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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – AT: Ukraine

To appease Russia, Germany has refused to supply arms to the allied effort in Ukraine.

Karnitschnig ’22 [Matthew; correspondent at Politico; 1-20-2022; "Germany’s pivot from America"; POLITICO; https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-pivot-from-america/; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL]

The unfolding crisis in Ukraine reveals that reality cuts both ways.

Germany’s allies hoped Olaf Scholz’s coalition, which includes the Russia-critical Greens, would back away from the accommodative policies toward Moscow that marked the Angela Merkel era. Recent days have shown such optimism to be misplaced.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ

Multiple factors tie Russia and Germany together

Paul Maurice ’22, is a researcher at the Committee for the Study of Franco-German Relations (Cerfa) at Ifri, where he works in particular on questions of German domestic policy, Franco-German relations in the context of European construction and the political foreign and security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany., “A ''change of era''? Towards a Reorientation of German Foreign Policy after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”, Ifri Briefings, Ifri, March 7, 2022., translated by Google Translate, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/briefings-de-lifri/new-era-toward-realignment-german-foreign-policy-after-russian

The escalation of tensions between Russia and Ukraine at the beginning of 2022 raises the question of Germany's reliability with its partners - within the Atlantic Alliance or the European Union (EU) . In this crisis, Germany first appears as the "weakest link" of Europe, even the "Trojan horse" of Russia within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This Russian-Ukrainian crisis has had the effect of "testing both the cohesion of the new ''traffic light'' coalition, the authority of Chancellor Scholz and the adaptability of German foreign policy postMerkel1 ". Within the Chancellor's party, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), there are a large number of “ Rußland-Verstehers ”, who have a measured, even complacent attitude towards Vladimir Putin. The case of former Social Democrat Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) is the most symptomatic. The "personal friend" of Vladimir Putin sits on the boards of Russian energy companies such as Nord Stream AG and Rosneft, and is due to join that of Gazprom in June 2022. After his controversial remarks on the "threatening attitude" of Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz had to clarify his position on Gerhard Schröder2. The former Chancellor has today, despite the pressure, still not resigned from his post, but he is increasingly isolated. Green MEP Reinhard Bütikofer spoke of personal sanctions against him, and most of his close aides resigned in early March. Gerhard Schröder is certainly an extreme case within the SPD in terms of his position on Russia, but opposing camps have existed for a long time on this subject. This is why the party's new co-president, Lars Klingbeil, wanted to put an end to the dissonance. This position within the SPD has, however, marked German foreign policy in recent years – especially since the Social Democrats have occupied the Foreign Ministry for twelve years out of the sixteen that have passed. This ambiguity vis-à-vis Russia is shared by other political parties, such as Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Party (CDU). Admittedly, the former Chancellor was known for her cordial – reciprocal – intimacy with Vladimir Putin, but it had always refused to characterize the Nord Stream 2 project as anything other than a “purely economic” project. She had also refused to put this project in the balance during the balance of power with Russia in August 2020 – when she welcomed the opponent Alexeï Navalny in Berlin. Finally, within the army, certain officials also adopted an ambiguous attitude, which may have sown doubt as to German intentions. The head of the German Navy, Admiral Kay-Achim Schönbach, had made controversial remarks on January 22, 2022 regarding the "respect" that Vladimir Putin deserved and the "ineptitude" of the intentions lent by the allies NATO to Russia to invade Ukraine. If the admiral resigned the same evening and was disavowed by the Ministry of Defense, the remarks questioned the reliability of Germany. –,

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ

Germany-Russia relations are high now – Nord Stream 2 and Russian troop withdrawals

France 24 ‘22, the international news channel, broadcasts 24/7 (6 hours a day in Spanish) to 355 million households around the world in French, Arabic, English and Spanish., “‘Lasting security’ in Europe can only be achieved with Russian help, Scholz says”, France 24, 2/15/22, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220215-lasting-security-in-europe-can-only-be-achieved-with-russian-help-chancellor-scholz-says

Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz on Tuesday welcomed Russia’s partial troop withdrawal from the Ukrainian border, labelling it a “good sign”, and noted that lasting stability and security in Europe could only be achieved with Russia’s help. In the first apparent de-escalation in weeks, Moscow on Tuesday announced that some of the more than 100,000 troops and hardware amassed along Ukraine’s border were returning to their bases at the end of planned exercises. Western leaders have accused Moscow of positioning the troops in advance of a possible invasion of pro-Western Ukraine, warning that any attack would be met with severe economic sanctions. Speaking at a press conference after talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, Scholz said Russia was a crucial player in maintaining security in Europe and that Russia must remain a partner in ensuring stability on the continent. "For Europeans it is clear that lasting security cannot be achieved against Russia but only with Russia," he told reporters. “The diplomatic possibilities are far from being exhausted,” Scholz said. “That we hear now some troops have withdrawn is a good sign, we hope more will follow,” he said, noting that: “It should be possible to find a solution. No matter how difficult and serious the situation seems to be, I refuse to say it is hopeless.” Nord Stream 2 as leverage Scholz also said that he was committed to ensuring the transit of gas through Ukraine. “We are committed to ensuring gas transit in Europe works through Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and Nord Stream 1 according to the agreements we have. And we also want to ensure peaceful development in Europe,” Scholz said. Scholz reiterated that while he was intent on ensuring that a confrontation did not occur in Ukraine, if that were to happen, there would be consequences. The controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which bypasses Ukraine in bringing Russian energy to Germany, has emerged as a sticking point in Berlin’s relations with Washington and Kyiv. Many observers in Europe are concerned over Germany’s increasing reliance on Russian energy. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has warned that Russia would use the pipeline as leverage. “We have certain disagreements in our assessments” of the Russia-Germany energy link, Zelensky said after talks with Scholz in Kyiv on Monday.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ

Scholz’s speech condemning the Ukraine invasion was all bluster – Germany is choosing closer relations with Russia now

Priyanka Shankar ’22, journalist for Al Jazeera, “Months into the Ukraine war, has Germany’s position changed?”, Al Jazeera, 5/5/22, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/5/germanys-russia-policy-under-the-microscope-amid-war-in-ukraine

President Vladimir Putin has been intensifying Russia’s aggressive stance for years, with the Georgian war in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Even so, Berlin’s ties with Moscow have remained strong. According to Germany’s Federal Statistical Office, trade with the Russian Federation increased in January 2022 compared with January 2021. German exports to Russia increased by 30.7 percent while imports grew by 57.8 percent compared with the previous year. Since the war began in Ukraine, Berlin has begun phasing out its trade relations by imposing sanctions against Russian oligarchs and businesses and supporting a proposed European Union ban on Russian oil. But some German officials continue to maintain a close relationship with the Kremlin. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has kept key positions at Russia’s oil firm Rosneft and energy giant Gazprom. While he has participated in efforts to broker peace, his bond with Putin has been criticised. “For a long time, German decision-makers were under the illusion of a ‘change through trade’ policy approach. However, Gerhard Schröder in particular has also lost his ‘democratic compass’ towards Russia by turning his close ties with Putin into a personal benefit for himself and by refusing to dissociate from the Russian leader – despite Russia’s aggression in Ukraine,” Stefan Scheller, an associate fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations told Al Jazeera. But, according to Ischinger, the former chancellor’s relationships and business affairs are a private matter. “Germany has a system, which is a system based on freedom. The former chancellor can conduct whatever business he wishes to do, just like anybody else. He does get criticised every day by almost everyone because people don’t like his close association with the Kremlin. But that’s his problem and not the problem of the German government,” he told Al Jazeera. Scholz refuses to visit Kyiv Meanwhile, Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently upset some when he told German broadcaster ZDF that he would not visit Kyiv – a decision that came after Ukraine snubbed German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Ukraine had said Steinmeier would not be welcome in the capital because of his close relations with Putin. But the president has admitted to “getting Putin wrong” and that the now-halted Nord-Stream 2 project, which he advocated, was a mistake. Referring to Scholz, Ukraine’s ambassador to Germany, Andrij Melnyk, said his ostensibly retaliatory refusal to visit doesn’t sound very “statesmanlike”. This was not the first time Ukraine has called out a German chancellor’s actions. In early April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy referred to former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and ex-French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision to block Ukraine’s NATO application bid as a “miscalculation” that led to “the most horrific war in Europe since World War II”.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 1NC – Germany Relations › 1NC – German Economic Collapse Scenario

Multiple scenarios for extinction

Markley 16 (Stephen, Journalist for Paste Magazine, “Is France the Final Domino for the European Union?”, Paste Magazine, December 15, 2016, https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2016/12/is-france-the-final-domino-for-the-european-union.html)

