 2030: United for a New Era,” included proposals, such as the creation of a Center for Democratic Resilience, that have been scorned by pro-Trump Republicans, including many of the 63 Republicans who recently voted against the House resolution affirming support for NATO. The outcome of that vote surprised even Trump’s former ambassador to NATO, Kay Bailey Hutchison, who argued that the U.S. commitment to the alliance has remained ironclad across administrations, despite bellicose rhetoric. “I was nonplussed by that vote,” she said in an interview. A diplomat from a Baltic state, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to avoid alienating U.S. partners, called the vote a “Trump effect.” “But how many voted for it?” the diplomat added. “The mainstream is clearly in favor of NATO and strengthening NATO.” Similarly, Sen. Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), the co-chair of the Senate NATO Observer Group, who just returned from a trip to the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels, said the recent Republican votes against NATO were “poorly timed,” but he dismissed the 63 House Republicans as an “inconsequential” number. Amid the war in Ukraine, Tillis said, “this is a time where the alliance has really proven its mettle.” Another European diplomat said the war in Ukraine has caused European nations to address some of the complaints leveled by Trump, including insufficient spending on defense and reliance on Russian oil and gas. Those were the two issues raised by the former president when he criticized Stoltenberg at an alliance summit in 2018. “It should no longer be a big issue for his supporters,” the diplomat said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to be candid on a sensitive issue. But for some, the changes are not enough. Rep. Warren Davidson (R-Ohio), who voted against the recent resolution, said he objected not to NATO but to its future direction, which in his view places too large a burden on the United States and involves too much promotion of specific values. The resolution’s affirmation of “unequivocal support” risks being mistaken for unconditional support, Davidson said. When asked whether he could envision the United States exiting the alliance — as Trump considered with former advisers — Davidson said the real issue is rather whether other member nations who are not spending sufficiently on defense should leave the club. “Is there a point where America would consider pulling out? It’s something we should discuss,” said Davidson, an Army veteran who was stationed in Germany when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. “The better question is whether there’s a point where we would say to other member countries, ‘This might not be your place — you’re disinvited.’” Davidson said he objected in particular to the resolution’s endorsement of the Center for Democratic Resilience, which he called an “entity designed to meddle in other countries’ domestic politics.” Disagreements have broken out among member nations over the erosion of democracy within the alliance, with criticism directed in particular at Turkey, Hungary and Poland. A Central European diplomat said objections to the democracy center reflect admiration for the likes of Hungary’s Viktor Orban in other Western nations. De Maizière echoed that view, saying his primary concern about upcoming U.S. elections was that “right-wing Republicans are drifting away from this common path of Western values.”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms DA › Generic Nato/FoPo Links

FoPo matters to voters

Koberg 3-29(Kelsey holds a M.A. in Communication from Johns Hopkins University and degrees in Business Administration and Public Relations from Northwest Nazarene University. Kelsey Koberg is an experienced communicator with significant expertise in strategic, crisis, and financial communications with a background that includes work in both the public and private sectors. “Foreign policy could play a major role in 2022 midterm elections, according to GOP candidates”,

The war in Ukraine and botched withdrawal from Afghanistan are front and center in voters' minds, said several Republicans In 2020, foreign affairs ranked 12th in issues voters viewed as "extremely important," behind the economy, health care, crime and education, according to a Gallup poll. But several candidates running in competitive districts believe President Joe Biden’s botched withdrawal from Afghanistan and the war between Russia and Ukraine may put foreign affairs front and center in the 2022 midterms. Anna Paulina Luna, a veteran who is running for Congress in Florida’s 13th district, told Fox News Digital foreign policy is now affecting things like gas prices in America, making it a top issue in the upcoming midterms. "I really think that people, although they might not understand the nuts and bolts of it, they understand that if you have bad foreign policy, it’s going to hit you in your pocketbook. And that’s really how I break it down to voters," she said. Morgan Ortagus, who is running for Congress in Tennessee and is also an active U.S. Navy Reserve Officer, told Fox News Digital she believes Americans are "embarrassed" by Biden’s actions on the world stage, bringing foreign policy to the forefront in their minds. "In just over a year, Joe Biden’s foreign policy has unraveled, whether it was Israel under attack, whether it was the catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan or whether it’s now the most significant war in Europe since the end of World War II. And Americans know they want peace through strength," Stefanik added.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms DA › 2NC UQ push---GOP Win

North Carolina

Mercer 7-21 (Matt, BA in Political Science @ University of North Carolina at Charlotte, current Editor in Chief for North State Journal. “Beasley leads fundraising, but Budd holds US Senate advantage”,

RALEIGH — Democratic U.S. Senate candidate Cheri Beasley raised more money through the first half of 2022 than Republican Ted Budd, but in most campaign metrics, the three-term U.S. representative holds the advantage in the closely watched contest. Through June 30, Beasley raised $16 million for her campaign and Budd has raised $6.5 million. Beasley’s campaign also holds a cash on hand advantage, with $4.8 million to Budd’s $1.8 million. Beasley’s campaign was bullish about their efforts, with spokeswoman Dory MacMillan crowing about the advantage on Twitter, writing on July 18 “it’s Monday afternoon but its already been a bad week for Ted Budd.” But the importance of a candidate’s personal fundraising means much less when outside groups account for hundreds of millions campaign spending. Budd quipped in a statement that “With her huge cash advantage, maybe Cheri Beasley can afford enough gas to finally visit voters in all 100 counties in North Carolina instead of ignoring them like she did the during her three previous statewide campaigns.” “Republican Rep. Ted Budd enters the general election with a built-in advantage in the race to succeed retiring GOP Sen. Richard Burr given that Trump twice carried the state,” the story says. The RealClearPolitics polling average also shows Budd ahead of Beasley. As of July 18, Budd led by a nearly four-point margin in the five polls in the race since May. The most recent poll in race, conduct-d by the Trafalgar Group, showed Budd with a 48% to 45% lead. Last Friday, Budd received a boost from former U.N. Ambassador and South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley, who formally endorsed Budd. In 2020, longtime Republican Sens. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina and Mitch McConnell of Kentucky saw their challengers raise unprecedented amounts of money from national donors, but those challengers both lost by double-digit margins.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms DA › 2NC UQ push---GOP Win

New Hampshire

Silver 7-22 (Nate Silver is the founder and editor in chief of FiveThirtyEight and the author of “The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail — But Some Don’t.” “New Hampshire Is Tiny And Pretty Weird. That Could Help Maggie Hassan.”, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/new-hampshire-is-tiny-and-pretty-weird-that-could-help-maggie-hassan/)LR

In the Deluxe version of our midterm election forecast, Republicans have a 85 percent chance to win the House and a 51 percent chance to win the Senate, both largely unchanged from when we launched the model three weeks ago. Meanwhile, in the Classic version of the model, which sticks to purely quantitative factors and leaves out the expert race ratings published by the Cook Political Report and other such groups, Republicans are actually underdogs to win control of the Senate, with a 39 percent chance. Part of the reason Republicans are not better positioned in the Senate is they don’t have a lot of easy pick-up opportunities, but one race where Republicans could gain traction is the New Hampshire Senate race. Democratic incumbent Sen. Maggie Hassan has led in all but one poll this year against a series of potential Republican opponents, but the GOP shouldn’t write the race off. Hassan’s lead is small in most of these polls, and it’s still early, with the primary not scheduled until Sept. 13.1 New Hampshire is also an unusual state in that it has some factors that should make it relatively fertile ground to defeat an incumbent, and others that should make it a challenging one. So let’s take a look under the hood. The factor that could help Republicans most is that New Hampshire — famous for polling leads that seem to evaporate overnight, like Barack Obama’s against Hillary Clinton’s in the Democratic primary there in 2008 — is notoriously swingy. I don’t just mean that it’s a swing state, although it frequently is in general elections. I also mean that it has a lot of swing voters: moderate, independent voters who split their tickets. Consider that, in 2020, Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen won reelection there by 16 percentage points, while Republican Gov. Chris Sununu was reelected by 32 points on the same ballot.2

