2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › CP › 2AC – AT: DCS CP
DSCU 21 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency opened the Defense Security Cooperation University in September 2019 as part of an effort to professionalize the SC workforce and to serve as the Department of Defense's Center of Excellence for the SC community. ("A Comparison of Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales," 7-29-2021, https://www.dscu.edu/documents/publications/greenbook/v41_0/15_Chapter.pdf?id=1, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC) **date accessed through https://httpstatus.io/
Under FMS, the customer is entering a direct government-to-government relationship with the USG. In fact, the customer is purchasing directly from the USG. Depending on the political climate, this arrangement can be viewed as either an advantage or a disadvantage. Some nations and international organizations desire the association implied by the FMS interaction. Other governments, where the popular view of the United States is not as positive, may desire to distance themselves from the USG and enter into a DCS arrangement with a U.S. contractor. In this situation, public opinion may view a relationship with U.S. industry more favorably than the direct government-to-government relationship inherent in FMS.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › CP › 2AC – AT: DCS CP
DSCU 21 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency opened the Defense Security Cooperation University in September 2019 as part of an effort to professionalize the SC workforce and to serve as the Department of Defense's Center of Excellence for the SC community. ("A Comparison of Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales," 7-29-2021, https://www.dscu.edu/documents/publications/greenbook/v41_0/15_Chapter.pdf?id=1, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC) **date accessed through https://httpstatus.io/
In instances where the USG is neutral regarding purchase by FMS or DCS, SAMM C4.3.6 permits U.S. defense firms to designate a preference that a sale of their products or services be on a DCS basis. When a company receives a request for proposal from a country and prefers a direct commercial sale, the company may request DSCA issue a DCS preference for that particular sale. Approved DCS preferences are valid for one year and are held within security cooperation offices (SCOs) and at the item-manager level to allow screening of future letters of request. If the applicable implementing agency (IA) receives a request from the purchaser for a DCS preference item, the IA notifies the purchaser of the DCS preference and advises the purchaser to contact the applicable company directly. Support of a DCS preference is a “best effort” commitment by the DoD. This means that any failure on the part of the IA to comply with the DCS preference will not invalidate any resultant FMS transaction. Items provided on blanket order lines and those required in conjunction with a system sale’s total package approach (TPA) do not normally qualify for DCS preference. Customers funding a purchase using Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds may be required to purchase by FMS. The Director, DSCA, may also recommend to the DoS that it mandate FMS for a specific sale.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › CP › 2AC – AT: DCS CP
Kaidanow 17 – ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS. (Tina, United States Department of State, "Foreign Military Sales: Process and Policy," 1-20-2017, https://2017-2021.state.gov/foreign-military-sales-process-and-policy/index.html, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)
Beyond being a government-to-government process, FMS differs from DCS in several key ways. The first is in economy-of-scale buying power. When buying through the U.S. military, a country may be able to leverage a purchase that a particular Military Service is already buying for its own use to get a cheaper unit price than they would otherwise. Alternatively, the country may be able to pool with the purchase of another country that is also working within the FMS process. This provides benefit to our Military Services and promotes our ability to build meaningful partner capacity overseas.
Another reason a country might choose to use FMS is that it may not have the capability or capacity within its government to effectively oversee the acquisition, so they are paying DoD to do it for them. DoD provides contracting support, requirements evaluation, logistics support, and works directly with the U.S. supplier. As the exporting party in a Foreign Military Sales case is the United States Government, FMS sales are exempt from the requirement for export licenses.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › CP › 2AC – AT: DCS CP
DSCA 22 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as part of the United States Department of Defense, provides financial and technical assistance, transfer of defense matériel, training and services to allies, and promotes military-to-military contacts. (“SECURITY COOPERATION OVERVIEW,” 6-23-2022, , Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC) **date accessed through https://httpstatus.io/
DCS involves commercial contracts negotiated directly between your country and a U.S. defense contractor. DCS agreements are not administered by the USG and do not involve a government-to-government agreement. Instead, you deal with the U.S. contractor and that contractor is responsible for obtaining an export license from the Office of Defense Trade Controls, within the U.S. Department of State, to conduct each sale. The regulations for DCS are contained in the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
DCS is sometimes selected as an alternative to FMS when: a purchasing government's military requirements are significantly different from standard U.S. configurations; a purchasing government has a sufficiently sophisticated procurement staff with experience in defense systems; or when a purchasing government is seeking to establish a relationship between a U.S. manufacturer and its own domestic industry.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › CP › 2AC – AT: DoS CP
Gibbons-Neff 22 – Thomas Gibbons-Neff is the Kabul bureau chief and a former Marine infantryman. (Thomas Gibbons-Neff, "Potent Weapons Reach Ukraine Faster Than the Know-How to Use Them," New York Times, 6-6-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/06/world/europe/ukraine-advanced-weapons-training.html, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)
Since Russia invaded, NATO nations have upgraded Ukraine’s arsenal with increasingly sophisticated tools, with more promised, like the advanced multiple-launch rocket systems pledged by the United States and Britain.
