2022
Michigan
Evidence
general topic updates › finland and sweden › finland and sweden- baltics
David Axe, 6-28-2022, "With Sweden And Finland Set To Join NATO, Europe’s Geography Just Got A Lot More Difficult For Russia," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/06/28/with-sweden-and-finland-set-to-join-nato-europes-geography-just-got-a-lot-more-difficult-for-russia/?sh=4ee223821a41, accessed 7-3-2022//cpd
Turkey will lift its objection to Finland and Sweden joining NATO, setting the stage for the alliance’s biggest expansion in a generation.
The expansion will dramatically alter Europe’s strategic geography—in NATO’s favor.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
general topic updates › finland and sweden › finland and sweden- joining nato
Emily Rauhala, Amy, 06-28-22, "Turkey drops opposition to Finland, Sweden joining NATO," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/28/russia-ukraine-war-putin-news-live-updates/, accessed 7-3-2022//cpd
MADRID — Turkey has agreed to support Finland’s and Sweden’s membership in NATO, paving the way for the alliance to grow. The leaders of the three countries signed a memorandum Tuesday at a NATO summit in Madrid confirming Turkey’s support for the membership bids by Helsinki and Stockholm. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine pushed Finland and Sweden to seek to join the alliance.
Leaders from the Group of Seven wealthiest democracies ended their summit in Germany promising to “urgently” explore price caps on Russian oil and gas. They did not, however, impose new energy sanctions. In closing remarks, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said Russian President Vladimir Putin “must not win the war.”
2022
Michigan
Evidence
general topic updates › finland and sweden › finland and sweden- joining nato
Stephen Erlanger and Michael D. Shear 6-28-2022 "Latest NATO and Russia-Ukraine War News: Live Updates," https://archive.ph/aBpOd, accessed 7-3-2022//cpd
If Finland and Sweden join NATO, it would mark one of the most significant expansions of the alliance in decades at a time when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has radically altered Europe’s security calculus. It also underscores how the war in Ukraine has undermined President Vladimir V. Putin’s aim of weakening NATO by pushing Sweden and Finland, which were neutral and nonaligned for decades, into the alliance’s arms.
“I’m pleased to announce that we now have an agreement that paves the way for Finland and Sweden to join NATO,” NATO’s secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, said Tuesday evening. “Turkey, Finland and Sweden have signed a memorandum that addresses Turkey’s concerns, including around arms exports, and the fight against terrorism.”
2022
Michigan
Negative
Solvency › Say No › 2NC---Say No
Lisa Schirch 21, Lisa Schirch is Senior Research Fellow for the Toda Peace Institute and Sr. Professor of the Practice of Peace Studies at University of Notre Dame, “Social Media Impacts on Conflict and Democracy : The Techtonic Shift” pg. 216, April 2021 // SK
There are no quick fixes to threats stemming from social media use. There are wide disagreements and conceptual contradictions on how to define disinformation, dangerous speech, privacy and addiction. Most conversations about fixing social media focus on government regulation, or changes to tech companies’ platforms and moderation. The research documented in this book suggests the challenges related to social media are too big and too complex for any one actor. At present, tech companies do not have sufficient incentives to change. Government regulations are complex and slow to develop. There is an urgent need for civil society to form digital social movements to address digital threats to democracy and social cohesion.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Solvency › Say No › 1NC---Say No
Jean-Baptiste Vilmer 18, director of the Institute for Strategic Research of the Ministry for the Armed Forces, August 2018, “Information Manipulation: A Challenge for Our Democracies,” https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/information_manipulation_rvb_cle838736.pdf, RMax
The French position, which holds that NATO’s role in this field should remain confined to the detection and analysis of and response to hostile operations targeting its activities (rather than all disinformation and malicious interference operations) is widely shared within the Alliance. Fault lines nevertheless arise between allies on the question of what sort of response is most appropriate. They also disagree over whether or not to try to “beat Russia at its own game,” including within Russian-speaking communities, by spreading doubt about Moscow’s activities and goals or by offering a revised version of some chapters of history. Such an approach is highly contentious within NATO, where there are diverging views on the severity of the threat that partly reflect different perspectives on Russia’s role and the adequate NATO response to Moscow.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Solvency › Broad › 2NC---Countering Fails
Terry L. Thompson 20, lecturer in cyber policy at the Johns Hopkins University and University of Maryland, Baltimore County, “No Silver Bullet: Fighting Russian Disinformation Requires Multiple Actions,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol 21, no 1, pp. 182, //chico