For many Americans reading this, there is no doubt a sense of remove from the relevance of the European project. Think of it this way: for centuries Europe was the Middle East of the world. It was a war-hungry, dysfunctional, violent, chaotic piece of the globe that could barely go a decade without a barbaric, usually pointless blood-letting conflict. Since World War II and the economic and political integration that brought former nation-state rivals into mutually beneficial coexistence, the continent has been a region of remarkable prosperity and stability. Keep in mind, this has never happened before in human history: a set of political leaders and their constituents voluntarily chose to cede elements of sovereignty in order to form a better, stronger union. The United States and Great Britain, often mentioned as democratic ideals, were two empires won by violent conquest in which wealthy elites only begrudgingly allowed democracy to sift down to the most impoverished and brutalized citizens.

The parochial movements of the last five to ten years—from the EU’s troubles to the Scottish independence vote to the surge of American nationalism that brought us such phenomenon as the go-it-alone war in Iraq and now Donald Trump—have different roots and causes but they do share a common thread. We live in an increasingly complex and interdependent world where the greatest threats to peace, individual well-being, and human flourishing are largely transnational. Climate change, infectious disease, nuclear proliferation, financial crisis, cyber insecurity—these are all borderless phenomenon that do not care if their victims are French, British, American, or Syrian. Their worst consequences do not care about our flags, languages, religions, or skin colors. And yet at a time when transnational peril necessitates a greater need for cooperation, tolerance, and unity, Western liberal democracies are taking a hard turn into fragmentation, arrogance, self-pity, and denial. The break-up of the European Union brought on by a wave of selfish, quasi-authoritarian nationalism would be a staggering blow to the economic and political security of what remains of the increasingly precarious free world.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 1NC – Germany Relations › 1NC – German Economic Collapse Scenario

Collapse of EU economy results in cascading economic warfare that draws in all countries in the region – on the brink now due to Ukraine

Amanda Cooper 7/12/22, freelance journalist, “As 'economic warfare' threatens to break out in Europe, the euro finally crumbles below $1 for the first time since 2002”, Yahoo! News, 7/12/22, https://www.yahoo.com/news/economic-warfare-threatens-break-europe-102400479.html

The euro hit exactly $1 for the first time in 20 years on Tuesday, after Russia's decision to shut off a major natural gas pipeline threatened to wreak havoc across the region and business sentiment in Europe's economic powerhouse hit a 10-year low. The euro has lost around 12% in value against the dollar already this year, in part because of an expectation for the Federal Reserve to raise US rates more quickly than the European Central Bank will raise eurozone rates, even though both are racing to contain surging inflationary pressures. Behind the drive towards the buck this week has been Russia closing the Nord Stream 1 natural gas pipeline for 10 days this month for seasonal maintenance. While closures for maintenance are routine on refineries or pipelines, the fear among European governments is that Moscow will not reopen it, which could pave the way for an epic surge in energy prices. "This scenario will also create massive gas shortages in the region, prompting authorities to implement fuel rationing and, in the worst case, order brief shutdowns of factories to reduce energy consumption heading into the winter season, paving the way for what could be a deep recession," Diego Colman market analyst at Daily FX, said. "The threat of economic warfare will be on every trader's mind and depress the euro in the coming days until market participants have a better idea of what Russia plans to do next," he said. The final catalyst arrived on Tuesday, when an index of German businesses showed confidence hitting a 10-year low in July of -53.8, marking a sharp deterioration from June's -28. "The experts assess the current economic situation significantly more negatively than in the previous month and have further lowered their already unfavorable forecast for the next six months," Achim Wambach, president of the ZEW institute, which produces the survey, said. The euro briefly hit a session low in Europe of $0.9999, before recovering modestly to $1.00377, flat on the day. The last time it went below $1 was December 2002. Europe relies on Russia for 40% of its natural gas needs, most of which arrive via pipeline. Russia was already piping gas at around 40% capacity through Nord Stream 1 in retaliation for Western sanctions on its financial and energy sectors over its war in Ukraine. With regional natural gas prices now showing a 380% increase compared with last year and little prospect of shoring up inventories ahead of the winter, EU governments are scrambling to find alternative sources of fuel, firing up idled coal and even nuclear plants, and some have even considered rationing. Wholesale inflation in the eurozone is running at an eye-watering 36.3%, largely because of energy prices, while that in the United States is just 10.8%. The ECB has not yet raised interest rates, which are at 0%, while the Fed has raised rates to 1.75% from 0.25-0.50% at the start of the year and more large hikes are in the works. Another unwelcome surge in natural gas prices could force manufacturers and businesses across the region to slow, or shutter activity altogether, which could keep the euro below $1.00 for some time, analysts said. "I fear that once this dam is broken, the euro could settle below that level for the time being, until we (hopefully) know at the end of next week whether the gas is flowing again," Commerzbank strategist Antje Praefcke said in a note.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 1NC – Germany Relations › 1NC – German Economic Collapse Scenario

