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2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › 1NC’s › 1NC---No Kickout

The counterplan competes. The plan increases security cooperation with all of NATO, the counterplan only works with discrete parts

For reference, the resolution says “the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” [The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity.]

Supreme Court of Kentucky 3 (“Kotila v. Commonwealth,” 2000-SC-0341-MR, Lexis)//BB

Whether a conviction under this statute requires possession of all (as opposed to any) of the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture [**24] methamphetamine under some manufacturing process is a matter of statutory construction. First, we examine the language of the statute, itself. United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 338-39 (6th Cir. 2000) HN9 ("The starting point in a statutory interpretation case is the language of the statute itself."). Obviously, the multiple manufacturing methods and the availability of a broad range of readily available chemicals and equipment necessary for each manufacturing process militates against itemizing within the statute all of the possible chemical and equipment combinations by which methamphetamine could be manufactured. Nevertheless, KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) does not read "[p]ossesses chemicals or equipment," or "[p]ossesses some of the chemicals or equipment," or "[p]ossesses any of the chemicals or equipment." It reads "[p]ossesses the chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine." The presence of the article "the" is significant because, grammatically speaking, possession of some but not all of the chemicals or equipment does not satisfy the statutory language.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Case Stuff › AT Poetry Bad

Poetry is important to form a politics of engagement where we can challenges the contemporary issues of our world

Joan Retellack and Juliana Spahr 06 (“Introduction: Why Teach Contemporary Poetries?” Poetry and Pedagogy: The Challenge of the Contemporary)

Educational institutions like to think they know where they are going and that's why the word pedagogy has an almost irretrievably pejorative cast. The old-fashioned specter of pedagogy as a kind of psychological and moral teleology marching toward ideals of compliant good citizenship had hardly been outmoded before its anti-authoritarian replacement began to look suspiciously benighted and equally manipulative. The student who must question all authority must become the ultimate skeptic and therefore, paradoxically, cannot assume a critical stance toward the pedagogy of self.expression s/he is offered as an instrument of freedom. In the maw of this dichotomy between power as knowledge and student-centered learning, the very things that matter-~-the informed imagination, the passionate intellect-_can be swallowed whole. We are not attempting with this book to invent a new pedagogy, but to suggest that education must be in touch with the historical-contemporary intersection that forms the world in which we live. This can happen in many ways. What poetry has to offer is a compound experience in which the dynamic engagement of self and otherness, of formal discipline and experiment, is played out through the foregrounding of language. Every word, every combination of words, strikes us like a chord on multiple levels of intellect and emotion. Language is the site of cognitive modeling and intuitively nuanced play. The conceptual framework of this book draws on Wittgenstein's sense of language as a form of life, language games as the repertory of our human action--a repertory that profits from continual reinvention, and becomes stalled in thoughtless habitual usage. It also benefits from John Dewey's idea of art as experience and D. W. Winnicott's crucial distinction between the active imagination at play and the passive retreat into fantasy. Winnicott, like Dewey, believes that imaginative engagements with our world are responsible for not only our sense of reality but our zest for life. Winnicott argues that our most important life-affirming active principle is our capacity for that high-stakes engagement with the concrete materials of existence that we call play.* Whether in literature or the sciences, it is the playful mind that experiments and discovers. Gertrude Stein's (playful) argument that in our arts we are literally composing the time in which we live brings into focus the poetical urgency of what we value most in our uses of language. Our contemporary experience is both alarmingly and exhilaratingly complex--chaotic, excessive, messy. It demands an intricately informed agency, new ways to perceive and invent patterns, the ability to make mean-ing in motion. It is polylingual and perverse, full of delightful and nefarious artifice. As editors of this volume, we believe that the contemporary poetries of which the many authors represented here write can enliven our capaci-ties to make sense of where we are, where we want to go in medias rest of the world as we find it. If poetries that are truly in touch with their times are the pleine air laboratories of the language, what are the pedagogical implications? The essays in Poetry and Pedagogy assume that the functional mandate of the humanist classroom is to bring students into engagement with that part of their world negotiated through texts. Few would deny that the contem-porary has been the chronic blind spot in all but scientific and fine arts cur-ricula. Think how many "twentieth century lit.'survey courses still can't fit much in after the mid 1950s. In fact, the greatest challenge facing the Liberal Arts has always been the contemporary. (Stein liked to say that the official "we" is always about forty years behind what is actually going on in the arts.) The question therefore is how to invent a living poetry class-room, one that invites students to experience and make meaning of the forms of their era. This at the very least requires cognizance of the plurality of poetries har come out of our blatantly "multi" world-multicultural, ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic. The essays collected here address the productive possibilities, pleasures, and risks of teaching intercultural poetries of the sort that have proliferated since the 1960s. Avant-gardes (i.e., innovative contemporary arts of all sorts) have tended to be not only pedagogical in their implications, but also international in their interests. An immediately obvious pedagogical impli-cation has to do with ways in which these poetries demand an active making of meaning on the part of the reader--a performative dimension that enacts a significant linguistic agency. In today's world that agency must be broadly informed and multifaceted. Having gone from the perhaps overly opti-mistic concept of the global village to increasing concerns about the politics of globalization, a contemporary poetics cannot be limited to the narrowly expressive 1-poem, nor the conceptual formalist poem, nor to fragmented language and syntax or paratactic riffs, nor to single rhythm, loudly declaimed spoken poetry. Any "I" from whom one has something to learn must be in conversation with an unsettling mélange of "others." The conversational intimacy of the internet, along with its nonmaterial location in cyberspace, has brought on a particular strain of the Brechtian formula for art that acti-vates agency: empathy and estrangement. These can also be viewed as qualities of the reflexive hybridization that has become a distinguishing mark of our times. However one construes all this, the fact is, from the early 1990s on, national and international conversations have flourished among any of the poets represented in this book. The geometries of their attention radiate in many directions.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Case Stuff › AT: UNIQUENESS PRESSES › AT: Pinkner

Pinker’s “violence down” argument ignores military modernization, nuclear arsenals, and sanitizes interventionism

Robinson 19 (Nathan J., PhD student in Sociology & Social Policy. Nathan is interested in criminal justice policy, particularly in Louisiana. His research focuses on adult education in U.S. prisons and on the politics of indigent legal defense. At Yale Law School, he co-directed the Green Haven Prison Project and worked for the New Orleans public defender and the ACLU's National Prison Project. “The World’s Most Annoying Man” Foreign Affairs )NFleming

