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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Turkey DA › 1NC – ! – Syrian Invasion

It's likely now – Erdogan’s telling the U.S. to withdraw.

Ragip Soylu 7/20, Middle East Eye correspondent based in Ankara and former correspondent for Turkish media outlets Daily Sabah and ATV, “Turkish president tells US to remove forces from northern Syria”, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-erdogan-wants-us-out-northern-syria \\SYang

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called on the United States to leave northern Syria, saying the withdrawal could weaken "terror groups" supported by Washington.

"The US needs to leave the areas on the east of the river Euphrates, this is our conclusion at the Astana [talks]," Erdogan told a group of journalists who accompanied him to Tehran on Tuesday for a trilateral summit with his Iranian and Russian counterparts.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Turkey DA › 2NC – I/L – Gen-Z

Gen-Z voters are key to the election – huge voter population and they’re swing voters who vote temporally.

Çiğdem Yılmaz 7/19, journalist for the Hurriyet Daily news, the oldest English-language daily in Turkey, July 19, 2022, “Generation Z to hold key to Turkey’s future as millions of new voters set to cast ballots in 2023 polls”, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/generation-z-to-hold-key-to-turkeys-future-as-millions-of-new-voters-set-to-cast-ballots-in-2023-polls-156687 \\SYang

Millions of Turkish youth will vote for the first time in their lives in the general elections in 2023, as parties are expected to put those who are seen as holding a key to the country’s future at the heart of their campaigns, according to a research conducted by daily Milliyet.

“Generation Z is a very political generation contrary to popular belief that they are apolitical. The only difference is that their political views are not stable; they determine politics temporally,” said Murat Şeker, the head of the City Politics Center at Istanbul University.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Turkey DA › 2NC – Link – Gen-Z

Gen-Z voters want reliable politics, hate hypocrisy, and are nationalist – the plan’s bolt from the blue is a disaster for Erdogan.

Seyma Nazli Gurbuz 21, Journalist for the Daily Sabah, Turkish Daily available in English and Arabic, April 12, 2021, “Turkish youth focus on reliability in politics, demand firm economy”, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/news-analysis/turkish-youth-focus-on-reliability-in-politics-demand-firm-economy \\SYang

With a young population that has seen constant growth, Turkey is getting ready to welcome millions of new voters from Generation Z in the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. Although there are still two years until the polls, which sounds like a long time, the political parties have already rolled up their sleeves to attract the youth, who have unique characteristics compared to the previous generations due to being raised in a digital era. Being aware of their worth, the members of Generation Z expect more understanding from the elderly, demanding a stable economy and reliable politics, pointing to these as their criteria to vote for any political party.

"My primary criterion in voting for a political view is to stand strong against the outside world, to defend our rights and not to compromise," said 17-years-old Kaan. "The second is that the candidate or the political party should not be hypocritical. He/she should not speak differently to everyone in order to to make everyone happy. Of course, they should also keep their promises."

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Turkey DA › 2NC – U/Q – Gen-Z

Erdogan just adopted a new strategy catering to Gen-Z voters involving cancelling student loan interest – it’s working and key.

Stratfor Worldview 7/19, the world's leading geopolitical intelligence platform, July 19, 2022, “Turkey: Erdogan Cancels Student Loan Interest in Bid to Win Student Support”, https://worldview.stratfor.com/situation-report/turkey-erdogan-cancels-student-loan-interest-bid-win-student-support \\SYang

What Happened: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that student loan borrowers would only repay the principal from now on, admitting that keeping interest rates tied to inflation was proving too much for many borrowers, Al-Monitor reported July 18. A July poll by Gezici Research found that 80% of Generation Z Turks — defined as those born after 2000 — would not vote for Erdogan in Turkey's 2023 general election.

Why It Matters: Erdogan is resorting to populism to try to attract Gen Z voters, who will account for around 11.8% of the voting population in 2023, and the president likely will try more special subsidies that may adversely affect the government's finances to try to win them over. Without Gen Z's support, Erdogan could lose the election next year.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Turkey DA › 2NC – UQ – AT: Economy

The Turkish economy structurally beats inflation—adaptation, diversity, and demand signal durable growth.

Economist 7/21 [Economist; newspaper dedicated to reporting on global economics; 7-21-2022; "How has Turkey’s economy kept growing despite raging inflation?"; the economist; https://www.economist.com/briefing/2022/07/21/how-has-turkeys-economy-kept-growing-despite-raging-inflation; Accessed 7-25-2022; AW]

Amid such chaos, it is remarkable that the economy has kept going as well as it has. Much of that is the result of Turkey’s many commercial strengths. It has a large domestic market of 85m mostly young consumers, and has long been a staging post for trade between east and west. The country’s business culture has deep roots. The proportion of the population that aspires to be entrepreneurs is high by international standards. There are, broadly speaking, three kinds of Turkish business. The first is large firms, often conglomerates. These account for a quarter of employment and half of the business sector’s value-added. Some are joint ventures with European firms. The best manufacture high-quality capital goods, car parts and military hardware for export. They approach German levels of productivity. At the other end of the scale are small, unregistered firms, with low productivity. In between is a third group of medium-sized family firms, with some workers on the books and others not. This structure helps explain the agility of Turkish business. Many large firms are conservatively run and diversified across industries and export markets, which gives them a built-in resilience. The largest conglomerate, Koc Holding, has four main divisions: vehicles and parts (in joint ventures with Ford and Fiat), white goods, oil refining and banking. Sabanci Holding, another conglomerate, has retail, energy, cement-making, banking and manufacturing businesses. The best mid-sized family firms share with them a nimbleness that comes from years of living with economic volatility. Turkey has a history of high inflation. Bosses have become experts at juggling finances. Companies have had time to adjust to a weak lira since 2018. Many have reduced their dollar debts. Smaller firms adjust by other means. The line between company and household is blurred. Risks are pooled among family members. Very often the response to adversity is to work harder. Four-fifths of the workforce put in more than 40 hours a week in their main job, one of the highest shares in the oecd—though long hours compensate for low labour productivity. Another strategy for small and mid-sized firms is to push business into the grey economy, where wages often do not keep up with inflation or minimum-wage laws. Istanbulls Hard work and agility help businesses to keep going. But they also need demand. One of the big surprises in Turkey has been the strength of consumer spending. Inflation in the high single-digits has weighed on consumers in Europe and America. Yet, in Turkey, far higher inflation has not sapped demand. There are plenty of theories as to why. One is that consumers saw the fall of the lira, knew what that meant for future inflation, and splurged in anticipation of higher prices. Durable goods in particular are a hedge against inflation. New cars, white goods or imported luxuries hold their worth better than lira, even if they are not as liquid a store of value as, say, gold coins or dollar bills. With interest rates so low in real terms it is almost negligent not to borrow to spend.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Turkey DA › 2NC – UQ – AT: Swinland

