2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › IL---Info Ecosystem › IL---LIO
Herbert Lin 19, senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University, June 2019, “The existential threat from cyber-enabled information warfare,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 75, No. 4, p. 187-196, ¶ indicates start of a new paragraph //chico
¶ On the existential threat from cyber-enabled information warfare ¶ Corruption of the information ecosystem has become an existential threat to civilization as we know it because prosperity and advancement depend on a secure information infrastructure and environment that provides human beings with contextualized, reli- able, trustworthy information when and where it is needed. Information is as much a part of human ecol- ogy and the essence of being human as DNA (itself a form of information!) is a part of the evolutionary processes in biological systems. ¶ Today, chaos reigns in much of the information ecosys- tem on which societies depend. In many forums for poli- tical and societal discourse, national leaders shout about fake news, by which they mean information they do not like. These same leaders lie shamelessly, calling their lies truth, or perhaps “truthful hyperbole.” Acting across national boundaries, these leaders and their surrogates exacerbate existing divisions, creating rage and diminishing confidence in elections and democratic insti- tutions. Using unsupported anecdotes and sketchy rheto- ric, denialists undermine well-established science about climate change and other urgent issues. Established insti- tutions of the government, journalism, and education – institutions that have traditionally provided stability – are under attack precisely because they have provided stability.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › IL---Info Ecosystem › IL---Info Ecosystem
Herbert Lin 19, senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University, June 2019, “The existential threat from cyber-enabled information warfare,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 75, No. 4, p. 187-196, modified language indicated in brackets, ¶ indicates start of a new paragraph //chico
Research in the fields of cognitive and social psychol- ogy has formalized what Hitler knew intuitively. We now understand that human cognitive processing cap- ability is not unlimited; humans have finite cognitive resources that can be “used up” under mentally stress- ful circumstances. Findings from the same cognitive psychology that has transformed neoclassical econom- ics into behavioral economics (and resulted in three Nobel Prizes in economics) have made clear the “bounded rationality” of human thought and the simul- taneous existence in every individual of the capability to engage in two types of cognitive processing.
Specifically, heuristic dual-system cognitive theory posits that human beings have two systems for cogni- tive processing – an intuitive, reflexive, and emotionally driven mode of thought (often designated as System 1) and a slower, more deliberate, analytical mode of thought (often designated as System 2). Kahneman (2011) provides a primer on System 1 and System 2 thinking. (See Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Chaiken 1987 for other variants of dual-system cognitive theory; see Kruglanski and Thompson 1999 for a contrary view on dual-system cognitive theory.)
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › IL---Info Ecosystem › IL---Info Ecosystem
Herbert Lin 19, senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University, June 2019, “The existential threat from cyber-enabled information warfare,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 75, No. 4, p. 187-196 modified language indicated in brackets, ¶ indicates start of a new paragraph //chico
¶ The infrastructure for human civilization is undeniably tangible (that is, physical, chemical, and biological), but it is increasingly virtual as well, and the virtual aspects of that infrastructure – the information ecosystem (or, equivalently, environment) – in many ways has become central and often critical to the way people now live all over the world. As Balkin (2012) describes, “it is not an exaggeration to say that modern states are informational states: states that recognize and solve problems of governance by collecting, analyzing, and distributing information.” Consider that nations require good information to allo- cate benefits and social services to the populace; to administer mechanisms for public safety (e.g. law enfor- cement, court systems, fire-fighting); to provide for national security; to gather revenue to support national expenditures; and to engage with other nations in ways that support national interests. Businesses and nonprofit entities in turn are also highly dependent on information. They use it to develop products and services for customers and cli- ents; to understand markets and audiences for their products and services; to inform customers and clients about their products and services; to comply with laws and regulations applicable to their products and ser- vices; and to maintain their accounting and finances. Construction and manufacturing projects entail the coordination of dozens, hundreds, or thousands of par- ties – all of whom must have a justifiable confidence in the information they are sharing and relying upon. ¶ Contextualized, reliable, trustworthy information is as important to the thinking of human beings as clean air is to human breathing. Human beings depend on good information for making informed decisions about politi- cal candidates standing in elections; to know as consu- mers which specific products and services will best serve their needs; for managing their finances; in making health-related decisions about themselves and their loved ones; in learning to perform their jobs more effec- tively or efficiently; and in truly countless other ways. ¶ Nations also engage extensively in information pro- duction. They provide education for young people; sup- port scientific research that undergirds economic growth and prosperity; and collect, curate, and disseminate large- scale statistical data that influence decisions at every level of society. Imagine what life would be like if citizens could not count on the validity and trustworthiness of the informa- tion underlying any of these activities. In some cases, the result would be no more than minor annoyance. In others, however, the result could be life-threatening. Nations could be [devastated], as they could and likely would make bad or at least sub-optimal decisions about war and peace, the economy, law enforcement, housing, food production, energy, and the many other important mat- ters for which governments have some responsibility.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Russia › IL › Impact---Conventional Deterrence
John Mearsheimer 18, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, Ph.D. in government from Cornell University; interviewed by Robert Haffa, interviewer for Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 2018, “The Future of Conventional Deterrence: Strategies for Great Power Competition,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A580345007/AONE?u=umuser&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=b5a5d678, RMax
SSQ: Your book Conventional Deterrence was published in 1984. What is your definition of conventional deterrence?
