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2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – T/L

Relations between Russia and North Africa are only possible because of US isolation

Isabelle Falcon ’17, Deputy director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, “Russia’s quest for influence in North Africa and the Middle East”, Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, 4/11/17, https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/programmes/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/publications/en/8.pdf

This confirms that Russia’s regional politics remain above all an instrument working towards the realisation of larger ambitions in its foreign policy and security agenda. This is shown perhaps by what is left of its, still modest, economic footprint. The regional powers are aware of this whilst taking into account the calculations of a strengthened Russia. Indeed, said powers are often at the origin of such rapprochements. Thus, the heating up of links with Algeria would not have been possible if the Algerian regime had not needed international legitimisation at the end of the period of violence that it emerged from at the end of the 1990s. In the case of Egypt, the rapprochement can also be explained by Cairo’s will to play Russia and America off against one another so as to draw the greatest profits. This is in a context where it is necessary to find a solution to the very reserved stance of Western countries towards President Sisi’s regime. Indeed, regional actors maintain their independence as, despite Russia’s new found political and military credibility, they are still seen as “strangers in the Middle East.”75 To explain this, several examples are cited by an expert including the constitutional project proposed by Moscow for Syria following the Astana76 format which is unpopular in the region (for example in Turkey). The same specialist also evokes the traces left in the region by Russia and their contribution to the creation of memories of “Russian wars against Islam” (Afghanistan, Chechnya and Aleppo).77 The multi-faceted game which Moscow employs – at times both a strength and a means of safeguarding its influence in a particularly unstable and conflictual area – contributes to the blurring of its image. In Syria, how should Russia develop relations with Tehran when the Gulf monarchies and especially Israel aim to extract concessions from Moscow in order to contain Iranian influence? There are many in Iran who believe, as put by the old spokesperson of the Iranian ex-president Mohamed Khatami, that Russians are untrustworthy and likely “to stab you in the back.”78 Many of these new regional relations, whether with Turkey or Saudi Arabia, lie on shaky foundations and are far from being based on complete trust. Success is not always straightforward or clear, a conclusion demonstrated by the mixed result of the Astana Conference held in March 2017. An important parameter of the Russian growth in regional influence lies in the possibility that the region becomes the object of a “deal” between Moscow and the Trump administration. This would be under the name of the struggle against international terrorism. As of March 2017, too many uncertain variables are in play to proffer a definitive answer to this question. For now, political circumstances in Washington are preventing progress from being made, given Russia’s place at the heart of issues questioning the legitimacy of Donald Trump. In any case, scepticism abounds in Moscow as Trump’s new security advisor, H. R. McMaster is not the zealous proponent of total war against radical Islam that Flynn was” and that “this limits room for détente.”79 The Trump administration’s position on Iran (the president will doubtless be keen to limit Iran’s influence in Syria) could complicate things, especially as Russia is attached to the JCPOA that Trump has criticised at several instances.80

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – T/L

A more cohesive NATO strategy would reshape security cooperation with Africa.

Tardy ’22 [Thierry Tardy; director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense College in Rome and visiting professor at the College of Europe in Bruges; February 2022; German Marshall Fund of the United States; https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/Tardy%20-%20NATO%20MENA%20-%20brief.pdf; 7-17-2022; SK]

The Way Forward There is a consensus on the fact that the security challenges in the Middle East and North Africa can create instability in NATO member states, which therefore ought to do something about it. Whether there exists a consensus on what to do and whether NATO should be a central component of the response is less obvious. With these reservations in mind, below are three steps that NATO ought to take were it be willing to shape the security environment in the MENA. Strategy The ongoing Ukraine crisis has given NATO a new direction in the sense that it has provided it with a relatively straightforward task: to deter and defend against Russia on the eastern flank. The alliance has adopted doctrinal documents and taken measures aimed at operationalizing this agenda. Nothing like this really exists with regard to the southern flank.23 Policy documents like the Framework for the South or the Package for the South are not strategic texts nor do they define a level of ambition for NATO in the region. This is partly a sign that the allies want to concentrate on the eastern flank (and maybe then on China) and that the attention and energy that they are ready to dedicate to the MENA is limited as a consequence. If, on the contrary, NATO wishes to upgrade its presence and impact in the MENA, then a significant effort is to be made at the strategic level. The alliance could not by itself address the root causes of instability in the region, which is clearly beyond its remit, but it could at least give more purposefulness to what it has done so far. This first implies a comprehensive analysis of the security situation in the MENA and of the issues that are likely to spill over into NATO in the near future. This does not need to be carried out by NATO itself. It could rely on national input or a mix of open-source and classified information. On this basis, a strategic reflection and document, as part of the current Strategic Concept process, defining the objectives, methods, and resources of NATO’s presence in the region is of the essence. A dedicated document or a section in the Strategic Concept would not only give visibility to a policy that has suffered from a lack of strategy, it would also clarify the level of ambition of the allies. A strategic narrative laying down a “renewed cooperative security” ambition for the region would also help articulate such ambition with NATO’s deterrence and defense agenda. Resources and political commitment would have to follow suit and be sustained over time. No quick fix will do. Furthermore, a “renewed cooperative security” plan should be accompanied by strategic communication (in English, French, and Arabic) on what NATO intends to do, how, and why it matters to the recipient entities. Any strategic-communications or public-diplomacy effort should also include a counter-disinformation component. Ideally such communication would be paired with a similar exercise carried out by the EU. Realistically, the chance that such a strategic framework will be adopted is not high; conversely, the chance that NATO would achieve anything meaningful in the region absent a strategic vision is equally low. Division of Tasks and Concentration of Efforts Second, any purposeful NATO presence in the MENA will have to be the result of a well thought-through partnership with the EU. The two institutions must capitalize on what they do best and refrain from developing activities that are better covered by the other. This also applies to cooperation with the UN and its development and humanitarian agencies. The typology of security issues in the region presented above is useful in this respect. Distinguishing between conflicts, terrorism, or organized crime; between state fragility, bad governance, or the porosity of borders; and the more diffuse human-security issues makes it possible to identify areas where a military alliance can add value and others where it most likely will not. NATO can play a role in response to open conflicts or terrorism, and it can contribute to the strengthening of military and security institutions, but it is unlikely to be able to bring anything tangible in human-security domains. This prioritization matters to the definition of where the alliance should go, but it also calls for partnerships insofar as any NATO activity on a narrow segment will only produce an effect if complemented by parallel actions on the other (economic, political, etc.) segments, by other entities. With this logic in mind, if NATO and the EU are engaged in capacity-building and training in the region, NATO must concentrate on the defense segment for which it offers the best know-how or resources. This includes tasks such as defense-sector reform, capacity-building on operations in high-temperature environments, military counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, assisting in building interoperability between allies and partner countries, and handling improvised explosive devices.25 But NATO should probably refrain from investing in security areas where the EU or the UN are better placed or only embrace these tasks in places where the others cannot go. Focus on the defense segment suggests that NATO alone is unlikely to play a strategic role, in the sense that its limited presence will in most cases be insufficient to be transformative. Hence the importance of inter-institutional cooperation. Beyond cooperative security, NATO must retain the capacity to conduct military operations in a crisis-management mode in the region. This goes against the current post-Afghanistan mood, yet the nature of the environment makes it impossible to rule out a major military operation one day. (There was similar intervention fatigue in 2010 while NATO was drafting its Strategic Concept and a year later it got involved in Libya.) This carries implications for NATO planning and exercises as well as for the projection capabilities of European states, at a time when the collective-defense agenda tends to concentrate on territorial defense.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – T/L

Putin’s increased engagement with Africa so he can counter NATO.

