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2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › COVID Link

The dichotomy of gendered discourses used by Trump and Putin in their attempt to securitize COVID-19 normalize harmful gender stereotypes and roles, and normalize using toxic masculinity in response to a crisis

Kuteleva and Clifford 2021 (Anna Kuteleva is a postdoctoral research fellow at the School of International Regional Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (Russia). Anna holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada). Sarah J. Clifford is an MSc student in Political Science at the University of Copenhagen (Denmark). Her Master’s project explores the intersections of American militarised masculinities, identity politics, and education policies. Clifford studied Political Science and worked as a Research Assistant for the China Institute and the Faculty of Education at the University of Alberta. “Gendered securitisation: Trump’s and Putin’s discursive politics of the COVID-19 pandemic,” European Journal of International Security (2021), 6, 301–317 doi:10.1017/eis.2021.5)

The masculinity performed by Trump and Putin is toxic, inasmuch as it (re)produces and nourishes state-inspired nationalism and white supremacy. On the domestic level, their gendered securitisation discourses atomise American and Russian citizens, imposing on them subjugating features of a homogenous national ‘we’ and creating new exclusionary boundaries along the lines of race and ethnicity. As a case in point, Trump employs hegemonic discourses to reconceptualise the United States as a white, masculine entity. In stark terms, Trump’s gendering of the nation constructs fictionalised divisions between who belongs to the ‘we’ and who is framed as the excluded Other. These discourses not only formulate the pandemic as a health crisis but also elevate it to that of a racialised security threat, capable of compromising the purity of the United States. As for the Russian case, the brand of hegemonic masculinity reproduced by Putin normalises the racialisation of Russian nationalism and further anchors Russianness in its ethnic and religious terms. Moreover, Putin fosters paternalistic domination over women by rendering them as passive victims of the pandemic to be protected and guided. Both Trump and Putin elevate the COVID-19 outbreak to a global threat. However, while Trump turns his response to the pandemic into a competition that the United States is destined to win, Putin focuses on cooperation under collective responsibility. Trump wants the United States to get ahead of other countries. Putin claims that Russia will learn from other countries and analyse their experience carefully while setting an example of the proper ethical conduct for the rest of the world. As much as these two narratives are at odds with each other, they both create multiple dichotomies where Others are represented as subordinated to the national Self and thus are either feminine or hyper-masculine. In the case of feminisation, Others are presented as passive, weak, and poorly organised. Hyper-masculine Others are aggressive, irrational, egotistical, and competitive. Both are portrayed as dangerous and threatening to the international community at large. These tight hierarchical dichotomies normalise and fuel the great power confrontation and prevent the international community from engaging in a constructive dialogue and synergetic planning to respond to the pandemic. In both cases, political leaders enacted hierarchical gendered identities in the securitisation of COVID-19, sustaining their national manhoods and bolstering their legitimation strategy. A year down the road, it is evident that Trump’s and Putin’s illusionary projections of the ‘guardian of the nation’ did not translate into effective policy responses that alleviated the threat of COVID-19. Both the United States and Russia are among the top ten most affected countries by COVID-19 worldwide.96 For the United States, 2020 was the deadliest year in its history, with deaths associated with COVID-19 reaching 473,000.97 Russia officially recorded more than 358,000 excess deaths between April and December 2020,98 with almost 100 per cent of these deaths in some regions attributed to COVID-19.99 These numbers demonstrate that both Trump and Putin failed many of their citizens, letting the deadly virus run wild. However, bringing to the fore Trump’s and Putin’s convergent securitising discourses, we do not target the failure of their securitising moves. Rather, we problematise Trump and Putin’s deployment of masculinity as a tool in securitisation that led both leaders to dangerously exert hegemonic masculinity in times of uncertainty. In the United States, Trump dispelled contrasting emotions of fear and security to quell the pandemic’s threat to American sovereignty, invulnerability, and global dominance, while concurrently cementing his position as the nation’s protector. In Russia, Putin drew on the idealised heteronormative concept of the nuclear family to frame himself as the nation’s patriarch and legitimise his authoritarian regime. As such, the process of securitising is not uniform but instead socially and culturally specific. We do not argue that a resurgence of hegemonic masculinity is intrinsic to securitisation or that securitisation is simply a ploy used by all national leaders during a crisis to reassert their nation’s sovereignty. Yet, our findings show that both Trump and Putin – two very notable and influential politicians in the international arena, to say the least – virtually turn masculinity into the means of securitising COVID-19. Overall, studies as the one we present here demonstrate how implicit and explicit references to masculinity in the process of securitisation confirm it as the political norm and thus naturalise the systemic effects of toxic gendered practices that permeate both Trump’s and Putin’s quests for power.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › COVID Link

Trump used COVID to secure the US’s masculinity by portraying it as the strong, masculine hegemon ready to defend both its own weak, and destroy the weakness around it to prevent “contamination”

Kuteleva and Clifford 2021 (Anna Kuteleva is a postdoctoral research fellow at the School of International Regional Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (Russia). Anna holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada). Sarah J. Clifford is an MSc student in Political Science at the University of Copenhagen (Denmark). Her Master’s project explores the intersections of American militarised masculinities, identity politics, and education policies. Clifford studied Political Science and worked as a Research Assistant for the China Institute and the Faculty of Education at the University of Alberta. “Gendered securitisation: Trump’s and Putin’s discursive politics of the COVID-19 pandemic,” European Journal of International Security (2021), 6, 301–317 doi:10.1017/eis.2021.5)

