Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Michigan Kritik

1ar falsifiability matters

Falsifiability matters – treating psychoanalysis like it’s not a pseudoscience is a dogmatic move that leads to scientific stagnation and prevents discipline development

Ferreira 21 (Clarice de Madeiros Chaves Ferreira - Vice-President of the Brazilian Association of Evidence-Based Psychology and holds a degree in psychology from FUMEC University and Scientific Initiation at the Clinical Neuroscience Investigation Laboratory of the Federal University of Minas Gerais, “Is psychoanalysis a pseudoscience? Reevalutating the doctrine using a multicriteria list”, Brazilian Psychiatric Association, September 2021, ., MG)

This article pointed out that psychoanalysis — not only on its classic, but also with its contemporary version — ends up checking all of the seven items in Hansson’s multicriteria list. It also fits the eighth item that was introduced in this work. So, in this way, psychoanalysis checks eight out of eight demarcation of pseudoscience’s items. The evidence presented in this article suggests that with both Popper and Hansson’s demarcation proposals, and taking into account its traditional and contemporary versions, psychoanalysis is indeed a pseudoscience. Even if the impression that it represents the most reliable human psychological theory is created by its proponents, that is not the case, because it considerably deviates from scientific standards of quality.

2022 Michigan Kritik

2ac death k

Affirming survival doesn’t devalue life – life is complex and malleable and can be celebrated even when it seems oppressive

Fassin, 10 - James D. Wolfensohn Professor in the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, as well as directeur d’études at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris. (Didier, Fall, “Ethics of Survival: A Democratic Approach to the Politics of Life” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, Vol 1 No 1, Project Muse)

Conclusion

2022 Michigan Kritik

2ac death drive

There’s no utility in embracing the death drive—it just reinforces things that already suck

Robinson 5 [Andrew, PhD in political theory at the University of Nottingham, Theory and Event, 8/1, “The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique”, projectmuse]

Guattari's critique of psychoanalysis makes clear the myths which underlie it.  'Psychoanalysis transforms and deforms the unconscious by forcing it to pass through the grid of its system of inscription and representation.  For psychoanalysis, the unconscious is always already there, genetically programmed, structured, and finalized on objectives of conformity to social norms'104.  Similarly, Reich has already exposed a predecessor of the idea of "constitutive lack" - the Freudian "death instinct" - as a denial that "I don't know".  It is, he says, a metaphysical attempt to explain as yet inexplicable phenomena, an attempt which gets in the way of fact-finding about these phenomena105.  He provides a detailed clinical rebuttal of the idea of the "death instinct" which is equally apt as an attack on Lacanians (who seem unaware of Reich's intervention).  In Reich's view, the masochistic tendencies Freud associates with the "death instinct" are secondary drives arising from anxiety, and are attributable to 'the disastrous effect of social conditions on the biopsychic apparatus.  This entailed the necessity of criticizing the social conditions which created the neuroses - a necessity which the hypothesis of a biological will to suffer had circumvented'106.  The idea of the "death instinct" leads to a cultural philosophy in which suffering is assumed to be inevitable, whereas Reich's alternative - to attribute neurosis to frustrations with origins in the social system - leads to a critical sociological stance107.  The relevance of Reich's critique to the political theory of constitutive lack is striking.  The "death instinct" is connected to an idea of primordial masochism which, in the form of "aphanisis" or "subjective destitution", recurs throughout Lacanian political theory.  Zizek in particular advocates masochism, in the guise of "shooting at" or "beating" oneself, as a radical gesture which reveals the essence of the self and breaks the constraints of an oppressive reality108, although the masochistic gesture is present in all Lacanian theorists.  The death instinct is typified by Zizek as a pathological (in the Kantian sense), contingent attitude which finds satisfaction in the process of self-blockage109.  It is identical with the Lacanian concept of jouissance or enjoyment.  For him, 'enjoyment (jouissance) is not to be equated with pleasure: enjoyment is precisely "pleasure in unpleasure"; it designates the paradoxical satisfaction procured by a painful encounter with a Thing that perturbs the equilibrium of the pleasure principle.  In other words, enjoyment is located "beyond the pleasure principle"'110.  It is also the core of the self, since enjoyment is 'the only "substance" acknowledged by psychoanalysis', and 'the subject fully "exists" only through enjoyment'111.  Primordial masochism is therefore central to the Lacanian concept of the Real, which depends on there being a universal moment at which active desire - sometimes given the slightly misleading name of the "pleasure principle" - is suspended, not for a greater or delayed pleasure, but out of a direct desire for unpleasure (i.e. a primary reactive desire).  Furthermore, this reactive desire is supposed to be ontologically prior to active desire.  Dominick LaCapra offers a similar but distinct critique to my own, claiming that Lacanian and similar theories induce a post-traumatic compulsion repetition or an 'endless, quasi-transcendental grieving that may be indistinguishable from interminable melancholy'112. Reich has already provided a rebuttal of "primordial masochism", which, paradoxically given Zizek's claims to radicalism, was denounced by orthodox Freudians as communist propaganda.  In Reich's view, masochism operates as a relief at a lesser pain which operates as armouring against anxiety about an underlying trauma113.  Regardless of what one thinks of Reich's specific account of the origins of masochism, what is crucial is his critique of the idea of a death drive.  'Such hypotheses as are criticised here are often only a sign of therapeutic failure.  For if one explains masochism by a death instinct, one confirms to the patient his [sic] alleged will to suffer'114.  Thus, Lacanian metaphysics conceal Lacanians' encouragement of a variety of neurosis complicit with oppressive social realities.  Politically, the thesis of primordial masochism provides a mystifying cover for the social forces which cause and benefit from the contingent emergence of masochistic attachments (i.e. sadistic power apparatuses).  One could compare this remark to Butler's claim that Zizek 'defends the trauma of the real... over and against a different kind of threat'115.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Kritik Answers** › 2AC – Fem IR – Perm

Perm solves – transition does NOT entail complete rejection NOR embrace of hybrid masculinities – solves any residual link

Wright 19 (Katharine A. M. Wright, Matthew Hurley, Jesus Ignacio Gil Ruiz. Katharine A. M. Wright is a Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK. Matthew Hurley is a Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK. Jesus Ignacio Gil Ruiz was the former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor, 2019, NATO, Gender and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge. ) nihara

There therefore remain possibilities to displace hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 2005; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). Even if these possibilities have been lost in application empirical case studies. As Duncanson (2015: 244) argues, to realise this, ‘hierarchical relations must be replaced with relations of equality, mutual respect, or empathy’. She critiques Connell’s (2002) suggestion that the transition phase should be one where a masculinity open to equality within women is hegemonised. Rather, the transitory stage has to be one where traditionally disparaged, feminized traits are newly valued and incorporated into ‘softer’ or hybrid masculinities.

