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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › 1NC – Greece Relations › 1NC – Oil Scenario

Russian oil is key to avert an economic collapse – full embargo decks growth

Steven Mufson et al. ‘22, *covers the business of climate change for The Washington Post, **Aaron Steckelberg is a graphics reporter who creates maps, charts and diagrams that provide greater depth and context to stories over a wide range of topics, ***Andrew Van Dam writes the Department of Data column each week for The Washington Post, ****Naema Ahmed is a graphics reporter at The Washington Post, “Here’s where Russian oil flows”, The Washington Post, 3/8/22, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/03/08/russia-oil-imports-ban/

The shock of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has upended politics around the world and posed a key question: Should the rest of the world shun Russian oil to avoid paying money to the Putin regime? The Biden administration has decided to ban the import of oil and natural gas from Russia, expanding on the sweeping economic sanctions already in place. The European Union, which relies much more heavily on imports of Russian oil, has not yet taken action, though it has vowed to cut its use of Russian gas by two-thirds this year. Russia is the world’s largest oil exporter. Many lawmakers from both parties in the United States are arguing that it is possible to impose a ban on Russian oil without hurting the U.S. economy. But will the barrels add up in the global market? Oil analysts say the sheer magnitude of Russia’s oil exports makes them difficult if not impossible to offset, setting up high prices and an economic slowdown.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › 1NC – Greece Relations › 1NC – Oil Scenario

Greece-Russia relations are key to maintain Russia oil exports flowing

Reuters ’22, international news agency, “Greece turns into new hub for Russian ship-to-ship fuel oil exports”, Daily Sabah, 5/20/22, https://www.dailysabah.com/business/energy/greece-turns-into-new-hub-for-russian-ship-to-ship-fuel-oil-exports

As sanctions on Moscow drive traders to find new ways to export Russian oil via ship-to-ship (STS) loadings, fuel oil arrivals offshore Greece jumped to record levels in April, data showed and sources said. Trading Russian crude and oil products remain legal for now as the European Union is yet to fully agree on a proposed embargo, but banking and other financial sanctions on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24 have made it increasingly more difficult to do so. In April, shipments of Russian fuel oil with Greece as a destination reached nearly 0.9 million tons, about double March levels and could reach new records in May, according to Refinitiv Eikon data. The bulk of this was shipped from Russian ports to Greece’s Kalamata port, the data showed. The Greek energy ministry declined to comment on what it said was private companies' business. Traders said the fuel oil – a by-product of refining crude oil into lighter, cleaner products like auto fuels – is being stored and blended offshore onboard tankers and being loaded via ship-to-ship transfer for re-export. While it is not uncommon for fuel oil to load offshore Greece for exports to other destinations, the level of activity was very high compared to normal April levels, one industry source said. The Evridiki tanker, which has the capacity to load 130,000 tons, loaded a Russian fuel oil cargo in mid-April off Kalamata, two shipping sources said. The tanker then made its way to the United Arab Emirates oil hub of Fjairah, Refinitiv data shows. Russia has been increasing fuel exports to the hub, with arrivals set to jump to about 2.5 million barrels according to data from oil analytics firm Vortexa. Another tanker, Okeanos, with the same capacity, loaded fuel oil via STS off Kalamata earlier this month and is currently heading to India, the data shows. The Kriti King, which loaded a 130,000-ton fuel oil cargo offshore Kalamata in early May, is currently heading to China, according to Refinitiv data. Shipping sources told Reuters that Russian oil sellers have restored STS operations in Rotterdam and near Spain's Ceuta, after EU sanctions and activist protests derailed such operations in Denmark.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › 1NC – Greece Relations › 1NC – Oil Scenario

However, relations are on the brink now – lack of trust in NATO unity solidifies mutual desire in the Greek-Russo relationship, but plan flips it – new security cooperation fully puts Greece in the West’s court

National Herald ’22, is the paper of record of the Greek Diaspora community. Through independent journalism, we bring news to generations of Greek-Americans, with stories on the individual, community and international level, “Russia’s Ukraine Invasion Put Greece on World Stage, Divided Greeks”, The National Herald, 3/23/22, https://www.thenationalherald.com/russias-ukraine-invasion-put-greece-on-world-stage-divided-greeks/