Knickmever 3/12 [Ellen Knickmeyer; ; 3-12-2022; Russian footholds in Mideast, Africa raise threat to NATO; AP NEWS; https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-business-syria-europe-aed781f59cc4c792f4c6ecdc2541b141; 7-17-2022; SK]

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine dominates world attention. But with less global scrutiny, Putin is also busy advancing Russia’s presence in the Middle East and Africa -- an expansion that military and civilian leaders view as another, if less immediate, threat to security in the West. Putin’s strategy in the Mideast and Africa has been simple, and successful: He seeks out security alliances with autocrats, coup leaders, and others who have been spurned or neglected by the U.S. and Europe, either because of their bloody abuses or because of competing Western strategic interests. — In Syria, Russia’s defense minister last month showed off nuclear-capable bombers and hypersonic missiles over the Mediterranean, part of a security partnership that now has the Kremlin threatening to send Syrian fighters to Ukraine. — In Sudan, a leader of a junta that’s seized power in that East African country has a new economic alliance with the Kremlin, reviving Russia’s dreams of a naval base on the Red Sea. — In Mali, the government is the latest of more than a dozen resource-rich African nations to forge security alliances with Kremlin-allied mercenaries, according to U.S. officials. Especially in the last five or six years, “what you’ve seen is a Russia that is much more expeditionary and casting its military power further and wider afield,” retired U.S. Gen. Philip M. Breedlove told The Associated Press. “Russia is trying to show itself as a great power, as at the seat in world affairs, as driving international situations,” said Breedlove, the top NATO commander from 2013 through 2016, and now a distinguished chair at the Middle East Institute think tank in Washington. But with Putin’s hands already full battling the fierce resistance from a much weaker Ukrainian military, experts view his expansionist goals in the Middle East and Africa as a potential long-term threat, not a present danger to Europe or the NATO alliance. “It’s threatening NATO from below,” Kristina Kausch, a European security expert at the German Marshall Fund think-tank, said of the leverage Russia is gaining. “The Russians have felt encircled by NATO – and now they want to encircle NATO,” she said. To achieve its strategic aims, Russia provides conventional military or Kremlin-allied mercenaries to protect the regimes of often outcast leaders. In return, these leaders pay back Russia in several ways: cash or natural resources, influence in their affairs, and staging grounds for Russian fighters. These alliances help advance Putin’s ambitions of returning Russia’s influence to its old Cold War boundaries. Russia’s new security partnerships also aid it diplomatically. When the U.N. General Assembly condemned Putin’s Ukraine invasion this month, Syria joined Russia in voting against, and many of the African governments that have signed security deals with Russian mercenaries abstained. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Friday that Russia would bring recruits from Syria to fight in Ukraine. The threat was seen primarily as an intimidation tactic and U.S. officials say there’s been no sign of Syrian recruits in Ukraine. Some security experts say Russian mercenaries are using Mali as a staging ground for deployment to Ukraine, but U.S. officials have not confirmed these reports. Regardless of how imminent the threat is, U.S. and European leaders are paying increasing attention to Putin’s moves in the Middle East and Africa — and Russia’s growing alliance with China — as it formulates plans to protect the West from future aggression. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said in mid-February that the West could no longer ignore the competition for influence across Africa, where China spends billions on infrastructure projects to secure mineral rights, and Russia provides security through Kremlin-allied mercenaries. “We see and realize that if we withdraw from this competition as liberal democracies, then others are going to fill these gaps,” Baerbock said as Western diplomats huddled on the Ukraine crisis, in the last days before Russia’s invasion. Perhaps the boldest example of Russia flexing its global reach was when it sent defense minister Sergei Shoigu last month to Damascus to oversee Russia’s largest military drills in the Mediterranean since the Cold War, just as Russia’s military made final preparations for its assault on Ukraine. The drills, involving 15 warships and about 30 aircraft, appeared choreographed to showcase the Russian military’s capability to threaten the U.S. carrier strike group in the Mediterranean. Russia’s Hmeimeem air base on Syria’s Mediterranean coast has served as its main outpost for launching attacks in Syria since September 2015. Russia’s attacks in Syria, which leveled ancient cities and sent millions of refugees to Europe, allowed President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal government to reclaim control over most of the country after a devastating civil war. “Hmeimeem base is now an integral part of Russia’s defense strategy not just in the Middle East but all the world,′′ said Ibrahim Hamidi, a Syrian journalist and senior diplomatic editor for Syrian affairs at the London-based Asharq al-Awsat newspaper. In Africa, too, Russia is open to working with leaders known for anti-democratic actions and abuses of human rights. On the eve of Russia’s invasion with Ukraine, Kremlin officials met in Moscow with an officer of a military junta that seized power in Sudan. Isolated by the West, Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo warmly responded to Russia’s overture of a new economic-focused alliance. Upon returning home, Gen. Dagolo announced that Sudan would be open to allowing Russia to build its long hoped-for naval base at Port Sudan on the Red Sea. It’s far from certain that Russia would be able to take advantage anytime soon. The Ukraine invasion is straining its military and financial resources and showing Russia’s military weaknesses, and international sanctions are crippling its economy. But longer-term, a Red Sea port could help give it a greater role in the Mediterranean and Black Sea, increase Russian access in the Suez Canal and other high-traffic shipping lanes, and allow Russia to project force in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. “They certainly could create enough havoc to cause problems,” said Breedlove, the former NATO commander. Russia’s expanding alliances aren’t just about its conventional military. From 2015 to 2021, Russian mercenary security outfits increased their presence around the world seven-fold, with operations in 27 countries as of last year, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The most prominent is the Wagner Group, which the U.S. and EU consider to be a surrogate of the Russian military, but which the Kremlin denies even exists. From Libya to Madagascar, security contracts granted to Wagner Group and others give Russia access to mineral resources, staging grounds for deployments and substantial footholds challenging Western nations’ influence there.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – AT: Ukraine

Western sanctions in response to Ukraine are causing Russia to step up its influence in North Africa, diplomatically and economically.