But training soldiers how to use the equipment has become a significant and growing obstacle — one encountered daily by Junior Sgt. Dmytro Pysanka and his crew, operating an aged antitank gun camouflaged in netting and green underbrush in southern Ukraine.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › CP › 2AC – AT: DoS CP
DSCA 22 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as part of the United States Department of Defense, provides financial and technical assistance, transfer of defense matériel, training and services to allies, and promotes military-to-military contacts. (“SECURITY COOPERATION OVERVIEW,” 6-23-2022, , Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC) **date accessed through https://httpstatus.io/
Training is a key element of successfully operating and maintaining today’s high technology military equipment. The DoD has established training resources to support its own training needs. Under FMS, customers can access many of these training resources. Although the DoD does acquire contractor training in certain circumstances, some types of military training are simply not available through commercial sources, such as access to the DoD’s unique training ranges. On the other hand, the customer may require some form of tailored training that is not available from the DoD.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › CP › 2AC – AT: DoS CP
DSCA 22 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as part of the United States Department of Defense, provides financial and technical assistance, transfer of defense matériel, training and services to allies, and promotes military-to-military contacts. (“SECURITY COOPERATION OVERVIEW,” 6-23-2022, , Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC) **date accessed through https://httpstatus.io/
The U.S. conducts Security Cooperation business with over 200 countries and international organizations around the world. We typically refer to specific Security Cooperation activities, such as sales of defense articles and services, as “programs” and conduct them under two primary U.S. legislative authorities: The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), as amended, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended (22 U.S.C 2151 et seq.). Under these authorities, there are several methods available to provide foreign partners with U.S. defense articles and services. The most commonly used method is Foreign Military Sales (FMS) - but other alternatives might also be available to meet your country’s requirements. For any given purchase your country may be considering, there are benefits, limitations, and trade-offs associated with each of these methods.
FMS is a program that allows your government to purchase defense articles and services as well as design and construction services, from the U.S. Government (USG). This program is operated on a “no-profit” and “no-loss” basis to the USG and requires an authorized representative from your government to submit a Letter of Request (LOR) to the USG for the desired defense articles and services.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › CP › 2AC – AT: DoS CP
DSCA 22 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as part of the United States Department of Defense, provides financial and technical assistance, transfer of defense matériel, training and services to allies, and promotes military-to-military contacts. (“SECURITY COOPERATION OVERVIEW,” 6-23-2022, , Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC) **date accessed through https://httpstatus.io/
The U.S. conducts Security Cooperation business with over 200 countries and international organizations around the world. We typically refer to specific Security Cooperation activities, such as sales of defense articles and services, as “programs” and conduct them under two primary U.S. legislative authorities: The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), as amended, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended (22 U.S.C 2151 et seq.). Under these authorities, there are several methods available to provide foreign partners with U.S. defense articles and services. The most commonly used method is Foreign Military Sales (FMS) - but other alternatives might also be available to meet your country’s requirements. For any given purchase your country may be considering, there are benefits, limitations, and trade-offs associated with each of these methods.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › T › 2AC – AT: Not Semi-Autonomous
BAE Systems, international defense, aerospace and security company, "What is Autonomous Engagement?", https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/definition/autonomous-engagement, DL
Autonomous Engagement is a weapons system’s technological ability to identify, engage, and destroy an identified target without human intervention, based on specific targets or aim designations chosen by human operators.