ATHENS – Initially applauded for expressing “full solidarity” with Ukraine and sending small arms to help its people fend off a Russian invasion, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis suddenly finds himself under fire for going too far. The New Democracy leader told Parliament when the invasion began that he was standing by Ukraine – and ethnic Greeks there, 10 of whom were killed in the early stages and scores of thousands still trapped in the besieged city of Mariupol. In breaking with a history of Greek government being reluctant to be involved in foreign wars, his was among the first off the bloc to offer more than tweets of support, shipping arms and backing European Union sanctions – even if still buying Russian oil and gas and letting shipping continue between the countries. But most Greeks don’t agree with what he did, and not just the major rival SYRIZA, which came to power in 2015 on a promise to take Greece out of NATO and not send troops to Afghanistan but reneged on both promises. Still, with most of the EU fiddling about what to do, NATO saying it won’t get involved, the United States not supporting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s request for a No-Fly zone over his country, Greece was an outlier. In a feature on the ambivalence if not outright opposition to Mitsotakis’ tough stance, the site POLITICO noted that a just-released survey found that 70 percent of Greeks said his hard line against Russia, a close Orthodox country, was a mistake. In another survey, 63 percent said the decision may prove dangerous for Greece, especially if, as expected, Russian President Vladimir Putin may see most or all of his demands met in return for ending the war – and target those against him. That would be Greece, which relies on Russian oil and gas and has tried to keep tight relations with Putin, a volatile character who had rejected SYRIZA overtures for a bailout, leaving the Leftists to embarrassedly turn to international lenders. Even Mitsotakis is apparently feeling a big sheepish and trying to mediate his opposition to Putin’s War, his government turning down Ukraine’s request teo send Soviet-era TOR-Μ1 and Osa-AK missile systems, saying enough was enough. The war has seen his government tilt even further toward the United States, with which it renewed a military defense cooperation agreement and said would allow a greater US military presence in the country, including more bases. SIDING WITH PEACE When he first talked to lawmakers, the site noted, he stood up boldly and said his government was all-in on the side of Ukraine and that, “There can be no equal distances. You are either with peace and international law or against them.” Turns out most are against them and in Putin’s camp with the same kind of fervor still seen among former US President Donald Trump’s near-religious fervor zealots who believe he can do no wrong. What Mitsotakis did was take Greece out of a neutral act and balancing role to get involved in international intrigue, a path many Greeks don’t want, especially with the country having a hard-core sector of Russian sympathizers. The EU sanctions that bar Russian airlines will also cost Greece Russian tourists and Mitsotakis’ government got into open undiplomatic spat with the Russian Embassy, neither side backing off and with worries hard feelings will remain. The feature by Nektaria Stamouli pointed out that many Greeks were caught by surprise but his initial decision to jump into the battle with both feet as Russian sentiments remain in parts of Greece. And there are centuries of religious, military, economic and cultural ties between the two countries, with SYRIZA also seizing the chance to snipe again from the sidelines and attack him – while supporting his call to back Ukraine, up to a point. Unlike the EU, which during the war has fumbled over a response and limited sanctions, likely in anticipation of hoping a post-war Putin won’t take some kind of political revenge, Mitsotakis wasn’t timid about taking on the Russian leader. “Greek society also has historical ties to Russia, a fellow Christian Orthodox nation that helped the Greeks fight off Ottoman rule in 1821. More recently, Moscow has been viewed as a protector in Greece’s long-running rivalry with neighbor Turkey,” the story noted. Mitsotakis met with Putin in December, 2021 and Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias was among the last to meetRussian foreign chief Sergei Lavrov days before the invasion but no reports he asked him to help save ethnic Greeks in Mariupol. “Greece,” Mitsotakis declared in the Greek Parliament, “is the last outpost of the West,” sidelining its relationship with Russia – and Putin – and leading to wonder if it marked a bigger shift in Greece’s role on the world stage. That’s as it still tries to recover from a near-decade long economic and austerity crisis that required 326 billion euros ($358.75 billion) in three international bailouts after generations of wild overspending and runaway patronage. Constantinos Filis, Director of the Institute of Global Affairs and a professor of international relations at the American College of Greece, described the shift as “two choices,” to POLITICO. TAKING A STAND First, he said, Greece decided “it cannot depend on the EU and NATO to secure itself from Turkey” – it also needs bilateral military deals to boost its own capacity. Second, he added, “Greece under the current government has decided to get more deeply involved and put its hand in the fire, even with boots on the ground.” Turkey – which started now-stalled EU accession talks in 2005 – opposes EU sanctions but isn’t, like Serbia which allowed Russian airlines, taking any heat for it and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has emerged as an unlikely peace broker. While defying the EU he wants to join, sending drones to help Ukraine fight Russian forces, he’s also bought Russian-made S-400 missile systems that undermine NATO and could be used against Greece, but it drawing applause for trying to mediate a settlement to the war, leaving Greece out of the equation. When he authorized sending arms to Ukraine, Mitsotakis said he thought it would help Greece’s national interests although most Greeks feel otherwise now, even more as the war continues. “With what moral standing would we ask for similar assistance if we found ourselves in the same position?” he told the site in an interview. “We have an additional reason, compared to other European countries, to be on the right side of history,” he added, making a clear reference to Greece’s tense relationship with Turkey. But there’s belief in Greece that NATO – which has refused to intervene over Turkey sending fighter jets and warships into Greek airspace and waters and plans to drill for oil and gas off Greek islands – would leave Greece on its own in a conflict. In a poll conducted after Russia’s invasion, 71 percent condemned the invasion, but 65 percent said Greece should remain completely neutral. And in a POLITICO poll, 60 percent said Russian invasion was unacceptable, the lowest figure among the six countries polled. After giving support to the decision to support Ukraine, SYRIZA leader Alexis Tsipras, trailing Mitsotakis’ party in polls up to 14 percent, said that shouldn’t have included sending weapons, his party having strong Communist ties. George Katrougalos, Syriza MP and a former foreign minister, told the site that, “The subversion of the old doctrine … that Greece has a political home in Europe but also wants to have a bridge role with the other political powers, and its replacement with the Cold War mantra that ‘Greece is a Western outpost,’ does not benefit our country.” Several retired senior army officers have also gone on TV in Greece to vehemently oppose the Greek arms shipments to Ukraine. “Harmful, unnecessary and silly,” said one. Added Filis: “Greece has to follow a multidimensional foreign policy, act as a bridge between politicians and state. It cannot close its door to China, Russia and other emerging powers.” But it may just have.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › 1NC – Greece Relations › 1NC – Oil Scenario

Greece-Russia relations are warm right now – cautious optimism

George Tzogopoulos ’22, Ph.D., Lecturer at the European Institute of Nice, Director of EU-China Programmes, Senior Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy and the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, “What is Next for Russia and Greece?”, RIAC, 1/14/22, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/what-is-next-for-russia-and-greece/

The new year starts with cautious optimism for the Greek–Russian relations. The meeting between President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Sochi in December, 2021 was significant for two reasons. It has confirmed the willingness of Russia and Greece to leave the diplomatic crisis of 2018 behind and bring the bilateral relationship back to normalcy—after three years of arduous efforts. More importantly, it has outlined their joint interest in placing this bilateral relationship into the general international environment and its contradictions. The two leaders thus used several adjectives to illustrate the nature of the Sochi discussions—such as ‘productive’, ‘constructive’, ‘substantive’, ‘open’, ‘direct’, and ‘sincere’. Greece’s membership in the EU and NATO—the cornerstone of its foreign policy—does not allow illusions about the future course of the Greek–Russian relations, which could deviate from the Western framework. This reality, however, makes both countries keen on rather being pragmatic and setting realistic goals they can possibly fulfil. President Putin, for instance, has expressed the belief that Greece would always advocate for a balanced and objective position on a number of issues pertaining to the interaction between Russia and the EU. Premier Mitsotakis, for his part, has considered Russia to be essential to the architecture of European security, making a reference to the Ukraine crisis. At the meeting, he was talking about the need of the Minsk agreements (among other accords) to be respected and implemented, and he concluded that the Greek government could not but be interested in a settlement as well as in non-aggravation, since many Greeks also live the region. Although tensions between Russia and NATO over Ukraine go beyond the capacity of Greece to influence these developments, the latter considers the preservation of communication channels essential. In the words of Mitsotakis during the press conference, ‘the absence of communication does not lead to anything good’. Amid the ongoing debate in Europe, Greece belongs to the countries interested in Russia’s engagement in a dialogue with the EU. This position is shared by core member states of the EU, namely Germany, France and Italy. As far as the Eastern Mediterranean is concerned, Russia is continuously reiterating its standard position about such a resolution of the Cyprus issue that ought to be built on the UN framework. The Greek Prime Minister publicly thanked the Russian President for this firm position. From another prism, the changing Eastern Mediterranean dynamics have brought Moscow and Ankara quite close in the last years, which is a source of concern for Athens. This is another reality that has rendered Greece determined to mend ties with Russia. The rapprochement also serves the interests of Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean, which has certainly found a modus vivendi with Turkey while Moscow does not always agree with Ankara. In that regard, the principal advantage of the ties between Greece and Russia is their historical longevity. It is symbolic that the visit of Kyriakos Mitsotakis to Russia, the first in his capacity as Prime Minister as he had already visited the country in February 2019 (then the leader of the main opposition New Democracy party), took place during the 200th anniversary of the Greek Revolution. Emotional celebrations and Russia’s active participation in them have facilitated the forging of a new type of understanding between the two countries. Looking towards the future, the Joint Plan of Action for 2022–2024 offers an institutional umbrella for common actions where tourism will certainly play a critical role. President Putin has commended relevant bilateral collaboration during the coronavirus crisis, saying: ‘We are grateful to the Greek authorities for the decision to recognize Russian Sputnik V vaccination certificates.’ Synergies in the handling of taxation issues, science, high technology, finance, and maritime security are expected to continue. This is also the case for closer cooperation between Greek and Russian universities, think tanks and research centers. Greek-Russian discussions are not always easy. Russian appetite for new investments in Greece, for example, often turns into a complex and time-consuming process due to strict European regulations. Besides, energy talks do not automatically result in agreements on prices in accordance with the requests made by the one or the other side—however, these talks are taking place in good climate. One day before the meeting of the two leaders in Sochi, Kostas Skrekas, Greek Minister of the Environment and Energy, met with Gazprom Chairman, Alexey Miller, in St. Petersburg. On the whole, challenges did not prevent bilateral trade from growing by 56 per cent in the first nine months of this year as President Putin said. Notwithstanding the policy of sanctions, there is still room for Greek exporters to reach the Russian market. The warm meeting between President Putin and Premier Mitsotakis marks the beginning of a new chapter in the Greek–Russian relations under the existing circumstances, where both sides raise expectations that they are able to meet. There was no better way to launch this new chapter than with the announcement of President Putin to transfer the archives of its Jewish communities to Greece, which the Nazis moved to Germany during World War II and which have been in Moscow since 1945. This is another emotionally significant development in a special year. Following the Sochi meeting, Premier Mitsotakis and his Russian counterpart Mikhail Mishustin had a telephone conversation to discuss the Joint Action Plan 2022–2024. Moreover, President Putin sent a letter to the Greek Prime Minister wishing ‘peace and prosperity to our friends, the Greek people.’ This good climate is beneficial for Russia and Greece, which are both striving for stability, continuity and progress in the bilateral relationship.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Impact Turn