The forging of more equal relations is the ultimate, more challenging stage. The hybrid stage may make it more likely that relations of equality, mutual respect, empathy, and so on, are formed, however, so rather than dismiss the New Man syndrome in all its contexts, assuming it always camouflages the continuation of patriarchy, militarism, and neoliberalism, we can look to expose its contradictions and to push for those relations of equality.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Kritik Answers** › 2AC – Fem IR – Perm

Over-deterministic interpretations of institutional co-option are insufficient – specifical institutional analysis is key to avoid essentialism

Wright 19 (Katharine A. M. Wright, Matthew Hurley, Jesus Ignacio Gil Ruiz. Katharine A. M. Wright is a Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK. Matthew Hurley is a Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK. Jesus Ignacio Gil Ruiz was the former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor, 2019, NATO, Gender and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge. ) nihara

In a military context, hegemonic masculinity has been used to explain why it is that the creation of the ‘New Man’ (for example, the heroic peacekeeper, the humanitarian soldier scholar) has not resulted in gender equality or for that matter, genuine peace and security on many military interventions. Yet, perhaps the utility of the concept leads to too hasty conclusions in feminist scholarship; NATO as an institution to the automatic assumption that change in masculinities is little more than the ‘flexibility of the machinery of rule’ (Duncanson, 2013: 71). Duncanson offers an important note of caution on the negative connotations of appropriation, change and transformation of hegemonic masculinity, stating that it is too deterministic. She argues that ‘there is nothing in the concept itself which necessitates an interpretation that it always inevitably shifts in order that men retain power; that it can never be transformed, dismantled’ (Duncanson, 2013: 63).

Connell and Messerschmidt argue that research on hegemonic masculinity ‘needs to give much closer attention to the practices of women and to the historical interplay of femininities and masculinities’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). To do so, it is necessary to centralise interaction of women and men, of masculinities and femininities in and through specific institutional practices. In doing so, we provide examples of understanding the construction of particular hegemonic and subordinate masculinities and femininities within NATO. It is therefore necessary to avoid essentialism, and assumed (negative) types, while acknowledging the fluidity and hybridity between masculinities and femininities. Hegemonic masculinity therefore remains a valuable theoretical and analytical tool, particularly when applied to a militarised institutional setting such as NATO.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Kritik Answers** › 2AC – Fem IR – FW

Engaging NATO is valuable – studying its internal dynamics is NOT endorsement – BUT, avoids co-option AND oversimplification

Wright 19 (Katharine A. M. Wright, Matthew Hurley, Jesus Ignacio Gil Ruiz. Katharine A. M. Wright is a Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK. Matthew Hurley is a Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK. Jesus Ignacio Gil Ruiz was the former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor, 2019, NATO, Gender and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge. ) nihara

Feminist knowledge of NATO is integral to addressing these questions. The study of an institution does not have to correlate with an endorsement of their politics and practices (Holmes et al., 2019). It is possible to remain a ‘critical friend’. A concept we introduce in the introduction to this book. This builds on the work of Rech et al. (2015: 56) who contend

that the study of the military, of militarism, and of processes of militarisation, should not be undertaken solely for its own sake, but should also by guided by the possibility of engagement with the forces and institutions responsible, and should not be bashful about doing so.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Kritik Answers** › 2AC – Fem IR – FW

Debating the internal dynamics of NATO addresses a key gap in the archive of feminist scholarship – rejoinder is a pre-requisite to effective analysis

Wright 19 (Katharine A. M. Wright, Matthew Hurley, Jesus Ignacio Gil Ruiz. Katharine A. M. Wright is a Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK. Matthew Hurley is a Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK. Jesus Ignacio Gil Ruiz was the former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor, 2019, NATO, Gender and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge. ) nihara

Taking a feminist approach to NATO also addresses a key gap in the field. It provides a cornerstone to addressing Enloe’s (1993: 203) concerns that: We [feminist scholars] know all too little about the internal cultural dynamics of institutions such as NATO. This ignorance prevents us as analysts of internationalized political culture from determining whether and how genuinely new concepts of ‘enemy’, ‘threat’, and ‘security’ are trickling through the alliance’s bureaucratic layers. Nor can we tell how (I don’t believe we need an ‘if’) these possible cultural transformations are reshaping NATO’s own gendered culture. We need feminist anthropologists to imagine their ‘field’ as lying inside NATO’s Brussels headquarters.

While we imagine our ‘field’ as lying inside NATO, from the outset of this project we have been aware of the challenges of doing this. In particular, in gaining access to an institution necessarily steeped in secrecy given its role in international security and defence. Our unique scholar-practitioner authorial partnership has helped us to better imagine NATO. For example, Gil Ruiz’s expertise as the former Chief of the Gender Advisor Office International Military Staff (IMS), including responsibility for supporting the organisation of the NCGP Annual Conferences from 2012 to 2015, has provided invaluable in-depth insight. This has equipped us with a working knowledge of the NCGP from an ‘insider’ perspective, something academic ‘outsiders’, even with privileged access to the institution can never fully ‘know’. This synergy of practitionerscholar perspectives offers a novel understanding of NATO and its engagement with gender, one that is unique within the current literature.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF › 2AC---Perm---Do the CP

Federal gov’t is a shared division of power---includes states.

