2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Swindland Thumper
Moore 7-18 (Mark Moore is a political editor at the New York Daily Posts, 7-18-22, “Turkey’s Erdogan renews threat to block Finland and Sweden from NATO”, New York Post, SC)
Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Monday renewed his threat to “freeze” NATO membership for Sweden and Finland unless they stick to their pledges to crack down on terrorist groups. “I want to reiterate once again that we will freeze the process if these countries do not take the necessary steps to fulfil our conditions,” Erdogan told reporters. “We particularly note that Sweden does not have a good image on this issue,” the Turkish strongman continued. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, Finland and Sweden set aside decades of neutrality during wartime and asked to join the 30-member alliance. But Erdogan balked, saying the two countries were too lax in their stand against terrorists because they hosted Kurdish militants. At June’s NATO summit in Madrid, which was attended by President Biden, the three countries reached a deal on deporting or extraditing groups considered to be security threats, including members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and lift arms restrictions imposed after Turkey’s 2019 military incursion into northern Syria. But on Monday, Erdogan once again raised the threat of blocking their entrance into NATO unless they make good on the promises they made. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan renewed his threat to "freeze" NATO membership for Finland and Sweden.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ – Turkey-NATO Coop Now
Ash 6-28 (Timothy Ash Senior Sovereign Strategist at BlueBay Asset Management in London, 6-28-22, “ASH: Turkey playing a delicate balancing act between Ukraine, Russia and Nato”, SC)
Turks are rightly proud of the success of Bayraktar drones in the conflict in Ukraine. Ukraine has also celebrated the success of Bayraktar drones against Russian armour, particularly in turning the tide in the first few weeks in the Battle of Kyiv – with songs even produced and sung by Ukrainians soldiers to acclaim the battlefield changing nature of this high-end Turkish technology. Turks like to view this as a great example of the country’s new-found technological and military prowess, but also their willingness to show support for Ukraine despite obvious risks to damaging valuable relations with Russia. Ukrainians are, though, beginning to doubt Turkey’s commitment to their cause, notwithstanding the undoubted success of Bayraktar. Turkey’s stance on peace talks in Antalya in March and again over trying to broker a deal to break the grain blockade of Ukrainian ports has left a distinct impression in Kyiv that Ankara is too keen to toe the Russian line and force a Russian friendly peace deal down their throats. In Antalya the Turkish side were confident a deal was to be done, and even sold a deal as in the offing, but this seemed to be close to terms being offered by Moscow, with little effort to accept or even understand the Ukrainian position. Predictably the Antalya peace process eventually collapsed. The fact that Ankara seems tone deaf to Ukraine’s position was also evident on talks on-going over breaking the grain blockade, with Ankara negotiating directly with Moscow and seemingly little effort being made to involve the Ukrainian side – even though any plan involves decisions about unblocking Ukrainian ports. On the ports issue, Turkey seemed unable to comprehend the Ukrainian position that getting agreement to de-mine ports was worthless unless there were also security guarantees to ensure that Russian forces did not use this as an opportunity to launch amphibious landings against Odesa, Mikolaiv, et al. Turkey appeared naïve in both the Antalya talks and the talks over ending the grain blockade. The Turkish side appeared to be adopting a peace deal at any (to Ukraine) cost strategy, but with zero effort to understand the Ukrainian position. But key to understanding the Turkish position on the war in Ukraine, and its seemingly blinkered effort to bring peace at almost any cost (to Ukraine), is that the Erdogan administration views all of this through its very narrow electoral lens. And therein it faces difficult elections within the next year, with opinion polls not looking good for either Erdogan or his ruling AKP, while the economy is in a desperately weak position. A degree of desperation and wishful thinking is hence evident in Turkey’s approach to the war in Ukraine. On the latter, over the past decade, under Erdogan’s failed monetary policy mantra that “high interest rates cause inflation,” the economy has been in an almost constant state of balance of payments crisis. Erdogan continually prioritises growth over inflation and exchange rate stability, as in the past credit growth has delivered real GDP growth, jobs and votes. But this has meant the economy has been run too hot, the price of which has been wide current account deficits, large external financing requirements and constant pressure on the lira to weaken. An orthodox response would be to tighten monetary and/or fiscal policy to slow domestic demand, lower import demand and with it the trade and current account deficits, thereby alleviating pressure on the lira. But Erdogan’s interest rate ideology has removed this option for the CBRT, meaning that the lira has had to take the strain, which has in turn fuelled inflation. Turks are unhappy with inflation and a constantly weakening lira. They feel poorer, which explains Erdogan’s lowly popularity. But Erdogan still thinks he can win the election by pulling a few more rabbits out of the hat – including the recent exchange rate protected deposit scheme, and more recently restrictions on corporates borrowing in lira if they have large FX deposits. Erdogan thinks that this can buy him some time, helping slow dollarisation, anchor the lira enough for him to push the growth agenda just one more time to win the next election. In normal times it would be touch and go whether this strategy could hold things stable enough to get through to elections by June 2023 and deliver Erdogan a win. But the war in Ukraine has just made the maths here even more difficult – higher energy and food import costs and the threat of the loss of key Ukrainian and Russian tourism receipts (one quarter of the total) are pushing the current account deficit wider and putting even more pressure on the lira. Erdogan needs this war to end and soon, otherwise he risks getting rolled over in an extreme balance of payments crisis which would scupper any remaining popularity he has. So, Erdogan has been happy to allow Bayraktar drones to go to Ukraine – they advertise Turkish engineering prowess and generate important export earnings. But beyond that Turkey has done little to help Ukraine’s cause. And, as noted, if anything the Antalya peace talks and the talks over unblocking grain deliveries from Ukraine have undermined Kyiv’s position. Turkey has also failed to join Western sanctions on Russia – arguing that it simply cannot afford to, given its challenging balance of payments position. If relations with the West were better, it might have hoped for financial support to offset losses from sanctions and the war in Ukraine. But this option is constrained by broader Western concern about policy choices made by Erdogan, including over monetary policy. Some close to the Erdogan administration have even argued that Turkey could benefit from sanctions by acting as a middle-man similar to its position on Iranian sanctions. Some think that Turkey could benefit as Russian companies look to reflag to avoid sanctions, as Russian capital and business look to exit and evade sanctions, and also by being a conduit for Russian capital – tourism, the latter being the scenario where Russians seek to holiday in Turkey but using this as an opportunity to park capital by opening Turkish bank accounts and buying property. To some extent facilitating capital flight from Russia is a benefit for the West in heaping the economic pressure on Russia, but there is a fine dividing line for Turkey here from being seen to profit from the conflict, and concern that some of the activity might be on the edge of actual sanctions breaking. A recent visit by US Treasury officials to Turkey likely was meant to draw clear lines as to what is and is not acceptable. And then there is the whole furore around Turkey’s stalling on Finland and Sweden’s bid to join Nato. As Nato allies have highlighted, Turkey does have understandable security concerns over Scandinavian support for various Kurdish groups. It has leverage now to force Sweden and Finland to rein these in. And playing hardball on this issue will play very well with the domestic nationalist constituency in Turkey before elections. It's potentially a win-win for Turkey. But the risk is that Erdogan overplays his hand and permanently damages relations with the West. He needs to realise that for the US and the rest of its Nato allies, Russia is the priority and is seen as a clear and present danger, and an existential threat to Ukraine and the West. Finnish and Swedish Nato entry is a huge win for the West, for Ukraine, and a major snub to Putin. If Erdogan now blocks this at the Nato summit in Madrid later this month, relations with the West will, I think, be permanently soured. And likely the West will adopt an openly hostile, as opposed to largely neutral, approach to Erdogan’s re-election by June 2023. Blocking Swedish and Finnish membership would also stall rising hopes of a deal over Turkey’s compensation for leaving the F35 project, through purchase of additional F16s and upgrade kits. This would damage Turkey’s defence capability. Now playing hardball to the end of this could turn the next election in Erdogan’s favour, and I think he will have to balance this off against the risk of a major balance of payments crisis if he plays hardball too long. And with the West angered, he would have few tools to allay any such BOP crisis – he does not want to hike policy rates or go to the IMF, capital controls are counterproductive and will damage business, the CBRT has limited reserves and FX adjustment just leads to more inflation. If he faces a BOP crisis after vetoing Finnish and Swedish Nato membership, I think the West would stand on the sidelines as a full balance of payments crisis washes over Erdogan. And likely Erdogan would lose the next election. Logic would suggest that Erdogan would play very hardball to the Madrid summit – get deals over Kurdish groups in Sweden and Finland, easing of arms sanctions, and new agreements over new arms purchases like the F16. He can tell electors at home that he played hardball and won concessions. He will hope the West is grateful enough to keep capital markets open to allow him to finance his external borrowing needs. All this feels pretty binary. But I think in all this, Erdogan needs to realise that for the West the crisis in Ukraine is a defining moment, a definitive challenge they face, and it’s a time to ask if allies are with the West or against it. Erdogan has tried staying on the fence, to some extent trying to play one side off against the other. I think time for such an approach is fast running out. Madrid will likely be the moment when Erdogan has to decide whose side he is on. An important week is in store for Nato and Turkey.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ – Turkey-NATO Coop Now
Congressional Research Service 21 (Congressional Research Service, December-30-2021, accessed on 1-3-2022, Congressional Research Service, "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44000.pdf//BVN SC)