A third reason that US and EU countermeasures against disinformation have been only partly successful is the reluctance of social media companies to identify and block or delete deceptive posts. Concerned employees at Facebook were "prevented from making any changes for fear of violating Facebook's 'objectivity,' as well as alienating conservative users and legislators." (35) In an apparent about-face, Facebook announced in October 2019 measures designed to prevent foreign interference in the 2020 elections. (36) These measures will take time, and their effectiveness is uncertain. Other social media companies are also taking action, but not quickly enough, and experts point out that dealing with disinformation requires a political response as well. (37) Meanwhile, Russian disinformation in social media continues to be a concern. As recently as February 2020, FBI Director Christopher Wray warned the House Judiciary Committee about Russia's ongoing "information warfare" against the United States. (38)
2022
Michigan
Negative
Solvency › Broad › 2NC---Countering Fails
Tonya Riley 21 (Tonya, Technology and cybersecurity policy researcher, 4-30-2021, "Analysis," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/30/cybersecurity-202-defense-department-isnt-armed-combat-growing-threat-information-warfare-experts-warn/, DOA: 6-22-2022//Smarx Ahsan)
Experts will say the United States can learn from how cyberthreats have evolved in addressing growing online information operations.
Gerstell, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, will warn that foreign intelligence agencies are taking a page from cyber criminals' playbook by operating just far enough under the radar to avoid repercussions.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Solvency › Broad › 1NC---Countering Fails
Joseph Bernstein 21 is a senior reporter at BuzzFeed News and a 2021 Nieman Fellow. “Bad News: Selling the story of disinformation,” Harper’s Magazine, //chico
And to what effect? Last year, Facebook started putting warning labels on Trump’s misinformative and disinformative posts. BuzzFeed News reported in November that the labels reduced sharing by only 8 percent. It was almost as if the vast majority of people who spread what Trump posted didn’t care whether a third party had rated his speech unreliable. (In fact, one wonders if, to a certain type of person, such a warning might even be an inducement to share.) Facebook could say that it had listened to critics, and what’s more, it could point to numbers indicating that it had cleaned up the information ecosystem by 8 percent. Its critics, having been listened to, could stand there with their hands in their pockets.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Solvency › Broad › 2NC---Solvency
Terry Thompson 20, lecturer in cyber policy at Johns Hopkins University and University of Maryland, 2020, “No Silver Bullet: Fighting Russian Disinformation Requires Multiple Actions,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 182-194, https://doi.org/ 10.1353/gia.2020.0033, RMax
There is no single solution—no silver bullet—that will effectively address the organized, well-funded, and efficient Russian deception and disinformation operations or their broader campaign of active measures directed against US and European elections. Expanding efforts by governments, think tanks, social media companies, and the growing social media analysis industry will help to detect, publicize, and respond to disinformation. The authorities granted by the 2020 NDAA will go a long way toward addressing the problem of information warfare directed against the United States. But a much harder challenge will be overcoming political and cultural polarization and Americans’ love of social media. Absent a comprehensive national effort involving all elements of government and society, the United States will continue to struggle with foreign interference. The 2020 election will demonstrate whether US actions to date are enough to thwart Russian disinformation in the election process.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Solvency › Broad › 2NC---Solvency
Dr. Rod Thornton 15, Senior Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London, Ph.D. from the University of Birmingham, September 2015, “The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare: Responding to Russian Information Warfare,” The RUSI Journal, Vol. 160, No. 4, pp. 40-48, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047, RMax
The first option, censorship of the Russian media message, is widely dismissed across the EU and in the US. As John Whittingdale, the UK’s current secretary of state for culture, media and sport, stressed in 2014: ‘There is nothing Russia would like more than to be able to say the West is censoring [it]’. 71 The second alternative would be for Western powers, through NATO, to employ their own counter-information warfare campaigns to match those of Russia. However, this would be futile, not least because NATO’s members are, for the most part, liberal democracies whose governments are expected to remain wedded to the truth in the information they provide to both domestic and international audiences. Moreover, they have a free media acting as the fourth estate to ensure that the truth is told. When it comes to conducting information-warfare campaigns, this predilection for the truth can be something of a handicap [barrier], allowing for the projection of only one narrative amid the welter of counter-narratives produced by Russian outlets. Furthermore, Western efforts to promote this singular message have been underwhelming. As the UK parliamentary Defence Committee was recently told, ‘although the BBC Russian Service was available, it was only online and was in no way a counterweight to the propaganda channelled through Russian Television’. 