Doesn’t thump—Sweden and Finland have to meet a list of conditions for membership—ratification will drag out into next year

AFP 7/21 [Agence France Press; French private international news agency; 7-21-2022; "Turkey To Assess Finland, Sweden Compliance On NATO Accession"; Barron’s; https://www.barrons.com/news/turkey-to-assess-finland-sweden-compliance-on-nato-accession-01658394607?tesla=y; Accessed 7-21-2022; AW]

Turkey on Thursday said a new "permanent committee" would meet Finnish and Swedish officials in August to assess if the two nations are complying with Ankara's conditions to ratify their NATO membership bids. Finland and Sweden dropped their history of military non-alignment and announced plans to join NATO after Russia invaded Ukraine at the end of February. All 30 NATO members must ratify the accession. NATO member Turkey has demanded the extradition of dozens of suspected "terrorists" from both countries under an accession deal the three signed last month. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has threatened to "freeze" the process over Sweden and Finland's failure to extradite the suspects. He accuses them of providing a haven for outlawed Kurdish militants. "If these countries are not implementing the points included in the memorandum that we signed, we will not ratify the accession protocol," Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu reaffirmed in a televised interview. He said the committee would meet in August but provided no details. Turkey's parliament has broken for its summer recess and will not be able to hold a ratification vote before October. Some Turkish officials have warned that the process may drag out until next year.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Turkey DA › 2NC – UQ – AT: Swinland

Turkey will freeze Sweden and Finland membership, or Erdogan will spin it as a win.

AP 7/18 [Associated Press; American non-profit news agency headquartered in New York City. Founded in 1846, it operates as a cooperative, unincorporated association; 7-18-2022; "Turkey warns it can 'freeze' Sweden, Finland's NATO process"; PBS NewsHour; https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/turkey-warns-it-can-freeze-sweden-finlands-nato-process; Accessed 7-20-2022; AW]

ANKARA, Turkey (AP) — Turkey can still “freeze” Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO unless the two countries take steps that meet Ankara’s security demands, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Monday. Last month, Turkey lifted its objection to Sweden and Finland joining the alliance but warned that it would block the process if they fail to extradite suspects with links to outlawed Kurdish groups or the network of an exiled cleric accused of orchestrating a failed coup in 2016. The Nordic countries’ accession still needs to be approved by the parliaments of all 30 NATO members and Turkey’s parliament could refuse to ratify the deal. NEWS WRAP: NATO takes another step toward Finland and Sweden memberships “I would like to remind once again that if these countries do not take the necessary steps to fulfill our conditions, we will freeze the (accession) process,” Erdogan said in a televised addressed following a Cabinet meeting. “Our stance on this issue is very clear. The rest is up to them.” Erdogan said that Sweden in particular was not “projecting a good image,” but didn’t elaborate. There was no immediate reaction from Sweden and Finland to Erdogan’s comments. Turkey accuses the two countries of being too lenient toward groups it considers to be national security threats. Turkey’s justice minister said earlier this month that the government had renewed requests for the extradition of terror suspects wanted by his country.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Turkey DA › 2NC – UQ – AT: F-16s

It fails in the Senate too.

Harris 7/19 [Bryant Harris; reporter for Defense News; 7-19-2022; "Greece moves to join Lockheed’s F-35 program as Turkey F-16 bid stalls"; Defense News; https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2022/07/19/greece-moves-to-join-lockheeds-f-35-program-as-turkey-f-16-bid-stalls/; Accessed 7-23-2022; AW]

He made the remarks after a meeting with Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., who exercises considerable leverage over arms sales to other nations as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Menendez’s home state of New Jersey boasts the sixth largest Greek American population in the U.S. and the fourth largest Armenian American population, making Greece’s adversarial NATO ally Turkey particularly unpopular among many of his constituents. Greece, Turkey jockey for position in Washington Menendez has threatened to use his leverage to block the $6 billion sale of 40 Lockheed Martin Block 70 F-16 fighter jets to Turkey. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis directly appealed to Congress to block the F-16 sale during an address before a joint meeting of Congress in May – immediately after he announced Greece’s intention to acquire the F-35 at the White House. The U.S. kicked Turkey out of the F-35 co-production program in 2019 over Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense amid fears its advanced radar system could allow Moscow to spy on the stealth fighter jets. The Greeks have found a critical ally in Menendez as they seek to block the F-16 sale to Turkey amid repeated Turkish violations of Greek airspace, the ongoing occupation of Northern Cyprus and maritime disputes over gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean. This puts Athens at odds with President Joe Biden, who voiced support for the F-16 sale at the NATO summit in Madrid last month after Turkey dropped its opposition to Swedish and Finnish accession to the alliance. The Turks are also seeking a separate $400 million sale to upgrade their current F-16 jets with new missiles, radar and electronics. “We should sell them the F-16 jets and modernize those jets as well,” Biden said in Madrid. “But I need congressional approval to be able to do that, and I think we can get that.” It remains unclear how the White House plans to persuade Menendez, who remains committed to using his position to block the sale. Menendez told Defense News on Monday that he remains a hard no on the F-16s but said he could consider the sale if Turkey addresses issues he has previously raised with Ankara. Those include its actions in the eastern Mediterranean, its continued possession of the S-400s, it human rights record and ongoing attacks against the US-backed fighters in northeast Syria.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Turkey DA › 2NC – UQ – AT: F-16s

The House has blocked the sale of F-16’s to Turkey.

Wichmann 7/15 [Anna Wichmann; writer at the Greek Reporter; 7-15-2022; "Congress Votes to Block Sale of F-16 Fighter Jets to Turkey"; GreekReporter; https://greekreporter.com/2022/07/15/congress-fighter-jet-f-16-turkey/; Accessed 7-22-2022; AW]

The US House of Representatives voted to approve a measure that will likely block the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey on Thursday. The measure prohibits the US President from selling or transferring the fighter jets or kits to Turkey unless the President can show Congress that Turkey has “not violated the sovereignty of Greece” in the last 120 days. It also requires the President to stipulate that providing the materials to Turkey is in the national interest of the United States, a high but not impossible bar to clear. The amendment was added to the National Defense Authorization Act, the country’s massive military spending bill for 2023, and was approved by a House of Representatives committee this week. After its approval, it had to be passed by Congress. The amendment, which was pushed by Greek-American Democrat Chris Pappas from New Hampshire and Frank Pallone, Democrat from New Jersey, was passed by Congress in a 244 to 179 vote on Thursday. Although passed by Congress, the entire bill, including the amendment, must be voted on by the Senate before becoming law. The massive bill, which allots a stunning $800 billion in defense spending, will likely go through a round of changes before it is passed by the Senate in the coming months. The amendment also mandates that the US President show concrete steps have been “taken to ensure that such F-16s are not used by Turkey for repeated unauthorized territorial overflights of Greece.” US Congress passes amendment to block sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey The amendment comes at a particularly tense moment in Greece-Turkey relations. In recent months, the Turkish military has conducted overflights of its aircraft above Greek islands without approval, prompting rebuke from Greece and other nations. In June, a spokesperson for German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said “the violation of Greek air space and overflights above Greek islands is not correct.” Turkey’s refusal to talk to allies within NATO was “counterproductive and contrary to the spirit of the alliance,” the spokesperson added.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Turkey DA › 2NC – UQ – AT: F-16s

Erdogan won’t say yes to the conditions – the link proves.