In a paralleled vein to feminist discussions of 9/11, COVID-19 produces what Bonnie Mann calls the ‘unmanning’ of America.18 Mann details how sovereignty is a ‘style of national masculinity’ with any violation of a nation’s borders resulting in its figurative demasculinisation.19 Accordingly, the pandemic challenges the American doctrines of absolute sovereignty, invulnerability, and global hegemony. To counter this threat, Trump reframes it not as a public health dilemma but as a threat to the nation’s security and hegemonic masculinity. In this setting, COVID-19 presents a direct threat to the national body that is innately gendered. On 4 February Trump securitises COVID-19.20 However, in January and February, Trump struggles with fully committing to the securitising move and vacillates between securitising and desecuritising the spread of COVID-19. At first, Trump frames the virus only as a ‘potential threat’ contained in China.21 Simultaneously, he assures his audience that ‘[o]ur country is prepared for any circumstances’ and that ‘there’s no reason to panic at all’ as the possibility of exposure and mortality to the American nation ‘remain[s] low’. 22 It is not until 13 March that Trump constructs COVID-19 as an existential crisis and ‘national emergency’, one that not only threatens the nation’s health but also has the power to obstruct its sovereignty and security.23 As specified by Trump, one of the existential challenges of the pandemic is that the United States will face the ‘public health consequences of a mass uncontrolled cross-border movement’. 24 Starting from the presidential campaign in 2015, Trump persistently pushes migration out of the domain of ‘normal politics’. As the pandemic unfolds, he builds upon the image of the othered and villainised migrant to redefine COVID-19 not only as a health hazard but also as a security threat that can compromise the nation’s sovereignty. Trump personifies these fears in undocumented migrants who potentially carry COVID-19. This extra discursive layer highlights how the perceived threat to America’s sovereignty elevates the virus from a public health dilemma to a national security crisis through the processes of Othering. For example, he emphasises that they threaten to create a perfect storm that would spread the infection to our border agents, migrants, and to the public at large. Left unchecked, this would cripple our immigration system, overwhelm our healthcare system, and severely damage our national security.25 As a response, Trump affirmatively declares that ‘we’re not going to let that happen’. 26 Sara Ahmed explains such a discursive reconstruction as an attempt to monopolise and ‘eliminate the source of fear’ – a move by the state to control the uncontrollable through asserting selfdetermination and containment.27 In other words, Trump portrays the United States as no longer fearful but as a nation that is mobilised to repel the dangerous Other. This construction also frames Trump and his administration as the protectors of the nation (‘we’) from the existential threat (‘they’) by concurrently securitising and desecuritising COVID-19. Trump’s narrative does not alleviate the threat of the pandemic but, counterintuitively, dispels notions of fear and security to discursively embolden his masculine command over the nation. COVID-19 is not only embodied by the undocumented migrant but is also personified through a multiplicity of Others. To shift the blame for the harms of the COVID-19 outbreak, Trump fixates on China and racialises the pandemic as a ‘Chinese’ threat. Since 21 January, Trump obsessively emphasises that COVID-19 ‘comes from China’ and should be regarded as the ‘Chinese virus’ or ‘Wuhan virus’. 28 Restricting international travel from China to the United States, Trump labels his executive order the ‘China ban’, stating that ‘China, you can’t come in. I’m sorry.’ 29 While the United States evades an attack from the virus by shutting its borders and taking strong actions, China is presented as weak and incapable. According to Trump, the COVID-19 outbreak ‘could have been stopped in China, before it started, and it wasn’t’ and now ‘the whole world is suffering because of it’. 30 China is portrayed as a soft nation because of its permeable borders, passivity, and ineffective leadership. The feminine softness makes it not only vulnerable but also dangerous. By differentiating and separating the nation from the pandemicstricken Others, Trump does not allow the insecurity of COVID-19 to feminise the United States and, in turn, (re)secures America’s masculinity. By framing COVID-19 as a destabilising force to the United States’ masculinity, Trump mobilises the nation around three gendered narratives to perform and actualise American hegemony: the gendered construction of the national ‘we’, militarisation, and displays of the United States’ economic omnipotence. These three discursive formations function as applicators to deconstruct how the nation is mobilised to repel the threat. Building on this logic, Trump’s performances of certain hegemonic traits demonstrate how gender practices become a securitising tool utilised by national leaders in times of crisis. The performative values that the American state believes its citizens personify are embedded in these gender practices. In Trump’s words, Americans are those who ‘do not despair’. 31 He argues that ‘we do not give in to fear’ and ‘we pull together, we persevere, and we overcome, and we win’. 32 Americans ‘sacrifice together’, 33 but, as Ahmed puts it, the nation is presented as winning by ‘refusing to transform its vulnerability and wounds … into an affective response of fear’. 34 A response that is premised on exemplifying the masculine characteristics of ‘valour’, aggression, and determination in times of combat. These characteristics frame the nation as being militarised and in a perpetual state of conflict that will not dissipate until the threat has been vanquished: As our citizens persevere through this present challenge, we’re renewing American unity and we’re replenishing American will and we are witnessing new American valor each and every day. We see it every day. The daring and determination of our people in this crisis reminds us that no matter how hard it gets, no matter what obstacles we must overcome, Americans will keep on fighting to victory and we will secure the glorious future that our citizens so richly deserve, especially after going through this nightmare, this evil beast.35 Here, Trump constructs the notion of an ‘internal strength’ that the American populace epitomises – one that transforms the emotions of fear and insecurity into the imagery of mobilisation and collective triumph.36 In this framework, the nation escapes potential feminisation by acting as a wilful subject and taking command of the pandemic. To further denote a sense of control and agency, Trump uses active verbs to place the United States not as a passive, feminised observer but as an active, masculine participant. By positioning the United States as one that is ‘renewing’, ‘replenishing’, and ‘witnessing’, Trump construes the nation as actively mobilising and hence, enacting its masculinity against COVID-19. To perform the state’s hegemonic masculinity, Trump also militarises the society. Drawing upon established gendered identities, the Trump administration evokes a series of securitising moves to militarise COVID-19.37 As early as 15 March, Trump argues that the United States ‘deployed over a thousand officers in support of the coronavirus missions’, reframing the pandemic not as an emergency managed by health professionals but one controlled by the military that will ‘defend our homeland during this crisis’. 