Nuclear weapons pose a strong challenge to Pinker’s thesis of declining violence, one he never dealt with adequately. He argues in his books that the “long peace” since World War II was not the result of nuclear weapons, and argues that nukes are essentially “useless in winning wars and in keeping the peace” since no country would dare to use them: “Incinerating massive numbers of noncombatants would shred the principles of distinction and proportionality that govern the conduct of war and would constitute the worst war crimes in history. That can make even politicians squeamish, so a taboo grew up around the use of nuclear weapons, effectively turning them into bluffs.” Of course, this means the United States itself has committed the “worst war crimes in history” since it intentionally dropped nuclear weapons on two civilian populations. And while there is certainly a “taboo” on such behavior—Hiroshima horrified much of the world, though Americans tend to think it was fine—U.S. commanders contemplated using nuclear weapons in Vietnam, too. (Good thing Lyndon Johnson got a bit “squeamish,” although not so squeamish as to stop a war that killed two million Vietnamese people.) Realizing that the presence of thousands of weapons that can vaporize cities, and the giant U.S. war machine constantly researching terrifying swarms of autonomous flying death robots, rather undercuts the whole Most Peaceful Era Ever theory, Pinker points to the fact that “the United States has reduced its inventory by 85 percent from its 1976 peak.” He concedes, however, that “Cynics might be unimpressed by a form of progress that still leaves the world with 10,200 atomic warheads.” Indeed, cynics might! The big problem with Pinker’s violence thesis has always been that it declares victory prematurely. He is quite clear in saying he doesn’t think peace is necessarily here to stay, or that progress can’t unravel, and thinks this should silence critics who think he is overly optimistic. But the truth is that we’re just not far enough past the end of World War II to begin to comment on a general trend. The two global bloodbaths occurred within the lifetimes of people who are still alive. Over the course of human history, this is a nanosecond. It’s not a “long peace,” but a very short one. One should probably not be drawing any conclusions about what kind of era this is until we’ve seen a bit more of it, otherwise you might end up like the people who said World War One had been the war to “end all wars.” Others have pointed out that Pinker’s worldview requires him to minimize some pretty heinous violence, especially that perpetrated by the United States. (A good overview of this is found in the International Socialist Review.) He trumpets Democratic Peace Theory without much attention to the way the “democratic” U.S. has squelched popular uprisings abroad that threaten its interests. He even goes so far as to say: “Among respectable countries… conquest is no longer a thinkable option. A politician in a democracy today who suggested conquering another country would be met not with counterarguments but with puzzlement, embarrassment, or laughter.” Probably true, if they said “conquering.” If they said “liberating” or “spreading democracy to,” on the other hand, they’d be met with quite a different reaction! To avoid acknowledging U.S. aggression, he has to downplay the hideousness of the Vietnam War, and mostly blames “communists” for it, saying that “the three deadliest postwar conflicts were fueled by Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese communist regimes that had a fanatical dedication to outlasting their opponents” and “the American democracy was willing to sacrifice a tiny fraction of the lives that the North Vietnamese dictator was willing to forfeit.” This exoneration of the U.S. for the Vietnamese deaths is downright despicable, and Pinker needs to get himself much better acquainted with the reality of what we did. Naturally, Pinker is more critical of anti-nuclear activists than of the military industrial complex. “Stop telling everyone they’re doomed,” he warns. “The message that many antinuclear activists want to convey is ‘any day now we will all die horribly unless the world immediately takes steps which it has absolutely no chance of taking.” And after all, “the world has survived half-mad despots with nuclear weapons before, namely Stalin and Mao, who were deterred from using them, or, more likely, never felt the need.” Very reassuring. (He also points out that “war is illegal.”) Illustration by Mike Freiheit What’s maddening about Pinker’s body of recent work is that it attacks the very people who are doing the most to address the problems he says he cares about. Progress is made by progressives, as Jeremy Lent pointed out, and it’s yesterday’s “social justice warriors” that are responsible for the declines in racist language and corporal punishment that Pinker shows off as accomplishments of Our Great Liberal Democratic Capitalist Order. The Pinkers of times past were the one Martin Luther King was addressing in Letter From Birmingham Jail, who placed trust in the “benevolent forces of modernity” to make things better rather than actually taking part in a social movement. As my friend Sam Miller McDonald put it, “most of those good things that Steven Pinker likes to brag about came about because of the hard work and sacrifice of the kind of people Steven Pinker likes to complain about.” Indeed, Pinker is quite open that he doesn’t believe in “struggle.” He views political problems as “mistakes,” errors to be corrected through the application of rationality, rather than “conflicts” between values and interests. He wants to “depoliticize issues as much as possible” and “treat politics as science, engineering, or medicine.” This is why he refuses to see that certain kinds of power are zero-sum, that the interests of the boss does not coincide with the interests of the worker. That would mean that advancing the interests of the worker required a political fight, rather than simply the application of technology. This is the Obama worldview, and the Obama presidency proved why it doesn’t work. It turns out that interests do conflict, and that if you try to take actions that enrich working people and threaten corporate power, the people whose power is threatened will do everything they possibly can to destroy you. Steven Pinker’s works are worth examining for a few reason. For one thing, they show how deeply conservative a “liberal” worldview can be. Pinker is all for Equal Rights, Democracy, Sensible Regulation, Secularism, and the other great Liberal values. And yet like many liberals, he seems to detest the left more than the hard right. (He infamously praised the “highly literate, highly intelligent” alt-right. Then when he was criticized, he said: “A lot of people who are ignorant of the alt-right equate them with the skinheads and the Nazis carrying the tiki torches, I was referring to the alt-right strictly from its origins in internet discussion groups.” So, not Richard Spencer, but… Richard Spencer?) He simply accepts the right-wing narrative of various events. This often shows up in small framing comments. Bernhard Goetz was “a mild-mannered engineer” who “became a folk hero for shooting four young muggers,” not a vigilante who attacked four Black men after one of them asked him for money. (I’ve never looked up what Pinker thinks of James Damore, but I’m sure he thinks he was an intelligent young man fired for reporting the uncontroversial results of scientific studies.*) He partly defends the Tuskegee syphilis study, calling it a “one-time failure to prevent harm to a few dozen people,” that “may even have been defensible by the standards of the day” (It was actually 400 people that the United States government allowed to believe they were being treated for syphilis when they weren’t, and it lasted 40 years.)

2022 Michigan Kritik
Case Stuff › AT: UNIQUENESS PRESSES › AT: Women’s Participation Increasing = Progress

Increasing representation of women defers structural change and abets the system

Griffin, 2015. (Penny, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. “crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective,” in feminist review 109: 49-72, spp)

Essentialism has been no obstacle to the rapid uptake of the ‘rise of gender harmony’ in governance discourse on finance. Frequently described and represented as more responsible, nurturing, financially cautious and intrinsically less corrupt (see, for instance, Stern, 2001; World Bank, 2001), women have found themselves positioned in recent discussions of financial crisis as a solution to the excesses of male-dominated finance, in a show of essentialism that governance feminism has run with in its agenda for getting more women in boardrooms and on trading floors. Economic observers have frequently attributed the seeds of the global financial crisis ‘to a combination of reckless risk-taking and outright corruption’ and, just as ‘risk-taking has been laid at the door of masculinity, so too has corruption’ (Fogg, 2013). Accordingly, women ‘are simply more honest’, more trustworthy and public-spirited and less corrupt than men (ibid.). They are also ‘naturally’ more prone to long-term thinking or empathic and prosocial behaviour than men (ibid.). Policy-oriented studies have emerged to demonstrate ‘that including women is good for business’ and evidence has been marshalled to show that firms that promote women into management are more profitable, better organised, accountable, motivated and innovative (Prügl, 2012: 29). Making ‘women’s difference productive for the solution of the crisis’, such accounts have centralised women’s supposed patience, their consistence and their attention to detail (ibid.: 30). Importantly, however (and in case men begin to feel threatened by all this attention on women’s gifts), these accounts have redeemed men in finance by extolling women’s contributions to profit in conjunction with men’s tendency towards extremes, painting women as ‘competent associate[s] in a common endeavor’ (ibid.: 31). Iceland’s efforts to ‘signal a new culture within the banking system’ (Wall Street Journal, 2008), appointing female chief executives to the newly nationalised Icelandic banks, serves as a good example of the extent to which essentialist, and behavioural, explanations have monopolised contemporary accounts of financial crisis. According to Salam, the ‘macho men of the heavily male-dominated global finance sector’ created the conditions for global economic collapse’, assisted by ‘their mostly male counterparts in government’ (Salam, 2009: 68). Women, on the other hand, are less inclined to ‘risky’ behaviour on financial markets (except when menstruating; see Lite, 2008). As Elias (2013: 161) notes, women’s perceived carefulness as consumers (according to Global Gender Gap reporting) also makes them better placed as managers of household finances. According to the WEF, they are ‘driving the post-financial-crisis-economic-recovery’ not only though their ‘retail power’ but by ‘engaging in acts of consumption that enable them to break with traditional gender stereotypes in favor of an empowered gender identity as consumer’ (ibid.: 161–162). Governance feminism’s embrace of the neo-liberal market guarantees that it firmly avoids questions that might challenge the shape of the economic system that has led to crisis. Governance feminism, and governance feminism’s response to financial crisis, has been extensively silent on the gendered underpinnings of global governance, and global finance in particular, focusing instead on a particular (and perhaps unsurprising) support for institutional measures to enhance women’s participation. The increasing prevalence of descriptions of gender that directly correlate low gender gaps with high economic competitiveness is, as Elias (2013: 159) notes, a powerful instrument of governance, feeding into states’ obsessions with their national economic competitiveness and ‘thus legitimating neoliberal competitiveness enhancing policy agendas’. While it may be, then, ‘no bad thing that an organisation such as the WEF has placed gender prominently on its issue agenda’, since this can legitimate ‘a focus on gender issues within state and nonstate arenas and within international organisations’, the ‘inevitability about the way in which gender issues are instrumentalised in order to link women’s empowerment and gender equality straightforwardly to economic growth and competitiveness’ is, Elias notes, troubling. ‘By disappearing feminism in favour of technical measurement and celebrity humanitarianism’, governance feminism simply reiterates problematic visions of gender ‘whereby gender equality and women’s empowerment’ can be understood only in relation to their ‘ability to serve the market economy’ (ibid.: 166–167).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Case Stuff › AT: UNIQUENESS PRESSES › AT: Women are in politics

Their women in politics example doesn’t disprove our argument that dominant politics operates via displays of hegemonic masculinity

Maruska, 2010. (Jennifer Heeg, PhD in IR from Georgetown, Lecturer in Political Science and Texas A&M in Qatar, “When are states hypermasculine?” In Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 248-251, SPP)