Germany-Russian ties enable further Russian aggression – turns the DA

Constanze Stelzenmüller 6/21/22, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe Fritz Stern Chair on Germany and trans-Atlantic Relations, “Merkel’s lack of regrets illustrates the fallacies of Germany’s Russia policy”, Brookings, 6/21/22, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/21/merkels-lack-of-regrets-illustrates-the-fallacies-of-germanys-russia-policy/

Merkel left office of her own will, the only postwar chancellor to do so. She was popular at home and she was admired worldwide as one of Germany’s greatest postwar leaders. Now, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24 has cast a dark backwards shadow over her tenure. Should she not have paid more attention to Putin’s repression of civil society and murders of political opponents in Russia? His poisoning of European politics by means of disinformation and corruption? His careful weaving of a continent-wide web of dependency on Russian gas? His stationing of intermediate-range missiles in Kaliningrad? His increasingly evident imperial ambitions? Should she not have seen a connection between the assault on Chechnya, with which Putin began his reign at the turn of the millennium, the war with Georgia in 2008 which resulted in that country’s dismemberment at Russian hands, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and eight years of proxy war in Donbas with 14,000 dead? But those who expected a self-critical examination of her record were disappointed. “I don’t see that I should now have to say, that was wrong. And I will therefore not apologize.” The literal English translation is clunky, but then so is Merkelish in the original German. The point of the former chancellor’s remarks to a Berlin theatre audience was clear enough: she had nothing to regret. Merkel contended that she always saw through Putin: “I always knew he wanted to destroy Europe.” Yet she insisted — in a phrase redolent of Bismarckian Realpolitik — that it was important to maintain “a trade connection” with “the world’s second largest nuclear power.” One commentator branded her comments as appeasement. A second seized on her description of Putin’s war as “a great tragedy” as evidence of fatalistic determinism. Others suggested that Merkel had simply been “the perfect chancellor for a system that had reached its limits.” None of these explanations is entirely off the mark. What matters, however, is that Merkel’s signature approach to dealing with problems — comprehending them fully, but choosing to manage rather than to resolve them — was shared not just by her various coalition partners, but by the German business community and by voters. It is in line with a longstanding postwar tradition of German leaders framing strategic choices as strategic constraints, thereby evading the appearance of agency or responsibility. As a recipe for grappling with an unchained totalitarian Russia — and with a future of permanent upheaval and disruption — it is not just futile but reckless.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: EU Economy Impact

EU economy will collapse now regardless

Smith 22 (Elliot Smith is a Markets Reporter for CNBC in London. He joined the team in April 2019 after two and a half years with Citywire, where his reporting garnered the 2018 PressGazette British Journalism Award for Specialist Media (Finance), May 6, 2022, “We see a big recession in the making’: Top CEOs are fearing the worst in Europe”, )

The CEOs of several European blue chip companies have told CNBC that they see a significant recession coming down the pike in Europe. The continent is particularly vulnerable to the fallout from the Russia-Ukraine war, associated economic sanctions and energy supply concerns, and economists have been downgrading growth forecasts for the euro zone in recent weeks. The euro zone faces concurrent economic shocks from the war in Ukraine and a surge in food and energy prices exacerbated by the conflict, along with a supply shock arising from China’s zero-Covid policy. That has prompted concerns about “stagflation” — an environment of low economic growth and high inflation — and eventual recession. “For sure, we see a big recession in the making, but that’s exactly what we see — it’s in the making. There is still an overhanging demand because of the Covid crisis we just are about to leave,” said Stefan Hartung, CEO of German engineering and technology giant Bosch. “It’s still there and you see it heavily hitting us in China, but you see that in a lot of areas in the world, the demand of consumers has already even been increased in some areas.” In particular, Hartung noted lingering consumer demand for household appliances, power tools and vehicles, but suggested this would dissipate. “That means for a certain amount of time, this demand will still be there, even while we see the interest increase and we see the pricing increase, but at some point in time, it won’t be just a supply crisis, it will also be a demand crisis, and then for sure, we are in a deep recession,” he added. Inflation in the euro zone hit a record high of 7.5% in March. So far, the European Central Bank has remained more dovish than its peers, such as the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve, both of which have begun hiking interest rates in a bid to rein in inflation. However, the ECB now expects to conclude net asset purchases under its APP (asset purchase program) in the third quarter, after which it will have room to begin monetary tightening, depending on the economic outlook. Berenberg Chief Economist Holger Schmieding said in a note Friday that near-term risks to economic growth are tilted to the downside in Europe. “Worsening Chinese lockdowns and cautious consumer spending in reaction to high energy and food prices could easily cause a temporary contraction in Eurozone GDP in Q2,” Schmieding said. “An immediate embargo on gas imports from Russia (highly unlikely) could turn that into a more serious recession. If the Fed gets it badly wrong and catapults the U.S. straight from boom to bust (unlikely but not fully impossible), such a recession could last well into next year. Yet Schmieding suggested that the euro zone is likely to enter recession only “if worse came to worst,” and that it isn’t a base expectation. Mark Branson, president of German financial regulator BaFin, said any military escalation in Ukraine or further energy supply disruption could pose serious risks to growth in Europe’s largest economy, with industrial sectors particularly vulnerable. “We’re already seeing that growth is down to around zero in many jurisdictions, including here, and it’s vulnerable. It’s also vulnerable from the ongoing Covid-related shocks,” he said. “We’ve got inflation that’s going to need to be tackled, and it’s going to need to be tackled now, so that’s a cocktail which is difficult for the economy.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: EU Economy Impact

EU’s economy is declining now due to the Ukraine war

Randow 22 (Jana Randow, ECB, economics & more at Bloomberg in Frankfurt, April 29, 2022, “Recession Threat Hangs Over Europe’s Fragile Economic Growth”, )