72 One outlet tucked away on a website is no answer to a Russian information-warfare ‘blitzkrieg’. There is similar reluctance, for instance, in Washington, to use the Voice of America radio station in an ‘overtly propagandistic role’. Meanwhile, in the Baltic States the attempts to counter Moscow’s ‘information war’ are seen as ‘uncoordinated and weak’. 73 The basic problem across the board is that liberal democracies have an inherent distaste for producing anything at the strategic level that resembles propaganda or could be classed as psychological warfare.74 In fact, one of the reasons that the Russians concentrate so much on their information-warfare output is that they know it cannot be countered effectively; indeed, they have shown a ‘readiness to stoop to methods the West cannot emulate without sullying itself’.
75 As Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss point out, the Russians are thinking asymmetrically: ‘Feeling itself relatively weak, the Kremlin has systematically learnt to use the principles of liberal democracies against them’.76
2022
Michigan
Negative
Solvency › Broad › 1NC---Solvency
Rod Thornton 15, Senior Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department of King's College London. He previously taught at the University of Kurdistan Hewler in Erbil, Iraq and in the University of Nottingham's department of Politics and International Relations. “The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare”, //lenox
Russia has shown it can occupy whole slices of another state’s territory using no more than information warfare, deniability and a few highly disciplined special forces. The Russian military, supported by a substantial information warfare infrastructure, has employed the tenets of hybrid warfare remarkably skillfully. Such activities have, of course, to be countered by NATO and the EU to ensure Moscow cannot use these tactics so easily in future. As NATO STRATCOM COE puts it, ‘analysis of the Ukraine conflict suggests that NATO and the EU must adapt to the new reality where information superiority, as opposed to military power, is becoming increasingly important’. 70 If today ‘the main battlespace is in the mind’, it must be considered how Western powers and institutions engage in this arena. The first option, censorship of the Russian media message, is widely dismissed across the EU and in the US. As John Whittingdale, the UK’s current secretary of state for culture, media and sport, stressed in 2014: ‘There is nothing Russia would like more than to be able to say the West is censoring [it]’. 71 The second alternative would be for Western powers, through NATO, to employ their own counter-information warfare campaigns to match those of Russia. However, this would be futile, not least because NATO’s members are, for the most part, liberal democracies whose governments are expected to remain wedded to the truth in the information they provide to both domestic and international audiences. Moreover, they have a free media acting as the fourth estate to ensure that the truth is told. When it comes to conducting information-warfare campaigns, this predilection for the truth can be something of a handicap, allowing for the projection of only one narrative amid the welter of counter-narratives produced by Russian outlets. Furthermore, Western efforts to promote this singular message have been underwhelming. As the UK parliamentary Defence Committee was recently told, ‘although the BBC Russian Service was available, it was only online and was in no way a counterweight to the propaganda channelled through Russian Television’. 72 One outlet tucked away on a website is no answer to a Russian information-warfare ‘blitzkrieg’. There is similar reluctance, for instance, in Washington, to use the Voice of America radio station in an ‘overtly propagandistic role’. Meanwhile, in the Baltic States the attempts to counter Moscow’s ‘information war’ are seen as ‘uncoordinated and weak’. 73 The basic problem across the board is that liberal democracies have an inherent distaste for producing anything at the strategic level that resembles propaganda or could be classed as psychological warfare.74 In fact, one of the reasons that the Russians concentrate so much on their information-warfare output is that they know it cannot be countered effectively; indeed, they have shown a ‘readiness to stoop to methods the West cannot emulate without sullying itself’.75 As Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss point out, the Russians are thinking asymmetrically: ‘Feeling itself relatively weak, the Kremlin has systematically learnt to use the principles of liberal democracies against them’.76 This asymmetry in willingness and abilities does not, however, mean that no action has been taken by Western powers. In January 2014, NATO set up a Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga as a direct consequence of the Russian information-warfare campaign in an attempt to counter Russia’s significant advantage in this realm. Yet even this body recognises that it is difficult for the West with its free media ‘to compete with the forceful, synchronised messaging of the Russian government’. 77 For its part, the EU is discussing sponsoring its own Russian-language channel as ‘The truth is the best weapon the EU has’. 