Conclusion: hypermasculine politics: State behavior (by foreign policy elites and within popular culture) reflects hegemonic masculinity, which is just one type of masculinity that occurs at the top of a hierarchy of power relations. As previously discussed, various forms of masculinities manifest on the international stage, including hegemonic masculinity (of Western elites) and other, subordinated masculinities (such as gay men, men of color; and non-Western men), as well as many forms of subordinate femininity. Hegemonic femininity is perfectly sound as a theoretical concept, but it is present only when "feminine" values dominate the social structure under analysis. But insofar as states are "manly," the field of international politics is dominated by states with differing hegemonic masculinities. American hegemonic masculinity's most recent turn towards hypermasculinity is in stark contrast to Germany's focus on economic primacy. But it does not matter whether Gerhard Schroeder or Angela Merkel is at the helm: like all other states, Germany must behave in a manly way in order to compete against other manly states-and to survive in a feminine anarchy.67 The point is well theorized by now that "when women enter politics, particularly in areas of foreign policy, they enter an already constructed masculine world where role expectations are defined in terms of adherence to preferred masculine attributes such as rationality, autonomy, and power. "68 This is adherence to a generalized description of hegemonic masculinity. What I propose as hypermasculinity goes further than this, and refers to aggressive and bellicose behavior. It is possible that female heads-of-state may be more likely to adhere to a hypermasculine hegemonic masculinity, in order to minimize their anatomical female-ness. Television pundits make this point: Andrew Sullivan refers to Queens Elizabeth and Victoria, Margaret Thatcher, and now Hillary Clinton as "Warrior Queens. "69 The concepts of hegemonic masculinity, and subordinate masculinities and femininities, give this punditry (based on intuition and a specific reading of history) real theoretical heft. The field of international politics in the US is dominated almost completely by straight white men-or women who "act like men" (as is frequently said about Hillary Clinton)--or by non-white men and women who conform (by choice or necessity) to the culture of Washington. Even the 2008 election of President Barack Obama, unprecedented as it was, does not fundamentally alter this reality. After all, current First Lady Michelle Obama's senior thesis at Princeton reflected on her experiences as a Black American at an Ivy League university, stating that "the path I have chosen to follow by attending Princeton will likely lead to my further integration and/or assimilation into a White cultural and social structure that will only allow me to remain on the periphery of society; never becoming a full participant." Furthermore, she continues in the next paragraph, "as I enter my final year at Princeton, I find myself striving for many of the same goals as my White classmates." It remains to be seen, but while some may hope that the Obama administration ushers in an era where the particular strand of hegemonic masculinity is less hypermasculine than it was immediately following 9/11, international politics remains as imbued with hegemonic masculinity as ever. Acceptable behavior in international politics transcends the individual’s race or gender; to get to a position of power, all participants (gay, straight, male, female, light or dark-skinned) must conform to the "cult of [hegemonic] masculinity." As Carol Cohn has showed us in the field of nuclear strategy, "learning the language is a transformative, not an additive, process." Heads of state must be perceived as strong on national security; national security relies on war or the threat of war. This is hegemonic masculinity in the extreme. Hegemonic masculinity is international politics, and international politics is hegemonic masculinity. In the words of two feminist theorists "international politics is a process which is always already gendered and which is maintained as gender-neutral only in reducing gender to 'women' and their particular concerns."73 If gender is not widely considered to be useful as a line of inquiry into politics, it is only because politics are dominated so completely by the mindset of hegemonic masculinity. As R. W. Connell wrote:

2022 Michigan Kritik
Case Stuff › AT: FEM IR TURNS › AT: K = Gender Binaries

Masculinity and femininity are culturally constructed – masculine doesn’t inherently dominate the feminine

Workman 96 (Thom, Poli Sci @ U of New Brunswick, YCISS Paper no. 31, p. 5, January 1996, http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP31-Workman.pdf)

The gender critique of war provides a generalized account of wars and the way they are fought. The gender critique tells us why we have wars at all. While it is suggestive with respect to the frequency, character, and scope of war, it does not try to account for the timing and location of specific wars. It tells us why war is viewed widely as an acceptable practice or way to resolve human differences (although this acceptance invariably is accompanied with obligatory protestations of reluctance). The gender critique of war, for example, cannot account for the timing and location of the 1991 Gulf War, although it can provide an explanation of the warring proclivities of modern Western states, especially the inconsistency between the peaceful rhetoric of the US and its incessant warring practices. It can account for the spectre of war in the aftermath of Vietnam, with the end of the Cold War, and with the election of George Bush. It is less able to account for the appearance of war in the Middle East in January of 1991. The opening intellectual orientation of the gender critique of war rests upon a constructivist view of human understanding and practice, that is, a view that anchors practices, including war, within humankind's self-made historico-cultural matrix. This view is contrasted starkly with those that ground human practices psychologically or biologically or genetically. War is not viewed as a natural practice as if delivered by the Gods; it arises out of human-created understandings and ways-of- living that have evolved over the millennia. More specifically, the assumption that men (the nearly exclusive makers and doers of war) are biologically hard-wired for aggression and violence is resisted, as is the related notion that women are naturally passive and non-violent. The explanation for war will not be found in testosterone levels. It is not the essential or bio-social male that makes war. War is the product of the gendered understandings of life—understandings of the celebrated masculine and the subordinated feminine—that have been fashioned over vast tracts of cultural time. And since war arises from human-created understandings and practices it can be removed when these understandings change. War is not insuperable. Indeed, the rooting of war in human created phenomena is recognized as a response to the political incapacitation associated with biologically determinist arguments: "Attempts of genetic determinists to show a biological basis for individual aggression and to link this to social aggression, are not only unscientific, but they support the idea that wars of conquest between nations are inevitable."8

2022 Michigan Kritik
Case Stuff › AT: FEM IR TURNS › AT: K = Gender Binaries

Our theory of hegemonic masculinity does not rely on binaries but recognizes that a constructed conception of masculinity is privileged over other masculinities and femininities

Wadley, 2010. (Jonathan, PhD in IR from Florida and currently professor of IR and sexual politics at San Diego. “Gendering the State: Performativity and Protection in International Security,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, pp. 49-50, SPP)

Often, the qualities of gender norms are structured as dichotomous pairs. As signifiers of identity, they establish hierarchy among the actors upon which they are "written." They include, among other things: rationality/irrationality, civilized/barbaric, autonomous/dependent, active/passive, and powerful/weak-all of which map onto the dominant signifier pair of masculine/feminine. The examination of gender dichotomies such as these has been helpful in accounting for how unequal, relational identities have been maintained and how they have privileged some actors and marginalized others. However, there are limits to this kind of analysis. By viewing relational gender identities in dichotomous terms, one risks neglecting the variation that exists within those categories. Simply put, there are different and unequal types of masculinity and femininity. Within the range of masculinities, there are dominant and subordinate types. A hegemonic masculinity is an idealized, relational, and historical model of masculinity-one to which other forms of masculinity are subordinate. Although the qualities associated with it characterize a small percentage of masculine actors, its idealization and cultural pervasiveness require other actors to position themselves in relation to it. And while it is continually evolving, incorporating other forms of masculinity even as it subordinates them, it remains identifiable. By performing in accordance with a dominant model of masculinity, states can constitute (and thus, position) themselves relationally as powerful subjects. For Connell, this kind of positioning is at the heart of the concept of masculinity, to such a degree that the term "represents not a certain type of man but, rather, a way that men position themselves through discursive practices." Cynthia Enloe argues similarly that patriarchy is perpetuated by “men who are recognized and claim a certain form of masculinity, for the sake of being more valued, more 'serious,' and 'the protectors of/and controllers of those people who are less masculine.” A comparable process occurs among states. As with men, the more that states are able to constitute themselves in alliance with the norms of the hegemonic masculinity the more they will improve their position and boost their credibility. Thus, states have constant incentives to perform in ways that not only are masculine but that constitute them as a certain form of masculine actor, one who embodies the elements of the hegemonic masculinity. Performances that masculinize states by positioning them closer to the ideal of the hegemonic masculinity are likely to be most effective in the realm of security. This is because security performances are central to the production of the state as a unitary subject and because, so often, security performances are rendered intelligible by highly pronounced ideas about masculinity and femininity. War, in particular, demonstrates this claim. Long ago, Kenneth Waltz observed that in times of war the state is united (and, therefore, a single entity) to a greater degree than at any other time. Tickner makes a similar observation but concludes that gender plays a big role in producing state unity: the state becomes a citizen-warrior in times of war. Jean Bethke Elshtain and Susan Jeffords go one step further, arguing that collective identities are constructed through the types of men and women that war creates or brings out. But absent war, security performances are still crucial for state production and reproduction. By taking dangers, threats, and other signs of insecurity to be there objects, security performances reproduce the boundaries between a secure self and a dangerous other. Boundary reproduction is central to processes of statecraft, and security performances occur where the integrity of the state's boundaries are discursively challenged, often in an explicit manner. Whether such threats are internal or external, the effect is the same. Indeed, the distinction often collapses. One effect of successful security performances, then, is the appearance of the state as a unitary, continuous actor, and one who can claim legitimacy over those "internal" to it. An additional effect of successful security performances is the constitution of the state as an actor who is hierarchically dominant to certain other international actors, frequently states. Both of these can be accomplished by performing security in accord with the norms of the hegemonic masculinity. The relational quality of gender ensures that any performances that gave the state the appearance of personhood will necessarily position its personhood in relation to other states. Any gendered construction of the state, even if it does not live up to masculine ideals, will be "socially defined contradistinction from some model (whether real or imaginary) of femininity; thus, the gender norms that make a state intelligible as a subject also situate it relationally to other actors.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Case Stuff › AT: FEM IR TURNS › AT: K = Essentialism

No link and turn – we don’t assume men are inherently more aggressive than women – the military creates this essentialism to serve its interests. We critique discourses that sustain notions of masculinity intrinsically tied to violence

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 69 (SPP).