Relations with Russia are key to the German economy – underpins the entire EU economic system

Evgeny Tugolukov 7/13/22, investor, founder of the Medscan group of medical companies., “Evgeny Tugolukov: Germany’s prosperity is fueled by Russia, and the Siemens story suggests the penny may be dropping in Berlin”, RT, 7/13/22, https://www.rt.com/news/558883-germanys-prosperity-fueled-by-rus/

Since its historic reunification in 1990, Germany has secured its prosperity with advanced industry and technologies, which in turn has been driven by the hard work and creative spirit of its people. However, to a large extent, the success of German industry was ensured by energy and raw materials from Russia, which made its goods more competitive on the global market. This informal alliance, in many ways, allowed Berlin to become the locomotive of the entire economy of the European Union, and enabled Russia to overcome the crisis of the 1990s that followed the collapse of the USSR. In the days of Gerhard Schröder’s chancellorship, Russian-German relations were a model of mutually beneficial cooperation. From a philosophical point of view, the fate of the two countries is an example of an historical paradox, when how things are contradict how they should be. Right now, we are not in direct conflict, but clearly Berlin, along with its Western allies, has engaged in a proxy fight with Russia. One that has been building since shortly after Schröder left office and his successor, Angela Merkel, agreed to a number of measures which set the course for a confrontation. The “Iron Chancellor” Otto von Bismarck, the founder of the united German state, once prophetically said: “A war between Germany and Russia is the greatest stupidity. That’s why it’s bound to happen.” From the point of view of objective logic, a strategic alliance between the two great continental powers could be a guarantor of peace and prosperity in Europe. Sadly, now it is difficult to discuss the perspectives of a partnership, but the Germans, as practical people, always think – and indeed talk – about what will come the day after some tumultuous event. Severing ties that have developed over decades is fraught with hardship. Thus, there is still hope that among the elites of Western countries there will prevail not only the instinct of self-preservation, but also a rational approach, which is usually so characteristic of the Germans. In this sense, the outcome of the Siemens gas turbine story can be considered a landmark event. Of course, the company produces far more than turbines. The exchange of knowledge, experience, technology, equipment, and pharmaceuticals plays a huge role. Thus, attempts to isolate Russia will not only lead to human suffering, which is immoral, but also slows down the development of research in many areas. Such as in medicine, for example, where – as the COVID-19 pandemic has recently shown – every day counts. Cooperation in humanitarian areas such as healthcare can pull our relationship out of the hole where it currently exists. The revival of interaction in such cases, there is no place for confrontation, will help develop both economies, and restore trust. Do not forget that a native of Lower Saxony, Baron Karl von Munchausen, who served as an officer for the Russian empresses and even took part in one of the Russo-Turkish wars, was able (if, of course, we can believe his stories) to pull himself, along with his horse, out of a swamp by his own hair. Germany needs Russia and Russia needs Germany. More importantly, a safe, secure, and prosperous Europe needs them both working in harmony. The alternative will benefit neither side.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 1NC – Germany Relations › 1NC – German Economic Collapse Scenario

German relations with Russia are increasing due to lack of a cohesive NATO vision for European security – the plan flips that

Tank Oguzlu ’21, Professor, Antalya Bilim University, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Antalya, Turkey, “NATO's Transformation into a Global Actor in the Age of Great Power Politics.”, Perceptions (Vol. 26, Issue 1), Center for Strategic Research, Spring-Summer 2021, https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA674712060&sid=googleScholar&v=2.1&it=r&linkaccess=abs&issn=13008641&p=AONE&sw=w&userGroupName=umuser

While many Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the three Baltic republics, view Russia as their key geopolitical challenge, many Western and European allies are predisposed to see both Russia and China more from a geoeconomic than geopolitical perspective. While they feel quite concerned about the challenges that China and Russia pose to the roots of the liberal international order, the Western European allies seem to share the view that adopting a tough geopolitical approach toward Russia and China would likely diminish any hope left to help revitalize multilateral global governance in the years to come. From a European perspective, it would not be possible to achieve long-term peace and stability across the European continent if Russia were to be excluded from the European security architecture as a legitimate player. Indeed, pushing Russia further into a corner would endanger European security. A similar situation prevails in the context of the Europeans' relations with China. China offers Europe immense opportunities to tap into. It is quite notable that Germany is not buying into American pressure to stop cooperating with Russia in the Nord Stream II project, nor are many European allies heeding the American warning that they would do well to prevent China from building the 5G telecommunication infrastructure across the continent.