Dora Antoniou 7/16, journalist for Kathimerini, a daily, political and financial morning newspaper published in Athens, “Ankara not likely to accept F-16 strings”, https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1189154/ankara-not-likely-to-accept-f-16-strings/ \\SYang

The approval this week of a relevant amendment by the US Congress which is seen as a first step to stop the sale of new F-16 aircraft to Turkey and the upgrading of its existing ones has caused optimism in Greece that its positions are being heeded. But there are also several opposing forces at play, which are making the situation complicated. 

According to Dr Triantafyllos Karatrantos, an analyst at the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) think tank, a clearly positive development would be that any agreement to sell or upgrade aircraft to Turkey is accompanied by a strict framework stipulating good neighborly relations and avoiding provocations, disputes or engagement with third countries.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Turkey DA › 2NC – UQ – AT: F-16s

F-16 sale isn’t going through – the house is blocking.

Connor O’Brien 7/14, defense reporter for POLITICO, July 14, 2022, “House adds roadblock to Biden's plan to sell U.S. fighter jets to Turkey”, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/14/house-adds-roadblock-to-bidens-quest-to-sell-u-s-fighter-jets-to-turkey-00045825 \\SYang

The House on Thursday threw up a roadblock to President Joe Biden’s push to sell new F-16 fighters to Turkey in yet another blow to the administration’s efforts from fellow Democrats.

Lawmakers tacked on a provision to annual defense policy legislation that bars the U.S. from selling or transferring the jets unless the administration certifies that doing so is critical to U.S. national security.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Turkey DA › 2NC – UQ – AT: Opposition Winning

DISUNITY – no single opposition candidate means no shot Erdogan loses.

Selcan Hacaoglu 6/10, journalist for Bloomberg News, June 10, 2022, “ Turkey Opposition Frets Over Challenger to Erdogan in Vote”, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-10/turkey-opposition-frets-over-challenger-to-erdogan-in-2023-polls \\SYang

Cracks appeared in a Turkish opposition alliance hoping to take on President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in polls next year after members of the bloc had a public spat over who should be their candidate. 

Kemal Kilicdaroglu, a member of Turkey’s Alevi religious minority and head of the secular CHP party is seen as a potential opposition nominee. But one of his allies questioned whether he can muster the support of majority Sunni Muslim voters crucial to ending the decades-long rule of Erdogan’s AK Party.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Turkey DA › 2NC – U/Q – Framing

Erdogan won’t go down without a fight – black swans like election reforms ensure he maintains a tenuous grasp on power.

Laura Pitel 22, FT's Turkey correspondent, covering Turkish politics, foreign policy, business, the economy and society, March 14, 2022, “Unexpected Turkish electoral reforms could hit Erdogan’s opponents”, https://www.ft.com/content/2613206f-e33f-452b-803a-eed3edc8ce2d \\SYang

Turkey’s ruling alliance has unveiled a plan to amend the country’s electoral laws that could damage the opposition’s efforts to wrest control of parliament from the ruling party of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. A long-awaited package of changes unveiled on Monday included a surprise measure that would alter the way that members of parliament are allocated within electoral districts.  The proposal, analysts say, could undermine efforts by a group of opposition parties to take control of the Turkish parliament after almost two decades of dominance by Erdogan’s Justice and Development party (AKP). Erdogan, whose AKP came to power in 2002, has witnessed an erosion of support for his ruling party in recent years as Turkey has suffered a succession of economic crises. Although he spearheaded a 2018 change in the country’s system of governance that handed more power to the president, he still needs control of parliament to approve legislation, including the government’s annual budget. Under the proposed changes, members of parliament would be allocated based purely on the vote share of each party in a given district. The current system, by contrast, allocates MPs according to the vote share won by each electoral alliance before dividing them up in line with the vote share of each party within that bloc. That allows parties to pick up MPs in districts where they get a small share of the vote. Can Selcuki, director of the Turkiye Raporu polling agency, said that if the new rules had been applied to parliamentary elections that took place in 2018, they would have resulted in 10 more MPs for Erdogan’s ruling alliance out of a total of 600. While that number is small, Selcuki said, it could be critical for Erdogan if the next election is very close. The change, if passed, also significantly reduces the likelihood that Erdogan will bring forward presidential and parliamentary elections that are scheduled for June 2023 because the legislation would take 12 months to come into force once approved. The draft legislation, which was put forward by the AKP and its partners from the Nationalist Movement party (MHP), is likely to be adopted into law given that the parties hold a majority in parliament. Opposition parties, who for years struggled to dent the president’s popularity, struck their first serious blow in 2019 when they formed an official electoral alliance to defeat the AKP in local elections in Istanbul, Ankara and several other big cities. They have built on that co-operation and grown increasingly bullish about their chances of defeating Erdogan at the next national vote. The unexpected plan to alter the voting system is the latest sign of the challenges faced by an opposition in confronting Erdogan, who has a wide array of tools at his disposal as he seeks to hang on to power.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Turkey DA › 1NC – UQ – Winning Now

Second most recent poll – Erdogan is ahead and on the rise but it’s a tight race – proves the brink, plus AKP base is uniquely strong – no thumpers.

Abdulkadir Selvi 6/15, columnist for the Turkish poll Optimar, June 15, 2021, “Optimar poll: AKP votes 36 percent, Erdogan on the rise”, https://t24.com.tr/haber/optimar-anketi-akp-nin-oyu-yuzde-36-erdogan-yukseliste,1040625 **Title and card text translated using google translate. If you have any questions regarding the translation of this article email @ stephen.yang25@paceacademy.org \\SYang

Hürriyet columnist Abdulkadir Selvi shared the results of the survey conducted with 2519 people between 12-15 May in his column.