38 In this framework, the nation’s military capabilities are constructed as a source of security, a physical reassertion of its masculinised control and dominance. Here, Trump touts the desirability of the military, stating that [o]ur great military is operating at 100 per cent during this crisis and thousands of troops are deployed alongside of civilians in the COVID hotspots, as you know. You see them all over. I spoke – when I spoke with Governor Cuomo, and when I spoke to Gavin Newsom, and many of the other governors, they wanted to know if we could have some military help with the medical, and we – we gave it to them.39 This quote presents the military as the masculinist protector of the nation with Governors jockeying for its aid while simultaneously framing it as a pervasive and saturating force who is ‘all over’. The military’s spreading encroachment across all vectors of society assures Trump’s audience of the United States’ ever-growing control over the virus, and in turn, paints the military as the reason for the nation’s success. As a result, Trump hails his response to the pandemic as ‘a tremendous victory’, ‘thanks to our all-out military operation and the extraordinary devotion of our people’ as ‘we believe we will experience far fewer deaths than even the optimistic projection’. 40 In tandem with the physical deployment of the military, Trump’s rhetoric is imbued with militarised references. Trump constructs the pandemic as a figurative battlefield, one that parallels ‘a World War, or a World War One or Two or something’ as it is ‘a war all unto itself’. 41 To align with this imagery, military hospitals are deployed to New York and Los Angeles, ‘frontline workers’ are reconceptualised as heroic, selfless soldiers falling in the line of duty, and even ordinary citizens are viewed as making their patriotic contribution to the nation by ‘fighting this battle from home’. 42 Not only does Trump construct the pandemic as an ‘all-out war’ but he places himself at the centre of society’s militarisation: ‘I’m a wartime president. This is a war. This is a war. A different kind of war that we’ve ever had.’ 43 Here, Trump figuratively takes control of all militarised activities intended to protect the population by using the personal pronoun ‘I’. As an extension of this militarised paternalism, Trump’s reluctance to count the casualties of this ‘war’ creates ambiguity and disillusionment that alters what Christine Sylvester calls the ‘perceptions of American war capabilities’. 44 Following this logic, Trump often refuses to broadcast the statistics of American mortality and case rates. However, when discussing these statistics discreetly, multiple members of Trump’s team utilise dehumanising tactics by referring to those who passed away from COVID-19 as having ‘expired’ – a term that more frequently refers to food past its due date rather than the loss of a citizen.45 Trump also deploys these discursive tactics to create a façade of militarised success that is further bolstered by notions of paternalistic protection as well as hegemonic and charismatic leadership. For instance, when prompted by reporters in multiple press briefings to discuss the number of cases, Trump belligerently dismisses their questions as ‘nasty’, ‘really bad reporting’, and ‘sensationalism’. 46 These discursive tactics expose Trump’s lack of transparency as an effort to give the American people a renewed sense of ‘hope’ and safeguard them from the brutal truth of ‘war’. 47 Once again, such militarised responses to the pandemic place Trump not only within the centrefold of controlling America’s military activities but also in the role of hegemonic protector. While Trump’s role as the nation’s protector rests upon his position as the Commander in Chief, his legitimation strategy also relies heavily on the United States’ economic capacity. Unlike his two predecessors, Trump’s reign has conjured a blatant reframing of previously exemplified American masculine norms. From George W. Bush’s indelible hyper-sexualised bravado48 to Barack Obama’s familial paternalism,49 Trump’s form of physical masculinity leaves much to be desired. As a result, the construction of Trump’s masculinity and, in the consortium, his legitimacy revolves not around his prominent physical characteristics but instead around his success as an entrepreneur.50 On multiple occasions, Trump draws on his economic success over the three years as president to demonstrate his capacity to rule. He states that ‘nobody has ever done anything like what we were able to do’ 51 and forcefully appropriates this achievement: I think you’re going to have a recovery. Look, I built – they were just telling me inside, and it’s fact – I built the greatest economy – with the help of 325 million people, I built the greatest economy in the history of the world. And one day, because of something that should have never been allowed to happen, we had to close our country, we had to close our economy.52 Such assertions portray Trump not only as a legitimate and successful leader of the United States but, more importantly, as the one responsible for maintaining its position as the economic powerhouse and global hegemon. As the latter quote exemplifies, Trump excessively utilises the first personal pronoun (‘I’), which allows him to embody the success of the nation. As the American economy slipped into one of the worst downturns since the Great Depression, Trump claims that ‘I had to turn it off in order to get to a point where we are today.’ 53 While claiming responsibility for the economic safety of the nation, Trump also assures his audience that Americans will ‘help countries around the world as well’ because ‘the whole world is watching’ them.54 The narrative of Trump’s leadership par excellence produces an image of the United States as the supreme leader in the fight against COVID-19, whereas other countries ‘aren’t highly sophisticated’ and represent failures.55 For example, Trump contrasts the United States’ rate of COVID-19 testing with that of other countries: We are way ahead on testing. We are the best in the world on testing. We’ve tested much more than anybody else, times two – or every country combined. We’ve tested more than every country combined. … The quality of our tests is the best and the number is the best.56 These multiple superlatives and assertions that the United States is ‘first’ on one or another measure enable Trump to reinforce a masculine fiction of conquest and triumph. In this framework, the pandemic becomes a platform for the United States to demonstrate and maintain its innovative capacity and supremacy. Similarly, other top-level members of Trump’s administration extend the narrative of American omnipotence. As a case in point, Mike Pompeo reminds the media that ‘a lot of countries are asking us for assistance and a lot of countries have received assistance’, assuring that the United States has ‘of course, done the right thing’. 57 However, he instantly highlights that the United States will be ‘an enormous force for good’ in other countries and regions only after it provides for itself: We’ve made sure we had the resources for our own people, but as the American greatness – as American power and American commercial prosperity continues to grow, we’re building out – we’re getting not only ventilators but all of the equipment that the world will need.58 While Trump and Pompeo make it clear that the United States will take care of itself first, they continue to represent the nation as the world’s saviour and protector of the weak. This notion is explicitly rhetorical. Although both figures elevate COVID-19 to a ‘global threat’, 59 it is clear that the United States is isolated. Rather than binding together as a universal front and leading the world to victory, Trump and his most prominent team members continually denounce the work of both other nations and international organisations, portraying the United States as individually successful in comparison. In turn, the fight against COVID-19 is framed not as a fight for global immunity and humankind but as a competition over who is going to defeat the threat first.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › COVID Link