This is often referred to as “fire and forget,” a capability that has been continuously evolving for more than 70 years. U.S. weapon systems have been flying with autonomous functionality since the 1940s, with levels of self-governed capabilities, including target identification, target cueing, target prioritization, and terminal guidance increasing over time. To be clear, however, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has long classified these weapons systems as semi-autonomous or not autonomous, because they require human involvement in identifying and choosing their intended target or group of targets.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › T › 2AC – AT: Not Semi-Autonomous
Rieder et al April 2020, Travis Rieder, Director of the Master of Bioethics degree program and Assistant Director for Education Initiatives at Johns Hopkins, Brian Hutler, political philosopher and legal theorist and Hecht-Levi fellow, Debra J H Mathews, Assistant Director for Science Programs for the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics, "Artificial Intelligence in Service of Human Needs: Pragmatic First Steps Toward an Ethics for Semi-Autonomous Agents", PubMed, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32228385/, DL
The ethics of robots and artificial intelligence (AI) typically centers on "giving ethics" to as-yet imaginary AI with human-levels of autonomy in order to protect us from their potentially destructive power. It is often assumed that to do that, we should program AI with the true moral theory (whatever that might be), much as we teach morality to our children. This paper argues that the focus on AI with human-level autonomy is misguided. The robots and AI that we have now and in the near future are "semi-autonomous" in that their ability to make choices and to act is limited across a number of dimensions. Further, it may be morally problematic to create AI with human-level autonomy, even if it becomes possible. As such, any useful approach to AI ethics should begin with a theory of giving ethics to semi-autonomous agents (SAAs). In this paper, we work toward such a theory by evaluating our obligations to and for "natural" SAAs, including nonhuman animals and humans with developing and diminished capacities. Drawing on research in neuroscience, bioethics, and philosophy, we identify the ways in which AI semi-autonomy differs from semi-autonomy in humans and nonhuman animals. We conclude on the basis of these comparisons that when giving ethics to SAAs, we should focus on principles and restrictions that protect human interests, but that we can only permissibly maintain this approach so long as we do not aim at developing technology with human-level autonomy.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › T › 2AC – AI – General
Edward Hunter Christie 3-31-2022, former Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit, Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Founder of AI Policy Consulting, and author of NATO’s Artificial Intelligence White Paper, "Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe", SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/17816858221089372, DL
Artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence—for example, recognising patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions or taking action—whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems (Reding and Eaton 2020, 14).
The range of potential military applications is at least as vast as the range of tasks that require human cognition, for example analysing and classifying visual data, organising logistics, operating support vehicles, or tracking and engaging hostile targets (Christie 2021b, 84). States are racing to achieve superiority in the AI domain (Lin-Greenberg 2020). Furthermore, like other digital technologies, AI diffuses rapidly and cheaply across areas of human activity and across borders. Nevertheless, as with other technological transformations, states with greater resources and levels of effort, and better policies, will reap the benefits of technology adoption more rapidly than others.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › T › 2AC – AI – General
Lockman and Christie 21 – Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Innovation Officer in the Emerging Security Challenges Division in NATO’s International Staff, and focuses particularly on Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy. Edward Hunter Christie is the owner and founder of AI Policy Consulting and served as lead consultant to NATO in the preparation of NATO’s AI Strategy. He was formerly Deputy Head of Innovation in NATO’s International Staff and the author of NATO’s Artificial Intelligence White Paper. (“An Artificial Intelligence Strategy for NATO," NATO Review, 10-25-2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/10/25/an-artificial-intelligence-strategy-for-nato/index.html, Accessed 6-19-2022, LASA-SC)
One does not have to look far to see how Artificial Intelligence (AI) – the ability of machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence – is transforming the international security environment in which NATO operates. Due to its cross-cutting nature, AI will pose a broad set of international security challenges, affecting both traditional military capabilities and the realm of hybrid threats, and will likewise provide new opportunities to respond to them. AI will have an impact on all of NATO’s core tasks of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security.
