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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Defense Autonomy INB › 2AC --- No Impact – China War

No China war

Shifrinson 19—(assistant professor of international relations at Boston University). Joshua Shifrinson. 2/8/19. The ‘new Cold War’ with China is way overblown. Here’s why. February 8, 2019. )

Is a new Cold War looming — or already present — between the United States and China? Many analysts argue that a combination of geopolitics, ideology and competing visions of “global order” are driving the two countries toward emulating the Soviet-U.S. rivalry that dominated world politics from 1947 through 1990. But such concerns are overblown. Here are four big reasons why. 1. The historical backdrops of the two relationships are very different When the Cold War began, the U.S.-Soviet relationship was fragile and tenuous. Bilateral diplomatic relations were barely a decade old, U.S. intervention in the Russian Revolution was a recent memory, and the Soviet Union had called for the overthrow of capitalist governments into the 1940s. Despite their Grand Alliance against Nazi Germany, the two countries shared few meaningful diplomatic, economic or institutional links. In 2019, the situation between the United States and China is very different. Since the 1970s, diplomatic interactions, institutional ties and economic flows have all exploded. Although each side has criticized the other for domestic interference (such as U.S. demands for journalist access to Tibet and China’s espionage against U.S. corporations), these issues did not prevent cooperation on a host of other issues. Yes, there were tensions over the past decade, but these occurred against a generally cooperative backdrop. 2. Geography and powers’ nuclear postures suggest East Asia is more stable than Cold War-era Europe The Cold War was shaped by an intense arms race, nuclear posturing and crises, especially in continental Europe. Given Europe’s political geography, the United States feared a “bolt from the blue” attack would allow the Soviet Union to conquer the continent. Accordingly, the United States prepared to defend Europe with conventional forces, and to deter Soviet aggrandizement using nuclear weapons. Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union also feared that the United States might attack and wanted to deter U.S. adventurism. Concerns that the other superpower might use force and that crises could quickly escalate colored Cold War politics. Today, the United States and China spend proportionally far less on their militaries than the United States and the Soviet Union did. Though an arms race may be emerging, U.S. and Chinese nuclear postures are not nearly as large or threatening: Arsenals remain far below the size and scope witnessed in the Cold War, and are kept at a lower state of alert. As for geography, East Asia is not primed for tensions akin to those in Cold War Europe. China can threaten to coerce its neighbors, but the water barriers separating China from most of Asia’s strategically important states make outright conquest significantly harder. Of course, as scholars such as Caitlin Talmadge and Avery Goldstein note, crises may still erupt, and each side may face pressures to escalate. Unlike the Cold War, however, U.S.-Chinese confrontations occur at sea with relatively limited forces and without clear territorial boundaries. This suggests there are countervailing factors that may give the two sides room to negotiate — and limit the speed with which a crisis unfolds. 3. The Cold War had just two major powers The Cold War took place in a bipolar system, with the United States and Soviet Union uniquely powerful, compared with other nations. This dynamic often pushed the United States and the U.S.S.R. toward confrontation and contributed to more or less fixed alliances; moreover, it encouraged efforts to suppress prospective great powers, such as Germany. In 2019, it’s not at all clear we are back to bipolarity. Analysts remain divided over whether the U.S. unipolar era is waning (or is already over) — and, if so, whether we are heading for a new period of bipolarity, modern-day multipolarity or something else. Regardless, most analysts accept that other countries will play a central role in East Asian security affairs. Russia, for example, still benefits from legacy military investments, India is developing economically and militarily, and Japan is beginning to build highly capable military forces to complement its still-significant economic might. Even if these nations aren’t as powerful as the United States or China, their presence makes for more fluid diplomatic arrangements and more diffuse security concerns than during the U.S.-Soviet competition. The resulting security dynamics are therefore likely to look very different. 4. Ideology plays less of a role in U.S.-Chinese relations Many people see the Cold War as an ideological contest between U.S.-backed liberalism and Soviet-backed communism. But that’s not the whole story. The early 20th century saw liberalism, communism and fascism vie for ideological preeminence. With fascism defeated alongside Nazi Germany, the postwar stage was set for a struggle between communism and liberalism to reinforce the U.S.-Soviet contest. That each ideology claimed universal scope ensured that the ideologies served as rallying cries for Third World conflicts, which were subsequently associated with the U.S.-Soviet struggle. The respective “ideologies” of the United States and China do not favor this type of contest today. Indeed, analysts calling for a hard-line stance against China have faced difficulties even identifying a coherent Chinese ideological alternative. And while some researchers claim that a nascent ideological contest pitting an “autocratic” China against the “liberal” United States is emerging, this narrative ignores the political contests that shape Chinese politics (and have parallels in U.S. politics). Autocracies and democracies often cooperate. And on one important ideological issue — how they organize their economic lives — China and the United States have both embraced economic growth via trade, the private sector and semi-free markets.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Defense Autonomy INB › 2AC --- No Impact – NoKo War

