2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – AT: Ukraine
Mankoff 22 (Jeffrey Mankoff, Jeffrey Mankoff is senior associate with the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program. His areas of expertise include international security, Russian foreign policy, regional security in the Caucasus and Central Asia, ethnic conflict, and energy security, January 20, 2022, “Regional Competition and the Future of Russia-Turkey Relations”, , RM)
Western observers are increasingly worried and puzzled by the apparent rapprochement between Vladimir Putin’s Russia and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey, which is taking place despite an escalating Russo-Turkish competition for influence extending from North Africa through southeastern Europe and the Caucasus to Central Asia. A shared aspiration to legitimate the idea of regional powers policing their respective neighborhoods and building regional orders outside the framework of Western-led multilateral institutions and based on hierarchy, limited sovereignty, and the disruption of smaller states’ territorial integrity provides a basis for Russo-Turkish cooperation. Yet by inserting themselves more directly into their neighbors’ disputes and conflicts, Russia and Turkey have multiplied the number of friction points between them. This combination of deepening political-economic relations alongside escalating confrontation throughout their shared periphery rests on unstable foundations. Which of these tendencies wins out—a shared interest in moving toward a less Western-centric global order based on post-imperial spheres of influence, or competition over defining the nature and extent of those spheres—will be a critical determinant of the future course of Russo-Turkish relations.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – AT: Ukraine
Bardakçı 21 (Mehmet Bardakçı, 12-6-21, “Is a Strategic Partnership Between Turkey and Russia Feasible at the Expense of Turkey’s Relations with the EU and NATO?”, Comparative Southeast European Studies, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2021-0001/html?lang=en//BVN SC)
The article mainly contends that since the real and expected benefits from the European Union (EU) and NATO were not delivered sufficiently from Turkey’s perspective, Turkey looked for alternatives and collaborated with Russia more intensely in recent years. Turkey’s cooperation with Russia was also facilitated by several global, political, economic, conjectural, security-related, and individual-level factors. Another argument of the study is that despite Turkey’s intensive collaboration with Russia, it is not feasible for Turkey to build a strategic partnership with it in the short- and medium-term at the expense of its relations with NATO and the EU. The main reasons for this are, in addition to the institutional and social shortcomings, geostrategic divergences, Russia’s inadequacy as an economic actor, the pitfalls of an asymmetric relationship with Russia, the security risks posed by Russia, NATO’s continuing importance for Turkey’s security needs, and the incompatibility of Russia’s and Turkey’s political systems. Keywords: EU; NATO; Russia; strategic partnership; Turkish foreign policy Introduction The arrival of the Russian S-400 air defence system in Turkey in July 2019 was welcomed enthusiastically by many in Turkey. This breakthrough event was even described by some in Turkey as the “country’s liberation from the West” (Tol and Taşpınar 2019, 107). Almost a decade ago, the question started to be asked as to whether Turkey was drifting away from the West, especially since it had approached Iran and voted against sanctions on Iran over its nuclear programme in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as well as clashed with Israel over the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010. This time, however, this question is more pronounced and the likelihood of a strategic shift became more tangible with the arrival of a weapon system from a country that has been confronting the West recently. Given that Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union (EU) have been at a nadir in recent years, many regarded the acquisition of the Russian weapon system as a precursor of Turkey’s withdrawal from the North Atlantic Alliance (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO) and the EU. In addition to many other factors, Moscow’s and Ankara’s bitter relations with the West are a major reason why the two countries have closed ranks in recent years. A milestone for Moscow’s relationship with the West was its annexation of Crimea in March 2014 while the coup plot against the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) government in Turkey in July 2016 marked a watershed in Ankara’s relations with the West. Russia had to confront a series of economic sanctions from the West after 2014 while Turkey was deeply disappointed with its Western allies for their slow and reluctant condemnation of the coup attempt. Ankara has even aired doubts that the West might have been behind the coup attempt. These events have helped peak the two countries’ deeply-ingrained sense of distrust towards the West. As one observer put, “Despite their obvious differences and even antagonisms, Russia and Turkey are united by one thing—the fact that they are two great powers connected historically, culturally, and geographically to a Europe that never fully accepted them as one of their own” (Lukyanov, People with Big Ambitions, The Moscow Times, 19 July 2016). A major objective of this article is to unpack the puzzle of whether Russia could replace the EU and NATO as a strategic partner for Turkey. The article contends that in addition to some factors facilitating the Russo–Turkish rapprochement, Turkey searched for alternatives, collaborating with Russia owing to the decline in the real and expected benefits from the EU and NATO from the Turkish perspective. Another major contention of this article is that despite the close collaboration between Moscow and Ankara, in particular after the coup attempt against the Turkish Government in July 2016, it is hard for Turkey to forge a strategic partnership with Russia because of significant divergent geostrategic interests, Russia’s inadequacy as an economic actor, the downsides of an asymmetric relationship with Russia, the security risks posed by Russia, the continuing importance of NATO for Turkey’s security as well as the incompatibility of Turkey’s and Russia’s political systems. Moreover, the absence of a solid social basis and the lack of institutionalization in their relations further make it infeasible for Turkey to switch from the Transatlantic Alliance to Russia. The study is divided into three sections. The first part concerns the motives that brought Moscow and Ankara together, including, first and foremost, their strained relationship with the West, economic interests, conjectural factors such as the Syrian conflict, transformation of the global governance system, and similarity of their political culture based on security and personal harmony between the leaders. The second part draws attention to the limitations in the relationship, and the third part explains why a strategic partnership between Turkey and Ankara and at the expense of Turkey’s partnership with the EU and NATO is not feasible in the foreseeable future. Finally, the conclusion wraps up the article.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – AT: Swindland
Kirişci 22 (Kemal Kirişci is a nonresident senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe's Turkey Project at Brookings, with an expertise in Turkish foreign policy and migration studies, June 27, 2022, “Erdoğan’s problem is not with Sweden and Finland but with Turkey’s Western vocation”, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/27/erdogans-problem-is-not-with-sweden-and-finland-but-with-turkeys-western-vocation//RM)
Erdoğan first announced that he did not view the NATO membership bids of either Finland or Sweden favorably, on the grounds that they had become “safe houses” for terrorists. This was a reference to the presence and activities of individuals and organizations with ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as well as Gülenists, widely recognized to be the perpetrators of the coup attempt against him in July 2016. The announcement came on May 13 and may initially have been an attempt to divert attention from two events around that time: a political ban of opposition politician Canan Kaftancıoğlu, widely credited for engineering the defeat of Erdoğan’s preferred candidate in Istanbul’s 2019 mayoral elections, and the violent intervention by Israeli police during the funeral of the slain Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, over which Erdoğan chose to remain uncharacteristically silent. He subsequently intensified his objections by adding that “all forms of arms embargoes,” especially by Sweden, against Turkey’s defense industry go against “the spirit of military partnership under the NATO umbrella.” Erdoğan has since made it clear that he will not easily relinquish his veto unless these objections are addressed. A flurry of diplomatic activities followed to address what Stoltenberg on numerous occasions defined as Turkey’s “legitimate” concerns, without concrete results. The deadlock appears to result from different definitions of “terrorism” and Erdoğan’s insistence on the extradition of persons including Swedish nationals and a member of the Swedish parliament. It goes without saying that direct material support, as highlighted by several experts and former Turkish diplomats, provided to the PKK — recognized by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union as a terrorist organization — is indeed problematic and needs to be resolved. The