According to Selvi; "Which party would you vote for if there was an election today?" If the undecided ones are distributed, the rate of those who answered the question is as follows:

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Bad – Entanglement

Unless the aff is unanimously agreed upon by NATO members, states will entangle others into conflicts to reinvigorate the alliance

Recchia 22 Stefano Recchia (Stefano Recchia (PhD, Columbia University) holds the John G. Tower distinguished chair in international politics as an associate professor at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, TX. His research focuses on the politics and ethics of military intervention and multilateral cooperation in security affairs.), 3-31-2022, "Protecting civilians or preserving NATO? Alliance entanglement and the Bosnian safe areas," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2022.2044315

The possibility that the United States and some of its main allies might pull each other into conflicts besetting non-members, because of alliance pressures, has not been explicitly examined. My argument is that when alliance members at first disagree openly about how to proceed in the face of a security crisis in their neighbourhood, after a period of deadlock, concerns about the alliance’s perceived relevance and effectiveness may push the allies to coalesce around an intervention policy that none of them previously favoured. In such cases, it is appropriate to speak of mutual entanglement, given that the allies pull each other into the resulting military operation. Mutual entanglement, I argue, is especially likely for members of institutionalised alliances, such as NATO, that combine elements of both a traditional defensive alliance and a collective security organisation. Members may value the alliance not just for its mutual security guarantee, but as a symbol of their collective identity, which can be expected to generate strong incentives for consensual problem-solving.5 Imagine a situation in which core NATO members, notwithstanding pressures to tackle a security crisis in their neighbourhood, fail for a considerable time to agree on a common policy; indeed, they are at odds to such an extent that they partly undermine each other. This results in significant alliance discord and public recriminations. Eventually, pro-alliance leaders on different sides of the intra-NATO dispute, worried about the alliance’s health, start pushing for a joint military response – motivated to a significant degree by a desire to reinvigorate the alliance and signal unity of purpose both domestically and internationally. After some pulling and hauling, the main alliance members converge around a particular military intervention policy. The alliance – specifically, the value that member states attach to the alliance relationship – will have pulled members toward the intervention. This is not a case of one side in an alliance dragging other members into a military conflict. Instead, the allies have pulled each other toward intervention in a non-member state; they have mutually entangled each other.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Bad – Russia

Increasing NATO’s power supports a violent, interventionist institution and strains relations with Russia – Baltic states prove

Daniel 19 Daniel Larison (He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, World Politics Review, Politico Magazine, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and was a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago,), 5-14-2019, "Yes, NATO Expansion Was a Mistake," American Conservative, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/yes-nato-expansion-was-a-mistake/

Hal Brands complains about critics of NATO expansion: As for the critique that it was NATO expansion that provoked Russian revisionism, this argument has always been flimsy. Yes, the expansion angered Russian officials, during Yeltsin’s time as well as Putin’s. It was undoubtedly humiliating for the fallen superpower. But the idea that NATO expansion caused Russian aggression rests on an implicit counterfactual argument that, absent NATO expansion, Russia would not have behaved in a domineering fashion toward countries on its border. There is simply nothing in Russian history — and nothing in Vladimir Putin’s personality — that supports this argument. NATO expansion has been a mistake for the U.S. because the U.S. didn’t need to add any more security commitments in Europe or anywhere else after the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the USSR meant that the threat to European peace and security had substantially diminished. There was arguably no need for NATO at all, much less a larger one. The larger alliance has not found “new purpose” through expansion, but continues to cast about looking for some reason to exist now that its only real reason for being, the Soviet Union, has been dead for almost three decades. That first took the form of “humanitarian” intervention in Kosovo, an illegal war that set a precedent that Russia would subsequently exploit, and then it morphed into supporting the unending war in Afghanistan. In 2011, “humanitarian” intervention was once again back on the menu as the alliance was dragged into backing a U.S.-led attack on the Libyan government that destabilized the country and the surrounding region until today. The last twenty years have seen the continued growth of the alliance at the same time that the alliance has become increasingly divorced from its original purpose of defending Europe from attack. NATO’s expansion during that time has been a mistake, and so has NATO’s attempt to reinvent itself for a world where it is no longer needed. There is no question that NATO expansion has antagonized Russia and strained U.S.-Russian relations for the last two decades. Not every round of NATO expansion has been equally provocative to Russia, but all of it has been unwelcome to them. Bringing in the Baltic states was a bad idea primarily because it overextended the alliance and because the U.S. was extending security guarantees to states that it could not actually defend. The alliance has been fortunate that it has never had to back up these commitments. The U.S. and NATO were able to “get away” with the earlier rounds because Russia was weakened enough during the 1990s that it wasn’t in a position to do anything about them. That doesn’t mean that NATO expansion up until that point was a good idea. All that it means is that it hasn’t blown up in our faces yet. It was the subsequent attempts to push for bringing Ukraine and Georgia into the alliance that proved to be truly unacceptable to Russia, and it was the 2008 Bucharest meeting when the alliance promised both states that they would eventually become members that paved the way for the conflict between Russia and Georgia later that year. NATO expansion was not the cause of the current conflict in Ukraine, but it created the context for Russia’s reaction to the overthrow of Yanukovych and the establishment of a pro-Western government in Kiev. Had there been no NATO expansion after the end of the Cold War, or even if there had been no NATO expansion after 2004, it is unlikely that the August 2008 war and the current war in Ukraine would have ever happened. Sold as something that promotes European stability and peace, continued NATO expansion has in fact undermined both in the last decade and a half.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Bad – Russia

US/NATO security operations empirically set up proxies to fight their battles for them – Ukraine and Afghanistan proves

Miah and Sheppard 22 Malik Miah and Barry Sheppard, 3-25-2022, "US goal is to ‘bait and bleed’ Russia, not defend Ukraine’s people," Green Left, https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/us-goal-bait-and-bleed-russia-not-defend-ukraines-people-