Turkey’s location near several global hotspots has made the continuing availability of its territory for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces command in Izmir (see Figure A-3). From Turkey’s perspective, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about encroachment by neighbors, as was the case with the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing. Some similar Turkish concerns—though somewhat less pronounced—may stem from Russia’s ongoing regional involvement in places such as Syria and Ukraine, and may partly motivate recent Turkish military operations to frustrate some Russian objectives in various conflict arenas.86 As a result of growing tensions between Turkey and Western countries, and questions about the safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets, some observers have advocated exploring alternative basing arrangements in the region.87 Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, Jordan and Romania might be connected with concerns about Turkey.88 Additionally, Turkish actions in opposition to the interests of other U.S. allies and partners in the Eastern Mediterranean (see “Cyprus, Greece, and Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas” below)— particularly over the past two years—have led U.S. officials to encourage cooperation among those allies and partners.89 In 2020, the Trump Administration waived restrictions on the U.S. sale of non-lethal defense articles and services to the Republic of Cyprus, effectively ending a U.S. arms embargo that had dated back to 1987, and attracting criticism from Turkish officials.90 Turkey’s influence in the Black Sea littoral region and its relationships with European countries bordering Russia make its actions in this sphere important for U.S. interests. Ongoing Turkish defense cooperation with or arms sales to Ukraine, Poland, Georgia, and Azerbaijan may present opportunities to make renewed common cause between the United States and Turkey to counter Russia.91 Alternatively, Turkey’s interactions with these other countries could possibly check both U.S. and Russian ambitions, or increase regional tensions potentially leading toward conflict.92 A case in point will be how Turkey regulates and controls other countries’ maritime access to and from the Black Sea—a limited privilege granted to Turkey in the Montreux Convention of 1936 (with provisions to give Turkey greater control when at war).93
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ – Turkey-West Coop Now
Outzen 7-1 (Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of US government service both in uniform and as a civilian. 7-1-22, TURKEYSource, “Experts react: What the NATO summit breakthrough means for Turkey and the Alliance”, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/experts-react-what-the-nato-summit-breakthrough-means-for-turkey-and-the-alliance//BVN SC)
This week at their Madrid summit, NATO allies formally invited Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance. It was the latest step in a whirlwind process initiated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and delayed by Turkey—home to the second-largest military in the Alliance, after the United States—which argued that the Nordic countries did not sufficiently address Turkey’s national-security concerns. After weeks of tough negotiations, Turkey, Finland, and Sweden agreed to a breakthrough trilateral declaration on Tuesday. Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asked experts for their take on the implications of the summit and the trilateral declaration. Jump to an expert reaction Mehmet Fatih Ceylan: A victory for NATO unity and cohesion Ian Brzezinski: Erdogan recognizes NATO brings far more geopolitical value than Russia Rich Outzen: The summit brings Turkey’s security concerns to the fore A victory for NATO unity and cohesion The ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014 has entirely changed the security landscape, not only in the Euro-Atlantic area, but globally. It has fundamentally altered threat perceptions beyond the Alliance, leading Finland and Sweden to officially apply for membership in NATO. These two countries have indeed crossed the Rubicon and deserted their neutrality in response to persistent Russian belligerence in the middle of Europe. Their decision to combine their efforts and assets with the Alliance against Russian aggression is natural and legitimate. Hence the need to incorporate Finland and Sweden into the Alliance family. The trilateral memorandum signed among Turkey, Finland, and Sweden on June 28 is a welcome development designed to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and unity, and further strengthen the Alliance. It is commonplace in NATO to consult on and negotiate over any dispute among allies and would-be allies to find a common ground. That is how NATO plays its role, and at the end a solution accommodating such concerns is found by consensus. It is also true that once new members accede to NATO, they are bound by the decisions previously taken by the Alliance on a wide range of subjects. In NATO there exists a robust set of decisions and practices in fighting terrorism, beginning with the intervention in Afghanistan. Therefore, there is already an agreement comprising all sorts of conceptual work and practices in different geographical theaters on combatting terrorism, developed within NATO and binding on all members. The newly adopted Strategic Concept (SC) clearly identifies Russia and “terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations” as the primary sources of threats in a 360-degree manner and across all three core tasks of NATO: collective deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. Given that terrorism is “the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity,” as defined in the SC, it makes sense both for Finland and Sweden to cooperate with Turkey in combatting terrorism as one of the primary sources of threats against Alliance interests. In a nutshell, collective deterrence and defense against actual and potential adversaries, nipping crises in the bud, and expanding the web of networks with partners under challenging circumstances are the main tasks of NATO in the next decade. The main center of gravity for NATO is its solidarity, unity, and cohesion, including all allies and those set to become allies. The summit decisions in their entirety will help NATO to navigate the troubled waters ahead over the long term. —Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is the president of Ankara Policy Center and previously served as permanent representative of Turkey to NATO. Erdogan recognizes NATO brings far more geopolitical value than Russia At their summit in Madrid, NATO leaders decided to “invite Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO, and agreed to sign the accession protocols.” This was an important breakthrough. Until now, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had held up the protocols on the grounds that the two Nordic nations had embargoed his nation from defense sales and refused to extradite alleged Kurdish terrorists. Consensus was facilitated by a meeting between US President Joe Biden and Erdogan—a bilateral long sought by the Turkish leader—and memorialized via a trilateral Turkey-Sweden-Finland memorandum in which the latter two agreed to lift the embargoes, condemn the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist organization, “address” Turkey’s pending extradition requests, and support Turkey’s involvement in European Union defense initiatives. The breakthrough underscored the influence and leadership of the United States in NATO. There is no way Erdogan would have lifted his veto solely due to European pressure. It also reflects Erdogan’s recognition that NATO brings Turkey far more geopolitical value than Russia, which would savor seeing this Nordic bid for NATO membership fail. Consensus on Finland and Sweden’s applications also demonstrated the Alliance’s unity in the face of Russia’s aggression and the difficulty Moscow still has when it comes to fully peeling Erdogan away from the transatlantic community. Once again, Putin’s strongest relationship in the Black Sea region has proven to be far more transactional than strategic. With that said, Turkey, like all the other NATO allies, still has to ratify these accession protocols. There remains ample opportunity for Erdogan to introduce additional negotiations with the rest of NATO. I am optimistic that Sweden and Finland will become NATO members, but it is still too early to say this round of NATO enlargement is a done deal. —Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy. The summit brings Turkey’s security concerns to the fore The summit was a great success for Ankara for three distinct reasons. The first is the content of the trilateral memorandum signed with Sweden and Finland: No arms embargo on Turkey, an affirmed commitment to address Turkish security concerns, no aid to the PKK or (significantly) the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), the Gulen movement mentioned as a terror concern, collaboration on the defense industry, working groups to follow—it’s hard to see what they missed. Of course, these are statements of principle, and execution or a final commitment will play out over time. But that is as true for Ankara approving accession as it is for the specified cooperation. The second reason is the ringing endorsement from the White House not only for the trilateral memorandum, but for the strengthening of Turkish air power and specifically a commitment to press Congress to approve F-16 fighter jet sales and upgrades. Notably, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has already weighed in with a strong endorsement of the deal. The in-person meeting of presidents Biden and Erdogan was notable, too. The third reason is more subtle: the inclusion in the new, slimmed-down Strategic Concept of language on countering terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations.” This language, and the prominence given both terror concerns and the Russian military threat, address Turkish concerns and highlight the value Turkey adds to the Alliance.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ – Turkey-West Coop Now
Bekdil 6/6 (Bekdil, B. E, Burak Ege Bekdil is a Turkey correspondent for Defense News. He has written for Hurriyet Daily News, and worked as Ankara bureau chief for Dow Jones Newswires and CNBC-e television. He is also a fellow at the Middle East Forum and regularly writes for the Middle East Quarterly and Gatestone Institute (2022, June 6). Turkey seeks to repair ties with Western Procurement Club. Defense News. Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/06/06/turkey-seeks-to-repair-ties-with-western-procurement-club//RM)