Given that the U.S. is no longer as committed to European defense at it was in the past and does not want to act as the sole leader of the liberal international order any longer, it behooves the European allies to develop their own capabilities to survive as an herbivorous actor among such carnivorous powers as Russia, China and the U.S. The willingness of the European allies to mantle such a role in the emerging global order is now more evident than ever, and the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Layen has underlined that the EU will have to evolve into a geopolitical actor. This seems to explain why the EU has recently mentioned China in its documents as a systemic rival while signing off on NATO's latest communique in late 2019 that the rise of China and Russia now offer both opportunities and challenges.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › 1NC – Germany Relations › 1NC – German Economic Collapse Scenario

German-Russia relations are high despite the Ukraine War – lack of draw towards NATO solidifies Russian influence

Stefan Meister ’22, Head of Program, International Order and Democracy, DGAP, “Germany’s Russia problem”, Wilson Center, 2/1/22, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/germanys-russia-problem

In the framework of Russia’s military buildup near Ukraine and the Kremlin’s calls for a new security order for Europe, Germany has become the weak spot for the West. It is the major entry point for the Kremlin to divide Europe and upset transatlantic relations. With the departure of Angela Merkel, however, Germany finds itself without an adequate Russia policy and irresolute in its defense of Ukraine. The new governing coalition in Germany, which sees the Social Democrat Olaf Scholz as chancellor, Annalena Baerbock of the Green Party as foreign minister, and the Liberal Christian Lindner as minister of finance, lacks a common Russia and Eastern Europe policy. This leads to disagreements on how to respond to the substantial security challenge Europe is facing now. The new coalition’s agreement had no clear statement on Russia. Nord Stream 2, a particular point of contention for the EU and the United States, was not mentioned at all. The text said only that Germany’s energy policy is to be regulated at the EU level. Chancellor Scholz seems unwilling to deal with the Russia challenge and allows the leftists in his own party to undermine Germany’s and Europe’s sanction and deterrence efforts. The governing coalition appears to lack leadership on the current crisis with Russia. German politics and society are divided over Russia. There is still a strong legacy of guilt linked to the Nazi regime and the more than 20 million deaths in the Soviet Union; Ostpolitik has also had a long tail affecting current sentiment in Germany. Former chancellor Willy Brandt’s decision to open relations between the former West Germany and the Eastern bloc, which became known as his administration’s Ostpolitik, is a solid part of the identity of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and important segments of German society. Many talk about Russia, but few people in the Bundestag today really understand the logic of Putin’s regime. There are wings in both the Green Party and the SPD that are opposed to supplying weapons to Ukraine or challenging nuclear deterrence. Relevant parts of the SPD want to see Nord Stream 2 operational, and Frank Walter Steinmeier (also of the SPD) a year ago was still arguing that Nord Stream 2 and Germany’s energy policy were probably the last bridges to Russia. The rhetorical ambiguity with regard to Nord Stream 2 and possible sanctions supports the perception in the Kremlin that there will be again no tough sanctions imposed by the West, just as no tough sanctions were imposed in 2008, in response to the Russo-Georgian War, or in 2014, with the Russian occupation of eastern Ukraine. Key politicians from the biggest opposition party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), have made it clear they will not support the international banking system SWIFT sanctions and argue that sanctions levied against Russia should not harm Germany too much, especially in a time of high energy prices. Several key actors in the governing coalition, including those from the (neo)liberal Free Democratic Party, support this position. Crisis of Communication Germany, with its history of Nazi rule, has credible grounds for its refusal to supply weapons to Ukraine. But with the changing security situation in Europe, Germany needs to engage in a responsible debate on this topic, a debate nobody is willing to lead. At the same time, it is incomprehensible that Germany should try to prevent NATO partner Estonia from supplying older East German−origin weapons to Ukraine. The unwillingness of Chancellor Scholz to clarify Germany’s position has created a communication crisis for the German government. He does not provide leadership for Germany on Russian bellicosity, and Germany is not leading Europe in addressing the current crisis. In this light it becomes ever clearer how important Angela Merkel was in providing leadership to Europe with respect to Russia after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in the Donbas, and in maintaining a direct channel of communication with the Russian president. The current lack of a strong German presence weakens Europe even more at a time when Moscow has made clear that only talks with Washington are relevant in discussing the future of Ukraine and European security. The U.S. president Joe Biden took political risks when he made a deal with Angela Merkel on Nord Stream 2. He further supported Germany in the U.S Congress by preventing, at the time, additional sanctions against Russia. But Germany is not returning the favor. Lower gas prices and finalization of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline seem to be more important than a united transatlantic front. Germany now receives more than 50 percent of its gas from Russia, making it even more vulnerable. This dependence weakens the Western sanctions policy and Ukraine. Germany under Angela Merkel had become the main political partner for Ukraine after Poland pivoted to focusing on historical and domestic policy issues.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Negotiations