78 However, doubts remain as to how much impact a single channel can have; indeed, this channel ‘needs to find a way to counter Moscow’s grip on the Russian-language airwaves or its target audience will never hear [the truth]’. 79 Furthermore, it will always be difficult for any collective of states – whether NATO or the EU – to agree on the nature and content of information campaigns, not least due to disagreement over what exactly the ‘truth’ is and how best to present it. As one Estonian military officer concerned with NATO’s information operations put it, ‘if we want to counter Russian propaganda…we have to unite our lines and speak with the same voice’.80 However, there is no such unity in these international organisations and thus the idea of NATO producing its own ‘synchronised messaging’ remains a pipe-dream. Therefore what collectives such as NATO will always lack is what makes Moscow’s information assault so effective: a truly integrated approach. The major threat to Western interests anywhere in the world is not terrorism, it is the threat posed by information warfare such as that recently conducted by Russia. It has achieved clear results and this success can be repeated. As NATO finds it almost impossible to react effectively in a symmetrical fashion to this threat, it has felt the need to resort to more traditional means. Yet the responses seen so far are redolent of ‘Maginot Line thinking’–in other words, these are responses that are better suited to the ‘last war’. Unlike the Russian military, NATO is still putting the use of military force ahead of information warfare because – as an institution–it knows no other way of reacting. The US and the UK have, for instance, decided to send a small number of (non-combat) troops to Ukraine.81 This, though, is a naive move that does no more than play into the Kremlin’s hands. The message that Moscow can now send out to those who would support its actions is that while Russia is not sending any of its own troops over the border into Ukraine (officially, at least), the US and UK are doing so – and from thousands of miles away. Under such circumstances, it raises questions as to who the aggressor really is. It is an easy sell for the information-warfare-savvy Russians. There is talk, too, of NATO responding both by beefing up the rapid reaction forces currently on standby to be sent to the Baltic States and by holding more exercises there.82 This, though, raisesthe question of to what exactly they are supposed to ‘react’. Russian troops, while they might one day mass near the Baltics to apply psychological pressure, are unlikely to cross any borders, at least not overtly. Indeed, Russia’s ‘new generation of warfare’ is specifically designed to achieve results without the need for any such crass action that might, in turn, provide an excuse for NATO (or others) to interfere–thereby paralysing both the target country and those that might come to its defence. Moreover, one aim of the Russian information warfare campaign has always been to ‘sow discord’ within NATO. 83 ‘Russia’, as the former head of Polish special forces, Roman Polko, says, ‘is mercilessly using NATO’s weaknesses in order to play its own game’. 84 Of prime importance to Russia is to prevent the invocation of Article V by avoiding the trigger for ‘an armed attack’ on any one NATO state.85 This weakness of Article V has been recognised – with the UK parliamentary Defence Committee one voice among many calling for the word ‘armed’ to be removed:86 NATO must resolve the contradiction between the specification in Article 5 that a response should be to an ‘armed attack’ and the likelihood on the other hand of an ‘unarmed attack’ (such as a cyber attack or another form of ambiguous warfare). NATO must consider whether the adjective ‘armed’ should be removed from the definition of an Article 5 attack. Most NATO states are, however, unlikely to agree to this – again showing the weakness of a multinational body. They will not want to engage militarily with Russia just because one of their number might be subject to a (plausibly deniable) ‘form of ambiguous warfare’, however disruptive. Thus, such debate over rapid reaction forces and Article V merely facilitates Moscow’s information-warfare campaign. It should be remembered that NATO’s offer of military assistance to the Baltic States is also an offer to fight a war–a very destructive one – on their territory. Such an offer may well have the effect of stoking fear among both Balts and compatriot Russians, once again providing potential grist to Moscow’s information-warfare mill.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Add-Ons › DOD Innovation › AT: DoD Innovation Add-On---2NC
Gilli & Gilli 19 Andrea Gilli, Senior Researcher in Military Affairs at the NATO Defense College in Rome, works at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, PhD in Political Science from the European University Institute, MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics, & Mauro Gilli, a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security, PhD in Political Science from Northwestern University, MA in International Studies from Johns Hopkins University. [Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage, 43(3), 141–189]