The Securitization of COVID-19 is emblematic of National Leaders’ desires to secure their nation’s place as the masculine hegemon and their place as its ruler, reconstructing narratives of toxic masculine power and weak feminine subordinates

Kuteleva and Clifford 2021 (Anna Kuteleva is a postdoctoral research fellow at the School of International Regional Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (Russia). Anna holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada). Sarah J. Clifford is an MSc student in Political Science at the University of Copenhagen (Denmark). Her Master’s project explores the intersections of American militarised masculinities, identity politics, and education policies. Clifford studied Political Science and worked as a Research Assistant for the China Institute and the Faculty of Education at the University of Alberta. “Gendered securitisation: Trump’s and Putin’s discursive politics of the COVID-19 pandemic,” European Journal of International Security (2021), 6, 301–317 doi:10.1017/eis.2021.5)

Securitisation is ‘a set of interrelated practices and the processes of their production, diffusion, and reception/translation that bring threats into being’. 6 The concept of securitisation opens up a way to denaturalise the framing of certain events, issues, things, or people as posing existential threats to states and societies.7 Many scholars also use it to call into question the givenness of the differential categories of ‘security’ and ‘insecurity’. 8 Scholars who examine the politics of diseases, however, often deal with threats that are not talked into being. For example, using the case of HIV/AIDS, Colin McInnes and Simon Rushton argue9 that to question the ‘reality’ of the threat posed by a disease is ‘both morally indefensible and empirically absurd’. Similarly, the danger that COVID-19 presents is all too real. More than two million people are known to have died from COVID-19 as of January 2021. A year has passed since the virus was discovered, yet hospitals are still buckling under a torrent of COVID-19 patients and the routines of daily life remain interrupted for billions worldwide. Importantly, COVID-19 is an endemic that will stay with us for some time. In this context, the concept of securitisation is used not to question the threat that COVID-19 poses for the survival and wellbeing of people around the world but to elucidate how political actors reconstruct understandings of COVID-19 via securitising moves and what different pathways of response become appropriate as a result of these moves. Consequently, we treat securitisation as ‘a sustained strategic practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development … is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate it’. 10 Adopting Thierry Balzacq’s approach,11 we do not problematise the fact of securitisation but critically examine how and with what effect discursive politics of securitisation works. Specifically, we are interested in how state actors that dominate discursive politics of (in)security performatively build upon established and context-specific gendered identities in the process of securitisation. The very notion of national security is gendered inasmuch as it is grounded in the gendered nature of the state and state practices.12 This entails that power operates via the (discursive) construction and reconstruction of hierarchical hybrid gendered identities with the intent to enforce certain security interests on domestic and international levels. As Charlotte Hooper emphasises, ‘it is a commonplace observation that international relations reflect a world of men in that they influence international affairs through their physical capacities, through (masculinist) practices at the institutional level, and through the symbolic links between masculinity and power’. 13 Consequently, Hooper argues that masculinity is hegemonic, meaning that specific forms of masculinity dominate over all other gendered identities, including other masculinities. These relatively stable hegemonic configurations of gender practices exemplify ‘the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women’. 14 Following this logic, hegemonic masculinity is instrumental in constructing threat and danger as well as performing security. Hegemonic masculinity takes on many forms depending on different social, political, and economic settings. In this sense, it is dynamic and context-specific. Each state’s potential to claim the status of the masculine hegemon in the international arena depends on its performance among other states and its ability to repel threats both domestically and internationally. National leaders actualise and perform hegemonic masculinities to convince audiences at home and abroad that they are able to combat a threat. Masculinised imageries allow national leaders to present security as a result of their rule, making that rule legitimate. In effect, performing a state’s hegemonic masculinity ties directly to its leader’s ability to securitise a threat. Importantly, the process of securitising not only represents but also is reproductive of hegemonic masculinity of the state. National leaders rearticulate it through the narratives and imageries evoked in their securitising moves. Drawing on this theoretical framework, we examine how national leaders in the United States and Russia reconstitute hegemonic masculinities within the ‘threat-defence’ logic of responses to the COVID-19 outbreak. Our sample includes statements on COVID-19 made by Trump and Putin from the early onset of the current global public health crisis to 30 April 2020. This time frame covers an important period in the discursive formation of the COVID-19 outbreak in both the United States and Russia as a matter of national security. It allows us to examine securitisation in the making rather than focus on the audience’s acceptance of securitising moves. In other words, the chosen time frame restricts our analysis to the very first performative attempts at securitising the pandemic.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › COVID Link

Identifying COVID 19 as a security threat reinforce and recreate hierarchal gendered identities in order to enforce its securitization

Kuteleva and Clifford 2021 (Anna Kuteleva is a postdoctoral research fellow at the School of International Regional Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (Russia). Anna holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada). Sarah J. Clifford is an MSc student in Political Science at the University of Copenhagen (Denmark). Her Master’s project explores the intersections of American militarised masculinities, identity politics, and education policies. Clifford studied Political Science and worked as a Research Assistant for the China Institute and the Faculty of Education at the University of Alberta. “Gendered securitisation: Trump’s and Putin’s discursive politics of the COVID-19 pandemic,” European Journal of International Security (2021), 6, 301–317 doi:10.1017/eis.2021.5)