No noko war

Campbell 17 (Charlie Campbell - Beijing Correspondent for TIME – “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Are Not Reason Enough to Start a War” – 4/28/17 - http://time.com/4759066/north-korea-kim-jong-un-donald-trump-nuclear-weapons/)/TK

But even if North Korea were not to retaliate, there’s no guarantee strikes would achieve their goal of permanently retarding the regime’s nuclear program. Plus there would be dire strategic consequences. Beijing would be livid. The U.S. would have started yet another 21st Century war, utterly alienating international public opinion, tearing up its hard-fought Asian security alliance and inviting Chinese hardliners to push it out of the region. According to an August 2016 study by Brown University, the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan — in which the U.S. military has been involved — have directly cost 370,000 lives since 2001. (Not that we’ve stopped counting.) Read More: Can North Korea Actually Hit the U.S. With a Nuclear Missile? However, the broader point is that North Korea, for all its many and egregious faults, is a state hell-bent on survival. It might have nuclear weapons, but the regime cannot use them without guaranteeing its own destruction. That’s how nuclear deterrents work. North Korea is not ISIS with an “end of days” deathwish, wreaking jihad across the globe in its quest for a global caliphate. “Why are people panicking about North Korea?” asks Daniel Pinkston, an East Asia expert at South Korea's Troy University. “It’s secular, they want to survive and they are very cognizant of power balances. They are not suicidal.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Defense Autonomy INB › 2AC --- No Impact – Latin Am War

No Latin America war

Cárdenas 11 (Mauricio, senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative at the Brookings Institution, was cabinet minister during the Gaviria and Pastrana administrations in Colombia. Think Again Latin America, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/17/think_again_latin_america?page=full)

"Latin America is violent and dangerous." Yes, but not unstable. Latin American countries have among the world's highest rates of crime, murder, and kidnapping. Pockets of abnormal levels of violence have emerged in countries such as Colombia -- and more recently, in Mexico, Central America, and some large cities such as Caracas. With 140,000 homicides in 2010, it is understandable how Latin America got this reputation. Each of the countries in Central America's "Northern Triangle" (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) had more murders in 2010 than the entire European Union combined. Violence in Latin America is strongly related to poverty and inequality. When combined with the insatiable international appetite for the illegal drugs produced in the region, it's a noxious brew. As strongly argued by a number of prominent regional leaders -- including Brazil's former president, Fernando H. Cardoso, and Colombia's former president, Cesar Gaviria -- a strategy based on demand reduction, rather than supply, is the only way to reduce crime in Latin America. Although some fear the Mexican drug violence could spill over into the southern United States, Latin America poses little to no threat to international peace or stability. The major global security concerns today are the proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism. No country in the region is in possession of nuclear weapons -- nor has expressed an interest in having them. Latin American countries, on the whole, do not have much history of engaging in cross-border wars. Despite the recent tensions on the Venezuela-Colombia border, it should be pointed out that Venezuela has never taken part in an international armed conflict. Ethnic and religious conflicts are very uncommon in Latin America. Although the region has not been immune to radical jihadist attacks -- the 1994 attack on a Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, for instance -- they have been rare. Terrorist attacks on the civilian population have been limited to a large extent to the FARC organization in Colombia, a tactic which contributed in large part to the organization's loss of popular support.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Defense Autonomy INB › 2AC --- No Impact – Africa War