JJM: Conventional deterrence is all about persuading an adversary not to initiate a war because the expected costs and risks outweigh the anticipated benefits. When I wrote Conventional Deterrence, I was specifically interested in examining situations where two large armies face each other and at least one of them is thinking about attacking the other.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Russia › IL › IL---Russia---European Populism
Victor Ginsburgh 21, Victor Ginsburgh has a PHD in economics from the Free University of Brussels. He has been an Economics professor at Université Libre de Bruxelles since 1975, Sergio Perelman obtained his first degree in Economics at the University of Buenos Aires and a PhD. in Economics at the University of Liège, Belgium, where he is Professor of Economics since 1991, Pierre Pestieau is a Belgian economist. He received his B.A and M.A degrees in economics from the University of Louvain and then his PhD from Yale University, August 2021, "Populism and Social Polarization in European Democracies," CESifo Economic Studies, https://academic.oup.com/cesifo/article/67/4/371/6346855?login=true ; //AShah
Our aim was to explain populist attitudes (that may eventually lead to populist votes) by a number of factors, the most important being the degree of social polarization, which measures the extent of social divides that plague our societies. Polarization is significantly positively correlated with all four populist attitudes, particularly when immigration inflows are treated as an endogenous variable and the model is estimated using IV-2SLS. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to correlate populism using such indicators of polarization that reflect the socioeconomic divides better than standard measures of inequality or poverty.
To compute our measure of social polarization, in each country we fractionalize population into three groups, low, middle and high income. The distances between the income groups are the ratios of people experiencing either difficulties ‘to make ends meet,’ or ‘material deprivation’.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Russia › IL › IL---Russia---Expansionism
Tomáš Čižik 17, is a director of Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA), a Bratislava based international relations and security policy think-tank. Tomáš holds a PhD in Theory of Politics from Faculty of Political Science and International Relations at the Matej Bel University, May 2017, " Information Warfare - New Security Challenge for Europe.," Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs, //AShah
Armed insurgency, Russia's main kinetic HW tool against Ukraine, was instigated and backed by massive information warfare since it's inception. The rebels, who are mostly mobilized, trained, and armed by the Russian special services, and further supported by the Russian armed forces, have been destabilizing Donetsk and Luhansk regions since February 2014. The crisis started to unfold after the pro-Russian former president Yanukovich was forced to flee to Russia as a result of the revolutionary rally in Kiev over his decision to hinder Ukraine's association with the EU. The mass protests in Kiev's Maidan Square, which brought the new pro-European government to power, demonstrated the unequivocal support of the vast majority - 90% according to some polls - of the Western Ukrainians for European integration (IRI, 2014). In response to the undesired change of the government in Ukraine (GoU), Russia launched an aggressive information campaign blaming the government for alleged violations of the rights of the Russian speaking minorities in the country. Using this narrative, predominantly Russian-speaking Crimea was officially annexed by Russia, and Russian special services started to organize separatist outbreaks in Donbas. For these purposes, Russia used the dissatisfaction of the Russian speaking Ukrainians with the new government's attempt to drop the law making Russian the official second language of Ukraine.