Legal Dictionary 16 [Federal Government. August 7, 2016. https://legaldictionary.net/federal-government/]

A federal government is a system of government that divides the power between a larger central government, and the local and regional governments beneath it. In the United States, the federal government’s powers were established by the Constitution. Perfect examples of federal governments are those that function best in large countries with a broad diversity among its citizens, though where a common culture still exists, which ties everyone together. To explore this concept, consider the following federal government definition.

Definition of Federal Government

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF › 2AC---Perm---Do the CP

The counterplan requires federal action

USC, ND (10 U.S. Code § 341 - Department of Defense State Partnership Program https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/341)LR

Authority.— (1)In general.—The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, is authorized to establish a program of activities described in paragraph (2), to support the security cooperation objectives of the United States, between members of the National Guard of a State or territory and any of the following: (A)The military forces of a foreign country. (B)The security forces of a foreign country. (C)Governmental organizations of a foreign country whose primary functions include disaster response or emergency response. (2)State partnership.— Each program established under this subsection shall be known as a “State Partnership”. (b)Limitations.— (1)In general.— An activity with forces referred to in subsection (a)(1)(B) or organizations described in subsection (a)(1)(C) under a program established under subsection (a) may be carried out only if the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines and notifies the appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days before initiating such activity that the activity is in the national security interests of the United States. (2)Prohibition on activities with units that have committed gross violations of human rights.— The conduct of any assistance activities under a program established under subsection (a) shall be subject to the provisions of section 362 of this title. (c)Coordination of Activities.— The Chief of the National Guard Bureau shall designate a director for each State and territory to be responsible for the coordination of activities under a program established under subsection (a) for such State or territory and reporting on activities under the program. (d)Regulations.— This section shall be carried out in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe for purposes of this section. Such regulations shall include accounting procedures to ensure that expenditures of funds to carry out this section are accounted for and appropriate. (e)Availability of Authorized Funds for Program.— (1)In general.—Funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense, including funds authorized to be appropriated for the Army National Guard and Air National Guard, are authorized to be available— (A)for payment of costs incurred by the National Guard of a State or territory to conduct activities under a program established under subsection (a); and (B)for payment of incremental expenses of a foreign country to conduct activities under a program established under subsection (a). (2)Limitations.— (A)Active duty requirement.— Funds shall not be available under paragraph (1) for the participation of a member of the National Guard of a State or territory in activities in a foreign country unless the member is on active duty in the Armed Forces at the time of such participation. (B)Incremental expenses.— The total amount of payments for incremental expenses of foreign countries as authorized under paragraph (1)(B) for activities under programs established under subsection (a) in any fiscal year may not exceed $10,000,000. (f)Rule of Construction.— Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede any authority under title 10 as in effect on December 26, 2013. (Added and amended Pub. L. 114–328, div. A, title XII, § 1246(a)–(c), (d)(1), (2)(B), Dec. 23, 2016, 130 Stat. 2520, 2521; Pub. L. 115–232, div. A, title XII, § 1210, Aug. 13, 2018, 132 Stat. 2023; Pub. L. 116–92, div. A, title XVII, § 1731(a)(16), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 1813.)

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF › 2AC---Perm---Do Both---Shields PTX

Perm shifts backlash to the states

A. Brooke Overby, 3 (A. Brooke Overby, Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law, 2003, accessed on 7-4-2022, Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education Temple Law Review, Summer, 76 Temp. L. Rev. 297,“Our New Commercial Law Federalism”, , HBisevac)

We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the States' officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.n65 The concerns articulated in New York and echoed again in Printz addressed the erosion of the lines of political accountability that could result from federal commandeering.n66 Federal authority to compel implementation of a national legislative agenda through the state legislatures or officers would blur or launder the federal provenance of the legislation and shift political consequences and costs thereof to the state legislators. Left unchecked, Congress could foist upon the states expensive or unpopular programs yet shield itself from accountability to citizens. While drawing the line between constitutionally permissible optional implementation and impermissible mandatory implementation does not erase these concerns with accountability, it does ameliorate them slightly.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF › 2AC---AT Russian Backlash

China proves

Balachandran 6-22 (P.K, M.A.in Sociology University of Delhi, BA and MA in Politics and Sociology @ Delhi University. “Nepal Backs Away From US State Partnership Program”, https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/nepal-backs-away-from-us-state-partnership-program/#:~:text=Suspicious%20about%20the%20military%20content,a%20U.S.%20disaster%20mitigation%20program.)LR

Suspicious about the military content and wary of antagonizing China, Nepal rejects a U.S. disaster mitigation program. Fearing that the U.S. State Partnership Program (SPP) is a trap to involve Nepal in an anti-China military alliance, the Sher Bahadur Deuba government has rejected the program. The Deuba government – like predecessor governments in 2015, 2017 and 2019 – was initially impressed with the SPP for its disaster mitigation content, but it had to reject the partnership in the end, because the mood in Nepal is unambiguously against foreign programs that smack of a military alliance. Nepali governments have generally not wanted any transnational agreements that could jeopardize their delicately balanced relationship between India and the United States on the on hand and China on the other. Flush with success in convincing the Deuba government to get the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact ratified by the Nepali parliament in February, the U.S. moved to bolster the military dimension to Nepal-U.S. relations by pushing ahead with a pending request from Nepal to join the SPP. The SPP is a bilateral program that is outwardly peaceful in intent. But it is perceived to have deep-set military objectives with consequences not only for Nepal’s internal security, but also for relations with its two big neighbors, China and India. Critics in Nepal say that joining the SPP would be tantamount to signing onto to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). The impact on Sino-Nepal relations would be catastrophic if the SPP leads to stronger Nepal-U.S. military ties. At the same time, India might not be thrilled either. Under the SPP, the Indian Army’s exclusive and unique relationship with the Nepali Army would be diluted, a prospect the conservative Indian top brass cannot reconcile with. Critics say that while disaster mitigation is fine, the rub lies elsewhere: The SPP is administered by the National Guard Bureau, guided by State Department foreign policy goals, and executed by each U.S. state’s senior military officer (the state adjutant general) in support of the Department of Defense policy goals. “Through SPP, the National Guard conducts military-to-military engagements in support of defense security goals but also leverages whole-of-society relationships and capabilities to facilitate broader interagency and corollary engagements spanning military, government, economic and social spheres,” the U.S. National Guard website says. In other words, the SPP is a multi-purpose vehicle to advance wide-ranging U.S. political and strategic objectives under the overall cloak of humanitarian engagement. Worried about Nepal coming under more pressure from the United States, Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Hou Yanqi called on Nepal’s home minister, ostensibly to get confirmation of Nepal’s continued adherence to the “One China” policy. But sources said that the SPP was the envoy’s main concern. Nepal’s condemnation of Russia for its aggression in Ukraine had made Beijing suspicious about growing links between the Deuba and the Biden regimes.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF › 2AC---AT Russian Backlash