No African War

Burbach and Fettweis 14 – [David T. Burbach, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, B.A. in Government from Pomona College, and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Christopher Fettweis, Associate Professor in International Relations at Tulane University, 2014, The Coming Stability? The Decline of Warfare in Africa and Implications for International Security, http://www.contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/assets/CSP-35-3%20Burbach%20and%20Fettweis.pdf] Jeong

Anarchy has not come to Africa – at least not in the expanding, all-encompassing way meant by the pessimists of a decade or two ago. The continent is far from uniformly peaceful, and current outbreaks of violence are reminders of the need for more progress. On the whole, however, Africa is less war-torn than at any time in the past, which runs contrary to widespread perceptions that exist even among foreign policy experts. Kaplan remains unchanged, claiming recently that his most important predictions have actually been borne out.95 However, the evidence suggests that despite neo-Malthusians fears, by most measures life on the continent is improving. War is becoming less of a threat to the life of the average African than emerging middleincome threats like traffic accidents or diabetes. Nor have realist fears of predatory wars and wholesale remaking of the map of Africa come to pass. That is not meant to dismiss the suffering of residents of the Central African Republic, South Sudan or northern Nigeria, nor to suggest that all is well. There are hundreds of millions of Africans who do not face as great a threat of armed conflict as they once did, however. It is important to see Africa as more than 50 distinct countries, some – and by historical standards, relatively few – of which are beset by warfare, even if they continue to face other, even greater challenges. Nothing guarantees that these trends will continue. Indeed, several require active maintenance. If the outside world stops responding to African hotspots, at least with diplomatic resources and avoiding support to plunder-financed armed groups, conflict becomes more likely. Intense American –Chinese competition could encourage internal conflict or spur vicious circles of tension between neighbours. The United Nations, former colonizers and AFRICOM have all been useful in helping to bring stability to the continent, but their long-term interest is hardly assured. A global recession or a wave of protectionism could dash optimism about economic growth. But for now, for the first time in quite some time, there is reason for optimism about the decline of warfare in Africa. What the United States and other outsiders should not do, however, is continue to look at Africa though a lens that overemphasizes conflict and a few crisis-afflicted nations. Additional American support for African peacekeeping capability is welcome, but an increase in American investment in African economies would do even more good for more people. Policymakers should emphasize to the business community how much is now going right in Africa. The Obama Administration has taken useful steps in that direction, but at other times shows signs of the ‘Africa-as-Anarchy’ mindset. Programmes to help African governments build capacity outside the military-security sphere could be expanded, such as police and judicial systems, or the infrastructure and service delivery needs of large cities in which a growing share of Africans live. Africa faces many problems. Peace does not necessarily bring freedom, justice, or prosperity. But today a far greater percentage of people on the continent live without serious risk of dying due to warfare than pessimists expected. On the contrary, ‘end of war’ optimists may prove to be right about Africa too, if on a slower time scale than most of the world. Perhaps a rising generation of leaders and citizens are being influenced by both global norms and expectations of greater opportunities. Africa is surely the hardest test of the global trend away from international conflict. If conflict can no longer find a home there, will it be welcome anywhere?

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Defense Autonomy INB › 2AC --- AT: Europe leads

Europe can’t lead---the US is irreplaceable

Ana Palacio 11/20/20, former minister of foreign affairs of Spain and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group and a visiting lecturer at Georgetown University, “ America, Heal Thyself,” Project Syndicate, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joe-biden-heal-divided-america-liberal-world-order-by-ana-palacio-2020-11

The stakes are high. If the pole around which the international order was built continues to weaken, the dangerous drift of recent years – exemplified by the absence of a coordinated global response to the COVID-19 pandemic – will continue. Even the diplomatic muscle memory that has enabled the limited recent examples of cooperation will fade.