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms DA › 2NC UQ push---GOP Win

Nevada – Roe doesn’t save the dems lol

Reid 7-20 (Tim, Political Correspondent of Reuters. “'The Supreme Court did us a favor': Democrats seize on abortion ruling as midterm lifeline”, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/the-supreme-court-did-us-favor-democrats-seize-abortion-ruling-midterm-lifeline-2022-07-20/)LR

LAS VEGAS, July 20 (Reuters) - Susie Lee, one of the U.S. Congress's most endangered Democrats, has spent this year fighting a tough re-election campaign in the face of soaring inflation and weighed down by President Joe Biden's dismal approval numbers. Then on June 24, the U.S. Supreme Court threw a potential lifeline to the Nevada congresswoman as she seeks a third term in this November's midterm elections: the justices ended federal abortion rights by overturning the landmark 1973 Roe-v-Wade decision. Within 24 hours, armed with an issue she hopes will galvanize voters and reverse a disastrous-looking election year for Democrats, Lee launched the first ad of her campaign - a $500,000 TV and digital attack on her pro-life Republican opponent on the issue of abortion rights. "We have a stark choice in the race for Congress," the ad declares. Lee, like dozens of fellow endangered Democratic incumbents across the United States, is refocusing much of her campaign on abortion rights, hoping the Supreme Court's decision can help win back suburban voters who have soured on her party because of high food and gas prices and an unpopular president. Frustrated with what they see as weak messaging by national party leaders on Biden's policy achievements, some Democratic foot soldiers say the overturning of Roe-v-Wade has thrown them a political lifeline, a foot in the door of voters otherwise disinclined to listen to them because of high inflation. Party strategists and analysts warn, however, that the issue of abortion rights will likely not be enough to save Democrats from losing control of the U.S. House of Representatives, and possibly the Senate too. Brian Stryker, a Democratic pollster, said that while there has been a shift of about three percentage points in national opinion surveys toward Democrats since the court's ruling, "inflation is still far and away voters' top concern." Some of the eight on-the-ground Democrat workers and abortion activists who talked to Reuters conceded that surging inflation is still a big problem for Democrats, and that the abortion issue may not be enough keep Congress in Democrats' hands. "Everyone feels the pinch at the gas pump, the bite every time you go to the grocery store," said Lani Paz, head of the Southwest Democratic Club.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms DA › 2NC UQ push---GOP Win

Georgia – graph

NBC 7-25 (NBC Midterms Predictions. “Georgia Senate Primary Election Results: Warnock, Walker win”, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2022-primary-elections/georgia-senate-results)LR

How are votes in Georgia cast? Some states and some individual counties provide results broken down by type of ballot cast, which can include Election Day votes, or those cast early, either in person or by mail. Whenever that information is widely available in a state on election night, NBC News will display it.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms DA › 2NC UQ push---GOP Win

GOP narrowly wins Arizona

Medina 5-5 (Jennifer Medina, graduated from the University of Southern California with a degree in print journalism and political science. Jennifer Medina is a national politics reporter, covering political attitudes and power, with a focus on the West. “In Arizona, a Swing State Swings to the Far Right”,

Minutes into her pitch at the Cochise County Republican headquarters in the suburbs of southern Arizona, Ms. Lake zeroed in on the presidential election 18 months ago, calling it “crooked” and “corrupt.” She claimed nearly a dozen times in a single hour that the 2020 election was stolen from Donald J. Trump, a falsehood that the audience — some of whom wore red hats reading “Trump Won” — was eager to hear. Ms. Lake, a former local Fox anchor who won Mr. Trump’s endorsement as she campaigns to become Arizona’s next governor, calls the 2020 election a key motivation in her decision to enter the race. “We need some people with a backbone to stand up for this country — we had our election stolen,” Ms. Lake said in an interview after the Cochise County event in March, adding, “I don’t know if it’s a winning issue, but it’s a winning issue when it comes to saving this country.” Republicans in many states have grown increasingly tired of the Stop the Steal movement and the push by Mr. Trump to reward election deniers and punish those who accept President Biden’s victory. At a time when Mr. Biden’s approval ratings are sinking, leaders in the party are urging candidates to focus instead on the economy, inflation and other kitchen-table issues. But 12 weeks before its Republican primary in August, Arizona shows just how firm of a grasp Mr. Trump and his election conspiracy theories still have at every level of the party, from local activists to top statewide candidates. And this week’s victory for J.D. Vance, the “Hillbilly Elegy” author who received the former president’s endorsement in the Republican primary for an Ohio Senate seat, shows that loyalty to Trumpism goes a long way in battleground states. Two forces have helped ensure election denialism remains a core issue in Arizona: the Republican-sponsored and widely derided review of the presidential vote in the state’s largest county, and Mr. Trump’s continued attacks on the Republican governor, Doug Ducey, for rebuffing his efforts to block election certification. More than three dozen Republicans running for office in Arizona — including six candidates for statewide posts — have made denying the 2020 results a centerpiece of their campaigns, according to two groups tracking candidates, States United Action and Pro-Democracy Republicans. States United Action is nonpartisan; Maricopa County’s top elections official, a Republican, began Pro-Democracy Republicans last year. “There’s nothing but elitists in charge,” said Suzanne Jenkins, a 75-year-old retiree who described herself as a Tea Party Republican and who drove about an hour to Sierra Vista to hear Ms. Lake speak. But winning the crowded Republican primary is far from certain. Ms. Lake faces especially fierce opposition from Karrin Taylor Robson, a Phoenix-based business owner who has contributed millions to her own campaign. Already, the race to replace Mr. Ducey, who cannot run again because of term limits, has become among the most expensive governor’s races in state history, with $13.6 million in spending so far.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms DA › 2NC UQ push---GOP Win

Only 7 states matter

Rothenberg 6-28 (Stuart, Senior Editor at Inside Elections with Nathan L. Gonzales. He served for over two decades as the Editor and Publisher of The Rothenberg Political Report, a non-partisan political newsletter covering U.S. House, Senate and gubernatorial campaigns, and presidential politics. He also was a national columnist for Roll Call and for The Washington Post. B.A. from Colby College and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Connecticut. He has taught at Bucknell University and at the Catholic University of America. “A handful of voters will decide Senate control in 2022”, )LR