OR The U.S. isn’t going to be involved in negotiations.

Anurag Roushan 7/3, 7/3/2022, “Russia-Ukraine war | US Won't Press Ukraine To Engage In Peace Negotiations With Russia, Says John Kirby,” , RES

As the forces of Russia and Ukraine continue to engage in the ravaging war, US National Security Council (NSC) coordinator John Kirby stated that it's not Washington's role to press Kyiv to engage in peace talks with Moscow. “It’s time for the United States to continue to support Ukraine, and that’s what we are doing,” Kirby told a journalist on Fox News Sunday. He went on to say that the decision of whether and when to pursue a diplomatic settlement with Russia would always be made by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. "President Zelenskyy gets to determine how victory is decided and when and on what terms. And what we’re going to do is continue to make sure that can succeed on the battlefield so that he can succeed at the table. But even President Zelenskyy will tell you that the time is not now for those discussions," the US NSC coordinator added. According to reports, Russian troops continue to make steady progress in Ukraine's eastern region and launched recent strikes on Kyiv and other cities in the country. Kirby also commended Ukrainian forces, saying that they have resisted Russian invaders far more successfully than anyone anticipated.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Negotiations

Sanctions mean the U.S. and its allies are key to negotiations.

James M. Acton 3/10, Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., 3/10/2022, “To Support Zelensky, the United States Needs to Negotiate With Putin,” , RES

“It’s not that I want to talk to Putin,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said last week about Russia’s president. “I need to talk to Putin. The world needs to talk to Putin. There is no other way to stop this war.” The United States should heed this plea. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s unprovoked and illegal invasion has been both heroic and effective, but its situation is precarious. For all their flaws, Russia’s armed forces may yet prevail in a prolonged conflict, and there is still a real danger that much of Ukraine will become a Russian vassal state under a puppet government. Moreover, even if Ukraine can hold off Russian forces indefinitely, the prospect of forcibly evicting them from its territory—particularly in the south—is daunting. All the while, Russia is slaughtering Ukraine’s citizens ever more indiscriminately. But as Zelensky’s statement suggests, Ukraine’s plan to end this war is probably not to vanquish the invading forces. Rather, its goal appears to be to make the prospect of continuing the war, and the occupation that could follow it, exceptionally painful for Russia—so painful that Putin comes to view a settlement agreement that preserves Ukraine’s independence as the lesser of two evils. Putin may already be feeling the pain. The United States believes that Putin embarked on this war seeking to conquer most or all of Ukraine. Today, Moscow has implicitly recognized Zelensky’s government by demanding, in return for an end to the war, that Kyiv agree to Ukrainian neutrality, acknowledge Crimea as Russian territory, and recognize Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states. If Ukrainian forces continue to perform well, Putin will have to settle for still less and may even have to pay Ukraine reparations. (Conversely, if Russian forces achieve breakthroughs, Putin will be able to drive a harder bargain.) Even in the best case, if Zelensky wants a negotiated settlement, he will likely have to make significant concessions to Russia—as he has acknowledged. Any such concessions will probably be bitterly opposed by many in the United States and Europe. Ultimately, though, it is not their call. The democratically elected government of Ukraine should get to decide what price it is willing to pay for an end to the slaughter of its citizens and the preservation of Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign state. The United States and its allies should support Zelensky in any diplomatic course he pursues. Indeed, he cannot end the war without them. Economic sanctions on Russia strengthen his hand at the negotiating table by raising the costs to Russia of continuing to fight. By the same token, however, it is virtually inconceivable that Russia would agree to a settlement without sanctions relief. For this reason, the United States and its allies must be prepared to lift sanctions—including on Russia’s central bank—if Russia and Ukraine negotiate and implement a settlement agreement.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Link