The euro zone’s recovery from the pandemic is already showing signs of flagging even before it meets the economic storm clouds heading its way. The danger of a recession loomed into view this week after Russia halted gas flows to Poland and Bulgaria, offering a foretaste of what the region might have in store. But even without the energy rationing such a move might provoke, the outlook looks ominous, underscored by weaker-than-expected growth reported Friday. European Weakness Inflation and war are weighing on economic output across the region European Central Bank Chief Economist Philip Lane insisted after the data that there’s “still a lot of momentum” in the recovery. Even so, European factories are signaling distress amid record inflation and a stubborn supply squeeze, aggravated by strict lockdowns in China. Meanwhile any catch-up on leisure and travel by Covid-liberated consumers may fade, not least as price increases eat into incomes. The coronavirus itself could return with a vengeance. European financial markets reflect the gloom, and economists at Morgan Stanley are among those seeing a “meaningful slowdown” in the second half. Corporate giants including Germany’s BASF SE are bracing for “serious disruptions,” and the OECD is warning that governments underestimate the impact of the war in Ukraine. What that suggests is that a year that began with the region extending its growth beyond pre-Covid levels, and offered the prospect of further tailwinds from European Union fiscal aid, now risks becoming another sorry episode in the single currency’s history of frustrating setbacks to growth. “The economy may show resilience in the coming quarters, but the problem is, what will happen at the end of the year?” said Anatoli Annenkov, an economist at Societe Generale SA in London. “We don’t know what will happen with wage growth and fiscal stimulus in 2023, there’s as much concern over China as there is over energy costs, and it’s easy to become pessimistic in light of the war.” Given the backdrop, Europe’s main equity benchmark has struggled to find its footing this year and widening bond spreads are feeding concerns that fragmentation will return to the 19-nation euro zone. First-quarter gross domestic product data didn’t offer cause for hope. The euro area grew only 0.2%, less than economists anticipated, hurt by a contraction in Italy, stagnation in France and weaker-than-expected growth in Spain. Indicators since then aren’t much better. Factory output and new orders are close to grinding to a halt, and business confidence across major economies has declined since the start of the year. That’s left services to shoulder the burden, undermined by waning consumer confidence. “Manufacturing will be very weak in the coming months and quite likely contract in the second quarter,” said Veronika Roharova, an economist at Credit Suisse International, who predicts euro-area growth of 2.8% this year. Still, “services are strong and household savings high, the labor market continues to look healthy and fiscal support is ensuring we won’t see a spending slump.” Lane of the ECB, interviewed by Bloomberg Television after the growth data, observed that it was “not very high admittedly, but still positive.” “We know from the near-time indicators, from what’s going on right now, that there still seems to be reasonable activity right now here at the end of April,” he added. Even so, economic forecasts for this year are being slashed. The International Monetary Fund cut 1.1 percentage point off its projection this month and now sees growth of 2.8%. The Institute of International Finance anticipates just 1% expansion. ECB officials acknowledged this month that growth risks have increased “substantially,” but they remain optimistic they can deliver an accelerated exit from crisis-era stimulus to combat inflation at a record 7.5% in data on Friday. Some policy makers are touting the first interest-rate increase since 2011 as soon as July, and even Russia’s complete halt of gas deliveries to Poland and Bulgaria and the prospect that euro-zone countries could also be shut off next doesn’t seems to deter them. While “this would definitely have a more negative, stronger immediate effect” Governing Council member Madis Muller said on Wednesday, he added that “the risk of an economic contraction in the euro area on the whole is more likely to be small.” The effect in Germany, the region’s biggest economy, might be more significant. First-quarter growth of 0.2% matched expectations, but the Bundesbank sees a risk of it shrinking nearly 2% this year if the war escalates and an embargo on Russian coal, oil and gas leads to restrictions on industry. Scores of companies including BMW AG and ThyssenKrupp AG have warned earnings could be affected, and utility Sniper SE said Wednesday that the economic toll of any stoppages in gas supplies would be “dramatic.” German Economy Minister Robert Habeck insisted this week that a full embargo on Russian oil would be “manageable.” Meanwhile the EU has been discussing new sanctions targeting the commodity, and Emmanuel Macron’s victory in French presidential elections may reinforce the bloc’s cohesion in addressing challenges together. The ECB also highlighted this month that fiscal measures to help households cope with surging inflation are helping. The prospect of such policies being extended, particularly in the event of a Russian energy shut-off, could provide a cushion for the economy, though at a cost to public finances. “Fiscal measures, including at EU level, will help shield the euro area from the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine,” ECB President Christine Lagarde told the IMF meetings last week. The central bank’s next policy decision is on June 9.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

Germany and Russia relations low, they are threatening conflict now

Gorman 21 (Lucy has been a correspondent intern at the OWP since 2021. She is a junior at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, studying Peace, War, and Defense and Psychology with a concentration in intelligence and international relations. Through her studies, she has developed a special interest in counter-terrorism, understanding the effects of war on populations, and regions of the Middle East and East Asia, November 3, 2021, “Germany And Russia Threaten Nuclear Arsenal Use Against Each Other”, )

A protest note was handed to the German military by the Russian Defense Ministry in response to comments about deterring Russia’s nuclear capabilities. Germany especially had been coming out with statements about the pressing need to focus on Russia and reducing their nuclear capabilities, causing Russia to deliver the note. According to Reuters, Russia announced it would break off existing institutionalized contacts with NATO and the alliance agreed on a new plan to defend against any potential Russian attack. In an interview last Thursday, incumbent Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer stated that “We have to make it very clear to Russia that in the end — and that is also the deterrent doctrine — we are ready to use such means [nuclear weapons] so that it has a deterrent effect beforehand and nobody gets the idea…” It is alarming that Germany is quick to state that they would put to use such weapons against Russia. The spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, said that “there are level-headed people in the German leadership who can prevent their defence minister from recklessly wanting to test our armed forces.” It is unknown what the note from Russia stated, but it introduces a possible strife between the two nations over nuclear power. Janis Kluge, an expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, views the current relationship between Berlin and Moscow as at an all-time low in post-Soviet history. Germany-Russia relations have always been complicated with shifts from alliances to total warfare. The recent rise in negative relations stemmed from Russia’s seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Within NATO, Germany was quick to impose multiple rounds of harsh sanctions against oil and other Russian industries. This leaves Germany and Russia with unstable relations today, meaning the note is indicative of a possible major conflict between the two. Germany has made an aggressive threat towards Russia by stating that they would go as far as to use nuclear weapons in acts of deterrence. This puts hundreds of millions of people at risk, as a deadly conflict would arise if Germany took such severe action. Germany’s initial comments and responses to the situation are intended to make Russia fearful of an attack and be cautious with their nuclear program. Weapons of mass destruction like the ones in question are obviously catastrophic, which pushes the common reaction to often be the use of them as it is the only way to counter such a massive threat. It is ironic that many nations choose to fight the problem with further use of the same weapons. However, nations may not see many alternatives to preventing the spread of nuclear power as they have to put forth a large enough and credible type of threat.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

The Ukraine invasion was the last straw for Germany-Russia relations

Judy Dempsey ’22, is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic Europe., “Russia’s Invasion Has Become a Watershed Moment for Germany”, Carnegie Europe, 3/3/22, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/03/03/russia-s-invasion-has-become-watershed-moment-for-germany-pub-86553