With new opportunities, risks, and threats to prosperity and security at stake, the promise and peril associated with this foundational technology are too vast for any single actor to manage alone. As a result, cooperation is inherently needed to equally mitigate international security risks, as well as to capitalise on the technology’s potential to transform enterprise functions, mission support, and operations.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › T › 2AC – AT: PGMs Not AI
Insinna 22 – Valerie Insinna was Defense News' air warfare reporter. Beforehand, she worked the Navy and congressional beats for Defense Daily, which followed almost three years as a staff writer for National Defense Magazine. Prior to that, she worked as an editorial assistant for the Tokyo Shimbun’s Washington bureau. (Valerie, “Updated autonomous weapons rules coming for the Pentagon: Exclusive details,” 5-26-2022, Breaking Defense, Lexis, Accessed 6-23-2022, LASA-SC)
DoD directive 3000.09 [PDF], signed by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter on Nov. 21, 2012, established policy, responsibilities and review processes for the “design, development, acquisition, testing, fielding, and employment of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, including guided munitions that can independently select and discriminate targets.”
But in the decade since its release, artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies have made a massive leap forward, and it’s “entirely plausible” there may need to be revisions that reflect the Pentagon’s “responsible AI” initiative and other ethical principles adopted by the department, said Michael Horowitz, DoD director of emerging capabilities policy.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › T › 2AC – AT: PGMs Not AI
Defense Innovation Board 19 – The Defense Innovation Board is an independent advisory board set up in 2016 to bring the technological innovation and best practice of Silicon Valley to the U.S. Military. It is governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act and provides independent recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. (“AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” October 2019, , Accessed 6-23-2022, LASA-SC)
DoD’s policy regarding autonomy in weapons systems comes from the 2012 DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.09. There, DoD defines an autonomous weapons system (AWS) as: “a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous weapons systems that are designed to allow human operators to override operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage targets without further human input after activation.”15 Here autonomy is limited to the ability of a system to act without direction and intervention by a human during target engagement. A human may watch or supervise a system, but that system can carry out a commander’s intent and its task without any further guidance. How it does so is not specified; it is the behavior that is autonomous. Thus, DoDD 3000.09 does not explicitly address AI as such, but the Directive is broad enough to cover autonomous systems run on AI.16
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › More Thumpers › 2AC – Thumper
DSCA 6-22-2022, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) – Precision Guided Munitions", https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/nato-support-and-procurement-agency-nspa-precision-guided-munitions, DL
WASHINGTON, June 22, 2022 - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the NATO Support and Procurement Agency of Precision Guided Munitions and related equipment for an estimated cost of $22.7 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.
NATO Support and Procurement Agency as Lead Nation has requested the possible sale of two hundred thirtynine (239) GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs, Increment I; two hundred four (204) FMU-152 fuzes; two hundred four (204) MK-82 500LB General Purpose Bombs; and fifty (50) BLU-109 2000LB Hard Target Penetrator Bombs, that will be added to a previously implemented case. The original FMS case, valued at $1.87 million, included forty (40) GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs, Increment I. Therefore, this notification is for a total of two hundred seventy-nine (279) GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs, Increment I; two hundred four (204) FMU-152 fuzes; two hundred four (204) MK-82 500LB General Purpose Bombs; and fifty (50) BLU-109 2000LB Hard Target Penetrator Bombs. Also included are smoke signal cartridges; engineering and technical support and assistance; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The total estimated cost is $22.7 million.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › More Thumpers › 2AC – AT: PGMs Bad For Taiwan
Yu 3-11-2022, Matt Yu and William Yen citing Su Tzu-yun, an associate research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, "Cost-effective, guided missiles 'key to asymmetric warfare in Taiwan'", Focus Taiwan, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202203110018, DL
Taipei, March 11 (CNA) Taiwan should leverage cost-effective precision-guided munitions to bolster its counter-invasion asymmetric warfare capabilities, a researcher from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research said Friday.
Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), an associate research fellow at the Taipei-based think tank, told CNA that affordable precision-guided air defense and anti-ship missiles would be key to giving Taiwan an advantage over an invading military force.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › More Thumpers › 2AC – NATO I/L -> Taiwan
Philip Anstrén 6-30-2021, fellow in the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The case for greater US-EU collaboration on Taiwan", Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-case-for-greater-us-eu-collaboration-on-taiwan/, DL
NATO should prepare contingency plans in the event of Chinese aggression against Taiwan. Because they don’t have even the ambiguous security commitments toward Taiwan that the United States does, European members of NATO would be loath to send military assets to assist a US intervention in the Taiwan Strait. However, European members of NATO could commit to stepping up their military responsibilities in the North Atlantic should the United States have to come to the defense of Taiwan. The goal would be to backfill Washington, freeing it up to act in the Taiwan Strait and maximizing its capacity to deter China. A similar effect could be achieved by having European countries step up their security role in the Indo-Pacific, as countries like Germany, France, and the UK are increasingly trying to do.