“Turkey is a NATO ally and will remain one. The war between our two partners Russia and Ukraine has created a new understanding in favor of strengthening procurement ties with our NATO allies,” a presidential aide told Defense News, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss Ankara’s diplomatic tightrope walk. The war has once again put Turkey in a pivotal broker position within NATO. Ankara has cultivated ties with both Russia and Ukraine that officials hope will provide dividends in future negotiations. Turkey’s approval is also needed to advance Sweden’s and Finland’s respective NATO membership applications, which grew out of their fear that Russia would work to permanently isolate them from the alliance. But there is some history to overcome. In 2020, Turkey paid $2.5 billion for the Russian S-400 air defense system. But fearing further isolation and sanctions from its allies, Turkey decided against making the system operational. In response to the acquisition, the U.S. suspended Turkey’s membership in the multinational consortium that builds the fifth-generation F-35 fighter jet. Turkey’s down payment of $1.5 billion for a first batch of the stealth aircraft, which Ankara never received, remains to be reimbursed. In March of this year, a senior Turkish diplomat who deals with NATO and security affairs told Defense News that the Russo-Ukrainian war has practically killed all potential Turkish-Russian deals related to strategic weapon systems. With Russia off the table as a military supplier, Turkish leaders are back to surveying the Western market. A senior Turkish procurement official said earlier this spring that the Eurofighter Typhoon is one option, involving the sale of about 80 aircraft — a purchase that would give Turkish industry an edge as it builds the country’s indigenous fighter jet in the making, the TF-X. The Typhoon was originally designed as an air superiority fighter. It is manufactured by a consortium made up of Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo, which conducts the majority of the aircraft project through a joint holding company, Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH. The NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency, representing the U.K., Germany, Italy and Spain, manages the project and is the prime customer. Turkey also has moved to acquire 40 F-16 Block 70 aircraft and upgrade kits for its 80 older F-16s. The Turkish request went to Congress in April. Earlier in May, the Biden administration asked the House of Representatives to approve the upgrade of Turkey’s F-16 fighter jet fleet. A potential deal may include high-tech missiles, radar systems and electronic warfare suites for the planes. In addition, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed hope in March that the trilateral talks between Turkey, France and Italy to co-produce the European air and anti-missile defense system SAMP/T, built by Eurosam, would resume after the French elections in April. In similar optimism, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said in late March that Italy and France were thinking “more seriously” now on co-producing the SAMP/T systems in Turkey. Meanwhile, Britain took steps to ease Turkey’s return to the Western procurement system. Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Faruk Kaymakcı said in February that Britain had lifted a ban on arms sales to Turkey, imposed after a unilateral Turkish offensive in northern Syria in 2019. The ease in trade restrictions was kept secret from the public, and some observers say Canada might follow suit. But most Western restrictions remain in effect. For instance, the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden imposed full arms embargoes on Turkey since 2019 over its military interventions in Syria. France has placed restrictions on an array of defense and aviation subsystems, and Italy has barred the sale of certain products. Germany has suspended plans to sell engines to power the Altay, Turkey’s first indigenous main battle tank in the making. “Turkey’s careful balancing act between its NATO allies and Russia has generally been recognized in the West, sometimes with much praise. How Turkey will maneuver between clashing Western and Russian interests in the near future will shape Western appetite for Turkey’s return to their procurement system,” said Ozgur Eksi, a defense analyst in Ankara. Some Western diplomats think Erdoğan may try to use Turkey’s veto power in NATO for a reset in procurement ties with the West. He said May 13 that his country is “not favorable” toward Finland and Sweden joining the alliance, indicating Turkey could use its membership to veto moves to admit the two countries. The issue was unresolved at press time. “The Turks appear to be preparing for a tough bargaining process, which may include the transfer of certain weapons system,” said a U.S. diplomat in Ankara. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine prompted Finland and Sweden to reconsider their traditions of military nonalignment. Eksi said that because of the war in Ukraine, Turkey would unlikely consider touching major arms deal with Russia that were previously on the table. “That includes any Turkish intention to buy the Russian-made Su-35 or Su-57 aircraft,” he said. Erdoğan has previously said Turkey was interested in buying the Russian-made fighter jets.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ – Turkey-Russia Relations Low
Got 20 (Antoine Got is based in Europe and works on security and defense issues. The views expressed in this article are his own, and do not reflect the views or positions of any organization with which he is affiliated, 11-19-20, “TURKEY’S CRISIS WITH THE WEST: HOW A NEW LOW IN RELATIONS RISKS PARALYZING NATO”, War on the Rocks, SC)
Ultimately, however, fears of a Turkish realignment with Russia are likely overblown. Moscow and Ankara’s relations have historically been fraught, and the recent rapprochement stems more from opportunism and coinciding interests than a major reorientation in Turkish foreign policy at the expense of its traditional alliances. In fact, Turkey’s forceful posturing is making it steadily more at odds with Russia in conflict environments where both operate, including Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Libya. Its growing involvement in the Caucasus, for instance, has brought it dangerously close to armed confrontation with NATO’s primary contestant, Russia, which supports Armenia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization framework. This was highlighted by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s underscoring of Russia’s “obligations to Armenia.” Though the violence ended there, Turkey’s proxy saber-rattling contributes to increase risks of accident or miscalculation leading to armed confrontation with Russia — something all parties are eager to avoid. With antagonistic security interests at stake, Turkey and Russia are ultimately more likely to balance against rather than align with each other, though several NATO allies continue to regard Ankara’s ties to Moscow with a deep-seated sense of suspicion.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ – Russia Isolated
Kim 5/11 (Kim, L. Kim was born in Charleston, Illinois. He earned a bachelor’s degree in geography and foreign languages from Clark University, studied journalism at the University of California at Berkeley and graduated from Central European University in Budapest with a master’s degree in nationalism studies.(2022, May 11). Russia isolated in its postimperial phantasm. Wilson Center. Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russia-isolated-its-postimperial-phantasm//RM)
From a strategic point of view, Putin’s attack on Ukraine has thrown back Russia to its weakest position since World War II. Ukrainians have shown they are ready to fight and die, and that they will never accept a Russian puppet regime. In a best-case scenario for the Kremlin, Russia ends up controlling swaths of eastern Ukraine, including a land corridor from Russia to Crimea, allowing Russian forces to continue threatening Ukraine’s Black Sea coastline and the country’s center. Yet even this state of play would hardly improve the Kremlin’s hand compared to what it was before the February invasion, when Russia already occupied Crimea and had the Ukrainians tied down in a low-level war in the eastern part of the country. Strategically speaking, the status quo ante was favorable to Russia, since the simmering conflict was draining Ukraine’s scarce resources and hobbling its aspirations to join the EU and NATO. Germany and France, signatories to the stalled Minsk peace process, were uninterested in inflaming tensions with Russia over Ukraine—as was the United States. After taking office, President Biden tried to patch up relations with Moscow so that he could focus on his main foreign policy priority, China. Biden held a summit with Putin, refused to give Ukraine any clearer guidance on NATO membership, and ignored calls to sanction Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline. In the leadup to the attack, Putin, the eternal tactician, may have been under the impression that he was on a roll in Russia’s “near abroad.” In 2020, when mass protests broke out in Belarus, wedged between Poland, the Baltic region, and Russia, Putin offered dictator Alexander Lukashenko financial support and riot police. After a flare-up in a bitter territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan that same year, the Kremlin inserted itself into the fight by dispatching Russian peacekeepers to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. In January the Kremlin briefly deployed a Russian rapid-reaction force to Kazakhstan to help a friendly regime shore up its authority amid antigovernment demonstrations and violence. Though all are dependent on Russia, none of the beneficiaries of recent Kremlin support has returned the favor by actively backing the war against Ukraine. Russia’s Isolation To varying degrees, Putin’s attack on Ukraine sent shocks through every former Soviet republic as Russia showed itself to be an unpredictable, revanchist power. Russia’s isolation in its own neighborhood has nothing to do with NATO; its lack of true allies is a strategic disaster entirely of Putin’s own making. In light of their history as Soviet vassals, the desire of former Warsaw Pact countries to join NATO was understandable and, in view of what’s happening in Ukraine, completely sensible. On emerging from behind the Iron Curtain three decades ago, these countries didn’t have the luxury to wait and see whether their former overlord would first develop into a peace-loving, democratic neighbor. That the Russian establishment even before Putin was opposed to NATO expansion is also understandable, given Russia’s past domination over Central and Eastern Europe. The irony is that NATO membership for the region’s small, insecure nations made Russia’s western border the most stable it has ever been. Although Putin fulminated about U.S. missile defense installations in Romania and Poland, it was unclear how they were supposed to neutralize Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, the largest in the world. In fact, before Russia launched its first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the United States was drawing down its military presence in Europe and attempting to pivot to Asia. The case of Ukraine is the most egregious example of how Russia’s postimperial phantom pains have clouded the Kremlin’s strategic thinking. Ukraine, with its close cultural, linguistic, economic, and religious ties to Russia, should have been a natural ally. While most Ukrainians were proud of their distinct identity, they were generally well-disposed toward Russia and deeply ambivalent about NATO before 2014. The Alliance itself was divided over Ukraine’s membership precisely because of the country’s deep connections to Russia. Even as Putin’s attack on Ukraine eight years ago spurred the United States, Britain, Canada, and Germany to send troops to NATO allies in Eastern Europe, it did not solidify support for Ukrainian membership within the Alliance. When Putin ordered a full-scale invasion in February, Ukraine was not significantly closer to joining NATO than it had been in 2008, when the issue was hotly debated, together with Putin, at the annual NATO summit. What has changed since 2014 is that a majority of Ukrainians support NATO membership and