complication arises from a definition of terrorism in Turkish law that goes beyond criminalizing participation in violent acts and infringes on basic freedom of speech. This loose and often aggressive framing of the terms terrorist and terrorism is regularly used by Erdoğan and members of his government to silence and repress their critics and opponents. Erdoğan’s uncompromising stance contrasts with the earlier years of his leadership of Turkey, when he seemed to be committed to liberal democratic values and when Ankara — with considerable U.S., Finnish, and Swedish support — started its accession process towards EU membership. Turkey achieved its greatest integration with the trans-Atlantic community, and shared peacekeeping responsibilities on behalf of NATO in its neighborhood, and persistently supported NATO’s enlargement including the “open door” policy. Erdoğan has since transformed Turkey’s parliamentary system to a presidential one with practically no checks and balances on his power. Growing authoritarianism and repression of critics and opponents has become a defining face of the country, with the sentencing of civil society activist Osman Kavala and Selahattin Demirtaş, former leader of the main Kurdish political party, together with the likelihood that Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu, who enjoys higher poll ratings than Erdoğan, may well face a political ban too. NATO has became another target of Erdoğan’s vitriol as he blames the West for Turkey’s growing economic ills and political isolation. This goes back to the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, when members of parliament from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) alleged NATO involvement without presenting a shred of evidence, even calling it a “terror organization.” This allegation has been periodically nurtured by the government even if Erdoğan has personally avoided it. Yet, Erdoğan’s close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, decision to purchase S-400 missiles from Russia, and a relentless diplomatic battle over them with Washington has deeply damaged the reliability of Turkey as a NATO ally. Skepticism about Turkey’s place in the alliance was further aggravated by Erdoğan’s threat to expel 10 Western ambassadors, seven of them from allies, for asking him to implement a European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruling and release Kavala. Instead, Erdoğan chose to categorically dismiss the ECHR decision as well as the Council of Europe’s initiation of disciplinary action against Turkey. This persistent anti-Western and anti-U.S. narrative has found a receptive mood in a Turkish citizenry deprived of access to alternative discourses. Not surprisingly, the Turkish public in recent years has perceived a greater security threat from the United States than from Russia (see slides 81-83 here). According to Metropoll, a public opinion research company, 65% of respondents in April 2022 did not trust NATO; in January, 39.4% preferred closer relations with China and Russia compared with 37.5% preferring closer relations with the EU and U.S.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – T/L
Mankoff 3-10 (Jeffrey Mankoff is a distinguished research fellow at the U.S. National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies specializing in Russian and Eurasian affairs and a nonresident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is the author of the forthcoming book, Empires of Eurasia: How Imperial Legacies Shape International Security, 3-10-22, “Turkey’s Balancing Act on Ukraine Is Becoming More Precarious”, Foreign Policy, SC)
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has upended the geopolitical calculations of countries around the world. For Turkey, a NATO member that has performed a delicate balancing act between Kyiv and Moscow, the war is forcing some hard choices. Like his World War II-era predecessor Ismet Inonu, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seeks to keep Turkey out of today’s conflict as much as possible, while maximizing his own room to maneuver. Amid the escalating conflict and humanitarian disaster, however, Ankara faces growing pressure to pick sides. Turkey faces a range of vulnerabilities from either an emboldened or a desperate Russia. Erdogan’s strategy therefore centers on supporting Ukraine without jeopardizing ties with Moscow. Over the longer term, the course of the war itself will do much to determine how Ankara maintains this balancing act. Strong, unified NATO support for Ukraine, along with Russian military setbacks, would provide the best opportunity to reinforce Ankara’s commitment to Ukraine—and to the alliance. Russia and Turkey have for centuries been rivals across a wide geographic space encompassing the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Black Sea, and Central Asia. Vulnerability to Russian military power throughout these regions has encouraged Turkish leaders to seek allies: Britain and France in the Crimean War, Germany in World War I, and NATO in the Cold War. When the international environment has been less threatening, though, Turkey has looked to Russia (and the Soviet Union) for economic opportunities and as a partner for boosting its own strategic autonomy. The Soviet Union’s collapse created a series of buffer states (including Ukraine) that shielded Turkey from Russian military power, allowing Ankara to pursue a more forward-leaning policy in Eurasia. It also opened up new opportunities for Turkish companies in Russia, which became a major source of tourists to Turkey’s Mediterranean resorts as well as a lucrative market for exporters and construction companies (many with close ties to Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party). Turkey also turned to Russia for energy, at one point getting the majority of its natural gas from Russia, and signing a deal with Russia’s state-owned Rosatom to build Turkey’s first nuclear power plant at Akkuyu. Ties with Russia also allowed Ankara to hedge against what it perceived to be excessive dependence on the West amid tensions over Washington’s role in the Syrian conflict. Erdogan’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system after he was unable to strike a deal with the United States for the Patriot system sent a message to Turkey’s NATO allies that Ankara had other options. Some voices in Turkish political and military circles would like to go further, seeing Russia’s pursuit of a non-Western security order in Eurasia as preferable to continued dependence on NATO. Improved relations with Moscow also reflected a growing closeness between Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was the first foreign leader to call Erdogan after the failed 2016 coup attempt, and whose strongman rule contrasted with mounting U.S. and European criticism over Turkey’s democratic backsliding. Russia and Turkey nevertheless remain geopolitical rivals. Their forces and proxies have clashed repeatedly—in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus. In February 2020, Russian forces (or Russian-backed Syrian forces) bombed Turkish positions near Idlib, Syria, killing over 30 Turkish soldiers. Nor was Russia the only target of Turkey’s Eurasian outreach. Ukraine is also important to Turkey as both an economic and a geopolitical partner. Trade between the two countries has increased rapidly since Ukraine’s 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity, reaching $7.4 billion in 2021. Ankara and Kyiv also signed a free trade agreement on the eve of the most recent Russian invasion. Since 2019, Turkey has also supplied Ukraine with military assistance, notably the Bayraktar TB2 armed drones that were instrumental in Azerbaijan’s victory over Russian ally Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh and that have inflicted significant casualties on Russian-backed forces in both Libya and the Donbass. During Erdogan’s visit to Kyiv at the start of February, the two countries agreed to set up a factory to produce drones inside Ukraine. Turkey’s security is much better served by an independent Ukraine than a Ukraine under Russian military-political domination. Further territorial changes at Ukraine’s expense would allow Moscow to bolster its naval presence along the northern Black Sea coast. (Russia’s post-2014 militarization of Crimea has already tipped the balance of power in the Black Sea against Turkey.) While the bulk of refugees fleeing Ukraine have so far gone westward, a longer conflict could also send refugee flows to Turkey, a country still struggling with the effects of large-scale migration from Middle Eastern conflicts. Turkey also remains susceptible to Russian retaliation. Despite some diversification in recent years and new offshore discoveries, Turkey is dependent on Russia for the bulk of its gas and a significant percentage of its oil. With Turkey’s inflation likely to be above 40 percent for the year, turbulence in energy markets could have damaging effects not just on Turkey’s economy but on Erdogan’s political fortunes ahead of elections next year. Even with its military tied down in Ukraine, Russia retains the capacity to hit back at Turkish interests. Idlib remains a particular liability, packed as it is with refugees and a motley collection of rebels who would likely flee for the Turkish border in the event of an offensive on the city. Because of all this, and because its relationship with Moscow is important to Erdogan’s larger geopolitical ambitions, Turkish support for Ukraine has been real—but cautious. On the first day of the conflict, Erdogan characterized the Russian attack as “unacceptable” and “contrary to international law.” Turkey has since reiterated long-standing commitments to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (including Crimea, the annexation of which Ankara has insisted it will never recognize). Yet many Turkish statements during the first week or so of the conflict lacked the moral clarity of those from its Western counterparts, instead calling on both Russia and Ukraine to find a diplomatic solution. With the conflict worsening and Western unity holding, Ankara grew slightly bolder. In a March 6 telephone call with Putin, Erdogan called for a cease-fire, the opening of a humanitarian corridor, and a peace agreement. Turkey has also continued to supply both humanitarian assistance and military equipment to Ukraine. Perhaps its most visible contribution has been continuing to supply drones to Ukraine—deflecting Russian criticism with the disingenuous claim that such sales are purely private transactions. At Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s request, Turkey also agreed to invoke the 1936 Montreux Convention, which allows Ankara to regulate the passage of warships through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits—the first time since World War II it has done so. The decision required a formal determination that the Russia-Ukraine conflict qualified as a war—thereby rejecting Putin’s description of a “special military operation.” Effectively, the decision to invoke Montreux means that Turkey can prevent Russia from reinforcing its naval forces already present in the Black Sea with ships based outside the Black Sea. (The bulk of Russia’s navy remains engaged in the Eastern Mediterranean off Syria.) Particularly if the conflict drags on, closure of the straits could degrade Moscow’s naval and amphibious capabilities. Still, Turkey’s rhetoric remains cautious, and it continues its policy of engagement with Moscow. Erdogan has spoken with Putin on multiple occasions since the start of the war, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is set to attend the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in Turkey later this week, where he plans to meet his Ukrainian counterpart, Dmytro Kuleba.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – T/L
MICHAEL RUBIN 19, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “It’s Not Us—It’s Him,” https://www.the-american-interest.com/2019/12/03/its-not-us-its-him//BVN SC
Turkey’s recent turn toward Russia is a reflection of Erdoğan’s animosity toward America. To suggest Erdoğan pragmatically seeks to get the best deal for his country by forcing Washington and Moscow to bid for Turkey’s affection misses the point. First, the idea of NATO is collective defense in times of crisis, not an opportunity for members to launch bidding wars for cash, concessions, or contracts. Second, to apologize for Erdoğan’s tilt toward Russia ignores his embrace or promotion of pro-Russian aides and allies like military counselor Adnan Tanrıverdi or politician and activist Doğu Perinçek, a paramount influence among Turkey’s top brass, an unabashed critic of NATO, and a supporter of both Russia and a Eurasian alliance. After Israel intercepted the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish-owned ship seeking to run Israel’s blockade and support Hamas, killing nine Turks in the process, Erdoğan threatened to use every international forum to undercut Israel. Erdoğan now uses the same tactics against the United States and NATO: Rather than simply withdraw from an alliance that he appears to despise, Erdoğan seeks to cripple it from within. NATO is a consensus driven organization, so Turkey and its Russian backer gain more leverage from filibustering its processes than by simply leaving the alliance. That there is no mechanism within NATO to expel a member only strengthens Turkey’s leverage. Turkey may remain a member of NATO, but its strategic pivot toward Russia shifts the balance toward Moscow across the entire Black Sea region, allowing Russia to further solidify its strategic encroachment on Georgia and Ukraine.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – AT: NATO Moderates Turkey
HEISBOURGSENIOR 20 (FRANÇOIS HEISBOURGSENIOR is an ADVISER AT THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, “Judy Asks: Is NATO Paralyzed Over the Greece-Turkey Conflict?,” 9/3/20, SC)
NATO’s purpose as an organization is to ensure the collective defense of its members on the basis of its founding Washington Treaty. It was never designed to adjudicate disputes between its members. It should therefore not come as a surprise that NATO is paralyzed over the current Greece-Turkey conflict. Similarly, in 1974, when Greece and Turkey were on the cusp of war over Cyprus, it wasn’t NATO as such which prevented hostilities but the involvement of its most powerful member, the United States of America. At the time, the United States leaned heavily on the contenders to avoid direct confrontation and basically imposed a ceasefire on Turkish forces operating in Cyprus. In 2020, the [US] United States has adopted a much lower profile and is operating without a clear sense of direction. This applies both to the Greek-Turkish nexus and to the broader multifaceted crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, which involves numerous local and external players.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – AT: Russia Isolated
Reuters 3-5 (Reuters is an international news agency owned by Thomson Reuters. It employs around 2,500 journalists and 600 photojournalists in about 200 locations worldwide. Reuters is one of the largest news agencies in the world. The agency was established in London in 1851 by the German-born Paul Reuter, 3-5-22, “"Russia Too Big To Be Isolated": Kremlin On Sanctions By US, Europe”, NDTV, SC)
London: The Kremlin said on Saturday that the West was behaving like bandits but that Russia was far too big to be isolated as the world was much larger than just the United States and Europe. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters that the West was engaged in "economic banditry" against Russia and that Moscow would respond. He did not specify what response there would be but said it would be in line with Russian interests. "This does not mean Russia is isolated," Peskov told reporters. "The world is too big for Europe and America to isolate a country, and even more so a country as big as Russia. There are many more countries in the world." Peskov said that if the United States imposed sanctions on Russia's energy exports then it would give a considerable jolt to energy markets.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – AT: Russia Isolated
Reuters 4-12 (Reuters is an international news agency owned by Thomson Reuters. It employs around 2,500 journalists and 600 photojournalists in about 200 locations worldwide. Reuters is one of the largest news agencies in the world. The agency was established in London in 1851 by the German-born Paul Reuter, 4-12-22, “Impossible to isolate Russia, or hold it back: Putin warns the West”, Business Standard, SC)
President Vladimir Putin warned the West on Tuesday that attempts to isolate Moscow would fail, citing the success of the Soviet space programme as evidence that Russia could achieve spectacular leaps forward in tough conditions. Russia says it will never again depend on the West after the United States and its allies imposed crippling sanctions on it to punish Putin for his Feb. 24 order for what he called a "special military operation" in Ukraine. Sixty one years to the day since the Soviet Union's Yuri Gagarin blasted off into the history books by becoming the first man in space, Putin travelled to the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Russia's Far East, 3,450 miles (5550 km) east of Moscow. "The sanctions were total, the isolation was complete but the Soviet Union was still first in space," Putin said, according to Russian state television. "We don't intend to be isolated," Putin said. "It is impossible to severely isolate anyone in the modern world - especially such a vast country as Russia." Russia's Cold War space successes such as Gagarin's flight and the 1957 launch of Sputnik 1, the first artificial satellite from earth, have a particular pertinence for Russia: both events shocked the United States. The launch of Sputnik 1 prompted the United States to create NASA in a bid to catch up with Moscow. Putin says the "special military operation" in Ukraine is necessary because the United States was using Ukraine to threaten Russia - including via the NATO military alliance - and that Moscow had to defend Russian-speaking people in Ukraine from persecution. He said on Tuesday that the had no doubts Russia would achieve all of its objectives in Ukraine - a conflict he cast as both inevitable and essential to defend Russia in the long term. "Its goals are absolutely clear and noble," Putin said. "It's clear that we didn't have a choice. It was the right decision." Ukrainian forces have mounted stiff resistance and the West has imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia in an effort to force it to withdraw its forces. Russia's economy is on track to contract by more than 10% in 2022, the biggest fall in gross domestic product since the years following the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, former finance minister Alexei Kudrin said on Tuesday. Putin toured the space port in Russia's far east with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. "Why an earth are we getting so worried about these sanctions?" Lukashenko said, according to Russian state television. Lukashenko, who has a track record of sometimes saying things that appear to jar with his closest ally's stated positions on a range of issues, has insisted that Belarus must be involved in negotiations to resolve the conflict in Ukraine and has said that Belarus had been unfairly labelled "an accomplice of the aggressor".