Can adversaries of the United States easily imitate its most advanced weapon systems and thus erode its military-technological superiority? Do reverse engineering, industrial espionage, and, in particular, cyber espionage facilitate and accelerate this process? China's decades-long economic boom, military modernization program, massive reliance on cyber espionage, and assertive foreign policy have made these questions increasingly salient. Yet, almost everything known about this topic draws from the past. As we explain in this article, the conclusions that the existing literature has reached by studying prior eras have no applicability to the current day. Scholarship in international relations theory generally assumes that rising states benefit from the "advantage of backwardness," as described by [End Page 141] Alexander Gerschenkron.1 By free riding on the research and technology of the most advanced countries, less developed states can allegedly close the military-technological gap with their rivals relatively easily and quickly.2 More recent works maintain that globalization, the emergence of dual-use components, and advances in communications (including the opportunity for cyber espionage) have facilitated this process.3 This literature is built on shaky theoretical foundations, and its claims lack empirical support. The international relations literature largely ignores one of the most important changes to have occurred in the realm of weapons development since the second industrial revolution (1870–1914): the exponential increase in the complexity of military technology. We argue that this increase in complexity has promoted a change in the system of production that has made the imitation and replication of the performance of state-of-the-art weapon systems harder—so much so as to offset the diffusing effects of globalization and advances in communications. On the one hand, the increase in complexity has significantly raised the entry barriers for the production of advanced weapon systems: countries must now possess an extremely advanced industrial, scientific, and technological base in weapons production before they can copy foreign military technology. On the other hand, the knowledge to design, develop, and produce advanced weapon systems is less likely to diffuse, given its increasingly tacit and organizational nature. As a result, the advantage of backwardness has shrunk significantly, and know-how and experience in the production of advanced weapon systems have become an important source of power for those who master them. We employ two case studies to test this argument: Imperial Germany's rapid success in closing the technological gap with the British Dreadnought battleship, despite significant inhibiting factors; and China's struggle to imitate the U.S. F-22/A Raptor jet fighter, despite several facilitating conditions. Our research contributes to key theoretical and policy debates. First, the [End Page 142] ability to imitate state-of-the-art military hardware plays a central role in theories that seek to explain patterns of internal balancing and the rise and fall of great powers. Yet, the mainstream international relations literature has not investigated this process.4 Because imitating military technology was relatively easy in the past, scholars and policymakers assume that it also is today, as frequent analogies between Wilhelmine Germany and contemporary China epitomize.5 In this article, we investigate the conditions under which the imitation of state-of-the-art weapon systems such as attack submarines and combat aircraft is more or less likely to succeed. Second, we develop the first systematic theoretical explanation of why U.S. superiority in military technology remains largely unrivaled almost thirty years after the end of the Cold War, despite globalization and the information and communication technology revolution. Some scholars have argued that developing modern weapon systems has become dramatically more demanding, which in turn has made internal balancing against the United States more difficult.6 This literature, however, cannot explain why in the age of globalization and instant communications—with cyber espionage permitting the theft of massive amount of digital data—U.S. know-how in advanced weapon systems has not already diffused to other states. Other contributors to the debate on unipolarity have either pointed to the relative inferiority of Chinese military technology without providing a theoretical explanation, or they have argued that developing the military capabilities to challenge the status quo is, in the long run, a function of political will—an argument that cannot account for the failure of the Soviet Union to cope with U.S. military technology from the late 1970s onward.7 We argue that in the transition from the second industrial [End Page 143] revolution to the information age, the imitation of state-of-the-art military technology has become more difficult, so much so that today rising powers or even peer competitors cannot easily copy foreign weapon systems.8 Our findings address existing concerns that China's use of cyber espionage and the increasing globalization of arms production will allow Beijing to rapidly close the military-technological gap with the United States.9
2022
Michigan
Negative
Add-Ons › DOD Innovation › AT: DoD Innovation Add-On---2NC
Brad Williams 21, reporter for Breaking Defense covering cyber, networks, and emerging tech, 7/29/2021, "To Transform Tech, DoD Must Stop Being An ‘Innovation Tourist:’ Report," Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/07/to-transform-tech-dod-should-stop-being-an-innovation-tourist-report/
WASHINGTON: A new report urges the Pentagon to stop acting like an “innovation tourist… visiting new shops, spending some money, and moving on to the next destination” if it wants to truly achieve “a bona fide strategy for bringing emerging technologies into the department.”