Why shouldn’t someone else lead? Simply put, because no one else can. There is no single actor, or even a collection of actors, that is ready to take America’s place.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Defense Autonomy INB › 2AC --- EU Autonomy Fails

European autonomy fails

Luke Coffey 20, MS, Politics and Government of the European Union, London School of Economics, Director, Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation, Daniel Kochis, MA, Comparative Political Science, Fordham University, Senior Policy Analyst, European Affairs, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, Davis Institute, 8/10/20, "NATO in the 21st Century: Preparing the Alliance for the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow", The Heritage Foundation, Speical Report, No. 235, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/nato-the-21st-century-preparing-the-alliance-the-challenges-today-and-tomorrow

NATO and the European Union. The strength of the transatlantic alliance revolves around the axis of NATO, which has done more to promote democracy, peace, and security in Europe than any other alliance—including the European Union—since its inception in 1949. Far from being outmoded, NATO today is more relevant and crucial for maintaining transatlantic security than it has been since the end of the Cold War. While some in Brussels and across the halls of power in Europe may have dreams of an independent EU Army or an independent EU defensive apparatus capable of replacing NATO and the U.S. military, true EU “strategic autonomy” in defense is a chimera.

The EU will never be able to provide the peace and stability that NATO— with feet firmly rooted in both North America and Europe for the past 70 years—has delivered, and will continue to deliver. While EU-led defense initiatives may be able to provide some defense improvements at the margins, the outsized costs include decisions that enervate NATO, exacerbate existing fractures within Europe, and severely stress the transatlantic link.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Semiconductor INB › 2AC – Impact Turn

Semiconductor dependencies prevent Taiwan invasion---capitalist peace theory!

Chitkara 22, Hirsh Chitkara is a reporter at Protocol focused on the intersection of politics, technology and society. Before joining Protocol, he helped write a daily newsletter at Insider that covered all things Big Tech., (Hirsh, “The great onshoring: Inside the transcontinental chip race”, Protocol, May 20, https://www.protocol.com/policy/us-eu-semiconductors-ttc-onshoring) //CHC-DS ‍

Fabricating our way into World War III? Political economists have long theorized that great powers are less likely to go to war if they rely on one another for trade. The so-called “capitalist peace theory” is a core tenet of classical liberalism — one of the many reasons scholars say we should embrace globalization, even if it comes with quite a few nasty side effects. Install a McDonald’s in your capital city, Thomas Friedman posited in 1996, and no other McCountry will invade. (Russia has since served as the counterpoint to this theory, though McDonald’s is now leaving Russia.) If the capitalist peace theory holds, then reshoring chips would have considerable geopolitical ramifications, according to Rao. In this sense, he added, China poses a greater threat: “The Chinese can’t actually threaten Taiwan currently, or at least not so easily, because they need the chips.” To secure that supply, China is expected to pour well over $100 billion dollars into developing its domestic semiconductor industry. “The way to frame this is whether or not China requires Taiwan — and in the future, they may not,” Rao said.

CHART OMITTED

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Semiconductor INB › 1AR – Squo Solves

The European Chips Act solves---increases RnD, domestic production, and global partnerships to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities.

Cota 22, Jillian Cota is a research intern with the Renewing American Innovation Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC., (Jillian, “The European Chips Act: A Strategy to Expand Semiconductor Production Resiliency”, CSIS, March 7, https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/european-chips-act-strategy-expand-semiconductor-production-resiliency) //CHC-DS ‍

In February 2022, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the European Chips Act, which adds €15 billion to an existing €30 billion in public investments to create new STEM-focused programs, attract new talent to Europe, and build new infrastructure. These actions are part of a strategy to support a thriving European semiconductor industry ecosystem, averting future shortages of semiconductors, and promoting investment into the European semiconductor industry.