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – AT: Not United
Kirişci 6-27 (Kemal Kirişci is a nonresident senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe's Turkey Project at Brookings, with an expertise in Turkish foreign policy and migration studies. From 2013 until 2020, he was TÜSİAD senior fellow at Brookings and director of the Turkey Project. Kirişci is a regular contributor to the Order from Chaos blog at Brookings, 6-27-22, “Erdoğan’s problem is not with Sweden and Finland but with Turkey’s Western vocation”, Brookings, SC)
NATO has became another target of Erdoğan’s vitriol as he blames the West for Turkey’s growing economic ills and political isolation. This goes back to the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, when members of parliament from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) alleged NATO involvement without presenting a shred of evidence, even calling it a “terror organization.” This allegation has been periodically nurtured by the government even if Erdoğan has personally avoided it. Yet, Erdoğan’s close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, decision to purchase S-400 missiles from Russia, and a relentless diplomatic battle over them with Washington has deeply damaged the reliability of Turkey as a NATO ally. Skepticism about Turkey’s place in the alliance was further aggravated by Erdoğan’s threat to expel 10 Western ambassadors, seven of them from allies, for asking him to implement a European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruling and release Kavala. Instead, Erdoğan chose to categorically dismiss the ECHR decision as well as the Council of Europe’s initiation of disciplinary action against Turkey. This persistent anti-Western and anti-U.S. narrative has found a receptive mood in a Turkish citizenry deprived of access to alternative discourses. Not surprisingly, the Turkish public in recent years has perceived a greater security threat from the United States than from Russia (see slides 81-83 here). According to Metropoll, a public opinion research company, 65% of respondents in April 2022 did not trust NATO; in January, 39.4% preferred closer relations with China and Russia compared with 37.5% preferring closer relations with the EU and U.S.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – AT: Not United
TASS 7/19, Russian news agency, 7/19/2022, “Relations between Russia and Turkey are developing, Putin says,” , RES
TEHRAN, July 19. /TASS/. Relations between Moscow and Ankara are developing, and the bilateral trade turnover is growing at a swift rate, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Tuesday at the meeting with President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the sidelines of the Astana Format Trilateral Summit in Tehran. Relations between the two countries are developing; "against all odds, the trade turnover is growing, interestingly, at a very significant rate," the Russian leader said. Putin also expressed satisfaction that the two presidents have the opportunity to hold the bilateral meeting on the summit sidelines.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – AT: Not United
Paul T. Levin 19, is docent in International Relations and the founding director of the Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies, “What’s Driving Turkey’s Foreign Policy?,” 10/24/19, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-future-of-turkeys-foreign-policy//BVN SC
At the risk of oversimplification, it may be useful to talk of an emerging global struggle between two forms of governance: liberal democracy and oligarchical authoritarianism. There are still meaningful differences between the West on the one side, and Russia and other oligarchical authoritarian states on the other — despite the emergence of Trump and other conservative-nationalist populists in power in countries like Hungary. Thus, while it may be misleading to speak of a new Cold War, there does appear to be a new ideological divide emerging between Russia and the West that has a clear national security dimension. If this continues over the coming decade, Turkey will face the same question as during the Cold War: Which side is it on? In light of the transformations that have occurred in the Turkish foreign policy elite, it seems much more likely for Turkey to side with Russia this time around. There are strong affinities between the Russian and Turkish models of governance today, and leaders in both countries share a desire to be liberated from the interference of Western governments, non-governmental organizations, and international institutions concerned with internal matters such as human rights and freedoms. They both have ambitions to be more than leaders of mere subservient states on the periphery of Western institutions. Russia wants respect as a world power,111 Turkey as a formidable regional power. And there are also significant push factors in Turkey’s relations with the West. Unless there is a regime transformation in Turkey, it is likely to continue to diverge from its traditional Western allies.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – AT: Not United
Dixon et. al. 7-19 (Robyn Dixon is a foreign correspondent on her third stint in Russia, after almost a decade reporting there beginning in the early 1990s. In November 2019 she joined The Washington Post as Moscow bureau chief, Kareem Fahim has served as the Istanbul bureau chief and a Middle East correspondent for The Washington Post since September 2016. Previously, he worked for 11 years as a staff reporter for the New York Times, with assignments on the metro desk and as a Cairo-based foreign correspondent reporting on the Arab uprisings and their aftermath, Karina Tsui is a reporting intern on The Washington Post’s Foreign desk. Before The Post, she was a Toni Stabile fellow for investigative reporting at Columbia Journalism School, 7-19-22, “Putin makes rare international trip to Iran amid isolation from the West”, The Washington Post, SC)
The presence of Erdogan, who has tried to position himself as a mediator between Moscow and Kyiv, raised hopes that he could help build on progress made last week in Turkey, when Russia and Ukraine agreed to preliminary steps that would allow grain shipments to resume from Ukrainian ports. Russia is blockading Ukraine’s Black Sea shipping routes, including the major port of Odessa, contributing to a global food crisis as the price of bread, cooking oil and fertilizer soars. More than 100 ships laden with grain are estimated to be stuck at port or at sea. U.N. officials, who are also helping to broker the grain agreement between Ukraine and Russia, said more work needed to be done. During a news briefing Monday, Farhan Haq, a spokesman for the U.N. secretary general, said that “we don’t have any particular expectations” that a grain deal will emerge from the three-way meeting in Iran. Since the talks in Istanbul last week, he added, “we feel that incrementally, there’s been a little bit more progress made, but there’s nothing to announce at this stage.” Putin sounded a similar note at the outset of his meeting with Erdogan, saying, “It’s true that not all issues have been resolved yet, but the fact that there is movement is already good.” The leaders were also discussing Turkey’s plans for a military incursion into northern Syria, targeting a U.S.-allied Kurdish-led militia. Ankara says the planned operation is aimed at pushing back fighters affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which it regards as a terrorist group. But any military operation could put Turkey in conflict with Iran and Russia, which are allies of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and have maintained military forces in the country. Khamenei appeared to signal his displeasure during a meeting with Erdogan on Tuesday, saying that a military attack was “definitely to the detriment of Syria, Turkey and the region.” An aide to Putin, Yuri Ushakov, said before the Tehran meetings that Russia opposed any action that violated Syria’s territorial integrity. But as the leaders gathered late Tuesday to address the media, Erdogan brushed off Russia’s and Iran’s opposition to his military plans: “I hear from you, my dear friends, that you understand Turkey’s security concerns. I am grateful for this. However, words alone are no cure for wounds.” Erdogan also criticized attacks on civilians in rebel-held Idlib province in northwestern Syria, carried out by Russia or the Syrian government, saying they “undermine our efforts for a political solution.” Putin’s visit comes just days after President Biden visited Saudi Arabia and Israel, where he spoke of fears that China and Russia were seeking to fill a power vacuum in the Middle East. “We can’t let that happen,” he said Friday in Tel Aviv. “There is a reality in the region with Russia in the center of it,” said Vali Nasr, professor of Middle Eastern studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. “This has countered the United States’ belief that the dynamic [in the region] is about Israel and Arabs getting together against Iran. The Putin-Erdogan-Raisi meetings show that there are other players and dynamics beyond those in Riyadh last week.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – Turkey-West/NATO Coop