The report, Ending Innovation Tourism: Rethinking the U.S. Military’s Approach to Emerging Technology Adoption, is authored by Melissa Flagg and Jack Corrigan of Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › Offense › IL---trade off turn
Gabrielle Lim 20, researcher at Harvard Kennedy School’s Shorenstein Center and a fellow with Citizen Lab. “The Risks of Exaggerating Foreign Influence Operations and Disinformation,” Centre for International Governance Innovation (CGI), //chico
Third, an overemphasis on “bad actors” and their supply of disinformation diverts our attention from the material problems that drive our demand for and receptivity to dubious content of suspicious origin. In a commentary for the Harvard Kennedy School’s Misinformation Review, Alexei Abrahams and I argue that thus far the focus of the West’s countermeasures in the fight against misinformation and disinformation has relied on repressive strategies — root out the networks, shut down the accounts and remove the content. However, this strategy is, as many have pointed out already, a never-ending “game of whack-a-mole” that (at best) provides short-term tactical gains. These palliative measures must be coupled with long-term solutions that take aim at the reasons why people flock to fringe websites and dubious accounts for their news. It is not that we want to be lied to, but rather that our trust in the institutions and authorities to which we delegate our well-being and future has eroded. As such, redressive strategies should also be explored to regain and restore trust and legitimacy in our institutions, politicians and governing bodies. And, where possible, domestic policy should be directed at making democratic participation easier. “Bad actors” will always be around and try to mess with information systems, but we can choose to make voting easier, prevent gerrymandering, and amend or repeal laws that lead to voter suppression.
“Bad actors” will always be around and try to mess with information systems, but we can choose to make voting easier, prevent gerrymandering, and amend or repeal laws that lead to voter suppression.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › Offense › IL---free press turn
Gabrielle Lim 20, researcher at Harvard Kennedy School’s Shorenstein Center and a fellow with Citizen Lab. “The Risks of Exaggerating Foreign Influence Operations and Disinformation,” Centre for International Governance Innovation (CGI), //chico
Second, the fear of foreign speech could exacerbate ongoing tensions between states in a way that will likely hurt civil society and press freedom. Although influence operations have little (if any) actual impact on a state’s national security, governments may use the fear of foreign speech to expel, control and surveil foreign journalists and civil society. Take China and the United States, for example. Both accuse one another of interfering in each other’s domestic affairs, citing influence operations and collusion that may be detrimental (although rarely articulated in specifics or evidence). As such, retaliatory measures have been carried out by both states through the expulsion of journalists and by forcing media workers to register personal information with government officials. Hua Chunying, a spokeswoman for the Chinese foreign ministry, defended the expulsion of journalists from The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post, tweeting: “We reject ideological bias against China, reject fake news made in the name of press freedom, reject breaches of ethics in journalism.” And as Harvard Law School’s Evelyn Douek shows in her chapter for the forthcoming book, “Combating Election Interference: When Foreign Powers Target Democracies,“ the way social media companies and governments are moderating foreign content amounts to a “free speech blind spot,” due to their seemingly ad hoc and inconsistent enforcement. The ongoing rhetoric of fear surrounding foreign influence operations and espionage is now expanding to include foreign students and businesses. In addition to curtailing the flow of information and intellectual collaboration, such actions may also contribute to increasing xenophobia.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › Offense › IL---Cooption Turn