Aris, 6/12

(Ben, German reporter for BNE NTELLINEWS, Russia preparing for second Africa Summit to build closer ties as it pivots away from the West, https://www.intellinews.com/russia-preparing-for-second-africa-summit-to-build-closer-ties-as-it-pivots-away-from-the-west-247188/)

Russia is preparing for the second Russia-Africa summit, scheduled for October-November 2022 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as it steps up its campaign to move closer to the African countries and pivot away from the West due to the latter's extreme sanctions imposed after the start of the war in Ukraine. Russia was already heavily invested in Africa as part of President Vladimir Putin’s policy of fostering ties with the non-aligned nations of the developing world ever since relations with the West soured following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. But the need to develop deep trade and investment ties in Africa has been given a new urgency since the West has broken off almost all business ties with Russia this year. Better relations with Africa are commercially important as Russia starts searching for new customers to buy its energy, grain and other commodities. But there is also an important political dimension as well as Putin seeks to undermine US hegemony and to gain international recognition of his regime. With a cornucopia of commodities and technology in some sectors such as nuclear power on offer, many African countries are willing partners. The details of the summit will be decided in talks between the African Union, Russian Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko said at a meeting with the Speaker of Mozambique’s Assembly (parliament), Esperanca Bias, during an official visit to Maputo from May 30 to June 1. "We are already preparing the next summit. Its dates will be determined jointly with the African Union," Matviyenko said reports Tass, adding that Russia saw Mozambique as a "reliable and time-tested" partner in Africa."Russia has always provided assistance to Mozambique and it keeps doing so. We are pleased to see your success in economic and social development. We note with satisfaction the steady development of the political dialogue," Matviyenko added. Russia has deep business ties with Mozambique, but as bne IntelliNews has reported, the business relations do not always run smoothly. Russia's VTB bank was a key participant raising $2bn for a project that should have transformed Mozambique's economy, but the project collapsed and became the subject of a legal battle that has sullied the country’s reputation. The Russia-Africa Summit has been an important platform for promoting Russian interests on the continent and leaders from 48 of Africa’s 54 countries attended the first summit held in the Russian resort city of Sochi in October 2019. It was co-chaired by the presidents of Russia and Egypt, Vladimir Putin and Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. Egypt is a key Russian partner in North Africa, which imports 80% of its grain from Russia and Ukraine. The event was supposed to be held annually, but was delayed following the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic in 2020. It is now back on for this autumn. This year’s summit will be even more important as Russia looks for new markets and to expand existing ones after the West imposed extreme sanction on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine at the end of February. For its part Africa is keen to keep relations civil, as many countries on the continent depend on Russian grain imports. The AU head, Senegalese President Macky Sall, met Putin in Sochi on June 3 in a bid to offset an impending food crisis due to the war in Ukraine and secure grain imports for his members. Sall has also highlighted that the decision to expel Russian banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system could hurt food supplies to the continent, RFI reported. African nations have been among Russia’s most loyal supporters since the conflict in Ukraine started. In a UN vote to condemn Russia’s invasion about half the African countries chose to abstain from condemning Russia, as they sought to maintain good relations with the West, but signal to Moscow they still see Russia as an important partner. As bne IntelliNews reported, the voting patterns in the UN votes concerning the war in Ukraine paint a very clear picture of which African countries support Russia. Matviyenko’s trip to Mozambique was part of preparing the ground for this year’s summit. Bias said that Matviyenko’s visit showed that "Russia is always with Mozambique and Mozambique is always with Russia. Our relationship dates back to the period when Mozambique was fighting for independence. Even after we gained independence, Russia has always been by our side. These relations are obvious in different areas," Bias stressed. A co-ordination council has been established under the aegis of the Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum (RAPF). According to Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister, “Concrete proposals for consolidating Russian-African co-operation are being worked out by three councils (co-ordinating, public and scientific ones) reporting to the Partnership Forum Secretariat. They represent ministries, agencies, business and public organisations engaged in the development of relations with the African continent.” Moscow is poised to build relations of strategic partnership with pan-African organisations and regional integration associations, Lavrov added. Lavrov said that the two most important goals of the summit will be to sign off on a “memorandum of understanding between the government of the Russian Federation and the African Union on basic principles of relations and co-operation” and a “memorandum of understanding between the Eurasian Economic Commission and the African Union on economic co-operation. The Eurasian Economic Commission is the executive body of the Eurasia Economic Union (EEU), Russia’s answer to the European Union. It is a trade club that unites five former Soviet states, with several more in the region granted observer status. Russia hopes to extend the reach of the EEU down into Africa by co-ordinating with the AU more closely. At the upcoming summit a roadmap for this co-operation will be finalised in co-operation with the Southern African Development Community (SADS), Lavrov said. Progress on building up a North-South free trade area between the EEU and AU has already taken its first concrete step forward after the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) came into effect on January 1 this year. AfCFTA reduces to zero 95% of all previous intra-Africa tariffs that were imposed on cross-border trade. Only Eritrea has not yet signed up to the deal. With that previous tariff expense eliminated, sourcing for African products can now take place on a continental basis, thus expanding the potential for African supply chain development exponentially. The free trade regime in Africa will also allow Special Economic Zones (SEZ) to import machinery and parts to make African products such as machinery. These either be sold on the regional market (when import duties on the parts become due) or re-exported to markets like Russia (duty free). With almost all high-tech machinery exports to Russia now banned, using Africa as a production base, which is free to import machinery from Europe, may become a way for Russia to avoid sanctions and buy badly needed equipment it can no longer source from Europe. For example, the Russian automotive sector has almost entirely collapsed in the first months of the war, as it remains heavily dependent on imports of parts that it cannot make itself. Russia has already begun developing such SEZs in Africa, most notably in Egypt’s Port Said but also in Mozambique and Namibia. The importance of the upcoming summit has been bolstered by the booming trade between Russia and Africa, which has soared this year. Afreximbank president Benedict Oramah said in a recent interview with Tass that trade between African countries and Russia has seen considerable progress. “Just six years ago there were exports of some $8bn from Russia and imports to Russia from Africa of $2bn or less. Today we have Russian exports to Africa worth $14bn a year and imports of African products of about $5bn. That means bilateral trade is about $20bn”. This represents a doubling in Russian-African trade since 2015, or an average annual growth rate of 15%." North Africa currently dominates Russian trade, led by Egypt ($4.53bn), Algeria ($3bn) and Morocco ($1.2bn), with South Africa fourth with $1bn, reports Tass. Moreover, in nearly all African countries Russian trade and investment is increasing. Russia is in the process of establishing a $5bn ecommerce trade portal with African countries, has been targeting Nigeria as a growth market and has a naval base at Port Sudan. The EEU will sign off an agricultural trade deal with the AU, and Egypt is expected to sign off an EEU Free Trade Agreement at the summit. Russia is heavily involved in the African oil and gas industry, but has also been investing in infrastructure, with Russia providing railway equipment to Egypt and developing manufacturing facilities on a continental basis.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – AT: Ukraine

Ukraine has decreased Western focus on Africa.

Seldin 7/15 [Jeff Seldin; ; 7-15-2022; Europe Warns of Russian Pressure From Africa; VOA; https://www.voanews.com/a/europe-warns-of-russian-pressure-from-africa/6660246.html; 7-16-2022; SK]

And nowhere are concerns growing as fast as they are in the Sahel, the semiarid stretch of land spanning northern and western Africa from Senegal to Sudan.

“By sending a couple of thousand Wagner paramilitaries, the Russians are taking over there,” Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren told an audience in Washington Thursday. “We cannot accept that.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – AT: Ukraine

The Ukraine invasion proves Africa’s strong relationship with Russia because of weak US commitments.