Some scholars have argued that men are more likely to make war than women, because men are naturally aggressive. Wars break out because men are in positions of political and military power. Francis Fukuyama's 1998 Foreign Affairs article is an example of this type of reasoning. If this logic were true, it could be argued that men are likely to misinterpret the actual offense-defense balance because their aggressive tendencies inspire them to seek out conflict. The relationship between gender and aggression, however, is more complicated. Claims of "natural" aggression in men are politically suspect because they imply it is impossible for men to be otherwise, and therefore ignore the many men who do not behave aggressively. Joshua Goldstein finds little evidence that increased levels of testosterone in men fuel wars, or that biological factors explain the near-monopoly men have had on war-fighting throughout history. Instead of blaming men's biological composition for state aggressiveness, feminists in IR have identified military training and the installment of martial values in men as a source of aggressive policies. Cynthia Enloe draws attention to the myriad strategies associating nationalism and masculinity that military recruiters have used around the world and through time to encourage men to enlist, from promises of a fast-track to "first-class citizenship" for racial minorities, to presumptions of cultural superiority for groups already privileged. In the case of World War I, a "crisis of masculinity" in Britain was incited by the physical ineligibility of much of the working classes for military service, resulting in widespread government intervention to produce a nation of men more suited for the rigors of war deemed necessary to maintain Britain's colonial empire and place in the world. Anxieties over the ability of men to defend the nation prompted attempts to reshape gender relations throughout society to encourage the reinvigoration of traditional gender roles. This evidence indicates that rather than being inherently masculine, the military serves as an important site for the creation and maintenance of gender identities in society. As Enloe points out, "If maleness, masculinity, and militarism were inevitably bound together, militaries would always have all the soldiers they believed they required."42 Viewing gender as an identity, as "a socially imposed and internalized lens through which individuals perceive and respond to the world,"43 does a better job at explaining the underestimation of the costs of war than theories of men's innate aggression.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Framework › Deliberation

Their model of deliberation relies on a hegemonically masculine model of rationality and stasis point that attempts to push “unproductive” knowledge to the private or domestic sphere –

Tomlinson, 10 (Barbara, “Feminism and Affect at the scene of argument”, Ch 1 – transforming the terms of reading)

Contemporary U.S. political and academic discourse abounds with a recurring set of formulaic claims that feminist scholars (and feminists in general) are angry, unreasoning, shrill, humorless, ugly, man- hating, perverse, and peculiar. This “trope of the angry feminist” is designed to delegitimize feminist argument even before the argument begins, to undermine feminist politics by making its costs personal, and to foreclose feminist futures by making feminism seem repulsive to young women. The trope is a convention, a plot trick, a setup, a narrative structure, a character type. 2 Its incessant repetition constitutes part of a cultural training program that makes antifeminism and misogyny a routine element in everyday speech and written argument. Instigated by expressly po liti calopposition to feminism, deploying affectively charged strategies that float free of evidence, clichés like the angry feminist put animosity— not argument— at the center of politi cal discussions, interpellating readers as always already antifeminist. The repetition and circulation of such tropes produces a cumulative overdetermined quality that makes them seem already true before the moment of argument. One never encounters the feminist’s argument for the first time because it comes already discredited. Because the trope of the angry feminist encourages unacknowledged ways of interpreting feminist affect, its inveterate irruption is consequential in journalism, entertainment, po liti cal, and quasi- intellectual arenas, as I describe in this introductory chapter. It is perhaps even more consequential in its influence on academic discourses, the subject of the remainder of the book: affect in academic discourses on social justice is often policed through “ideologies of style” that purport to be neutral but operate to entrench current conditions of power. In this book I argue that we have failed to theorize adequately the role of such pervasive affective and ideologically encapsulated arguments in academic and political discourses. In consequence, we do not recognize that our conventional reading practices mislead us about ways to comprehend and counter them. I argue that transforming the terms of reading can reframe the problem, and propose for that purpose a critical toolkit that I call “feminist socioforensic discursive analysis.” My argument here constitutes a provocation to transform the terms of reading, to reframe interpretation of affect in both feminist and antifeminist writing. Th e trope of the angry feminist is a familiar conceit, like many similar phrases deployed to delegitimize social criticism, one that draws on a deep well of related clichés, affective rhetorical strategies, and familiar tropes. Th ese discursive moves circulate as instantiations of power. Th e trope of the angry feminist presents itself as fresh each time it is uttered, its repetitious banality framed as mere reflection of the repetitious banality of the feminist’s argument. Th is leads to the absurd but po liti cally effi cacious situation where readers are weary of arguments they have never heard. These argumentative tactics often succeed in part because our normal reading and writing practices lead us to object or counterargue in ways that fail to come to grips with the specific nature of the rhetorical situation that the tropes instantiate. Our conventional reading practices reinscribe ways of thinking that seem “logical” or “fair” because they are so familiar; they lead us to treat the tropes as surface features of discourse that serve to “skew” debate from its direct and proper form. These conventional practices, permeated by unacknowledged power relations, encourage us to respond to the tropes “normatively,” with reproaches about textual etiquette, textual responsibility, or textual appropriateness, to complain about inadequate evidence, to provide counterexamples, or to condemn the person proffering the trope, as though its use violates an agreement about the proper nature of civic discussion, and as if there is a mechanism of accountability. None of this is the case. Responses that might chastise, correct, or even complain about the trope of the angry feminist are inadequate in part because they rest, ultimately, on an imaginary ideal: a discursive arena regulated by impartial principles in which utterances are adjudicated by unbiased observers. Framing political and even academic discussion in this commonsense way treats rhetoric as a neutral technology to be deployed or evaluated in isolation from its conditions of production, the situations of speakers, or the general societal power relations that give utterances friendly to prevailing power relations an overdetermined “reasonableness” while rendering most oppositional arguments automatically suspect. Our reading practices already rest on uninterrogated and deeply gendered and racialized models of textuality, argument, authorship, politeness, and emotion. Under such conditions, affect is a potent tool of dominance, infusing the reading situation to teach us what power is, who has it, how to get it, how to be rewarded, and how to avoid the punishments power can deliver. Louis Althusser (1971) argues that concrete individuals become constituted as “subjects” through ideology, but the most powerful ideological influences do not come to us in the form of ideological pronouncements. Th at would make them visible, controversial, and refutable. Instead, he argues, the most powerful ideologies exist in “apparatuses,” in practices, and these practices are always material. Reading, writing, and argument are social practices sedimented with ideologies of legitimacy, propriety and fairness so powerful and pervasive that we presuppose their value rather than examining their effects.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Framework › SSD

Their conception of switch side normalizes opposition as a narrative of completeness that shuts out feminist considerations of IR

Sjoberg and Chessman 2012 (Laura Sjoberg, PhD in IR from USC and Professor at UF, and Christian Chessman, JD UC Berk, "The Biopower of Occupation: Insights for ‘Knowledge Exchange’in (Gender and) IR,” November 17, 2012 http://genderinglobalgovernancenet-work.net/events/critical-reflections-on-the-researcher-practitioner-relationship-2/attachment/sjoberg-and-chessman-biopower-of-occupation (rishi)).