In just thirty minutes on Sunday, Chancellor Olaf Scholz put Germany on a radical new path. In an extraordinary speech made during a special session of the German parliament on Sunday, Scholz ended the decades-long Ostpolitik of his Social Democratic Party (SPD), with immense ramifications for Europe and NATO. Ostpolitik, or “eastern policy,” was forged in the early 1970s and intended to bring the Soviet Union politically and economically closer to Europe. One major component was building a gas pipeline, which the United States opposed, that West Germany hoped would bring confidence, stability, and predictability with the USSR. But Ostpolitik also meant that Germany’s ruling left wing had little sympathy for dissident movements in communist Eastern Europe, as these movements upset the Cold War status quo. That belief in having a special relationship with Russia persisted even when President Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimea in 2014. Germany’s powerful and influential business lobbies and pro-Russia left-wingers preferred to protect their interests with Russia, despite the Kremlin’s crackdown on human rights, press freedom, and civil society. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Thursday was the last straw for Scholz. He became convinced that Germany could no longer hedge its bets with Russia. In his speech to legislators, he laid out his vision for the country’s radical shift. Scholz said German defense spending would increase to 2 percent of gross domestic product, meeting the target set in 2014 during NATO’s summit in Wales. In addition, he announced a special 100 billion euro ($113 billion) fund to provide much-needed basic equipment for the German armed forces. Scholz also said Germany would send weapons to Ukraine, ending a long-held policy that it would not deliver weapons to a conflict zone—hardly a plausible argument when Germany supplies weapons to authoritarian regimes. Finally, the country would move quickly to reduce its dependence on oil and gas. This means sharply cutting back its imports of Russian energy, which account for 55 percent of its gas imports. Apart from mapping out an ambitious new course for Germany, it was Scholz’s impassioned support for Ukraine that won him rapturous applause. “The twenty-fourth of February 2022 marks a watershed in the history of our continent,” he said. “With the attack on Ukraine, Russian President Putin has started a war of aggression in cold blood.” But what does Scholz’s speech mean in practice? First, Russia has lost one of its most important supporters in Europe, and Germany no longer sees Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine through the prism of Russia. The time when the SPD tacitly acknowledged Russia’s sphere of influence over these sovereign, independent countries is over. In addition, Germany’s relations, particularly with Poland and the Baltic states, will markedly improve. These countries were highly critical and distrustful of Berlin’s commitment to Nord Stream 2, the $11 billion project to bring Russian gas directly to Europe that was finished and awaiting certification when Scholz halted it last week. They, along with Ukraine, believed the pipeline would increase their vulnerability in terms of energy supplies and make Germany more dependent on Russia for its energy, pushing Germany to lean more Russia-friendly inside the EU and NATO. Expect a thaw in relations. Scholz’s announcement to send weapons to Ukraine will also boost Germany’s standing in this part of Europe. Early last month, Germany faced widespread ridicule over its promise to supply Ukraine with 5,000 helmets, as other NATO members sent weapons, and it blocked Estonia’s move to send German-made weapons to Kyiv. This policy change ends the long-held suspicion that Berlin did not want to antagonize Russia. In addition, these decisions are a boost for NATO, with Germany now fully committed to the defense of Europe via the U.S.-led military alliance. The change shows that Germany no longer wants to be seen as a “free rider,” always relying on the United States to be Europe’s security guarantor without paying much for that security umbrella. Germany was repeatedly criticized for its unwillingness to spend 2 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, and this raised questions among allies if Germany was taking America’s protection for granted. One caveat to the increase in defense spending. The 100 billion euro “special fund” will kickstart a long overdue modernization of Germany’s armed forces. This is no joke: German soldiers were sent recently to the Baltic states lacking thermal underwear and other basic clothing. But spending more over the next few years will not be useful if it leads to more duplication of equipment among allies instead of focusing on adapting weapons systems to cyber attacks, modern aircraft fighters, and the changing nature of warfare. Germany could now shape the future direction of EU foreign policy. The war in Ukraine has shown how the EU, pushed by Germany, needs a revamped “Eastern Partnership” policy that entails not only reducing Russian interference, especially by pro-Russian and local oligarchs in politics and the economy, but also strengthening the state institutions and combating corruption. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—countries in which Russia has consistently meddled—want to join the EU, or failing that, some special relationship that will make their trade, economy, political, and social structures more closely tied to Europe. Scholz’s policy change indicates that Germany will no longer stand in the way of these changes, and could even lead them.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

Germany is firmly committed to NATO again post-Ukraine invasion

Paul Maurice ’22, is a researcher at the Committee for the Study of Franco-German Relations (Cerfa) at Ifri, where he works in particular on questions of German domestic policy, Franco-German relations in the context of European construction and the political foreign and security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany., “A ''change of era''? Towards a Reorientation of German Foreign Policy after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”, Ifri Briefings, Ifri, March 7, 2022., translated by Google Translate, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/briefings-de-lifri/new-era-toward-realignment-german-foreign-policy-after-russian

But this turnaround in German foreign and security policy is not only beneficial to Europe, however. The German Chancellor gave numerous pledges to US President Joe Biden who hoped to see Germany once again become this “model ally” after the Trump era14. Once again, Germany remains faithful to its principles, according to which “the cohesion of the European Union” is not incompatible with “the strength of NATO”. Finally, in this volte-face vis-à-vis Russia, the strength of these changes must be for Olaf Scholz to use "as much diplomacy as possible", but "without being naive": it is the duty of the diplomacy "to keep the channels of discussion open". Diplomacy within the framework of international institutions has always been the guarantee of a democratic German foreign policy faithful to the principles of international organizations of collective security. At an emergency meeting of the UN General Assembly on March 1 , 2022, Foreign Minister Annalaena Baerbock, called on the international community to condemn outright the Russian aggression which “brutally attacked” the international order of peace. His speech reaffirms both the attachment to the principles of collective security and also shows that the Russian invasion marks the beginning of a new era for German diplomacy.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – EU Economy Impact – Internal Link

Cohesion with the rest of Europe incentivizes Russia to shut of German pipelines, destroying their economy

Al Jazeera 22 (Al Jazeera is the state-owned Arabic-language international radio broadcaster of Qatar. It is based in Doha and operated by the media conglomerate Al Jazeera Media Network, July 11, 2022, “Nord Stream 1 pipeline shuts down amid German suspicion of Russia”, )

A major gas pipeline from Russia to Germany shut down for annual maintenance on Monday, as Berlin grew concerned that Moscow may not resume the flow of gas as scheduled. The Nord Stream 1 pipeline, Germany’s main source of Russian gas, is scheduled to be out of action until July 21 for routine work that the operator says includes “testing of mechanical elements and automation systems”. The operator’s data showed the gas flow dropping as planned on Monday morning. But German officials are suspicious about Russia’s intentions, particularly after Russia’s Gazprom last month reduced the gas flow through Nord Stream 1 by 60 percent. Gazprom cited technical problems involving a gas turbine powering a compressor station that partner Siemens Energy sent to Canada for overhaul. That turbine could not be returned because of sanctions imposed over Russia’s war on Ukraine. Canada said over the weekend that it would allow the part to be delivered to Germany, citing the “very significant hardship” that the German economy would suffer without a sufficient gas supply. German politicians have dismissed Russia’s technical explanation for last month’s reduction in gas flows through Nord Stream 1, saying the decision was a political gambit to sow uncertainty and push up prices. German Vice-Chancellor Robert Habeck had said he suspects that Russia may cite “some little technical detail” as a reason not to resume gas deliveries through the pipeline after this month’s maintenance. However, a spokesperson for the economy ministry said that while Germany is in a serious situation when it comes to its gas supply, the security of supply is currently guaranteed. The Nord Stream 1 pipeline transports 55 billion cubic metres (bcm) a year of gas from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea. The head of Germany’s network regulator, the Bundesnetzagentur, said “no one can say exactly” whether the gas will be switched back on. “As expected, Nord Stream 1 is at zero since this morning,” Klaus Mueller, head of the Bundesnetzagentur, told Reuters on Monday. “What happens at the end of the maintenance, nobody is able to say at this moment. We won’t know any time sooner than a day before its scheduled end.” Mueller said that gas consumers have lobbied Bundesnetzagentur for priority treatment in the event of potential gas rationing later in the year. The regulator would base allocation decisions on their social and economic impact and consequences for delivery chains, Mueller said. Such decisions would be taken in October with the help of an IT platform, he added. Ukraine and its allies accuse Moscow of using spurious pretexts to strangle gas flows in retaliation for sanctions over the invasion, which Russia describes as a “special military operation”. The Kremlin denies the manipulation of gas flows or using energy as a political weapon. Meanwhile, Germany and the rest of Europe are scrambling to fill gas storage in time for winter and reduce their dependence on Russian energy imports. Germany, home to Europe’s biggest economy, has been getting about 35 percent of its gas to power industry and generate electricity from Russia.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – EU Economy Impact – AT: Defense