ANALYSIS — If you are from New York, Nebraska, Oregon, Vermont or Mississippi, you have the same right to vote that everyone else in the country does. But that doesn’t mean that you will have the same political clout. In fact, you are likely to be irrelevant in this fall’s elections. The midterm dynamic tends to be far stronger in the House than in Senate contests, where individual candidates matter more. So, the focus for 2022 is very much still on the midterm Senate races. Voters in seven states will decide who controls the U.S. Senate in 2023-24: Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. If Republicans net even one seat in the fall midterms, they can block President Joe Biden’s judicial, diplomatic and executive branch appointees for the rest of his term. While some of those seven states have large populations — Pennsylvania is the fifth most populous, Georgia the eighth, North Carolina the ninth, Arizona the 14th, Wisconsin the 20th, Nevada the 32nd and New Hampshire the 41st, according to the 2020 census — only a handful of voters in each state will decide who wins their 2022 Senate races. That is because most voters are reliably Republican or reliably Democratic. They may well tell you that they are independents who cast their votes depending on their evaluation of the candidates, but that is usually poppycock. Most are closet partisans who vote consistently for one party or the other but like the idea of being “independent.” Since each of the seven states is almost evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans, those partisans generally don’t decide who wins. It is true swing voters — “soft” Democrats, and “soft” Republicans in those states who have the power to pick winners in any statewide contest. Traditionally, turnout in midterm elections is significantly below that in presidential years, so part of the parties’ electoral calculations includes their ability to turn out out voters who otherwise would not show up at the polls in a typical midterm. In most of these states, the handful of crucial voters come from one of two demographic categories. Either they are minority voters who don’t always turn out — such as in Philadelphia, DeKalb County (Atlanta) or Nevada, for example — or they are suburban white swing voters, who are fiscally conservative but culturally progressive and live and work in places like the Philadelphia suburbs, the Atlanta suburbs, and Maricopa County (Phoenix). Candidates matter in the handful of competitive House races in 2022, but they will matter much more in the fight for the Senate. Senate campaigns spend dramatically more money and get far more media attention than do House contests, and voters get to know Senate hopefuls better than they do House candidates. Moreover, few House districts are competitive. Swing voters and base turnout will be crucial in a state like Georgia, where Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden and Senate hopeful Raphael Warnock squeezed out narrow victories in 2020. Warnock beat appointed Sen. Kelly Loeffler 51 percent to 49 percent, a margin of about 95,000 votes out of 4.5 million cast. Warnock is likely to win or lose narrowly in November, depending on whether minority voters turn out and whether suburban women are more upset about inflation or the Republican Party’s continued veer to the right — as well as the Supreme Court’s decisions. The same is true in Pennsylvania, where blue-collar Democrat John Fetterman and TV celebrity and Trump-backed Republican Mehmet Oz are expected to be locked in a close contest. Can Fetterman turn out minority voters and people in the Philadelphia suburbs the way Biden did (carrying the state by 80,000 votes in 2020), or will Fetterman underperform among those groups in November the way Hillary Clinton did (losing the state by 45,000 voters in the 2016 presidential race), increasing the likelihood of an Oz victory? A relative handful of voters will decide. In Arizona, Democrat Mark Kelly defeated appointed GOP Sen. Martha McSally 51.2 percent to 48.8 percent — a margin of about 80,000 votes out of 3.3 million votes cast for the two nominees. Can Kelly hold the suburbs in 2022 without Trump on the ballot and with inflation among voters’ top concern? The one thing that is almost inevitable is that the winners will claim a mandate and act as if they won decisively. In fact, it is likely that relatively small percentages of swing voters — as well as turnout rates — will separate the winners from the losers.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms DA › 1NC UQ---GOP Win

GOP will most likely win Congress

Schoen 7-24 (Douglas E. Schoen is a political consultant who served as an adviser to former President Clinton and to the 2020 presidential campaign of Michael Bloomberg. He is the author of “The End of Democracy? Russia and China on the Rise and America in Retreat.” “Republicans’ missing 2022 ingredient: A positive and constructive agenda”, https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/3571562-republicans-missing-2022-ingredient-a-positive-and-constructive-agenda/)LR

Republicans have every reason to be optimistic that their party will win control of the House — and likely the Senate — in the November midterm elections. The Democratic Party is defending razor-thin majorities in Congress at a time when Americans broadly disapprove of President Biden and are deeply pessimistic about the way things are going in the country, especially with the economy. Indeed, nearly three-quarters of Americans (72 percent) say that the country is on the wrong track, and a majority (51 percent) describe the economy as being in “poor shape.” There is also a widespread belief that inflation is a very serious problem (64 percent) and that Biden bears at least some responsibility for it (73 percent). Given how unfavorable the current national political environment is for Democrats — on top of the fact that the president’s party almost always loses House seats in midterm elections — criticizing the Biden administration for inflation and the rising cost of living could very well be a sufficient strategy for the G.O.P. to win control of Congress this year. That being said, in order for a true red-wave election to take place in 2022 — and to sustain itself through 2024 — Republicans need to do more at the national, state and local levels than just attack Democrats and oppose their agenda. Rather, the GOP must develop a positive and constructive agenda that offers centrist solutions to the key issues facing the country in order to show the American people that the party’s priorities are in line with their own. It is also critical that the new Republican agenda is forward-looking, and not focused on relitigating Donald Trump’s past grievances about the 2020 election. Continuing to dwell on the 2020 election is counterproductive to the G.O.P.’s short- and long-term political goals, as it alienates swing voters and Independents — who largely accept Joe Biden’s victory as legitimate, believe Jan. 6 was an attempted insurrection and are concerned about addressing the challenges of today, not fighting about alleged voter fraud in the last election. In order to reach these voters in the middle, Republicans should promote an economic plan that provides tax incentives for job creation, prioritizes deficit reduction, eases inflation and limits government spending to fiscally prudent programs that have broad public support, such as Medicare and Medicaid. Loosening overly burdensome regulations on America’s energy sector would also be immensely beneficial in terms of helping the U.S. achieve energy independence — which the public increasingly recognizes as an important goal, given the current crisis with gas prices. Furthermore, instead of criticizing Democrats for surging crime and the migrant crisis at the Southern border, Republicans should propose actual solutions such as increasing funding to bolster and better train law enforcement officers — both police officers in localities, and patrol agents at the southern border. To that end, the GOP can lead the way by proposing a long-overdue immigration compromise that strengthens our physical border security and also provides a pathway to citizenship for the millions of undocumented immigrants brought here illegally as children. National Republicans should also take a page from Virginia Governor Glenn Youngkin’s 2021 playbook by promoting individual liberties generally, and specifically empowering parents through enhanced school choice opportunities and promoting greater parental involvement in curricula. This strategy helped Youngkin connect with moderate suburban voters, which is the precise coalition that the G.O.P. should be targeting in 2022. Perhaps most importantly, on hot-button social issues — namely, abortion and guns — the G.O.P. needs to establish a more moderate party line in order to distance itself from the party’s extreme fringes. Put another way, the Republican Party’s positions on these issues must reflect the reality that Americans broadly support abortion as a legal right with limitations, and widely favor common-sense restrictions on gun ownership that still allow law-abiding citizens to own guns. Towing the centrist line on abortion and guns can be enormously beneficial to the Republican Party. By assuming a more open stance on abortion legality, Republicans can better sell their party as one that protects individual liberties; similarly, by moving to the middle on guns, the GOP can position and promote themselves as the law and order party. Ultimately, Republicans merely opposing Democrats at every turn is not enough to produce a red-wave election in 2022 and will certainly not be enough to carry a pro-Republican trend through to 2024. In order for the G.O.P. to secure a red wave in 2022 and improve their chances of retaking the White House in 2024, the party needs to coalesce around a moderate agenda that offers real solutions, avoids relitigating past grievances, and rejects the party’s extreme fringes.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms DA › 1NC UQ---GOP Win

Most polls are wrong, GOP win is possible

Gingrich 7-21 (Newt Gingrich, Former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. Ph.D in European History @ Tulane University. “Former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives”, https://www.newsweek.com/gops-coming-us-senate-landslide-opinion-1726465)LR

