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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

Hostile statements have been exchanged – relations are low

Keep Greece Talking KGT ’22, Greek News in English, “Russian statements against Greece are “unacceptable”, says Foreign Ministry”, Keep Greece Talking, 3/7/22, https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2022/03/07/greece-russia-foreign-ministry-unacceptable-statements/

The statement by the spokeswoman of the Russian Foreign Ministry are “unacceptable” the Foreign Ministry in Athens said late on Sunday. Greece ’s Foreign Ministry responded to the unprecedented statement by Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova who lashed out against the country for its stance on the war in Ukraine. Zakharova went to far to accuse the Greek government of “hypocrisy.” – Statement is here. “Greek foreign policy is a principled policy and has always been based on complete respect for international law,” Zakharova’s counterpart in the Greek Foreign Ministry, Alexandros Papaioannou said late on Sunday. “Greece contributes to, and is bound by, the decisions of international organizations it takes part in, such as, among others, the European Union and NATO,” he added. “A main concern of our country’s is to promote truth, on the basis of confirmed and irrefutable facts. Every effort to promote fake news and disinformation, aiming to mislead public opinion, is to be condemned, wherever it comes from. The recent statements by the spokeswoman for the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the (social media) posts of the Russian Embassy in Athens are, unfortunately, unacceptable. They do not comport with diplomatic practice, or the historical bonds connecting the Greek and Russian people. Greece would like to see historical relations maintained and Russian behavior reflecting this,” the spokesman’s statement concluded.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

Greece-Russia relations are at an all-time low–Ukraine proves

Kokkinidis 4-23 (Tasos Kokkinidis is a Greek Reporter journalist, 4-23-22, “Russia Warns Greece of Complete Breakdown in Relations”, Greek Reporter, SC)

On Friday, Russia’s Foreign Ministry warned Greece that relations between the two nations that “share the same faith” have been “reduced to almost nothing.” Maria Zakharova, director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, warned in a statement released on social media that the “historical parallels” between Greece and Russia were in danger of becoming “a solid double line between us.” The Russian official focused on Greece’s decision to declare 12 Russian officials “personae non-gratae,” on April 6 joining other European states that had taken similar steps in response to accusations of atrocities committed by Russian forces against civilians in Ukraine. The Foreign Ministry said the decision was made in line with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963. Russia’s embassy in Athens condemned Greece’s decision and warned of consequences. “We have strongly protested against this unjustified and hostile step which aims to further destroy our bilateral relations,” the Russian embassy announced in a statement. “We made clear that this action will not remain without consequences,” it further said. Grecian Delight supports Greece Breakdown of Greece, Russia relations despite historic ties In her social media post, Zakharova lamented the breakdown of relations between Russia and Greece and delved into the historic ties between the two countries. “There was a time when Russia helped Greece achieve independence and restore its statehood, and its first head was previously Russia’s foreign minister, but now this country’s diplomatic relations with Russia have been reduced to almost nothing,” Zakharova warned. She added that “this happened despite the fact that we share the same faith with the Greeks, the same traditions, and were always there to help our Greek friends.” “This is not so much an issue of Euro-Atlantic solidarity erasing the past, since it is a sovereign choice for every nation to decide whom to honor. Even worse, this deprives people and nations of their future, independence and the right to make sovereign choices,” Zakharova concluded. Diplomatic spat between Russia and Greece The Russian official has previously alleged that there is an orchestrated defamation of Russia in Greece following the ongoing war in Ukraine. “Senior officials in Athens find themselves making gross accusations against our country and its leadership,” Zakharova said. She added: “We noticed the unprecedented campaign launched in Greece to defame Russia’s policy. Senior officials in Athens allow themselves to make crude accusations against our country and its leadership [and] they are literally competing with their like-minded people. They hypocritically speak of an ‘unprovoked attack’ against Ukraine, for the first time since World War II, a ‘mass invasion’ and so on.” “Europe, including Greece, is fully integrated into the ranks of the Kiev regime’s advocates, while the anti-Russia hysteria cultivated by the authorities has reached a boiling point,” the Russian foreign ministry official said. Greece responded to the statements saying they are “unacceptable.” The spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry, Alexandros Papaioannou, noted the following: “The recent statements by the spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the posts of the Russian embassy in Athens are, unfortunately, unacceptable.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

Greece-Russia relations are low – tit-for-tat diplomat expulsions

Agence France-Presse AFP 6/28/22, is a French private international news agency headquartered in Paris, France, “Russia expels eight Greek diplomats”, Inquirer.net, 6/28/22, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1617997/russia-expels-eight-greek-diplomats