Through this legislation, the Commission hopes to: Increase EU resilience to supply chain disruptions like those created by building more domestic capacity. Make Europe a long-term industrial leader in semiconductors, increasing its global in manufacturing from 9% to 20% by 2030.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Semiconductor INB › 2AC – Squo Solves

US and Europe are already taking measures to create semiconductor resiliency.

Arcuri 22, Gregory Arcuri is a research assistant for the Renewing American Innovation (RAI) Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)., (Gregory, “How Is the U.S. Cooperating with Its European Allies on Issues of Technology?” , CSIS, April 5, https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/how-us-cooperating-its-european-allies-issues-technology) //CHC-DS ‍

The Council’s first meeting in September 2021 led to a series of notable outcomes on issues where significant agreement already exists. For example, on the issue of the global semiconductor shortage, both sides are committed to “identify[ing] gaps in the semiconductor value chain” and enhancing their respective semiconductor ecosystems. The U.S. and Europe have already begun taking important steps towards this shared goal. Of note, the European Commission has drafted legislation to mobilize over €43 billion in public and private funds to double its share of the global semiconductor manufacturing market by 2030. Meanwhile, in the United States, lawmakers continue to debate the CHIPS for America Act and the FABS Act, which provide lump-sum and tax-based incentives for chip manufacturers to “onshore” their operations. While these appear to be self-serving initiatives, the two sides view them as critical to ensuring mutual resiliency in a critical strategic industry.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › EU Leadership INB › 2AC – INB – Inevitable

The CP is going to inevitably happen – the aff isn’t key.

Csernatoni 19 [, PhD in International Relations from Central European University, 2019. The EU’s Technological Power: Harnessing Future and Emerging Technologies for European Security. Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe, 119–140. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-12418-2_6 DOA: 6/20/2022 //ArchanSen]

This comes at a moment when National Defence Technological and Industrial Bases (DTIBs) in Europe have increasingly come under pressure to produce competitive defence capabilities, due to budgetary restrictions and defence market forces. There is no denying the fact that the centre of gravity for security and defence technology R&D and innovation has shifted from the national and military levels to the corporate and civilian ones, because of a variety of factors, such as economic austerity reasons and the sharp decline of national defence R&D investment programmes in the post-Cold War period in Europe. In this regard, the maintenance of a strong EDTIB was set out to become a top mission for the EDA and the European Commission, by improving security and defence capabilities, the military expenditure of member states and by focusing on enhancing European security via the development of innovative and competitive high-end technologies.

Political will has been developing in the EU concerning high-tech security and defence capacity build-up, as demonstrated by the policy initiatives and strategies recently spearheaded by the EDA and the European Commission to empower the European defence technology and innovation sectors. The rapprochement between the EDA and the European Commission has increased significantly as shown by their combined efforts to converge national strategic needs and advocate for a more coherent pan-European common defence policy. The 2016 policy initiatives, the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (SDIP) and the European Commission’s European Defence Action Plan (EDAP), are prefiguring a new practice of collaboration between the EDA and the Commission to create a stronger European defence market, to revitalise the European defence industrial base and to encourage member states to spend more on defence research and emerging technologies. The European Commission’s launch of the Preparatory Action (PA) on CSDP-related research and in partnership with the EDA as the hub of defence research is indicative of such moves. The PA is a support programme in the form of a one-off and of limited duration budget (Crespo 2015), which shifts financing opportunities for the European defence industries from EU member states to the EU per se.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › EU Leadership INB › 1AR – INB – Squo Solves

Massive regs from EU.

Satariano 22 [Adam Satariano, 3-24-2022, "E.U. Takes Aim at Big Tech’s Power With Landmark Digital Act", No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/technology/eu-regulation-apple-meta-google.html, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]

The European Union agreed on Thursday to one of the world’s most far-reaching laws to address the power of the biggest tech companies, potentially reshaping app stores, online advertising, e-commerce, messaging services and other everyday digital tools.