There is consensus that U.S. House Republicans will win a majority this fall, and that Kevin McCarthy will be the next speaker of the House. There is a lot more confusion about the U.S. Senate races. Republicans are handwringing, and Democrats are hopeful as they think through the state-by-state races for U.S. Senate. But there's a flaw in the popular Senate race analysis. Most people are thinking about Senate races as small, individual contests. When you think of each race as small and individual, there is hope the Democrats could keep the current 50-50 split—or lose only a few seats. This kind of small race analysis emphasizes candidate quality, money raised, and current polling (which is inconclusive, at best). But if the 2022 Senate elections are analyzed and run as a big, nationalized races, the Democrats will likely lose the Senate by a wide margin. When you have 9.1% inflation (compared to 1.4% inflation when Donald Trump left office), Democratic candidates at any level should feel like they are in trouble. The highest price of gasoline in history—more than double the price just two years ago—does not help them. And those aren't the only problems Americans are seeing and feeling every day. Add skyrocketing murder, rape, and robbery rates; millions of people entering the country illegally receiving taxpayer-funded benefits, and continuing labor and supply chain disruptions caused by destructive government programs. Further, consider the unpopular cultural policies being implemented by federal bureaucrats with aggressive agendas. Given all these big problems, it is difficult to see how we can expect small race outcomes in U.S. Senate races—unless Republicans are extraordinarily committed to self-destructive behavior and out-of-touch Washington-focused consultants. In Georgia, for example, Herschel Walker may have a hard time winning a small race campaign against an extraordinarily well-funded incumbent and professional preacher, such as Sen. Raphael Warnock (D-GA). These were not simply Republican or conservative tsunamis; they were American tsunamis. The American people were tired of policies that don't work being forced upon them by bureaucrats and politicians who don't live in the real world. We are now on the edge of another American tsunami. As I wrote in my new book, Defeating Big Government Socialism: Saving America's Future, there is an emerging tidal wave of Democrats, Republicans, and independents who want us to come together and solve problems with common sense rather than Washington sense. They are totally sick of Washington sense. Some 87% of Americans want to restore the America that works. By a 91% to 6% margin, the American people agree with Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. that the content of our character matters far more than the color of our skin. This American tsunami is going to defeat an amazing number of sitting Democratic senators, as well as hopeful Democratic candidates.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk › 2AC -- K › 2AC -- K -- Settler Colonialism

Theorizations of queerness that don’t centralize settler colonialism recreate queer citizenship and homonationalism

Morgensen 10 [2010, Scott Lauria Morgensen, SETTLER HOMONATIONALISM, GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 16, Number 1-2: 105-131]

Modern sexuality arose in the United States as crucial to a colonial society of normalization. The violent sexual regulation of Native peoples became a proving ground for forming settler subjects as agents and beneficiaries of modern sexuality. Their subject positions arose relationally within the colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality and call for broad analysis in queer, American, and Native studies. 40 I now ask how colonial histories made settlement a primary condition of the formation of modern queer subjects and politics in the United States. I reexamine scholarship in queer studies that suggests this claim, and I mark how future queer scholarship can center the study of settler colonialism, including as a condition of homonationalism. Settler colonialism is the open secret in most historical work in U.S. sexuality studies and queer studies. Settler colonialism conditioned every aspect of the history of sexuality in the United States, but only rarely has it been made a focus of study. My account has suggested a convergence between the sexual colonization of Native peoples and the growth in the United States of techniques of modern sexuality. These proliferated in the decades following the frontier’s “closure,” a time that in fact represented a heyday of state and religious efforts to institute a colonial education of desire, as in the events at the Crow Agency or during the 1879 – 1918 tenure of the Carlisle Indian School. Far from reflecting finality, this period witnessed tense negotiations of active and contested settlement. In such a time, any iteration of modern sexuality that placed Native people in the past knew itself to be a contingent claim that remained open to challenge. Thus scholars must recognize that modern sexuality is not a product of settler colonialism, as if it came into being in the United States after settlement transpired. Modern sexuality arose in the United States as a method to produce settler colonialism, and settler subjects, by facilitating ongoing conquest and naturalizing its effects. The normative function of settlement is to appear inevitable and final. It is naturalized again whenever sexuality or queer studies scholars inscribe it as an unexamined backdrop to the historical formation of modern U.S. sexual cultures and politics. Scholars in Native and American studies have theorized settler colonialism as the social processes and narratives that displace Native people while granting settlers belonging to Native land and settler society. With Renée Bergland and James Cox, I examine how this displacement is enabled by settler narratives of Native absence or disappearance.41 Both terms share a quality of invoking the very thing being argued as not present. Stories of Native absence or disappearance thus precisely do not erase Native people but produce particular forms of knowledge about Native people, as already or inevitably gone. Cox argues that tales of Native disappearance should also be read as narratives of settlement. The very absence of Native people in a story is telling us a story about qualities of settler subjects, cultures, and social life. Queer scholarship on race and sexuality has been effective at marking colonial relations and discourses and inviting the study of settlement. Scholars reveal that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sexual sciences and civil institutions distinguished primitive from civilized sexuality in order to define queer margins for sexual normality. Eithne Luibhéid and Roderick Ferguson explain how Asian immigrants and conquered Mexicans after the midnineteenth century, and African Americans during slavery and the Jim Crow society, were produced as racial and sexual populations for national regulation.42 Queers of color in such contexts were targeted for control, but as emblems of entire racial populations to be queered as the primitive margins of national whiteness and its civilizational sexuality.43 In turn, Jennifer Terry and George Chauncey, among others, explain how sexual sciences classified perversions by documenting white subjects as degenerates who had regressed to prior stages of racial evolution. 44 In early activism, white sexual minorities reversed discourse on sexual primitivity in order to embrace it as a nature deserving recognition by modern citizenship. In the United States, Harry Hay organized the Mattachine Society by referencing stories of berdache as the primitive nature of sexual minorities and as a primitive model of acceptance that modern societies could emulate — themes that were sustained in homophile and gay and lesbian civil rights activism.45 Each such moment is illuminated by its relation to settlement. As Luibhéid’s remarkable historical research suggests, the structural locations of non- Native people of color within the biopolitics of modern sexuality in the colonial and imperial United States align with those assigned to Native peoples by sexual colonization.46 Their distinctive encounters with racial and sexual power thus may be examined as interrelated effects of the United States forming as a colonial power through processes of settlement. Yet studying their ties also will mark the many nonidentical locations occupied by non-Natives, including queers of color, in relation to Native people under colonial conditions of settlement. In turn, white U.S. sexual minorities who defended their sexual primitivity articulated normative practices of settler citizenship. Philip Deloria and Amy Kaplan have examined settler citizenship as based on the conquest and incorporation of primitivity, so that primitivity becomes a resource to be drawn on when asserting the unique strengths of a settler civilization.47 Modern sexuality discourses also taught white U.S. American men to tap and control their primitive roots, as when G. Stanley Hall’s recapitulation theory of play or youth health movements in the YMCA invited white youth to explore primitive developmental stages so as to become civilized adults with virile sex and sexuality.48 White U.S. sexual minorities thus organized in a political culture that already validated a journey to personhood and citizenship that translated primitive roots into settler modernity. Defending primitive sexual nature, which could include appropriating Native American culture as part of their history, translated their queer marginality into a normative assertion of settler citizenship. Focusing on settlement also marks the way that theories of degeneration assigned to modern queers in the early-twentieth-century United States presumed Native disappearance. As degenerates, modern queers appeared as failed subjects, incapable of representing either white civilization or authentic primitivity. Yet this framing also naturalized them across racial differences as non-Native, in that it presumed that authentic Native people had already disappeared from the modern and settled spaces where queer degenerates would be found. If living Native people ever did appear in those spaces, they tended to present as out of place. For instance, Nayan Shah’s compelling history of sexuality and migration cites a California police report from 1918, which criminalized a relationship between a South Asian migrant man and an American Indian youth by narrating it as sexual predation. This regulatory moment occurred amid recent histories of scalp bounties and massacres targeting Native peoples across Northern California, including only two years after the death of Ishi, famed survivor of the Yahi tribe. How might popular narratives of lost Native authenticity have shaped the police description of the youth only by his town of origin (Truckee) and his assimilation into a multiracial underclass? How, still, might tales of sexual primitivity persist, as his framing as the passive object of his racialized partner’s desire suggests (without naming) the logic of berdache? 49 In turn, Siobhan Somerville and Kevin Mumford have shown how popular stories and social practices in the early twentieth century linked homosexuality to miscegenation, including representing it as emblematic of white “slumming” for sexual adventure in African American districts of New York City and Chicago.50 Yet in the Northeast, blackness already connoted historical miscegenation with Indianness. Amy den Ouden has explained how in the wake of normative associations of Native people with blackness in New England, Native communities with black family lines could be marked by white authorities as racially inauthentic, thereby delegitimating their Native identities and land claims. In light of this, by the early twentieth century, how did discourses on sexual perversion tie Indianness and blackness to homosexuality, and how did they interlink? Did the histories of black-Indian communities and of their regulation shape modern racial theories of homosexuality? What would a queer history of homosexuality and miscegenation look like if Indianness — as an identity, or an object of colonial discourse — were crucial to analysis?51 Queer studies must center settler colonialism and processes of settlement in order to pursue these directions in scholarship. Settler colonialism appears in the relational of colonial and modern sexual regimes; in narratives of sexuality and gender based on Native absence and disappearance, despite evidence of Native survival and resistance; and in the normative formation of settler sexual subjects, cultures, and politics. I argue that queer accounts of settler colonialism will be supported by studying the colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality. The frame of colonial biopolitics makes the discursive and institutional relationality of Native and settler subject positions relevant to any account of modern sexuality in the United States. While such accounts have tended to exclude Native people, biopolitics marks erasure as meaningful to narrating settlement, even as that move can be investigated for evidence of the irruption of Native people amid stories of their demise. The frame of colonial biopolitics will also mark how the power relations structuring “Native” and “settler” articulate diverse people, cultures, and politics across differences of race, nation, class, disability, gender, and sexuality that exceed these two terms and their opposition. Yet the normativity of the terms within colonial biopolitics will still inform every U.S. formation of modern sexuality. Studying their relationality can recall that the locations they define for Native people always are exceeded by the discrepant histories and epistemologies of Native people’s interdependent and resistant lives. In turn, the term non-Native can help mark how subjects outside Native communities incompletely fit the term settler — whether excluded from it categorically or asked to pass through or appeal to it — as they negotiate varied non-Native lives in a settler society. Differences among non-Native people of color, or between them and white people, thus will not be erased by marking their shared inheritance of settler colonialism; indeed, doing so will mark those differences, even as their distinctive relationships to settler colonialism and its naturalization become relevant to study.52 In the process, analyzing the colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality will focus queer studies on the work of denaturalizing settlement. I mean here not just that settler colonialism will be marked as a condition of all modern sexual power in the United States but also that the meaningfulness of its naturalization will become a major area of study. We need many more, and more detailed accounts of the subjects, institutions, and power relations that form whenever settler colonialism is naturalized within modern queer projects in the United States. My argument invites scholars to return to homonationalism and explain it as one crucial effect of the settler histories of modern sexuality in the United States. We will see that if non-Native queers become sexual subjects of life, they will do so by joining a colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality that functions to produce modern queers as settler subjects in relation to Native peoples. Normatively white and national queer politics will arise here by naturalizing settler colonialism, notably when appeals to the settler state fail to trouble its colonial relation to Native peoples and its enforcement of a settler society.53 To invoke Puar, the settler formation of U.S. queer projects will make them “queer as regulatory” over Native peoples, whose social lives will appear distant in time and space despite the continued existence of collective and allied Native activisms for decolonization and calls to non-Natives to join. Homonationalism will arise here, where the historical and contemporary activity of settler colonialism conditions queer modernities in the United States.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk › 2AC -- K › 2AC -- K -- Settler Colonialism