MOSCOW — Russia said Monday it was expelling eight Greek diplomats over a decision by Athens to deliver military equipment to Ukraine, where Moscow’s troops are fighting. Greece’s ambassador was summoned to the Russian foreign ministry and told the diplomats had eight days to leave the country, said a ministry statement. The decision was “the direct consequence of unfriendly actions taken by the Greek authorities”, said the ministry. The statement referred specifically to the delivery of weapons and military material to Ukraine and the expulsion of Russian diplomats from Greece. The Greek foreign ministry expressed “profound regret” over the move, which it claimed was “baseless”. Athens said the diplomats in question were “distinguished by their professionalism and high sense of responsibility (and) performed their duties in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna conventions on diplomatic and consular relations.” Athens expelled 12 Russian diplomats in April, following Moscow’s military operation in Ukraine, launched in late February. Despite the two countries historical ties, because of their shared Orthodox Christian religious heritage, Athens has joined other Western nations in condemning the Russian military operation. Western countries around the world have expelled several hundred Russian diplomats over the issue, and Russia has replied in kind.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Impact Turn

Germany-Russian ties enable further Russian aggression – turns the DA

Constanze Stelzenmüller 6/21/22, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe Fritz Stern Chair on Germany and trans-Atlantic Relations, “Merkel’s lack of regrets illustrates the fallacies of Germany’s Russia policy”, Brookings, 6/21/22, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/21/merkels-lack-of-regrets-illustrates-the-fallacies-of-germanys-russia-policy/

Merkel left office of her own will, the only postwar chancellor to do so. She was popular at home and she was admired worldwide as one of Germany’s greatest postwar leaders. Now, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24 has cast a dark backwards shadow over her tenure. Should she not have paid more attention to Putin’s repression of civil society and murders of political opponents in Russia? His poisoning of European politics by means of disinformation and corruption? His careful weaving of a continent-wide web of dependency on Russian gas? His stationing of intermediate-range missiles in Kaliningrad? His increasingly evident imperial ambitions? Should she not have seen a connection between the assault on Chechnya, with which Putin began his reign at the turn of the millennium, the war with Georgia in 2008 which resulted in that country’s dismemberment at Russian hands, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and eight years of proxy war in Donbas with 14,000 dead? But those who expected a self-critical examination of her record were disappointed. “I don’t see that I should now have to say, that was wrong. And I will therefore not apologize.” The literal English translation is clunky, but then so is Merkelish in the original German. The point of the former chancellor’s remarks to a Berlin theatre audience was clear enough: she had nothing to regret. Merkel contended that she always saw through Putin: “I always knew he wanted to destroy Europe.” Yet she insisted — in a phrase redolent of Bismarckian Realpolitik — that it was important to maintain “a trade connection” with “the world’s second largest nuclear power.” One commentator branded her comments as appeasement. A second seized on her description of Putin’s war as “a great tragedy” as evidence of fatalistic determinism. Others suggested that Merkel had simply been “the perfect chancellor for a system that had reached its limits.” None of these explanations is entirely off the mark. What matters, however, is that Merkel’s signature approach to dealing with problems — comprehending them fully, but choosing to manage rather than to resolve them — was shared not just by her various coalition partners, but by the German business community and by voters. It is in line with a longstanding postwar tradition of German leaders framing strategic choices as strategic constraints, thereby evading the appearance of agency or responsibility. As a recipe for grappling with an unchained totalitarian Russia — and with a future of permanent upheaval and disruption — it is not just futile but reckless.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: EU Economy Impact

EU economy will collapse now regardless

Smith 22 (Elliot Smith is a Markets Reporter for CNBC in London. He joined the team in April 2019 after two and a half years with Citywire, where his reporting garnered the 2018 PressGazette British Journalism Award for Specialist Media (Finance), May 6, 2022, “We see a big recession in the making’: Top CEOs are fearing the worst in Europe”, )