The second contribution we argue that “Occupy” as method could make to feminist research is in understanding research more generally as being stable in its liminality rather than anchored by a static certainty about ontology, epistemology, method, or field politics. One way to think about this might be thinking about IR as art, as Christine Sylvester suggests: It takes an eye for sex and gender to see the art of it all. Even then it is difficult. Surrounded by enchanted positivism, which promises progress in knowledge – yes, this is the way! – only a long learning curve has brought us to the point of X-raying and carbon-dating the facts presented as timeless tendencies, as ‘objective’ IR. If we do not journey along the learning curve, we end up trying to draw without looking, observing, and reckoning with life. (Sylvester 2002, 273) Sylvester is arguing that seeing the world in a way that is linear, rational, and exclusively scientific neglects a number of concerns which are normatively important to feminisms, which find their substance in the political, the personal, and the critical. At the same time, anchoring research in liminality contradicts the discipline’s anchoring in a positivist social science based on approximating certainty. As researchers, liminality-as-research-goal is another uninhabitable space in IR – one which might be physically inhabited as an embodied disruption of positivist social science – one which might be a space of otherness and a space of protest all at once – both providing new intellectual turf for IR and disrupting its operationaliity. 29 Occupying Research to Occupy (Feminist) IR We are interested in a number of ways that both research practice and the political landscape of the field might change as a result of the introduction of the methodological principles for performing research and navigating the field that we glean from the ideas and practices of the ‘Occupy’ movement. In our view, one of the most useful questions such an interpretation can ask is how the space of the need to ‘do/think things differently’ becomes/became less inhabitable/uninhabitable space in the discipline of IR/the practice of governance, and how to inhabit that uninhabitable space, methodologically for IR theory and practically for the world of governance? In the paper (ready for posting soon), we think of it in terms of the “perfect operationality” (in Baudrillard’s terms) of a simulacrum of ‘what IR is’ (or, in your terms ‘how to govern’) where the system and its normalized ‘opposition’ form a tight narrative of completeness that makes ‘otherness’ to it impossible. That narrative completeness relies on bodies being where they are ‘supposed’ to be (in Foucauldian terms about biopower being an enforcer of sovereignty), and re-placement of bodies (occupation) interrupts the narrative completeness of the imperium by demonstrating the inhabitability of uninhabitable space.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Framework › Hegemon DA

The reading of framework is a patriarchal move that attempts to push “unproductive” knowledge to the private or domestic sphere – reject the neg the damage has already been done

Tomlinson, 10  (Barbara, “Feminism and Affect at the scene of argument”, Ch 1 – transforming the terms of reading)

Contemporary U.S. political and academic discourse abounds with a recurring set of formulaic claims that feminist scholars (and feminists in general) are angry, unreasoning, shrill, humorless, ugly, man- hating, perverse, and peculiar. This “trope of the angry feminist” is designed to delegitimize feminist argument even before the argument begins, to undermine feminist politics by making its costs personal, and to foreclose feminist futures by making feminism seem repulsive to young women. The trope is a convention, a plot trick, a setup, a narrative structure, a character type. 2 Its incessant repetition constitutes part of a cultural training program that makes antifeminism and misogyny a routine element in everyday speech and written argument. Instigated by expressly po liti calopposition to feminism, deploying affectively charged strategies that float free of evidence, clichés like the angry feminist put animosity— not argument— at the center of politi cal discussions, interpellating readers as always already antifeminist. The repetition and circulation of such tropes produces a cumulative overdetermined quality that makes them seem already true before the moment of argument. One never encounters the feminist’s argument for the first time because it comes already discredited. Because the trope of the angry feminist encourages unacknowledged ways of interpreting feminist affect, its inveterate irruption is consequential in journalism, entertainment, po liti cal, and quasi- intellectual arenas, as I describe in this introductory chapter. It is perhaps even more consequential in its influence on academic discourses, the subject of the remainder of the book: affect in academic discourses on social justice is often policed through “ideologies of style” that purport to be neutral but operate to entrench current conditions of power. In this book I argue that we have failed to theorize adequately the role of such pervasive affective and ideologically encapsulated arguments in academic and political discourses. In consequence, we do not recognize that our conventional reading practices mislead us about ways to comprehend and counter them. I argue that transforming the terms of reading can reframe the problem, and propose for that purpose a critical toolkit that I call “feminist socioforensic discursive analysis.” My argument here constitutes a provocation to transform the terms of reading, to reframe interpretation of affect in both feminist and antifeminist writing. Th e trope of the angry feminist is a familiar conceit, like many similar phrases deployed to delegitimize social criticism, one that draws on a deep well of related clichés, affective rhetorical strategies, and familiar tropes. Th ese discursive moves circulate as instantiations of power. Th e trope of the angry feminist presents itself as fresh each time it is uttered, its repetitious banality framed as mere reflection of the repetitious banality of the feminist’s argument. Th is leads to the absurd but po liti cally effi cacious situation where readers are weary of arguments they have never heard. These argumentative tactics often succeed in part because our normal reading and writing practices lead us to object or counterargue in ways that fail to come to grips with the specific nature of the rhetorical situation that the tropes instantiate. Our conventional reading practices reinscribe ways of thinking that seem “logical” or “fair” because they are so familiar; they lead us to treat the tropes as surface features of discourse that serve to “skew” debate from its direct and proper form. These conventional practices, permeated by unacknowledged power relations, encourage us to respond to the tropes “normatively,” with reproaches about textual etiquette, textual responsibility, or textual appropriateness, to complain about inadequate evidence, to provide counterexamples, or to condemn the person proffering the trope, as though its use violates an agreement about the proper nature of civic discussion, and as if there is a mechanism of accountability. None of this is the case. Responses that might chastise, correct, or even complain about the trope of the angry feminist are inadequate in part because they rest, ultimately, on an imaginary ideal: a discursive arena regulated by impartial principles in which utterances are adjudicated by unbiased observers. Framing political and even academic discussion in this commonsense way treats rhetoric as a neutral technology to be deployed or evaluated in isolation from its conditions of production, the situations of speakers, or the general societal power relations that give utterances friendly to prevailing power relations an overdetermined “reasonableness” while rendering most oppositional arguments automatically suspect. Our reading practices already rest on uninterrogated and deeply gendered and racialized models of textuality, argument, authorship, politeness, and emotion. Under such conditions, affect is a potent tool of dominance, infusing the reading situation to teach us what power is, who has it, how to get it, how to be rewarded, and how to avoid the punishments power can deliver. Louis Althusser (1971) argues that concrete individuals become constituted as “subjects” through ideology, but the most powerful ideological influences do not come to us in the form of ideological pronouncements. Th at would make them visible, controversial, and refutable. Instead, he argues, the most powerful ideologies exist in “apparatuses,” in practices, and these practices are always material. Reading, writing, and argument are social practices sedimented with ideologies of legitimacy, propriety and fairness so powerful and pervasive that we presuppose their value rather than examining their effects.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Framework › FIAT K

Interpreting FIAT as simulation of USFG action destroys our agency in relating to the resolution – turns deliberation and advocacy and reifies hegemonic ideologies- FAR forces debaters into engaging in praxis and method planning

Antonio 95 (Robert, July 1995, “Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”, American Journal of Sociology, Volume 101, No. 1)

Treating words as mirrors of reality provides a comforting illusion of "certainty." This tendency obscures the social bases of language, reifies social conventions, and weakens capacities to imagine and create alternative conditions. Linguistic "abbreviations" cement obligatory social ties where "mutual agreement" about "feelings" is absent and the tendency to "let go" must be stemmed. Nietzsche held that language serves social selection of the herd, keeping experiences, desires, impulses, and actions of weak persons within boundaries, inscribing strong individuals as collective enemies, and redirecting ressentiment into regimentation. Accordingly, cultural rationalization makes this process of liquidating particularity more effective and universal (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 100—102, 216—17; 19686, pp. 357-58, 380). Since Nietzsche was himself a master writer, his polemics about words per se are hyperbolic.11 The real target is Socratic culture's exceptionally abstract languages, rampant conceptual reifications, and impoverished aesthetic sensibilities. Nietzsche believed that the obsession with rational representation makes the body an inert target of disciplinary control. Adoration of concepts, theory, and reason makes the abstract signifier the ultimate object of knowledge. Purely formal concepts are treated as the "highest," "real," and "true" things, while sense experience is relegated to the degraded status of "appearance." Platonic ideas, Chris- tian soul, Kantian things-in-themselves, and Newtonian atoms and time are all foundational reifications that "dehistoricize" the corporeal world and erect illusions of firm "grounds" for those who cannot face life without God and tradition or bear the weight of its connective choices and its "great dice game" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 287-90; 19686, p. 549; 19686, pp. 35-37). Destroying Socratic culture's "objective" foundations (i.e., God and Truth), the latest phase of cultural rationalization greatly amplifies feel- ings of uncertainty. The consequent desperate searching and clinging produces frenetic reification; fanatical new prejudices, religions, and politics appear alongside the most sterile intellectual formalisms. Mass culture's hastily formulated languages blur all difference and ambiguity (e.g., parties "transform their principles into great at fresco stupidities"). The proliferation of abstract signifiers, arising from diverse locations and detached from any sense of stable referents, contribute to increasingly mechanical, diffuse, and mindless regimentation. In this fashion, Nietzsche severed the links that modern theorists saw between rationalization and enhanced communication, social integration, and legitimate authority (Nietzsche 1983, p. 215; 1986, pp. 161-62; 1966, pp. 216-17; 19686, pp. 357-58, 380-81). According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations over identify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing over concern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?  A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Nietzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Framework › 1% Risk Wrong