have no doubts that Russia has become their mortal enemy. As for NATO, member states such as the United States and Britain began arming and training the Ukrainian military. Putin’s fears of an increased U.S. presence in Ukraine—and Eastern Europe more broadly—became a self-fulfilling prophesy. The reputational damage to Russia that Putin’s belligerence has caused is staggering. Finland and Sweden are considering NATO membership, and even Switzerland has ended its traditional neutrality and adopted EU sanctions against Russia. Germany, once Russia’s most faithful partner in Western Europe, is determined to stop relying on Siberian natural gas, ending an energy relationship that began during the Cold War. Trust and economic synergies that took decades to build have been sacrificed for Putin’s delusional war. The Kremlin may retort that it has friends in other parts of the world. But even in the United Nations, Russia has been ostracized, with a large majority of countries calling on Moscow to end its offensive in Ukraine. Putin received explicit support only from Belarus, Syria, Eritrea, and North Korea, with China and India abstaining. The isolation of Putin’s Russia is linked to the country’s inability to articulate an attractive message about what it stands for beyond being the self-proclaimed antipode to the United States. At least during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the bearer of a powerful ideology that found adherents around the world. During his two decades in power, Putin has squandered the possibilities of Russian soft power. With a tiny fraction of Russia’s oil windfall, he could have established a global network of institutes, like Germany’s Goethe-Institut or Spain’s Instituto Cervantes, to tap into widespread interest in Russian culture. Instead he focused on Russian hard power, turning the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II into the regime’s ideological foundation. The untold human sacrifice in World War II was the source of the Soviet Union’s legitimacy as a UN Security Council member and worthy rival to the United States. With his unprovoked war against Ukraine, Putin has surrendered the last piece of moral high ground Russia, as the successor state of the Soviet Union, held as a leading member of the coalition that defeated Hitler. Putin’s savage attack on Ukraine will taint and overshadow the memory of Russian heroism in World War II for generations to come. In May 2005, leaders from more than fifty countries, including the United States and Ukraine, attended the Victory Day celebrations marking the sixtieth anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat. The number of foreign guests has since decreased inversely to Putin’s mounting aggression. Last year, only the leader of Tajikistan paid Putin the honor of attending his parade. This May 9, in a striking symbol of Russia’s isolation, no foreign guests came at all.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ – Russia Isolated
Rochlitz 3/16 (Rochlitz , M. ,Michael Rochlitz is Professor for Economics with a focus on institutional change at Bremen University.(2022, March 16). Russia's slide into international isolation. Zentrum für Osteuropa- und internationale Studien (ZOiS). Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-spotlight/russias-slide-into-international-isolation//RM)
On 24 February 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. The decision was based on a series of fatally flawed situational assessments, including an overestimation of the fighting abilities of the Russian army, an underestimation of the determination of the Ukrainian army and people, and a faulty evaluation of the West’s willingness to impose serious economic sanctions. The massive sanctions that have since been imposed on Russia’s economy have led to a freeze on half of the central bank’s reserves, a fall in the value of the rouble of more than 40 per cent, and an exodus of most Western companies from Russia. Increasing political repression and a fear of border closures caused several hundred thousand Russians – a significant part of the country’s intellectual elite – to flee abroad. The economic consequences of these developments will be disastrous. At the moment, neither the Russian government nor most Russian people seem to realise the extent of the economic catastrophe that is already sure to happen. In the best scenario, Russia’s economy will shrink by 10 to 20 per cent this year, a somewhat worse decline than during the 2008 financial crisis. But if the war continues, and new war crimes lead to additional sanctions, the economic disaster might be comparable to that caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. A self-inflicted catastrophe There are few, if any, politicians in recent history who have inflicted such massive harm on their own country in such a short time as Putin has done in the last 20 days. Three weeks ago, Russia was a middle-income country well integrated into the global economy, with a large part of its population enjoying a standard of living comparable to that of some European states. Russians could choose from a similar range of consumer goods to people elsewhere in the world, occasionally travel abroad for a holiday, and expect to lead a relatively stable and peaceful life. Today, Russia has become an almost completely isolated pariah state. Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, and Syria were the only countries that voted against a UN resolution condemning the Russian war in Ukraine. According to a list compiled by researchers at Yale University, by 13 March, 350 foreign companies had ceased or curtailed their operations in Russia, with only 34 overseas firms continuing to operate normally. As both Airbus and Boeing are no longer servicing Russian planes, Russia’s airlines were forced to stop international flights and might soon be forced to stop domestic flights as well. Travel within the country will be pushed back to where it was in the early twentieth century. It is unlikely that any of these companies will return to Russia if the current situation continues or deteriorates. As a consequence, the country will be deprived of many of the high-technology and consumer goods it has been importing until now. As Russia produces very few hi-tech goods, this will seriously affect the Russian economy, disrupting supply chains and making the country’s situation similar to that of Iran during the last 30 years. A similarly heavy blow will be the brain drain caused by the recent wave of repression. Most of the hundreds of thousands of people who have fled Russia in recent weeks are highly qualified specialists and researchers who are difficult to replace. The remaining scientists in Russia will be cut off from international networks, as worldwide academic institutions have cut all ties with Russian universities. The consequences for science, research, and innovation in Russia will be devastating. Dark prospects for the future Even in the best possible scenario of immediate peace, it would take several years to repair the damage already caused. Such a scenario would probably require the fall of the Putin regime, and a new government that ends the war and takes responsibility for Russia’s actions, to open up the possibility of bringing the country back into the international community. Even in this highly unlikely scenario, however, Russia’s population will have suffered substantial economic harm, and the horrors already committed in Ukraine will leave deep scars for Ukrainians and Russians alike. In what is unfortunately a more likely scenario, the war will drag on for a considerable time, potentially leading to a complete end of Western oil and gas imports from Russia. Although China might be willing to jump in, Russia will not be able to significantly increase its oil and gas exports in the near future, as the existing infrastructure in the Far East is already operating at full capacity. Moscow will thus have to rely on Chinese loans to import Chinese consumer goods. As a result, Russia might turn into some large-scale version of North Korea: economically dependent on China and with a government that through tight control of travel and information will try to prevent its population from finding out the true reasons for the disaster that has befallen it.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Yes Nuclear Ukraine
Bender 3-24 (Bryan Bender is a senior national correspondent for POLITICO, where he focuses on the Pentagon, NASA, and the defense and aerospace industries. He was previously the national security reporter for the Boston Globe, where he covered U.S. military operations in the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and the Balkans. He also writes about terrorism and government secrecy. He is an adjunct professor at the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism at Arizona State University and the author of “You Are Not Forgotten,“ the story of an Iraq War veteran’s search for a missing World War II fighter pilot in the South Pacific, 3-24-22, “How the Ukraine war could go nuclear”, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/24/how-ukraine-war-could-go-nuclear-00019899//BVN SC)
Not since the Cold War has the specter of nuclear war hung so heavily over a president’s crisis diplomacy. As President Joe Biden meets with fellow NATO leaders, calls for a ceasefire in Ukraine are growing more urgent than ever — to alleviate the widespread human suffering but also to dial back what veterans of nuclear planning consider an alarming potential for it to spiral into a clash of atomic superpowers. The nuclear brinkmanship from Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent weeks is unprecedented: He ordered a snap nuclear war game before the invasion and days later put his nuclear forces on high alert. And the Kremlin has repeatedly signaled it could resort to nuclear weapons — an option explicitly reserved in Russian military doctrine — if it determines the West’s intervention in the conflict goes too far. Again on Tuesday, in an interview with CNN, Putin’s chief spokesperson refused to rule out the use of nuclear arms in the conflict. So far, Biden has sought to dial down the tensions. The Pentagon has not changed the alert status of U.S. nuclear forces and military leaders have publicly said they have not detected Russian actions suggesting they are preparing to use nuclear weapons. The Pentagon also took the unusual step early in the conflict of putting off a regularly scheduled test of an intercontinental ballistic missile to avoid fueling nuclear tensions. Yet as the conflict drags on, and Russia’s conventional forces suffer surprisingly heavy losses while its economy reels, the prospect that Putin might resort to using weapons of mass destruction is increasing. Moscow has already demonstrated that it’s willing to use hypersonic missiles for the first time in a war. State Department: 'Russia's forces are committing war crimes in Ukraine' SharePlay Video With limited contact between the Kremlin and Western capitals, the risk that Moscow’s intentions could be misread with catastrophic consequences will only grow more acute, according to numerous specialists. “There has always been a chance of mistakes, but I think the chances are much higher,” said former Sen. Sam Nunn, the longtime chair of the Armed Services Committee and now co-chair of the nonprofit Nuclear Threat Initiative. “I think we are in a different era in terms of blunders.” It is a high-wire act confronting Biden as he tries to stiffen the spines of NATO countries for what is expected to be a long struggle. Allies are helping Ukraine fend off its bigger aggressor — including