The CEOs of several European blue chip companies have told CNBC that they see a significant recession coming down the pike in Europe. The continent is particularly vulnerable to the fallout from the Russia-Ukraine war, associated economic sanctions and energy supply concerns, and economists have been downgrading growth forecasts for the euro zone in recent weeks. The euro zone faces concurrent economic shocks from the war in Ukraine and a surge in food and energy prices exacerbated by the conflict, along with a supply shock arising from China’s zero-Covid policy. That has prompted concerns about “stagflation” — an environment of low economic growth and high inflation — and eventual recession. “For sure, we see a big recession in the making, but that’s exactly what we see — it’s in the making. There is still an overhanging demand because of the Covid crisis we just are about to leave,” said Stefan Hartung, CEO of German engineering and technology giant Bosch. “It’s still there and you see it heavily hitting us in China, but you see that in a lot of areas in the world, the demand of consumers has already even been increased in some areas.” In particular, Hartung noted lingering consumer demand for household appliances, power tools and vehicles, but suggested this would dissipate. “That means for a certain amount of time, this demand will still be there, even while we see the interest increase and we see the pricing increase, but at some point in time, it won’t be just a supply crisis, it will also be a demand crisis, and then for sure, we are in a deep recession,” he added. Inflation in the euro zone hit a record high of 7.5% in March. So far, the European Central Bank has remained more dovish than its peers, such as the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve, both of which have begun hiking interest rates in a bid to rein in inflation. However, the ECB now expects to conclude net asset purchases under its APP (asset purchase program) in the third quarter, after which it will have room to begin monetary tightening, depending on the economic outlook. Berenberg Chief Economist Holger Schmieding said in a note Friday that near-term risks to economic growth are tilted to the downside in Europe. “Worsening Chinese lockdowns and cautious consumer spending in reaction to high energy and food prices could easily cause a temporary contraction in Eurozone GDP in Q2,” Schmieding said. “An immediate embargo on gas imports from Russia (highly unlikely) could turn that into a more serious recession. If the Fed gets it badly wrong and catapults the U.S. straight from boom to bust (unlikely but not fully impossible), such a recession could last well into next year. Yet Schmieding suggested that the euro zone is likely to enter recession only “if worse came to worst,” and that it isn’t a base expectation. Mark Branson, president of German financial regulator BaFin, said any military escalation in Ukraine or further energy supply disruption could pose serious risks to growth in Europe’s largest economy, with industrial sectors particularly vulnerable. “We’re already seeing that growth is down to around zero in many jurisdictions, including here, and it’s vulnerable. It’s also vulnerable from the ongoing Covid-related shocks,” he said. “We’ve got inflation that’s going to need to be tackled, and it’s going to need to be tackled now, so that’s a cocktail which is difficult for the economy.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: EU Economy Impact

EU’s economy is declining now due to the Ukraine war

Randow 22 (Jana Randow, ECB, economics & more at Bloomberg in Frankfurt, April 29, 2022, “Recession Threat Hangs Over Europe’s Fragile Economic Growth”, )

The euro zone’s recovery from the pandemic is already showing signs of flagging even before it meets the economic storm clouds heading its way. The danger of a recession loomed into view this week after Russia halted gas flows to Poland and Bulgaria, offering a foretaste of what the region might have in store. But even without the energy rationing such a move might provoke, the outlook looks ominous, underscored by weaker-than-expected growth reported Friday. European Weakness Inflation and war are weighing on economic output across the region European Central Bank Chief Economist Philip Lane insisted after the data that there’s “still a lot of momentum” in the recovery. Even so, European factories are signaling distress amid record inflation and a stubborn supply squeeze, aggravated by strict lockdowns in China. Meanwhile any catch-up on leisure and travel by Covid-liberated consumers may fade, not least as price increases eat into incomes. The coronavirus itself could return with a vengeance. European financial markets reflect the gloom, and economists at Morgan Stanley are among those seeing a “meaningful slowdown” in the second half. Corporate giants including Germany’s BASF SE are bracing for “serious disruptions,” and the OECD is warning that governments underestimate the impact of the war in Ukraine. What that suggests is that a year that began with the region extending its growth beyond pre-Covid levels, and offered the prospect of further tailwinds from European Union fiscal aid, now risks becoming another sorry episode in the single currency’s history of frustrating setbacks to growth. “The economy may show resilience in the coming quarters, but the problem is, what will happen at the end of the year?” said Anatoli Annenkov, an economist at Societe Generale SA in London. “We don’t know what will happen with wage growth and fiscal stimulus in 2023, there’s as much concern over China as there is over energy costs, and it’s easy to become pessimistic in light of the war.” Given the backdrop, Europe’s main equity benchmark has struggled to find its footing this year and widening bond spreads are feeding concerns that fragmentation will return to the 19-nation euro zone. First-quarter gross domestic product data didn’t offer cause for hope. The euro area grew only 0.2%, less than economists anticipated, hurt by a contraction in Italy, stagnation in France and weaker-than-expected growth in Spain. Indicators since then aren’t much better. Factory output and new orders are close to grinding to a halt, and business confidence across major economies has declined since the start of the year. That’s left services to shoulder the burden, undermined by waning consumer confidence. “Manufacturing will be very weak in the coming months and quite likely contract in the second quarter,” said Veronika Roharova, an economist at Credit Suisse International, who predicts euro-area growth of 2.8% this year. Still, “services are strong and household savings high, the labor market continues to look healthy and fiscal support is ensuring we won’t see a spending slump.” Lane of the ECB, interviewed by Bloomberg Television after the growth data, observed that it was “not very high admittedly, but still positive.” “We know from the near-time indicators, from what’s going on right now, that there still seems to be reasonable activity right now here at the end of April,” he added. Even so, economic forecasts for this year are being slashed. The International Monetary Fund cut 1.1 percentage point off its projection this month and now sees growth of 2.8%. The Institute of International Finance anticipates just 1% expansion. ECB officials acknowledged this month that growth risks have increased “substantially,” but they remain optimistic they can deliver an accelerated exit from crisis-era stimulus to combat inflation at a record 7.5% in data on Friday. Some policy makers are touting the first interest-rate increase since 2011 as soon as July, and even Russia’s complete halt of gas deliveries to Poland and Bulgaria and the prospect that euro-zone countries could also be shut off next doesn’t seems to deter them. While “this would definitely have a more negative, stronger immediate effect” Governing Council member Madis Muller said on Wednesday, he added that “the risk of an economic contraction in the euro area on the whole is more likely to be small.” The effect in Germany, the region’s biggest economy, might be more significant. First-quarter growth of 0.2% matched expectations, but the Bundesbank sees a risk of it shrinking nearly 2% this year if the war escalates and an embargo on Russian coal, oil and gas leads to restrictions on industry. Scores of companies including BMW AG and ThyssenKrupp AG have warned earnings could be affected, and utility Sniper SE said Wednesday that the economic toll of any stoppages in gas supplies would be “dramatic.” German Economy Minister Robert Habeck insisted this week that a full embargo on Russian oil would be “manageable.” Meanwhile the EU has been discussing new sanctions targeting the commodity, and Emmanuel Macron’s victory in French presidential elections may reinforce the bloc’s cohesion in addressing challenges together. The ECB also highlighted this month that fiscal measures to help households cope with surging inflation are helping. The prospect of such policies being extended, particularly in the event of a Russian energy shut-off, could provide a cushion for the economy, though at a cost to public finances. “Fiscal measures, including at EU level, will help shield the euro area from the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine,” ECB President Christine Lagarde told the IMF meetings last week. The central bank’s next policy decision is on June 9.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