Yegin 19 (Mehmet Yegin is a Visiting Fellow at the Americas Research Division at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin. He works on American politics and Turkish Foreign Policy. He studied on American Politics in his MA studies at the University of Cincinnati in Ohio, USA. He obtained his Ph.D. from Political Science Department of Bilkent University with a thesis title of “Why Turkey Join or Avoid Joining U.S.-led Military Coalitions?” Engaged in research at Ankara based think tank USAK (International Strategic Research Organization) since 2008, Yegin served as the Director of the organization’s Center for American Studies from 2012 to 2016, June 2019, “Turkey between NATO and Russia: The Failed Balance”, SWP, SC)
Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 air defense missile system has raised questions concerning Turkey’s alliance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the country’s future intentions. Nonetheless, a break with NATO is unlikely, as alliance dependence is still applicable for both Turkey and other members. Turkish government circles have cast the recent purchase as a means to gain more autonomy from and/or better bargaining power with Western allies. However, the purchase of S-400s will not bring about the desired outcomes. Instead, it will generate a dual dependency characterized by vulnerability to Russia and an increased need for assurances from NATO. Turkey also seems to have reached the limits of its bargaining power, as the United States is placing more weight on punitive measures. The only explanation left for the purchase is the possibility that President Tayyip Erdoğan may be seeking a domestic rally effect via a confrontation with the United States to prevent possible challengers to his leadership from gaining momentum.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – Turkey-West/NATO Coop
The European Institute for International Law and International Relations, 7-5-2022, "How do Russia and Turkey manage to maintain a privileged relationship despite their differences on many issues?," European Institute for International Law and International Relations, https://www.eiir.eu/international-relations/europe/how-do-russia-and-turkey-manage-to-maintain-a-privileged-relationship-despite-their-differences-on-many-issues///DS
First of all, the good personal chemistry between the two presidents plays its role. Putin and Erdogan are both adepts of speaking frankly, and they present this as an asset in inter-state relations, making it possible to overcome differences and blockages. In fact, each time the different stands they have on Syria, Armenia, NATO, Libya… threatened to reach the point of crisis, the two heads of state met or spoke to each other, finding an agreement to overcome it while acknowledging the persistent disagreements. Erdogan and Putin also agree on the way they treat opposition in their respective countries, which is brutal to say the least. They both also agree on the strongman image they intend to project, both internally and on the international scene. A turning point in the closeness between the two presidents was Putin’s expressed support for Erdogan after the failed coup in 2016, while Western countries, for their part, criticized the massive repression that followed that event in Turkey. What role does the West play in the current convergence between Moscow and Ankara? This is another major point of convergence between the two countries. Wether one sees it negatively or positively, and with obviously very different historical contexts, both countries consider that the West has refused their will of cooperation and integration. They also believe that their Western partners have ignored their security interests as they see them. For example, on the Kurdish question for Turkey, the enlargement of NATO for Russia. Turkey, like Russia, is interested in the idea of a less Western-centric multipolar world, in which regional powers see their role enhanced. But the anti-Western posture is clearly more structural in the case of Russia (which sees itself as a global power) than in the case of Turkey (who wants to extend its influence but on different regional scales). Thus, for Russia we are dealing with questions of principle, of world vision. For Turkey we are probably dealing with something more situational, more fluid because it is more negotiable, and this can constitute a fragility in the bilateral relationship. This is perhaps why the Russians have been keen, over the last decade, to involve Turkey in economic cooperations that have a strategic scope, creating long-term dependence (nuclear, energy…). The rejection of Western policies is ultimately a common objective. Syria, Libya, the Caucasus – topics where the interests of Ankara and Moscow are far from fully converging. But the one objective of marginalizing Western countries, and showing the decline of their authority on the international scene reconcile them. During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020, the Minsk group (of which France and the United States are co-chairs with Russia) was not very active and the ceasefire agreement was steered exclusively by Russia and consultations with Turkey. Considering the tensions with the Europeans in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey sees it as useful to be able to display a capacity for coordination with Russia. As for Moscow, it likes to emphasize the spirit of cooperation that governs its relations with Ankara in the Black Sea. Turkey has positioned itself in the Black Sea as a littoral power tending to oppose the plans of Alliance members who are pushing for a stronger NATO presence. This, of course, suits Russia. Turkey has developed its relations with Kiev, affirming its support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, condemning the annexation of Crimea and developing Ukrainian-Turkish arms projects. What impact does the war in Ukraine have on relations between Russia and Turkey? Before the war, Russian officials have repeatedly denounced the arms cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine. Turkey also participated in the first summit of the “Crimea Platform”, initiated by Ukraine August 2021, in Kiev. As long as this policy is not explicitly part of a NATO strategy towards Ukraine, Moscow can accept the development of Ukrainian-Turkish ties. But when Russia complained, before the war in Ukraine, about the development of cooperation between the latter and the Nato countries, and if it was mainly aimed at the role of the Americans or the British, it also had in mind the Turkish drones. For the moment, Turkey gives the impression of remaining in its posture of Russia-West balance : it condemns the invasion, it closes the straits to warships, but it does not take sanctions against Russia, continues to work with it in the economic field, and seeks to pose as a mediator. Everything depends on what Turkey wants to do with the opportunity that the war in Ukraine potentially represents for it: continue its game of balance between the West and the Russians as in recent years; or repair its relations with its NATO allies? It seems that the first option prevails at this stage – let’s not forget that Turkey is very dependent on Russia economically (energy, tourism…). It seems to want to make its usefulness known to the various players in the context of this war, which is upsetting many balances, and to gain an additional regional and international aura from it (and to make people forget its economic crisis?). To what extent does the desire to expand their respective influences constitute limits to their political and economic cooperation? So far, the two actors are playing in the same arena, sometimes with more or less serious friction. But their order of priorities is different. For Turkey, it is the Middle East and the Mediterranean, while Russia’s foreign policy remains focused on maintaining its weight in the ex-Soviet space. This could change if Turkey were to become more enterprising in this space that Russia claims as its sphere of influence. Moscow