It has become obvious that Washington provoked Russia into the war in Ukraine — a completely reactionary invasion that must be roundly condemned — but left Ukraine to fight it. While the Ukrainian people have the right to defend themselves by any means necessary, the government’s alliance with the United States and Western imperialist powers undermines their defense. Many inside Ukraine are for “neutrality” and against aligning solely with US world domination. The facts show that the US does not care about workers and farmers in Ukraine. It rejects an all-out direct military intervention against Russia, not because it could lead to World War III, but because its main objective is to significantly, if not completely, remove an international rival, Russia, from the world stage. In addition, the restrictions on allowing Ukrainian refugees to enter the US remains, even though President Joe Biden says Ukrainians who arrive will have temporary protective status for 18 months. It hasn’t happened yet. Dan Glazebrook documented the US “bait and bleed” policy towards Russia in a recent Counterpunch article. “The term ‘bait and bleed’,” wrote Glazebrook, “was defined by international relations theorist John Mearsheimer in 2001 as a military strategy that ‘involves causing two rivals to engage in a protracted war, so that they bleed each other white, while the baiter remains on the sideline, its military strength intact’”. Glazebrook revealed that the current US National Defense Strategy (NDS) “explicitly endorses such a strategy”, and “makes no bones about who it is aimed at”. The NDS was authored by then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis in 2018, under former president Donald Trump’s administration and sets out “a clear road map … to meet the challenges posed by a re-emergence of long-term strategic competition with China and Russia,” wrote Glazebrook. It identifies “interstate strategic competition” rather than “terrorism” as “the primary concern in US national security” today. According to Glazebrook, “the NDS vows that ‘with our allies and partners, we will challenge competitors by maneuvering them into unfavorable positions, frustrating their efforts, precluding their options while expanding our own, and forcing them to confront conflict under adverse conditions’. “There it is, in black and white: it is official US policy to bait Russia into conflict,” he wrote. Mearsheimer noted in a 2015 lecture that “If you really want to wreck Russia, what you really want to do is encourage Russia to conquer Ukraine”. “The US and the UK – the latter in particular – appear to have been taking this advice very seriously,” wrote Glazebrook. US meddling in Afghanistan Referring to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Glazebrook wrote: “Until 1998, the mainstream view of US support for the anti-communist insurgency in Afghanistan throughout the 1980s was that it had been a response to the Russian invasion of December 1979. But, as Glazebrook reminds us, “in an interview in 1998, Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to US President Jimmy Carter, admitted that the truth was the exact opposite”. Brzezinski told Le Nouvel Observateur that Carter had signed “the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul” four months earlier. Brzezinski wrote to Carter at the time to express that “this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention”. When the Soviets officially crossed the border, he wrote to Carter, saying: “We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.” “Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war that was unsustainable for the regime, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire,” wrote Glazebrook. “Asked whether he regretted the move, which plunged Afghanistan into a conflict which is now into its fifth decade, he replied ‘Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it?’ “Plunging the Afghan people into a half-century of devastating war was of no consequence for the likes of Brzezinski. His successors clearly have the same attitude towards Ukraine,” wrote Glazebrook. It was not Russia alone that invaded Afghanistan, but the Soviet Union, which included Ukraine. Many Ukrainian troops took part in the invasion and suffered the “demoralisation” of war, as did all the Soviet Republics, including Ukraine. The occupation, and the social counter-revolution led by the decisive sector of the Soviet bureaucracy (organised by the Communist Party of the USSR) from 1998‒91, led to the breakup of the Soviet Union. This social counter-revolution overthrew the nationalised, planned economies of the Soviet Republics and restored capitalism in all of them, including Russia and Ukraine. The Brzezinski quote brings to mind one by then-US Secretary of State Madeline Albright in 1996 on 60 Minutes. Leslie Stahl asked Albright whether the sanctions taken against Iraq after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait were justified, given the reports that half a million children had died as a result. Albright answered: “I think this is a very hard choice, but the price – we think the price is worth it.” Truman and Roosevelt Glazebrook referenced then-Senator Harry Truman’s comment to President Franklin D Roosevelt in 1941, concerning the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union during WWII: “If we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible.” In fact, the US held back on opening a “second front” against Germany and then did so only slowly, starting in northern Africa — letting both sides “bleed” in the fighting in the Soviet Union. In the end, the majority of German casualties in WWII were on the eastern front. A staggering 25 million soldiers and civilians lost their lives in the Soviet Union. The expansion of NATO east was begun under then-President Bill Clinton in 1997 and continued. Each expansion increased tensions with Russia. The US and Britain pressed for Ukraine and Georgia to become part of NATO, but Germany and France demurred. A compromise was reached that Ukraine and Georgia would not join immediately, but would do so in the future. This threat has been maintained to this day. Russia correctly views Ukraine joining NATO as an existential threat and a “red line”. Any Russian government, including the most liberal bourgeois democracy, would do so. In 2008, acting on the promise that it would join NATO, Georgia attempted to retake two small Russian-occupied territories. This led to a short war with Russia, with Georgia believing that NATO would intervene. It did not. Glazebrook quoted Kent University Professor Richard Sakwa, a Russia and Ukraine expert, who wrote that, following the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, “British Foreign Secretary David Miliband visited Kiev and pledged Britain’s support, dooming the country to becoming the next epicentre of the artificially constructed struggle for mastery of Europe.” 2014 coup The 2014 coup against the elected president of Ukraine, Victor Yanukovych, was engineered by the US. US Ambassador Victoria Nuland directly intervened to appoint the new Ukrainian nationalist government’s first president. A few US “experts” were first part of the new government. Biden’s son, Hunter, eventually joined the Board of Directors of the Ukrainian energy company, Burisma, in spite of having no experience in the field. After the coup, the new Ukrainian nationalist government in western Ukraine launched a civil war against the largely Russian-speaking east. It included downgrading the legal status of the Russian language. The civil war continued up to the present, with the NATO countries supporting the Ukrainian nationalists and Russia the other side. Glazebrook wrote that following the coup, NATO staged the Rapid Trident military exercise on Ukrainian territory on September 15‒16 of that year, a war-gaming exercise involving 15 “allied and partnered nations”. “Since then, plans for NATO incorporation have proceeded apace. A British government document listing British support to the Ukrainian military outlines these plans in detail. “In 2016, NATO outlined its Comprehensive Assistance Package of 16 ‘capacity building programmes and several trust funds for military modernization’ whilst ‘NATO allies also participate in a wide range of military exercises with Ukrainian armed forces through the Military Committee with Ukrainian Work Plan. “But it was in June 2020 that this process was really ramped up, when Ukraine was offered ‘Enhanced Opportunity Status’ with NATO. Notes the British document, ‘this status provides Ukraine with preferential access to NATO’s exercises’ and training.” No wonder the Ukrainian government believed that NATO would back it up if there was an invasion. While the US said it didn’t want a war with Russia, it coyly let the prospect of NATO intervening remain open. It wasn’t until November 2021 that NATO publicly ruled out intervention. Glazebrook’s assessment is that this was the final signal to Russia that it could invade, which Putin all along wanted to do, in keeping with his avowed intention of restoring the old Russian empire — without the tsar, but with Putin as its head. He received support from the head of the Russian Orthodox church before the invasion began. Since the invasion, Putin has bombed Ukrainian and Russian-speaking areas of the country — including the largely Russian-speaking city of Mariupol — causing many Russian speakers to join the resistance. Since the invasion, Putin has bombarded not only Ukrainian parts but also of Russian speaking parts of Ukraine, causing many Russian-speakers to join the resistance. The most egregious example has been the Russian bombardment and takeover of the largely Russian-speaking city of Mariupol. In that city and other parts that Russia has occupied, Putin has denied those people self-determination, in keeping with his tirade against the Russian Revolution and Lenin for advocating national self-determination. US will arm Ukraine up to a point The US-NATO military buildup of Ukraine has stopped Russia from a quick victory and has inflicted losses and damage to the Russian invading forces. US policy is and will continue to be making sure that enough military aid from NATO countries is provided to Ukraine to keep the war going. But it will stop at direct intervention that would mean Russia’s defeat. The US has built up Ukraine’s military and the civilian far-right militia — which the US has nurtured since 2014 — to assure that, if Russia succeeds in forming a weak government in Ukraine under its tutelage, there would be a massive armed resistance to continue the “bleeding”. If Russia “wins”, it loses.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Bad – Russia