Obadare 3/4 [Ebenezer Obadare; ; 3-4-2022; Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine May Drive a Wedge Between the West and Africa; Council on Foreign Relations; https://www.cfr.org/blog/russias-invasion-ukraine-may-drive-wedge-between-west-and-africa; 7-17-2022; SK]

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine May Drive a Wedge Between the West and Africa

The West needs to pay close attention to how they react to African countries' silence on the Russian invasion of Ukraine and avoid seeming patronizing and dismissive to neutral African nations.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – AT: Ukraine

Russia is still invested in North Africa despite Ukraine.

Cafiero and Milliken 4/15 [Giorgio Cafiero, Emily Milliken; CEO and founder of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct fellow at the American Security Project; 4-15-2022; Russians unlikely to leave Libya, despite Ukraine war; Al Jazeera; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/15/russians-unlikely-leave-libya-despite-ukraine-war; 7-8-2022; SK]

Russia’s Wagner Group, a shadowy paramilitary organisation tied to the Kremlin, has played a significant role in Libya, supporting renegade military commander Khalifa Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) in the country’s civil war.

Western observers had begun wondering in recent weeks whether Wagner forces would be withdrawing from Libya to instead focus on supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – Algeria

Algeria is pursuing an independent foreign policy strategy, striking a balance between cooperation Russia and the West.

Fenton-Harvey, 5-25

[Jonathan; journalist and researcher who focuses on conflict, geopolitics and humanitarian issues in the Middle East and North Africa; 5-25-2022; Algeria's conundrum over tensions between Russia and the West; https://english.alaraby.co.uk/analysis/algerias-conundrum-over-russias-tensions-west]

As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine drags on, North African countries have been hit by rising prices of staple goods, creating a new consumer crisis. Yet as a hydrocarbon-rich nation, Algeria could be presented with new economic opportunities as European countries look to replace Russian energy sources. Algeria is also trying to adopt a careful balancing act between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states which have imposed economic sanctions on Moscow. Retaining ties with Europe is important for Algiers to acquire potential energy exports, while Russia has been an invaluable security and strategic partner. Thus, Algeria will hope to continue its independent foreign policy where it can balance between both Europe and Russia. On 11 April, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi struck a deal for Algiers to supply gas to Rome. Per the deal between Algeria’s Sonatrach and Italy’s Eni, Algiers will send 9 billion cubic meters of gas to Rome by next year and in 2024. “Right after the invasion, I announced that Italy will move with speed to reduce dependence on Russian gas. This agreement is a significant response to that strategic objective. There will be others,” Draghi said after the meeting. In March, Sonatrach and Eni announced finding a “significant” oil and gas field in the Algerian desert, which both companies will jointly explore. Following this, on 10 May, Russian Foreign Minister met with Algerian President Tebboune, with the aim of enhancing bilateral ties in various sectors, from military to humanitarian areas. Following the meeting, Lavrov referred to the two countries’ “military and technical cooperation” while praising “the confidence placed in us (by Algeria) in this domain”. Military partnership Both Algeria and Russia have adopted a similar stance of flexibility in the Middle East and North Africa. Regarding various disputes in the region, Algeria is more aligned with Russia’s position and seeks to uphold positive ties with most actors - even though its media often invokes anti-imperialist sentiment, which explains the historic amicability between Algiers and Moscow. Although Algiers was a prominent member of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, it still established close ties to the Soviet Union. Many of its political and military leaders trained there. And during the Cold War period, the Soviet Union and Algiers struck several arms agreements. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Putin sought to further strengthen ties between the two countries after visiting Algiers in 2006. That year, both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) concerning the Russian and Algerian gas companies Gazprom and Sonatrach. While causing some alarm to EU observers, the MoU entailed that Gazprom would help Algeria develop its natural gas reserves. Further demonstrating its determination to be a reliable ally of Algiers, Moscow has forgiven billions of dollars of Algerian debt, while Algeria sought Moscow’s assistance in 2019 against the mass anti-government protests, which forced former long-standing president Abdelaziz Bouteflika to resign. For Algeria, regional tensions have driven it towards Moscow and have propelled its desire to increase its . Currently, Algeria is Moscow’s third-largest arms customer after India and China, and Algiers’ purchases account for around half of Russia’s arms exports to Africa. Russia is also Algiers’ largest arms partner. And showcasing its wishes to maintain ties with Moscow despite the war in Ukraine, Algeria agreed with Moscow on 5 April to carry out joint military exercises on the border of Morocco – with whom Algiers has sour relations. The exercises will include training for tactical moves to search for, detect, and destroy illegal armed groups. About 80 soldiers from the southern military region will participate and will take place at the Hammaguir base in southern Algeria. The manoeuvres are scheduled for November 2022. Such exercises are a continuation of similar activities, such as in October 2021 when both armies  in the North Ossetia region, aiming to increase their effectiveness and further their counter-terrorism cooperation. Moscow’s support for Algeria helps it over the Western Sahara dispute, in which the US supports Morocco’s stance, having recognised Rabat’s sovereignty over the territory. Thus, given Russia’s supportive stance towards Algeria over military partnerships, and how much of a vital ally it is, US pressure on Algeria would be unlikely to deter it from scaling down its ties with Moscow. Yet amid the Ukraine war, Washington has already attempted this. In late March, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged Algeria to limit ties with Russia. Blinken also urged Algeria to repair its fraught ties with Morocco, particularly regarding the dispute over Western Sahara, over which Washington has still upheld recognition of Rabat’s sovereignty. Such a move would therefore be unlikely to sway Algeria into moving away from Moscow.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – Algeria

Internal Documents Prove

Algeria Invest, 6/9

(Digital platform dedicated to financial investment in Nigeria, Algeria-Russia: the strong bilateral relations mentioned, )

Minister of Finance, Abderrahmane Raouya, received on Wednesday in Algiers Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Algeria, Igor Beliaev, who came to visit him at the end of his mission in Algeria, said a statement of the ministry. During the meeting, held at the Ministry's headquarters, Mr. Raouya and his interlocutor highlighted "the strong ties that have always characterized the relations between the two countries and which constitute an important pledge for the development of deep and diversified economic relations", the same source explains. Minister of Finance congratulates the Russian diplomat for the efforts he made during his mission in Algeria. The interview was also used to review the current state of bilateral economic and financial cooperation and the ways and means to further develop and strengthen it.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – Algeria

Algeria’s decision to suspend a friendship treaty with its longtime ally Spain, proves that Algeria is increasingly aligning itself towards Russia, away from the West.