The counterplan triggers Russian backlash

SIRECI and COLETTA 9 (SIRECI, JONATHAN, and DAMON COLETTA. Sireci; MS @ Troy Univeristy, BS @ United States Air Force Academy. Coletta; Professor of Political Science @ United States Air Force Academy.“Enduring without an Enemy: NATO’s Realist Foundation.” Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 1, 2009, pp. 57–81. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23616104. Accessed 4 Jul. 2022.)LR

From a defensive realist perspective, longer partnerships can signal more of a threat against the common enemy of the cooperating states. This variable ties into the final independent variable: the number of military partnerships a state is engaged in. An increased number of partnerships a state is engaged in can threaten its opposing powers, who may feel the need to engage in partnerships of their own to maintain a balance of alliances and power. The use of American state-level militaries with nation-states designates the expanded role of American states in national defense. The purpose of the State Partnership Program is to create less of a defensive reaction by opposing states that are more likely to be threatened by the expansion of American military endeavors. The stationing of Russian troops in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia was a reaction to the formation of the State Partnership Program. Threatened by the encroachment of American forces (regardless of the fact they were reserve troops), Russia sought countermeasures to create a balance of power against the offshore hegemony. The defensive actions taken by Russia led the United States to sent only reserve forces. Under defensive realism, it becomes increasingly difficult for American troops to operate in a former Soviet realm, since any activity taken can easily be perceived as hostile and aggressive.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF › 2AC---INB---FAF---FAF Bad

Risks retal against the whole country

Glennon and Sloane 16 Michael J. Glennon, ILaw Prof @ Tufts University. Robert D. Sloane, Law Prof @ Boston University [Foreign Affairs Federalism: The Myth of National Exclusivity, Print]//BPS

2. The Danger of Retaliation against the Entire Nation Above all, however, the Framers stressed a concern at the outset that continues to be politically relevant today: "that the peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART," for "[t]he union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members."107 State involvement in the international realm risks conflicts with nations that may retaliate—economically, militarily, or otherwise—against the United States as a whole.108 For the Framers, this was no hypothetical danger. Their experience under the Articles of Confederation underscored the very real threats and concrete retaliatory conduct, including war, that state disregard of national treaty obligations had provoked. Since 1789, the Supreme Court has consistently echoed the same concerns. In 1832, in Brown v. Maryland,109 the Court struck down a Maryland law that required licenses for certain imports, emphasizing that the state law at issue could spark disputes with other nations. "What answer," Chief Justice Marshall asked, "would the United States give to the complaints and just reproaches to which such an extraordi¬nary circumstance would expose them? No apology could be received, or even offered."110 It is one thing, the Court has suggested, for a state to expose itself to the risks of conflict with a foreign power, but it is quite another to arrogate to itself the power to expose its fellow states to those risks. Hence, in the same vein, the Court in 1875 struck down a California law that in effect regulated immi¬gration, and by implication, commerce with foreign nations. The injured nation could not direct a claim for redress to California, the Court observed, because California could: hold no exterior relations with other nations. It [the foreign claim] would be made upon the government of the United States. If that government should get into a difficulty which would lead to war, or to suspension of intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all the Union?111 A century later, in 1979, California imposed an ad valorem property tax on foreign-owned cargo containers. The Court again invalidated the state law, mind¬ful that the "risk of retaliation by Japan ... [was] acute, and such retaliation of necessity would be felt by the Nation as a whole."112 The Court's concerns in this regard are now embodied in the so-called "one voice" doctrine—a putative requirement, inferred from the Constitution's text and structure, that the nation speak with one voice in the realm of foreign affairs. The one-voice doctrine often reflects a reasonable national interest in bolstering the efficacy of American foreign policy. The national interest sometimes benefits from at least the appearance of national unity and popular support. Open conflict between the federal and state governments on key foreign policy questions can undermine national foreign policy objectives. Of course, sometimes the foreign policy of the federal government is less than clear. Yet the federal government’s silence with respect to a particular issue of foreign policy does not neces¬sarily imply an absence of a federal policy. Still less does it indicate that the states should feel free to enter the field. Federal silence, inaction, or ambiguity may be calculated. Sometimes the best policy is to do and say nothing, or deliberately to attempt, with nuance, to leave national policy unclear.113 But the question is whether the doctrine has been expanded beyond the limit of its logic.114

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF › 2AC---INB---FAF---FAF Bad

Nuclear war with Russia

Spiro '99 (Peter J. Spiro, Associate Professor at Hofstra Law School, 1999, Lexis//GH-Aspomer)