Security cooperation empirically antagonized and provoked Russia

Galen 18 Ted Galen (Ted Galen Carpenter is senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Carpenter served as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011), 6-15-2018, "Is NATO Pushing Russia Towards Retaliation?," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/commentary/nato-pushing-russia-towards-retaliation

The United States and its NATO allies continue to find ways to antagonize Russia. The latest provocation is a request from Norway to more than double the number of U.S. troops stationed on its territory and deploy them even closer to the border with Russia. Granted, the numbers involved are not large. There are currently 330 American military personnel in the country on a “rotational” basis. Oslo’s new request would increase the number to seven hundred. If the Norwegian government gets its way, the new troops would be stationed in the far north, barely 260 miles from Russia, in contrast to the existing unit in central Norway, several hundred miles from Russian territory. The rotational aspect theoretically complies with Norway’s pledge to Moscow in 1949 when it joined NATO that Oslo would not allow U.S. bases on its territory. Indeed, Foreign Minister Ine Marie Eriksen Soriede reiterated that assurance in connection with the new troop request, contending that there would be “no American bases on Norwegian soil.” Making their official status rotational supposedly means that the troops are there only on a temporary basis. It is a cynical dodge that fools no one—least of all Vladimir Putin and his colleagues in the Kremlin. Norwegian officials also insisted that the new deployment was not directed against Russia. That assurance has even less credibility than the rotational rationale. Oslo’s request came just days after nine nations along NATO’s eastern flank, including Poland, the Baltic republics, and Romania called for a larger Alliance (meaning largely U.S.) military presence in their region. In addition to the move to increase the number of U.S. troops in Norway, major NATO military exercises (war games), code‐​named Trident Juncture 18, are scheduled for October. The focus of those exercises will be central and northern Norway, and they will involve thirty‐​five thousand troops, seventy ships, and 130 aircraft. Nevertheless, Soriede insisted that she couldn’t see “any serious reason why Russia should react” to Oslo’s proposal for an enhanced U.S. military presence. She should perhaps receive credit for being able to make such a statement with a straight face. But such transparent dishonesty is a longstanding feature of NATO’s behavior toward Moscow. Even during the Cold War, Western officials routinely insisted that the Alliance was not directed against the Soviet Union. In their more candid moments, though, they conceded the obvious—that NATO was a military mechanism to contain Soviet power. Granted, it was not the sole purpose. Lord Hastings Ismay, NATO’s first secretary general, stated that NATO was created to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” The first objective, though, seemed to be the most important. Containment of the Soviet Union made sense to keep democratic Europe out of Moscow’s geopolitical orbit, and NATO was an important component of that strategy. But Western leaders continued to apply that model to a noncommunist Russia once the Cold War ended. Indeed, they intensified the containment rationale by adding new members throughout Eastern Europe and expanding the Alliance to Russia’s border. Those actions were taken despite verbal assurances from Secretary of State James Baker and West German foreign minister Hans‐​Dietrich Genscher at the time of German reunification that NATO would not expand beyond Germany’s eastern border. Throughout the Alliance’s inexorable move eastward, Western officials and pundits insisted that NATO enlargement was not directed against Russia. Indeed, some members of the Western foreign‐​policy community argued that the move would benefit Russia by erasing Cold War dividing lines and increasing Eastern Europe’s political and economic stability. One wonders whether Westerners thought that the Russians were gullible enough to believe such absurd arguments, or the proponents actually believed their own propaganda. NATO leaders continue to insist that the Alliance has no offensive intent against Russia or that the Alliance seeks to undermine Moscow’s interests. But NATO’s behavior belies such assurances. The interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo that weakened and eventually truncated Serbia, a longstanding Russian ally, was certainly not a friendly act. Stationing Alliance (most notably U.S.) forces and weapons systems in NATO’s easternmost members, (a process that has accelerated markedly since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014) likewise is provocative. Yet Western leaders and publics act as through Russia has no legitimate reason to react negatively to such moves, as Soriede stated explicitly regarding the proposed increase in the U.S. troop presence in her country. NATO has conducted several large‐​scale military exercises in Poland and other member states, as well as naval maneuvers in the Black Sea near Russia’s important naval base at Sevastopol. Again, the Russians apparently are wrong to regard such actions as provocative and threatening. U.S. and NATO leaders need to adopt a much more realistic attitude. Any nation would regard NATO’s behavior as decidedly unfriendly, and even menacing, if conducted on its frontiers. Continuing such actions while cynically denying their hostile intent could easily lead to miscalculation and a catastrophic confrontation. As a first step toward mending ties with Moscow, the Trump administration should summarily reject Norway’s unnecessary request for more U.S. troops.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Bad – Russia

Strengthening NATO incentivized Russia to invade Ukraine. The plan overextends NATO by committing even further to it which increases tensions

Guyer 22 Jonathan Guyer (Jonathan Guyer covers foreign policy, national security, and the world for Vox. From 2019 to 2021, he worked at The American Prospect, where as managing editor he reported on Biden’s foreign-policy team.), 1-27-2022, "How America’s NATO expansion obsession plays into the Ukraine crisis," Vox, https://www.vox.com/22900113/nato-ukraine-russia-crisis-clinton-expansion