Their impact calculus values imperial lives over those of the colonies – threats to the empire are always heightened to overlook and justify continued colonial violence. Due to the hegemony of white masculinity, you should flip the script in this round and start with 0% risk of the disad instead of 100%

Mignolo ‘7 (Walter, argentinian semiotician and prof at Duke, “The De-Colonial Option and the Meaning of Identity in Politics” online)

The rhetoric of modernity (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, to development and modernization after WWII) occluded—under its triumphant rhetoric of salvation and the good life for all—the perpetuation of the logic of coloniality, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and the dispensability of human lives from the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 Unfortunately, not all the massive killings have been recorded with the same value and the same visibility. The unspoken criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign (from a de-colonial interpretation) of the hidden imperial identity politics: that is, the value of human lives to which the life of the enunciator belongs becomes the measuring stick to evaluate other human lives who do not have the intellectual option and institutional power to tell the story and to classify events according to a ranking of human lives; that is, according to a racist classification.5

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Framework

Prefer the C/I-Debates about operational aspects of military policy trade off with analyses of cultural constructs that justify the use of force- FAR allows us to still approach emerging technology but through a constructive frame

Levy 15 Levy, Yagil. Prof. Yagil Levy. Department of Sociology, Political Science and Communication at Open University of Israel "What is Controlled by Civilian Control of the Military? Control of the Military vs. Control of Militarization." Armed Forces & Society (2015): 0095327X14567918. rishi

Along these lines, Feaver and Gelpi showed that militarily inexperienced leaders in the United States, more than militarily experienced ones, extended the use of force to deal with interstate conflicts that did not present a substantial threat to national security. 21 Desch acknowledged that, ‘‘the most prevalent civil-military relations problem of the post-Vietnam era has not been keeping the dogs of war on the leash, but rather getting them off of it’’.22 In other words, civilians may be more warprone than the military.23 It follows that civilian control may even promote the use of force when war-prone civilians successfully mobilize the society for war and even push the reluctant military to battle.24 Therefore, effective civilian control can rein in the military but not the use of force. Here, therefore, is the gap in the literature. Students of militarism do not link the propensity to use force to the broader issue of what type of civilian control may restrain the use of force, aside from the cultural process of demilitarization. Furthermore, students of militarism have not extended the theme of civilian control from controlling the military to controlling the civilian institutions that legitimize the use of force. Similarly, even students of civilian control who acknowledge that civilian control and military restraint do not necessarily go hand in hand have not questioned the extent to which we should decouple the two different processes as different modes of control rather than different effects of control. In other words, they have not scrutinized the mechanisms legitimizing the use of force decoupled from the mechanisms monitoring the armed forces. Given this gap in the literature, in the following section I present a revised conceptualization of civilian control by introducing the distinction between control of the military and control of militarization. Two Modes of Control Control of the Military A distinction should be made between control of the military and control of militarization. Control of the military refers to the extent to which the citizenry, through civilian state institutions, sets limits on the freedom of action of the military in the areas of activity that have political implications, such as military doctrine and policies, operational plans, weapons systems, organization, recruitment, and promotion of officers. Such limits correspond with political objectives and the resources required to attain those goals that civilians (in a democracy, popularly elected civilians) shape autonomously. These goals are regarded as expressing the will of society as a whole. The military, in turn, abides by these civilian directives.25 To a large extent, relations of exchange are formed, in which the military subordinates itself to civilian rulers in exchange for the resources (material and symbolic) that the state possesses and provides to the military.26 It follows that control of the military should be broadly conceptualized and should not be limited to the relations between elected civilians and generals. Viewed in this vein, although authoritarian regimes effectively control their militaries (Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy are good examples), control of the military is deficient without the engagement of the citizenry. Control over the military operates mainly through institutional mechanisms that have an effect on the manner in which policy makers activate the military. In addition to the monitoring of the military by elected civilians, collective actors working outside the formal institutions, mainly social movements and interest groups, often affect institutional policy making through lobbying, protests, court appeals, and the media. Ultimately, what is important is not whether the troops are deployed to fight or remain in their barracks but the political process that leads to the decision about the deployment, pertaining to the broader political implication of military activity as presented earlier. As a highly developed theme, control of the military is not the focus of this article but control of militarization and its relationship with the control of the military is. Control of Militarization While the control of the military is aimed at controlling the organization and its supervisors, the control of militarization is concerned with controlling the mechanisms for legitimizing the use of force. Drawing on Burk’s ‘‘way of war,’’27 Johnston’s ‘‘strategic culture,’’28 Mann’s ‘‘militarism,’’29 and Beetham’s ‘‘political legitimacy,’’30 the legitimacy to use force relates to the extent to which the state’s legal mode of using armed force against an external adversary is socially accepted as a normal, pervasive, and enduring strategic preference. Such legitimacy encompasses social beliefs about the role of war in human affairs, the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses, and the efficacy of the use of force. Legitimacy can be evaluated along a spectrum whose most extreme pole at one end is pacifism. Pacifism opposes the use of force to resolve international disputes. In the middle of the spectrum, the use of force is legitimized when it is instrumental in defending what is perceived as the nation’s security. The other extreme pole is militarism, meaning that the legitimacy for using force is unquestionable or barely questionable. Militarism ranges from regarding the use of force and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity,31 an approach that typifies many industrialized democracies (and therefore is the definition used in this article), to an irrational value system that espouses war as a goal in itself.32 The degree of this legitimacy can be determined by monitoring public opinion and political debates. However, public and elite opinion and rhetoric can be more deeply analyzed as a multilayered structure, which reflects deeper cultural constructs that are less easily detectable. Focusing on the level of legitimacy for using force moves beyond the narrow focus on the military’s institutions, influence, and resources, and the attitude toward the use of force to address militarized political cultures that are often generated outside of the military. Assuming that militarism is a socially and politically driven phenomenon, the military is not necessarily the most salient part of the political culture nurturing militarism. When it is more restrained than warmongering politicians, the influence of the military does not result in militarization. Hence, an exclusive focus on the military may be misleading. The control of militarization involves the political discourse in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role. This discourse aimed at subjecting the elected civilians’ use of force to a deliberative process that takes place within the public and political arenas and addresses the legitimacy to use force. Several conditions promote this deliberative process: 1. Relative slowness in decision making to guarantee that decisions are made through argumentation in which everyone’s opinion is in principle equally valuable and equally fallible. As Huysmans held, such deliberation takes time and can always be questioned again. Thus, speedy decision making in response to a perceived threat thwarts this principle, strengthens the executive branch of government, and suppresses dissent.33 2. Debates should not be confined to the operational aspects of military policies but should extend to the broader logic behind and rightness of such policies. In other words, the debates should focus on the very legitimacy for using force and its utility in promoting the public good.34 Thus, the focus is on affecting the political cultures legitimizing the use of force, rather than taking this legitimacy for granted. Therefore, during the debates there should be a thorough consideration of nonlethal or less belligerent policy alternatives. 3. Access to information is not obstructed by manipulation, such as threat inflation.35 4. Relatedly, debates should be conducted through an open discourse in which the dominant discourse does not hinder the political opposition from challenging decision makers.36 Such a dominant discourse often takes the form of asserting the need for unity in times of crisis, thereby muting dissenting voices.37 By extension, challenging the decision makers should also challenge the power relations in society that affect the legitimacy of using force and may create barriers to deliberation. In general, deliberation alone does not necessarily ensure a more democratic outcome unless actors have other power resources as well, such as the ability to mobilize to overcome entrenched interests.38 This is why free and fair elections, along with constitutional mechanisms such as checks on the power of each branch of government, equality under the law and impartial courts, are preconditions for the deliberative process.39

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Framework

The counter-interp is to center feminist action research in debate- FAR

Reid 04, (Colleen Reid, Simon Fraser University, “Advancing Women’s Social Justice Agendas: A Feminist Action Research Framework”, published in IIQM) GP