sending more arms and U.S. troops to defend NATO’s eastern borders — while not pushing Putin over the edge. Russia invaded Ukraine as cooperation between Washington and Moscow on nuclear arms control has been unraveling in recent years. The two countries have walked away from several treaties to control the deadliest weapons, including one that outlawed intermediate-range nuclear missiles that could threaten Europe. The only remaining nuclear pact between the two sides is the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which limits deployed strategic weapons to 1,550 each. Biden and Putin agreed last year to extend it until 2026. But the treaty does not cover any of the thousands of smaller, or “battlefield,” nuclear weapons in their respective arsenals, including at least 2,000 in Russian stockpiles, according to public estimates. Gas prices, nuclear talks and hacking: What Russia sanctions mean in America SharePlay Video Two Defense Department officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, say they are vigilantly gathering intelligence on Russian military moves for any sign that it might be taking such weapons out of storage or preparing for deployment units trained in nuclear or chemical warfare. ‘Raising the ante’ Longtime observers of Russian nuclear policy have been startled at how reckless the Putin regime has been with its nuclear threats compared to leaders in Moscow during the Cold War. “The communist party of the Soviet Union was incredibly disciplined about this,” said Rose Gottemoeller, a former undersecretary of state for arms control who has negotiated treaties with Russians and served as NATO deputy secretary general from 2016 to 2019. “There were only a few Soviet leaders who were allowed to speak about nuclear doctrine and strategy, and they did so in a very carefully scripted way. MOST READ YYMMDD_Template_Producer.00_02_39_17.Still015.jpg New Jan. 6 Trump documentary footage revealed U.S. military’s newest weapon against China and Russia: Hot air The Southwest is bone dry. Now, a key water source is at risk. Capitol Police say a Jan. 6 defendant’s demands could expose secret security features Shadow 2024 race: Newsom vs. DeSantis “We are in a more difficult crisis than anyone could have predicted with this constant nuclear saber-rattling that has been going on,” she added. “We have to take what [Putin’s] people say seriously, because he was serious about invading Ukraine when many of us hoped he would turn away at the last minute.” Vladimir Putin The nuclear brinkmanship from Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent weeks is unprecedented: He ordered a snap nuclear war game before the invasion and days later put his nuclear forces on high alert. | Adam Berry/Getty Images The dearth of diplomacy and growing distrust only fuels the risk of “mushroom clouds appearing on the battlefield,” Izumi Nakamitsu, United Nations high representative for disarmament affairs, warned on Tuesday. She hearkened back to the numerous instances during the decades-long standoff between the United States and then-Soviet Union when the two sides nearly came to nuclear blows. But diplomacy — and a good bit of luck — prevailed. “We are all aware of the close calls and near-misses,” she said at an event hosted by The Stimson Center. “Unfortunately, I fear we have forgotten many of those difficult lessons. A simple glance at a headline today can point to how acute nuclear risks have become.” Those concerns are shared across the spectrum by advocates for nuclear disarmament and those who believe a more robust U.S. nuclear arsenal is needed to deter adversaries. “I really am worried here that the war is going so badly for Putin … it raises the possibility of Putin feeling like he needs to escalate to win his way out of this conflict,” said Tim Morrison, a former Trump White House nuclear policy adviser who is now a researcher at the Hudson Institute, a hawkish think tank. That, he continued, “is right in the wheelhouse of Russian [military] doctrine for a low-yield nuclear or even chemical [weapons] use.” Morrison added that he fears the situation could unravel to the point where Putin is “raising the ante, climbing the rungs of the escalation ladder to make the point to NATO ‘hey, you guys really need to knock it off with arming the Ukrainians, I will no longer tolerate this.’” Russia has already ratcheted up the war with its hypersonic missile launch in Ukraine last week, and it has also been accused of dropping phosphorus bombs, which are banned under the Geneva Convention (though using the chemical to obscure troop movements or illuminate targets is not). “A simple glance at a headline today can point to how acute nuclear risks have become.” Izumi Nakamitsu, United Nations high representative for disarmament affairs NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on Wednesday the alliance will be assisting Ukraine with specialized equipment in the event of a Russian attack with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Gottemoeller said she fears that Moscow’s use of a tactical nuclear weapon is a serious possibility. “Putin is capable of anything,” she said. “He could declare there is an existential threat from a NATO ally resupplying the Ukrainians.” ‘You’re not going to necessarily know’ Others worry less about Putin ordering a nuclear attack and more about a miscalculation leading to the use of nuclear weapons. Nunn has been sounding the alarm about the threat of an accidental nuclear exchange as a result of a cyber attack on nuclear command-and-control systems — including by malign actors not directly involved in the conflict who could be confused for a nuclear adversary. “Third parties, third countries, might interfere in terms of command-and-control or warning systems,” he said of potential hackers. “Interference in command-and-control could be taken in this kind of atmosphere as probably a deliberate act.” Nunn successfully lobbied Congress last year to require the Pentagon to conduct a “failsafe review” of the U.S. nuclear arsenal “to prevent cyber-related and other risks that could lead to the unauthorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons as the result of an accident, misinterpretation, miscalculation, terrorism, unexpected technological breakthrough, or deliberate act.” Further complicating the task of U.S. and allied commanders to decipher Russian intentions, said Morrison, is the fact that so many Russian battlefield systems are also designed to unleash both conventional and nuclear or chemical warheads. In other words, it could be exceedingly difficult to know when the Russian military has decided to pursue a nuclear option. “One of the problems with Russian nuclear forces is how many of their systems are dual-capable,” Morrison said. “So you’re not going to necessarily know if the S-300 or that long-range [missile or artillery] battery is packing a conventional warhead or a nuclear one.” US Ambassador to UN: 'The world narrowly averted a nuclear catastrophe last night' SharePlay Video If U.S. military leaders detected Russian nuclear maneuvers, Nunn said, Biden may have no choice but to act more aggressively to deter Moscow, including putting American nuclear forces on alert. “If you’d seen bombers in the air, all sorts of activities in the nuclear forces, it would have been a different proposition,” Nunn said. “The risk of nuclear use is in my view higher through a mistake or blunder than through intent. But nevertheless blunders get more likely when nuclear weapons are put on alert.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Turkey Mediates Ukraine
Dalay 22 (Galip Dalay, Galip Dalay is associate fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House. He specializes in Turkish politics and Middle Eastern affairs. The views expressed in this commentary are his own. Read more opinion on CNN, March 29, 2022, “Why Turkey is in a unique position to mediate”, //RM)
As Russian and Ukrainian delegations arrive Tuesday in Istanbul for peace talks, Turkey's unique political position is under the spotlight. Could the nation that straddles Europe and the Middle East emerge as peacemaker? As the war grinds on, a growing list of countries are exploring the possibility of mediating, stepping in to avert further bloodshed and the conflict spreading beyond Ukraine's borders. Earlier this month, Turkey hosted Ukrainian and Russian foreign ministers for a trilateral meeting in its southern city of Antalya. Afterward, the Turkish foreign minister visited both Moscow and Kyiv. Likewise, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett visited Moscow for the same purpose. And China has signaled readiness for mediation. Potentially other countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, India or South Africa, might get in line to broker some kind of resolution. Almost all countries that have vied for the mediation role have also engaged in a strategic balancing act between the West and Russia for some time. Serving an intermediary role is a way for them to prevent further catastrophe in the conflict, and project international stature. But it is also a way for them to avoid making difficult choices the war might force upon them, such as choosing or tilting toward one side more clearly. But the list of fence-sitters in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is not confined to mediators. Many more countries have chosen to remain "neutral," including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Morocco. The rationale for abstaining differs between countries, but some reasons cut across. The international system is changing. And the idea that the world is no longer Western-centric, and increasingly multipolar, is widespread in the non-Western world. It informs their policies toward Russia, and toward China as well. As long as the dominant narrative of this war is put in a West/NATO versus Russia dichotomy, it will have little resonance in the non-Western world. Plus, the fence-sitting approach is also a way of signaling discontent with the US/Western policy. It was illustrative that the rulers of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, who depend on the US for their security, refrained from taking calls from President Joe Biden earlier this month. This snub was meant to convey their displeasure with the United States for Washington's insufficient support for their botched Yemen campaign. From food and energy supplies to geopolitical vulnerabilities, many other factors also define their approach. For instance, in spite of its close military ties with the US, Egypt depends heavily on Moscow in terms of its food security. It also closely cooperates with Russia in Libya, with both supporting the warlord Khalifa Haftar. (Kyiv accuses Haftar of sending mercenaries to aid Russia in Ukraine.) Likewise India, in spite of needing the West as a countervailing force against China, has long maintained close ties with Moscow; has purchased the Russian-made S-400 missile systems; and has pursued a policy of balancing between Russia and the West. ut of all these countries sitting on the fence and trying to mediate, Turkey has a unique profile and position. It is a NATO member, an organization for which Russia and previously the Soviet Union served as raison d'être or the foundational threat. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been increasingly castigating the Western-centric international system. But as a member of many Western institutions, Turkey is also a beneficiary, and in a sense, part of the geopolitical West. Meanwhile, Turkey also has maritime borders with both Ukraine and Russia. Plus, Turkey is Russia's largest trade partner in the Middle East and North Africa region. And it has competed and cooperated with Russia through conflict zones in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh in recent years. Compared to other contenders for mediation, Turkey has the highest stakes in this conflict. The war is fundamentally changing the geopolitics and balance of power in the Black Sea region, and Turkey is a major Black Sea power. Turkey will probably play a humanitarian role soon, too, as the number of refugees -- already in the millions -- rises. French President Emanuel Macron's announcement that France, Turkey and Greece will undertake a joint evacuation mission in Mariupol is a harbinger of a humanitarian role that might become more salient in Erdogan's policy down the road. In spite of its policy of not provoking Russia, Turkey is simultaneously not pursuing a policy of equidistance. It sells armed drones to Ukraine, which are exacting significant losses on Russian targets, and has closed the Turkish straits to warships. In addition to Russia dominating the Black Sea, it has a sizable Mediterranean presence where it is deeply involved in conflicts spots in Syria and Libya. Turkey's sea closure will put pressure on Russian policy in these conflict zones if the war is prolonged. Yet unlike other NATO members, Turkey has neither joined the Western sanctions against Moscow nor closed its airspace to Russia. Doing so would have probably triggered a Russian veto against Turkey's quest for mediating the conflict. And there are an increasing number of anti-war Russian activists and pro-Kremlin figures heading to Turkey. Turkey is basically trying to be pro-Ukraine without becoming too aggressively anti-Russia. Its capital city, Ankara, is too deeply exposed to Russia both economically and geopolitically. Russia is Turkey's largest source of tourists, grain imports and gas. In any case, at this stage, there is not yet any sign of the West pushing Turkey more strongly in joining the sanction regime against Moscow. And despite Turkey's efforts, the conflict is not ripe for mediation yet, because Moscow still appears to be hellbent on the military option. This does not mean that efforts or talks will cease in this conflict; to the contrary, we are likely to see more. Russia wants to give the impression it is interested in diplomacy to buy time and prevent further Western sanctions, but to no avail. No breakthrough should be expected anytime soon. In spite of this, keeping the idea of a diplomatic process alive is still important. Plus, the mediation serves Turkey's interests well. It boosts its international stature; turns Turkey into one of the major centers of diplomacy in this conflict; and delays some of the difficult decisions that it might face down the road. hat said, as the war drags on, Turkey's previous strategic juggling act may no longer be feasible, particularly as Russia is now more openly treated as an enemy of NATO and European security. From imperial Ottoman times to the present, Turkey and Russia have fought each other 13 times, but they have also cooperated. In the past, grievances vis-à-vis the West, or even anti-Westernism, have usually driven them closer to each other. Now, Russia's geopolitical revisionism and Putin's dramatic shift in post-Soviet ambitions will drive an uneasy Turkey closer toward the West.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Turkey Mediates Ukraine
Cuhadar and Diaz-Prinz 22 (Esra Çuhadar, Ph.D.; Dr. Esra Çuhadar is a senior expert for dialogue and peace processes at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Juan Diaz-Prinz, Ph.D., Dr. Juan Diaz-Prinz is a senior expert on mediation and dialogue at the U.S. Institute of Peace, April 28, 2022, “To Sustain Hopes for Peace in Ukraine, Keep an Eye on Turkey”, //RM)
Russia’s atrocities against Ukrainian civilians and its escalated warfare in southeastern Ukraine have swept aside last month’s public discussion of peace options as the countries briefly held talks in Turkey. Yet even in the darkest moments, all sides in this war, including the United States and Europe, have strong interests in maintaining channels for negotiation that can be used when opportunity re-emerges. Protecting that interest means understanding and maintaining Turkey’s role in facilitating talks—and its potential to serve more actively as a mediator. By at least some norms of peace processes, Turkey is an atypical mediator—but policymakers would do well to note strengths, not widely recognized, that it can bring to this role. While analysts have suggested China, Israel, India and others as possible mediators—and while no options should be ignored—Turkey has emerged as the most immediately useful go-between. It is no accident that Turkey was Kyiv’s and Moscow’s preferred choice for their brief attempts at negotiations in March. By design, Turkey’s role in those talks was limited to facilitation, providing a secure space and even-handed treatment of Russian and Ukrainian negotiators, but without injecting Turkish observations or proposals. Particularly for Russia, Turkey can seem like an illogical choice as mediator. It is not neutral between the combatants, but rather is a member of NATO, which Russia’s government has declared an enemy. Turkey has supported Ukraine with humanitarian gestures, evacuating some 16,000 civilians from combat zones and receiving nearly 60,000 Ukrainian refugees so far. It has even sold Turkish-built, armed, aerial drones that Ukrainians have deployed against Russian ground offensives. Also, Russia and Turkey have had their own conflicts, both historically and in recent years. Yet part of Turkey’s utility as an interlocutor for Russia may be some of these very qualities. Any eventual Russian-Ukrainian agreement will need acceptance—and likely, reconstruction funds—from the United States and Europe. As a NATO member, Turkey can offer influence with its U.S. and European allies in securing that support. Turkey has built credibility by developing a specific capacity for mediation over recent decades, and by showing itself to Russia and Ukraine as an independent actor that, while a NATO member, is not unduly influenced by the United States or Europe. Even now, with heightened battlefield violence and accusatory rhetoric from both sides, Turkey is continuing its go-between role. Its diplomats are continuing meetings with both sides separately and keeping lines of communication open. This creates an asset for managing, and hopefully limiting, the conflict—one that policymakers should not ignore.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Turkey Mediates Ukraine
Atlantic Council 22 (Atlantic Council IN TURKEY provides analysis and insight on Turkey and related developments with coverage from Turkish, regional, and international experts. This blog offers timely news and commentary on key issues related to transatlantic relations, energy, business, migration, and key players, February 25, 2022, “Experts react: What does the Russia-Ukraine conflict mean for Turkey?”, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/experts-react-what-does-the-russia-ukraine-conflict-mean-for-turkey//BVN SC)
For several weeks, President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu have been offering Turkey as a potential mediator between Russia and Ukraine. President Zelenskyy consistently welcomed this offer as part of his increasingly desperate search for any way to derail President Putin’s planned invasion. While Kremlin spokesman Dmitriy Peskov (a Turkey specialist who began his diplomatic career in Ankara) initially rejected the offer, the Kremlin subsequently reversed course and said Turkey’s mediation might be useful if it resulted in Ukraine coming into compliance with the Minsk Protocol (despite Russia being in serious breach of the same agreement). Putin, however, clearly favored military escalation rather than mediation, consigning the Minsk agreement to the dustbin of failed European diplomacy. Unlike Germany and France, co-leaders of the Minsk process, however, Turkey has a centuries-old history of confronting and cooperating with Russia. Ankara has been an outspoken supporter of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and a critic of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and developed a significant program of cooperation with Kyiv on military technology, while also retaining effective relations with Russia on energy, agricultural trade, and tourism as well as some key defense technologies (e.g., S-400 air defense systems). It is therefore possible Turkey could have a meaningful mediation role to play once Putin finishes his illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, which the Russian president will use to strengthen Russia’s position in the political negotiations that will come at the end of this war in Ukraine, as happens with all military conflicts.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Yes Turkish Economy Impact
Reuters 18 (Reuters is an international news agency owned by Thomson Reuters. It employs around 2,500 journalists and 600 photojournalists in about 200 locations worldwide. Reuters is one of the largest news agencies in the world. The agency was established in London in 1851 by the German-born Paul Reuter, 8-10-18, “US STOCKS-Turkey turmoil spills over to Wall St, shaves 200 pts off Dow”, SC)
Aug 10 (Reuters) - The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell more than 200 points on Friday amid a widespread selloff in global stocks as the Turkish lira tumbled due to concerns over the country’s economy and a deepening rift with the United States. President Donald Trump doubled tariffs on aluminum and steel imports from Turkey, deepening the currency’s losses and raising concerns that the crisis could weigh on other economies. “Problems in emerging markets are more important than ever because of the global growth engine that emerging markets have become,” Peter Cecchini, chief market strategist at Cantor Fitzgerald in New York, wrote in a note. “This will eventually matter greatly to U.S. markets.” Investors fled to safe-haven assets, with the dollar rising to a 13-month high and U.S. bond yields slipping to a three-week low. Ten of the 11 major S&P sectors were lower, with bank stocks taking the biggest hit. “Banks are leverage plays on the global economy. Anytime there’s a sniff of contagion they will be weak,” said Michael Antonelli, managing director, institutional sales trading at Robert W. Baird in Milwaukee. JPMorgan, Wells Fargo and Bank of America fell more than 1 percent, weighing the most on the benchmark S&P 500. At 9:48 a.m. EDT the Dow Jones Industrial Average was down 158.88 points, or 0.62 percent, at 25,350.35, the S&P 500 was down 13.35 points, or 0.47 percent, at 2,840.23 and the Nasdaq Composite was down 31.69 points, or 0.40 percent, at 7,860.09. S&P technology sector’s 0.42 percent fall was led by chipmakers. Intel dropped 2.6 percent after Goldman Sachs downgraded the stock to “sell”. Micron also fell 1.1 percent. Microchip’s shares fell 10.5 percent, the biggest decliner on the S&P, after it forecast disappointing second-quarter revenue. Data on Friday showed U.S. consumer prices rose in July and the underlying trend continued to strengthen, pointing to a steady increase in inflation pressures. Declining issues outnumbered advancers for a 2.34-to-1 ratio on the NYSE. Declining issues outnumbered advancers for a 1.85-to-1 ratio on the Nasdaq. The S&P index recorded 4 new 52-week highs and 7 new lows, while the Nasdaq recorded 33 new highs and 45 new lows.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Yes Turkish Economy Impact