Reuters, 6/13

(Reuters, Algeria is increasingly aligned with Russia, Spanish minister says, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/algeria-is-increasingly-aligned-with-russia-spanish-economy-minister-says-2022-06-13/)

MADRID, June 13 (Reuters) - Algeria's decision to suspend a friendship treaty with Spain last week was not surprising because Algiers is increasingly aligning itself with Russia, Spanish Economy Minister Nadia Calvino said on Monday. Calvino said she had noticed a growing rapprochement between Algeria and Russia at the spring meeting of the International Monetary Fund in April. "I saw back then that Algeria was more and more aligned with Russia, so this (decision to suspend the treaty) didn't surprise me," Calvino said in an interview with Radio Catalunya. The diplomatic row between the two countries followed a change of stance by Spain over Western Sahara, a territory Morocco claims while Algeria supports a group that seeks its independence. Spain is also a member of the European Union and the NATO military alliance, both in the forefront of international opposition to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. After Algeria's decision, Madrid has tried to convince the North African country to backtrack. "I hope that Algeria will reconsider its position and the statements it has made," Calvino told reporters in Barcelona. Algeria is one of Spain's main suppliers of gas and Spain has said it will firmly defend its national interests and those of its citizens and companies. Calvino reiterated on Monday that the gas supplies continue normally and was confident there would be no disruption.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – Russia-North Africa Ties

Russia-MENA ties are strong – influence is spreading through Africa

Imran Bayoumi ‘21, is a Master of Global Affairs candidate at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy where he focuses on security. He holds a B.A. in Political Studies from Queen’s University., “Russia’s Return to Africa”, The International Affairs Review, 3/9/21, https://iar-gwu.org/blog/russias-return-to-africa

Russia’s announcement that it plans to open a naval base in Sudan marks a clear return of Russia to the African continent amid a push to expand its power. Since the mid-2010s, Russia has sought to reassert itself via a mix of having an official state presence on the continent and the use of private military contractors (PMCs). Thus, while former President Trump disparaged African nations as “shit-hole countries” in 2018 and later fired then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson while he was on a tour of Africa, Russia was steadily increasing its presence via diplomatic and military means. In the face of a rising Russian presence, this article will propose policy recommendations that allow the Biden administration to counter Russian influence while building strong bilateral relations with African states. During his term, President Trump never made a single visit to Africa and only received a few African heads of state. In comparison, Russia received 10 African heads of states between 2017 and 2019. The most significant diplomatic event during this period was the Russia-Africa Summit, which brought representatives from all 54 African states, including 43 heads of state. Diplomatic ties between Russia and Africa are important—the 54 African nations represent the largest voting bloc at the UN and often vote together, and Russia is eager to court this influence. In addition to general members, African countries hold three of the 10 seats on the Security Council, known as the A3. In a further attempt to strengthen Russian-African ties, Russia has often backed the goals of the A3 at the Security Council, including blocking human rights and democratic governance initiatives. Moscow also seeks to increase its access to natural resources across Africa. One such area is in energy, where Russia seeks to develop the capacity of African nations via its state owned enterprises. Simultaneously, Russia is also increasing its soft power push, through the creation of regional Russian language centers that promote the Russian language and culture and partnerships between Russian and African universities. Beyond diplomatic channels, Russia has sought to deepen its ties to Africa via military means. Russia’s naval base deal with Sudan is for at least 25 years, with an option to renew for another 10. The land for a Russian naval base is provided free of charge, and Russia has full autonomy over the transfer of military equipment into the country. Once fully developed, the base is expected to hold up to four naval vessels and 300 people. The signing of the naval base deal in Sudan is not Russia’s only military foray in Africa. In December 2020, Russia dispatched 300 soldiers to the Central African Republic (CAR) because of ongoing civil unrest, playing a vital role in securing a peace deal between government troops and rebels in 2019. Building on the close ties between Moscow and Bangui, the Kremlin is reportedly interested in opening a military base in the CAR as it presents an attractive gateway for extending Russian power into Central Africa, including the natural resource-rich Democratic Republic of the Congo.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – Russia-North Africa Ties

Relations are high – driven by US abandonment

Stephen Norris ’20, is the Walter E. Havighurst Professor of Russian History and the Director of the Havighurst Center for Russian and Post-Soviet Studies, “Russia and the South: Five Things to Know about Russia’s Relationship with the Middle East and North Africa”, Havighurst Center, 5/15/20, https://blogs.miamioh.edu/havighurst/2020/05/15/russia-and-the-south-five-things-to-know-about-russias-relationship-with-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/

In its efforts to establish a role as peace-broker in the MENA region, Russia will need to capitalize on its ties with Syria, as well as the opportunities for secure diplomatic opportunities in the region. Until now, the Kremlin has assumed that order will emerge spontaneously ​as strong military and political leaders network over shared interests. ​However, in order to achieve the goal of being a strong peace-broker, Russia will need to consolidate a strategy of active diplomacy oriented toward diversifying relationships, presenting a non-ideological approach, and showing long-term investment in Syria. While the U.S. has traditionally been interested in inspiring and sustaining Western liberal values such as democracy, Russia is more pragmatic — aiming instead at security and stability. ​U.S. failures in MENA​, especially in the Syrian Civil War provide an opportunity for Russia to contrast itself with the U.S. in the eyes of both the European Union and Syrian allies. Russia has strengthened its relationship with the Assad regime at the expense of the U.S. This will continue to be the case as long as Trump is in office. The U.S. abandonment of its Kurdish allies has created a vacuum that Russia will likely continue to fill.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – Russia-North Africa Ties

Russian re-engagement with the region ensures power-broker status

Stephen Norris ’20, is the Walter E. Havighurst Professor of Russian History and the Director of the Havighurst Center for Russian and Post-Soviet Studies, “Russia and the South: Five Things to Know about Russia’s Relationship with the Middle East and North Africa”, Havighurst Center, 5/15/20, https://blogs.miamioh.edu/havighurst/2020/05/15/russia-and-the-south-five-things-to-know-about-russias-relationship-with-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/

Russia’s intervention in MENA is not new. In fact, involvement in MENA has been prevalent throughout Russia’s history, and its exit during the late-Soviet era was the ​exception, not the rule​. In the 18th Century, Russia began creating ties with Middle Eastern countries to gain access to warm water ports, and in the 19th Century, Russia protected Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. After World War II, Russia courted new Arab states and provided them with arms. In fact, Russia has consistently sold arms to MENA countries and is now the ​second largest global arms exporter​. Before scaling back ties with MENA countries in the 1980s and 1990s — due to military failures such as the ​First Chechen War​— Soviet involvement in the region was pervasive. In the 1970s, Russia had access to Egyptian support bases and “friendship agreements” with Cairo and Damascus, as outlined in this ​EUISS report​. Today, Russia has returned their focus on MENA. Although their presence can be found in Israel and the Persian Gulf Arab states, the most notable intervention is in Syria. Carengie Senior Fellow Eugene Rumer writes that Russia has “​emerged​ as a key power broker and military actor” in MENA countries.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – Russia-North Africa Ties

America’s history of isolationism to Africa has resulted in Russia gaining an advantage in the area.

Bruhl 6/14 [Joe Bruhl; ; 6-14-2022; America Ignores Africa at Its Own Peril; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/america-ignores-africa-at-its-own-peril/; 7-16-2022; SK]

America’s ambivalence toward Africa puts it at a dangerous disadvantage there — and impacts U.S. leadership around the globe. While Washington focuses on the Russian military threat in Eastern Europe and Chinese expansionism in the Pacific, Russia and China are outcompeting the United States in Africa in ways that could fundamentally alter the global balance of power.