Gabrielle Lim 20, researcher at Harvard Kennedy School’s Shorenstein Center and a fellow with Citizen Lab. “The Risks of Exaggerating Foreign Influence Operations and Disinformation,” Centre for International Governance Innovation (CGI), //chico
First, the widespread use of the term “fake news” combined with concerns over national security (although often sincere and well-meaning) have given illiberal and authoritarian-leaning governments around the world top cover to enact a range of censorship-enabling measures that are then used to crack down on dissent, target political opponents and instill a culture of self-censorship. In the Philippines — where President Rodrigo Duterte continues to prosecute a “war on drugs” that has led to the deaths of thousands — penalties for spreading false and alarming information were included in a special measures bill to combat COVID-19. Critics of the bill warn that it will be selectively used to punish political opponents and deter dissent. Last year, Singapore — which has continually ranked poorly for press freedom — also passed a law targeting “fake news” and false information. Citing examples of foreign interference in the United States and the United Kingdom, Singapore justified the bill on the grounds of national security. Borrowing a common refrain from the West, the government stated that falsehoods “weaponised, to attack the infrastructure of fact, destroy trust and attack societies.” Now Nigeria, again in the name of national security, is mulling its own bill targeting false information, which has widely been mocked as a copy-paste of Singapore’s law
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › Offense › IL---Credibility Turn
Melanie Freeze et al. 2020, PhD from Duke University, Visiting Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Carleton College; Mary Baumgartner, Peter Bruno, Jacob R. Gunderson, Joshua Olin, Morgan Quinn Ross, and Justine Szafran all have BAs from Carleton College; February 2020, “Fake Claims of Fake News: Political Misinformation, Warnings, and the Tainted Truth Effect”, //SK
A subset of research on the misinformation effect explores whether the negative effects of misinformation on memory can be reversed, or at least minimized (e.g., Blank and Launay 2014; Chambers and Zaragoza 2001; Christiaansen and Ochalek 1983; Eakin et al. 2003; Echterhoff et al. 2005; Ecker et al. 2010; Wright 1993). For example, one of the earliest studies on the effects of misinformation warnings conducted by Dodd and Bradshaw (1980) found identifying the source of the misinformation as biased dramatically reduced the effect of misleading information on eyewitness memory. In the field of political science, a related body of literature also scrutinizes the causes, implications, and difficulty of countering political misinformation for topics, including the 2010 health care reform (Berinsky 2015; Nyhan 2010); climate change (van der Linden et al. 2017); campaign advertisements and political candidates (Amazeen et al. 2018; Cappella and Jamieson 1994; Pfau and Louden 1994; Thorson 2016; Wintersieck et al. 2018); political news (Clayton et al. 2019); and governmental policies, actions, and politically relevant data (Pennycook et al. 2018; Weeks 2015).Footnote7 Under some conditions, warnings of misinformation can help individuals counter the effects of misinformation on attitudes and memory, but the corrections are often only partial, with long-lasting negative effects on trust (Cook and Lewandowsky 2011; Huang 2015; Lewandowsky et al. 2012; Nyhan and Reifler 2012). Warnings may even produce a boomerang or backfire effect and lead to misinformation becoming more deeply entrenched in memory when corrections conflict with personal worldview or ideology (Nyhan and Reifler 2010). In a meta-analysis of 25 studies on retrospective warnings and post-event misinformation, Blank and Launay (2014) found retrospective warnings were only somewhat effective, on average reducing the post-event misinformation effect by half.