is keeping a tight rein on Ankara’s desire to develop its presence in Central Asia in the name of historical, linguistic and cultural kinship. Above all, with the war in Ukraine, one wonders if Turkey, a member of NATO, will be able to continue for long on its line of a transactional attitude in which it plays the Russian card in its negotiations with its Western partners, and the anti-Western card in its power relations with Moscow. Correct relations with Turkey are perceived in Moscow as an asset in relation to several major strategic issues. The impression has often been given that Turkey is more or less leading the game. Meaning, on the international stage, and in particular in its relations with Western countries and some of its neighbors, Russia has not exactly shown flexibility lately, with an often offensive, if not aggressive, behaviour. In this context, the manifest effort of Russian diplomacy to find points of agreement with a Turkey that does not hesitate to impose its pace and its interests offers a striking contrast! This is because correct relations with Turkey are perceived in Moscow as an asset in relation to several major strategic issues. The Black Sea-Mediterranean stage is a key issue. Russia proceeds by priorities : Turkey is not a convenient partner in Syria (where it tends to take advantage, at present, of the Russian withdrawal linked to the war in Ukraine), but this is acceptable, as long as it remains on the right line in the Black Sea, an arch-strategic zone for Moscow. However, one of the major objectives of Russian foreign policy in recent years has been to divide by all means the NATO alliance, which it sees as strong militarily but weak politically. Hence the efforts to quickly complete the contract for the sale of the S-400 anti-aircraft system. One of the reasons why Ankara worked to improve its relationship with Moscow was probably its perception that its Western allies would not necessarily be of much help in the event of a problem with Russia, and that it was therefore necessary to manage and stabilize this relationship as best as possible in autonomy. Regardless the extremely controversial democratic system reigning in Turkey, this is more “looking out for themselves” behaviour than “challenging NATO” behaviour.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 1NC – Ukraine Diplomacy Impact › 1NC
Starr 15 (Steven Starr, Steven Starr is the director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility. He has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology; he also maintains the website Nuclear Darkness. Starr also teaches a class on the Environmental, Health and Social Effects of nuclear weapons at the University of Missouri, October 14, 2015, “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction”, /RM)
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs. Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.] The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences.] Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet. Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment? It is, of course, debatable whether or not nuclear winter could cause human extinction. There is essentially no way to truly “know” without fighting a strategic nuclear war. Yet while it is crucial that we all understand the mortal peril that we face, it is not necessary to engage in an unwinnable academic debate as to whether any humans will survive. What is of the utmost importance is that this entire subject –the catastrophic environmental consequences of nuclear war – has been effectively dropped from the global discussion of nuclear weaponry. The focus is instead upon “nuclear terrorism”, a subject that fits official narratives and centers upon the danger of one nuclear weapon being detonated – yet the scientifically predicted consequences of nuclear war are never publically acknowledged or discussed. Why has the existential threat of nuclear war been effectively omitted from public debate? Perhaps the leaders of the nuclear weapon states do not want the public to understand that their nuclear arsenals represent a self-destruct mechanism for the human race? Such an understanding could lead to a demand that nuclear weapons be banned and abolished. Consequently, the nuclear weapon states continue to maintain and modernize their nuclear arsenals, as their leaders remain silent about the ultimate threat that nuclear war poses to the human species.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 1NC – Ukraine Diplomacy Impact › 1NC
Brookes 3/31 (Peter Brookes, Senior Research Fellow, Center for National Defense, Peter researches and develops Heritage’s policy on weapons of mass destruction and counter proliferation, Mar 31st, 2022, How Russia Might Deploy Nukes in Ukraine War, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/how-russia-might-deploy-nukes-ukraine-war//RM)
With Russian forces struggling mightily to subjugate Ukraine in the face of incredible resistance from both the Ukrainian army and ordinary citizens, observers are concerned about the Kremlin escalating the war with the use of nuclear weapons. At this point, it’s arguably “low risk,” but it’s not “no risk.” Moscow could certainly decide to move the war from conventional to nuclear at any time. As such, we must take the threat of the use of Russian nuclear weapons very seriously, surveil it intensely, and prepare for the possibility of a nuclear event. But under what circumstances might Russia use a nuke against Ukraine—or as part of the Ukraine conflict? Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian president and current deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, outlined Moscow’s policy on using nuclear weapons in an interview Saturday, according to The Guardian: Number one is the situation when Russia is struck by a nuclear missile. The second case is any use of other nuclear weapons against Russia or its allies. The third is an attack on a critical infrastructure that will have paralyzed our nuclear deterrent forces, and the fourth case is when an act of aggression is committed against Russia and its allies, which jeopardized the existence of the country itself, even without the use of nuclear weapons, that is, with the use of conventional weapons. That’s relatively clear, but that’s not all. Russia also has a secretive “escalate to deescalate” doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons that Medvedev didn’t mention—unsurprisingly—in that list of four conditions. This unspoken possibility is perhaps the most likely scenario of all. Let’s face it: The war isn’t going well for Vladimir Putin & Co. What the Kremlin thought would be a three-day dash to Kyiv has turned into a monthlong slog, which has seen Russian forces losing general officers, troops, and equipment at an alarming rate. The outcome—once thought to overwhelmingly favor Moscow—is up for grabs. That state of affairs doesn’t bode well for the Kremlin and its cronies. Even authoritarian leaders care about public opinion at home and the effect it might have on the regime’s control over the country. Losing the war in Ukraine would have repercussions on Russia internationally, too, including significant reputational costs, likely diplomatic pariah status, punishing economic costs, and a demoralized, depleted military. In other words, losing in Ukraine will be plenty painful for Putin and his pals—and this is when, unfortunately, the use of nuclear weapons potentially comes into play for the Russians. Indeed, Putin might use a nuke (or more) in an (as yet unproven) “escalate to deescalate” plan for advancing Russia’s unjust goals in Ukraine. Although there is debate about the effectiveness of using a nuke on the battlefield in Ukraine, alternatively Russia could pop off a low-yield, tactical (aka battlefield) nuke over an unpopulated area, or even the Arctic Ocean. The point would be to send a clear signal to the U.S., NATO, and others who are supporting the Ukrainian political and military resistance that their backing must end—immediately. If they choose otherwise, the risk would be that Moscow might escalate from a single, low-yield battlefield nuke over an unpopulated territory to high-yield theater or intercontinental-range nukes targeting populated areas in these countries. The Kremlin might calculate that Ukraine’s supporters (e.g., NATO) don’t have the political will to risk a wider conflict or chance a move up the nuclear-escalation ladder. Ukraine’s backers—and Ukraine itself—would have to make some fateful choices. Using the “escalate to deescalate” nuclear stratagem, Moscow potentially could force any number of advantageous political and military outcomes to the war in Ukraine, including a victory that avoids the unpleasantries of a loss. Of course, the use of a nuclear weapon in war for the first time since World War II is a troubling idea to contemplate. But we must understand that the Russian political and military playbook includes pages on the use of nukes. Consequently, we must consider Russia’s use of nuclear weapons a real possibility, monitor the movement of Russian nuclear forces with vigor, and prepare for making the tough choices that the possibility of a nuclear event would bring.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 1NC – Ukraine Diplomacy Impact › 1NC