Notably, the linguistic divide between the population of the western and eastern regions of Ukraine is reflected in political preferences on the part of the population. According to the opinion polls conducted by the Kiev's International Institute of Sociology, 72.5% of the population of Donetsk region are in favor of integration of Ukraine into the Russian-led Customs Union as opposed to the 9.4% supporting EU integration (Zn. ua, 2014). The regional differences with regard to foreign policy orientation, also stimulated and well exploited by Russian propaganda, can be seen as the main source of the political disagreement between eastern and western Ukraine. As a result of effective information warfare conducted by Russia and the pro-Russian separatists on the ground, they were able to manipulate with the divides among the population against Ukraine's integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures by provoking violent conflict in Donbas without even having mass support.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Russia › IL › IL---Russia---Baltics
Hal Brands 19, Hal Brands is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies US foreign policy and defense strategy. Concurrently, Dr. Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion, November 2019, "How Russia Could Force a Nuclear War in the Baltics," https://www.aei.org/op-eds/how-russia-could-force-a-nuclear-war-in-the-baltics/ //AShah
Would the US fight a nuclear war to save Estonia? The question would probably strike most Americans as absurd. Certainly, almost no one was thinking about such a prospect when NATO expanded to include the Baltic states back in 2004.
Yet a series of reports by the nonpartisan RAND Corporation shows that the possibility of nuclear escalation in a conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia over the Baltic region is higher than one might imagine. The best way of averting it? Invest more in the alliance’s conventional defense.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Russia › IL › IL---Russia---Baltics
Brent M. Eastwood 22, Now serving as 1945s New Defense and National Security Editor, Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer, January 2022, "Forget Ukraine: Could Russia Invade And Conquer The Baltic States?" https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/forget-ukraine-could-russia-invade-and-conquer-the-baltic-states/ //AShah
We’re Focused on Ukraine But Look Out For the Russian Threat to the Baltics: It was a shot heard around the world in the Russian military analysis community. A RAND Corporation simulated wargame in 2016 concluded that the Russian military could reach the suburbs of the Estonian and Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga in less than 60 hours. In the iterations of the exercise, the Estonians and Latvians would need at least seven brigades of troops that include at least three armored brigades to potentially fight the Russians to a standstill.
But it gets worse from here. In another RAND wargame in 2019, the players examined if NATO and Russia would use tactical nuclear weapons during a simulated war in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). The scenario also had Russian conventional forces over-running capitals in the Balkans and NATO having the last fail-safe option to use non-strategic nuclear weapons.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Russia › IL › IL---Russia---Ukraine War
Associated Press 6/21/2022 (Associated Press, independent global news organization dedicated to factual reporting, 6-21-2022, "Google Exec Warns U.N. Security Council: Ukraine Is 'A Crystal Ball' For Information Warfare," Time, https://time.com/6189556/google-security-ukraine-information-warfare/, DOA: 6-22-2022//Smarx Ahsan)
UNITED NATIONS — A Google executive warned the U.N. Security Council Tuesday that cyberattacks, disinformation and other forms of information warfare being waged in Ukraine are a “crystal ball” for future problems elsewhere.
“States must find a way to turn the volume down and settle on some kind of deterrence doctrine for the cyber domain,” Jared Cohen said at a council meeting on hate speech, incitement and atrocities in Ukraine.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Russia › IL › IL---Russia---Ukraine War
Dr. Jill Goldenziel 22, professor at U.S. Marine Corps University, Affiliated Scholar at the University of Pennsylvania’s Fox Leadership International Program, Ph.D. from Harvard, March 2022, "The Russia-Ukraine Information War Has More Fronts Than You Think," https://www.forbes.com/sites/jillgoldenziel/2022/03/31/the-russia-ukraine-information-war-has-more-fronts-than-you-think/?sh=165dd3faa1e2, RMax
The West has proclaimed Ukraine’s victory in the information war. Memes like the Ghost of Kyiv and the soldiers of Snake Island, impassioned speeches by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, horrific images of Russian-wrought destruction, photos of millions of Ukrainians fleeing their homes, and tales of Miss Ukraine laying down her tiara and picking up a machine gun beside millions of her countrymen have captivated the West. No doubt this narrative is partially responsible for the outpouring of Western munitions and military assistance to Ukraine, sanctions against Russia, and aid to displaced Ukrainians. If the objective of Ukraine’s information war was to gain sympathy and assistance from the West, Ukraine has certainly succeeded.
However, the information war has more than just a Western front. While the West dismisses Russian narratives, other influential actors are listening and embracing them. Russia’s narrative is carrying sway in the developing world and in China – and some of its disinformation is being parroted by conspiracy theorists within the U.S. Russia’s war disinformation will have consequences for international relations long after the war. The West must act to counter it.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Russia › IL › IL---Russia---Ukraine War
Serge Schmemman 22, Times correspondent and bureau chief in Moscow, Pulitzer Prize recipient, 5/5/2022, "The Information War in Ukraine Is Far From Over: Serge Schmemann," No Publication, https://www-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/2659748494?pq-origsite=primo, RMax
If the first casualty of war is truth, then the corollary in Ukraine is that information is the first battlefield.