There is still room for NATO involvement---fears of escalation are unfounded---the US and NATO must adopt a policy of going just-behind crossing the redline

Altman 7/12 (Dan Altman; "The West Worries Too Much About Escalation in Ukraine: NATO Can Do More Without Provoking Moscow", 7-12-2022, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-07-12/west-worries-too-much-about-escalation-ukraine, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

As the world looks on while Ukrainians fight for their lives and their freedom, many feel a burning desire to do more to support them. The problem is not a lack of forces or resources—it is fear of provoking a wider, perhaps nuclear, war with Russia. That fear is why U.S. President Joe Biden and other NATO leaders have consistently made clear that they will not intervene directly in the conflict, instead limiting their help to weapons, money, intelligence, and sanctions. As devastating as events in Ukraine are today, a nuclear war with Russia could kill more people than Ukraine’s entire population of roughly 44 million.

NATO leaders understand that they must walk this fine line between aiding Ukraine and risking war with Russia, but they have no theory of how to do it. The German and French governments hem and haw about whether to provide Ukraine with tanks. When Poland proposed a plan to transfer MiG-29 fighter aircraft to Ukraine, the United States refused. U.S. Defense Department spokesperson John Kirby warned that it “raises serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance” and therefore was not “tenable.” Yet the United States was already shipping Javelin antitank missiles and Stinger surface-to-air missiles. Soon after, it began sending other weapons, including M777 howitzers and now HIMARS multiple rocket launchers. What is the difference? Those weapons do more to strengthen Ukraine’s combat power than MiG-29s, so the theory cannot be that Russia reacts more strongly to policies that do more harm to its interests. Why, then, missiles and artillery but not planes? The answer is that there is no answer. It is simply arbitrary.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Internal Link Turn

China-Taiwan war goes nuclear. Deterrence is key. It’s fast and more probable than European war.

Pettyjohn and Wasser 5-20-2022, *senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security, **fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (Stacie and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs,

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Internal Link Turn

An “epic military win” is key---Russia’s on the brink of losing---BUT, giving up on military operations signals weakness to China over Taiwan, causing miscalc---current Western support is slow, but the AFF speeds it up

Corera 7/21 (Gordon Corera; "Russia about to run out of steam in Ukraine", 7/21/2022, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62259179, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Russia will struggle to maintain its military campaign and Ukraine may be able to hit back, the head Britain's foreign intelligence service says.

MI6 chief Richard Moore said Russia had seen "epic fails" in its initial goals; removing Ukraine's president, capturing Kyiv and sowing disunity in the West.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Internal Link Turn

Realism cannot solve the war now---negotiations will be rendered ineffective

Sood 7/11 (Rakesh Sood; "Ending the Ukraine war in an imperfect world", 7-11-2022, ORF, https://www.orfonline.org/research/ending-the-ukraine-war-in-an-imperfect-world/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

The war in Ukraine has been underway for over four months. What began as a European conflict has had global repercussions. Of course, Ukraine and its people have borne the maximum brunt. More than five million Ukrainians have left the country and over eight million are internally displaced. Rising casualties and large-scale destruction have set back the country by decades. Recent estimates for rebuilding the destroyed cities and infrastructure are as high as $750 billion.

During 2020-21, most economies that could afford to, provided generous financial support to its citizens in the form of direct payments and subsidised food to tide over the economic hardships caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Supply chains suffered disruptions, aggravated by politics. Economic recovery has generated demand, creating inflationary pressures. Today, inflation rates are rising across the world and in the largest economies have reached levels not seen since the early 1980s. As these countries tighten money supply, fears of recession loom large. The war in Ukraine has aggravated the situation for the poorer countries by creating food and fertilizer shortages. The sharp surge in energy prices threatens the prospects of economic recovery. Prospects of collective global action to deal with these challenges appear remote, given growing tensions among major powers.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Internal Link Turn

“Do not humiliate Russia” is a dumb idea and only bolsters Russia’s stance---we are past the point of return

Bento 7/15 (Xavier Bento, Programme Assistant at Friends of Europe; "Don’t humiliate Russia! Or how to repeat past mistakes at the cost of European security", 7-15-2022, Friends of Europe, https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/dont-humiliate-russia-or-how-to-repeat-past-mistakes-at-the-cost-of-european-security/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

Last month, French President Emmanuel Macron suggested that Europe “must not humiliate Russia so that the day the fighting stops, we can build a way out through diplomatic channels,” contesting that diplomacy must consistently be considered to address violent conflicts. Problematically, Macron simultaneously implied that negotiations could only take place if Russia can escape any form of shame or humiliation.