ORUÇ 2-23 (MERVE ŞEBNEM ORUÇ, A political commentator, columnist, and a TV host mostly focusing on the Syrian civil war, Middle East, Turkish-American relations, and Turkish foreign politics as well, 2/23/33, “Turkey to preserve ties with Russia, Ukraine to de-escalate tensions”, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkey-to-preserve-ties-with-russia-ukraine-to-de-escalate-tensions//RM)
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan highlighted the necessity of maintaining calm and will maintain relations with both countries amid ongoing tensions between Russia and Ukraine as Moscow recognized the sovereignty of the separatist Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR). Speaking to reporters on his way back from Senegal on Wednesday, Erdoğan said Turkey cooperates with both Russia and Ukraine and will not halt relations or plan to impose sanctions against Moscow. “We have political, military and economic relations with Russia. Same with Ukraine. We cannot give this up if you ask me because our country has high interests in this regard,” Erdoğan said. He noted that Turkey aims to resolve the issue without harming relations and will conduct talks with the Turkish delegation as soon as he returns home. Careful calculations need to be made to figure out the pros and cons of actions to be taken against Russia, Erdoğan said, noting that steps need to be taken in a delicate manner. “Some say the conflict will boost the costs of natural gas while others discuss turning off the valves. We need to take our steps with this sensitivity in mind,” he said, adding that Turkish officials are currently in contact with Russian counterparts to arrange a meeting. “We will continue phone diplomacy and I hope we achieve favorable results,” Erdoğan said. The president noted that he highlighted Turkey's stance regarding Ukraine's territorial integrity to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a recent phone call and that Turkey does not accept any actions violating the Minsk agreements. "I told him that we are ready to undertake the responsibility to ensure that the crisis is solved through diplomacy and dialogue," he said, adding that the ongoing tensions pose a threat to security in the Black Sea. "Our hope is for our Black Sea neighbors Russia and Ukraine to immediately return to the negotiation table," he added. Erdoğan continued by saying that he believes the planned NATO summit is quite important in this regard, as countries will discuss measures to be taken in light of Russia’s actions. He noted that he would hold another meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin following the NATO summit. He criticized Western leaders for their ineffective talks with Putin. “As you know, Macron came to Moscow and you see the picture. Scholz followed him and you see that picture too,” Erdoğan said, adding that Biden was also supposed to speak with Putin, but no concrete results have been achieved so far. He noted that NATO was the only instrument left to display a common stance. “In this videoconference meeting, NATO needs to decide on its stance and do whatever necessary,” Erdoğan said, adding that no troops have been sent to Ukraine so far, but Russia has amassed soldiers near the Ukrainian border. “Of course, you don’t need to be an oracle to know what’s coming in the face of this picture,” Erdoğan said, adding that Turkey will display its final stance regarding the issue after the meeting. However, the president highlighted that Turkey has already sided with Ukraine regarding Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Putin’s recent recognition by rejecting it for violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity. NATO member Turkey, which shares a maritime border with both Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea, has good ties with both its neighbors and has offered to mediate the crisis, while warning Moscow against invading Ukraine. Turkey has been closely following the developments and is in close contact with both Kyiv and Moscow. While forging cooperation on defense and energy, Turkey has opposed Moscow’s policies in Syria and Libya, as well as its annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. It has also sold sophisticated drones to Ukraine, angering Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday signed decrees to recognize the sovereignty of Luhansk and Donetsk, known as the Donbass, at a televised event in which he delivered a fiery speech questioning Ukraine's right to statehood. Putin also instructed Moscow's Foreign Ministry to establish formal diplomatic relations with the two areas held by pro-Russia rebels, which are part of the Donbass region and belong to Ukraine under international law.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 1NC – Turkish Economy Impact › 1NC
Kemp 10 (Geoffrey Kemp | The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-234 | DOA: 7/6/2022 | SAoki)
The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 1NC – Turkish Economy Impact › 1NC
Wheeldon 22 (03/31/2022 | Tom Wheeldon | ‘Turkey juggles relationships with Russia, Ukraine amid economic crisis’ | https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20220331-turkey-juggles-relationships-with-russia-ukraine-amid-economic-crisis | DOA: 7/6/2022 | SAoki)
‘Extremely vulnerable’ Turkey’s “economic crisis” is the “most important factor in its calculations”, Howard Eissenstat, a Turkey expert at St. Lawrence University in New York state and the Middle East Institute in Washington DC, put it to FRANCE 24. The Turkish lira lost 47 percent of its value over the past year, as prices soared by over 54 percent. This 20-year inflation high marked a new nadir in the currency crisis wracking Turkey since 2018, a crisis experts blame on Erdogan’s belief – contrary to all economic evidence – that higher interest rates cause inflation. Turkey does not want to “antagonise Russia”, Eissenstat noted, because it is “extremely vulnerable to a loss of Russian wheat, gas and oil”. Russia is in effect a vital trading partner for the beleaguered Turkish economy, providing 45 percent of its natural gas and a colossal 70 percent of its wheat. The latter is an especially high-priority import, seeing as escalating bread prices are a major source of discontent in Turkey. Russia is also Turkey’s biggest source of tourists, with its 4.7 million visitors accounting for 19 percent of all travellers to the country in 2021. ‘Competitive co-operation’ Historically, Turkey and Russia have a track record of antagonising each other, most notably when the clashing geostrategic manoeuvrings of Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire saw them fight on more than 10 occasions from the sixteenth century to the twentieth century. At the outset of the Cold War, Kemalist Turkey’s axiomatic anti-communism and pro-Western ethos prompted it to join NATO and host US nuclear missiles, a major source of Soviet vexation until they were removed after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The most recent Russo-Turkish diplomatic crisis flared in 2015, when Turkey shot down a Russian jet near the Syrian border. But a formal apology from Erdogan soon ended Moscow’s retaliatory sanctions – inaugurating a rapid thaw in relations that weathered Russia and Turkey backing opposing sides in the Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh wars. This recent paradigm in Russo-Turkish relations is best described as “competitive co-operation”, the German Marshall Fund’s Unluhisarcikli said, in which supporting rival forces abroad “doesn’t prevent them from cooperating in the fields of energy and trade”. A year on from that swiftly resolved spat with Russia, a dramatic coup attempt sparked a pervasive crackdown as Ankara held responsible Islamic cleric Fetullah Gulen and his movement. Erdogan’s government felt the West was not supportive enough after this would-be putsch. Thus the failed coup set the stage for Turkey-Russia ties to deepen, explained Reilly Barry, a Turkey researcher at Harvard University. Following the putsch attempt, Russian President Vladimir Putin “successfully sowed more seeds of doubt into Erdogan’s mind that the West is not his ultimate protector and security assurance, and achieved his desired effect to create a wedge among NATO allies when Turkey purchased the S-400 missile system from Russia, a major red line for a NATO country to cross", Barry told FRANCE 24. “So, the Turkish government has formulated a stance on seeing Russia as a potential major power protector in cases when Western relations and alliances do not suit Turkey’s best interests.” In this context, “having been close with Russia and Putin lately more so than at any other time in recent history, it would make Turkey extremely vulnerable to be condemning Russia in the language that the US and Western European countries are”, Barry continued. “It is also important to remember the US and other countries do not share a sea with Russia and are not only separated by one other country [Georgia],” she added.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 1NC – Syrian War Impact › 1NC