Germany and Russia relations low, they are threatening conflict now

Gorman 21 (Lucy has been a correspondent intern at the OWP since 2021. She is a junior at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, studying Peace, War, and Defense and Psychology with a concentration in intelligence and international relations. Through her studies, she has developed a special interest in counter-terrorism, understanding the effects of war on populations, and regions of the Middle East and East Asia, November 3, 2021, “Germany And Russia Threaten Nuclear Arsenal Use Against Each Other”, )

A protest note was handed to the German military by the Russian Defense Ministry in response to comments about deterring Russia’s nuclear capabilities. Germany especially had been coming out with statements about the pressing need to focus on Russia and reducing their nuclear capabilities, causing Russia to deliver the note. According to Reuters, Russia announced it would break off existing institutionalized contacts with NATO and the alliance agreed on a new plan to defend against any potential Russian attack. In an interview last Thursday, incumbent Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer stated that “We have to make it very clear to Russia that in the end — and that is also the deterrent doctrine — we are ready to use such means [nuclear weapons] so that it has a deterrent effect beforehand and nobody gets the idea…” It is alarming that Germany is quick to state that they would put to use such weapons against Russia. The spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, said that “there are level-headed people in the German leadership who can prevent their defence minister from recklessly wanting to test our armed forces.” It is unknown what the note from Russia stated, but it introduces a possible strife between the two nations over nuclear power. Janis Kluge, an expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, views the current relationship between Berlin and Moscow as at an all-time low in post-Soviet history. Germany-Russia relations have always been complicated with shifts from alliances to total warfare. The recent rise in negative relations stemmed from Russia’s seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Within NATO, Germany was quick to impose multiple rounds of harsh sanctions against oil and other Russian industries. This leaves Germany and Russia with unstable relations today, meaning the note is indicative of a possible major conflict between the two. Germany has made an aggressive threat towards Russia by stating that they would go as far as to use nuclear weapons in acts of deterrence. This puts hundreds of millions of people at risk, as a deadly conflict would arise if Germany took such severe action. Germany’s initial comments and responses to the situation are intended to make Russia fearful of an attack and be cautious with their nuclear program. Weapons of mass destruction like the ones in question are obviously catastrophic, which pushes the common reaction to often be the use of them as it is the only way to counter such a massive threat. It is ironic that many nations choose to fight the problem with further use of the same weapons. However, nations may not see many alternatives to preventing the spread of nuclear power as they have to put forth a large enough and credible type of threat.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