Zschernig has been questioned even by those who otherwise propound federal exclusivity. n87 But the decision seems both explained and justified (at least at the time) by its Cold War context. In the tinderbox world of superpower competition, the potential consequences of giving offense were obviously profound. One could not expect the Soviets necessarily to understand that when a state official spoke, it was not for the nation; or at least one would not want to risk error in assessing that perception. At the very least, there was the specter of state action upsetting the elaborately choreographed relationship between East and West Blocs; at worst, one could plausibly draw a scenario in which offense caused by state action lit the fuse to World War III. Nor against this backdrop could one rely on the political branches to beat back state action before the damage was done; n88 the context, in other words, supported the strict application of a dormant federal power. n89 [*1243] Zschernig found parallels in two other contexts at the juncture of state activity and foreign relations. In applying the dormant foreign Commerce Clause to strike down a state tax on foreign-owned cargo containers, the Court in Japan Line emphasized the "paramount" requirement that the federal government "speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments." n90 The Court stressed the danger that a state tax on international instrumentalities could provoke the retaliation of foreign nations, which "retaliation of necessity would be directed at American transportation equipment in general, not just that of the taxing state, so that the Nation as a whole would suffer." n91 As in Zschernig, the Japan Line Court nullified the state measure notwithstanding the absence of an affirmative federal policy (either through treaty or statute) on the issue. California, the Court concluded, "may not tell this Nation or Japan how to run their foreign policies" in "an area where a uniform federal rule is essential... Even a slight overlapping of tax - a problem that might be deemed de minimis in a domestic context - assumes importance when sensitive matters of foreign relations and national sovereignty are concerned." n92 Perhaps even more clearly than the dormant foreign affairs power, this sort of severe application of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause would have seemed defensible, especially insofar as it built upon a well-settled dormant power in the domestic commerce context. n93 Japan Line was handed down against an international economic backdrop not far removed from the corresponding national security context, where before theentrenchment of today's free trade regimes the specter of trade wars loomed in economic relations even between friendly states. [*1244] Finally, one can also integrate into the rule of federal exclusivity the designation of customary international law as part of federal common law. Under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, n94 the federal courts were free to apply general common law, including customary international law, without regard to the common law interpretations of state courts; there was no need specially to justify the application of customary international law in the absence of controlling state or federal statutory or constitutional law. n95 That changed with Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, n96 which denied the federal courts the power to create common law "except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress." n97 The presumption thereafter was that federal common lawmaking had to be grounded in some particular federal interest. n98 It was only with the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Sabbatino that the application of customary international law as federal common law was found acceptable under Erie. n99 That holding can be justified on the same basis as the dormant [*1245] foreign affairs power. Inappropriate interpretation of or noncompliance with customary international law could cause offense to foreign nations, which might respond with action against the nation as a whole. The Court did not clearly articulate its holding in such terms, adverting only to unspecified "potential dangers" n100 were Erie extended to legal problems affecting international relations, and noting "a concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign nations." n101 The decision did, however, cite commentary that advocated federal court interpretation of customary international law, "lest the provincialism of state courts lead to impolitic judicial decisions offensive to the sensibilities of foreign nations." n102 As with the dormant foreign affairs power cases, the rule against state court interpretation of customary international law would seem to have been justified, especially in a Cold War context. To take the facts of Sabbatino itself, the federal government couldn't have state courts misapplying the act of state doctrine n103 to deny the effectiveness of Cuban (and other Communist Bloc) nationalizations; the risk of upsetting the superpower balance would have been too great to trust the responsibility of applying or interpreting the relevant standards to nonfederal actors. n104 And that perhaps explains why [*1246] the inclusion of customary international law in the category of federal common law has, until recently, been accepted as uncontroversial. n105 And so these three different strands of the exclusivity principle - the dormant foreign affairs power, the dormant foreign commerce power, and the inclusion of customary international law as a part of federal common law - all seemed sustainable in a world that would not differentiate between the component unit and the whole. However important they would otherwise be, federalism values could not be vindicated in the face of a plausible and substantial risk that unconstrained state action would result in dramatic harm to the nation as a whole. C. The Case for Maintaining Federal Exclusivity If one assumed a world in which nations were still held responsible for the acts of their component units, one could support a fairly strong case for confirming the holdings of Zschernig, Japan Line, and Sabbatino, and the precept that the states should be denied the tools to interfere with national foreign relations. n106 Constitutional pedigree aside, the functional [*1247] underpinnings of the exclusivity principle are powerful. It is not just that individual states will take action that will harm other states, though that fact highlights the problems of state-level action from a democratic process perspective. It is that such decisions will be consistently distorted in the face of significant externalities; state-level actors, because they do not shoulder the consequences of their actions, will not take into account those consequences in the decision-making balance. These externalities will also tend to create information deficiencies; because the states will not shoulder the consequences of their conduct, they have less incentive to understand what those consequences will be. Indeed, a standard lament of state-level foreign policy activity is that it is based on insufficient expertise. n107 Assuming continued externalities, the case against state-level action remains strong. The magnitude of state and local international activity has grown dramatically in recent years, so that one might expect a growing risk of unwelcome resulting entanglements; though much of this activity is benign, some provokes the traditional concerns of the exclusivity principle. The persistent potential for subfederal action to disrupt national foreign relations is demonstrated by the recent diplomatic controversy and constitutional litigation concerning state and local sanctions against companies doing business in Burma. n108 Though they enjoy the formal power to suppress it, the political branches of the federal government remain less well positioned to police this activity than the courts. The changing construction of international society aside, n109 perhaps the best argument for softening the rule of federal exclusivity highlights the end of the Cold War and the diminished ultimate dangers of foreign retaliation. In recent years there has been a marked blurring of the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs; so fast has the line eroded - hastened by the communications revolution, the greater ease of travel, and the growing priority of trade over traditional national security issues - that globalization has become almost an instant cliche. The international arena is now very much of local interest, as reflected in the dramatically [*1248] heightened profile of state and local governments on the world scene. This is particularly pronounced in matters relating to trade and investment. One in six private-sector jobs in the United States is now linked to the global economy. n110 The number of Americans working for foreign companies in the United States now stands at five million; foreign direct investment in the United States has quadrupled since 1981. n111 Subfederal jurisdictions now see international trade and foreign investment as critical to their economic well-being. They compete ferociously for foreign investment with tax breaks and other incentives. n112 Most states now maintain at least one trade office abroad; n113 many have concluded trade-related agreements with foreign entities; n114 and the foreign trade mission has become a standard responsibility for governors and large-city mayors. Most of these trade and investment-related activities are unobjectionable, from both policy and constitutional perspectives. n115 [*1249] The growing importance of the world to the states has also made the states more important to the world. If they stood as independent nations, seven American states would be counted among the top twenty-five countries in terms of gross domestic product; even Vermont, with the smallest economy among the states, would outrank almost 100 nations. n116 It is thus not surprising that foreign authorities, themselves critically interested in global commerce, court state-level officials to attract investment from and promote exports within the subfederal jurisdictions. Moreover, state and local governments directly control vast procurement budgets; the annual expenditures of state and local governments exceeds one trillion dollars. n117 Subfederal governments now have international economic clout. The problem is that this clout can and will occasionally be deployed in ways that offend foreign nations.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF › 2AC---INB---FAF---FAF Bad