Arbaa & Varon 19 (Ofer Arbaa: Department of Economics and Management, Ruppin Academic Center, Emek Hefer, Israel, Eva Varon: Graduate of Masters in Finance, London Business School, London, UK, December 2019, “Turkish currency crisis – Spillover effects on European banks”, SC)
In this paper, we aim to analyze the impact of the Turkish lira currency shock on the stock returns of 29 major banks in Europe. Literature after the global economic crisis of 2008, deals mostly with the financial spillovers of shocks in the US or Europe to emerging markets rather than vice versa and on a macro level (Stracca, 2014; Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2015; Chen, Filardo and Zhu, 2016; Fadejava, Feldkircher, & Reininger, 2017; Fratzscher, Duca and Straub, 2016). As a result, we look at data on some of the largest banks in Europe from both high and low risk economies. Our results illustrate the investors' sentiment of how resilient banks would be to possible bank defaults with spillover effects. The stocks of the overall banking sample react negatively to the crisis in Turkey and results indicate that banks that recently increased their leverage or experienced a decrease in liquidity or profitability have also been subject to higher abnormal losses on the event day and a day after the event, where the losses in general were the most severe. Nevertheless, leverage, liquidity and performance ratios are by themselves not sufficient to assess the financial soundness of banks, since the risk is more related to the quality than the quantity of the assets they carry. Across countries, we find Greece, Italy and Spain, the three economies of PIIGS analyzed in this paper, to be significantly related to the Turkish currency shock. Banks of Greece show the highest abnormal losses, which indicates that geographical proximity can be a factor in speculative attacks and/or crisis spillovers. Moreover, banks located in countries with lower systematic risk such as Germany, Netherlands and France react strongly to the Turkish lira crisis. Therefore, investors do not appear sensitive to whether a bank is operating in a less or more healthy banking system. In addition, losses of banks are not necessarily proportionate to the size of their exposures, with the exception of Turkish banks, which have been the most vulnerable. Spanish and Italian banks, which carry the largest amount of loans extended to Turkey do not seem to display the highest abnormal losses among the European banks. German banks, on the other hand, have no subsidiaries in Turkey and their claims are small relative to their capital (2.4%) and yet they disclose significant abnormal losses. In fact, the underlying risk resulting from banks' exposures to Turkey is difficult to assess, as there are many indirect factors that might influence the operation of banks such as other country and industry-specific risks. German, Dutch and French banks could be vulnerable to the extent that their economies will support the ailing financial system in other EU areas. UK and Switzerland, which are considered as outsiders of the EU financial system (the former in the process) appear to be immune to these pressures and therefore their banks are found relatively stable. We conclude that foreign banks' lending practices may be a source of instability in their financial markets even when a shock originates in a relatively small economy to which the banks have direct or indirect exposure. The role of banks in transmitting disturbances from emerging markets across borders is of increasing relevance with the presence of international banks and emerging markets with greater openness in their financial sectors. To better understand this phenomenon, further research would be useful that analyzes the response of individual bank balance sheets and lending decisions to such shocks from the emerging economies.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Relations Solve Turkish Economy
Büyük 3-14 (Hamdi Fırat Büyük currently works as a Political Analyst and a Journalist at the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) in Sarajevo. He was a visiting Research Fellow at the University of Sarajevo’s Faculty of Political Science in the academic year of 2017-2018. His main academic interests are the Balkan studies, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey-Balkan relations. Büyük worked as political analyst at Turkey’s prestigious think-tank International Strategic Research Organisation (USAK) for 3 years and he was also the editor-in-chief of USAK’s leading news and opinion page on International Politics, the Journal of Turkish Weekly (JTW), 3-14-22, “Turkey Rules Out Sanctioning Russia, Citing Risk to Economy”, Balkan Insight, https://balkaninsight.com/2022/03/14/turkey-rules-out-sanctioning-russia-citing-risk-to-economy//BVN SC)
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on Sunday on the margins of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum that Ankara will not join Western sanctions against Russia. “We did not join sanctions as a matter of principle and have no intention of joining [them],” Cavusoglu told a press conference. Cavusoglu said sanctions will not resolve problems and will damage the Turkish economy. “Our counterparts ask whether we will join these sanctions, and we explain to them how these sanctions will affect our economy and [business] sectors,” he said. Turkey continues to follow an ambiguous policy towards Russia following its February 24 invasion of Ukraine. It has condemned the Russian invasion and continues to have ties with Ukraine, but will not sanction Moscow or close its airpsace to Russian planes. Ankara helped to equip the Ukrainian army, most prominently with armed drones, which have resulted in heavy Russian casualties recently. Turkey hosted the first first high-level meeting between Russia and Ukraine last week in Antalya. The talks, attended by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, did not result in any breakthroughs but the two sides agreed to continue talks. “There is nothing to replace the negotiation process,” Lavrov told reporters after the meeting. The invasion of Ukraine started on February 24. However, the success of the Russian military is being questioned and the Ukrainian army and people have resisted more than was expected. Russia is meanwhile being hit by record-heavy Western sanctions, which aim to cripple its economy and businesses. According to the UN, more than 2.3 million Ukrainians have fled the country, seeking shelter in neighbouring countries, as Russia pounds major Ukrainian cities, including the capital, Kyiv, the second-largest city, Kharkiv and the port of Mariupol.
2022
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Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Turkey Stabilizes ME
YILDIZ 21 (Güney Yildiz is a researcher and journalist based in London with a focus on Turkey, Syria and the Kurds in the Middle East, 3-24-21, “Turkish-Russian Adversarial Collaboration in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh”, SWP Comment, SC)
Until 2016, among the two backers of Syria's Bashar al-Assad regime, Iran had the upper hand over Russia and exerted more influence on the regime apparatus and the ruling Assad family. Iran was the first country to come to Damascus' help by providing weapons, financial support, advisors, and proxies to fight the armed rebellion. When Turkey doubled down on its involvement in Syria starting in late 2015, the Assad regime could not turn to Tehran for protection, since Iran lacked the capacity to deliver. As the Turkish threat was combined with the possibility of imminent and crippling Western air strikes, the Assad regime had little choice but to become more reliable upon Russia. In that way, Turkey's presence allowed Moscow to dominate the Syrian regime and reduce Iran's influence. Turkey became the dominant backer of the opposition, as the armed groups realized they could not survive without Turkey due to Russia's intervention. Regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia gradually lost influence on the ground. Western diplomatic and political influence over the Syrian opposition also eroded - to Ankara's benefit. In December 2016, Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan envisaged Astana, Kazakhstan's capital, as a new venue for carrying on the Syria peace talks. In doing so, they also set in motion a game plan through which Moscow and Ankara controlled the warring parties in Syria and took control of the conflict. The Astana Process removed international mediation mechanisms set up in Vienna and Geneva from the center of attention. The Turkish-Russian cooperation also further curbed Iran's influence, since tensions between the Turkey-backed rebels and proxies and the Assad regime had been resolved through bilateral Ankara-Moscow talks rather than in Astana. Ankara's successful pressure campaign on Washington in 2019 to reduce the amount of help it was giving to the Syrian Kurds was of benefit to Moscow, which saw the presence of the United States and the partnership in eastern Syria to be much more challenging than Turkey's presence in north-west Syria. In 2016, Russia had given the green light for the Turkish incursion into Syria. In return, Ankara, in effect, facilitated the regime takeover of Aleppo, the most important city under rebel control.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Turkey Stabilizes ME
Daniel 21 (Rémi Daniel is a PhD candidate in the International Relations Department at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is a Neubauer Research Associate at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), working on Turkish current foreign policy, and an Azrieli Fellow, 6-15-21, “Turkish-Russian Relations: A Puzzle that Shakes the Middle East”, SC)
Since 2016, there has been increased engagement between Turkey and Moscow, which has become crucially important in various theaters of war and because of its significance for regional and global balances of power. Researchers have tried to assess it on numerous occasions. However, Turkish-Russian relations remain a puzzle for many. They have not led to a complete realignment of the two countries, as some of their most enthusiastic supporters and their most worried critics had foreseen, but on the other hand, they overcame crises that many observers at the time predicted would sever the relationship altogether. Onlookers used variety of expressions to qualify these relations and show the difficulty of defining them and their profound ambiguity, among others: “uneasy alliance,”[2] “fragile friendship,”[3] “partnership of convenience,”[4] “adversarial cooperation,”[5] “cooperative competition,”[6] and “brutal entente.”[7] Moreover, just in the last few months, a series of events occurred that impact, directly or indirectly, Turkish-Russian ties:[8] the implementation of the ceasefire in Nagorno Karabakh, new developments in Libya, the tensions surrounding Idlib, the election of Joe Biden, and changes in the Ukrainian conflict, as well as with Belarus. Each of these parts has emphasized some of the determining factors involved in the links between Moscow and Ankara. This article is an attempt to assess Turkish-Russian relations based on what emerged during these recent events. Converging interests Since the dismantling of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Russia have developed relations in different fields. Trade has been an important one of them[9] and Russia is one of Turkey’s top providers.