The Ukraine invasion was the last straw for Germany-Russia relations

Judy Dempsey ’22, is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic Europe., “Russia’s Invasion Has Become a Watershed Moment for Germany”, Carnegie Europe, 3/3/22, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/03/03/russia-s-invasion-has-become-watershed-moment-for-germany-pub-86553

In just thirty minutes on Sunday, Chancellor Olaf Scholz put Germany on a radical new path. In an extraordinary speech made during a special session of the German parliament on Sunday, Scholz ended the decades-long Ostpolitik of his Social Democratic Party (SPD), with immense ramifications for Europe and NATO. Ostpolitik, or “eastern policy,” was forged in the early 1970s and intended to bring the Soviet Union politically and economically closer to Europe. One major component was building a gas pipeline, which the United States opposed, that West Germany hoped would bring confidence, stability, and predictability with the USSR. But Ostpolitik also meant that Germany’s ruling left wing had little sympathy for dissident movements in communist Eastern Europe, as these movements upset the Cold War status quo. That belief in having a special relationship with Russia persisted even when President Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimea in 2014. Germany’s powerful and influential business lobbies and pro-Russia left-wingers preferred to protect their interests with Russia, despite the Kremlin’s crackdown on human rights, press freedom, and civil society. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Thursday was the last straw for Scholz. He became convinced that Germany could no longer hedge its bets with Russia. In his speech to legislators, he laid out his vision for the country’s radical shift. Scholz said German defense spending would increase to 2 percent of gross domestic product, meeting the target set in 2014 during NATO’s summit in Wales. In addition, he announced a special 100 billion euro ($113 billion) fund to provide much-needed basic equipment for the German armed forces. Scholz also said Germany would send weapons to Ukraine, ending a long-held policy that it would not deliver weapons to a conflict zone—hardly a plausible argument when Germany supplies weapons to authoritarian regimes. Finally, the country would move quickly to reduce its dependence on oil and gas. This means sharply cutting back its imports of Russian energy, which account for 55 percent of its gas imports. Apart from mapping out an ambitious new course for Germany, it was Scholz’s impassioned support for Ukraine that won him rapturous applause. “The twenty-fourth of February 2022 marks a watershed in the history of our continent,” he said. “With the attack on Ukraine, Russian President Putin has started a war of aggression in cold blood.” But what does Scholz’s speech mean in practice? First, Russia has lost one of its most important supporters in Europe, and Germany no longer sees Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine through the prism of Russia. The time when the SPD tacitly acknowledged Russia’s sphere of influence over these sovereign, independent countries is over. In addition, Germany’s relations, particularly with Poland and the Baltic states, will markedly improve. These countries were highly critical and distrustful of Berlin’s commitment to Nord Stream 2, the $11 billion project to bring Russian gas directly to Europe that was finished and awaiting certification when Scholz halted it last week. They, along with Ukraine, believed the pipeline would increase their vulnerability in terms of energy supplies and make Germany more dependent on Russia for its energy, pushing Germany to lean more Russia-friendly inside the EU and NATO. Expect a thaw in relations. Scholz’s announcement to send weapons to Ukraine will also boost Germany’s standing in this part of Europe. Early last month, Germany faced widespread ridicule over its promise to supply Ukraine with 5,000 helmets, as other NATO members sent weapons, and it blocked Estonia’s move to send German-made weapons to Kyiv. This policy change ends the long-held suspicion that Berlin did not want to antagonize Russia. In addition, these decisions are a boost for NATO, with Germany now fully committed to the defense of Europe via the U.S.-led military alliance. The change shows that Germany no longer wants to be seen as a “free rider,” always relying on the United States to be Europe’s security guarantor without paying much for that security umbrella. Germany was repeatedly criticized for its unwillingness to spend 2 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, and this raised questions among allies if Germany was taking America’s protection for granted. One caveat to the increase in defense spending. The 100 billion euro “special fund” will kickstart a long overdue modernization of Germany’s armed forces. This is no joke: German soldiers were sent recently to the Baltic states lacking thermal underwear and other basic clothing. But spending more over the next few years will not be useful if it leads to more duplication of equipment among allies instead of focusing on adapting weapons systems to cyber attacks, modern aircraft fighters, and the changing nature of warfare. Germany could now shape the future direction of EU foreign policy. The war in Ukraine has shown how the EU, pushed by Germany, needs a revamped “Eastern Partnership” policy that entails not only reducing Russian interference, especially by pro-Russian and local oligarchs in politics and the economy, but also strengthening the state institutions and combating corruption. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—countries in which Russia has consistently meddled—want to join the EU, or failing that, some special relationship that will make their trade, economy, political, and social structures more closely tied to Europe. Scholz’s policy change indicates that Germany will no longer stand in the way of these changes, and could even lead them.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Germany-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