In addition to imperfectly counteracting misperceptions, misinformation warnings can produce other, often unintended, consequences. Although few in number, some studies outside of political science have investigated how misinformation warnings can extend beyond the intended target of misinformation and negatively influence surrounding information and memories. For example, Greene et al. (1982) discovered participants who were warned that post-event information came from an untrustworthy source were less likely to recognize events that were correctly described in the post-event description, compared to a no warning condition. Similarly, Meade and Roediger (2002) found warnings of an unreliable co-witness reduced recall of correct items reported by the co-witness.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › Alt Causes › Alt Cause---Politicians
Brendan Nyhan 2019, Professor of Public Policy, University of Michigan, February 2019, “Why Fears of Fake News Are Overhyped”, SK
We must also recognize that fake news entrepreneurs aren’t the only people trying to meet the demand for this kind of content. The most worrisome misinformation in U.S. politics remains the old-fashioned kind: false and misleading statements made by elected officials who dominate news coverage and wield the powers of government. As 2016 illustrated, the costs of making unsupported claims are low in highly partisan contexts, which limits the incentive for politicians to avoid them. Reading a fact-check of Trump’s convention speech, for instance, reduced false beliefs that crime was increasing in the long term but did not affect his support.
Trump has gone on to make more than 8,000 false claims during his first two years in office, many of which are amplified in cable news chyrons or in credulous online news headlines. As a result, a sizable minority of Americans still believes some of his most frequently repeated false claims. These beliefs persist despite unprecedented fact-checking efforts, which struggle to overcome unprecedented levels of polarization in media trust. Even more corrosively, Trump’s supporters are increasingly rationalizing those falsehoods. Belief in the importance of presidential candidates being honest has declined from 71 percent among Republicans in 2007 to just 49 percent today, threatening the previously uncontested norm that the president should be expected to say things that are true, or at least not obviously false.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › Alt Causes › Alt Cause---Social Media
Serena Giusti 21, Head of the Programme on Eastern Europe and Russia at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies (Pisa) and Senior Associate Research Fellow at the Institute for International Studies. (ISPI) “Multilateralism, Global Governance and the Challenges of Disinformation,” Cyber Insights Magazine, October 1 2021,
Social media (including messaging platforms) are becoming more and more relevant for contemporary societies: they constitute the main sources of information for an increasing number of citizens. They have also become vital communication tools for governments, diplomatic personnel, international organisations (IOs) and all actors, formal and informal, taking part in the international system.
Social media can be used by states as tools to project power, by spreading manipulated information or fake news or to libel individuals or institutions working in crucial sectors. Both authoritarian and democratic leaders tend to deploy them quite often in order to reach a wide range of political goals: inter alia, to delegitimise disruptive journalists and media, to discredit political opponents or leaders of foreign states, to orient electoral choices in other states or even to contribute to the justification of especially grave decisions, such as foreign interventions motivated by alleged violations of international law by third countries’ governments. In particular, the use of disinformation by state and non-state actors to interfere in domestic affairs of other countries (e.g., before and/or during political elections or referenda) is endangering not only the very concept of sovereignty, but also the independence and security of states and the functioning of democratic processes, with serious implications for relations among states and multilateralism as a consequence. Whereas cases of weaponization of disinformation regard especially autocratic regimes, democracies are not exempted, as the attempts by some American Alt-Right groups to influence the 2017 French President elections prove.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › Alt Causes › Alt Cause---Social Media
Paul Barrett et al 2021, Paul M. Barrett is an assistant managing editor and senior writer at Bloomberg Businessweek.; Justin Hendrix is CEO and Editor of Tech Policy Press, a new nonprofit media venture concerned with the intersection of technology and democracy. Previously, he was Executive Director of NYC Media Lab; Grant Sims; Septemer 2021, “How tech platforms fuel U.S. political polarization and what government can do about it”, //SK
As both members of Congress and federal law enforcement agencies investigate the origins and execution of the January 6 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, the role social media played in the mayhem is emerging as a crucial issue.
The House Select Committee probing the mob attack has asked a wide range of social media and telecommunications companies to preserve records related to several hundred people, including members of Congress, who could be relevant to the investigation. Beyond these specific requests, the Committee has signaled a broader interest in how false claims about the 2020 election spread on platforms like Facebook and Twitter, including how algorithms might contribute to the promotion of disinformation and extremism. Meanwhile, federal prosecutors pursuing more than 600 criminal cases are relying on evidence gathered from social media accounts used to organize the attempt by Trump supporters to stop Congress from certifying President Joe Biden’s victory.