This gave rise to mixed reactions from other Western leaders. The United States Ambassador to the European Union, Mark Gitenstein, declared that Russian President Vladimir Putin had “humiliated himself” by his conduct in the war and that the West wanted to see him defeated on the battlefields of Ukraine. Similarly, former US ambassador to Moscow, Michael McFaul, claimed: “Putin will only negotiate when his army can’t keep marching forward, humiliated or not. Macron should focus on creating that condition.” The strongest European reactions came from the head of the Estonian parliament’s Foreign Affairs Commission, Marko Mihkelson, who stated that Macron was “still looking for ways to save war criminal Putin from humiliation,” and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis claimed Macron’s comments risked jeopardising the unity and security of the EU. Most notably, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba said that allies should “better focus on how to put Russia in its place” and that “calls to avoid humiliation of Russia can only humiliate France and every other country that would call for it.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Internal Link Turn

Continued assistance to Ukraine is key---otherwise, Russia is emboldened to engage again, and the US will lose its diplomatic credibility

Ferguson 7/14 (Michael P. Ferguson, Master of Science in Homeland Security at San Diego State University; "Is imperialism negotiable?", 7-14-2022, Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3559028-is-imperialism-negotiable/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

Despite modest gains in east Ukraine, June was not a good month for Russia. Within a single week, European Union leaders offered Kyiv candidacy for membership, NATO reached an agreement to bring Sweden and Finland into the alliance and Great Britain’s defense secretary, Ben Wallace, called for a 20 percent hike to his budget.

These historic developments are sure to rile Kremlin officials, but the future of Western support to Ukraine’s fight remains uncertain. As public interest in the war continues to dwindle, appeasing Russia’s extortionate demands could become more desirable. Such concessions would do more than disfigure Ukraine and impose devastating new realities on Western security institutions — they would declare to the world that imperialism is negotiable.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Grain UQ

Huge barriers to grain deal---demining ports, persuading shippers, Russia already stole the grain, and substantial political divisions

Malsin et. Al 7/21 (Jared Malsin, William Mauldin and Alistair Macdonald; "Russia, Ukraine Face Thorny Issues to Complete, Implement Grain Deal", 7-21-2022, WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-ukraine-face-thorny-issues-to-complete-implement-grain-deal-11658408580, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

ISTANBUL—Negotiators, having reached the outlines of a deal for Ukraine to export grain from seaports amid the war with Russia, face challenges to getting it done, from the demining of ports to persuading shippers they can operate safely in a conflict zone.

Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and United Nations officials are expected to resume negotiations this week on a framework that would establish a grain export corridor in the Black Sea and potentially help alleviate a hunger crisis in some developing countries.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

G20 summit failed and heightened tensions

RFE 22 ("G20 Diplomats Find No Common Ground As Western Countries Press Russia Over War In Ukraine", 7-9-2022, Radio Free Europe, https://www.rferl.org/a/g20-diplomats-gather-ukraine-war-global-inflation/31934288.html, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Diplomats from the world’s major industrialized nations failed on July 8 to find common ground over Russia’s war in Ukraine and how to deal with its impact on grain shipments and energy markets.

Russia’s foreign minister walked out of two sessions held by diplomats from the Group of 20 (G20) amid criticism of the war on Ukraine and amid calls for Russia to allow Kyiv to ship grain out to the world.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

Putin can’t be trusted by his words

RFE 22 ("Putin Claims Russia Will ‘Guarantee’ Peaceful Export Of Ukrainian Grain", 6-3-2022, Radio Free Europe, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-war-grain/31882556.html, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Russian President Vladimir Putin denied accusations his armed forces are blocking Ukrainian grain exports from the Black Sea and said his government would “guarantee" peaceful passage to ships leaving Ukraine's ports.

In an interview with Russian state television on June 3, Putin tried to put the blame on Ukraine for the trapped grain, saying Kyiv has mined the Black Sea and sunk vessels, preventing grain ships from leaving.