It is already all too apparent around the world that COVID-19 is dangerous. In the modern history of natural disasters, this virus will have few rivals. States continue to wrestle with how best to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, but its securitisation is already universal.1 The mechanisms of securitisation are socially and culturally specific. Simply put, all states securitise COVID-19 but each state does so in a unique way. By identifying the pandemic as an existential security threat, national decision-makers respond to it from both operational and normative perspectives. In doing so, they actualise and perform some national identities, while excluding or silencing others. We scrutinise this process by drawing on the cases of the United States and Russia. Experiences of these two states matter because they both play an active role in the evolving global discursive politics of the COVID-19 pandemic and consistently appear among the top ten most affected countries. Moreover, there is a divergence between the resurgence of the Cold War-style geopolitical confrontation between the West and Russia and the diplomatic ‘bromance’ between the US President Donald Trump and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin.2 These two politicians present themselves as alpha males promising to make their nations ‘great again’. As Sarah Ashwin and Jennifer Utrata point out, both of them attract immense international attention, and hence ‘these hypermasculine performances are not merely national in scope, but shape other places in our globalized world’. 3 Building our analysis on feminist methodologies,4 we examine how Trump and Putin instrumentalise hierarchical gendered identities to enforce the securitisation of COVID-19. Our analysis shows that both Trump and Putin draw heavily on projections of gendered power to maximise the effect of their securitisation moves and mobilise diverse gendered narratives, imageries, and practices to construct the meaning of the threat. These performances of securitisation set standards of appropriateness and legitimise certain kinds of foreign policy responses to the pandemic while silencing others or presenting them as ineffective. In this sense, we contribute to the discussion of COVID-19 politics by exploring gendered discursive practices that enable the move from ‘normal’ politics to the domain of emergency and exception or, as Andreas Kalyvas puts it, to the ‘politics of the extraordinary’. 5 This areticle is organised into three sections. The first section outlines our approach to securitisation and the methodology of our study. The following two sections examine the dynamics of securitising COVID-19 in the United States and Russia, indicating differences and similarities in their discursive strategies. The conclusions raise and bring to the fore questions not only regarding political responses to the COVID-19 pandemic but also concerning the nature and outcomes of the securitisation process.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › Climate Technics Link/Case turn

The K turns the aff – domination and technocracy embed the cycle of environmental destruction into politics

Bluhdom 09, [Ingolfur Blühdornis Associate Professor in Politics / Political Sociology at the Department of European Studies at the University of Bath Locked into the politics of unsustainability , 2009] Mr.Mr.

One reason is that in functionally differentiated and rapidly internationalising societies, the existing political institutions lack the structural ability to formulate and implement coordinated and effective policy approaches. Yet there is more to it than this. In order to see the arguably most powerful obstacle to major ecological progress, we need to focus on the values and paradigms governing national as well as international environmental policy-making. Since the mid-1980s, environmental politics has incrementally come to be dominated by a policy paradigm that is inherently incapable of organising the category of change that the IPCC targets necessitate. This is the paradigm of sustainability, ecological modernisation and, in its most recent appearances, "ecological industrial politics" and the "Green New Deal".[1] For all the good they have done in terms of turning environmentalism into a "new ideological masterframe" and a "non-controversial collective concern",[2] the concept of sustainability as well as the strategy of ecological modernisation have proved unable to deliver the "break with traditional models of economic development"[3] which are now widely recognised as indispensable for the effective mitigation of climate change. This is even more applicable to the latest addition to the lexicon of green-speak, the Green New Deal. Sustainability is interpreted by national governments as well as transnational bodies such as the EU first and foremost as sustained economic growth and competitiveness securing the continuation of established lifestyles and patterns of societal development. Its fundamental weakness is that as a purely formal concept (do not use up more resources than can be reproduced) it does not contain any inherent specification of what is to be counted as a resource (do polar bears count or not?), at which level an equilibrium between use and reproduction is to be achieved (before or after the destruction of Indonesian rain forests?) and which political values or principles are to be implemented in the envisaged society (authoritarian or democratic; decentralised or centralised; egalitarian or polarised).[4] Ecological modernisation (EM), in turn, is a market and technology-oriented policy strategy fraught with inherent limitations. For key environmental problems (e.g. habitat destruction, soil erosion, bio-diversity loss), marketable technological fixes are simply not available; environmental efficiency gains are persistently over-compensated by rebound effects and ongoing processes of growth; and all ecological modernisation depends on targets that are circumscribed by the ability to generate political legitimation and public support. Perhaps most importantly, though, EM ultimately just renews and extends the logic of growth and consumption which political ecologists as well as the much more moderate UN Brundtland Report[5] once identified as the underlying cause of industrial society's unsustainability. More explicitly even than EM approaches, the new ecological industrial politics and the Green New Deal aim first and foremost to spur technological innovation, increase consumer demand, create new jobs, open up new export markets, enhance the international competitiveness of national economies and so forth. In other words, they reframe global warming and the environmental crisis as an opportunity, a tool, for a new round of innovation and growth. They are supposed to provide a double, or even triple, dividend (economic, environmental, social), yet they entirely reverse the relation between means and ends that had once been envisaged by those proposing the use of economic or market based instruments for the achievement of ecological goals. In practice they are primarily an attempt to prolong the life expectancy of what is known to be unsustainable. Even Europe's leading Green Party, the once fairly radical German Greens, have fully embraced this rhetoric.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › Bioweapons Link

Discourse and fear of bioweaponry is gendered feminine- MDC’s utilize discourse and banning of biological warfare to justify feminizing and repressing LDCs

Cecire 09, (Ruth Cecire, Feminist Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 2009), pp. 41-65, Feminist Studies, Inc., ) GP

Gender, in addition to the practical concerns already discussed, appears to offer auseful prism through which to contemplate these issues. The feminine/masculine divide is a (or perhaps "the") critical hermeneutic through which each society constructs experience, assigns meaning, and asserts its basic values. Bridging the essentialist/constructionist rift, I would argue that this divide is informed by a conflation of biological difference and cultural representation. It is my contention that bioweapons have been disdained and ostensibly banned, at least in part, because they are largely gendered female and, hence, do not serve the fantasies and ends of the patriarchal war system; their semi-androgynous amalgam of science and disease fuels and substantiates extant culture and gender wars. As instruments of terror for the aforementioned "disenfranchised" nations and groups, they connote the mythical "furies" of "disempowered" female rage. That is not to say that bioweapons will never be employed by First World powers but, rather, that gendered perceptions shape their geopolitical status and deter potential use. Evidencing what Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild refer to as the "metaphorically gendered relationship between rich and poor countries,"36 First World males are intent on safeguarding their advantage by denying their Third World (disempowered) counterparts access to weaponry that would equalize the destructive playing field. Lastly, inasmuch as each weapon system conveys a certain status, banning a class of weapons, declaring them outlaw armaments, functions to further demean potential users.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › Biotech Link