[10] Energy occupies a central position in the exchanges between the two countries. Turkey relies heavily on Russia for natural gas, and at the same time it would like to serve as an energy hub between Western consumers and Eastern providers. Together with Russia’s attempts to create new streams for its production, this has served as a basis for common projects between the two countries, the latest of which being the Turkstream pipeline running from Russia to Turkey through the Black Sea.[11] Moscow also succeeded in being a partner in Turkey’s efforts to diversify its energy sources by building a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu.[12] Other significant fields of exchange between Turkey and Russia include tourism, with an important flow of Russian tourists to enjoy Turkish resorts, and construction. Beyond these long-term economic factors, the last few years have seen a new series of common political interests emerging between the two countries, or more precisely between their presidents. Erdoğan’s growing authoritarian tendencies have echoed Putin’s own political system.[13] The Russian president also played his cards very smartly when Turkey felt insufficiently supported by the West while facing of international and domestic threats, following, paradoxically, the downing of a Russian jet by the Turkish army in 2015 and in the context of the 2016 failed coup in Turkey. While, in both cases, Western leaders were hesitant in expressing support for Erdoğan, Putin saw an opportunity in the coup attempt and was among the first to call the Turkish president following the event.[14] Both leaders’ suspicion towards the US and European countries brought them closer to each other and these developments created a wider, more personal, basis for Turkish-Russian cooperation. Common successes While the economic relations between Russia and Turkey continued to grow slowly, Putin and Erdoğan developed a strong personal relationship. Starting in 2016, the two leaders met on a regular basis, which led to a new partnership between the two countries. This partnership found its most striking expression in Syria, where Moscow and Ankara understood that they had common interests. Russian support for Assad, Turkish worries that the Kurdish YPG, considered by many to be the Syrian branch of the PKK, could establish permanent control over a zone bordering Turkey led both countries to feel that the West, and more particularly the US, was retreating from Syria, which gave both Russia and Turkey the opportunity to coordinate some of their actions in the Syrian conflict. While, together with Iran, Turkey and Russia created their own platform to manage the Syrian civil war, the Astana process,[15] both countries also transformed the situation on the ground. Russian support enabled Assad to make important victories over insurgents and to restore his control over a large part of Syria. Turkey supported Islamist groups that fought the Kurdish militias and launched direct military interventions to create a buffer zone at its border. On the diplomatic scene, Putin and Erdoğan reached a series of ad hoc agreements to try and solve their different problems in Syria. Facing tensions in Idlib, where Turkey supports Islamist rebels, both as part of its strategy in Northern Syria and to avoid a new wave of Syrian refugees to its territory, whereas Russia supports Assad’s efforts to take over the city, the two leaders decided to turn the city into a “de-escalation zone” in 2018.[16] Similarly, Turkey’s advances in North-East Syria were inscribed in the Sochi agreement reached in October 2019 between Erdoğan and Putin.[17] It created a “safe zone” without Kurdish fighters and controlled by Syrian and Russian forces, while Turkish troops remained in the territories they had seized. Following the agreement, Turkish-Russian joint patrols started in the buffer zone, which embodied both countries’ cooperation in Syria. All this was made without consideration for Western positions on the conflict and was considered as a success for Erdoğan and Putin, who, by “putting boots on the ground” and creating faits accomplis, imposed their own agendas in Syria based on national interests and hard power,[18] against the more liberal Western plans for the country. Another important mutually beneficial move was the decision by the Turkish government to buy Russian S-400 missiles.[19] This was a way for Turkey to express its disappointment towards Washington and an attempt to free itself from its dependence on Western providers for its defense. For Putin, the sale was a blow to NATO. The introduction of Russian material into a NATO member’s military system, contrary to the alliance’s rules, created tensions between Turkey and its allies and weakened the organization’s internal cohesion.
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Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Relations Solve Syria
RFE/RL 17 (RFE/RL journalists report the news in 27 languages in 23 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established. We provide what many people cannot get locally: uncensored news, responsible discussion, and open debate, 9-29-17, “Putin, Erdogan Pledge To Closely Cooperate On Syria, Increase Trade”, RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty, SC)
Following talks in Ankara, the Turkish and Russian presidents said they agreed to closely cooperate on ending Syria’s civil war. Russian President Vladimir Putin said in the Turkish capital on September 28 that Moscow and Ankara will work to "deepen coordination" on ending the six-year-old war, adding the "necessary conditions" now existed for the conflict to end. Putin spoke at a joint press conference with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who said that Turkey “will continue close cooperation with Russia for reaching a political solution to the crisis in Syria." Erdogan said that the pair agreed to "pursue more intensely" the creation of a “de-escalation zone” in Idlib Province, in comments echoed by his Russian counterpart. "Readiness was confirmed to comply with the final agreements on creating four de-escalation zones, including the biggest of them in Idlib Province," Putin said. Moscow and Ankara support different sides in Syria’s war. Russia and Iran are backing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the conflict, while Turkey and the United States are supporting various rebel groups opposed to Assad’s rule. But Russia, Turkey, and Iran earlier this month agreed to create a "de-escalation zone" in Idlib, an area under the control of opposition forces in northern regions. Three other "de-escalation zones" have come into effect in different parts of Syria since July. Islamic State (IS) fighters, who captured large swathes of Syrian territory in 2014, are opposed by all sides and are being driven from most of their strongholds by the separate government and rebel campaigns. Putin's one-day working visit to Ankara comes three days after the two leaders spoke by telephone in a call that included a discussion of the controversial independence referendum in Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish region. Erdogan said after meeting Putin on September 28 that Ankara and Moscow agree that the territorial integrity of both Iraq and neighboring Syria must be preserved. He added that the September 25 nonbinding referendum in Iraq’s Kurdish region had no legitimacy and that the regional leaders must be prevented from making "bigger mistakes." Election authorities in the Kurdistan region say the independence referendum passed with 92 percent support. Ankara sees the vote, which was also fiercely opposed by the Baghdad government and much of the international community, as a threat to its national security and fears it will inflame separatism among its own Kurdish population. However, the Kremlin has not explicitly condemned the referendum, stressing instead the importance of maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity. On economic matters, the two presidents said they wanted to see progress in two major projects: the TurkStream gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant being built in Turkey with Russian collaboration. "We place great importance on the realization of these projects swiftly," Erdogan said. "We have observed during our talks that there are some disruptions. We will fix them quickly." Erdogan said the two states aim to increase their trade turnover to $100 billion a year. Putin said Russia and Turkey will continue to lower trade barriers both countries erected during a period of soured relations last year after a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian warplane on the Syrian border in late 2015. He said Russia has already lifted most of its restrictions on Turkish agricultural products, resulting in a 58.7 percent surge in imports of Turkish fruits, vegetables, and other farm products in the first half of 2017. Another sector that has rebounded is tourism, with the number of Russians taking vacations in Turkey increasing elevenfold so far this year to 2.5 million people, Putin said. Putin said that when the trade restrictions were in place last year, overall trade fell by 32 percent. But with the lifting of many restrictions, so far this year trade has rebounded by 31.5 percent, he said. The two leaders didn't mention a deal announced earlier this month for Turkey to buy Russia's most advanced air defense missile system, the S-400, in its first major weapons purchase from Moscow. The deal, Turkey’s most significant weapons purchase from a non-NATO supplier, has raised concerns in the West over technical compatibility with NATO equipment. Both Moscow and Ankara have brushed off those concerns, with Erdogan saying on September 12 that Turkey “makes the decisions about our own independence ourselves.”
2022
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Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Relations Solve Syria
Asharq Al-Awsat 6-17 (Asharq Al-Awsat is an Arabic international newspaper headquartered in London. A pioneer of the "off-shore" model in the Arabic press, the paper is often noted for its distinctive green-tinted pages. The New York Times in 2005 called Asharq Al-Awsat "one of the oldest and most influential in the region,” 6-17-22, “Russia, Turkey, Iran Agree to Ease Tensions in Northern Syria”, SC)
Russia, Turkey and Iran agreed to calm the situation in northern Syria by implementing relevant agreements, Reuters reported on Thursday. In a joint statement following talks in Kazakhstan, the three countries announced that they decided to deploy more efforts to ensure the stability of the situation in the de-escalation zone in Syria’s Idlib. According to Reuters, the three countries “highlighted the necessity to maintain calm on the ground by fully implementing all agreements on Idlib”, without specifying what that meant for Turkey’s plans to carry out a military operation against the Kurdush-led People's Protection Units (YPG) there. Several agreements have been concluded between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including the Sochi Memorandum of 2019, in which Turkey committed to stop its military operation dubbed the “Peace Spring.” It also included the establishment of a demilitarized zone and deployment of joint Russian-Turkish patrols ensure a ceasefire.
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Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – AT: Ukraine
Arab News 3/20, 3/20/2022, “Turkey says Russia and Ukraine nearing agreement on ‘critical’ issues,” , RES
NATO member Turkey shares a maritime border with Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea, has good relations with both and has offered to mediate between them.
It has voiced support for Ukraine, but has also opposed far-reaching Western sanctions imposed on Moscow over the invasion.