To restore momentum to its work in Africa, Washington should develop an integrated strategy that does three things: establishes continent-wide objectives with tailored regional strategies, dramatically expands mutually beneficial economic investment, and leverages areas in which the United States holds comparative advantage over its competitors.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – Russia-North Africa Ties

Strategic partnership with North Africa is a priority of Russia’s foreign policy.

Klomegah, 6/29

(Kester Kenn, journalist specializing on socio-economic and political development issues in former Soviet republics, particularly in the Russian Federation and Eurasia. Writes for Pressenza News, Russia-African Relations in the Context of Geopolitical Changes, https://www.pressenza.com/2022/06/russia-african-relations-in-the-context-of-geopolitical-changes/)

Russia plans to hold the second Russia-Africa summit later this year. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, indicated in mid-June message that “in these difficult and crucial times the strategic partnership with Africa has become a priority of Russia’s foreign policy. Russia highly appreciates the readiness of Africans to further step up economic cooperation.” Lavrov said: “It is in the interests of our peoples to work together to preserve and expand mutually beneficial trade and investment ties under these new conditions. It is important to facilitate the mutual access of Russian and African economic operators to each other’s markets and encourage their participation in large-scale infrastructure projects. The signed agreements and the results will be consolidated at the forthcoming second Russia-Africa summit.” The above statement arguably offers some implications especially discussing this question of relationship-building. Lavrov has aptly asserted that within the “emerging and sustainable polycentric architecture of the world order” relations with Africa is still a priority, but Russians always close their eyes on the fact that Russia’s foreign policy in Africa has largely failed to pronounce itself, in practical terms, as evidenced by the countable forays into Africa by Russian officials.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 1NC – North Africa Relations › 1NC – Libya Scenario

Nuclear war

Lancaster 2k [Carol, Associate Professor and Director of the Master's of Science in Foreign Service program at Georgetown University, Foreign Affairs, October, 2000)]

THE MOST BASIC CHALLENGE facing the United States today is helping to preserve peace. The end of the Cold War eliminated a potential threat to American security, but it did not eliminate conflict. In 1998 alone there were 27 significant conflicts in the world, 25 of which involved violence within states. Nine of those intrastate conflicts were in sub-Saharan Africa, where poor governance has aggravated ethnic and social tensions. The ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been particularly nightmarish, combining intrastate and interstate conflict with another troubling element: military intervention driven by the commercial motives of several neighboring states. Such motives could fuel future confiicts in other weak states with valuable resources. Meanwhile, a number of other wars-in Colombia, the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Angola, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi-have reflected historic enmities or poorly resolved hostilities ofthe past. Intrastate conflicts are likely to continue in weakly integrated, poorly governed states, destroying lives and property; creating large numbers of refugees and displaced persons, and threatening regional security The two interstate clashes in 1998--between India and Pakistan and Eritrea and Ethiopia-involved disputes over land and other natural resources. Such contests show no sign of disappearing. Indeed, with the spread of weapons of mass destruction, these wars could prove more dangerous than ever.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 1NC – North Africa Relations › 1NC – Libya Scenario

Advanced weaponry ensures escalation in Libya – causes Great Power war throughout the region

Nathan Vest ’19, is a research assistant and Middle East specialist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation., “Can Anything Stop the Flow of Advanced Weapons into Libya?”, Defense One, 12/13/19, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/12/can-anything-stop-flow-advanced-weapons-libya/161892/

Weapons previously unseen in the conflict have now arrived. Videos have circulated purporting to show anti-Hifter fighters using an advanced Chinese-made FN-6 man-portable air defense system to shoot down an MiG-21 jet fighter. Hifter-aligned forces have posted videos of themselves using anti-tank guided missiles to destroy enemy vehicles and using thermal sights of advanced Russian-made ATGMs for targeting and reconnaissance. U.S.-made Javelin ATGMs were discovered in Gharyan, south of Tripoli, when anti-Hifter forces captured that town in June. That such armed groups are deploying advanced weapons has dangerous implications. With continued exposure to and training on such systems, Libyan armed groups’ capabilities will become increasingly sophisticated and deadly. Moreover, as they continue publishing novel uses of their advanced weaponry online, other armed groups stand to learn and benefit. Like in Afghanistan in the 1990s and 2000s — as well as in the Sahel in the 2010s — militants from other armed groups may come to Libya to receive training. If Libya becomes a nexus for growing expertise and potential outflow of arms, increasingly deadly regional armed groups could further destabilize the region. As was the case between 2012 and 2014 when Libyan arms bolstered the arsenals of terrorist and separatist groups, light weapons could proliferate into Libya’s fragile neighbors, a number of which are grappling with mounting ISIS- and Al-Qaeda-linked insurgencies.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 1NC – North Africa Relations › 1NC – Libya Scenario

In particular, Russian cooperation with Algeria is key to prevent escalation of the Libyan civil war and massive instability throughout North Africa – failure undermines global stability

Kester Kenn Klomegah ’20, MD Africa Editor and is an independent researcher and writer on African affairs in the EurAsian region and former Soviet republics, “Understanding Russia-Algerian Strategic Partnership”, Modern Diplomacy, 7/19/20, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/07/19/understanding-russia-algerian-strategic-partnership/

For almost 20 years, Russia has pursued its economic cooperation and other geo-strategic interests using the Declaration on Strategic Partnership agreement signed in 2001 with the Arab Republic of Algeria in the Maghreb region. The Maghreb also known as Northwest Africa, the Arab Maghreb is a subregion of North Africa that is effectively a western part of the Arab world and is predominantly Muslim. In geopolitical context, Russia has excellent relations with countries in this region compared to the rest of Africa. While that two-decade old Declaration on Strategic Partnership agreement has primarily allowed Russia to step up military-technical cooperation by supplying arms and military equipment, it also sets out principles for the consolidating long-term bilateral policy goals between the two countries. During her weekly media briefing, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova hinted about the official visit of Algerian Foreign Minister Sabri Boukadoum. “Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov will hold talks with the Algerian Foreign Minister in Moscow on July 22 in order to maintain dialogue on the current issues of bilateral relations and the issues on the regional agenda,” the diplomat said. She reminded that Russia and Algeria had signed the Declaration on Strategic Partnership in 2001, which set out the long-term goals of joint work. “In nearly two decades, we have managed to expand the basis of our cooperation significantly. We are successfully developing mutually beneficial ties in the economic, military-technical, research and humanitarian spheres, and in 2019, the turnover between two states reached $3.4 billion. This is a significant figure,” Zakharova said. Undoubtedly, Russia has tried to sustain its multifaceted bilateral relations with Algeria that plays an important role in maintaining regional stability in North Africa. Sabri Boukadoum has served as Minister of Foreign Affairs since April 2019. In this short period though, he has expressed his country’s keenness on resolving the Libyan crisis through dialogue and maintaining the integrity of the country’s territory. According to him, Algeria does not accept the presence of foreign forces in Libya, regardless of which country they represent. Currently there is an intense fight between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces (the opposition from the Eastern region) to control the Libyan capital. There are external forces already supporting the two warring groups. The inflow of arms for the conflicting sides in Libya is only aggravating the situation in the country. It adds to the involvement of foreign mercenaries and the presence of extremist and terrorist groups, whose activities reinvigorated jointly with the military escalation and is threatening the local, regional and global peace. This development largely worries Algeria that wanted to assist Libyans in addressing “structural governance and security issues” and prevent a new Arab Spring from spilling over unto its territory. From Russia’s perspective, besides Algeria’s role in ensuring regional stability in North Africa, this country makes a significant contribution to the fight against terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel zone, actively participates in international efforts to achieve national accord in Mali, and has a constructive mediating potential in the Libyan settlement. On this basis, Russia wants to proceed from the premise that the upcoming talks help to strengthen multifaceted bilateral cooperation and to engage in the peaceful negotiation process in its neighboring Libya. As a sign of cordial friendship, Russia prompt responded to Algeria’s request for humanitarian aid by delivering a cargo full of medical protective equipment to help tackle the novel coronavirus pandemic. That aid was purchased and delivered by Rosoboronexport, which is the sole State Arms Exporter, on instructions from the Russian government late April. Algeria has one of the biggest number of coronavirus-related deaths among the African nations, according to official statistics.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 1NC – North Africa Relations › 1NC – Libya Scenario