Economic decline causes great power war and extinction

Liu 18 (Qian Liu is an economist based in China, November 13, 2018, “From Economic Crisis to World War III”, https://www.neweurope.eu/article/from-economic-crisis-to-world-war-iii/)

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising income inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict. The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates. But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labour markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies. Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment. The lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929. As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilise and stimulate the economy. If history is any guide, the consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman, prolonged periods of economic distress have been characterised also by public antipathy toward minority groups or foreign countries – attitudes that can help to fuel unrest, terrorism, or even war. For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun. To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict. According to research by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels. This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalisation, political polarisation, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis. Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the emotionally appealing populists to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that will only make matters worse. For example, despite the world’s unprecedented interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed, as countries – most notably, Donald J. Trump’s US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen. Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that the next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale military confrontation. By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington, considering such a scenario could help us avoid it because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long promised while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – EU Economy Impact – AT: Defense

German economic decline collapses EU and US economies

Ewing 19 (Jack Ewing writes about business from New York, focusing on the auto industry and the transition to electric cars.Before relocating to New York in late 2021, Mr. Ewing spent more than two decades reporting from Europe. He joined The International Herald Tribune, now the international edition of The New York Times, in 2010 as European economics correspondent, based in Frankfurt. Previously, he worked for a decade at BusinessWeek magazine, where he was European regional editor, August 16, 2019, “Germany Has Powered Europe’s Economy. What Happens When Its Engine Stalls?”, )

When a debt crisis slammed the eurozone nearly a decade ago, Germany’s powerhouse economy helped lift troubled neighbors like Greece, Portugal and Spain above the turmoil. The question that Europe faces now is whether those countries are strong enough to return the favor. Germany is on the brink of recession after its economy declined in the year’s second quarter. Spain, by comparison, is experiencing brisk growth, and even the Portuguese and Greek economies are expanding. Buoyed by tourism, booming construction and steady job growth, the southern European countries are helping to offset Germany’s weak performance. But will it be enough? As the United States economy appears to slow, China loses momentum and Brexit looms, can Europe dodge a downturn? The question may be decisive for Europe, and crucial for the United States. The European Union and the United States are each other’s biggest trading partners, and a slowdown in Europe would be another drag on America’s economy at a time when bond markets are already flashing warning signs. Most economists are not yet predicting a Europewide recession, but they are worried about the prospect. There is little chance that the European Union can thrive when Germany is sickly. “If the largest member state is affected,” said Katharina Utermöhl, senior economist at the German insurer Allianz, “this will also start to weigh on the euro area as a whole because of the close economic relations.” Should Europe sustain more economic body blows, like a no-deal Brexit, a debt meltdown in Italy or an escalation of the trade war, Ms. Utermöhl said, “the risk of a recession is rather high.” Some economists are more pessimistic. “Euroland is headed for a recession,” Carl Weinberg, the chief international economist at High Frequency Economics, a research consulting firm in White Plains, N.Y., said in an email Friday. “All the writing is on the wall.” Mr. Weinberg cited numerous indicators of trouble: less production at eurozone factories, surveys showing increasing gloominess among business managers and a contraction in global trade. The perilous state of the eurozone economy will be an early test for Christine Lagarde when she succeeds Mario Draghi as president of the European Central Bank in October. Mr. Draghi is expected to announce a new package of stimulus measures next month, but Ms. Lagarde will have to consider what the central bank can do if the situation gets worse. When Germany’s official statistics office reported on Wednesday that the economy shrank 0.1 percent in the second quarter, shock waves rippled through stock markets around the world. The reaction reflected the degree to which Germany sets the tone for the Continent. Germany has the eurozone’s biggest economy, accounting for more than a quarter of the bloc’s output. It has the most people, 83 million, and the most workers, who help stoke nearly every other country’s economy. The list of European Union countries that count Germany as their No. 1 trading partner is long. It includes France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Slovakia and Sweden. The relationships sometimes border on dependency. Germany accounts for 27 percent of Poland’s foreign trade. Britain, Poland’s No. 2 trading partner, accounts for only 6 percent, according to World Bank data. Suppliers throughout Europe earn much of their revenue by selling to big German manufacturers like Daimler, Siemens and ThyssenKrupp. But those companies are struggling. Daimler, the maker of Mercedes-Benz cars, has issued three profit warnings since October. Siemens, whose products include high-speed trains and equipment for oil and gas producers, this month reported a 6 percent decline in net profit. And the ratings firm Moody’s downgraded ThyssenKrupp’s debt further into junk territory this week, an indication that the giant steel maker is considered a default risk. As it strains against the German downdraft, Europe is battling a host of other woes. High on the list is Italy, which has a stagnant economy, an unstable government and one of the highest debt burdens in the world, giving it the potential to touch off another financial crisis. Another risk is that Britain will leave the European Union without a deal with Brussels, creating chaos in the flow of goods across the English Channel. And car sales are plunging around the world, threatening an important source of jobs in countries like Italy, France and Slovakia. The biggest squeeze comes from the trade war. President Trump’s tariffs on a range of Chinese imports and on European steel and aluminum have disrupted supply chains and profoundly unsettled managers who make decisions about how much money to invest in new factory space and how many people to hire. Germany is especially vulnerable to trade tensions because exports account for almost half of the country’s gross domestic product. And it is most sensitive to the downturn in the auto industry because vehicles are the country’s biggest export. Sales of German cars have slumped as Chinese buyers pull back. It can be difficult to gauge how deeply other individual economies are rattled by the trade war, but the latest numbers across Europe, released on Friday, contained troubling signs. Eurozone exports fell 5 percent in June, the European Union’s official statistics agency reported. Trade accounts for about one-third of the bloc’s gross domestic product. Eurozone growth has already been meager this year. The 19 countries in the currency bloc collectively grew 0.2 percent from April through June. The European Union, which includes the eurozone plus nine other countries, recorded the same rate. Spain was one of the best performers, registering a growth rate of 0.5 percent compared with the previous quarter, which helped balance out Germany’s 0.1 percent decline in output. But Spain and other fast-growing countries like Denmark and Finland are not big enough to replace Germany as Europe’s economic locomotive. Even if Europe manages to avoid two consecutive quarters of declining output, the technical definition of a recession, no one expects growth to be particularly impressive. “The slowdown in growth is everywhere in the eurozone, more or less,” said Jörg Krämer, the chief economist at Commerzbank. “There is no decoupling.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – EU Collapse Impact