Biotechnology reinforces imperial patriarchy across the globe

Shiva 92, (V Shiva, 1992, Women, Ecology, and Health: Rebuilding Connections: Introduction, published in the National Library of Medicine, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12286886/)GP

 Indigenous seeds, called landraces, were considered valueless, like indigenous peoples before them. Value was added to seeds only after an investment of time and money. The economic impact of this artificial value assigned to a gift of nature will be seen in Third World countries as plant breeders demand "rights" under new utility patents. The plant breeders, who are attempting to substitute local plant diversity with patented seeds throughout the world, go so far as to want laws to prevent farmers from using seeds gleaned from patented plants they have cultivated. Biotechnology is now treating human reproduction in the same proprietary way. Childbirth has been mechanized, and knowledge and skills are considered to be lodged with physicians, not with mothers. By transforming pregnancy into a medical disease, professional management, once confined to abnormal cases, is now considered necessary in every case. In cases of "abnormal" infertility, physicians believe they "create" babies, using the woman's body as so much raw material. The absurdity of this notion of man as creator can be seen by the patent application for the gene sequence coding for the hormone relaxin, which is produced in female ovaries but is being treated as an "invention" which can be owned. This attempt on the part of man to totally engineer the world, including the basic regenerative functions of the seed and women's bodies, is brought into question by the current crisis in health and ecology.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › Biotech Link

The language of bio science is entrenched in masculine ideals and norms- absent the alternative the aff just recreates harmful masculinity.

Connell 05, (RW Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, Hegemonic Masculinities, RW Connell was formerly a professor at the University of Sydney and an Australian sociologist)GP

But the appeal to science plunges us into circularity. For it has been shown, in convincing historical detail, that natural science itself has a gendered character. Western science and technology are culturally masculinized. This is not a question of personnel, though it is a fact that the great majority of scientists and technologists are men. The guiding metaphors. of scientific research, the impersonality of its discourse, the structures of power and communication in science, the reproduction of its internal culture, all stem from the social position of dominant men in a gendered world. The dominance of science in discussions of masculinity thus reflects the position of masculinity (or specific masculinities) in the social relations of gender.7 In that case, what can be expected from a science of masculinity, being a form of knowledge created by the very power it claims to study? Any such knowledge will be as ethically compromised as a science of race created by imperialists, or a science of capitalism produced by capitalists. There are, indeed, forms of scientific talk about masculinity that have capitulated to the dominant interests in much the same way as scientific racism and neoconservative economics.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › AI Link

The idea that AI is gender neutral is complete BS—as long as the programmers are biased, so too is their creation

Roff 16 (Heather, Gendering a Warbot, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18:1, 1-18, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246)

The base knowledge provided and the process by which it is accessed is key. What “facts” or pieces of information go into the database will affect the actions of the machine. If a data point or “piece” is not present, there is no opportunity for it to get there. An AI might be able to rearrange existing bits of information to combine them into new insights, but it will never generate something outside of its existing set of information structures. There is a gatekeeping function present in the construction of all symbolic representations. As Adam (1998) notes, “A formal system, in other words a computer system, is a political choice to maintain existing power structures” (108).16 To bring this back to gendered warbots, if programmers decide that “child” as an object or representation can never be paired with “combatant,” then the machine will not be capable of identifying child soldiers. Moreover, what constitutes “child” will have to be represented in some way. The process by which such “knowledge” is represented is thus crucial. As Adam (1998) explains, the problem about deciding “what sort of objects there are in the world” becomes another problem about knowledge about “facts,” and how a knowledge base about “facts” is recreated within a system of purely propositional knowledge” (39).17 The purely propositional knowledge approach is open to all of the feminist critiques from feminist epistemology, in particular, that there is some sort of Truth about which the facts must correspond and that knowledge derived from skills (such as a “knowing how”) is not real knowledge (Adam 1998, 114). Warfighting is as much an art as it is a science, and so prohibiting this kind of embodied or practical knowledge would appear to undermine the ability of a warbot to fight effectively. The most pressing problem for symbolic systems, however, comes from the direction of analogical reasoning. Faced with the certainty that warbots will encounter complex situations, which they cannot have prior knowledge of, they will require some mechanism to abstract the situation to one about which they do have some higher order representation. This is done by way of analogy. A program will have to break down the situation into smaller objects that it can represent, and then it will search its database for something that is analogous where the concepts are equivalent or appropriate. To find such an abstract analogy, the AI uses stereotypes (Adam 1998, 39).18 Programmers may not readily admit to this, claiming that “the important thing is to break the overall experience reflected in the memory into composable regularities” (Storrs Hall 2007, 221). “Composable regularities” might be that all hills are convex physical structures, but they might also be that “all women speak with a high voice” or “all combatants are men between 18 and 35.” Reasoning by analogy is a heuristic that humans employ when they are being cognitive misers and is not appropriate for complex situations requiring critical thought.19 This brings us full circle to the problem of which objects and concepts get represented in the dataset. If the programmers, who are predominantly white, male, upper-middle class and academic, equip an AI with these perspectives, then it is not difficult to see how gendered constructions will reproduce themselves (AAUW 2015). A particular masculinity might be reproduced, or a particular view of femininity may not be modeled at all (Adam 1998, 23). In either case, the AI is clearly not “gender neutral.”

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › Activism Link

The cooption of femnism under anti cap movements renforce the sexism in these spaces just pushes women out of the space, the left doesn’t care about femnism no matter how much they say they do

Dibben 21 (Dibben, Kimmy. “Sexism in the Campus Left.” Honi Soit, Honisoit, 17 Aug. 2021, http://honisoit.com/2021/08/sexism-in-the-campus-left/.)