Alex Lantier 19, PhD at the University of Geneva and writings appeared on Global Research, Countercurrents, "Syrian army, Iran threaten counterattack against Turkish invasion of Syria," 10/14/2019, https://countercurrents.org/2019/10/syrian-army-iran-threaten-counterattack-against-turkish-invasion-of-syria, /\
The war unleashed by Turkey’s invasion of Syria, targeting formerly US-backed Kurdish forces, escalated out of control this weekend as the Syrian army and Iran moved to counterattack. With Turkish troops and allied Al Qaeda militias advancing deep into Kurdish-held territory in Syria, the Middle East is only days away from an all-out war between the major regional powers that could trigger a global conflict between nuclear-armed world powers. UN reports show that 130,000 Syrians have fled their homes in the region amid the Turkish offensive, and Turkish officials claim they had “neutralized” at least 415 Kurdish fighters. Turkish troops seized the cities of Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn, amid heavy fighting including ongoing Turkish air raids, and seized a road crossing that cut off US and Kurdish troops in Kobani. Turkish troops also fired artillery at US troops near Kobani in what former US envoy Brett McGurk said was “not a mistake,” although Turkish officials later denied this. Turkey’s Syrian “rebel” allies, the Islamist Syrian National Army (SNA, formerly the Free Syrian Army), are executing Kurdish civilians in areas they hold, according to multiple reports. Kurdish politician Hevrin Khalaf was executed; her bullet-riddled car appeared in a video surrounded by SNA fighters. Beyond Al Qaeda-linked calls to destroy infidels, the British Daily Telegraph noted, the SNA’s main outlook “is sectarian: they are anti-Kurdish and they are Arab chauvinists.” Yesterday evening, the Syrian army announced it would march on the area. The official Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported: “Syrian Arab Army units began moving north to confront Turkish aggression on Syrian territory... The movement comes to confront the ongoing Turkish aggression on towns and areas in the north of Hasaka and Raqqa provinces, where the Turkish forces committed massacres against locals, occupied some areas and destroyed infrastructure.” The Syrian army has reportedly reached an agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) militia, whose alliance with the United States was broken by Washington a week ago. Under this agreement, Syrian army troops would reach the city of Kobani near the Syrian-Turkish border in 48 hours. On Saturday, President Donald Trump had authorized the remaining 1,000 US troops in Kobani to withdraw, and US forces were in full retreat across northern Syria this weekend to avoid being cut off by advancing Turkish troops. Iran, which has deployed tens of thousands of troops as well as drones to Syria in recent years to back the Syrian regime against a NATO-led proxy war, indicated it would support the Syrian army. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Advisor for International Affairs Ali Akbar Velayati met with Syrian Ambassador to Iran Adnan Mahmoud yesterday in Tehran. He gave Iran’s “full support to Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, calling for the withdrawal of the Turkish forces,” SANA reported. Velayati added, “The principled policy of Iran is based on supporting the people and government of Syria and defending their righteous stances in a way that entails continuing joint cooperation until terrorism and terrorist organizations are completely eliminated.” At the same time, military tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are surging amid mutual attacks on tankers carrying Persian Gulf oil supplies that are critical to the world economy. Last month, the US and Saudi governments blamed a September 14 missile attack on Saudi oil facilities that caused a sharp rise in world oil prices on Iran, without providing any evidence. Then on October 11, two missiles hit the Iranian tanker Sabiti off Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast. Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, said yesterday that Iran would retaliate against unnamed targets for the attack on the Sabiti. “A special committee has been set up to investigate the attack on Sabiti... Its report will soon be submitted to the authorities for decision,” Shamkhani told Fars News. “Piracy and mischief on international waterways aimed at making commercial shipping insecure will not go unanswered.” Saudi officials declined to comment on the Sabiti attack, and officials with the US Fifth Fleet in the Gulf sheikdom of Bahrain claimed to have no information on it. But there is widespread speculation in the international media that the attack was carried out by Saudi Arabia or with its support. The conflicts erupting between the different capitalist regimes in the Middle East pose an imminent threat not only to the population of the region, but to the entire world. Workers can give no support to any of the competing military plans and strategic appetites of these reactionary regimes. With America, Europe, Russia and China all deeply involved in the proxy war in Syria, a large-scale Middle East war could strangle the world oil supply and escalate into war between nuclear-armed powers. The working class is coming face to face with the real possibility of a Third World War. The Kurdish-led SDF militias in Syria, vastly outgunned by Turkish forces and vulnerable to air strikes, warned US officials in talks leaked by CNN that they would appeal for Russia to attack Turkey and protect SDF and Syrian army forces. As Turkey is legally a NATO ally of Washington and the European powers, such an attack could compel the United States and its European allies to either break the 70-year-old NATO alliance or go to war with Russia to protect Turkey. “You are leaving us to be slaughtered,” SDF General Mazloum Kobani Abdi told US officials in a meeting last Thursday. “You are not willing to protect the people, but you do not want another force to come and protect us. You have sold us.” Mazloum dismissed US officials when they replied by demanding that the SDF not cut a deal with Russia, but instead keep taking huge casualties from Turkish air raids. He said, “I need to know if you are capable of protecting my people, of stopping these bombs falling on us or not. I need to know, because if you’re not, I need to make a deal with Russia and the regime now and invite their planes to protect this region.” US forces across Syria were in full retreat, however, and US Defense Secretary Mark Esper told US television news yesterday that the Turkish-Kurdish conflict “gets worse by the hour.” Given the attempts by the Kurds to work out an alliance with Syria and Russia, he added, Trump “directed that we begin a deliberate withdrawal of forces from northern Syria.” Esper said he would “not place American service members in the middle of a longstanding conflict between the Turks and the Kurds. This is not why we are in Syria.” Esper said the Turkish army was rejecting the Pentagon’s appeals for a ceasefire with the Kurds and instead expanding its war aims inside Syria. “In the last 24 hours, we learned that they likely intend to expand their attack further south than originally planned, and to the west,” he said. Esper added that “all the exact things” US officials warned their Turkish counterparts would likely happen if they invaded Syria were now taking place, including the release of tens of thousands of Islamic State (ISIS) fighters held in prison camps by Washington’s former Kurdish allies.