Nuclear war

Timothy Graves 17, Master’s Degree in Creative Writing from Birkbeck, University of London, “Is The World On The Brink Of Nuclear Armageddon?”, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/timothy-graves/nuclear-armageddon_b_14789678.html

Since Donald Trump’s presidential inauguration last month, sales of dystopian fiction have soared. Novels that have flown off the shelf, or recently made it into Amazon’s top ten best-selling books chart, include George Orwell’s 1984, Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale and Huxley’s Brave New World. The resurgent interest in fiction that depicts a bleak totalitarian and authoritarian society reflects the fact that we are now living in a much more volatile and dangerous world. I do not think it is scaremongering to say that in recent years humanity has faced a number of catastrophic or even existential threats. From climate change and the rise in international terrorism to the prevalence of biological and chemical weapons, our capacity for warfare and destruction, and what the poet Robert Burns called ‘man’s inhumanity to man’, is self-evident.

But I believe the most pressing and immediate threat is that posed by the arsenals of nuclear weapons that have been stockpiled by the nuclear-armed states of the world who take false refuge in the Mutually Assured Destruction doctrine (MAD). In light of President Trump’s comments about nuclear weapons, last month atomic scientists in Chicago moved the hands on the Doomsday Clock to the closest it has been to midnight for sixty four years. Midnight represents global nuclear war.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – EU Collapse Impact

The EU prevents a North Korean arms race and escalation.

Boris Toucas 17, Visiting Fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “North Korea: The European Union Could Help Break the Diplomatic Stalemate”, Beyond Parallel – CSIS Blog, 1/5/2017, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-korea-the-european-union-could-help-break-the-diplomatic-stalemate/

North Korea’s continued progress on its nuclear and missile programs remains one of the most significant challenges to the international community. This is why the adoption of a new UN Security Council resolution that closes an important sanctions loophole and imposes closer scrutiny of North Korea’s diplomatic activities sends a strong, if late, message of unity and international resolve. But what comes next? There are a variety of options: Diplomatic normalization? This could trigger a regional arms race. Military intervention? This could plunge Northeast Asia into chaos. Unfortunately, prospects for negotiations are bleak, and unofficial discussions between North Korea and the United States are unlikely to succeed as in previous rounds.

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. —Schuman Declaration, May 9, 1950

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – EU Collapse Impact

Collapse of the German economy results in dissolution of the EU

Samuel Geddes ’22, journalist, “From Brussels to Beijing, a wave of economic collapse may be about to strike”,, Al Mayadeen English, 5/11/22, https://english.almayadeen.net/articles/opinion/from-brussels-to-beijing-a-wave-of-economic-collapse-may-be

Where the price of oil will go as a result is anyone’s guess, but what is certain is that all energy importing countries will suffer from unprecedented economic stress. Many economies may cease functioning entirely and effectively exit the modern world system. As well as the Global South, this shock will profoundly affect the European Union, itself overwhelmingly dependent on imported energy. Bafflingly, Brussels seems only half satisfied with ending its oil imports from Russia, roughly 25% of its total needs. Of far greater significance is the nearly 40% of European energy imports from Russia in the form of natural gas, that Brussels, with enthusiastic encouragement from Washington, has declared its intent to phase out. With the Russo-Ukrainian conflict devolving into a protracted war of attrition, the EU leadership is more aggressively pushing for an immediate end to gas imports as well, cutting off Moscow’s single largest income stream. Among the few opposing voices has been Irish MEP Clare Daly, who noted that further sanctions would not only cause huge privation to ordinary Russians but would fuel already rampant inflation and a historic decline in living standards within Europe. Whether the EU embargoes Russian gas, whether Moscow pre-empts this with its own embargo against Europe, or whether Ukrainian forces begin targeting pipelines from Russia that transit their territory, Daly’s warning may prove to have been overly conservative. For Germany alone to completely lose access to Russian energy would be a crisis on par with the hyperinflation of the 1920s. Contingency plans have been activated to prepare for fuel rationing, signaling the choice Berlin will soon have to make between heating and electrifying the homes of its citizens and keeping its industries alive. If the vast petrochemical facilities of western Germany, which have been the economic nerve center of the continent for over 150 years, are forced to scale down or even end production, the Eurozone’s days as a pole of the global economy are likely finished for good. Even if the conditions causing the collapse are only temporary, Europe’s aging demographics are already well past the point at which it will be able to rebound to its previous economic prominence. A wave of sovereign bankruptcies and exits from the Eurozone and the end of the European project itself seem to be an on-rushing reality.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – Cyber

Russia’s influence in Germany is driven by ability to conduct cyber operations – the plan forces Germany to respond and restrict that influence

John Lough and Andrew Monaghan ’21,*is an associate fellow of the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, ** is a researcher and analyst in the field of international politics. He is a Russianist in the area studies style, with a preference for old-fashioned Kremlinology. His particular interests are Russian domestic politics, strategy and biography, and he has written extensively on Russian Grand Strategy, UK-Russia Relations, and the Euro-Atlantic community’s relationship with Russia, particularly modern deterrence., “7 Russian influence in Germany”, Germany's Russia problem, Published by Manchester University Press, 2021, accessed via Project Muse on 7.17.22