The law, called the Digital Markets Act, is the most sweeping piece of digital policy since the bloc put the world’s toughest rules to protect people’s online data into effect in 2018. The legislation is aimed at stopping the largest tech platforms from using their interlocking services and considerable resources to box in users and squash emerging rivals, creating room for new entrants and fostering more competition.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › EU Leadership INB › 2AC – INB – Squo Solves

Squo solved – tech giant legislation.

Kang 22 [Cecilia Kang, 4-22-2022, "As Europe Approves New Tech Laws, the U.S. Falls Further Behind", No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/22/technology/tech-regulation-europe-us.html, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]

In just the last few years, Europe has seen a sweeping law for online privacy take effect, approved far-reaching regulations to curb the dominance of the tech giants and on Saturday reached a deal on new legislation to protect its citizens from harmful online content.

For those keeping score, that’s Europe: three. United States: zero.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – AI – Commercialization

The EU will seek commercial advantages on AI which undermines broader cooperation.

Franke 21, Dr. Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). She leads ECFR’s Technology and European Power initiative. Her areas of focus include German and European security and defence, the future of warfare, and the impact of new technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence on geopolitics and warfare., (Ulrike, “Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI”, European Council on Foreign Relations, ) //CHC-DS ‍

The EU’s effort to strengthen ethical AI, and to make ‘trustworthy AI’ a unique selling point for Europe, might also end up creating problems for transatlantic cooperation. Many EU policymakers believe that the EU’s insistence on ethical AI will eventually become a location advantage for Europe (much like data privacy): as more people become concerned about unethical AI and data security, they will prefer to use or buy AI ‘made in Europe’ rather than elsewhere. In this respect, two European aims are at odds with each other: on the one hand, Europeans want to ensure that AI is developed and used in an ethical way. Partnering with a powerful player such as the US on this matter should be an obvious way to help them achieve this goal. However, if the EU considers ethical AI not just a goal for humanity but a development that may also create commercial advantages for Europe, then transatlantic cooperation on this issue is counterproductive, as it would undermine Europe’s uniqueness.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – AI – Generic

EU fails---decentralization, overdependence on US, and slow adoption.

Lawrence and Cordy 20, *Christie Lawrence is a Director for Research and Analysis working on international AI cooperation and intellectual property. Prior, she worked at Harvard Belfer Center’s Cyber Project, the State Department, and as a management consultant. She holds a B.A. in Public Policy from Duke University and is a concurrent MPP/JD candidate at Harvard Kennedy School and Stanford Law School. ** Researcher, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. Koichiro Komiyama – Director, Global Coordination Division, JPCERT/CC, (Christie and Sean, “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence”, Belfer Center, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/case-increased-transatlantic-cooperation-artificial-intelligence) //CHC-DS ‍

The European Union’s Juncker 26 Commission (2014-2019) actively avoided regulating AI, causing the European Parliament to increase their efforts as a proactive voice in favor of stronger AI regulation. However, since the beginning of Ursula von der Leyen’s tenure, the Commission has initiated efforts to adopt stronger regulation for AI applications (i.e., differentiating regulation of AI based on defined “high-risk” and “low-risk” sectors”) and associated data spaces.27,28 These legislative proposals and their associated discussions are planned to be completed by the end of 2020. During the strategic planning and budgeting process of its R&D programs, the EU committed to providing at least EUR10.7 billion29 for AI-related research conducted between 2021 and 2027.30 Despite these financial and political efforts, the EU still remains technologically dependent on the US and China and suffers from a lack of capital and private funding, decentralized and uncoordinated AI expertise, severe brain drain (including to the US), and slow adoption of AI programming in its education and public sectors.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Funding

The EU is broke – gotta get the US to pay – they’ll have 1/5th of the money.