As proven in multiple high-profile cases in Federal and State Parliament this year, sexual violence and sexism are rife in politics. This is not limited to right-wing political organisations, as was shown in the Greens case in 2018. Nor is it limited to political parties. We need not look further than our very own campus to recognise that under the progressive veneer of left-wing activist organisations are structural issues of sexism, misogyny, gendered labour and abuse. There is not one such organisation on USyd’s campus that is free of this. Imperialist, sexist, racist and classist structures are replicated in spaces where we organise against them, and reconstitute themselves endlessly in individual interactions by default.

Misogyny runs perniciously throughout the campus left. One woman who has been isolated and socially expelled by such a culture, writes that misogyny in the left manifests as “everything from unequal distributions of labour to the full blown espousing of Incel ideological world views. It became clear that even multi-year membership within an ostensibly progressive faction on campus could fail to meaningfully circumvent a lifetime of learned sexism as well as classism, an inherent and tragic outcome of elite private boys school education.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › 2AC – Funding Fails

More spending fails---the military sucks

De Rugy 3/10 (Veronique de Rugy, senior research fellow at George Mason University, 3-10-2022, “More Defense Spending Does Not Equal More Safety”, Reason, accessed 6-28-2022, )//kp

The brutal invasion of Ukraine by Russia has renewed conservatives' calls for large increases of our defense budget. The extra money, we are told, would fund more weapons to better prepare us to respond to aggression in a world that looks increasingly dangerous. As compelling as these arguments can be in a stressful time, it's not quite so simple.

Providing military defense is a valid function of the federal government. However, that doesn't give license to Congress to simply pile on more spending, even when there are dangers out there. Nor does it mean that more spending will result in a completely safe world for us Americans. That's in part because that world doesn't exist. There's only so much safety money can buy.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › 2AC – Funding Fails

More funds exacerbate existing ineffectiveness

Manjoo 1/13 (Farhad Manjoo, New York Times columnist, 1-13-2022, “We Must Stop Showering the Military With Money”, The New York Times, accessed 6-22-2022, )//kp

Last month, Senator Joe Manchin, the West Virginia Democrat who has frustrated much of President Biden’s policy agenda, released  confirming what he’d been hinting for weeks. He  for the Build Back Better Act, the Democrats’ $2.2 trillion 10-year plan to address climate change and invest in child care, health care and education. Manchin argued it would increase inflation, harm the electricity grid and hamper national security and was simply just too “mammoth” and “sweeping” to support.

“I have always said, ‘If I can’t go back home and explain it, I can’t vote for it,’” he .

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Fund the Military › Solves - AI

Funding solves---ai specific

Vergun 21 (David Vergun, associate editor/writer at DoD News, 4-9-2021, “Artificial Intelligence Key to Maintaining Military, Economic Advantages, Leaders Say”, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed 6-22-2022, )//kpt

Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Michael S. Groen, director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, and Robert O. Work, vice chair of the NSCAI, spoke to reporters at the Pentagon.

Work provided an overview of the report:

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Fund the Military › Solves - Modernization

Only funding solves modernization

Eaglen 5/16 (Mackenzie Eaglen, Senior Fellow at American Enterprise Institute, 5-16-2022, “$846 Billion: The Budget the U.S. Military Really Needs”, American Enterprise Institute, accessed 6-22-2022, )//kpt

While Pentagon leaders are busy  to meet ongoing requirements, politicians are dusting off their pocket constitutions to remind them  on appropriations.

Since release of the fiscal year (FY) 2023 defense budget request, rising inflation has remained front and center for Congress.  under questioning about what their inflation estimates for 2022, 2023, and the five-year projections are. Even without exact forecasts, it was and is clear that the White House’s  of $773 billion for the US military does not provide the growth above inflation necessary to simultaneously keep pace with rising personnel costs, , and general warfighting readiness.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Fund the Military › Solves - 1NC

More funds for ai and cyber PLEASE!

Aderholt 5/9 (Robert Aderholt, Alabama’s 4th congressional district representative, 5-9-2022, “Our defense budget gap threatens America’s security”, The Hill, accessed 6-28-2022, )//kp

Since Russia invaded Ukraine at the end of February, the United States, and other nations, have been helping the Ukrainians resist by sending them billions of dollars of military equipment. 

I have supported these efforts and am open to sending even more. While we as a country have stood up and led on this issue, I feel in many respects, since the end of the Cold War, we’ve gone adrift. This current crisis in Europe has shed an even bigger light on our own military shortcomings. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Fund the Military › Solves - 1NC

Funding’s key to readiness

Eaglen 5/23 (Mackenzie Eaglen, senior fellow at the American Enterprise and former on the congressionally mandated National Defense Strategy Commission, 5-23-2022, “The US defense budget’s latest casualty is readiness”, DefenseNews, accessed 6-28-2022, **some graphs omitted, I kept one because it looks cute** )//kp

America’s military leaders state time and again that China’s forcible assault on Taiwan, and therefore our response to it, is a near-term challenge . Given the lengthy time to plan, program,  and field credible combat power,  is really one of today. Alarm bells should be ringing in Congress as the president’s latest defense budget cuts readiness.

Given that ongoing support for Ukraine is straining some key U.S. military supplies and munitions, everyone should be concerned the China fight would  and faster. As this Pentagon team is  by  to prepare for future wars over , the result is the erosion of our few remaining competitive advantages.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Fund the Military › Solves - 1NC

Only funding solves modernization

Eaglen 5/16 (Mackenzie Eaglen, Senior Fellow at American Enterprise Institute, 5-16-2022, “$846 Billion: The Budget the U.S. Military Really Needs”, American Enterprise Institute, accessed 6-22-2022, )//kp

While Pentagon leaders are busy  to meet ongoing requirements, politicians are dusting off their pocket constitutions to remind them  on appropriations.