Settler colonialism is at the core of the heteropatriarchy, and critiques of such heteronormativity that fail to first comprehend that role recreate settler colonialism – only a prior breakdown of the politics of the settler can resolve either impact

Morgensen 11 (Scott Lauria, assistant professor of gender studies at Queen’s University, “Spaces between Us: Queer Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Decolonization”, University of Minnesota Press, 11/17/11, pp. 1-28)//JSL

This book examines how settler colonial power relations among native and non-native people define the status "queer." It argues that modern queer subjects, cultures, and politics have developed among natives and non-natives in linked, yet distinct, ways. The imposition of colonial heteropatriarchy relegates native people and all non-native people of color to queered statuses as racialized populations amid colonial efforts to eliminate native nationality and settle native lands. Modern sexuality comes into existence when the heteropatriarchal advancement of white settlers appears to vanquish sexual primitivity, which white settlers nevertheless adopt as their own history. When modern sexuality queers white settlers, their effort to reclaim a place within settler society produces white and non-native queer politics for recognition by the state. Yet memories and practices of discrepant sexual cultures among Indigenous peoples and peoples of color persistently trouble the white settler logics of sexual modernity. For instance, native modes of kinship, embodiment, and desire such as those today called "Two-Spirit" produce Native queer modernities that denaturalize settler colonialism. the comparative studies in this book show settler colonialism as the context in which non-native and native people produce modern queer subjects, cultures, and politics. A methodological shift in native studies heralded by such scholars as Linda Tuhiwai Smith and Robert warrior theorizes settler colonialism by tracing the "intellectual histories" (Warrior) and methods of Native peoples practicing survival, resistance, and decolonization.2 Scholarship in settler colonial studies must support this turn, as when Patrick Wolfe theorizes settler colonialism as "a structure, not an event" that calls for a sustained denaturalizing critique.3 Andrea Smith calls on Native studies to refuse its "ethnographic entrapment" in the description of Native cultures and instead become an interdisciplinary site for explaining and transforming a world defined by settler colonialism.4 She promotes this shift by invoking queer theory, which displaced the description of sexual minorities in gay/lesbian studies by theorizing heteronormativity as a power relation that conditions all subjects and social life.5 Scholars at the intersections of Native and queer studies have responded to these calls by demonstrating that each field is intrinsic to the other.6 Smith explains that "the heteronormativity of settler colonialism" has subjected Native and non-Native people to settler colonial rule and regimes of modern sexuality. In this context, "queer" statuses accrue to nonheteronormative identities—such as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, or queer—after colonial heteropatriarchy first redefines embodiment, desire, and kinship to eliminate Native culture, control racialized populations, and secure, in Sherene Razack's term, a "white settler society." In this book, queer will refer to statuses produced by the heteropatriarchal power of white supremacist settler colonialism. My analysis joins critics of homo-normativity in arguing that all "queer" statuses are not equivalent.7 Jasbir Puar critiques "homonationalism" as the process whereby whiteness and imperialism create U.S. queer subjects as "regulatory" over peoples queered by U.S. rule.8 I resituate Puar's account to argue that in a white settler society, queer politics produces a settler homonationalism that will persist unless settler colonialism is challenged directly as a condition of queer modernities.9 Native and queer studies must regard settler colonialism as a key condition of modern sexuality on stolen land, and use this analysis to explain the power of settler colonialism among Native and non-Native people. This book investigates how settler colonialism produces what I call "non-Native queer modernities," in which modern queers appear definitively not Native—separated from, yet in perpetual (negative) relationship to, the original peoples of the lands where they live. The phrase suggests a settler colonial logic that disappears indigeneity so it can be recalled by modern non-natives as a relationship to native culture and land that might reconcile them to inheriting conquest.10 Thus, "non-native" signifies not a racial or ethnic identity but a location within settler colonialism. non-native queer modernities naturalize settler colonialism when they confront queer differences as racial or diasporic in a manner that sustains native disappearance. If queer subjects align with whiteness or homonationalism, their settler colonial roots may seem clear. But even multiracial and transnational queer critiques of racism and imperialism can erase native people and naturalize settler colonialism in ways that indirectly or directly define queer modernity as not native. This book examines "native queer modernities" as projects that formed historically precisely to displace the settler colonial logics that sustain "non-native queer modernities."