ND 22 [New Direction, 05-22-2022, "Why an EU Army is a bad idea – We don’t need a political bloc of the unwilling", https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/why_an_eu_army_is_a_bad_idea_we_dont_need_a_political_bloc_of_the_unwilling, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]

Arguments are made that limited European resources would be more effective if integrated. This has become one of the EU’s main selling points for EU defence. It sounds plausible – but if you add up the defence budgets of 26 EU countries (Denmark has opted out of EU defence) you arrive at a figure of approximately $200 billion (2020) or 1.5% of the accumulated GDPs of these countries. The US spent about $800 billion, which is some 3.7% of GDP. And you certainly do not need EU involvement to create joint forces with allies. The history of purposeful coalitions goes back centuries. In recent times, under NATO, we have had the 14-nation ACE Mobile Force, the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, and the German/Dutch Corps as examples of closely aligned national formations. All this has worked perfectly well. There is no need for EU involvement – unless of course your motives are political rather than military.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Say No

Say no.

The Week 22 [Week UK, 03-29-2022, "The arguments for and against an EU army", https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/956217/the-arguments-for-and-against-an-eu-army, DOA: 6-25-2022 //ArchanSen]

History shows there have been numerous failed attempts at forming an EU army, with opposition from outside the union and within. Critics suggest these disagreements would continue even if the idea was signed off. In a 2018 opinion piece for the Atlantic Council, international security and defence analyst Brooks Tigner wrote that the bloc would face a plethora of “technical, legal, and administrative differences” that would “boil down to the most mundane things such as soldiers’ rights”. Operational costs and caveats “always pose major headaches”, he added. The Telegraph’s James Crisp warned that there were “already grumbles” about French defence companies receiving “preferential and lucrative contracts”. “Diplomats joke that Mr Macron is in favour of a European army as long as it is a very French European army,” he said.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Undermines NATO

EU defense policy decks NATO.

The Week 22 [Week UK, 03-29-2022, "The arguments for and against an EU army", https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/956217/the-arguments-for-and-against-an-eu-army, DOA: 6-25-2022 //ArchanSen]

One of Britain’s key concerns about the prospect of an EU army was that it would duplicate or undermine the role of Nato.

Bart M.J. Szewczyk, from the US think tank the German Marshall Fund, agreed that it is “illogical” that a federal EU defence policy would be any better at “raising spending, pooling resources, or improving procurement” than current structures such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Nato allies and partners working as a team in long-established modes of cooperation – and not an inexperienced EU working at cross-purposes or even actively undermining the alliance – will remain the security provider of first resort for Europe,” he wrote in Foreign Policy.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Overlap

Overlap, lack of communication, distrust, and military vulnerabilities severely limit cooperation.

De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, ) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

PROBLEMS IN NATO-EU COOPERATION As the overall strategic interests and security priorities of NATO and the EU have begun to overlap in response to emerging global challenges, the relationship — and hence cooperation — between the two organizations has become more complex. Limited communication channels Although personnel exchanges and joint exercises have helped to set up a framework and a mindset for more integrated operations, officials interviewed for this paper24 under the condition of anonymity pointed out that information sharing and the results achieved have been very limited. The lack of a secure communication system to share information between the two organizations severely hinders their ability to work together on a daily basis but most importantly to coordinate in a real crisis scenario and consequently to put in place a joint response. As of now, there is no direct inter-institutional secure lines of communication between the EU and NATO. All communications take place between each member state and either within NATO or within the EU. This also is particularly relevant when it comes to sharing best practices or handing over tasks from one organization to the other.25