Germany is firmly committed to NATO again post-Ukraine invasion

Paul Maurice ’22, is a researcher at the Committee for the Study of Franco-German Relations (Cerfa) at Ifri, where he works in particular on questions of German domestic policy, Franco-German relations in the context of European construction and the political foreign and security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany., “A ''change of era''? Towards a Reorientation of German Foreign Policy after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”, Ifri Briefings, Ifri, March 7, 2022., translated by Google Translate, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/briefings-de-lifri/new-era-toward-realignment-german-foreign-policy-after-russian

But this turnaround in German foreign and security policy is not only beneficial to Europe, however. The German Chancellor gave numerous pledges to US President Joe Biden who hoped to see Germany once again become this “model ally” after the Trump era14. Once again, Germany remains faithful to its principles, according to which “the cohesion of the European Union” is not incompatible with “the strength of NATO”. Finally, in this volte-face vis-à-vis Russia, the strength of these changes must be for Olaf Scholz to use "as much diplomacy as possible", but "without being naive": it is the duty of the diplomacy "to keep the channels of discussion open". Diplomacy within the framework of international institutions has always been the guarantee of a democratic German foreign policy faithful to the principles of international organizations of collective security. At an emergency meeting of the UN General Assembly on March 1 , 2022, Foreign Minister Annalaena Baerbock, called on the international community to condemn outright the Russian aggression which “brutally attacked” the international order of peace. His speech reaffirms both the attachment to the principles of collective security and also shows that the Russian invasion marks the beginning of a new era for German diplomacy.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Negotiations

OR The U.S. isn’t going to be involved in negotiations.

Anurag Roushan 7/3, 7/3/2022, “Russia-Ukraine war | US Won't Press Ukraine To Engage In Peace Negotiations With Russia, Says John Kirby,” , RES

As the forces of Russia and Ukraine continue to engage in the ravaging war, US National Security Council (NSC) coordinator John Kirby stated that it's not Washington's role to press Kyiv to engage in peace talks with Moscow. “It’s time for the United States to continue to support Ukraine, and that’s what we are doing,” Kirby told a journalist on Fox News Sunday. He went on to say that the decision of whether and when to pursue a diplomatic settlement with Russia would always be made by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. "President Zelenskyy gets to determine how victory is decided and when and on what terms. And what we’re going to do is continue to make sure that can succeed on the battlefield so that he can succeed at the table. But even President Zelenskyy will tell you that the time is not now for those discussions," the US NSC coordinator added. According to reports, Russian troops continue to make steady progress in Ukraine's eastern region and launched recent strikes on Kyiv and other cities in the country. Kirby also commended Ukrainian forces, saying that they have resisted Russian invaders far more successfully than anyone anticipated.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Negotiations

Sanctions mean the U.S. and its allies are key to negotiations.

James M. Acton 3/10, Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., 3/10/2022, “To Support Zelensky, the United States Needs to Negotiate With Putin,” , RES

“It’s not that I want to talk to Putin,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said last week about Russia’s president. “I need to talk to Putin. The world needs to talk to Putin. There is no other way to stop this war.” The United States should heed this plea. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s unprovoked and illegal invasion has been both heroic and effective, but its situation is precarious. For all their flaws, Russia’s armed forces may yet prevail in a prolonged conflict, and there is still a real danger that much of Ukraine will become a Russian vassal state under a puppet government. Moreover, even if Ukraine can hold off Russian forces indefinitely, the prospect of forcibly evicting them from its territory—particularly in the south—is daunting. All the while, Russia is slaughtering Ukraine’s citizens ever more indiscriminately. But as Zelensky’s statement suggests, Ukraine’s plan to end this war is probably not to vanquish the invading forces. Rather, its goal appears to be to make the prospect of continuing the war, and the occupation that could follow it, exceptionally painful for Russia—so painful that Putin comes to view a settlement agreement that preserves Ukraine’s independence as the lesser of two evils. Putin may already be feeling the pain. The United States believes that Putin embarked on this war seeking to conquer most or all of Ukraine. Today, Moscow has implicitly recognized Zelensky’s government by demanding, in return for an end to the war, that Kyiv agree to Ukrainian neutrality, acknowledge Crimea as Russian territory, and recognize Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states. If Ukrainian forces continue to perform well, Putin will have to settle for still less and may even have to pay Ukraine reparations. (Conversely, if Russian forces achieve breakthroughs, Putin will be able to drive a harder bargain.) Even in the best case, if Zelensky wants a negotiated settlement, he will likely have to make significant concessions to Russia—as he has acknowledged. Any such concessions will probably be bitterly opposed by many in the United States and Europe. Ultimately, though, it is not their call. The democratically elected government of Ukraine should get to decide what price it is willing to pay for an end to the slaughter of its citizens and the preservation of Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign state. The United States and its allies should support Zelensky in any diplomatic course he pursues. Indeed, he cannot end the war without them. Economic sanctions on Russia strengthen his hand at the negotiating table by raising the costs to Russia of continuing to fight. By the same token, however, it is virtually inconceivable that Russia would agree to a settlement without sanctions relief. For this reason, the United States and its allies must be prepared to lift sanctions—including on Russia’s central bank—if Russia and Ukraine negotiate and implement a settlement agreement.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Link