When tens of thousands of Russian troops started moving toward the Ukrainian border late last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin effectively issued an ultimatum: They won’t go home until he had “concrete agreements prohibiting any further eastward expansion of NATO.” This week, as the US and Russia exchange formal diplomatic letters, Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized that “NATO’s door is open, remains open, and that is our commitment.” But few have been asking why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would want to move east in the first place. What was once a Cold War security pact has become a 21st-century organization with global military commitments and ever more member countries from Eastern Europe. Members of the alliance didn’t always foresee its expansion and, three decades ago, some of America’s most renowned foreign policy thinkers argued that NATO should be nowhere near Ukraine. Ukraine is a former Soviet republic. It isn’t joining NATO anytime soon, and President Joe Biden has said as much. Still, NATO’s open-door policy — the alliance’s foundational principle that any qualified European country could join — cuts both ways. To the West, it’s a statement of autonomy; to Russia, it’s a threat. The core of the NATO treaty is Article 5, a commitment that an attack on any country is treated as an attack on the entire alliance — meaning any Russian military engagement with a hypothetical NATO-member Ukraine would theoretically bring Moscow into conflict with the US, the UK, France, and the 27 other NATO members. The prospect of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO has antagonized Putin at least since President George W. Bush expressed support for the idea in 2008. “That was a real mistake,” said Steven Pifer, who from 1998 to 2000 was ambassador to Ukraine under President Bill Clinton. “It drove the Russians nuts. It created expectations in Ukraine and Georgia, which then were never met. And so that just made that whole issue of enlargement a complicated one.” No country can join the alliance without the unanimous buy-in of all 30 member countries, and many have opposed Ukraine’s membership, in part because it doesn’t meet the conditions to join. All of this has put Ukraine in an untenable position: an applicant for an alliance that wasn’t going to accept it, while irritating a potential opponent next door, without having any degree of NATO protection. Revisiting NATO’s own history is not to justify Putin’s revanchism and threats to democracy. It is certainly true that he is a repressive leader who has annexed neighbors and funded separatists, cracked down on activists and allegedly poisoned enemies. Some experts say that his criticism of NATO expansion is a mere pretext. Still, the stakes of NATO’s presence on Russia’s borders and potential expansion are high, and at least in today’s Washington, few question that presence. “The open-door policy is the one that maximizes friction with Russia, which has culminated in the crisis we have now,” said Mary Sarotte, a historian of international relations at Johns Hopkins University. “I don’t think Vladimir Putin is primarily interested in historical accuracy, but I believe he is genuinely aggrieved at the way the post–Cold War order includes no stake for Russia.” So how did it become an article of faith in Washington that NATO would expand in its membership and its purpose? Debating NATO’s future in the ’90s As the Soviet Union cracked up, it wasn’t certain that NATO would stick around either. “During the Cold War, NATO had a mission that was clear and tight, and could be put on a bumper sticker,” said Rajan Menon of the research group Defense Priorities. The alliance existed, he explained, “to deter and defeat the Warsaw pact,” the countries aligned with collapsing Soviet Russia. Its mission was in doubt after the Cold War — so much so that the president of the dissolving Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, even asked about his country joining NATO. Even the shape of the US role in Europe was uncertain. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the American public was more concerned about domestic policy. Bill Clinton had been elected with a campaign slogan of “It’s the Economy, Stupid,” and without experience as a statesman, he seemed likely to restrain America’s global ambitions. President Bill Clinton stands in front of his limo in Moscow’s Red Square, in January 1994. Diana Walker/Getty Images As Clinton became a frequent traveler to Russia and quickly plunged into statecraft, the promotion of democracy in Europe emerged as a primary US foreign policy goal. But it wasn’t clear that a military alliance like NATO would be the best way to advance that. A debate over NATO’s merits erupted in Washington in the ’90s. George Kennan, the eminent architect of the Soviet “containment” strategy and a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, wrote in 1997 that expanding NATO would be a “fateful error” because it would “inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion.” Kennan was far from alone in his criticism, as journalist Peter Beinart noted this week: Thomas Friedman, America’s most prominent foreign policy columnist, declared it the “most ill-conceived project of the post-Cold War era.” Daniel Patrick Moynihan, widely considered the most erudite member of the US Senate, warned, “We have no idea what we’re getting into.” Meanwhile, military leaders saw enlargement as detrimental to US interests, the Congressional Budget Office saw it as too expensive, and, later, intelligence agencies outright opposed adding Ukraine and Georgia. Clinton’s Secretary of Defense William Perry wrote in his memoir that he nearly resigned over enlargement. The nascent European Union might have been the channel to consolidate democratic development in post-Soviet countries. Or Europe could have been engaged through the multinational Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or even through a focus on closer relationships with individual countries. But Washington chose NATO. In the early ’90s, that generation of national security operatives weren’t prepared to forfeit leverage in Europe. “NATO had to find something to do or go out of business, and these people who grew up all their lives alongside it would not let it go out of business,” said Barry Posen, a political scientist at MIT. Jenonne Walker, who served in the Clinton White House, said she was among the minority who would have preferred the European Union as the mechanism for US engagement. “Almost everyone in the establishment wanted it to be through NATO, because that was where our influence was deemed to be greatest,” she said. Clinton first floated a program that would be a gateway to NATO membership, called the Partnership for Peace, but that was ultimately dropped. By 1994, NATO said it “would welcome NATO enlargement that would reach to democratic states to our East,” and Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungry would be the first to join. Electoral politics of the moment also reinforced Clinton’s decision to back NATO expansion. Republicans had won on that platform in the ’94 midterms. Ahead of the 1996 presidential election, “the domestic side of the White House” believed that growing the alliance would “play good with Polish American, Baltic American, Hungarian American communities,” explained Pifer. President Clinton, his national security adviser Tony Lake, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were optimistic that NATO could branch out, with the possibility of a constructive relationship between NATO and Russia. As that trifecta supported adding member states, the NATO alliance became an organizing principle of US foreign policy going forward. Putin’s war on Ukraine, explained NATO enlargement reoriented America in the world Initially, it took much political maneuvering for the newly united Germany to join NATO. The alliance added more eastern bloc counties in the late ’90s and early 2000s. The Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the northern end of Russia’s western border joined NATO in 2005 without much fuss from Russia. As it grew, NATO became a vehicle to address new global issues that worried US leaders. “Enlarging NATO becomes the gift that keeps on giving,” said Joshua Shifrinson, an international relations scholar at Boston University. “It was a way of incentivizing liberalization in countries that had been in the Communist bloc, showing that the US still has a mission in Europe, and a way of the US projecting power and checking alternative systems like the European Union.” During the Cold War, NATO never engaged in military operations. But amid the Yugoslav conflict and Kosovo war of the ’90s, the alliance enforced a no-fly zone, then deployed a peacekeeping force, and in 1999 dropped hundreds of bombs on Yugoslavia. The whole process was delayed and disorganized, according to diplomats, and exposed NATO’s inadequacies in dealing with a hot war. That pushed Clinton to embrace NATO further. “Our inaction was making NATO look weak and irrelevant,” said Walker, who went on to serve as ambassador to the Czech Republic from 1995 to 1998. “And the line in the halls of power in Washington was, ‘We have to enlarge NATO to save it, to make it look as though it were dynamic and on the move and not stagnant.’” By taking on new military roles, the institution created new imperatives for itself. In the 2000s, NATO went to the front lines: fighting in Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks and training Afghan forces starting in 2003, countering piracy in waters near Somalia, and then in a military intervention that was meant to protect civilians in Libya and went much further than its United Nations–approved mandate in toppling the tyrant Muammar Qaddafi. Now, America’s foreign policy establishment is dominated by people who are even more committed to the alliance’s power than those who saved it in the 1990s. NATO’s existence and enlargement is a baseline assumption. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine aspire to join. That has consequences. James Dobbins, who served as a senior diplomat in Europe during the ’90s and 2000s, says that a commitment to NATO expansion has limited Biden’s options. “It’s particularly out of tune — the idea that the United States should expand its defense perimeter to a half-dozen countries in Europe, when we should be shifting our focus on China,” Dobbins said. At its core, this is about US power and how it has changed since the Soviet Union’s end. “It’s become a conversation about whether the US should be out in the world defending human rights and spreading democracy,” said Emma Ashford of the Atlantic Council. “Is the US out in the world to protect its own security or to be a crusading force for good?” The Biden administration will now have to find its own answer.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Bad – Russia