Political tensions and different strategic priorities Adding to this communication difficulty, political tensions have multiplied within both NATO and the EU, triggering a climate of distrust that prevents intelligence sharing. Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles26 and its invasion of northern Syria after U.S. troops withdrew raised security concerns in the alliance, while the Northern Cyprus question and Ankara’s activities in the eastern Mediterranean waters have created tensions with Greece.27 Relations between France and the U.K. have also significantly worsened since the AUKUS deal, which could ultimately impact the functioning of NATO. Complicating matters further, as described above, the two organizations’ activities have started to overlap, with NATO embracing capacity-building and cyber operations and the EU stepping up on crisis management. More recently, during preparation of its strategic concept, NATO has been questioning its role in the fight against climate change and in countering China’s multifaceted influence in the trans-Atlantic space. And following the AUKUS deal, the EU has been reflecting on developing a stronger military to be able to respond to crises directly impacting its security. NATO opposes any form of duplication, from command to resources, which is quite telling in terms of its soul-searching for the definition of its objectives and its range of action vis-à-vis global challenges.28 Recent events in Afghanistan offer a very good opportunity to reflect on the role of NATO and EU aspirations. After the Taliban took back Kabul, NATO called for an assessment of the accomplishments and failures of ISAF and Resolute Support.29 But instead the EU — not directly involved in Afghanistan as an organization but rather through individual member states — and the United Kingdom reflected on their excessive dependence on the United States in areas of paramount importance to European security. As evacuation operations started in Kabul, with devastating images traveling around the world, Borrell defined Afghanistan as a “wake-up call” for the strengthening of European defense.30 Allies complained about the United States’ lack of coordination and communication on the withdrawal, its unwillingness to extend the deadline for evacuations. For its part, the United Nation Security Council rejected a French-U.K. proposal to establish of a U.N.-controlled safe zone around the Kabul airport.31 While it is debatable whether or not the EU would have used its hypothetical army to secure Kabul’s airport, the Afghanistan experience exposed Europeans’ vivid vulnerabilities in the security domain and their dependence on the U.S. military’s logistical and technological capabilities.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 1AR – Solvency – Generic

EU initiatives fail---inter-state tensions, weak militaries, and over-dependence on the US.

De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, ) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Yet NATO-EU cooperation remains somewhat limited because of political tensions between member states (which hinders intelligence sharing) as well as weak European military capabilities and inadequate defense spending. Over the past few years the EU has made important progress in this domain through the establishment of the European Defense Fund and several defense projects under the Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism. Yet, according to several studies in the field, the state of European defense appears insufficient to tackle more serious military threats or to enable the EU to take initiatives in its neighborhood independently from the United States. In its “Strategic Compass” to be published in March 2022, the EU is supposed to adopt a bolder approach to its defense capabilities. In parallel, in a new strategic concept to be released in June 2022, NATO is supposed to tackle security throughout a widened angle, looking at domains that are not strictly defense-related.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Generic

Can’t solve sorry archan no time to tag

Retter et al 21, 1) Lucia Retter is a research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition, M.A. in international relations and international economics, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS); B.A. in modern and medieval languages, University of Cambridge, 2) Stephanie Pezard is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; M.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po); M.A. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; B.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po) 3) Stephen J. Flanagan is an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation. Ph.D. in international relations, Fletcher School, Tufts University; A.B. in political science, Columbia University 4) Gene Germanovich is an international defense researcher and currently serves as the acting international portfolio lead for the RAND National Security Research Division. B.S. in international affairs, Georgia Tech; M.A. in security studies, Georgetown University 5) Sarah Grand-Clement; publisher, 6) Pauline Paillé is an analyst at RAND Europe working in the area of defence and security. M.A. in international relations, Sciences Po Bordeaux (“European Strategic Autonomy in Defence: Transatlantic visions and implications for NATO, US and EU relations”, RAND Europe, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1319-1.html) //CHC-DS ‍

In the last five years, direct association between EU defence integration efforts (such as CDP, CARD, PESCO, EDF) and the notion of European strategic autonomy has become widespread – at least when this term is understood to mean defence and a narrower understanding of ‘security’ rather than, say, economic self-reliance. Yet the pace of cooperation and emergence of new structures hides a wide range of official positions held by different EU member states, and differing views and visions even within each individual nation’s politics. Most notably, the views of European officials and experts differ on the question of leadership, the degree of autonomy, the desired level of the EU’s ambition and the optimal balance between national and joint capability development. These various divergences, jointly, and separately, undermine the cohesiveness and therefore the feasibility and credibility of the general ambition to achieve European strategic autonomy. This section briefly outlines the issues pertaining to each of these categories of debate and disagreement.