That was where the war began, in early 2022, weeks before Vladimir Putin sent the first rockets, armored vehicles and troops into Ukraine, when he claimed that the massive buildup of troops along Ukraine’s borders was but another military exercise. And that was where the United States and its allies scored their first victories, when they made public intelligence anticipating the invasion and the pretext Mr. Putin would use for it.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Russia › IL › IL---Russia---Ukraine War
Todd Helmus 22, senior behavioral scientist at the RAND Corporation, member of the Pardee RAND Graduate School Faculty, 3/14/2022, "Keeping Russians Informed About Ukraine Could Help End This War," No Publication, https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/03/keeping-russians-informed-about-ukraine-could-help.html, RMax
“Light will win over darkness.” President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine spoke these words in his stirring address to the United Nations, and U.S. President Joe Biden cited these same remarks during his State of the Union address in emphasizing U.S. support for Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, on the other hand, is placing his bets on darkness. He is shielding his people from what is actually happening in Ukraine, the casualties inflicted by the Ukrainian Army, the mayhem unleashed by Russia on Ukrainian civilian centers, and the West's rationale for inflicting damaging sanctions. Increasing Russian access to this information, however, could be key to undermining Russian support for the war and undermining the political standing of Putin.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Russia › IL › IL---Russia---Broad
D. F. Reding & B. Wells 22, Dale F. Reding and Bryan Wells are both Chief Scientists at NATO, “COVID-19 Disinformation: A Multi-National, Whole of Society Perspective,” Advanced Science and Technology for Security Applications, ISBN 978-3-030-94824-5, Springer Cham, DOI: , p. 25-43 (under the ch. titled, “Cognitive Warfare: NATO, COVID-19 and the Impact of Emerging and Disruptive Technologies,”) //chico
The COVID-19 pandemic is not a consequence of geostrategic conflict. Never- theless, the pandemic has had a direct and adverse effect on all Alliance nations, particularly their medical, political, and economic systems. Exploiting this crisis, several countries and groups with partisan agendas attempted to create a watershed moment in global security by undermining Alliance cohesion and national resolve. As noted by the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Director-General at the 2020 Munich Security Conference, “We’re not just fighting an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic” (Zarocostas, 2020).
The COVID-19 pandemic presented an information exploitation opportunity for some strategic actors as part of existing grey zone conflicts. At the same time, this has raised awareness of the enduring challenge of countering misinformation, disinfor- mation and outright propaganda. These attacks can, and have, imposed considerable costs to the nations and has needlessly increased the death rate from COVID-19. However, in any complex crisis, such as that experienced during pandemics, infor- mation transparency and open communication builds trust and ultimately saves lives.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Russia › UQ › UQ---Future of War
Gill and Goolsby 22, Ritu Gill has a PhD in psychology from Carleton university, Rebbeca Goolsby is the co-Lead of a NATO Research Technology Group on cyberdiplomacy and communications, “COVID-19 Disinformation: A Multi-National, Whole of Society Perspective,” Advanced Science and Technology for Security Applications, ISBN 978-3-030-94824-5, Springer Cham, DOI: , p. XXII, 213 (under “Foreword”) //chico
In a world of significant global challenges, from an increasingly assertive Russia and terrorism to disruptive technologies and the rise of China, the Transatlantic Alliance is more important than ever. NATO has been, is, and will continue to be a unique exercise in human history. We are an alliance of nations based on fundamental common values, with our values an essential part, and the agility to adjust and adapt to ever-changing circumstances key ingredients of NATO’s enduring success. This strategic narrative, defined by our values and actions, is the bond, the glue, the foundation that keeps us together. Sustaining and protecting that narrative is an essential aspect of our Alliance.
Our narrative is clear and straightforward: there is no foundation for decent lives, economic activities, or fulfillment of individual or collective dreams and ambitions without shared security. There is no way to build a prosperous, democratic society without ensuring the foundation of security in the broader sense of that term, built on our shared values and freedom. Ensuring this security has been our raison d’être.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Russia › UQ › UQ---Russia
Mark Scott 22, Chief Technology Correspondent at POLITICO, writing about the global collision of technology and politics “As Ukraine conflict heats up, so too does disinformation,” POLITICO, 1-27-22, //chico
Ukrainian special forces planning so-called "false flag" operations. The United States considering chemical weapons attacks in the Eastern European country. NATO preparing to attack Russia during the upcoming Winter Olympics.