Relations are driven by a desire to take advantage of Western power declining

Isabelle Falcon ’17, Deputy director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, “Russia’s quest for influence in North Africa and the Middle East”, Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, 4/11/17, https://www.frstrategie.org/en/programs/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/russias-quest-influence-north-africa-and-middle-east-2017

In March 2017, Moscow received Prime Minister Netanyahu (for his fifth visit in ten months). Alongside the visits of Turkish president Erdogan and the Iranian president Rouhani, Moscow has found a new role for itself in the Middle East where it intends to remain for a long time. Its involvement in Libya and in particular its support for “Marshal” Haftar further strengthen this assessment. This new geopolitical structure marks a stark contrast with that of the 1990s, characterised by a considerable weakening of Russia’s influence across the broader region. As Russian political scientist Aleksei Mlachenko explains, Russia had then “abstained from independent endeavours in Near Eastern politics, giving the initiative entirely to its American and European partners.” On the one hand, the profound financial and economic crisis that Russia has faced has stopped its diplomatic system from having effective means of action, thus forcing it to prioritise certain areas outside of North Africa/the Middle East. (These included ex-Soviet republics, the Euro-Atlantic world and China). This marked a considerable break with the Soviet posture during the Cold War when the Soviet Union was actively involved in the region. From the mid-1950s, it actively promoted itself and extended its influence in economic, military and ideological terms. The area was of particular importance to the Soviet Union due to the proximity of the region to its borders. Indeed, the disappearance of the ideological dimension in the conduct of Russian foreign policy undoubtedly reduced the importance of certain traditional partnerships in the Middle East. The new importance given to the development of a “strategic partnership” with Western countries prescribed “an extreme prudence, if not a distance, with regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict amongst other sources of tension in the Middle East.” Around the middle of the 2000s, when Russia recovered to relative economic health, it was able to work at a renewal of its regional presence. This set a new tone in its foreign policy with declarations of a Russian agenda concerning the main international security issues. This was driven by a desire to distinctly mark its independence from Washington (whom the Russians believed had tarnished its image following the Iraq war and its spillovers). Moreover, it was characterised by an active promotion of its commercial interests (the “economisation” of Russian foreign policy) alongside the implementation of an “energy diplomacy.” Finally, support for armament exports was a unique opportunity to showcase Russian technological advances. If Russian activism is more visible on the Middle Eastern front, Moscow has also redeployed its interests in the Maghreb. This entrance into the Maghreb and Mashrek should be seen as part of a logic of geographical continuum. In 2005, it obtained observer state status in the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation. The Arab Spring firmly “shook” the process of Russian reengagement in the North African/Middle Eastern zone. Despite a willingness to act, Russian involvement has been extremely gradual (and devoid of any spectacular successes). Moscow was relatively reserved in its reaction to revolutions and demonstrated a preference for the maintenance of the status quo and the “legitimate” powers prioritising stability (independent of the nature of said regimes). This attitude marks a certain continuity in Moscow’s rejection to what it sees as the inclination of Western countries to support regime change. This has been the case in certain countries (Serbia 1999, Iraq 2003, the Rose Revolution in Georgia 2003, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine 2004) and occasionally through the use of force. This explains the recurrence of calls by the Russian authorities to stop intervening in Arab revolutions. The Russian reaction can also be explained through fear of an expansion of Middle Eastern political instability. Indeed, from the outset, the Russian authorities have voiced their concern at the the possibility that revolution might principally benefit Islamists. The conservative posture of Russia on the Arab Spring will have been received differently at the regional level. On the one hand, according to certain experts, the Algerian regime appreciated the Russian contribution to the development of cooperation projects of Sonatrach-Gazprom. On the other, the support of key figures in the Russian government to Muammar Gaddafi will take a long time to be forgotten in Tripoli. In any case, after the erosion of its positions in Iraq and in the 2003 war, Russia is determined to prevent the repetition of scenarios of regime change. This is clearly the case in Libya and Syria, two countries it considers as important stepping stones in its return strategy to the Middle East. The UN intervention in Libya and the elimination of Muammar Ghaddafi explain to a large extent the subsequent obstruction of Moscow on the Syrian question. When several Western powers argue that there cannot be a political solution to the intra-Syrian conflict with the maintenance of President Assad, Russia concludes that Syria will be the next country on the list of regime change. This threatens to deny it one of its most stable, if not main allies in the region. In turn, this allows Russian experts to state that the rescue of the Syrian regime is the most important of considerations that underpins the Kremlin line on Syria. When Moscow justifies its military intervention in Syria through issues touching at the stability of the region “it is a lie. Russia, first and foremost supports Bashar Al-Assad!” Another parameter through which to analyse Russia’s desire for regional influence can be found in an element of context. Moscow estimates that the world is witnessing the collapse of the old regional order and that this constitutes evidence of what it identifies, correctly or not, as the end of the “Western moment” in international relations. For the Kremlin, this new configuration constitutes an opportunity allowing an acceleration of Russia’s reinsertion of Russia in the region. Such a reintroduction is also seen by Moscow as a necessity in the context of conflict with Ukraine as it has to be demonstrated by any means that Russia is not as isolated as the West argues. However, this endeavour also contains certain risks, notably due to the fragility of the situation and the volatility of political equilibriums prevalent in the region. 1 – The return of Russia into North Africa and the Middle East: Multiple motivations. 1.1 – Russia as a power seeking global hegemony in a “post-Western” international context Through the assertion that Russia is “no more” than a regional power (2014), in an interview given to The Economist, President Barack Obama undeniably “provoked” the Russian authorities. Indeed, Russia under Putin has incessantly gone back on its diplomacy of the 1990s to demonstrate its intent to weigh in on major international issues. This is particularly shown in its activity on key issues such as its role as a nuclear power and as a permanent member of the Security Council. In its vision of the world, this is evidence of its capacity to play a role in Middle Eastern affairs, an area that strongly mobilises the attention of the international community. “Those who are in a strong position in this region will have strong positions in the world” argues Fyodor Lukyanov, a Russian political scientist known to be close to the seat of power. In this context, Russia did not hesitate to use rhetoric that denounced the West’s moral responsibility in bringing about the current Middle Eastern predicament (this is perfectly reflected by Vladimir Putin’s speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2015). This speech aimed to strengthen his own role at the forefront of the resolution of crises in the Middle East. In any case, the post-Arab Spring situation has offered new ground which is particularly favourable to the realisation of Russian ambitions. Indeed, the United States is advocating less involvement whereas Europe seems to be confused if not predominantly because of the EU’s internal travails. An additional factor which is related to Russia’s “Middle Eastern activism” can be found in its internal dynamics. Through foreign success, the Kremlin is actively seeking to respond to domestic issues. This is particularly notable in the economic sphere, where the projection of an image of a strong Russia at the heart of international issues serves as a solution to internal impediments. Before the Arab Spring, many of the antiquated relationships established during the Soviet Union era were far from having recovered to their previous level. Indeed, even the strongest ties (Syria, Libya, Egypt and Algeria) were far from a complete return to the Cold War paradigm. Moreover, successive revolutions had compromised some of the advances that Moscow had managed to achieve since the start of the 2000s. Thus, the war in Syria represented a real opportunity for Russia to demonstrate its renewed regional importance. Besides, there seems to have been a certain vengeful dimension to the motivations of the Russian Federation at the expense of Western countries. Indeed, from a Russian point of view, the military interventionism of Western states deprived Moscow of traditional (Saddam Hussein) or potential allies (Muammar Gadhafi). Today, Russia seeks to compensate for such perceived or actual geopolitical losses through a return in the area, expedited through its involvement in the Syrian question. This is certainly not unrelated to the Russian official line on Libya where Moscow holds a very similar discourse to that which it has developed in Syria since 2011. “Undoubtedly, it is only up to the Libyans themselves to determine who runs the country. This should not and cannot be envisaged or imposed by external actors” explains Vladimir Chizhov, Russian ambassador to the European Union. Moscow’s ambition to impose itself as a central power in the Middle East had manifested itself in several ways before and since the start of the intervention by Russian forces in Syria in September 2015. Moreover, it expressed itself far beyond the Syrian question with Russian contributions to the Iranian nuclear debate and agreements with the United States on chemical weapons in Syria (September 2013). This is further highlighted by both the self-promotion undertaken by Moscow at the heart of the Quartet and initiatives pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (The aim is to remove the idea that an exclusively American process of negotiations is still an option, following changes in Washington.) In any case, the Syrian question has allowed Russia to interact with Washington on a more level playing field – a key objective of Russian diplomacy in the Middle East and the wider world. Thus, the main aim of Russia’s military campaign in Syria is to impose itself as “co-leader” with the United States on intra-Syrian negotiations and to draw up of a peace initiative backed by both countries. This comes alongside saving Bashar Al-Assad who is in in increasingly dire straits. At the time, the last step of Moscow’s “Syria plan” aimed at forming a vast coalition of Russia/the US/European countries/regional powers (Iran, Iraq, Syria) against the so-called Islamic State. It was thought that this would help thaw the relationships between Russia and Western countries putting them on an “equal footing” that the Kremlin never ceases to aspire to and make claims to. Thus, it isn’t rare to hear Russian officials or political experts close to power underline that Russia and the United States have common interests “in many regional crises and zones of instability.” Such areas include Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan (which the Russian government links to the zone under consideration.) In the same way, when Russia is attempting to strengthen its presence in North Africa, it is with the calculation that this may open opportunities of interaction and dialogue with a certain number of European countries that are interested in the evolution of the regional situation. Undoubtedly, this is one of the key agendas of its current position on Libya. More broadly, Russian policy in Northern Africa and the Middle East is undeniably reactionary. It marks a response to an international environment which it perceives as undergoing profound changes relating to the perceived or imagined decline of Western global leadership that is undoubtedly desired by Russia. The Kremlin enjoys luring regional powers to the organisations which it promotes in a bid to strengthen its vision of an increasingly multipolar global order. Such a reading of global geopolitics highlights Russia’s importance in achieving such goals. From this point of view, the interest shown by Turkey in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or the possibility of Iran (observing member) fully joining said organisation are useful stepping stones. The same can be said regarding the anticipated alignment of Egypt’s Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and the Eurasian Economic Union. Besides, Russia is certainly aware of the inherent weaknesses hindering it weighing in as a global power. Thus, Russia is constantly searching for new partnerships with regional powers that would increase its international visibility and credibility throughout the Middle East and elsewhere. This is the case in such countries as Iran, Israel, Egypt and Morocco.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 1NC – North Africa Relations › 1NC – Libya Scenario