There is still room for NATO involvement---fears of escalation are unfounded---the US and NATO must adopt a policy of going just-behind crossing the redline

Altman 7/12 (Dan Altman; "The West Worries Too Much About Escalation in Ukraine: NATO Can Do More Without Provoking Moscow", 7-12-2022, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-07-12/west-worries-too-much-about-escalation-ukraine, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

As the world looks on while Ukrainians fight for their lives and their freedom, many feel a burning desire to do more to support them. The problem is not a lack of forces or resources—it is fear of provoking a wider, perhaps nuclear, war with Russia. That fear is why U.S. President Joe Biden and other NATO leaders have consistently made clear that they will not intervene directly in the conflict, instead limiting their help to weapons, money, intelligence, and sanctions. As devastating as events in Ukraine are today, a nuclear war with Russia could kill more people than Ukraine’s entire population of roughly 44 million.

NATO leaders understand that they must walk this fine line between aiding Ukraine and risking war with Russia, but they have no theory of how to do it. The German and French governments hem and haw about whether to provide Ukraine with tanks. When Poland proposed a plan to transfer MiG-29 fighter aircraft to Ukraine, the United States refused. U.S. Defense Department spokesperson John Kirby warned that it “raises serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance” and therefore was not “tenable.” Yet the United States was already shipping Javelin antitank missiles and Stinger surface-to-air missiles. Soon after, it began sending other weapons, including M777 howitzers and now HIMARS multiple rocket launchers. What is the difference? Those weapons do more to strengthen Ukraine’s combat power than MiG-29s, so the theory cannot be that Russia reacts more strongly to policies that do more harm to its interests. Why, then, missiles and artillery but not planes? The answer is that there is no answer. It is simply arbitrary.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Internal Link Turn

China-Taiwan war goes nuclear. Deterrence is key. It’s fast and more probable than European war.

Pettyjohn and Wasser 5-20-2022, *senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security, **fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (Stacie and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs,

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Internal Link Turn

An “epic military win” is key---Russia’s on the brink of losing---BUT, giving up on military operations signals weakness to China over Taiwan, causing miscalc---current Western support is slow, but the AFF speeds it up

Corera 7/21 (Gordon Corera; "Russia about to run out of steam in Ukraine", 7/21/2022, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62259179, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Russia will struggle to maintain its military campaign and Ukraine may be able to hit back, the head Britain's foreign intelligence service says.

MI6 chief Richard Moore said Russia had seen "epic fails" in its initial goals; removing Ukraine's president, capturing Kyiv and sowing disunity in the West.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Internal Link Turn

Realism cannot solve the war now---negotiations will be rendered ineffective

Sood 7/11 (Rakesh Sood; "Ending the Ukraine war in an imperfect world", 7-11-2022, ORF, https://www.orfonline.org/research/ending-the-ukraine-war-in-an-imperfect-world/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

The war in Ukraine has been underway for over four months. What began as a European conflict has had global repercussions. Of course, Ukraine and its people have borne the maximum brunt. More than five million Ukrainians have left the country and over eight million are internally displaced. Rising casualties and large-scale destruction have set back the country by decades. Recent estimates for rebuilding the destroyed cities and infrastructure are as high as $750 billion.