Foreign affairs federalism disunites messaging and angers other actors

Baasch & Prakash 16 Ryan Baasch, Law Clerk to Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson, 2015-16. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Law Prof @ University of Virginia. [Congress and The Reconstruction of Foreign Affairs Federalism, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 47]//BPS

I. Cacophonous Foreign Affairs The case against state involvement in foreign affairs is easy to make. States are unqualified to act in the international arena because they lack the information and the expertise that comes from continued and sustained engagement in foreign matters. Because of their ignorance and inexperience, states are apt to anger allies and undermine the actions and priorities of the more expert federal political branches. Those untutored in foreign matters should not be suffered to hamper those more informed and skilled, however good the intentions of the former. Further, the international ventures of state officials run counter to popular expectations. Voters expect that local officials will stick to local matters and that federal officials--senators, representatives, presidents--will steer our nation's diplomacy. In sum, foreign affairs federalism, as it operates today, imposes substantial costs and renders the United States disunited before the world. Some scholars disagree with our diagnosis. A few of them claim that state intervention generates weighty benefits. Others suggest that the drawbacks of state freelancing are insignificant, or are manageable. We disagree. This Part highlights the drawbacks of state involvement in foreign affairs. It then maintains that the supposed benefits of many voices in foreign affairs are illusory.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF › 2AC---INB---FAF---Warming Defense

Their models are bad and offend consensus

Piper 19 -- Kelsey Piper, citing John Halstead climate change mitigation researcher at the Founders Pledge. [Is climate change an "existential threat" — or just a catastrophic one? 6-28-2019, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/6/13/18660548/climate-change-human-civilization-existential-risk]

I also talked to some researchers who study existential risks, like John Halstead, who studies climate change mitigation at the philanthropic advising group Founders Pledge, and who has a detailed online analysis of all the (strikingly few) climate change papers that address existential risk (his analysis has not been peer-reviewed yet).

Halstead looks into the models of potential temperature increases that Breakthrough’s report highlights. The models show a surprisingly large chance of extreme degrees of warming. Halstead points out that in many papers, this is the result of the simplistic form of statistical modeling used. Other papers have made a convincing case that this form of statistical modeling is an irresponsible way to reason about climate change, and that the dire projections rest on a statistical method that is widely understood to be a bad approach for that question.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF › 2AC---INB---FAF---Warming Defense

Models are wrong AND are exaggerated

Vijay Jayaraj 21 (Vijay Jayaraj has a M.Sc., Environmental Science, University of East Anglia, England), Research Contributor for the Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of Creation, 3/11/21, accessed 10/17/21, “Why I Am a Climate Realist”, https://cornwallalliance.org/2021/03/why-i-am-a-climate-realist/)AGabay

The answer to my question trickled in slowly over a number of years. Evidence began to emerge that scientists acknowledged a large gap between the actual observed real-world temperature datasets (from satellites) and those temperature predictions from computer climate models. While these differences may not prove the allegations against the Climategate scientists, they do confirm one thing: the computer climate models exaggerate the future warming rate due to their high sensitivity to carbon dioxide emissions. As a result, the models continue to show an excessive and unreal warming rate for future decades. Despite plenty of evidence, the IPCC continues to use these faulty model predictions to inform the public and policymakers about future changes in temperature. A steady stream of scientific studies has documented the evidence for lack of dangerous warming—IPCC’s level of warming based on fifth- and sixth-generation (CMIP5 and CMIP6) models and the apparent absence of climate-induced ecological collapse. In 2020 alone, over 400 peer-reviewed scientific papers took up a skeptical position on climate alarmism. These papers—and hundreds from previous years—address various issues related to climate change, including problems with climate change observation, climate reconstructions, lack of anthropogenic/CO2 signal in sea-level rise, natural mechanisms that drive climate change (solar influence on climate, ocean circulations, cloud climate influence, ice sheet melting in high geothermal heat flux areas), hydrological trends that do not follow modeled expectations, the fact that corals thrive in warm, high-CO2 environments, elevated CO2 and higher crop yields, no increasing trends in intense hurricanes and drought frequency, the myth of mass extinctions due to global cooling, etc. Academia is filled with scientific literature that contradicts the position of those who believe climate change is unprecedented. Also, during the course of the last decade, it became apparent that most of Al Gore’s claims in his 2006 documentary were false. Contrary to his claims, polar bear populations remained steady, the Arctic did not become ice free during the summer of 2014, and storms did not get stronger due to global warming. In simple words, Gore misled the world and promoted falsehood as science, and he continues to do so while profiting from a renewable industry that is sold as the cure for global warming. Yet, he himself generates carbon dioxide emissions many times higher than an average family’s. So, not only are the predictions of models wrong, but also the interpretations of climate data and the propaganda of a climate doomsday were also wrong. Today, we know the modern warming rate is not unprecedented. Warming of such magnitude has happened twice within the past 2000 years. Further, ice at both poles is at historic highs, even compared with the Little Ice Age of the 17th century. Besides, there has been no increase in extreme weather events due to climate change and the loss of lives due to environmental disasters has drastically reduced during the last 100 years. So, I am a climate realist. I acknowledge that there has been a gradual increase in global average temperature since the end of the Little Ice Age in the 17th century. I acknowledge that climate change can happen in both ways—warming and cooling. I do understand that anthropogenic CO2 emissions and other greenhouse gases could have positively contributed to the warming from mid-20th century onwards. I also acknowledge that warming and the increased atmospheric carbon dioxide that has contributed to it have actually helped society. The current atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration, nearly 50 percent higher than in the 17th century, and the warming—which has occurred chiefly in winter, in higher latitudes and altitudes, and at night, thus raising cold temperatures but with little effect on hot temperatures—have actually resulted in optimal conditions for global plant growth, thus aiding in the flourishing of the agricultural sector. The Bengal tiger populations have bounced back, and polar bear populations are steady, thanks to conservation efforts. Forest area in Europe is increasing every year, and countries are planting tree saplings at a record rate. Life expectancy has reached all-time highs in many countries, and more people are constantly pulled out of extreme poverty every year (although business lockdowns to fight COVID-19 threaten to reverse that trend). Access to freshwater has improved and human productivity has increased drastically. So, there is no actual climate emergency. Instead, what we have are celebrities, activists, un-elected political bodies like the UN, and even some climate scientists religiously promoting a popular doomsday belief. The models do not know the future, and neither do the Climategate scientists. But an exaggerated view of future warming provides the ideal background for anti-carbon-based fuels policies that will undermine the economic well-being of every society in the world. We must not allow that.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF › 2AC---INB---FAF---Warming Defense