Participatory research and contemporary feminism share a number of major underlying features centering on the analysis of political economy and praxis (Maguire, 1993). The notion of praxis challenges the theory-practice relationship and raises problems associated with value-free science. The term “praxis” originates from the Greek word prasso meaning “doing” and “acting,” in contrast with the theoretical designs of epistemology; theoria 3 (Audi, 1995). Lal (1996) refers to pedagogical praxis the erasing of the boundaries between theory, methodology, and practice, and between field and home (Lal, 1996). Other researchers define praxis as a dialectical process of collective reflection and action (Israel et al., 1994; Kirby & McKenna, 1989), the joining of theory and action so that each is informed by and changes through its relation with the other (Ristock & Pennell, 1996), and the integration of knowing and doing (Kirby & McKenna, 1989). For praxis to be possible, theory must not only illuminate the lived experience of social groups, it must also be illuminated by their struggles (Lather, 1991). Theory is thought of as experience-based (Park, 2001), and reflection itself is embedded in praxis, not separate from it. Action upon reality and analyses of that learning may change awareness of the nature of problems and the sources of oppression (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2001). The processes of uncovering marginalized knowledges, giving priority to these knowledges, and enabling the collaborative development of action strategies are simultaneously theoretical and methodological. Woven within and between each of the following characteristics of a FAR framework is the notion of praxis theory, methods, and practice in dynamic interplay. A Feminist Action Research framework FAR guidingPrinciples Through integrating participatory research with feminist theory and research, the following guiding principles for FAR emerged: inclusion, participation, action, social change, and researcher reflexivity. Inclusion The first principle of feminist action research is inclusion. To include is to cause to be a part of something, to consider with, or to put into a group (Morris, 1982). Feminist action researchers contend that no social practices or activities should be excluded as improper subjects for public discussion, expression, or collective choice; no one should be forced into privacy (Young, 1990). Gender and women‟s daily experiences are central in the construction of theoretical frameworks and feminist action research methods. Women‟s experiences are central in several ways in understanding patriarchy as a system of domination and oppression, in identifying key issues and questions in all phases of the research process including action and evaluation, and in giving explicit attention to how women and men as groups benefit from the project.4 Feminist action researchers expose the inadequacy of androcentric research and its partial, inaccurate, and incomplete representation of human experience when women are muted (Maguire, 2001). By beginning with the experiences and research needs of women who have traditionally been silenced, the process of knowledge production is transformed and the ideological power base is challenged (Kirby & McKenna, 1989). Feminist action researchers seek to connect the articulated, contextualized personal with the often hidden or invisible structural and social institutions that define and shape our lives. Feminist action researchers attempt to make possible the development of strategies and programs based on real life experience rather than theories or assumptions, providing an analysis of issues based on a description of how women actually experience those issues (Barnsley & Ellis, 1992). Participation Inclusion is a precursor to the second principle of feminist action research participation. To participate is “to take part, join, or share with others” (Morris, 1982). Feminist action researchers are committed to making women‟s voices more audible and facilitating women‟s empowerment through “ordinary talk” (Maguire, 2001).

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Baudrillard

Revealing counter-hegemonic knowledge for a ballot participates in ongoing displays of academic masculine posturing for who can deconstruct the most

Haraway 88 (Donna, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (Fall 1988), spp)

The only people who end up actually believing and, goddess forbid, acting on the ideological doctrines of disembodied scientific objectivity-enshrined in elementary textbooks and technoscience Booster literature- are nonscientists, including a few very trusting philosophers. Of course, my designation of this last group is probably just a reflection of a residual disciplinary chauvinism acquired from identifying with historians of science and from spending too much time with a microscope in early adulthood in a kind of disciplinary preoedipal and modernist poetic moment when cells seemed to be cells and organisms, organisms. Pace,Gertrude Stein. But then came the law of the father and its resolution of the problem of objectivity, a problem solved by always already absent referents, deferred signifieds, split subjects, and the endless play of signifiers. Who wouldn't grow up warped? Gender, race, the world itself-all seem the effects of warp speeds in the play of signifiers in a cosmic force field. In any case, social constructionists might maintain that the ideological doctrine of scientific method and all the philosophical verbiage about epistemology were cooked up to distract our attention from getting to know the world effectively by practicing the sciences. From this point of view, science-the real game in town- is rhetoric, a series of efforts to persuade relevant social actors that one's manufactured knowledge is a route to a desired form of very objective power. Such persuasions must take account of the structure of facts and artifacts, as well as of language-mediated actors in the knowledge game. Here, artifacts and facts are parts of the powerful art of rhetoric. Practice is persuasion, and the focus is very much on practice. All knowledge is a condensed node in an agonistic power field. The strong program in the sociology of knowledge joins with the lovely and nasty tools of semiology and deconstruction to insist on the rhetorical nature of truth, including scientific truth. History is a story Western culture buffs tell each other; science is a contestable text and a power field; the content is the form. Period. So much for those of us who would still like to talk about reality with more confidence than we allow to the Christian Right when they discuss the Second Coming and their being raptured out of the final destruction of the world. We would like to think our appeals to real worlds are more than a desperate lurch away from cynicism and an act of faith like any other cult's, no matter how much space we generously give to all the rich and always historically specific mediations through which we and everybody else must know the world. But the further I get in describing the radical social constructionist program and a particular version of postmodernism, coupled with the acid tools of critical discourse in the human sciences, the more nervous I get. The imagery of force fields, of moves in a fully textualized and coded world, which is the working metaphor in many arguments about socially negotiated reality for the postmodern subject, is, just for starters, an imagery of high-tech military fields, of automated academic battle-fields, where blips of light called players disintegrate (what a metaphor!) each other in order to stay in the knowledge and power game. Technoscience and science fiction collapse into the sun of the irradiant (ir)reality-war. It shouldn't take decades of feminist theory to sense the enemy here. Nancy Hartsock got all this crystal clear in her concept of abstract masculinity. I, and others, started out wanting a strong tool for deconstructing the truth claims of hostile science by showing the radical historical specificity, and so contestability of every layer of the onion of scientific and technological constructions, and we end up with a kind of epistemological electroshock therapy, which far from ushering us into the high stakes tables of the game of contesting public truths, lays us out on the table with self-induced multiple personality disorder. We wanted a way to go beyond showing bias in science (that proved too easy any how) and beyond separating the good scientific sheep from the bad goats of bias and misuse. It seemed promising to do this by the strongest possible constructionist argument that left no cracks for reducing the issues to bias versus objectivity, use versus misuse, science versus pseudo- science. We unmasked the doctrines of objectivity because they threatened our budding sense of collective historical subjectivity and agency and our "embodied" accounts of the truth, and we ended up with one more excuse for not learning any post-Newtonian physics and one more reason to drop the old feminist self-help practices of repairing our own cars. They're just texts anyway, so let the boys have them back.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Baudrillard

Baudrillard’s theory cannot distinguish between the productive politics of the aff and the mass snooze of commodification—the affirmative disproves the simulation thesis by producing content that ruptures and interrupts the droning message of the war on terror.

Rojek 1993 (Chris, Senior Editor in Sociology at Routledge Forget Baudrillard? P. 120

Yet to imply that poetry excludes politics is surely eccentric Observing and communicating cannot be satisfactorily understood as unchanging constants. There is an historical dimension to them, as unchanging constants. There is an historical dimension to them. Baudrillard’s sociology is fatally immune to this because it is bluntly ahistorical. So it ignores how observing and communicating have changed and minimizes the stratified difference sbetween communicators and observers. Baudrillard correctly stresses that the distraction factories of the gflobal communications industry confuyse our sense of change and our awareness of difference. But the minimalist picture of humans as ‘monitroing screens’ or ‘terminals in mass communication networks’ which his sociloygy supplies is an unsuitable answer to this confusion. It does not even take seriously the circulation processes which his work identifies. For circulation involves not only repetition but also reaction. Benjamin’s sociology allows for reaction. His discussion of mass reproduction and the global circulation of images, bodies and commodities does not negate a political response; on the contrary it demands one. The decline of aura, the homogenization of culture and the manipulation of the masses are all things which Benjamin opposes. There may be a note of melancholy in his assessment of the prospects for successfully opposing these historical tendencies but he does not waver in his commitment to struggle and resistance. In contrast, Bduarillard discusses mass reproduction , homogenization, and manipulation as immoveable facts of life. One relates ot them through irony, play, seduyction and movement. Commitment in Baudrillard’s aleatory, reversible universe is always a sign of stuborrness. It closes down one’s range of response to the isness of hyperreality.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Baudrillard

Breaking the fantasy of mastery with an affirmation of vulnerability is critical to overcoming neoliberal subjectivity

Layton 14 Lynne Layton, Massachusetts Institute for Psychoanalysis and Editor, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 253 Mason Terrace, Brookline, MA, 02446, USA. E-mail:“Some psychic effects of neoliberalism: Narcissism, disavowal, perversion” Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2014) 19, 161–178. doi:10.1057/pcs.2014.5; published online 15 May 2014 rishi