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk › 2AC -- K › 2AC -- K -- Settler Colonialism

The biopolitical imposition of settler sexuality forms the backdown of modern-day heteropatriarchy

Morgensen 11 (Scott Lauria, assistant professor of gender studies at Queen’s University, “Spaces between Us: Queer Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Decolonization”, University of Minnesota Press, 11/17/11, pp. 31-53)//JSL

In the Americas and, specifically, the United States, the biopolitics of settler colonialism was constituted by the imposition of colonial heteropatriarchy and the hegemony of settler sexuality, which sought both the elimination of Indigenous sexuality and its incorporation into settler sexual modernity. theorists of sexuality who address biopower and colonization are indebted to Ann Stoler's efforts to locate Foucauldian accounts of modern sexuality within colonial studies.8 Although Foucault omitted colonialism from his work on sexuality, Stoler demonstrated how the histories he traced in Europe explain those of imperial metropoles and colonial societies producing modern sexuality and "race" as biopower.9 Stoler displaced more common readings of Foucault's history of sexuality in queer theory, which tended to frame European societies and their normative whiteness as roots of modern sexuality, and to pay secondary or no attention to race or colonialism. In particular, early queer accounts of Foucault's history of modern sexuality did not emphasize his reading of it as a mode of bio-politics, by which he described modern regimes that produce subjects of life by deploying state racism to define populations for regulation. Stoler argued that linking theories of biopolitics and colonialism shifts trajectories of queer theory that would interpret Foucault's history of sexuality as "a history of western desire."10 In light of colonial histories, Europe is Western only to the extent that it is metropolitan—a center of colonial empires —which means that neither Europe nor western cultural legacies will be understood without first studying their formation in relationship to both settler and franchise colonial societies. Stoler and other scholars in colonial studies examined how racial and national formations of sexuality produced the biopolitics of colonial regimes.11 As Stoler notes, a focus on modes of reproduction has accounted poorly for nonheteronormative sexualities and genders, and still requires critically queer readings. Yet work in colonial strudies shows —in concert with Foucault's work, but against limits he put on it—that modern sexuality may have arisen first in colonial societies, including settler colonial societies, if not in their relationship to European imperial states. On this basis, Stoler explains the sexual and racial regimes of metropolitan and colonial societies as based on a colonial "education of desire." Stoler here marks how colonial power deployed a sovereign power over death that nevertheless became complementary with a modern and disciplinary education of desire that produced normative subjects of life in relation to subject populations. She presents colonial biopolitics as what Foucault called a "society of normalization" —"a society where the norm of discipline and the norm of regularization intersect" — and shows that it formed subjects of life and populations marked for deadly regulation by educating them in their interdependent locations within colonial regimes.12

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk › 2AC -- K › 2AC -- K -- Settler Colonialism

Settler colonialism is inextricably linked to the creation of heteropatriarchal norms in the US

Morgensen 11 (Scott Lauria, assistant professor of gender studies at Queen’s University, “Spaces between Us: Queer Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Decolonization”, University of Minnesota Press, 11/17/11, pp. 31-53)//JSL

In this light, native queer and Two-Spirit activisms can be seen to engage, and contest, the settler colonial terms of modern sexuality in ways that remain distinct from the normative affirmation of those terms in non-native queer modernities. This occurs in their discrepant engagement with the biopolitics of settler colonialism that defines modern sexuality in the United States as a "contact zone." Following Mary Louise Pratt, this term invokes Europeans and Indigenous peoples in colonial situations producing conflictual yet creative exchanges, in which "conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict" generate "the interactive, improvisational dimensions of colonial encounters."44 Theorizing modern sexuality as a contact zone has several implications. First, recognizing that settler colonialism has not ended, "contact" is recognizable not only in the past or in local spaces but as pervasive throughout settler society and all that transpires within it. Indeed, modern sexuality is the contact zone, with all its manifestations meaningfully contextualized by a relationality of "natives" to "settlers" on colonized land. Just as all modern sexual subjects and practices in the United States arose amid settler colonization and narratives of native disappearance, native people articulated modern sexuality as a colonial project while countering it with distinctive Indigenous knowledges and modes of resistance. Second, modern sexuality acts as a contact zone independently of encounters among non-native and native people. For non-natives, sexual modernity produces them as subjects of contact because this modernity presumes native disappearance, by citing native sexual pasts to inspire in non-natives a sexual future. For native people, in turn, sexual modernity incites contact by presenting itself as the modernity of settlers. Even native people who embrace it do not erase its historical ties to colonization, while those who critique it disturb its conflation of coloniality with modernity and create alternative spaces for defining native modernities, including native queer and Two-Spirit activisms. Thus, and third, while the image of a contact zone suggests that colonization is its context, settler formations in fact are being displaced by decolonizing native claims on modernity. While they are interdependent with non-native queer cultures and politics, native queer modernities do not derive from them. Rather, they creatively articulate modern sexuality as settler sexuality by reimagining Indigenous knowledges of personhood and community that never ceased to trouble the supposed universality of settler claims. This book traces the cultural and political effects of this discrepancy in native queer claims on modernity as a counterpoint to the ubiquitous, but not all-powerful, effects of settler sexual culture.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk › 2AC -- K › 2AC -- K -- Settler Colonialism

Heteronormativity in today’s society can be directly traced back to settler colonialism

Morgensen 11 (Scott Lauria, assistant professor of gender studies at Queen’s University, “Spaces between Us: Queer Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Decolonization”, University of Minnesota Press, 11/17/11, pp. 31-53)//JSL

Modern sexuality arises in settler societies as a function of the biopolitics of settler colonialism. In the United States, the sexual colonization of Native peoples produced modern sexuality as "settler sexuality": a white and national heteronormativity formed by regulating native sexuality and gender while appearing to supplant them with the sexual modernity of settlers. Queer modernities in a settler society are produced in contextual relationship to the settler colonial conditions of modern sexuality. White settlers promulgating colonial heteropatriarchy queered native peoples and all racialized subject populations for elimination and regulation by the biopolitics of settler colonialism. Achille Mbembe has adapted Giorgio Agamben's account of biopower to colonial situations by explaining colonial rule as "necropolitics," or a positioning of the space-time of the colony in a state of exception to Western imperial rule.1 Mbembe invites revisiting the racialization and sexualization of colonial situations, including in white settler societies in the Americas that formed multiracial societies from the transatlantic slave trade, colonized indentured labor, and genocidal control of Indigenous peoples under European settlement. However, to pursue such an account, scholars must explain how the colony comes to be located in a state of exception in context of white-supremacist settler colonialism and the logic of Indigenous elimination. Mbembe's account limited its analysis to modern regimes of colonial biopolitics that arose in the nineteenth-century European franchise colonization of Africa and Asia. As a practice that is not past but continues today, the biopolitics of settler colonialism requires specific study.2 This chapter names necessary elements to such an account, narrowed to explain the settler colonial necropolitics that queered native peoples in the Americas by targeting modes of embodiment, desire, and kinship that Native queer and Two-Spirit people reclaim as their and their peoples' histories. I argue that the biopolitics of settler colonialism produces settler sexuality as the context traversed by non-Native and Native people formulating queer modernities. The queering of native peoples defined not only settler sexuality, broadly, but also the definition of queer subjects among white settlers: as a primitive, racialized sexual margin akin to what white settlers attempted to conquer among natives. when queer white settlers reversed such discourses—notably by laying claim to the colonial object berdache3—they argued their inclusion in settler society by traversing normative paths to settler citizenship, which incorporate and transcend ties to native roots to achieve national belonging. non-native queer modernities form by gathering a multiracial, transnational constituency as a diversity that exists in a non-native relationship to disappearing indigeneity. Yet, narrating native disappearance distinguishes non-native queer modernities from the survival of native queer people, who negotiate settler sexuality by recalling knowledges and practices queered by colonial hetero-patriarchy. native people defined unique identities, including two-Spirit, as modern, decolonizing native critiques of settler colonialism and its structuring of non-native queer projects. this chapter grounds my interpretation of non-native and native queer modernities within a genealogy of white-supremacist settler colonialism as the condition of sexual modernity and its contestation in a settler society.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk › 2AC -- K › 2AC -- K -- Settler Colonialism

queer + indigenous time !