No climate impact

Amber Kerr et al. 19 (Amber Kerr is an agroecologist with a PhD from UC Berkeley, and was the coordinator of the USDA California Climate Hub, based at the University of California, Davis, Daniel Swain is a Climate Scientist at UCLA, Andrew King is a lecturer in Climate Science and ARC DECRA fellow at the School of Earth Sciences and ARC Centre of Excellence for Climate Extremes, University of Melbourne, Peter Kalmus is an American climate scientist and data scientist at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Richard Bettis is Chair in Climate Impacts at the University of Exeter and Head of Climate Impacts in the Met Office Hadley Centre, 6/4/19, accessed 11/17/21, “Claim that human civilization could end in 30 years is speculative, not supported with evidence”, https://climatefeedback.org/evaluation/iflscience-story-on-speculative-report-provides-little-scientific-context-james-felton/)AGabay

There is no scientific basis to suggest that climate breakdown will “annihilate intelligent life” (by which I assume the report authors mean human extinction) by 2050. However, climate breakdown does pose a grave threat to civilization as we know it, and the potential for mass suffering on a scale perhaps never before encountered by humankind. This should be enough reason for action without any need for exaggeration or misrepresentation! A “Hothouse Earth” scenario plays out that sees Earth’s temperatures doomed to rise by a further 1°C (1.8°F) even if we stopped emissions immediately. Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory This word choice perhaps reveals a bias on the part of the author of the article. A temperature can’t be doomed. And while I certainly do not encourage false optimism, assuming that humanity is doomed is lazy and counterproductive. Fifty-five percent of the global population are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions beyond that which humans can survive Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter: This is clearly from Mora et al (2017) although the report does not include a citation of the paper as the source of that statement. The way it is written here (and in the report) is misleading because it gives the impression that everyone dies in those conditions. That is not actually how Mora et al define “deadly heat” – they merely looked for heatwaves when somebody died (not everybody) and then used that as the definition of a “deadly” heatwave. North America suffers extreme weather events including wildfires, drought, and heatwaves. Monsoons in China fail, the great rivers of Asia virtually dry up, and rainfall in central America falls by half. Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne: Projections of extreme events such as these are very difficult to make and vary greatly between different climate models. Deadly heat conditions across West Africa persist for over 100 days a year Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory: The deadly heat projections (this, and the one from the previous paragraph) come from Mora et al (2017)1. It should be clarified that “deadly heat” here means heat and humidity beyond a two-dimension threshold where at least one person in the region subject to that heat and humidity dies (i.e., not everyone instantly dies). That said, in my opinion, the projections in Mora et al are conservative and the methods of Mora et al are sound. I did not check the claims in this report against Mora et al but I have no reason to think they are in error. 1- Mora et al (2017) Global risk of deadly heat, Nature Climate Change The knock-on consequences affect national security, as the scale of the challenges involved, such as pandemic disease outbreaks, are overwhelming. Armed conflicts over resources may become a reality, and have the potential to escalate into nuclear war. In the worst case scenario, a scale of destruction the authors say is beyond their capacity to model, there is a ‘high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end’. Willem Huiskamp, Postdoctoral research fellow, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research: This is a highly questionable conclusion. The reference provided in the report is for the “Global Catastrophic Risks 2018” report from the “Global Challenges Foundation” and not peer-reviewed literature. (It is worth noting that this latter report also provides no peer-reviewed evidence to support this claim). Furthermore, if it is apparently beyond our capability to model these impacts, how can they assign a ‘high likelihood’ to this outcome? While it is true that warming of this magnitude would be catastrophic, making claims such as this without evidence serves only to undermine the trust the public will have in the science. Daniel Swain, Climate Scientist, University of California, Los Angeles: It seems that the eye-catching headline-level claims in the report stem almost entirely from these knock-on effects, which the authors themselves admit are “beyond their capacity to model.” Thus, from a scientific perspective, the purported “high likelihood of civilization coming to an end by 2050” is essentially personal speculation on the part of the report’s authors, rather than a clear conclusion drawn from rigorous assessment of the available evidence.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF › 2AC---INB---Soft Power Defense

Soft power fails.

Jim Lacey 13 — Jim Lacey, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps War College, holds a Ph.D. in Military History from Leeds University, 2013 (“Soft Power, Smart Power,” National Review Online, April 22nd, Available Online at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/346131/soft-power-smart-power, Accessed 05-27-2013)