Since release of the fiscal year (FY) 2023 defense budget request, rising inflation has remained front and center for Congress.  under questioning about what their inflation estimates for 2022, 2023, and the five-year projections are. Even without exact forecasts, it was and is clear that the White House’s  of $773 billion for the US military does not provide the growth above inflation necessary to simultaneously keep pace with rising personnel costs, , and general warfighting readiness.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Fund the Military › Solves - 1NC

Funding solves---ai specific

---upon reflection, not the vibe

Vergun 21 (David Vergun, associate editor/writer at DoD News, 4-9-2021, “Artificial Intelligence Key to Maintaining Military, Economic Advantages, Leaders Say”, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed 6-22-2022, )//kp

Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Michael S. Groen, director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, and Robert O. Work, vice chair of the NSCAI, spoke to reporters at the Pentagon.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Nuclear Ukraine

Russia won’t escalate to nuclear weapons–he loses China if they do

Corera 4/26 (Gordon Corera, Security correspondent, BBC News, April 26, 2022, “Ukraine war: Could Russia use tactical nuclear weapons?”, //RM)

Putin claims Ukraine is part of Russia, so using nuclear weapons on its territory seems bizarre. Russia itself is close by and "the fallout could cross boundaries", warns Patricia Lewis. The only time nuclear weapons have been used in conflict was by the US at the end of World War Two against Japan. Would Putin want to become the first leader to break the taboo and use them? Some worry he has shown a willingness to do things others thought he would not do, whether invading Ukraine or using nerve agent in Salisbury. Dr Williams says there is a further reason why Russia might not use nuclear weapons - China. "Russia is heavily dependent on Chinese support, but China has a 'no first use' nuclear doctrine. So if Putin did use them, it would be incredibly difficult for China to stand by him. If he used them, he would probably lose China." Could it lead to nuclear war? No one knows quite where the use of tactical nuclear weapons would lead. It could escalate and Putin would not want nuclear war. But miscalculation is always a risk. "They would imagine everyone would capitulate," says Patricia Lewis. "What would happen is that Nato would have to come in and respond." The US says it is monitoring the situation closely. It has an extensive intelligence gathering machine to watch Russian nuclear activity - for instance whether tactical weapons are being moved out of storage, or if there is any change in behaviour at launch sites. So far, they say they have not seen any significant changes. How the US and Nato would respond to any nuclear use is hard to predict. They may not want to escalate the situation further and risk all-out nuclear war but they also might want to draw a line. This might mean a tough conventional rather than nuclear response. But what would Russia then do? "Once you have crossed the nuclear threshold, there is no obvious stopping point," says James Acton. "I don't think anyone can have any confidence of what that world would look like."

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Nuclear Ukraine

Putin won’t use nuclear weapons–NATO will retaliate if he does

Ullman 2/16 (Harlan Ullman, Harlan Ullman is an Atlantic Council senior advisor and UPI’s Arnaud deBorchgrave Distinguished Columnist, 2/16/22, “Why Putin won’t invade Ukraine”, /RM

In regard to Ukraine, Putin also knows that an armed attack or aggressive use of force will make any chance of his achieving both his priorities even less likely than landing an astronaut on the sun. He also knows that the costs to Russia and to him personally will be high and possibly unaffordable. Sanctions and further isolation will hurt. Going to war, no matter the scope, or using cyber and influence operations to cripple Ukraine, will absolutely foreclose any chance for even part of Putin’s demands being considered by NATO. The Alliance’s response to a major attack will make the actions it took after Russia’s 2014 Crimean annexation appear anemic. It will expand its military capability and the number of forces stationed in Europe—exactly the opposite of Putin’s intent. NATO members will develop and deploy more advanced weapons, including new classes of missiles with low-yield nuclear warheads. NATO badly needs a new strategic framework (here, ironically, Putin is right for the wrong reasons). If war breaks out in Ukraine, the Alliance will certainly move to a new framework incorporating some of the actions mentioned above and announce it during the Madrid summit in June—another outcome Putin won’t like one bit. In an escalation, the West will impose sanctions more strictly and robustly than before. How much this will dent Russia’s economy or Putin’s inner circle is uncertain. But the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline will almost certainly be cancelled, denting Russia’s energy sector. Whatever credibility Putin may have gained will be lost given the “big lie” of his assurances that force would not be used in Ukraine. Of course, Russia will have accused the West of provoking violence requiring an “appropriate response.” If a subsequent occupation of Ukraine were required, even of just a portion of the country, body bags could be flowing back to Russia. And what is Putin’s exit strategy? No such plan following a Russian attack is obvious for Moscow other than a prolonged twenty-first century version of the Cold War, but one in which Moscow uses substantial force resulting in even greater isolation. And that could doom Putin’s rule in a way similar to how Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev got fired two years after the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. An advantageous stalemate The billion-ruble question is: How does this crisis end? Speculation over invasion scenarios has ranged from a massive, overwhelming air, sea, and land assault to a mix of cyber, special-forces, and influence-based non-kinetic operations. Should Putin not grasp the predicament he has imposed on himself, a limited move in the Donbas or seizing a land bridge into Crimea would seem to be the lowest-risk and lowest-cost option. He could then judge how NATO chooses to respond and wait. But Putin would almost certainly suffer the same consequences as if he took Kyiv and occupied much of the country. Assuming there is no military action, Putin has two choices. First, he can prolong the crisis and maintain the buildup on the Ukrainian border. That would be expensive and wear down his forces. Staying on constant alert takes a toll on people and pocketbooks. Or Putin could terminate the exercise with Belarus on February 20 as scheduled, draw his troops back from the Ukrainian border, claim victory, and continue to push for negotiations—arguing that as the West wrongly predicted an attack, it continues to fail to recognize Russian security interests and needs. Russia will no doubt continue political and psychological pressure on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to make concessions, either to accept the Minsk 2 agreement (despite its grant of semi-autonomy to the Donbas) or to suspend any request for NATO membership. And Russian “active measures,” such as disinformation campaigns, will continue to target Ukraine with the aim of eroding Zelenskyy’s standing and NATO solidarity by claiming “hysteria” over an invasion that never occurred. This scenario suits Putin’s interests far better than an uncertain military adventure, which is why he will choose it—and not because of anything uttered from a White House podium, no matter how much credit the administration will take for deterring a war.