All these moves would risk antagonizing China. But Beijing, faced with the united strength of the EU and the United States, would have little room to retaliate except rhetorically. That would be especially true if the EU and United States limit themselves, as recommended, to deterrent moves showing what they would do in the event of a cross-strait crisis. After all, China would inflict great harm on itself as well by, for instance, imposing trade sanctions against the United States and the EU—its largest trade partners.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › More Thumpers › 2AC – Turkey
Tanmay Kadam 4-8-2022, Geopolitical Researcher, "Washington To Arm Ukraine's Bayraktar TB2 Drones With Laser-Guided Rockets To Target Russian Tanks With Pinpoint Accuracy", Eurasian Times, https://eurasiantimes.com/us-to-arm-turkish-bayraktar-drones-with-laser-rockets/, DL
Traditionally, any rocket with a guidance system is called a missile however in the US military ‘guided rocket’ refers to the stock of 70 mm/2.75-inch Hydra 70 unguided rockets that have been turned into precision-guided munitions (PGMs) using laser guidance kit.
So far, the Ukrainian resistance has impressively employed its small fleet of TB2 drones against the invading Russian military which happens to be one of the world’s largest armed forces.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › More Thumpers › 2AC – AT: Heg Bad
Lowry 22 – Rich Lowry is editor of National Review and a contributing editor with Politico Magazine. ("The Isolationists Are Wrong: The Pax Americana Is Worth Defending," 2-24-2022, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/24/isolationists-are-wrong-pax-americana-worth-defending-00011448, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)
Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine doesn’t just herald a new era in European security, it underlines a growing threat to the American-led international order.
Pax Americana, the post-World War II system that has created the conditions for peace and prosperity in Europe and elsewhere, is entering a great period of testing, with the revanchist powers of Russia and China seeking to overturn it.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › More Thumpers › 2AC – AT: Illicit Arms Turn
Yousif 22 – Elias Yousif is a Research Analyst with the Stimson Center’s Conventional Defense Program. His research focuses on the global arms trade and arms control, issues related to remote warfare and use of force, and international security cooperation and child soldiers prevention. (Elias Yousif, "Under Caution: Assessing Arms Transfer Risk in Ukraine," Stimson Center, 3-7-2022, https://www.stimson.org/2022/under-caution-assessing-arms-transfer-risk-in-ukraine/, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)
Of course, there is a tremendous difference between small arms that have been handed out to civilians as compared to more sophisticated weaponry provided to government forces. But the risks are real and the potential negative legacy of arms transfers need to be acknowledged and addressed. We’ve seen time and time again how arms aimed at aiding an ally in one conflict have found their way to the frontlines of unforeseen battlefields, often in the hands of groups at odds with U.S. interests or those of civilians. This is especially true for small arms and light weapons, which hold some of the highest risks of loss, diversion into the illicit market, or misuse. From Afghanistan to Iraq to Colombia, well-intentioned transfers have a habit of outliving their political contexts, and risk fueling new conflicts, being captured by illicit groups, or contributing to enduring ecosystems of insecurity. In the end, it may well be the case that a thoughtful, and dispassionate assessment of the risks and rewards of arms transfers to Ukraine offers a strategically sound case for sending more weapons to combat the Russian invasion. But the risks of these arms transfers must be considered, and, where possible, mitigated. Any weapons transfers – particularly small arms and light weapons – need to have appropriate end-use monitoring mechanisms attached. Moreover, the conduct of use stipulations must also be put in place to ensure that these weapons are not used indiscriminately or harm civilians. While the defense of Ukraine is paramount, no one is better off when arms flow with disregard for the real risks associated with arms transfers. The people of Ukraine deserve assistance, and it is the responsibility of those making arms transfer decisions to ensure that assistance is thoughtful, responsible, and strategically sound in the short and long term.