During World War II, Stalin’s advisers encouraged him to seek the favor of the pope. He famously replied: “How many divisions does the pope have?” Decades later, the Soviets came to realize that papal power was not something to cavalierly disregard. Many, in fact, claim that Pope John Paul II’s moral authority was decisive in breaking the Soviet hold on Poland and propelling the Evil Empire toward its final demise. It was, therefore, a true example of the clout of “soft power.” Of course, one can maintain that view only by discounting the massive U.S. and NATO military forces that kept Soviet hard power in check for decades. A few years back, a number of policymakers, jumping on a popular academic trend given its greatest voice by Joseph Nye, began espousing a theory of soft power. In this new and shiny vision, America could wield its greatest global influence through the power of its example. The world would just look at how good we were, and how great it was to be an American, and clamor to follow us. Somehow these visionaries neglected to notice that Europe’s almost total unilateral disarmament had failed to translate into influence on the global stage. Rather, it had done the opposite. In a remarkably short time, European opinions on any matter of consequence ceased to matter. Worse, a large segment of the world took a good look at the American example and was repelled. Some of these people launched the 9/11 attack. At some point, it became clear that those holding a world vision that included returning to eighth-century barbarism were not finding our example attractive. Our deep-thinking strategists realized they needed a new answer. What they came up with was even more seductive than soft power. In the future, America would prosper through the employment of “smart power.” One wonders if our policymakers had been willfully employing “dumb power” for the previous two centuries. In any case, smart-power advocates claimed that a new policy nirvana was attainable, if only we could find the right mix of soft and hard power. Well, soft power and smart power were fascinating intellectual exercises that led nowhere. Iran is still building nuclear weapons, North Korea is threatening to nuke U.S. cities, and China is becoming militarily more aggressive. It turns out that power is what it has always been — the ability to influence and control others — and deploying it requires, as it always has, hard instruments. Without superior military power and the economic strength that underpins it, the U.S. would have no more ability to influence global events than Costa Rica. When President Obama made the strategic decision to pivot toward Asia, he did not follow up by sending dance troupes to China, or opening more cultural centers across the Pacific’s great expanse. Rather, he ordered the U.S. military to begin shifting assets into the region, so as to show the seriousness of our intent. If North Korea is dissuaded from the ultimate act of stupidity, it will have a lot more to do with our maintenance of ready military forces in the region than with any desire the North Korean regime has for a continuing flow of Hollywood movies. By now every serious strategist and policymaker understands that if the United States is going to continue influencing global events it requires hard power — a military — second to none. That is what makes a new report from the well-respected Stockholm International Peace Research Institute troubling. According to SIPRI, in 2012, China’s real military spending increased by nearly 8 percent, while Russia’s increased by a whopping 16 percent. Worse, SIPRI expects both nations to increase spending by even greater percentages this year. The United States, on the other hand, decreased real spending by 6 percent last year, with much larger cuts on the way. After a decade of war, much of our military equipment is simply worn out and in need of immediate replacement. Moreover, technology’s rapid advance continues, threatening much of our current weapons inventory with obsolescence. As much as the utopians (soft-power believers) want to deny it, American power is weakening even as the world becomes progressively less stable and more dangerous. In a world where too many states are led by men who still believe Mao’s dictum that “Power comes from the barrel of a gun,” weakness is dangerous. Weakness is also a choice. The United States, despite our current economic woes, can easily afford the cost of recapitalizing and maintaining our military. We are not even close to spending levels that would lead one to worry about “imperial overstretch.” Rather, our long-term security is being eaten up so as to fund “entitlement overstretch.” I suppose that one day, if left unchecked, the welfare state will absorb so much spending that the only military we can afford will be a shadow of what has protected us for the past seven decades. Soft power will then cease to be one option among many and, instead, become our only choice. We will become as relevant to the rest of the world as Europe. I wonder how many people realize just how different their daily lives will become if that day arrives. For a long time, American hard power has cast a protective shield around the liberal world order. It will not be pretty when that is gone.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF › 2AC---INB---Soft Power Defense

Too many alt causes to soft power swamp their internal links.

Betley 2017 - studied philosophy, politics, and economics at St. Olaf College (Alexander M, "The decline of American soft power - will it persist after Trump?," Oct 6, https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2017/10/decline-american-soft-power-will-it-persist-after-trump)

Turmoil, disengagement But today, as noted by Mattis, the turmoil associated with domestic political discord, as well as a disengagement with the international community on key issues, puts U.S. soft power severely at risk. Domestically, the president’s DACA debacle, as well as his failure to unequivocally denounce the violence instigated and perpetrated by neo-Nazis and white supremacists in Charlottesville, have left much of the world reeling. In the instance of Charlottesville, where President Donald Trump resorted to proclaiming that there was “blame on both sides,” it took a foreign leader, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, to rightfully condemn the events as “horrifying,” “racist,” and “evil.” Though Global Trumpism (to use Mark Blyth’s aptly entitled phrase) seems to be sweeping the Western world, basic liberal democratic values remain a fundamental linchpin of global order. Trump’s antics, glaringly hypocritical to professed American values, repel foreign actors and damage our image abroad — ultimately undermining our soft power. Additionally, blunders over the support of NATO, withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, and bellicose threats of meeting the North Korean challenge with “fire and fury like the world has never seen” further weaken our international standing. Paris has been, more than anything, an acknowledgment of the grave threat climate change poses to human society. Though the accord doesn’t contain binding agreements upon signatory states, the concerted will of the international community to hold strong to Paris leaves the United States isolated from international political consensus on perhaps the most sensitive issue of our time. Taking a serious toll Recent polling data from the Pew Research Center suggests these occurrences are having a serious toll on our power of attraction. Whereas only 25 to 30 percent of Europeans polled during Barack Obama's administration felt the U.S. was “on the decline,” recent surveys taken during the Trump administration show this number has spiked to 52 percent. Fewer countries than ever before view the United States as the world’s leading economic power (many replacing it with China). Nearly 75 percent of the world has given Trump a vote of no confidence in his ability “to do the right thing regarding world affairs.” This is in stark contradistinction to Obama’s time in office, where at any given moment the world population believed he would “do the right thing regarding world affairs” over 75 percent of the time. These trends and numbers, however, only confirm what many of us had already feared — President Trump’s unwillingness or inability to protect and advance fundamental U.S. interests due to the political necessity of maintaining his base at home. And although Mattis and Nye are both optimistic of the United States' ability to retain or recover many of her soft power resources in the future, such assurances in an age of pressing political challenges and revisionist international powers are surely no guarantee. Rather, it is much more likely this cascade begun by the Trump administration, indicative of the deeper and systemic pathologies of American political institutions, will persist far beyond a single presidency. As the ancient Greek historian, Thucydides, once warned, the delusional self-aggrandizement and egoism of a declining power accelerates its demise. Cleon-like, Trump is accelerating ours, ushering in the tragic and untimely decline of American soft power.