The Kremlin is ratcheting up its disinformation game with claims like these amid rising geopolitical tensions between Moscow and Western capitals, according to a review of state-backed media content over the last 10 days by POLITICO.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
ADV---Russia › UQ › UQ---Russia---AT: Squo Solves
Ian Thornton-Trump 22, Chief Information Security Officer for Cyjax Ltd, “RUSSIA: THE CYBER GLOBAL PROTAGONIST,” The EDP Audit, Control, and Security Newsletter, Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 19-26, cy
Russian disinformation operations are currently a cyber cornerstone of the country’s efforts to wield influence worldwide. Whether trying to weaken the EU, NATO, individual countries, or other groups, Russian operations perpetrated by cyber-espionage groups such as APT28 and APT29 have fostered anxiety, fear, and division throughout the world. Disinformation efforts have their roots in “active measures”, or propaganda efforts invented by the Soviet Union and embraced by the current Russian foreign intelligence services. Russian disinformation operations were credited with sowing discontent in the United States and damaging Hillary Clinton’s electoral chances in 2016; boosting support for far-right Italian political parties among those consuming alternative news stories in 2018; and prompting a decline in the Spanish leaders’ ability to influence public opinion during the 2017 Catalan crisis.19,20 In a CSIS article “Did Russia Influence Brexit?”, Russian cyber influence operations in the UK are elaborated on:
The UK Government is accused of making a deliberate effort not to find out how Russian influence may have affected the June 2016 vote. This is more incredulous because the government admits there was Russian interference in the 2014 Scottish referendum, declaring it the first time that Russia directly interfered in a Western election. The government also admits that Russia interfered in the [UK] December 2019 general election.21
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Solvency
David Shedd 20, professor at the Patrick Henry College, former acting director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and Ivana Stradner, Visiting Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, J.S.D. from the University of California, Berkeley,8/11/2020, "Countering Russia’s Influence Operations in the Balkans," https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/countering-russias-influence-operations-the-balkans, RMax
Even the pandemic has the potential for fomenting political unrest.
In recent days, thousands of Serbs have taken to the streets to protest Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s announced strict curfew in response to a surge in Covid-19 cases. Many have pointed a finger at pro-Russia ultra-right groups and foreign intelligence services for fueling the violent riots.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Solvency
Dr. Chris Dolan 22, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Masters of Science Program in Intelligence and Security Studies at Lebanon Valley College, two-time Fulbright U.S. Scholar in international security in North Macedonia and Kosovo, Ph.D. in International Relations and National Security Studies from the University of South Carolina, 2/15/2022, "NATO Must Boost Hybrid Warfare Defenses," https://www.justsecurity.org/80176/nato-must-boost-hybrid-warfare-defenses/, RMax
Russia could launch a conventional military invasion of Ukraine at any moment, but it could also destabilize and undermine it without ever firing a shot. Russian military exercises and positioning are powerful tools of unpredictability that keep NATO and Ukraine off balance while Russian operatives and their proxies wage a hybrid war through covert operations, coordinated disinformation campaigns, and cyber attacks. To build resilience against hybrid warfare, NATO should collaborate with the private sector and devote more resources to technology literacy and innovation.
Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Strategy
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Information Ecosystem Advantage
Herbert Lin 19, senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University, June 2019, “The existential threat from cyber-enabled information warfare,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 75, No. 4, p. 187-196, //chico
On the existential threat from cyber-enabled information warfare
Corruption of the information ecosystem has become an existential threat to civilization as we know it because prosperity and advancement depend on a secure information infrastructure and environment that provides human beings with contextualized, reliable, trustworthy information when and where it is needed. Information is as much a part of human ecology and the essence of being human as DNA (itself a form of information!) is a part of the evolutionary processes in biological systems.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Information Ecosystem Advantage
Michael Rich 20. President and Chief Executive Officer of the RAND Corporation. 10-22-2020. "Think Tanks in the Era of Truth Decay,"
We are living through a moment of crisis that will define who we are as a nation; yet we can't even agree on what's real and what's rumor. Our political discourse too often amounts to opinions about opinions, shouted across a cable-television split screen. Asked to describe their feelings toward the federal government, a majority of Americans say either “frustrated” or “angry.”
All of this points to a civic disease that I've been calling “Truth Decay,” and that has enfeebled our response to everything from climate change to domestic terrorism to a global pandemic. It's the diminishing role of facts and analysis in American public life, and it cuts much deeper than any political party or demographic. It's why nonpartisan think tanks like RAND are as important now as they have ever been.