German discussion of Russian influence in Germany focuses almost exclusively on disinformation, cyber vulnerabilities and the susceptibility of the Russian German community to the AfD message. Clearly, these should all be factors of concern for German policymakers, but they pale in comparison to the significance of Russia’s well-established networks in Germany across the worlds of politics, business, media and NGOs. These make Germany an easy target for Russian influence operations. There has been no in-depth research on the political connections of the CDU/ CSU and SPD in Russia. For example, it is surely significant that the East German head of the CDU’s political foundation office in Moscow has close personal ties with the Kremlin party, United Russia.61 Yet, in an article discussing foreign political influence in Germany, the head of counter-intelligence at the domestic intelligence agency did not even refer to these relationships62 – an indication perhaps of their sensitivity. The registration of the DOC and the lack of restrictions on the professional activities of former officials point to further alarming gaps in Germany’s counterintelligence defences. In addition, Russia’s influence-building activities benefit from another factor in Germany, which is unavailable elsewhere in Europe. Despite tensions in bilateral relations, the combination of trauma about Russia and gratitude for reunification require the political class to think in terms of reconciliation with Moscow and to pursue dialogue and cooperation. This creates multiple opportunities across different fronts to build relationships and project Russian views. Some journalists and businesspeople who have served for long periods in Moscow and have ‘gone native’ provide valuable channels for projecting pro-Russian views. For example, the Spiegel journalist Benjamin Bidder, who spent ten years in Russia, caused controversy in late 2019 after writing a story casting doubt on the veracity of Hermitage Capital’s account of the agonising death of its lawyer Sergey Magnitsky in a Moscow jail in 2009. As noted in Chapter 6, Andrea von Knoop, the official representative of Germany business from 1993 to 2007, is another example of an outspoken critic of western policy towards Russia. In 2016, Putin granted her Russian citizenship in recognition of her contribution to building business ties. She has lived in Russia for over thirty years.63 Germany’s deep respect for Russian culture is another significant advantage that facilitates the process of conditioning Germans to a Russian message. Currently, 158 members of Parliament (Die Linke and the AfD combined out of a total of 709) whose parties have clearly pro-Russian positions on sanctions, for example, provide Moscow with a much larger influence platform than it has in any other major European country. Finally, a further benefit for Russia in Germany is that public opinion has marked pacifist tendencies and does not support significant investment in defence. For now, Russia can remain sure that Germany’s bark will be worse than its bite. At the same time, in the face of pressures aimed at societal disruption, Germany has proved resilient thanks to its strong institutions, including its media, and its relatively low levels of inequality compared to the UK and the USA. However, past performance is not necessarily a guide to the future since Russia has so far deployed some of its ‘harder’ instruments sparingly possibly because it does not want to alienate irreversibly its once strongest advocate in the EU and NATO. For example, Moscow chose not to deploy the data it stole from Parliament and government servers in the run up to the federal 2017 election. This would have risked moving beyond managed disruption and damaging the bilateral relationship beyond repair. In the case of its interference in the US presidential election in 2016, Russia appeared to conclude that it had more to gain than to lose, while in Germany the calculation was possibly the reverse. There is speculation that a high-level German warning beforehand persuaded Putin to refrain from interference in the election. In addition, it is uncomfortable for Germany to discuss the dangers posed by Russian ‘soft’ power without calling into question the guiding principle of seeking maximum contact with Russia to prevent conflict and as redemption for the past. To this extent, Russia does not need to use the ‘harder’ instruments of power as robustly as in many other countries to achieve its desired levels of influence. This situation may change if Germany’s Russia policy hardens further. Some of Russia’s established influence-building advantages are in any case already starting to erode. The Ostpolitik generation is leaving the scene. Their successors, born in the 1980s, have less awareness of the Second World War and the division of Germany. They were still children when the Wall fell and have less instinctive sympathy for Russia. Over time, Moscow will need to find new tools and messages to ensure that Germans remain conditioned to respond to its voice. Yet for now, Russia’s influence in Germany remains strong and of a qualitatively different nature to that in other major European countries.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – T/L

Germany’s relations with Russia are driven by conflicting interests – the plan forces them to align against Russia for fear of aggression

John Lough ’21, is an Associate Fellow with the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, “Why Germany’s relationship with Putin’s Russia is a problem for Ukraine”, The Atlantic Council, 7/9/21, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-germanys-relationship-with-putins-russia-is-a-problem-for-ukraine/

If the German political class today has fewer illusions about Russia, many of its reflexes have remained. The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline is a monument to Germany’s undimmed desire to use economic relations as a tool to stabilize Europe’s ties with Moscow and to prevent Russia’s isolation. Although Merkel is believed to have privately hoped that the pipeline was in breach of EU competition law and would not go ahead, she has made no effort to stand in its way. Merkel has belatedly accepted that Nord Stream 2 is not just a commercial project, and the German government is now trying to agree a formula with the US that will incentivize Russia to continue the transit of gas through Ukraine and limit the Kremlin’s ability to use the pipeline for geopolitical purposes. Germany’s instincts towards Russia are shaped in large measure by the contradictory and violent history between the two countries in the twentieth century. Germany fears Russia but admires it at the same time. It senses that Europe is incomplete without Russia firmly anchored within it, but cannot reconcile itself to the fact that today’s version of Russia is not compatible with today’s Europe. At the same time, Germany tries to avoid confrontation and struggles to resist aggressive Russian behavior. It cannot countenance supplying defensive weapons to Ukraine. Its historical narrative about “the east” gives little space to the Belarusian and Ukrainian lands, a reflection of its discomfort with the murderous devastation carried out there by Hitler’s armies. Instead, Germany transfers its sense of guilt about Nazi crimes inflicted on the peoples of the USSR exclusively to modern Russia. Its academic expertise on Belarus and Ukraine is strikingly underdeveloped compared to that on Russia. With her East German background, Merkel has a clear understanding of Russia and is far from indifferent to Ukraine. For all her limitations, she has provided vital support to Kyiv since 2014. Her successor is unlikely to bring the same insight and confidence to dealing with Germany’s eastern neighborhood.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – T/L

Germany is choosing Russia now despite Ukraine – only the plan’s attempt to rebuild trust with allies flips the script

Jörn Fleck ’22, is Deputy Director of the Europe Center., “Experts react: The view from European capitals as consensus emerges against Russia”, The Atlantic Council, 1/28/22, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-the-view-from-european-capitals-as-consensus-emerges-against-russia/#the-view-from-germany

A tumultuous few weeks seem to have nudged the new German government toward aligning with allies on a stronger deterrent stance. Should Russia escalate in Ukraine, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock pledged on Thursday that the cancellation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline would be among the measures on the table, alongside a panoply of severe sanctions. No talk of sending arms to Ukraine or of enhancing forward presence on the Eastern flank however—that’s still a bridge too far for this coalition. Germany’s coming around is too little, almost too late—and a real shame, as Germany had made some progress towards becoming a more responsible stakeholder in Europe, especially since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. Foreign-policy officials and eventually even former German Chancellor Angela erkMel had come to understand that Russian revisionism had teeth. Berlin had started to tack away from a naïve view of Germany-Russia relations and toward a more hawkish stance. The last few weeks have undermined German credibility among allies and partners—from Kyiv to Tallinn, and from Warsaw to Washington. Some of the rhetoric directed at Berlin in recent days has been excessive, but it reveals real disappointments. The recent German pledge to supply five thousand helmets for Ukrainian troops betrayed a keen lack of understanding of where key allies are in preparing for the worst. Recent moves by the United States to increase the pressure on Russia and prepare for further escalation only accentuate how far behind the curve Berlin is. Rebuilding the trust squandered this January will require a step up in international engagement, as well as a concrete plan for Germany to support tougher measures should the crisis escalate further.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
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Russia will abandon Germany if they perceive them taking a pro-NATO stance – reverses decades of precedent in the relationship

John Lough and Andrew Monaghan ’21,*is an associate fellow of the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, ** is a researcher and analyst in the field of international politics. He is a Russianist in the area studies style, with a preference for old-fashioned Kremlinology. His particular interests are Russian domestic politics, strategy and biography, and he has written extensively on Russian Grand Strategy, UK-Russia Relations, and the Euro-Atlantic community’s relationship with Russia, particularly modern deterrence., “Introduction”, Germany's Russia problem, Published by Manchester University Press, 2021, accessed via Project Muse on 7.17.22

For German policymakers today, Russia’s readiness to have an adversarial political relationship with Germany and disrupt its alliances while continuing to sell it gas and buy its goods is disturbingly counter-intuitive. To them, it makes no sense for Russia to turn away from Europe and sacrifice a relationship with Germany that brought it clear advantages in the past. After all, Germany lobbied for the G7 to expand to include Russia. It consistently went the extra mile in both the EU and NATO to encourage its allies to show sensitivity to Russia. For example, it played a key role in 2008 in blocking the US proposal in NATO to give Membership Action Plans to Georgia and Ukraine. It also took on the burden of justifying the Nord Stream pipelines designed to bring gas directly from Russia to Europe. Moscow’s apparent indifference to damaged relations is even more bewildering since Putin likes the country and takes a deep interest in it. Worse still, Russia is attacking Germany indirectly by fanning divisions within the EU and NATO and weakening its strategic anchors.