Rifkin 17, Dr. Rifkin’s research primarily focuses on Native American writing and politics from the eighteenth century onward, exploring the ways that Indigenous peoples have negotiated U.S. racial and imperial formations. His work explores the roles of gender, sexuality, affect, and eroticism in those processes, addressing legal and administrative frameworks, textual representations, and forms of everyday experience. “Beyond Settler Time”, Pg 36-40

The notion of a generic life cycle organized around conjugal union and reproduction functions as perhaps the most prominent way of envisioning the everyday meaning of continuity. Such an account positions marital couplehood as necessary for procreation itself, and thus the survival of the human species appears to depend on bourgeois family formation and homemaking. J. Jack Halberstam refers to these “conventions of family, inheritance, and child rearing” as “reproductive temporality,” suggesting that “queer uses of time and space develop, at least in part, in opposition to the institutions of family, heterosexuality, and reproduction.”123 From this perspective, queer experiences of time run athwart of a projected life course organized around heterocourtship, conventional marriage, and the generationality of the nuclear family.124 More than imposing a particular vision of proper desire and kinship dynamics, this conception of a regular life weds personal development to a universalizing account of the movement of time. That process can be described as chrononormativity, which Elizabeth Freeman defines as “a technique by which institutional forces come to seem like somatic facts” and in which “historically specific regimes of asymmetrical power” appear as “seemingly ordinary bodily tempos and routines.” Furthermore, “these teleologies of living, in turn, structure the logic of a ‘people’s’ inheritance: rather than just the transfer of private property along heteroreproductive lines, inheritance becomes the familial and collective legacy from which a group will draw a properly political future.”125 The heteronormative presumption that the nuclear family and its privatized domestic arrangements serve as the basis for human futurity per se casts the legal, political, economic, and spatial dynamics necessary to sustain that social formation as simply the immanent basis for the unfolding of time itself, as inevitably providing the framework for thinking the past, the future, and their relation to the present. Here Freeman builds on Dana Luciano’s notion of chronobiopolitics, developed in Arranging Grief, which Luciano defines as “the sexual arrangement of the time of life.”126 In addition to being institutionalized in various ways, this specific developmental path comes to serve phenomenologically as part of the perceptual tradition through which people reckon with the possible, and heteronuclearity provides the background against which other modes of making a life appear as queer deviations or perverse orientations.127 By seeking to challenge the legitimation and proliferation of straight time (which itself can be understood as a denial of, in Bergson’s terms, the “qualitative multiplicity” of temporal experience), queer critique helps draw attention to how ordinary experiences are influenced by the momentum of dominant formulations of time as well as how such experiences might run in another direction, opening onto forms of temporal feeling that do not fit officially endorsed inheritances and trajectories.128 In other words, queer analyses help open ways of registering the imposed straightness of time while also highlighting alternative kinds of temporal experience. These kinds of questions about how one conceptualizes the proper shape of a life certainly resonate with the ongoing subjection of Native peoples to projects of assimilation that seek to inculcate ostensibly civilized ways of being in-time. In fact, the imposition of heteronormative social dynamics has been a key part of the U.S. government’s efforts to supplant Native modes of collectivity, casting extant Indigenous forms of association, occupancy, household formation, and governance as merely vestiges of a bygone time.129 Many of the initiatives within Indian policy have worked to reorient everyday forms of Native feeling and practice, seeking to alter the experience of time so that U.S. legal geographies and claims to sovereignty provide the background. That chronobiopolitical project depends on an encompassing chronogeopolitics, implicitly positing the givenness of U.S. territoriality and jurisdiction as the self-evident basis for understanding the movement of time. In particular, the allotment program employs reproductive temporality in ways that justify the jurisdiction of the settler state (chapter 3), and a similar aim can be seen at play in the reduction of Native peoplehood to quantities of procreatively transmitted Indian “blood” (chapter  4). Queer theorizations of temporality, then, aid in understanding Native opposition to such policy framings. From this perspective, such resistance appears not as a refusal of the modern but as an expression of alternative experiences of time that persist alongside settler imperatives, and are affected by them, while not being reducible to them. This kind of queer scholarship further challenges the implicit developmentalism of notions of a universal now, placing under significant pressure the historicist presumption that the past is an alien space separated by an unbridgeable gulf from the present. Carolyn Dinshaw has suggested the need to move beyond a notion of history as straight, as an unfolding “causal sequence” that, as such, rules out “an expanded range of temporal experiences—experiences not regulated by ‘clock’ time or by a conceptualization of the present as singular and fleeting; experiences not narrowed by the idea that time moves steadily forward, that it is scarce, that we live on only one temporal plane.”130 The possible range of ways of being-in-time is radically limited if one envisions temporality as singular and linear, as replacing what has come before in its steady forward movement (the kind of synchronous slices of time that Bergson displaces through the notion of duration). Moreover, this notion of time as an unending succession—in which the present unfolds out of the past while supplanting it—can be understood as itself relatively new. As Valerie Rohy observes, “historical alterity is, after all, a recent invention; the conviction that past ages are noncontiguous with modernity is a hallmark of modernity,” and in “Queering History” Jonathan Goldberg and Madhavi Menon ask, “Why has it come to pass that we apprehend the past in the mode of difference? How has ‘history’ come to equal ‘alterity’?”131 The positing of the past as on the other side of a great gulf contributes to the sense of the present as something of an integrated whole against which to juxtapose historical events or dynamics (our understandings now versus theirs then), and doing so replaces the coexistence of divergent experiences of time with the difference between the contemporary moment and that which it supposedly has surpassed (such as the antinomy of the modern versus the traditional). The idea of a singular, linear unfolding in which the present supersedes the past might be thought of as a form of “compulsory heterotemporality” in which the understanding of time “mimes the heteronormative demand for proper sexual sequencing,” replaying conceptions of proper individual life sequence at the level of time itself.132 Such a vision of history can be seen at play in the imagining of certain national events, like the Civil War, as moments of transition in which the country breaks away from a degraded past (slavery in the case of the Civil War), as opposed to tracing the regularities of settler violence in which the past appears less as a space of alterity than in a relation of continuity with the present (discussed in chapter 2). In this sense, processes of settler temporal recognition and inclusion might be understood as themselves largely enacted through forms of compulsory heterotemporality that depend on treating the straightness of time (and the ongoing transcendence of the past) as given. If historicism gains legitimacy through its implicit alignment with straightness, deviations from that experience of time can appear as queer. Temporal orientations that do not fit dominant Euramerican frames of reference can be interpellated as abnormal fixations on the past, translated as aberrant tendencies toward anachronism (as opposed to being seen as alternative ways of being-intime). Within Euramerican discourses, the Indian becomes the paradigmatic figure for these kinds of nostalgic inclinations. Discussing the emergence of protocols of bourgeois grieving in the nineteenth-century United States, Luciano observes, “The life-world of the Indian, exterior to the new nation’s modes of ordering, could only be incorporated into its historical timeline through its construction as permanently anterior,” later adding, “The progressive substitution of Indian melancholia, the ultimately fatal embrace of the past, by white melancholy, the reflective look backward that enabled one to continue moving forward, thus bespoke, to whites, their own more sophisticated comprehension of the ‘true’ nature of time’s passage.”133 The Indian serves as a symbol of backward relations to time, of insurmountable melancholic investments in the past in contrast to the putative straightness of time’s passage. The supposed anteriority of Native lifeworlds provides a model of perverse fixity, and, thus, Indigenous experiences of time seem as if they are a deviant way of remaining caught in the past. From this perspective Indigenous duration can be only the carrying forward of what properly should be past, an inversion of “real” time or “natural” time which implicitly is that of Euramerican historicism. Conversely, taking queer insights into account can enrich the meaning of historical density when approaching forms of everyday Native perception, storying, and processes of becoming. Rather than being seen as either a function of straight time (heterotemporal transmission) or simply a deviation from dominant settler linearity, storying can be treated as oriented by its own trajectories, giving rise to fields of possibility that cannot be measured within or through settler frames of reference. Conceptualizing time as not only plural but sensuous, as an expression of affective orientations, directs attention toward the need to consider how quotidian forms and feelings of continuity emerge as part of, in Cordova’s terms, the work of “maintaining stability” amid ongoing processes of transformation and change.134 Shared material conditions can engender forms of perception in common, providing a frame of reference through which individuals reckon with their joint environment. However, such an understanding of perceptual tradition can rely too much on the regularity of those shared circumstances and the group’s long-term containment within a fairly circumscribed area. If they were ever applicable to Native peoples, those kinds of consistency do not necessarily characterize a good deal of Indigenous experience in the United States since the mid-nineteenth century, given dispossessions, dislocations, privatizations, programs of detribalization, urbanization, and various other mobilities (chosen and coerced). Story offers a means of understanding how collective histories can be immanent within everyday interaction and perception, generating kinds of continuity and connections across time that do not necessarily require immediate contiguity of experience (either geographic or generational). As Miranda suggests, having “an identity and community” is possible even in the absence of a legally recognized land base and amid other forms of fragmentation, and part of what enables the sustaining of peoplehood in conditions of dispersion or diaspora is the felt presence of shared (hi)stories amid the circumstances of ordinary life, stories that intimately animate and orient ongoing collective practices of becoming (of re-creation, reinvention, and resurgence).135