During 2020-21, most economies that could afford to, provided generous financial support to its citizens in the form of direct payments and subsidised food to tide over the economic hardships caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Supply chains suffered disruptions, aggravated by politics. Economic recovery has generated demand, creating inflationary pressures. Today, inflation rates are rising across the world and in the largest economies have reached levels not seen since the early 1980s. As these countries tighten money supply, fears of recession loom large. The war in Ukraine has aggravated the situation for the poorer countries by creating food and fertilizer shortages. The sharp surge in energy prices threatens the prospects of economic recovery. Prospects of collective global action to deal with these challenges appear remote, given growing tensions among major powers.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Internal Link Turn

“Do not humiliate Russia” is a dumb idea and only bolsters Russia’s stance---we are past the point of return

Bento 7/15 (Xavier Bento, Programme Assistant at Friends of Europe; "Don’t humiliate Russia! Or how to repeat past mistakes at the cost of European security", 7-15-2022, Friends of Europe, https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/dont-humiliate-russia-or-how-to-repeat-past-mistakes-at-the-cost-of-european-security/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

Last month, French President Emmanuel Macron suggested that Europe “must not humiliate Russia so that the day the fighting stops, we can build a way out through diplomatic channels,” contesting that diplomacy must consistently be considered to address violent conflicts. Problematically, Macron simultaneously implied that negotiations could only take place if Russia can escape any form of shame or humiliation.

This gave rise to mixed reactions from other Western leaders. The United States Ambassador to the European Union, Mark Gitenstein, declared that Russian President Vladimir Putin had “humiliated himself” by his conduct in the war and that the West wanted to see him defeated on the battlefields of Ukraine. Similarly, former US ambassador to Moscow, Michael McFaul, claimed: “Putin will only negotiate when his army can’t keep marching forward, humiliated or not. Macron should focus on creating that condition.” The strongest European reactions came from the head of the Estonian parliament’s Foreign Affairs Commission, Marko Mihkelson, who stated that Macron was “still looking for ways to save war criminal Putin from humiliation,” and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis claimed Macron’s comments risked jeopardising the unity and security of the EU. Most notably, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba said that allies should “better focus on how to put Russia in its place” and that “calls to avoid humiliation of Russia can only humiliate France and every other country that would call for it.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Internal Link Turn

Continued assistance to Ukraine is key---otherwise, Russia is emboldened to engage again, and the US will lose its diplomatic credibility

Ferguson 7/14 (Michael P. Ferguson, Master of Science in Homeland Security at San Diego State University; "Is imperialism negotiable?", 7-14-2022, Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3559028-is-imperialism-negotiable/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

Despite modest gains in east Ukraine, June was not a good month for Russia. Within a single week, European Union leaders offered Kyiv candidacy for membership, NATO reached an agreement to bring Sweden and Finland into the alliance and Great Britain’s defense secretary, Ben Wallace, called for a 20 percent hike to his budget.

These historic developments are sure to rile Kremlin officials, but the future of Western support to Ukraine’s fight remains uncertain. As public interest in the war continues to dwindle, appeasing Russia’s extortionate demands could become more desirable. Such concessions would do more than disfigure Ukraine and impose devastating new realities on Western security institutions — they would declare to the world that imperialism is negotiable.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Grain UQ

Huge barriers to grain deal---demining ports, persuading shippers, Russia already stole the grain, and substantial political divisions

Malsin et. Al 7/21 (Jared Malsin, William Mauldin and Alistair Macdonald; "Russia, Ukraine Face Thorny Issues to Complete, Implement Grain Deal", 7-21-2022, WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-ukraine-face-thorny-issues-to-complete-implement-grain-deal-11658408580, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

ISTANBUL—Negotiators, having reached the outlines of a deal for Ukraine to export grain from seaports amid the war with Russia, face challenges to getting it done, from the demining of ports to persuading shippers they can operate safely in a conflict zone.

Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and United Nations officials are expected to resume negotiations this week on a framework that would establish a grain export corridor in the Black Sea and potentially help alleviate a hunger crisis in some developing countries.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

G20 summit failed and heightened tensions

RFE 22 ("G20 Diplomats Find No Common Ground As Western Countries Press Russia Over War In Ukraine", 7-9-2022, Radio Free Europe, https://www.rferl.org/a/g20-diplomats-gather-ukraine-war-global-inflation/31934288.html, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Diplomats from the world’s major industrialized nations failed on July 8 to find common ground over Russia’s war in Ukraine and how to deal with its impact on grain shipments and energy markets.

Russia’s foreign minister walked out of two sessions held by diplomats from the Group of 20 (G20) amid criticism of the war on Ukraine and amid calls for Russia to allow Kyiv to ship grain out to the world.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

Putin can’t be trusted by his words

RFE 22 ("Putin Claims Russia Will ‘Guarantee’ Peaceful Export Of Ukrainian Grain", 6-3-2022, Radio Free Europe, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-war-grain/31882556.html, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Russian President Vladimir Putin denied accusations his armed forces are blocking Ukrainian grain exports from the Black Sea and said his government would “guarantee" peaceful passage to ships leaving Ukraine's ports.

In an interview with Russian state television on June 3, Putin tried to put the blame on Ukraine for the trapped grain, saying Kyiv has mined the Black Sea and sunk vessels, preventing grain ships from leaving.