Russia-North Africa relations are strong – currently displacing US influence

Mohamed Sabry ‘20, is an Egyptian journalist who specializes in Egypt and Middle East affairs. He writes for several local media outlets and foreign news agencies, “US Looks to Draw North Africa Away From Russian Orbit”, Inside Over, 10/4/20, https://www.insideover.com/war/us-looks-to-draw-north-africa-away-from-russian-orbit.html

Russia’s Reach Grows in North Africa Esper’s tour came amid Russian moves to bolster its foothold in neighboring Libya, where Moscow backs the Libyan National Army (LNA) of eastern strongman Khalifa Haftar. Mercenaries from the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group are also fighting alongside Haftar’s forces against the Turkey-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). The Russian involvement in Libya is part of a regional strategy by President Vladimir Putin after the 2011 Arab Spring revolution to return to regions where Moscow used to be a key player. Russia perceived the Arab Spring revolutions as part of a US-sponsored plan to carry out regime changes in the Middle East and North Africa, causing Moscow to lose its influence in the region. As part of the new Russian strategy in the region, Moscow provided support to the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria against Turkey-backed opposition groups. The Russian military support has helped tip the tide of the war in Assad’s favor and gained Moscow a foothold in the pivotal Arab country. Washington’s Fear of Russia’s Future on the Libyan Coast Russia now has access to a naval base in Tartus on the Mediterranean coast in Syria. This base can accommodate 11 warships and perform operational capabilities throughout the Mediterranean. Moscow also operates the Khmeimim airbase in the Syrian city of Latakia. Russia has also involved itself in Libya following a NATO-backed uprising led to the ouster and subsequent death of ruler Muammar Gaddafi. Washington fears that if Russia managed to earn military bases on Libya’s coast, it would be able to threaten southern Europe and reduce US ability to maneuver militarily. Russia has also managed to forge a strong relationship with the new regime in Egypt, where it signed a $25-billion agreement to build the country’s first nuclear power plant. Moscow has also maintained a strong close relations with Algeria, which has relied on the Russian arms sales for decades. Washington’s allies Tunisia and Morocco have also edged closer to Russia in recent years. This increasing Russian influence was quite visible in Tunisia’s tourism industry, which is vital to the North African country’s economy.