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk › 2AC -- K › 2AC -- K -- Afropessimism

Including queer desire and sexual life in their analytic paradigm generates zones of possibility for insurgent Black life within the conditions of social death – non-normative desire contests the perpetual “threat status” of Black queer being and moves towards an autonomous articulation of life.

Avilez ’20 -- (GerShun Avilez, 2020, “Black Queer Freedom: Spaces of Injury and Paths of Desire,” Urbana: University of Illinois Press, accessed 7-23-2022) -- nikki

In bringing injury to the fore, this book also prioritizes desire as a means for contesting or simply dealing with social threat. In the context of a pervasive environment of death, the question of desire becomes secondary in JanMohamed’s analysis. He explains, The imminent, unpredictable possibility of death makes [this subject] live in such a way that his being is consumed with the preoccupation of avoiding the possibility of death. On the other hand, the same structure requires him to control his desire to live as fully as he would like since stepping out of the bounds of his social-death could easily result in his death. He is thus obliged to control and repress his own desire for a full life. The deathbound-subject’s “life” is thus defined by the need to avoid the possibilities of life as well as the possibility of death. (19; original emphasis) JanMohamed does a skillful job in tracing out the systematic constraints that render the death-bound-subject a liminal figure who often must restrain or control desire with the goal of self-protection. However, the move to limit or restrain desire is not a prominent concern for Black queer artists and thinkers. Even as they trace out the exact kinds of restraints that JanMohamed describes, the artists considered in this book consistently and defiantly express desire and claim a freedom within restriction. I track an embracing of life and a declaration of desire, both of which are done within the context of injury. The recognition of the ubiquitous nature of many kinds of threats makes the insistence on life and desire more important and their articulations more compelling. The injury-bound subject is a subject who desires, a subject defined not solely by injury but by desire (i.e., affection, unrestrained pleasure, freedom of movement, self-definition, and unencumbered embodiment), and it is the threat of injury that often informs the investment in disruptive desire. These desires become the subject of artwork by Black diasporic artists, and I evaluate the means for expressing such desire and explain the artists’ detailing of the social and psychological contexts of threat. Throughout, this book demonstrates how desire is understood to be a space of freedom as well as a strategy that redefines space. This desirous freedom is not a panacea that solves all problems, nor is it necessarily long-lasting; nevertheless, it offers moments of satisfaction, control, and autonomy. Sometimes, a simple kiss can make one feel freed for a moment. My emphasis on desire in the context of injury builds on recent work from Black queer theorists around questions of the erotic and pleasure. In his exploration of the social significance of unprotected, or “raw,” sex to Black gay men, Marlon M. Bailey advances the concept of erotic (sexual) autonomy in exploring how gay men choose sexual practices in the context of structural drivers. He insists that there is a need to develop a method that “accounts for sexual desires and practices—the contradictions between them—and the social factors and conditions” that shape the paths of and contour those desires and practices.8 As much as his essay is about the value of taking pleasure seriously in studies of Black gay male sexual practices and HIV/AIDS, it also reinforces the point that desire is always expressed in a sociocultural setting, a setting that may be anti-Black and determined by social and economic disparities. For Bailey, raw sex becomes one means for a resistant expression of individual desire and a technique of critiquing prominent discourses about queer vulnerability. In a different context but a similar conceptual register, Amber Jamilla Musser argues, in her extended consideration of sexual objectification of minoritarian women’s bodies, for the importance of stressing embodied pleasure.9 Musser’s book centers around what she calls “brown jouissance,” a concept that emphasizes sensual embodiment (“fleshiness”) that brings together pleasure and pain, subjectivity and objectivity (3). She refuses an understanding of pleasure that might be understood as moving beyond the body (“jouissance” in the psychoanalytic sense). Musser rejects a binary understanding of racialized female embodiment as either being perpetually objectified or simply liberated in a way that might ignore the kinds of structural realities that Bailey describes. In my reading, brown jouissance is a framework for analysis more than a simple description of a kind of pleasure. Brown jouissance is not just about asserting a pleasure-centered subjectivity. The analytic highlights the social conditions that work around and often against the subject; it reflects a “move toward the space around the individual” as it accentuates expression of the sensual for the individual (42). For both Bailey and Musser, defiant assertions of erotic pleasure push against axes of discrimination. What I take from this body of work is that pleasure may be a tool for undermining acts of interpellation but only when queer pleasure is made visible within its restrictive contexts can we fully discern and evaluate the queer subject. Pleasure must be a primary analytic, but pleasure considered in a vacuum tells us very little. It is for this reason that I emphasize threat and forces that seek to limit expressions of queerness in my consideration of desire. The critical move to attend to the “space around” is a way to shed light on the dynamics and complexities of the threat feedback loop. In drawing attention to the “space around,” I consistently detail how this space—consisting of social elements, including laws, public opinion, built environments, family, and employers—determines the social legibility of queer bodies and influences individuals’ relationships to their bodies. The space around bodies informs our understanding of the bodies themselves. I am interested in bodies in space.

Intersections and Dissents: Black Studies and Queer Theory