As noted earlier, , , , ) and other non-psychoanalytic thinkers focus on neoliberal subjective practices that demand a shift from comfort with dependence to repudiation of dependence. In a psychoanalytic frame, however, which recognizes no possibility of overcoming dependence, the task is to comprehend the psychic effects of a cultural lack of attunement to dependency needs and a cultural encouragement to split off and project dependency needs and vulnerability. Such effects, as we have seen, include intense shame about dependence (see ), omnipotent versions of autonomy, and narcissistic processes that include oscillations between grandiosity and self-deprecation with regard to the self, and idealization and devaluation with regard to the relation with others. These narcissistic states and oscillations are motored by the fantasies subtending the fetish structure of a perverse society that disavows a reality marked by gross failures of accountability and proper caretaking by those in authority (). The fantasies endemic to narcissistic neoliberal subject formation are produced in part by the radical split between autonomy and connection described earlier (and enacted differently by different groups): in the autonomy fantasy, we imagine ourselves self-sufficient and omnipotent, needing no one (the entrepreneurial self); in the fantasy marked by neoliberalism’s degraded state of dependency, we fantasize that we will be loved and taken care of without having to make any effort.  and , ) have well elaborated the ways that overinvestment in these fantasy logics operates in contemporary UK political culture, issuing in oscillations between policies that reproduce dependency and policies that punish dependency.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Baudrillard

There is no all-encompassing system of value that makes everything people do the capitalisms—your impact claims are overdetermined and vague—the affirmative’s creation of new codes is an effective form of politics.

MacCannell and MacCannell 1993 (Dean and Juliet, Sociology and English professors respectively at UC-Irvine, Forget Baudrillard? p. 141-143)

We are suggesting that Baudrillard took his analysis of the simula- crum up to the site of the new forms of capitalist exploitation that have introjected class structure into postmodernity. But he did not name the new sites of exploitation or initiate critical examination of them. His failure in this regard places his work at great risk. Historically it may contribute as much to the new forms of exploita- tion and their cover-up as to their exposure and eventual overthrow. He cannot 'read' or 'see' Mickey Mouse because Mickey stands in precisely the same relation to code creation as Baudrillard's theory taken in its entirety. Ultimately, both Baudrillard and Mickey Mouse insist on a generalized sense of the possible existence not of codes, which would be subversive, but of The Code, a single frame- work, already in existence, for everything. The Code, and correla- tively the pretence of the absence of need for any new code, is the only field for the putative free play of simulacra, or the appearance of a figure of lack which can be universally worshipped. If there were a code, it truly would accommodate human life to the impos- sible, to death, to ultimate pleasure, to the real. I f there were a code it would be equally and freely available to all human beings. Group, class, status, category, would disappear or be rendered insignificant. No wonder it is fervently desired by the prematurely utopian adherents of every political position. It would be stable and open to all for all time until the radical end of time that is supposed to be the Last Judgement.Postmodernity affirms the possibility of The Code in the form ofpure repetition, the simulacrum, and the 'random cannibalization of styles of the past', as Jameson put it. But postmodern capitalism is also committed to apparent diversity of consumer goods within the framework of a single Code, a commitment that produces a certain tension if not a contradiction and dialectic. Apparent diversity is achieved by the marketing of diverse codes the source and origin of which are officially unrecognized and repressed.We suggest that what is being exploited by postmodern capital- ism are the codes of those in the starkest of human situations, who have confronted 'the worst' most radically in their 'lifestyles' (=codes) or modes of relating to death and fulfilment. What is most successfully 'marketed' today are simulacra of whole ways of existing, adaptations of 'gang youth', punks, 'primitive' Brazilian Indians (At Play in the Fields of the Lord), homeless people, bag ladies, hookers, war victims, AIDS sufferers (the list is extended daily), their codes, the means they have worked out for dealing with the worst. We further suggest that Lacan was correct in his assertion that the 'panic' of the drive has displaced the Symbolic ofdesire for the contemporary or postmodern subject. There is no more 'needs fulfilment' in postmodernity. Capitalism, driven beyond its capacity to provide, has seen to that. All that it can promise us now is an endless series of futile attempts to accommo- date that which carmot be accommodated: the satisfied need, ultimate jouissance, death. Its radical failure of symbolization leaves its believers 'eyeball to eyeball' with The Real. Postmodern capitalism is the realm of 'enjoyment', where the human subject is commanded 'to enjoy' but carmot, where pleasure that cannot be experienced spills over into The Thing, where our 'things' obscenely and menacingly enjoy themselves at our expense.But there are those among us who deal directly with the absolute- ness of loss, those who know there is no substitutability, no itera- bility, no supplement. They have carved out an existence on the empty gound between the possibility of the symbolization of desire and the dream of a single Symbolic-Paternal Order. They are the only possible source of a critical viewpoint on postmodern capital- ism and of the creative energy needed to move it. We are disappointed with Baudrillard for not having found the site of post- modern exploitation, for giving us instead nostalgia for the medieval Church in the form of the now commonplace postmodern assertion of its absence. But if Baudrillard spends all his time withcommodities-as-simulacra, with God as simulacrum, with things that can have no relation to need, there must be a reason for it. He is avoiding the ground that has been departed by the cause of desire, the ground where new codes are created as a matter of necessity. This is the reason he did not find Mickey Mouse. Mickey is there on the ground of departed desire as a defender of its borders, to block those who have not entered and to cover up the creative adaptations of those who have. Mickey permits us to imagine that there is a universal code of which he is the emanation and emissary, while his owners, if not his animators, know there are as many codes - ripe for the plucking - as there are human groupings. What Mickey does not permit us to imagine is his code: that his head, with the two ears that never change their location or position, that his head is not only the maternal breast and the castrated balls, but a motion picture projector. What this Mickey- projector reproduces is not a universal code for iteration as has been claimed. It is rather a faithful reproduction of the absolute loss human life is based upon; of the theft of its creativity, its reduction, and abject resignation in the face of The Real.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Middle Passage

. we must affirm the plurality of different anti-colonial epistemic frameworks in tandem to break the supposed universalism of imperial thinking

Stamenkovic 13 (Marko, PhD Student at Universityof Ghent and member of the International Association of Curators of Contemporary Art, "On Colonial Blind Spots, Ego-politics of Knowledge and 'Universal Reason'," December 2013, pages 9-12 rishi

Similarly, what Mbembe proposes is to work out our own ways towards another vision of the world, perceived from another viewpoint. Such a vision is but a significant example of today’s counter-hegemonic theoretical strategies, produced locally yet with the causality and implications of global necrocolonial politics in mind. However, this vision is not conceived and shall not be accepted as another particular local knowledge, constructed in defense of a yet another pseudo-universal form of thinking that aspires to become the new epistemic sovereignty. We have to understand it as an alternative to the existent pseudo-universalism of imperial thinking and, by doing so, to work towards establishing a possible counter-hegemonic theoretical coexistence among various knowledge-worlds in their plurality. Mbembe’s own arguments have inscribed his theory of necropolitics into contemporary philosophy as one possible and legitimate variant of global knowledges. That is the main reason why to understand necropolitics means to approach it as the other of biopolitics: not as its clone but as its inevitable half in the ‘Siamese twin’ situation. In this regard, I treat the theory of necropolitics as an intentionally pseudo-universal option characterized by the strategic propensity to claim its own ‘universality’ on behalf of the global anti-imperialist South, and justly so: because its pseudo-universalism is aware of universalist mythology and its counter-effects: an obscurity imposed by the regime of singular universe of knowledge in the modern/colonial/capitalist/racial world-system (Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodríguez, 2002). Necropolitical theory thus appears as a disguised decolonial option behind which the South enters into a profound dialogue with the obdurate Northern epistemic mytheme. Positioned side by side, they must keep this dialogue open. If the biopolitical armature (the dominant structure of knowledge-communication) is gradually dismantled through such a dialogue, this will allow for a truly emancipatory potential of theoretical propositions, earlier dismissed, to be exposed again (or, in many cases, for the first time ever). In that sense, Mbembe’s ‘return of death’ to philosophy is part of the global and unavoidable process that is not only characterized by one single anti-imperial paradigm (‘necropolitical’, for that matter) but rather by numerous possible paradigms unrelated to necropolitics itself. Within such complexity, a single imperial epistemology is an insufficient option to cope with the numerous modalities of knowledge, or the pluriverse of local knowledge(s). Hence, to have the epistemological pluralism legitimized – and to have such legitimacy recognized and globally accepted side by side with the imperialist epistemology – is not only a worthwhile but an urgent task. It is so for the global anti-imperialist South as much as for the rest of the world.