Expanding NATO through security cooperation does not solve. It only provides the US with more avenues to create conflicts that support their own interests – causes Russian backlash and strengthens the Sino-Russo alliance

Dogan 22 Haluk Dogan (Haluk Dogan is a PhD candidate in Strategy and Security within the Department of Politics at the University of Exeter, where he also completed his MA in International Relations. His research focuses on international relations theory, foreign policy analysis, and West-Russia relations.) ,22 Feb 2022, "The US provoked the Russian invasion to maintain its global primacy," US provoked the Russian invasion to maintain its global primacy, https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/the-us-provoked-the-russian-invasion-to-maintain-its-global-primacy-55000

In a moot effort to cling to its hegemony and keep NATO relevant, Washington has, in turn, allowed the invasion to happen. Following a long period of escalation, Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered troops into Eastern Ukraine’s two breakaway regions, prompting immediate Western condemnation and an emergency UN Security Council meeting. While Moscow stands accused by the West of increasing acts of aggression on the Ukrainian border, the invasion was not a one-sided event. For months, the Anglo-American bloc has been unwilling to de-escalate the crisis. Washington and London have aimed to resuscitate the case for the NATO alliance, to invalidate arguments for a separate European Union-wide security arrangement, and to weaken Russia in seeking to prevent the emergence of rival blocs in Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific regions. However, to put it bluntly, this strategy will not reverse the decline of American hegemony. Is the ‘transatlantic alliance’ back? A couple of days before the invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy expressed his disappointment at the failure of his Western “friends” to support Ukraine vis-a-vis Russian aggression. This perception is consistent with Ukrainian officials’ previous accusation that US President Joe Biden gave Moscow a “green light” to invade. Kiev’s disappointment is completely understandable. Giving Moscow the green light is as much about transatlantic relations as it is about West-Russia or Ukraine-Russia relations. The US’ post-World War II hegemony is predicated on its domination in continental Europe, with NATO acting as the principal mechanism for achieving American primacy. The Anglo-American strategy now focuses on preventing European states from acting independently. The Russian threat is thought to serve that aim, pushing Europe to be in need of American and British power. The Anglo-American bloc has never been happy with France’s attempts to establish an alternative European security mechanism, or with Germany’s relations with Russia – especially in terms of cooperation on the Nord Stream gas pipeline. The growing economic ties between the European Union and China are also causes of concern for the Anglo-American alliance. In this context, it is not surprising Biden pointed out at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference: “America is back. The transatlantic alliance is back…The partnership between Europe and the United States, in my view, is and must remain the cornerstone of all that we hope to accomplish in the 21st Century, just as we did in the 20th Century.” Eliminating Russia in the ‘Great Game’? Neither NATO nor Western states will go to war with Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. The invasion justifies their efforts to undermine Russia economically and politically. However, the strategy of weakening Russia is not only about its military activities in Eastern Europe. The Kremlin has long embraced an approach that emphasises Russia’s great power status in a multipolar world, in direct opposition to the US’ vision of a unipolar world in which it reigns supreme. Therefore, the Anglo-American goal is not only to weaken Russia via economic sanctions, or harm Moscow’s economic interests in Europe, but also to divert its attention and energy away from the Indo and Asia-Pacific in particular, with the aim of hindering Russia’s partnerships with India and China. India has decades-long ties with Russia, and New Delhi recently started receiving Russian S-400 defence systems. But India is also a member of Quad – an alliance involving the US, Japan, and Australia, which aims to counter China’s growing assertiveness. Both the US and Britain have long been pushing India to cooperate with them in dealing with China. At the last Quad meeting, the US requested that India stand by its side in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Another important topic for discussion was the growing economic and diplomatic relationships between Russia and China. The Anglo-American bloc hopes that the Ukraine invasion will severely wound Russia, preventing it from being an important rival actor in their confrontation with China. The question of American decline Anglo-American domination will push Europe into submission to some extent, and Russia will be wounded. But will this reverse the unravelling of American hegemony in the long term? As Russian President Vladimir Putin made clear in his televised speech just before the invasion, sanctions imposed by the West will not dissuade Russia from attempting to preserve its standing on the world stage. NATO has already lost prestige and power, and the invasion of Ukraine will only worsen this situation. Increasing the Anglo-American bloc’s weight in Europe due to the conflict in Eastern Europe will also have a negative impact on their ability to contain China in Asia. As it follows Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will not cause France to abandon its call for strategic autonomy for the EU entirely, nor will it change the interdependence of Europe and Russia on gas. The Anglo-American coalition’s gas diversification efforts in favour of Europe will affect the strategic dynamics in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Yet it is not likely to obstruct the Nord Stream 2 project, despite Washington wanting to see this. Due to the steady erosion of the US’ hegemonic position in the world economy, it appears that China will continue to be the EU’s biggest trading partner. India has already signalled that it will remain neutral on the Ukraine crisis, which implies that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have little impact on the close ties between Moscow and New Delhi. More crucially, this situation appears to have given Moscow and Beijing further reasons to act together and get closer, despite their conflicting interests in Asia. They share a common desire to challenge the Western-dominated international system. Should Russia be wounded by Western sanctions, it will rely on China in economic terms to some extent, while their collective security actions will hasten the demise of US hegemony. In the case of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is no absolute winner. Indeed, nothing will change in terms of the ongoing and gradual unravelling of global American hegemony